ML15363A265

Request for Additional Information

ML15363A265
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	12/30/2015
From:	Shawn Williams Plant Licensing Branch II
To:	Pierce C Southern Nuclear Operating Co
Williams S
References
CAC MF5317, CAC MF5318
Download: ML15363A265 (4)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 December 30, 2015 Mr. C. R. Pierce Regulatory Affairs Director Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc.

P.O. Box 1295, Bin 038 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1AND2 - REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (CAC NOS. MF5317 AND MF5318)

Dear Mr. Pierce:

By letter dated November 24, 2014, the Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC, the licensee) submitted a request to revise the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications to adopt various previously approved Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Travelers and two changes not associated with Travelers.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has determined that additional information is needed related to TSTF-312-A discussed in the Enclosure. We request that SNC respond within 30 days of the date of this letter. Please note that the NRC staff's review is continuing and further requests for information may be developed.

Sincerely, Shawn Williams, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch, 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-348, 50-364

Enclosure:

Request for Additional Information cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

DOCKET NOS. 50-348 AND 50-364 By letter dated November 24, 2014 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML14335A623), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC, the licensee), submitted a license amendment request (LAR) which proposed changes to its Technical Specifications (TS) for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP), Units 1 and 2.

The NRG staff has determined that additional information is necessary regarding TSTF-312-A.

RAI No. 1, TSTF-312-A:

In an e-mail from SNC to the NRG dated December 15, 2015, SNC stated the following:

The FHA [fuel handling event] calculation (SM-96-1064-001) that is described in the Farley response to RAI #5 for TSTF-312-A (ML15271A223, dated 09/28/2015) identified that the NRG had previously documented their review and confirmation of the Farley FHA dose calculation in their SER [safety evaluation report] for License Amendment 165/157. The scope of the NRG review involved confirmation of calculated offsite and control room doses for an FHA event with containment hatches open.

The release path for an in-containment FHA event with the equipment hatch open is modeled in the FHA dose calculation as passing directly to the environment after exiting containment. For FHA events with release through a containment penetration, the release path passes through the auxiliary building, where it is filtered by the penetration area filtration system (PRF) prior to release to the environment.

As part of the review for License Amendment 165/157 SNC submitted excerpts from Farley FHA calculation SM-96-1064-001. As provided in Enclosure 2 to a letter from L. M. Stinson to the U.S. Document Control Desk dated June 10, 2004 (ML041670409),

which responded to NRG RAls [request for additional information], a summary table of calculated offsite and control room doses was provided for the following FHA scenarios:

• FHA in containment with the equipment hatch open

• FHA in the auxiliary building with PRF available and 0.5% bypass flow

• FHA in the auxiliary building with the spent fuel pool area roof hatches open and without PRF filtration (and most recently discharged fuel in the spent fuel pool has decayed at least 676 hours0.00782 days <br />0.188 hours <br />0.00112 weeks <br />2.57218e-4 months <br /> since discharge from the reactor)

The calculated offsite and control room doses for FHA events in the auxiliary building are bounded in both cases by the calculated dose consequences for the FHA event in containment, and are within the dose criteria specified in 10 CFR 100.11 and GDC 19 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A.

Enclosure

The NRC staff is unable to verify that the control room doses for the FHA events in the auxiliary building are bounded in both cases by the calculated dose consequences for the FHA in containment. The proposed TS would not require the PRF to be operable during a potential FHA in containment and the analysis performed without the PRF filtration operable assumes 676 hours0.00782 days <br />0.188 hours <br />0.00112 weeks <br />2.57218e-4 months <br /> rather than the 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> as assumed in the current licensing basis.

Please provide either:

1) a detailed justification why these three scenarios are applicable and bounding for the proposed implementation of TSTF-312-A (allowing open containment penetrations when a FHA in containment could occur), or

2) modify the proposed TSs to align the TS with the analyses cited above, or

3) provide a dose analysis of the FHA in containment analyzing the bounding containment configuration (openings to the environment or auxiliary building).

ML15363A265 *via e-mail OFFICE LPL2-1/PM LPL2-1/LA DRA/ARCB LPL2-1/BC LPL2-1/PM MMarkley NAME SWilliams SFigueroa UShoop* SWilliams (RPascarelli for)

DATE 12/30/15 12/29/15 12/18/15 12/30/15 12/30/15