ML16148A780

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Insp Repts 50-269/93-12,50-270/93-12 & 50-287/93-12 on 930412-16.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Configuration Control & Engineering Support Activities
ML16148A780
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/06/1993
From: Branch M, Whitener H
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML16148A779 List:
References
50-269-93-12, 50-270-93-12, 50-287-93-12, NUDOCS 9305180261
Download: ML16148A780 (12)


See also: IR 05000269/1993012

Text

t REGO4

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos.: 50-269/93-12, 50-270/93-12 and 50-287/93-12

Licensee: Duke Power Company

P.O. Box 1007

Charlotte, N.C.

28201-1007

Docket Nos.:

50-269, 50-270

License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47

and 50-287

and DPR-55

Facility Name:

Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3

Inspection Conducted: April 12-16, 1993

Inspector:

__ _ _ _ __

_ _

H. L. Whitener

)Date

igned

Reactor Inspector

Accompanying Inspectors: M. D. Hunt

M. N. Miller

Approved by:

M. W. Branch, Chief

Date

igned

Test Program Section

Engineering Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was conducted onsite in the areas of

configuration control and engineering support activities.

9305180261 930510

PDR ADOCK 05000269

0

PDR

2

Results:

In the areas examined the inspectors determined that the licensee has a strong

technical support staff of knowledgeable and experienced engineers.

The licensee implements an effective minor modifications program that allows

corrective action to be taken in a timely manner.

In the area of configuration control one violation was identified.

Violation:

Failure to Properly Maintain Drawing Changes in the Control Room,

(paragraph 4).

Strength:

The System and Component Engineering groups are well staffed with a large

group of knowledgeable experienced engineers.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

H. Barron, Manager, Oconee Station

T. Coutu, Manager, Support Operations

  • D. Coyle, Manager, System Engineering
  • W. Foster, Superintendent, Mechanical Maintenance

D. Garland, System Engineer

D. Hendricks, Administrative Specialist

  • D. Hubbard, Manager, Component Engineering

D. Kelly, Instructor, Training

J. Lee, Production Specialist, Operations

B. Loftis, Supervisor, Comp 'onent Engineering

K. Louvin, System Engineer

W. McAlister, Supervisor, Component Engineering

  • M. Patrick, Manager, Regulatory Compliance

J. Peebles, Supervisor, Document Management

  1. B. Peele, Manager, Site Engineering
  • S. Perry, Specialist, Regulatory Compliance,
  • G. Rothenberger, Superintendent, Operations

T. Royal, Supervisor, Component Engineering

L. Staggeus, Assistant, Document Control

C. Tompkins, Supervisor, Component Engineering

H.

Weir, Component Engineering Supervisor

  • L. Wilkie, Manager, Training

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, engineers,

operators, and administrative personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

B. Desai, Resident Inspector

K. Poertner, Resident Inspector

  • Attended exit interview on April 15, 1993.
  1. Attended exit interview on April 16, 1993.

Acronyms and Initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the

last paragraph.

2.

Technical Support

The inspectors reviewed the activities of the three station groups

providing engineering technical support to plant maintenance and

operations. The three groups include OSES in the Operations Department;

and SES and CES in the site Engineering organization. The review

focused on engineering involvement in the identification and resolution

of problems.

2

A.

Operations Support Engineering

A review of OSES was conducted to determine the duties assigned to

these personnel.

These OSES personnel are SRO licensed and

perform duties as shift supervisors from time to time as required

by.requalification training requirements. Additionally, they

serve as the interface between operations and the other

engineering groups during the resolution of day-to-day problems at

the Plant. They also perform testing of components, develop

various programs, review valve line ups for tests, and verify

system interfaces related to tests. OSE also insures that shift

personnel are adequately informed of station modifications, design

changes, significant operating events at other utilities, and any

other information to enhance nuclear safety.

The inspectors interviewed one operations engineer and his

supervisor regarding the duties performed and the qualifications

required for the tasks assigned. Both were knowledgeable and

appeared adequately trained for their work assignments.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

B.

