ML15239A075

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Forwards Final SALP Repts 50-269/93-11,50-270/93-11, 50-287/93-11 & 72-0004/93-11 for 920202-930501,summary of 930728 Presentation,Salp Slides Used at Presentation & Util Comments on 921019 Loss of Offsite Power Event at Unit 2
ML15239A075
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  
Issue date: 09/10/1993
From: Ebneter S
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Hampton J
DUKE POWER CO.
Shared Package
ML15239A076 List:
References
NUDOCS 9310120354
Download: ML15239A075 (32)


See also: IR 05000269/1993011

Text

SEP 10 1993

Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270,

50-287 and 72-4

License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47,

DPR-55 and SNM 2503

Duke Power Company

ATTN: Mr. J. W. Hampton

Vice President

Oconee Site

P. 0. Box 1439

Seneca, SC 29679

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE

(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-269/93-11, 50-270/93-11,

50-287/93-11 AND 72-4/93-11)

This refers to the NRC's Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)

for your Oconee facility which was sent to you on July 13, 1993; our meeting

of July 28, 1993, at which we discussed the report; and your written comments

dated August 18, 1993. I have enclosed a summary of our presentation at the

meeting, a copy of ttie SALP slides which were used at the presentation, a copy

of your written comments, and the Final SALP Report for the period February 2,

1992, through May 1, 1993.

We appreciate your efforts in evaluating the Initial SALP Report and providing

comments. The following is our evaluation of your comments:

Docket Nos.

We agree with this comment. The docket number of the Independent Spent Fuel

Storage Installation has been added to the Final SALP Report as you requested.

Maintenance/Surveillance

We understand that your Design Basis Documentation program identified the need

for testing the isolation relays at Keowee; however, the-SALP Board concluded

that action to accomplish these tests had not been initiated in a timely

manner. Therefore, no change is warranted for this section of the Final SALP

Report.

Engineering/Technical Support

Your response provided additional clarification on issues related to the Low

Pressure Injection h.2at exchangers, MG-6 relays at Keowee, the Electrical

Distribution System Functional Inspection, and licensed operator initial and

requalification examination programs. The weakness we noted in the

requalification examination construction and instructor cuing techniques can

9310120354 930910

PDR ADOCK 05000269

9

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Duke Power Company

2

SEP 10 1993

only be observed during a requalification examination. During the most recent

requalification examination, July 12-22, 1993, which was outside the

assessment period, we did not identify any problems with cuing and examination

construction. On this basis, we conclude that the problems have been

corrected. For the remaining items, we have considered the justification in

your request and have modified the SALP Report as described in Enclosure 4.

Supporting Data and Summaries

We have revised the Licensee Activities section of the Final SALP Report to

include your clarification comments on the October 19, 1992, loss of off site

power event. Also, we have revised the Direct Inspection and Review

Activities section to indicate the correct number of initial and

requalification examinations performed during this assessment period. We have

verified that only operator examinations administered during this SALP period

were assessed. The management meeting to discuss station blackout and Keowee

issues has been included as one of the additional meetings held during the

assessment period.

In accordance with Section 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and its enclosures

will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

No reply to this letter is required; however, should you have any questions

concerning these matters, I will be glad to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

Stewart D. Ebneter

Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1. Meeting Summary

2. SALP Slides

3. Duke Power Comments on SALP

4. Revision Sheet

5. Final SALP Report

cc w/encls:

M. E. Patrick

Compliance

Duke Power Company

P. 0. Box 1439

Seneca, SC 29679

cc w/encls:

See page 3

Duke Power Company

3

SEP 101993

cc w/encls: Continued

A. V. Carr, Esq.

Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242-0001

County Supervisor of

Oconee County

Walhalla, SC 29621

Robert B. Borsum

Babcock and Wilcox Company

Nuclear Power Generation Division

1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525

Rockville, MD 20852

J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.

