ML16154A325

Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty in Amount of $100,000 Re Violations Noted During Insp on 920926-1103

ML16154A325
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	05/14/1993
From:	Sniezek J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	DUKE POWER CO.
Shared Package
ML16154A324	List: ML16154A322 ML16154A325
References
EA-92-211, NUDOCS 9305180097
Download: ML16154A325 (13)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of

)

DUKE POWER COMPANY

)

Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, Oconee Nuclear Station

)

and 50-287

)

License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55

)

EA 92-211 ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY I

Duke Power Company (Licensee) is the holder of License Nos. DPR 38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) on February 6, 1973, October 6, 1973, and July 19, 1974, respectively. The licenses authorize the Licensee to operate the Oconee Nuclear Station in accordance with the conditions specified therein.

II An inspection of the Licensee's activities was conducted on September 26 -

November 3, 1992.

The results of this inspection indicated that the Licensee had not conducted its activities in full compliance with NRC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) was served upon the Licensee by letter dated December 28, 1992.

The Notice stated the nature of the violation, the provision of the NRC's requirements that the Licensee had violated, and the amount of the civil penalty proposed for the violation. The Licensee responded to the Notice by letter dated February 25, 1993.

In its response, the Licensee requested that the civil penalty be 9305180097 930514 PDR ADOCK 05000269 G

PDR

-2 mitigated because the violation was not safety significant and by itself does not warrant significant regulatory concern and that the particular example cited does not adequately consider all of the related information that accompanied the discovery and identification of the degraded Low Pressure Service Water System flow condition.

III After consideration of the Licensee's response and the statements of fact, explanation, and argument for mitigation contained therein, the NRC staff has determined, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order, that the violation occurred as stated and that the penalty proposed for the violation designated in the Notice should be imposed.

IV In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

The Licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of $100,000 within 30 days of the date of this Order, by check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer, payable to the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to the Director,

-3 Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555.

V The Licensee may request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order. A request for a hearing should be clearly marked as a "Request for an Enforcement Hearing" and shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.

20555. Copies also shall be sent to the Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement at the same address and to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region II, 101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900, Atlanta, Georgia 30323.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of the hearing. If the Licensee fails to request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order, the provisions of this Order shall be effective without further proceedings.

If payment has not been made by that time, the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.

In the event the Licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the issues to be considered at such hearing shall be:

-4 (a) whether the Licensee was in violation of the Commission's requirements as set forth in the Notice referenced in Section II above, and (b) whether, on the basis of such violation, this Order should be sustained.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION mes H. Sniezek D puty Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research Dated at Rockville, Maryland this /Aqbday of May 1993

APPENDIX EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION On December 28, 1992, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) was issued for a violation identified during an NRC inspection.

Duke Power Company (licensee) responded to the Notice on February 25, 1993.

The licensee requests that the civil penalty assessed for the violation be mitigated because the violation was not safety significant and by itself did not warrant significant regulatory concern. The NRC staff's evaluation and conclusion regarding the licensee's requests are as follows:

Restatement of the Violation 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and the licensee's Quality Assurance Program (Duke 1-A, Section 17.3.2.13), require that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected.

Contrary to the above, a condition adverse to quality was indicated during the performance of procedure PT/3/0150/22A, "Operational Valve Stroke Test", and the licensee failed to identify and correct the condition. Specifically, although the plant operators identified on June 9, 1992, that one low pressure service water (LPSW) system pump failed to provide the required flowrate (i.e., 5200 gpm) through the 3B low pressure injection (LPI) cooler for single LPI cooler operation, they did not recognize this as a condition adverse to quality. During subsequent testing on September 14, 1992, while the unit was shutdown for a refueling outage, the licensee determined that the reduced LPSW flow was due to valve 3LPSW-78 (the LPSW cooler outlet manual isolation valve) remaining in a throttled position due to an actuator problem.

Summary of Licensee's Response While not denying that a condition adverse to quality existed, the licensee, in both the body of the letter and the corrective actions listed, in effect, disputes that the violation occurred as written. The licensee also contends that the NRC staff, in assessing the violation, did not adequately consider all pertinent information concerning discovery and identification of the problem.

