ML16061A125
| ML16061A125 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 02/17/2016 |
| From: | Tom Gurdziel Time Warner Cable |
| To: | Blake Purnell Division of Operating Reactor Licensing |
| Purnell B, NRR-DORL 415-1380 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16061A126 | List: |
| References | |
| EN 51696, LTR-16-0097 | |
| Download: ML16061A125 (2) | |
Text
CHAIRMAN Resource From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Hello Blake, Tom Gurdziel <tgurdziel@twcny.rr.com>
Wednesday, February 17, 2016 10:12 PM Purnell, Blake Mitlyng, Viktoria; CHAIRMAN Resource; Lyon, Jill:(NMP)
[External_Sender] RE: FirstEnergy/Davis Besse Event Number 51696 Operating a commercial nuclear reactor with one channel in trip risks a scram if something else happens (to trip another channel) as it did here. In this particular case, I would expect that the complete calibration of channel 2 would finally require taking it out of Bypass and inserting a high value to prove that it would cause a channel trip. At this point, the plant would scram, and a blown fuse on another channel would not be needed. This is non-conservative and costly to the people who own stock in the FirstEnergy Company.
Making money in the US commercial nuclear generation business today is not easy or, for some, even possible. This performance by the FirstEnergy management team is, in my opinion, reckless. I am disappointed that I see no action already initiated by any member of NRC Region Ill.
You know, it took a lot of work by NRC people like Jack Grobe, Christine Lipa, and Scott Thomas, to name a few in the 2002 -
2004 (approximate) time frame to straighten out a site that couldn't identify a serious problem. To me, it looks like they are right back where they were in 2001.
I may be submitting a 2.206 request to get the NRC to take a little enforcement action on this matter if you don't first.
Thank you, Tom Gurdziel From: Purnell, Blake [1]
Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 2016 8:52 AM To: tgurdziel@twcny.rr.com
Subject:
RE: FirstEnergy/Davis Besse Event Number 51696 Mr. Tom Gurdziel, I am responding to your February 1, 2016, email to the NRC regarding a recent Davis-Besse event notification (Event No. 51696). As noted in your email, FirstEnergy personnel were calibrating nuclear instrumentation for Channel 2 of the reactor protection system (RPS) when RPS Channel 1 was in the trip position. The Davis-Besse technical specifications require nuclear instruments to be calibrated periodically. The technical specifications also permit continued operation with one channel of RPS in the trip position and a second channel in bypass. This is considered acceptable because the RPS can continue to perform its safety function.
In this event, a blown fuse caused another RPS Channel to trip and the RPS automatically tripped the reactor as expected. This event, including the licensees actions, is being evaluated by NRC inspectors. If you have any questions regarding this, please email me at Blake.Purnell@nrc.gov.
Sincerely, Blake Purnell, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 111-2 Division of Operator Reactor 1
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations This email has been sent from a virus-free computer protected by Avast.
www.avast.com 2
CHAIRMAN Resource From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Hello Blake, Tom Gurdziel <tgurdziel@twcny.rr.com>
Wednesday, February 17, 2016 10:12 PM Purnell, Blake Mitlyng, Viktoria; CHAIRMAN Resource; Lyon, Jill:(NMP)
[External_Sender] RE: FirstEnergy/Davis Besse Event Number 51696 Operating a commercial nuclear reactor with one channel in trip risks a scram if something else happens (to trip another channel) as it did here. In this particular case, I would expect that the complete calibration of channel 2 would finally require taking it out of Bypass and inserting a high value to prove that it would cause a channel trip. At this point, the plant would scram, and a blown fuse on another channel would not be needed. This is non-conservative and costly to the people who own stock in the FirstEnergy Company.
Making money in the US commercial nuclear generation business today is not easy or, for some, even possible. This performance by the FirstEnergy management team is, in my opinion, reckless. I am disappointed that I see no action already initiated by any member of NRC Region Ill.
You know, it took a lot of work by NRC people like Jack Grobe, Christine Lipa, and Scott Thomas, to name a few in the 2002 -
2004 (approximate) time frame to straighten out a site that couldn't identify a serious problem. To me, it looks like they are right back where they were in 2001.
I may be submitting a 2.206 request to get the NRC to take a little enforcement action on this matter if you don't first.
Thank you, Tom Gurdziel From: Purnell, Blake [2]
Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 2016 8:52 AM To: tgurdziel@twcny.rr.com
Subject:
RE: FirstEnergy/Davis Besse Event Number 51696 Mr. Tom Gurdziel, I am responding to your February 1, 2016, email to the NRC regarding a recent Davis-Besse event notification (Event No. 51696). As noted in your email, FirstEnergy personnel were calibrating nuclear instrumentation for Channel 2 of the reactor protection system (RPS) when RPS Channel 1 was in the trip position. The Davis-Besse technical specifications require nuclear instruments to be calibrated periodically. The technical specifications also permit continued operation with one channel of RPS in the trip position and a second channel in bypass. This is considered acceptable because the RPS can continue to perform its safety function.
In this event, a blown fuse caused another RPS Channel to trip and the RPS automatically tripped the reactor as expected. This event, including the licensees actions, is being evaluated by NRC inspectors. If you have any questions regarding this, please email me at Blake.Purnell@nrc.gov.
Sincerely, Blake Purnell, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 111-2 Division of Operator Reactor 1
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations This email has been sent from a virus-free computer protected by Avast.
www.avast.com 2