Winston and Strawn

1400 L Street, NW

Washington, D. C. 20005

Office of Intergovernmental Relations

116 West Jones Street

Raleigh, NC 27603

Heyward G. Shealy, Chief

Bureau of Radiological Health

South Carolina Department of Health

and Environmental Control

2600 Bull Street

Columbia, SC 29201

Manager, LIS

NUS Corporation

2650 McCormick Drive

Clearwater, FL 34619-1035

G. A. Copp

Licensing - EC050

Duke Power Company

P. 0. Box 1006

Charlotte, NC 28201-1006

Karen E. Long

Assistant Attorney General

N. C. Department of Justice

P. 0. Box 629

Raleigh, NC 27602

INPO

Duke Power Company

4

SEP 101993

bcc w/encls:

The Chairman

Commissioner K. C. Rogers

Commissioner F. J. Remick

Commissioner E. G. de Planque

J. M. Taylor, EDO

H. L. Thompson, Jr., EDO

J. F. Plisco, Regional

Coordinator, EDO

T. E. Murley, NRR

S. Varga, NRR

L. A. Wiens, NRR

F. Allenspach, SALP Coordinator, NRR

Regional Administrators, RI, RIII

RIV, and RV

K. Clark, RII, PAO

A. R. Herdt, DRP, RH

M. S. Lesser, DRP, RII

W. H. Miller, DRP, RH

R. L. Watkins, DRP, RH

NRC Resident Inspector

DRS and DRSS Branch Chiefs,

Document Control Desk

NRC Resident Inspector

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Route 2, Box 610

Seneca, SC 29678

Mr. John C. Heard, Jr.

Chief, Tech. Hazards Branch

Federal Emgcy. Mgmt. Agency

Suite 706A

1371 Peachtree Street, N. E.

Atlanta, GA 30309

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The Ch 'rman

Commiss ner K. C. Rogers

Commissi

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Commissio r E. G. de Planque

J. M. Tayl

, EDO

H. L. Thomp n, Jr., EDO

J. F. Plisco, Regional

Coordinator, EDO

T. E. Murley,

R

S. Varga, NRR

L. A. Wiens, NRR

F. Allenspach, SAL Coordinator, NRR

Regional Administra ors, RI, RIII

RIV, and RV

K. Clark, RII, PAO

A. R. Herdt, DRP, RH

M. S. Lesser, DRP, RH

W. H. Miller, DRP, RH

R. L. Watkins, DRP, RH

S. Vias, Chief, TSS (2 cop'es)

NRC Resident Inspector

DRS and DRSS Branch Chiefs,

and Section Chiefs

Document Control Des:

NRC Resident Inspector

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissio

Route 2, Box 610

Seneca, SC 29678

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ENCLOSURE I

MEETING SUMMARY

A.

A meeting was held on July 28, 1993, at the Oconee station to discuss

the results of the NRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance

(SALP) evaluation of the Oconee facility for the appraisal period of

February 2, 1992, through May 1, 1993.

B.

Licensee Attendees

R. B. Priory, Executive Vice President Power Generation Group

H. B. Tucker, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Generation Department

M. S. Tuckman, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Generation Department

J. E. Groman, Vice President, Generation Services

J. W. Hampton, Vice President, Oconee Nuclear Site (ONS)

H. B. Barron, Oconee Station Manager, ONS

J. M. Davis, Safety Assurance Manager, ONS

L. V. Wilkie, Training Manager, ONS

S. C. Adams, Community Relations Director, ONS

The list of licensee attendees does not include all of the Duke

Employees that were present at the SALP presentation.

C.

NRC Attendees

L. A. Reyes, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II (RH)

J. R. Johnson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII

A. R. Herdt, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3, DRP, RH

L. A. Wiens, Project Manager, Project Directorate 11-3, Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

K. M. Clark, Public Affairs Officer, RH

P. E. Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector, Oconee, DRP, RH

W. K. Poertner, Resident Inspector, Oconee, DRP, RH

W. H. Miller, Jr., Project Engineer, DRP, RII

D.

