Text

NRR E-mail Capture - Followup Actions Regarding February 2 2016 Meeting with Mr. Richard Kuprewicz
	ML16048A097
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	02/17/2016
From:	Pickett D; Plant Licensing Branch 1
To:	Kuprewicz R; Accufacts
References
	Download: ML16048A097 (31)
	v • d • e

NRR-PMDAPEm Resource From: Pickett, Douglas Sent: Wednesday, February 17, 2016 9:29 AM To: kuprewicz@comcast.net Cc: Tate, Travis; Krohn, Paul; Dentel, Glenn; McCoppin, Michael; Tifft, Doug; McNamara, Nancy; Screnci, Diane; Sheehan, Neil

Subject:

Followup Actions Regarding February 2 2016 Meeting with Mr. Richard Kuprewicz Attachments: Supplemental Information for Entergy Pipeline Evaluation.docx; Indian Point 50.59 Evaluation ML14253A339.pdf Mr. Kuprewicz -

It was a pleasure meeting with you on February 2, 2016, at NRC headquarters in Rockville, MD. We appreciated your insights and experience in evaluating natural gas pipelines. One of the take-aways we had following our meeting was to provide you with an explanation of how the Indian Point plant could safely shut down following the loss of certain systems, structures, and components (SSCs) located on the owner-controlled property that could be damaged by a postulated rupture of the proposed Spectra Energy 42-inch diameter natural gas pipeline.

The Indian Point site has a number of SSCs located outside the plants protected area fence that provide support during normal plant operation or accident conditions. Some of these SSCs (e.g., switchyard and fuel oil storage tanks) are not designed to withstand severe natural phenomenon such as major earthquakes, tornados, or hurricanes. As a result, the licensee is required by NRC regulations to be able to withstand loss of these SSCs and have other means to safely shut down the operating facilities.

I have attached two documents to assist in this explanation. First, I have attached a file called Supplemental Information for Entergy Pipeline Evaluation that provides basic information regarding nuclear plant layout. This file identifies the SSCs that could be impacted by a postulated rupture of the proposed gas pipeline. Also attached is the licensees letter and evaluation of August 21, 2014. Pages 12 through 14 provide a detailed explanation of how safety-related SSCs located within the plants protected area could compensate for the loss of non-safety related SSCs due to pipeline damage and safely shut down the operating units at Indian Point.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Doug Douglas V. Pickett, Senior Project Manager Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 & 3 James A FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Douglas.Pickett@nrc.gov 301-415-1364

Original Message --------

From: RICHARD KUPREWICZ <kuprewicz@comcast.net>

Date: Tue, February 16, 2016 11:39 AM -0500 To: "Krohn, Paul" <Paul.Krohn@nrc.gov>

Subject:

[External_Sender] Followup on Kuprewicz 2/2/16 Meeting At our meeting the NRC was going to followup with me by providing:

1

1. A list of safety critical equipment used to cool down the reactors that were in the hardened structures we talked about used to cool down the reactors,

2. A report that was in the public domain that indicated the general list of the above equipment I believe.

I would like to get this off my agenda with the Congressmen and others.

Thanks Richard B. Kuprewicz President Accufacts Inc.,

8040 161st Ave NE, #435 Redmond, WA 98052 Ph# 425 802-1200 Fax# 805 980-4204 kuprewicz@comcast.net 2

Hearing Identifier: NRR_PMDA Email Number: 2660 Mail Envelope Properties (Douglas.Pickett@nrc.gov20160217092800)

Subject:

Followup Actions Regarding February 2 2016 Meeting with Mr. Richard Kuprewicz Sent Date: 2/17/2016 9:28:58 AM Received Date: 2/17/2016 9:28:00 AM From: Pickett, Douglas Created By: Douglas.Pickett@nrc.gov Recipients:

"Tate, Travis" <Travis.Tate@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "Krohn, Paul" <Paul.Krohn@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "Dentel, Glenn" <Glenn.Dentel@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "McCoppin, Michael" <Michael.McCoppin@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "Tifft, Doug" <Doug.Tifft@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "McNamara, Nancy" <Nancy.McNamara@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "Screnci, Diane" <Diane.Screnci@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "Sheehan, Neil" <Neil.Sheehan@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "kuprewicz@comcast.net" <kuprewicz@comcast.net>

Tracking Status: None Post Office:

Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 2915 2/17/2016 9:28:00 AM Supplemental Information for Entergy Pipeline Evaluation.docx 23419 Indian Point 50.59 Evaluation ML14253A339.pdf 6773317 Options Priority: Standard Return Notification: No Reply Requested: No Sensitivity: Normal Expiration Date:

Recipients Received:

Supplemental Information Regarding Entergy Letter Dated August 21, 2014 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation of Proposed Spectra Energy Pipeline Basic Plant Layout Pressurized light water reactors, such as Indian Point, are required to maintain the ability to safely shut down without damaging reactor fuel or having an uncontrolled release of radiation following a host of design basis accidents that include a postulated guillotine rupture of the largest diameter piping system, seismic events, tornados, hurricanes, internal flooding events, loss of offsite or onsite AC power supplies, and a large number of plant transient events. The plant must be able to respond to these design basis accidents and transients by relying on safety-related equipment along with its supporting power supplies and ventilation systems that must be maintained in operating condition. Safety-related equipment, which is typically redundant, must be designed to withstand seismic events and protected against flooding, tornado generated missiles, and local environmental conditions. Safety-related equipment is located within robust structures that are typically reinforced concrete and are able to withstand seismic and flooding events as well as tornado generated missiles.

Structures housing safety-related equipment such as the containment (e.g., the reactor vessel, steam generators and primary water piping systems), auxiliary building (e.g., emergency core cooling system components), control building (e.g., the control room, electrical switchgear rooms, and cable spreading room) and diesel generator buildings (e.g., the emergency AC power diesel generators) are grouped together within the Protected Area. Access to the Protected Area is strictly limited and requires pre-approval by the stations security force. Indian Point is unique in that it has a second secure fence, known as the security owner control area (SOCA) fence that surrounds the Protected Area fence. The SOCA fence also prohibits unauthorized access and provides a time delay for any intruders intent on entering the facility.

Outside of the SOCA fence are a number of systems, structures and components (SSCs) that are not safety-related but considered important to safety (ITS). The SSCs ITS are not protected against seismic events, tornados, or hurricanes. The Indian Point facility is designed to withstand loss of all SSCs ITS and safely shut down by relying on safety-related equipment located within the Protected Area.

The licensees 50.59 evaluation addresses the loss of the following SSCs ITS on pages 12-14:

Switchyard The switchyard has transformers capable of bringing AC power from offsite to the plant or transmitting AC power from the plant to offsite.

GT2/3 Fuel Tank This non-seismic fuel oil tank contains oil for the safety-related diesel generators that are located within the Protected Area fence. The diesel generators have underground, seismically designed fuel oil storage tanks that are sized to supply oil for approximately 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . After 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , the licensee will either transfer oil from the GT2/3 Fuel Tank onsite or receive diesel generator fuel oil from offsite suppliers.

City Water Tank The City Water Tank serves as a backup water supply for safety-related systems.

Meteorological Tower The Meteorological Tower is used during post-accident conditions to assist in emergency planning efforts.

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The EOF serves as the central command post during post-accident conditions.

FLEX Building In response to the Fukushima earthquake and tsunami of 2011, licensees were required to store portable and flexible equipment such as pumps, generators, hoses, and cabling to assist during unanticipated events.

Unit 2 and 3 Steam Generator Mausoleums These buildings store the decommissioned steam generators from Units 2 and 3, respectively.