ML15261A112

Discusses 950914 Mgt Meeting W/Util Re Work Control Related Program Associated W/Implementing Keowee Overhead Emergency Power Path Mod

ML15261A112
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	09/25/1995
From:	Merschoff E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Hampton J DUKE POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 9510100324
Download: ML15261A112 (29)

Text

September 25, 1995 Power Company ATTN:

Mr. J. W. Hampton Vice President Oconee Site P. 0. Box 1439 Seneca, SC 29679

SUBJECT:

MEETING

SUMMARY

- OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION Gentlemen:

This refers to the management meeting conducted in the NRC Region II office on September 14, 1995, to discuss the work control related problems associated with implementing the Keowee overhead emergency power path modifications which led to the granting of Enforcement Discretion on August 31, 1995. A list of attendees and a copy of your presentation handout are enclosed.

Your presentation was beneficial, in that it provided the NRC staff with a good overview of those corrective actions which will be taken before implementing similar modifications on the Keowee underground emergency power path, as well as those long-term enhancements currently under review. As mutually agreed upon during the meeting, you will keep the Resident Inspector staff abreast of your plans to implement the underground emergency power path modifications.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely, Original signed'by:

Ellis W. Merschoff, Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees

2.

Licensee Presentation Handout cc w/encls:

(See page 2) 9510100324 950925 PDR ADOCK 05000269 PDR OFFICIAL COPY

DPC 2

cc w/encls:

Mr. J. E. Burchfield Compliance Duke Power Company P. 0. Box 1439 Seneca, SC 29679 Mr. A. V. Carr, Esq.

Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242-0001 Mr. Robert P. Gruber Executive Director Public Staff - NCUC P. 0. Box 29520 Raleigh, NC 27626-0520 Mr. Robert B. Borsum Babcock and Wilcox Company Nuclear Power Generation Division 1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525 Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.

Winston and Strawn 1400 L Street, NW Washington, D. C. 20005 Office of Intergovernmental Relations 116 West Jones Street Raleigh, NC 27603 Mr. Max Batavia, Chief Bureau of Radiological Health South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, SC 29201 County Supervisor of Oconee County Walhalla, SC 29621 Manager, LIS NUS Corporation 2650 McCormick Drive Clearwater, FL 34619-1035 cc w/encls cont'd:

(See page 3)

DPC 3

cc w/encls cont'd:

Mr. G. A. Copp Licensing - EC050 Duke Power Company P. 0. Box 1006 Charlotte, NC 28201-1006 Ms. Karen E. Long Assistant Attorney General N. C. Department of Justice P. 0. Box 629 Raleigh, NC 27602 Distribution w/encls:

L. A. Wiens, NRR R. Carroll, RH R. V. Crlenjak, RH G. A. Hallstrom, RH PUBLIC NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 78128 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672 SEND TO PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOM?

/YES' NO OFFICE Rll:DRP RIl: RP RII:

SIGNATURE NAME R arroll:rm RCrIenjak DATE 09//

95 09/

195 09/

/95 09/

/95 09/

/95 09/

/95 COPY?

YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL R br D COPY DOCUMENT NAME:

G:\\OCMTSUM9.14

LIST OF ATTENDEES NRC ATTENDEES S. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)

E. Merschoff, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII H. Berkow, Director, Project Directorate 11-2, Nuclear Reactor Regulations.

R. Crlenjak, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3, DRP, RII T. Peebles, Chief, Operations Branch, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), RH P. Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector - Oconee, DRP, RII R. Carroll, Project Engineer, Reactor Projects Section 3A, DRP, RII L. Keller, Resident Inspector - Oconee, DRP, RH DUKE POWER COMPANY ATTENDEES J. Hampton, Vice President, Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS)

B. Peele, Station Manager, ONS J. Davis, Engineering Manager, ONS W. Foster, Safety Assurance Manager, ONS R. Dobson, Modifications Engineering Manager, ONS E. Burchfield, Manager, Regulatory Compliance, ONS D. Hubbard, Maintenance Superintendent, ONS T. Grant, Electrical Systems Engineer, ONS J. Vigor, Manager, Electrical Support Services, Duke Power Company G. Gilbert, Manager, Safety Assurance, Duke Power Company ENCLOSURE 1

September 14, 1995 NRC Management Meeting on Keowee Modification (NSM-52966)

Jack Peele, Station Manager Oconee Nuclear Station ENCLOSURE 2

Agenda

• Introduction (Jim Hampton)

• Background (Jack Peele)

• Sequence of Events (Jack Peele)

• Independent Investigation Team Findings and Recommendations (Gary Gilbert)

• Corrective Actions (Jack Peele)

• Conclusion (Jim Hampton)

Introduction

• Implementation of the overhead portion of NSM-52966 did not meet expectations of ONS management

• Design concept of modification is sound

• Safety significance of modification evolution carefully evaluated

• Management used independent team to evaluate root cause and make recommendations

• Corrective actions are thorough and when implemented will ensure successful completion of NSM-52966

Background on NSM-52966

• Zone overlap single failure protection

• Load rejection overfrequency protection

• Keowee overspeed protection

• ACB air system logic

Overview of Nuclear Station Modifications (NSMs)

• ONS has a successful history implementing plant modifications

• NSD 301, Administration of Nuclear Station Modifications, describes process

• Post modification critiques frequently performed to identify enhancements to the NSM process

NSM Process

• PIP initiated to identify need for NSM

• Modifications selected at management activation meeting

• Scope document developed

• Engineering and design work performed

• Implementation procedure (TN) prepared

NSM Process (cont)

• Required reviews completed (50.59s, cross disciplinary, etc.)