Public Attendees

D. Cambell, Director, South Carolina Emergency Preparedness Division

R. Duggleby, South Carolina Emergency Planning Division

W. Corley, South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental

Control

J. Morris, South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control

D. Evett, Director, Pickens County Emergency Preparedness Agency

A. Horn, Director, Oconee County Emergency Preparedness Agency

M. McCance, Greenville News

E. Gorski, Anderson Independent

R. Young, WYFF-TV, Greenville, SC

N. Nygro, WYFF-TV, Greenville, SC

ENCLOSURE 2

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT

OF

LICENSEE PERFORMANCE

(SALP)

DUKE POWER COMPANY

SALP CYCLE 10

FEBRUARY 2, 1992

THROUGH

MAY 1, 1993

OCONEE

JULY 28, 1993

LICCOVR.CH3

SALP PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

1. IDENTIFY TRENDS IN

LICENSEE PERFORMANCE

2. PROVIDE A BASIS FOR

ALLOCATION OF

NRC RESOURCES

3. IMPROVE NRC

REGULATORY PROGRAM

PROJOBJ.CH3

REGION II

ORGANIZATION

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

ADMINISTRATOR

S. EBNETER

DEPUTY L REYES

DIVISION OF

DIVISION OF

DIVISION OF

REACTOR PROJECTS

REACTOR SAFETY

RADIATION SAFETY

AND SAFEGUARDS

DIR. E. MERSCHOFF

DIR.

A. GIBSON

DIR.

J. STOHR

DEPUTY J. JOHNSON

DEPUTY J. JAUDON

DEPUTY B. MALLETT

RII-ORG.CH3

DIVISION OF REACTOR PROJECTS

ORGANIZATION

DIVISION OF

REACTOR PROJECTS

DIR. E. MERSCHOFF

DEPUTY J. JOHNSON

REACTOR PROJECTS

BRANCH NO. 3

CHIEF

A. HERDT

PROJECTS SECTION

PROJECTS SECTION

NO. 3A

NO. 3B

CHIEF

CHIEF

M. LESSER

P. SKINNER

CATAWBA

HATCH

MCGUIRE

OCONEE -P. HARMON, SRI

VOGTLE

BR30RG.CH3

NRR ORGANIZATION

OFFICE OF

NUCLEAR REACTOR

REGULATION

DIR. T MURLEY

ASSOC. DIRECTOR FOR

ASSOC. DIRECTOR FOR

PROJECTS

INSPECTION AND

J. PARTLOW

TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT

IDIVISION

OF

ENGINEERING

DIVISION OF

REACTOR PROJECTS I/I

S. VARGA, DIR. I/II

G. LAINAS, ASST. DIR. II

D. B. MATTHEWS, PD 11-3

REACTOR INSPECTION

L A. WIENS

PROJ MGR, OCONEE

DIVISION OF REACTOR

CONTROLS AND

HUMAN FACTORS

DIVISION OF

REACTOR PROJECTS IIIIIVNR

DIV. OF RADIATION

SAFETY AND

SAFEGUARDS

DIVISION OF OPERATING

REACTOR SUPPORT

NRRORG.CH3

PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AREAS

FOR OPERATING REACTORS

A. PLANT OPERATIONS

B. RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS

C. MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE

D. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

E. SECURITY

F. ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT

G. SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY

VERIFICATION

FNCAREAS.CH3

AREA PERFORMANCE

CATEGORY 1

LICENSEE MANAGEMENT ATTENTION TO

AND INVOLVEMENT IN NUCLEAR SAFETY

OR SAFEGUARDS ACTIVITIES RESULTED

IN A SUPERIOR LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE.

NRC WILL CONSIDER REDUCED LEVELS

OF INSPECTION EFFORT.

CATIDEFN.CH3

AREA PERFORMANCE

CATEGORY 2

LICENSEE MANAGEMENT ATTENTION TO

AND INVOLVEMENT IN NUCLEAR SAFETY

OR SAFEGUARDS ACTIVITIES RESULTED

IN A GOOD LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE.

NRC WILL CONSIDER MAINTAINING

NORMAL LEVELS OF INSPECTION

EFFORT.

CAT2DEFN.CH3

AREA PERFORMANCE

CATEGORY 3

LICENSEE MANAGEMENT ATTENTION TO

AND INVOLVEMENT IN NUCLEAR SAFETY

OR SAFEGUARDS ACTIVITIES RESULTED

IN AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE;

HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE NRC'S CONCERN

THAT A DECREASE IN PERFORMANCE MAY

APPROACH OR REACH AN UNACCEPTABLE

LEVEL, NRC WILL CONSIDER INCREASED

LEVELS OF INSPECTION EFFORT.