The licensee also stated that mitigation factors used in assessing the civil penalty were not fully considered.

1.

Although the licensee's response does not deny the violation as cited, the licensee disputes that the operators were at fault in not recognizing that a problem existed in the LPSW system. The licensee contends that an undocumented evaluation had been performed by engineering and operating

-2 staff personnel when the anomalous flow indication first occurred. Operating crews who witnessed the questionable indications during subsequent tests were told that the issue had been evaluated and a problem did not exist. The licensee does admit that the evaluation was in error, but does not think that the operators were to blame. Rather, the licensee argues that the initial evaluation adequately addressed the practice of starting two LPSW pumps to perform the valve stroke test. The licensee contends that the actions taken were reasonable because the indications available at the time were not sufficient to reasonably expect the degraded condition to have been identified. The licensee further contends that only after actual flow testing was performed in September 1992, was information disputing the evaluation available.

2.

Since the test was not specifically designed to evaluate system performance, the observed flow indication did not immediately alert the operating crews to the possibility that a problem existed. Operators should not, therefore, be blamed for not immediately pursuing the issue.

3.

The licensee does not believe that the problem presented by the failed valve was safety significant because the valve disc would have always failed such that the disc would present the smallest cross section to the system flow. The observed flow reduction was a result of some amount of flutter in the disc's position. As a result, the LPSW system was continuously capable of supplying sufficient flow in the affected loop.

4.

The licensee recognizes that previous findings regarding a lack of flow testing had been identified in a Self-Initiated Technical Audit (SITA) performed on the LPSW system in 1987.

The flow testing which uncovered the problem with the valve was being performed to validate the engineering flow calculations and to resolve concerns expressed by the inspector following his review of those calculations. The licensee does not, however, concede that the problem definitely would have been discovered earlier even if the flow testing had been performed. This is primarily due to the nature of the interconnected system, which does not allow testing in all alignments.

5.

In addressing the escalation factors, the licensee has taken issue with the contention that the violation was primarily identified by the NRC resident staff. The licensee states that when the resident inspector questioned the need to start a second pump during the June 1992 test, the inspector was given the same explanation the operators had been given, and he did not express additional concerns at that time.

The licensee contends that its conclusion is supported by

0 S

Appendix

-3 NRC Inspection Report 92-13, which covers the time period in which the NRC inspector first raised the concern. The licensee points out that while the report addresses the valve stroke testing it does not contain any concerns relating to that testing. The licensee further states that after the inspectors found mistakes in the flow calculations which were performed to resolve some of the questions about the LPSW system, the concerns were promptly addressed.

Plant management then agreed that system testing would be beneficial and performed tests on Unit 3 prior to its scheduled startup. During that test the failed valve was found.

6.

In assessing the application of prior enforcement history, the licensee states that the root cause of the violation was the lack of system performance testing which could have more promptly identified the problem with the system. Since the previous enforcement action had identified different root causes, the previous enforcement actions should not be linked to the present enforcement action.

NRC Staff Evaluation

1.

The violation as written describes a condition observed by the operators which should have been further investigated by the plant staff. The licensee's position appears to be that it is acceptable for the operators and plant management to be reassured by, and in fact to rely only on, a seemingly plausible explanation without a formal analysis or testing supporting such a position. Instead of requiring a formal response the first time the problem was observed, in July of 1991, operators accepted the system engineer's explanation which was provided informally on the spot without any documentation. The next two times the test was run and the same problem was indicated, operators were assured that the problem had already been evaluated.

The operators and plant management knew that the LPSW system is cross-connected at the discharge of the two pumps. Given that fact, the explanation that non-essential loads would have an effect on the "B" train and not the "A" train does not appear to be persuasive, and should have been challenged. In addition, the LPSW system alignment for the valve stroke test (service to a single cooler and non essential loads) was actually less demanding than the alignment for a full system performance test (service to two coolers, multiple reactor building cooling units, and non essential loads).

Therefore, if the 5200 gpm could not be achieved under the alignment used for the valve stroke test, a question should have been raised about the system's

Appendix

-4 ability to meet the more demanding requirements that full system performance required. Finally, in the past there had been instances of cooler outlet flow control valves failing in the full open position which resulted in flow rates through the coolers high enough to peg the flow indicators (greater than 8000 gpm).