• Modification approved for implementation by Station Manager

• Planning and scheduling performed by Work Control and Maintenance

• Modification implemented by field crews

• Post-modification testing/documentation completed

Sequence of Events

>> 2/24/94, DPC submittal on zone overlap single failure

>> 8/25/94, DPC submittal on overfrequency/ overspeed hardware changes

>> 2/27/95, DPC letter states Keowee mod will be implemented within 30 days of NRC approval

>> 5/30/95, DPC letter states ACB Air System mods will be implemented within 30 days of NRC approval

>> 8/15/95, NRC issues SER on Keowee modification and surveillances

Sequence of Events (cont)

> 8/20/95, TN completed by Engineering

>> 8/21/95, Work Control receives work package

>> 8/22/95, Initial non-LCO TN work completed

>> 8/22/95, Status meeting by Work Control PM

>> 8/24/95, Meeting to review pre-LCO work

>> 8/25/95, 0700, Prejob briefing by Maintenance Superintendent

>> 8/25/95, Major changes 1 and 2 to TN issued

>> 8/25/95, Short duration LCO TN work completed

Sequence of Events (cont)

>> 8/28/95, 2201, entered 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO per TS 3.7.2

>> 8/29-30/95, Major changes 3 and 4 to TN issued

>> 8/30/95, 1100, Resident inspectors identified work practice concerns

>> 8/30/95, 1100, Craft reviewed work practice concerns

>> 8/30/95, 1300, Management met with RIs to discuss work practice concerns

>> 8/30/95, 1400, Modification work stopped

>> 8/30/95, 1630, PORC meeting recommended to back out of mod 10

Sequence of Events (cont)

>> 8/30/95, 2400, Craft work resumed to achieve desired backout configuration

>> 8/31/95, 0930, Site management notified Region II of potential need for NOED

>> 8/31/95, 1330, PORC meeting reviewed backout TN

>> 8/31/95, 1430, ONS, NRR, Region II conference call on mod status

>> 8/31/95, 1630, TN for backout issued

>> 8/31/95, 1630, PORC reviewed submittal for NOED

>> 8/31/95, 1700, Prejob briefing for backout TN

>> 8/31/95, 1800, Craft started work on backout TN

Sequence of Events (cont)

>> 8/31/95, 2130, ONS requested NOED

>> 8/31/95, 2201, TS 3.7.2 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO expired

>> 8/31/95, 2301, Unit 3 began power reduction

>> 8/31/95, 2330, NRC approved NOED to extend 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shutdown requirement to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

>> 9/1/95, 0230, LCO exited

>> 9/2/95, 1700, PORC reviewed and approved load rejection test

>> 9/3/95, 0900, Load rejection test successfully performed 12

72 Hour LCO Timeline work pre-backout backout implementation breaker work stoppage craft work TN dev and testing Actual continuity functional &

emergency breaker work checks logic tests start test Scheduled t=0 t

72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 13

How Assessment Was Conducted

• At the request of station management

• Team members

• Interviewed~ 30 individuals

• Reviewed procedures and documents

• Followed SEIT format 14

Identified Strengths

• Excellent teamwork in addressing problems

• Open receptive attitude

• PORC used effectively 15

Significant Findings

• No single point accountability for NSM

• Unnecessary schedule pressure from 30 day NRC commitment

• Inadequate contingency plans

• Confusion on proper use of blue tags

• Additional special attention needed

• Unclear expectations on uncontrolled drawings

• Inconsistent procedure change practices

• Inadequate time allowed for detailed planning and scheduling

• Inadequate management oversight/involvement 16

Root Cause

• Root cause of exceeding 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO was inadequate communication, coordination, planning and preparation associated with NSM activities 17

Recommendations

• Develop and communicate a detailed integrated schedule for NSM

• Validate and verify the procedure for implementation of NSM

• Independent review of schedule

• Assign project manager for NSM

• Establish procedural guidance for use of blue tags during this NSM

• Review completed procedure and reinforce management expectations as necessary

Long Term Recommendations

• Establish consistency between sites in mod organization, level of detail and milestones

• Review outstanding ONS NSMs for applicability of lessons learned

• Review and clarify blue tagging procedure

• Establish/communicate expectations on uncontrolled drawings

• Clarify/communicate expectations for use of PIP/VN for drawing problems

• Establish consistency on level of planned LCO work

• Reinforce expectations for procedure adherence as review indicates necessary 19

Corrective Actions

• Planning and Scheduling

• Modification Package

• Work Practices 20

Planning and Scheduling Corrective Actions

• Full-time Project Manager and team established

• Team will develop safe, detailed integrated schedule

• Independent review of schedule by onsite Safety Review Group

• Assess impact of schedule on safety system availability including possible need for one-time Tech Spec change to extend 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO

• Revise NRC commitments related to NSM-52966 21

Modification Package Corrective Actions

• Evaluate closeout of existing TN and development of multiple TNs

• Perform comprehensive validation and verification of TN (including complete walkdown) 22

Work Practice Corrective Actions

• Clarify management expectations for use of blue tags and controlled/uncontrolled drawings

• Review completed portion of TN to evaluate consistency of procedure change practices

• Appropriate management oversight of work practices for remainder of NSM-52966

• Independent monitoring of work practices by Safety Review Group 23

Long-Term Enhancements

• Enhancements recommended from independent investigation will be evaluated through our corrective action process (we do not consider long-term enhancements to be NRC commitments)

• As a result of NOED, Tech Specs that require 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to shut down all three units will be evaluated 24

Conclusions

• Implementation of NSM-52966 will enhance safety of ONS

• Safety significance of modification evolution carefully evaluated

• Management used independent team to evaluate root cause and make recommendations

• Corrective actions are thorough and when implemented will ensure successful completion of NSM-52966 25