CAT3DEFN.CH3

EVALUATION CRITERIA

1. MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT AND CONTROL

IN ASSURING QUALITY

2. APPROACH TO IDENTIFICATION AND

RESOLUTION OF TECHNICAL ISSUES

FROM A SAFETY STANDPOINT

3. ENFORCEMENT HISTORY

4. REPORTING, ANALYSIS AND CORRECTIVE

ACTION OF REPORTABLE EVENTS

5. STAFFING (INCLUDING MANAGEMENT)

6. TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS AND

QUALIFICATION

EVALCRIT.CH3

PLANT OPERATIONS

(CATEGORY 2)

OVERALL PERFORMANCE REMAINED GOOD.

STRENGTHS

  • CONTROL ROOM DECORUM
  • EXPERIENCE OF OPERATIONS STAFF
  • OPERATORS KNOWLEDGE OF SYSTEMS AND

PROCESSES

  • USE OF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF
  • IMPROVEMENT IN SHUTDOWN RISK

CONSIDERATIONS

OCONEE 7/93

PLANT OPERATIONS

(CONTINUED)

CHALLENGES

  • CONFIGURATION CONTROL EVENTS
  • ADHERENCE TO PROCEDURES

-

ATTITUDES

-

MANAGEMENT ATTENTION

  • KEOWEE OPERATIONS STANDARDS

RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS

(CATEGORY 1)

PERFORMANCE CONTINUED TO BE SUPERIOR.

STRENGTHS

  • RADCON ORGANIZATION
  • RADIATION EXPOSURE CONTROL
  • RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT CONTROL
  • ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING
  • WATER CHEMISTRY PROGRAM
  • RAD MATERIAL SHIPMENTS

CHALLENGES

  • POSTING AND LABELING
  • ADHERENCE TO RWP PROCEDURES
  • TIMELY FOLLOWUP OF RADCON AUDIT

DEFICIENCIES

MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE

(CATEGORY 2)

OVERALL PERFORMANCE WAS GOOD.

STRENGTHS

  • PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE
  • PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE
  • INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM
  • REDUCTION OF MAINTENANCE WORK REQUEST

BACKLOG

CHALLENGES

  • OPERATIONAL EVENTS ATTRIBUTED TO

MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES

  • MAINTENANCE CONTROLS
  • PROCEDURE ADHERENCE
  • SYSTEM FUNCTIONS NOT FULLY

DEMONSTRATED BY TESTING

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

(CATEGORY 1)

PERFORMANCE REMAINED SUPERIOR.

STRENGTHS

  • MANAGEMENT SUPPORT AND INVOLVEMENT
  • TRAINING PROGRAM
  • DRILL PROGRAM AND PERFORMANCE
  • OFFSITE SIREN SYSTEM MONITORING
  • EMERGENCY FACILITIES

CHALLENGES

  • MAINTAINING PERFORMANCE LEVEL
  • IMPROVE INFORMATION RELEASED FROM THE

JOINT INFORMATION CENTER

SECURITY

(CATEGORY 1)

PERFORMANCE REMAINED SUPERIOR.

STRENGTHS

  • KNOWLEDGEABLE STAFF
  • AUDITS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
  • PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION (ACCESS,

ALARMS, ETC.)

CHALLENGES

  • ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (CAMERA) RELIABILITY
  • COORDINATION WITH OTHER SITE

ORGANIZATIONS

ENGINEERING & TECHNICAL SUPPORT

(CATEGORY 2)

PERFORMANCE CONTINUED TO BE GOOD.

STRENGTHS

  • SUPPORT TO OUTAGE ACTIVITIES
  • SUPPORT TO PLANT OPERATIONS
  • INITIAL LICENSING OPERATOR TRAINING

CHALLENGES

  • RESOLUTION OF EMERGENT ISSUES
  • TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
  • SUPPORT TO SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTING TO

VERIFY PREDICTIONS (CALCULATIONS)

  • LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION

SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY

VERIFICATION

(CATEGORY 2)

PERFORMANCE REMAINED GOOD.