System Engineering

The SES is a part of the Site Engineering Organization. This

section is staffed with 22 experienced engineers from the former

Projects or Performance Groups. Their responsibilities include

approximately 70 systems. At Oconee many of the traditional

activities of a SE in support of plant operations and maintenance,

particularly related to generic activities such as pumps, valves,

IST, etc., are assigned to CEs (see paragraph 2.C).

The function

of the SE is to manage activities related to the assigned system

to maximize the performance, availability, and reliability of the

system. This involves maintaining an overview of all activities

related to the system. Also, as the technical expert for a

system, the SE provides technical input to support major

modifications, initiates minor modifications, evaluates test data

for adequate system performance, and participates in problem

resolutions to ensure a system meets required design function.

The PIP program is the method through which most station problems

are reported. The identified problems are screened by the PIP

coordinator. The problems are then reviewed by the Safety Review

Group who validate the significance and decide if an event is

reportable and if an operability determination is required.

Through. this review process, resolution of a problem is assigned

to a specific group and person, frequently the SE. The inspectors

reviewed the problem investigation data base in order to ascertain

SES involvement in identifying and resolving station problems.

From the PIP Summary List it was found that in the year

April 1992, through April 1993, 69 PIPs were originated by SES.

From the Problem Investigation Report Resolutions data base, of 70

3

problem resolutions assigned to SES and CES since February 1992,

16 were assigned to SES, indicating involvment in problem

resolution.

The inspectors also reviewed the SEs annual system report for the

Emergency Feedwater and Ventilation System. These reports provide

details of system problems, system major and minor modifications,

resolved issues, outstanding issues, test performance, special

tests and system availability. Recommendations of needed system

improvements are included in the reports. These reports also

address the team concept used by the licensee. Although the SE.is

responsible for system performance, problem resolution is often a.

result of multiple group input coordinated by the SE to bring the

best available expertise to focus on a problem. The inspectors

tracked portions of the engineering response to the failure of the

control room ventilation system to achieve a positive pressure in

the control room relative to the atmosphere. The subsequent

investigation resulted in identification of degraded equipment and

plant modifications or maintenance to effect repair; additional

control room sealing; inspection of ductwork and dampers resulting

in near team and long term plant modification; and identification

of a sensitivity of the control room pressure to the ABVS

configuration. A special test procedure was developed and

extensive testing performed to define the acceptable

configurations of the ABVS. This data was analyzed and provided

to operations.

The inspector concluded that the SES is adequately staffed with

knowledgeable engineers who assume ownership of their systems,

actively participate in identifying and resolving system technical

issues, and respond to engineering technical issues in support of

systems operation.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

C.

Component Engineering

The CES is part of the site engineering organization. Previously,

CES was the Maintenance Engineering group and was in the

maintenance department. The group's main function of providing

support to the maintenance department has not changed.

CES has the programmatic lead in the technical support program for

generic components and programs. For example, valves are generic

components and there are several valve programs such as the

"check valve program" and the "motor operated valve program". In

addition to components, CES also has responsibility for

structures, inspection activities, and testing. The CES

Instrument and Electrical Section has system responsibility for

most of the I&C systems. The CES is also responsible for

4

initiating minor modifications, temporary modifications, test

procedures, maintenance procedures, and issuing yearly technical

reports (self assessment) for each of their activities.

CES has a total of 65 technical personnel assigned in four

sections.

Each section has an engineering supervisor except the

Instrument and Electrical Section which has two supervisors. The

inspectors examined each section to determine its function and

staffing requirements. In addition, the inspectors verified that

each section was performing its assigned duties. This

verification was performed by reviewing lists and work packages of

minor modifications completed during the last outage and the minor

modifications prepared for the up coming outage. The work

history for each component was stored in a comprehensive computer

data base. This work history data base was also used for

trending. The inspectors reviewed the components and areas of

responsibility for each of the sections to verify that the

Component Engineering program was being satisfactorily implemented

in a timely manner. The areas of responsibility for the four

sections are listed as follows:

Mechanical I (ten personnel) - diesels, heat exchangers,

piping, hangers, snubbers, HVAC, tendons, metallurgical

welding, inservice inspections, hydro, erosion/corrosion

program, welding program, code issues, and lead shielding.