Operators were therefore well aware of the LPSW pump excess capability and the potential for high flow rates through the coolers should an outlet flow control valve malfunction. However, when subsequently confronted with a low flow condition through one of the coolers, they accepted an explanation that was in apparent conflict with their past experience. In summary, the NRC staff concludes that operations personnel had ample reasons to challenge and question the explanations given. In addition, the NRC staff concludes that licensee management given the above, had reason to question the engineering staff's conclusions, and failed to require a thorough evaluation of conditions, such as the one encountered in this situation.

2.

The licensee's position that the tests were not designed to evaluate system performance does not relieve the licensee of the responsibility to investigate and resolve any observed problems.

It is essential that anomalies or discrepancies be aggressively pursued regardless of the context in which they occur. This is the essence of the inquisitive, questioning attitude expected of all licensee personnel.

Additionally, the fact remains that the flow anomaly was pursued by an NRC inspector rather than a member of the plant staff and that anomaly did, in fact, indicate a condition adverse to quality. That the anomaly would have been more aggressively pursued, if it had occurred during a test which stipulated that 5200 gpm was required with only one LPSW pump operating, goes without saying.

In that circumstance, the acceptance criteria would have required meeting the flow rate or declaring the system inoperable.

If the acceptance criteria of the observed test had, in fact, required that 5200 gpm could be achieved with one pump, the violation would have been cited in that context.

What is at issue in this case is that a problem was indicated during a flow test. While not of a level to require action to be taken, (i.e., not meeting an acceptance criteria for operability), there was, as discussed above, certainly enough reason for the issue to have been pursued.

Neither NRC staff nor the licensee should accept a position that only when acceptance criteria are not met should problems be thoroughly investigated.

3.

The NRC staff does not agree with the licensee's contention that the valve failure was not safety significant. While

Appendix

-5 the potential safety consequences of the valve's failure in the as found condition were fortuitously minimal, other issues need to be considered when assessing safety significance. First, there is the significance of the failure of licensee personnel to identify this problem which has been discussed above. In addition, the potential for the valve to have failed in a more limiting condition needs to be considered and is discussed below. During the system's performance testing which finally identified that the valve had failed, the flow rate through the valve decreased each time the valve was operated in the shut direction, and flow did not return to the same value when the valve operator was returned to the full open position.

The fact that flow did not return to the previous value when the valve was partially cycled was the method used to determine that the valve was not operating properly. This also indicates that the valve disc's position was not exclusively a function of system flow. Rather, it indicates that the valve disc could have changed to less conservative positions when operated. While an evaluation performed after the fact may indicate that the observed flow was adequate, there is no assurance that the flow through the failed valve would not have changed significantly in the non-conservative direction under accident conditions or by operator action if the problem had not been identified and corrected.

4.

A lack of adequate flow testing was indeed a finding of the 1987 SITA on the LPSW system. However, contrary to the implication in paragraph 2.C of the licensee's response, the NRC staff did not state or imply, in either the Notice or the accompanying letter, that had the SITA findings been followed up it was certain that the degraded condition of 3LPSW-78 would have been discovered. Rather, the NRC stated in its letter that "it is likely that the plant staff would have been in a much better position to have identified the flow degradation caused by 3LPSW-78" if adequate actions had been taken to address the SITA findings.

The calculations presented to the inspectors in September 1992 represented the licensee's assurance that the LPSW system was operable and were provided in response to the initial concern expressed by the inspector witnessing the test in June 1992.

Prior to September, the inspectors had repeatedly requested either that flow testing be performed or a formal, documented evaluation be performed to resolve the concerns with LPSW flow indications during valve stroke testing in general and specifically the June 1992 test.

When the calculations were presented to the inspectors, the licensee contended that the calculations proved that the

Appendix 6

system was able to meet its design objectives and obviated the need for actual flow testing. The inspectors reviewed the calculations and found numerous errors in the calculations and the assumptions used. When the inspectors pointed out the errors, the licensee still did not agree that testing was required. Rather, licensee management informed the inspectors that the Unit 3 startup would continue without such testing being performed. The inspectors then informed the site management that the issue was of such a level of concern that it would necessitate contacting senior NRC Region II management for help in resolving the issue. The licensee only then agreed to perform actual system flow testing.