STRENGTHS

  • SHUTDOWN RISK INITIATIVES
  • NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED REQUESTS
  • QUALITY OF LICENSING SUBMITTALS

CHALLENGES

  • PROCEDURAL ADHERENCE
  • CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
  • RECOGNITION OF NEED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT

OF KEOWEE OPERATIONS

Duke Power Company

Oconee NuclearSite

J WHAMPTON

PO .Bor 1439

ENCLOSURET3-

Vice President

Seneca. SC 29679

(803)885-3499 Office

(803)8853564 Far

DUKEPOWER

August 18, 1993

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Attention:

Document Control Desk

Washington, DC

20555

Subject:

Oconee Nuclear Site

Docket NoS. 50-269, -270, -287; 72-4

Inspection Report 50-269, -270, -287/93-11

Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance

Gentlemen:

By letter dated July 13, 1993, the initial SALP report for the

Oconee facility was issued.

This report covered the time

period of February 1,

1992 through May 1,

1993.

A verbal

presentation of that report was made in

a public meeting on

July 28, 1993 at the Oconee site.

I would like to comment and provide additional information

regarding the Operator Training assessment (Attachment 1), the

Engineering assessment

(Attachment 2),

and the Maintenance/

Surveillance assessment (Attachment 3).

I request that these

comments be considered for inclusion into the final SALP report

and rating.

In addition, I request that the Docket Number assigned to the

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation be added to the

final SALP report.

Please contact me, or members

of my staff,

if

further

information is needed.

Very truly yours,

J .

W.

an tn

DRP OFFICIAL COPY

Document Control Desk

August 18, 1993

Page 2

cc:

Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II

Mr. L. A. Wiens, Project Manager

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

P. E. Harmon

Senior Resident Inspector

Oconee Nuclear Site

ATTACHMENT 1

OPERATOR TRAINING AREA

ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT

The "Summary of Results" section of the preliminary SALP report

indicates that "performance in the operator requalification program

declined from the previous assessment due to weaknesses in

examination content and evaluator techniques."

In Section V.B of the report, Direct Inspection and Review

Activities, it

is listed that two initial

and three requalification

examinations were conducted at Oconee. Our records indicate that

one

initial

exam

(50-269/93-300,

January

1993)

and

two

requalification exams

(50-269/92-302,

July 1992; 50-269/93-300,

January 1993) were administered during the SALP cycle.

The following information is taken from the above referenced

Examination Reports.

Duke Power believes the Operator Training

Program has shown continuous improvement during this SALP period.

A.

NRC Examination Report 50-269/92-302

In July,

1992,

the NRC

administered a requalification

examination. Nine of ten Reactor Operators (RO) and thirteen

of

fourteen Senior Reactor Operators

(SRO) passed the

examinations.

Based upon these results, the Oconee Requalification Program

was determined to be satisfactory.

A strength was noted in

the construction and maintenance of Job Performance Measures.

Weaknesses were noted in

the areas of written examination

construction,

communications

during

Emergency

Operating

Procedures implementation, and evaluator performance.

B.

NRC Examination Report 50-269/93-300

In January, 1993, the NRC administered initial written

examinations

and

operating

tests

to

seven

SROs.

Requalification

simulator

retake

examinations

were

administered to the RO and SRO who failed the July, 1992 test.

All seven SRO candidates passed the initial examinations and

both requalification retake examinees passed. The examiners

stated that

"both of the operators

exhibited noticeably

improved performance compared to their former examination

results".

Strengths identified were "instructor assistance during exam

administration, communications and team interaction, and an

improved crew command and control structure."

ATTACHMENT 1

OPERATOR TRAINING AREA

ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT

B.

NRC Examination Report 50-269/93-300 (continued)

It was also noted in the report that Oconee had "conducted an

extensive pre-examination review

...

and was successful in

significantly reducing the number of post examination comments

compared to previous examinations."

The examiners stated that the previous examination linked many

weaknesses to poor communications and command and control.

These problems were effectively addressed by management as can

be seen in

the following statements made by the examiners;

"The candidates displayed excellent communication skills and

team work between each other, especially during plant

transients.

The use of formalized repeat back communications

and operator involvement in the decision making process was

noteworthy."

In addition, the command and control structure was changed

such that the Unit Supervisor is

in

an oversight position.

This improved method of command and control revealed none of

the problems mentioned during the previous examination. The

examiners observed that "communications were clear, concise,

and formal" and identified the new structure as a strength.