In addition to the general review, the inspectors examined

the following items:

Lead Shielding Maintenance Directive 74.1 dated

December 11, 1991 for the temporary installation and

removal of lead shielding.

Tendon Inspection MP/O/A/1400/022 dated July 1, 1992

and the Unit 1 Tendon Report dated February 1, 1993.

Hydrostatic Test MP/O/A/1720/010 dated November 12,

1992.

Piping Pneumatic Test MP/O/A/1720/015 dated July 15,

1992.

Hydro layout drawings for the up coming Unit 2 outage.

Mechanical Section II (twelve personnel) - coatings, pumps,

compressors, motors, seals, hydrogen recombiners, balancing,

hatches, civil/civil inspections, fire protection, infrared

thermography, lubrication, oil analysis, vibration analysis,

predictive maintenance, and civil integrated leak rate

testing,. In addition to the general review, the inspectors

examined the following items:

5

Predictive maintenance PM-2 program for lubrication,

oil analysis, vibration, infrared, balancing, and the

1992 PM-2 Report dated February 25, 1992.

PM-2 computer program, Mastertrend V2.62, and the

trending results for oil, motor current, vibration,

fault history, infrared, and balancing.

Mechanical/I&E Section (twelve plus two contractor

personnel) - all types of valves, all types of valve

operators, positioners, valve limit switches, Limitorque

operators, regulators, steam traps, cranes, heat trace, AC

low voltage systems and breakers, check valve program, and

the motor operated valve program. In addition to the

general review, the inspectors examined the following items:

Check valve program and computer work history.

Motor operated valve program for GL 89-10.

CFARs (Component Failure Analysis Reports).

Instrument and Electrical Section (28 personnel) - all

instrumentation; 4160 and 6900 V switchgear; 600 V metal

clad switchgear; auxiliary power; most electrical systems;

all I&C systems; calibrations; procedures for electrical and

I&C; all types of instruments such as temperature/pressure,

and level transmitters; and setpoint documents. The

inspectors reviewed several completed minor modifications

and planned minor modifications for the up coming Unit 2

outage.

The inspectors concluded that CES was a well managed group containing

knowledgeable experienced engineers and technicians. CES performs a

needed and valuable service supporting the plant and the maintenance

department with their expertise in components, systems, and dedicated

programs. CES allows generic problems across system boundaries to be

identified and corrected in a timely manner.

3.

Modifications

There are three types of modifications performed, minor, major and

temporary. Major modifications are only performed by Design

Engineering. Technical support performs the minor and temporary

modifications and most of these modifications are performed by CES.

The inspectors reviewed the governing procedures; Site Directive 2.2.1

Control of Minor Modifications, and Site Directive 2.1.4 Control of

Temporary Modifications to determine their requirements and

applicability for supporting plant activities and changes.

Minor modifications are limited in scope, involving minor additions,

deletions or changes to equipment. General guidelines are that minor

modifications do not involve complex design calculations, are of a

6

single discipline, and are limited to a single component or similar

components in the same system. The inspectors verified that the

licensee's program requires a safety evaluation to meet the requirements

in 10 CFR 50.59, a post modification test, and drawing updates.

Temporary modifications are changes to a structure, system or component

that are normally limited to 18 months or less. Temporary modifications

include lifting and reconnecting electrical leads; and installation and

removal of electrical jumpers, blind/blank flanges, spool pieces,

valves, temporary hoses or piping, and temporary electrical power.' The

inspectors verified that a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation, a post

modification test, and a listing of updated drawings were required by

the governing procedures.

The inspectors reviewed a list of 751 minor and temporary modifications

for all three units that were initiated since January 1991, to verify

that technical support was involved in correcting plant problems. This

list had a description of each modification. The inspectors examined

108 completed Unit 1 minor modifications for valve replacements and

portions of 196 up coming Unit 2 valve.replacements to verify the

packages included a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation, required post

modification test, and a list of drawings to be updated. In addition,

the Minor Modifications Activity Report dated April 8, 1993, was

reviewed to follow up on valve replacements for both past and future

outages for all three units.