The licensee's point that, because of possible restrictions on testing, the problem may not have been identified even if the licensee had agreed to the testing earlier, is not well supported. The plant conditions that existed at the time the licensee is referring to did not present great difficulty in testing and would not have precluded detection of the problem. The Unit 3 LPSW system is independent of the shared Unit 1 and Unit 2 LPSW system. A system flow test could have been performed on the Unit 3 LPSW system during any refueling outage without any impact on the safety of the unit and without any effect on Units 1 and 2. When the licensee finally decided to perform the testing, the requisite procedures were written without significant problems, the system aligned in a fairly expeditious manner, and there was not an extreme degree of difficulty in performing.this test. Testing of the Unit 3 LPSW system at power was also feasible. In fact, a flow test was performed by the licensee at power to benchmark the system flow model calculations performed by design engineering.

5.

The NRC staff does not agree with the licensee's position that it was equally responsible for identifying the problem.

As discussed above, the licensee did not concede that a problem existed, or that flow testing was necessary until NRC staff forced the issue. The licensee should have been more responsive to the issue. The response to the SITA findings regarding a lack of flow testing, the response to the problems initially identified by the operators, and the initial response to the NRC staff concerns all support the conclusion that, absent NRC staff involvement, the problem would likely not have been identified. The testing which identified the failed valve was, in effect, performed reluctantly, and does not warrant consideration as licensee identification of the problem. While the licensee is correct that NRC Inspection Report 92-13 does not document the inspectors' concerns about the LPSW system, licensee

Appendix

-7 management was well aware of the concerns. As early as June 10, 1992 (the day after the concern was identified) the inspectors met with the plant staff to attempt to resolve the issue. The concern was periodically discussed in subsequent meetings with the licensee in which plant personnel maintained that they could demonstrate the acceptability of the flow indications. Finally, after giving the licensee ample opportunity to make its case and only after the licensee was unable to demonstrate through the use of calculations that the condition was not a problem, did the inspectors document the issue in an inspection report.

6.

The NRC staff disagrees with the licensee's contention that the root cause of the violation was a lack of system performance testing. The violation is based on the fact that a condition adverse to quality was not actively and aggressively pursued. Therefore, the primary root cause of the violation was the inadequate response of the plant operations and engineering staffs to a potential problem.

In addition, a lack of flow testing and other deficiencies in the LPSW system had been identified as early as 1987 in the licensee's SITA evaluation. The failure of licensee management to follow up on those findings, as well as management's acceptance of the informal and undocumented method of analysis used to resolve the identified LPSW flow reduction, make inadequate management oversight of the resolution of LPSW deficiencies a very significant contributing root cause.

The licensee's argument that escalation of the civil penalty should not be applied for licensee performance because the violation at issue is not similar to previous violations and the root cause of this violation differs from that of previous enforcement actions reflects a misunderstanding of the application of that factor. Assessment of the licensee performance factor is based on a broad view of performance, including all enforcement actions over a two-year period, and is not limited to similar violations or violations with similar root causes.

NRC Staff Conclusion NRC staff concludes that the violation occurred as written. The NRC staff also concludes that the licensee has not provided an adequate basis for its request for mitigation of the proposed civil penalty and that the civil penalty adjustment factors were appropriately applied. Consequently, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed civil penalty in the amount of $100,000 should be imposed.

Duke Power Company DISTRIBUTION:

PDR SECY CA JSniezek, DEDR SEbneter, RII TMurley, NRR JPartlow, NRR LChandler, OGC JLieberman, OE JGoldberg, OGC Enforcement Coordinators RI, RII, RIII, RIV, RV FIngram, OPA DWilliams, OIG BHayes, 01 EJordan, AEOD JLuehman, OE Day File EA File DCS NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route 2, Box 610 Seneca, SC 29678 OE OG O

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Duke Power Company DISTRIBUTION:

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