Duke Power believes the Operator Training Program has improved and

requests that the NRC review this information for inclusion in the

final SALP report and rating.

Duke also requests the NRC to verify

that only Operator Examinations which took place during the SALP

cycle are included in the report.

ATTACHMENT 2

ENGINEERING AREA

ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT

Section V.A,

Licensee Activities,

of the SALP report discusses

problems that were encountered with the LPSW system. The report

states that "...cooling water flow of the LPSW system through the

LPI heat exchangers were found to exceed the manufacturer's

specifications.

The power level of both units was reduced to

approximately 10 percent and modifications were made to reduce the

flow through the heat exchangers to meet the manufacturer's

specifications."

Duke Power would like to clarify this information.

The cooling

water flow of the LPSW system through the heat exchangers, during

a postulated design basis accident, could have potentially exceeded

the manufacturer's specifications.

This was discovered on a test

performed on Unit 3 and was also determined to be applicable to

Units 1 and 2.

Section F of

the SALP report contains

information on the

Engineering/Technical Support area.

The first paragraph on page

15, item (5)

lists

a failure to correct the MG-6 testing deficiency

after identification during Keowee Unit 2 testing.

The specific

MG-6 problem was promptly corrected.

A comprehensive program is

underway to deal with MG-6 concerns and is part of the Emergency

Power Management Plan.

The second paragraph on page 15 discusses the EDSFI report. Duke

Power requests that additional,

pertinent information from the

EDSFI cover letter

(ref: 50-269,270,287/93-02) be included in this

writeup. The second paragraph of the EDSFI cover letter indicates

that "this comprehensive inspection revealed no inoperable systems

and provided adequate assurance that the Electrical Distribution

System will perform as intended pending further analysis and

testing by the licensee".

The last paragraph of Section V.A, Licensee Activities, in the SALP

report discusses the October, 1992 loss of off site power event.

This

should

read,

"On

October

19,

1992,

during maintenance

activities, a loss of off site power occurred for Unit 2 which was

followed by a subsequent loss of one of the Keowee Hydro units."

A June, 1992 management meeting which was held at NRC headquarters

on Station Blackout and Keowee issues should be added to Section

V.D, Management Conferences.

ATTACHMENT 3

MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE

Section C contains information on the Maintenance/Surveillance

area. The second paragraph on page 10 discusses the test program

for Keowee Hydro. The report states that "...

relays required to

isolate portions of the switchyard and to transfer Keowee auxiliary

power to an alternate source were not fully tested".

Duke Power would like to clarify this information.

The need for

these tests had been previously identified by our Design Basis

Documentation program. Duke Power was awaiting testing procedure

development; complexity of the test and an extensive 50.59

evaluation precluded earlier testing.

ENCLOSURE 4

REVISION SHEET

SALP BOARD REVISION SHEET

PAGE

LINE

NOW READS

SHOULD READ

Title Sheet 1

INITIAL SALP REPORT

FINAL SALP REPORT

6

50-269.. ./93-11

50-269...../93-11 AND 72-4/93-11

8

OCONEE ....... 3

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 AND THE

INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE

INSTALLATION

BASIS:

These revisions change the Initial SALP Report to the Final

Salp Report and include the name and docket number of the

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.

15

13

Injection (LPI)...

Injection

(LPI)..., (5) failure

MG-6 testing

to adequately test the MG-6 relays

to verify operability. After the

development of an appropriate

procedure for testing the MG-6

relays, a long standing operability

problem was identified.

BASIS:

This change is for clarity. The problem was not the failure

to correct the MG-6 testing deficiency, but was the failure

to perform an adequate test to verify operability of the

relays. Once an adequate test was conducted, a relay which

had been inoperable for a long time was identified.

15

15

An Electrical ....

Although the Electrical Distribution

..... documentation.

System Functional Inspection

revealed no inoperable systems and

provided adequate assurance that the

electrical system will perform as

intended, it also revealed problems

in testing, design analyses and

design basis documentation.

BASIS:

This revision adds the comment that no inoperable systems

were identified during the EDSFI inspection.

18

15

through ...

the

through the LPI heat exchangers,

during a postulated design basis

accident, could have potentially

exceeded the manufacturer's

specifications. This was discovered

on a test performed on Unit 3 and