The inspectors conducted walkdown inspections of the following minor and

temporary modifications to verify the installations were in accordance

with the drawings and the requirements specified in the work packages:

Temporary Modifications

Unit 1

TSM-0055

Disable R1A-31 flow alarm by adding jumper

between TB 4 & 5 of 1RIA-31

Unit 2

TSM-1038

Disconnect RTD 2RD43B input in ICCM Train

B. Connect RTD 2RD43C to provide ICCM

with pressurizer temperature input.

Unit 3

TSM-0934

Open link 7 of row' B in 3MTC3 terminal

labeled on drawing 3LS29. This will

defeat the fuel weir pool interlock and

allow pumps to run.

0III

7

Minor Modifications

Unit 1

OE-4284

Revise spent fuel.pool level instrument to

allow temporary modification ONTM-730 to

be removed. Instrument procedure affected

IP/0/B/220/1G.

Unit 2

OE-4073

Replace post accident RB pressure

transmitters 2PT230 and 2PT231 per EQ

required change out. Procedures affected

IP/0/A/150/1H and 11.

Unit 3.

OE-4500

Replace indicator and square root

extractor for HPI crossover flow.

Procedure affected IP/0/A/202/1D.

Unit 1

OE-4231

Add snubber on 24" main feedwater and

modify S/R 1-03A-1-0-439A-H25 and 1-03A-1

0-439A-SR39 on 6" emergency feedwater

piping.

Unit 2

OE-4209

Add snubber on 24" main feedwater piping

and on 6" emergency feedwater piping.

Modify S/R 2-03A-1401A-DE033 from snubber

to rigid restraint. Delete S/R 2-03A01-0

1401A-SR50.

Unit .1

OE-5207

Replace 1LPSW-687 with item No. DMV-852.

Unit 1

OE-5225

Add vent valve 1CCW-422.

Unit 1

OE-5386

Relocate 1C-850 to vertical run.

Unit 1

OE-5387

Relocate 1C-852 to vertical run.

The inspectors verified that the above modifications were installed in

accordance with the required procedures/drawings. The inspectors

concluded that the licensee has a good program for minor and temporary

modifications. The inspectors also concluded that CES does an

effective job of supporting maintenance by identifying, tracking, and

resolving problems. This was evidenced by the large number of timely

modifications issued to correct plant problems.

4.

Drawing Configuration Control

The inspectors examined the drawing control process to evaluate the

issuance of drawing changes that reflect various plant changes and

modifications. The purpose of this review was to evaluate the

licensee's methods for assuring that the various site organizations were

in possession of the latest issue of controlled drawings reflecting the

as built plant.

8

All change notices and revised drawings are issued from the document

control center. Distribution is designated by predetermined distri

bution lists. The specific distribution lists to be used by document

control is determined by the group responsible for issuing the drawing

revision or change notice.

The inspectors noted that there was no receipt acknowledgement required

by the document control center to verify that the designated group

received the drawing transmittal.

Discussions with various personnel

involved in the issuance and receipt of drawing transmittals, indicated

that an informal method of receipt verification had existed for a long

time. No official drawing receipt verification exists. Various

personnel interviewed informed the inspectors that no problems had

arisen using the informal system of distribution control. A formal

receipt of documents is a more positive method of controlling documents

and insuring that the proper groups receive the documents issued.

Licensee management indicated that the need for a formal receipt program

would be reviewed and appropriate actions taken.

The inspectors reviewed control room drawings to verify that information

existed that reflected the latest and current plant configuration.

Drawings were selected which had been stamped indicating that a change

existed against the drawings These changes were identified by an OE

number. The OE number indicated that information such as drawings or

sketches covering changes against the drawing were on file in the

control room, but had not yet been incorporated into the drawing. The

following drawings with the OE changes as indicated were reviewed:

Drawing #

OE Change #

OFD 100A- 1.1

  • OE-

2307

OFD 100A- 3.1

OE- 4369, & 4370

OFD 122A- 1.1

  • OE-

2240, & *2229

OFD 122A- 1.3

  • OE- 2240, & *2229

OFD 122A- 1.4

  • OE-

2241, & *2257

OFD 101A- 2.3

  • OE-

4344

OFD 1OA- 2.4

OE- 2538

OFD 1O1A- 3.1

OE- 4841

OFD 101A- 3.4

OE- 4796, 4932, & 4906

Those OE change numbers preceded by an asterisk were missing from the

Unit 1 control room files. The same changes were found missing from the

Unit 2 control room files. The licensee advised the inspectors that the

same situation existed for Unit 3. The licensee initiate actions to

review all control room drawings to determine the extent of the

condition identified by the inspectors.

