ML15244A558
| ML15244A558 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1989 |
| From: | Wiens L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8908140230 | |
| Download: ML15244A558 (5) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 August 4, 1989 Docket Nos.
50-269 50-270 50-287 LICENSEE:
Duke Power Company FACILITY: Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF JULY 19 - 21, 1989 MEETING ON OCONEE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM During July 19 through July 21, 1989, NRC staff members met with representatives of Duke Power Company (DPC) at the Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) to discuss details of the ONS emergency power system. The meeting centered on recent design problems reported to the NRC and the corrective actions that have been taken. The staff was particularly interested in determining whether an integrated approach was being taken with respect to evaluation of problems and the application of corrective actions.
DPC initially presented a detailed description of the design and operation of the Oconee electrical system and the associated switching circuits. After this presentation, a tour of the Keowee hydro-electric units was conducted. On the second day of the meeting a detailed discussion was held of electrical system deficiencies which had been reported since January 1988 and the resulting corrective action. A tour of the Oconee plant was conducted after the conclusion of these discussions.
On July 21, 1989, an exit briefing was conducted with plant management. The following general observations were made by the NRC staff:
The ONS emergency electrical system is very complex; thus.DPC should ensure that the system is well documented and that relevant documentation is maintained up-to-date.
The revision to Technical Specification 3.7, which covers the ONS electrical systems, should receive priority attention and should ensure that the specifications reflect the operational requirements in effect at the plant. DPC should also evaluate systems or components that could affect the operability of the safety buses for inclusion in Technical Speci fi cations.
The current SITA and DBD programs should review the Emergency Power Switching Logic for single failure design conditions. It was indicated that this review was planned as part of these programs.
The need to ensure that an effective root cause analysis be performed when problems occur or are identified with systems, particularly when the cause appears to be operator error.
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PDR ADOCK 05000269 P
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The staff also made specific comments on the following items:
The ability of the High Pressure Injection pumps to start under worst case degraded bus voltage from the Keowee underground path has not been adequately demonstrated. It was recommended that DPC obtain actual pump motor starting data and verify the accuracy of the data provided by the motor manufacturer, which was used by DPC as base-line data to extrapolate the motor starting data under degraded voltage conditions. In addition, it was recommended that the motor manufacturer be contacted and requested to certify motor operability underthe oconee worst case degraded voltage condition.
It was noted that both Keowee units may be used for grid peaking. It was suggested that DPC evaluate the vulnerability of the units to an emergency lockout due to grid instability conditions.
The effect of degraded bus voltage on sequencing of 120 VAC relays and contacts and pickup/dropout setpoints of these relays and contacts was discussed. DPC engineers indicated that Oconee relays pickup voltage setpoint is 60% rated voltage.
A discussion was held on the practice of pulling control power fuses prior to racking out circuit breakers.
DPC stated that this was common practice for personnel safety purposes.
The conclusion of the NRC staff members was that DPC has an integrated, agressive program to identify, evaluate and correct problems. DPC was encouraged to continue with their current programs and aggressively implement corrective actions and resolutions to findings. The appreciation of the NRC attendees was expressed for the excellent preparation, assistance and cooperation provided by the DPC representatives.
Leonard A. Wiens, Project Manager Project Directorate 11-3 Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
List of attendees cc w/encl:
See next page Distribution:
/'Docket i le L. Wiens ACRS (10)
NRC & Local PDRs OGC (info. only)
R. Borchardt J. Sniezek E. Jordan PD 11-3 Reading D. Tondi D. Matthews F. Burrows.
[OCONEE MTG
SUMMARY
7/19-21 PM:PD II 3 D:PD I3 LWiens DMatthews.
7/ / /9 9 //89
-2 The staff also made specific comments on the following items:
The ability of the High Pressure Injection pumps to start under worst case degraded bus voltage from the Keowee underground path has not been adequately demonstrated. It was recommended that DPC obtain actual pump motor starting data and verify the accuracy of the data provided by the motor manufacturer, which was used by DPC as base-line data to extrapolate the motor starting data under degraded voltage conditions. In addition, it was recommended that the motor manufacturer be contacted and requested to certify motor operability under the Oconee worst case degraded voltage condition.
It was noted that both Keowee units may be used for grid peaking.
It was suggested that DPC evaluate the vulnerability of the units to an emergency lockout due to grid instability conditions.
The effect of degraded bus voltage on sequencing of 120 VAC relays and contacts and pickup/dropout setpoints of these relays and contacts was discussed. DPC engineers indicated that Oconee relays have a pickup voltage setpoint of 60% rated voltage.
A discussion was held on the practice of pulling control power fuses prior to racking out circuit breakers. DPC stated that this was common practice for personnel safety purposes.
The conclusion of the NRC staff members was that DPC has an integrated, aggressive program to identify, evaluate and correct problems.
DPC was encouraged to continue with their current programs and aggressively implement corrective actions and resolutions to findings. The appreciation of the NRC attendees was expressed for the excellent preparation, assistance and cooperation provided by the DPC representatives.
Leonard A. Wiens, Project Manager Project Directorate 11-3 Division of Reactor Projects I/Il Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
List of attendees cc w/encl:
See next page
cc:
Mr. A. V. Carr, Esq.
Mr. Paul Guill Duke Power Company Duke Power Company P. 0. Box 33189 Post Office Box 33189 422 South Church Street 422 South Church Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.
Bishop, Cook, Purcell & Reynolds Mr. Alan R. Herdt, Chief 1400 L Street, N.W.
Project Branch #3 Washington, D.C. 20005 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Mr. Robert B. Borsum Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Power Division Ms. Karen E. Long Suite 525 Assistant Attorney General 1700 Rockville Pike N. C. Department of Justice Rockville, Maryland 20852 P.O. Box 629 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Manager, LIS NUS Corporation Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice.President 2536 Countryside Boulevard Nuclear Production Dept.
Clearwater, Florida 34623-1693 Duke Power Co.
Senior Resident Inspector 422 Church Street U.S.Nuclar egultoryCorniisionCharlotte, North Carolina 28242 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route 2, Box 610 Seneca, South Carolina 29678 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. Heyward G. Shealy, Chief Bureau of Radiological Health South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201 Office of Intergovernmental Relations 116 West Jones Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27603 honorable James M. Phinney County Supervisor of Oconee County Walhalla, South Carolina 29621
0 0
ATTENDEES NAME ORGANIZATION
- Len Wiens NRR/PD 11-3
- Dom Tondi N
RR/DEST/SELB
- David Deatherage Duke/ONS-OPS
- Dhiaa Jamil Duke/Design
- Fred Burrows NRR/DEST/SELB
- Tom Curtis Duke/ONS Compliance
- Len Wert NRC/RI
- Bill McAlister Duke/ONS Maint. Eng.
- Dick Sweigart Duke/ONS/OPS
- Milt Hunt NRC/RII/DRS Aldean Bengh DE/ES im Stoner DE/ES
- Charlie Boyd Duke/ONS Design Eng.
- Pierce Skinner NRC/SRI
- At Exit