ML15223A599

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Forwards Proposed Tech Spec Revision in Response to NRC Discussing Term Operable as Applied to Tech Spec Requirements.No License Fees Provided Since Proposal Submitted in Response to NRC Request
ML15223A599
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/24/1980
From: Parker W
Duke Power Co
To: Reid R, Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML15223A601 List:
References
NUDOCS 8006300362
Download: ML15223A599 (4)


Text

REGULATO INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION 80TEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8006300362 DOC.DATE: 80/06/24 NOTARIZED: YES DOCKET 9 FACIL:50-269 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit to Duke Power Co.

05000269 50-270 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Duke Power Co.

05000270 50-287 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Duke Power Co.

05000287 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION PARKER,A.0, Duke Power Co.

RECIPNAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTON,HR.

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Director REIDR..

oerating Reactors Branch 4

SUBJECT:

Forwards o.rooosed Tech Spec revision in resoonse to NRC 800410. Itr discussing term "operable" as apolied to Tech Soec requirements.No license fees provided since Proposal submitted in response to NRC request.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: 40013 COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 1-ENCL SIZE: Z TITLE: General Distribution for after Issuance of Operating Lic OTE S:

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-"'MA au, atV2 o

-CHACV rc S-5t_

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ACTION:

tiC C-(%%T 05 7

7 INTERNAL: A/D CORE & CS21 1

.0 A/D REACT SYS18 1

0 CHEM ENG BR 17 1

0 EMERG PREP 16 1

0 HANAUER,S.

20 1

1 I&E 12 2

2 MooREV.

22 1

1 NRC PDR 02 1

1 OELD 14 1

0 0

ES FR 19 1

0 QA BR 15 1

0 REG FLE 01 1

1 EXTERNAL:

ACRS 20 16 16 LPDR 03 1

1 NSIC 04 1

1 JUL TOTAL NUMBEP OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LTTR 38 ENCL 31

DUKE POWER COMPANY Powra BUIsDINo 422 Sourn CtRack STREET, CE&RLOTTE, N. C. 28242 WILLIAM.0.

PARKER. JR.

24, 1980 VicE PRESIoENT TELEPHONE: AREA 704 STEAM PRODUCTION 373-4083 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention:

Mr. R. W. Reid, Chief.

Operating Reactors Branch No. 4

Subject:

Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287

Dear Sir:

Mr. Eisenhut's letter of April 10, 1980 to all power reactor licensees discussed some variance throughout the industry regarding interpretation of the term "OPERABLE"' as it applies to various Technical Specification requirements. As noted in Mr. Eisenhut's letter IE Information Notice also dealt with this subject.

As requested, a proposed Technical Specification revision is attached.

The proposal is considered to be sufficient to assure that adequate administrative controls exist to maintain the plant systems in a manner consistent with the single failure criterion.embodied in the general design criteria of 1OCDR 50, Appendix A.

Inasmuch as the proposal is being submitted in response to a written NRC request and pursuant to 10CFR 170, §170.22, Note 2, no license fees are provided.

Ve truly yours,

-William 0. Parker, Jr KRW:scs Attachment SR0 06 30 03 6Z

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director June 24, 1980 Page Two WILLIAM 0. PARKER, JR., being duly sworn, states that he is Vice President of Duke Power Company; that he is authorized on the part of said Company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this request for amendment of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, Appendix A to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55; and that all statements and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of h knowledge.

William 0. Parker, Jr., Vice resident Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of March, 1980.

Nty Public My Commiszion Expires:

September 20, 1984

1.2.7 Refueling Operation An operation involving a change in core geometry by manipulation of fuel or control rods when the reactor vessel head is removed.

1.2.8 Startup The reactor shall be considered in the startup mode when the shutdown margin is reduced with the intent of going critical.

1.3 OPERABLE A system, subsystem, train, component or device shall be considered OPERABLE when it is capable of performing its intended safety functions. Implicit in this definition shall be the assumption that all essential auxiliary equip ment required in order to assure performance of the safety function is capable of performing its related support function(s).

Auxiliary equipment includes but is not limited to normal or emergency electrical power sources, cooling and seal water, instrumentation and controls, etc. If either the normal or emergency power to system, subsystem, train, component or device is not available it is considered OPERABLE for the purpose of satisfying the require ments of its applicable Limiting Condition for Operation, provided:

(a) the alternate power source is available, and (b) the reduncant system is operable.

1.4 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION LOGIC 1.4.1 Instrument.Channel An instrument channel is the combination of sensor, wires, amplifiers and output devices which are connected for the purpose of measuring the value of a process variable for the purpose of observation, control and/or protection.

An instrument channel may be either analog or digital in nature.

1.4.2 Reactor Protective System The reactor protective system is shown in Figures 7-1 and 7-6 of the FSAR.

It.

is that.combination of protective channels and associated circuitry which forms the automatic system that protects the reactor by control rod trip.

It includes the four protective channels, their associated instrument channel inputs, manual trip switch, all rod drive protective trip breakers and activating relays or coils.

1.4.3 Protective Channel A protective channel as shown in Figure 7-1 of the FSAR (one of three or one of four independent channels, complete with sensors, sensor power supply units, amplifiers and bistable modules provided for every reactor protective safety parameter) is a combination of instrument channels forming a single digital output to the protective system's coincidence logic. It includes a shutdown bypass circuit, a protective channel bypass circuit and reactor trip module and provision for insertion of a dummy biscable.