On April 14, 1993, five of nine Unit 1 control room drawings examined by

the inspectors were found to have the drawing/sketches for the changes

identified on these drawings missing from the files.

9

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI requires that measures be

established for control of the distribution and use of drawings and

changes there to. The Duke Power Company Quality Assurance Program

Topical Report requires that such documents are maintained and utilized,

as appropriate, in the performance of quality related activities at each

nuclear station. At Oconee these requirements are implemented, in part,

by Operations Management Procedure 1-15, Revision 3, paragraph 5.1 which

requires that changes to a controlled drawing be maintained on file

until the controlled drawing is updated.

At the exit interviews, the inspectors identified the failure to

maintain changes to controlled drawings on file as Violation 50-269,

270, 287\\93-12-01.

The inspector noted that the drawings were protected in covers to

prevent deterioration during use and handling. These drawing were

readable and well maintained.

5.

Training

The training requirements for Accredited Manager and Technical Staff are

provided in Duke Power Company Standard #: 3001.0, Manager and Technical

Staff Training Program. This standard applies to Production Training

Services, Nuclear Production Department, and any other technical

personnel who support nuclear station technical work.

The program consists of initial training and continuing training topics

which provide the technical staff and management with knowledge and

skills required for their position. The initial or

Engineer/Professional training portion is applicable to new and in some

instances transferred employees. Management determines what portions of

the initial program can be bypassed. Additionally, SRO certification

training may be an acceptable substitute for the initial training.

The Engineer/Professional Program consists of the following topics:

Station Orientation

Basic Engineer/Professional

Nuclear Engineer

Engineer and Professional (ENPF) Systems

DPC Standard #: 3001.0 is designed to meet the guidelines of INPO 82-022, Technical Development for Technical Staff and Managers.

Personnel assigned to supervisory or management positions receive

additional training which is intended to be sufficient to fulfill the

guidelines given in the INPO Guidelines82-022 for managers.

Continuing training for managers and technical staff is determined by

the functional area assignment. A list of the required training topics

as well as training required on an "as needed" basis is maintained for

the assignment areas. The "as needed" training is component or system

oriented and is often given by selected vendors either on .or off site.

10

The inspectors reviewed the training records of four SEs and five CEs

for the period beginning January 1990, to the time of the inspection.

All of the nine records reviewed indicated that the individuals had

received/completed various technical studies along with certain site and

DPC specific training during the period.

The inspectors concluded that the training provided for the engineering

and technical support personnel is adequate. No weaknesses were

identified in this area. No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Exit Interview

The inspection scope and results were summarized on April 15, 1993 and

April 16, 1993, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The

inspectors described the.areas inspected and discussed in detail the

findings. Proprietary information is not contained in this report. The

licensee was advised of the apparent violation identified during the

inspection and listed below. Dissenting comments were not received.from

the licensee.

Violation 50-269,270,287/93-12-01:

"Failure To Properly Maintain

Drawing Changes in the Control Room Files".

.

7. Acronyms and Initialisms

ABVS

Auxiliary Building Ventilation System

AC

Alternating Current

CE/s

Component Engineer/s

CES

Component Engineering Section/Group

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CFAR

Component Failure Analysis Report

DPC

Duke Power Company

ENPF

Engineer and Professional

EQ

Environmental Qualification

GL

Generic Letter

HPI

High Pressure Injection

I&C

Instrument and Electrical

INPO

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

IST

Inservice Test

MP

Maintenance Procedure

OE

Minor Change or Modification

OSE/s

Operations Support Engineer/s

OSES

Operations Support Engineering Section/Group

PDM

Predictive Maintenance

PIP

Problem Investigation Process

PM

Preventive Maintenance

RB

Reactor Building

SE/s

System Engineer/s

SES

System Engineering Section/Group

SRO

Senior Reactor Operator

ISM

Temporary Site Modification

V

Volts