ML15219A037
| ML15219A037 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point, Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 02/01/1980 |
| From: | Weiner R ENERGY, DEPT. OF |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15219A034 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003100214 | |
| Download: ML15219A037 (4) | |
Text
Department of Energy Washington. D.C. 20461 NRC-Docket Nos.
50-270, and 50-287 Mr. Harold Denton Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Denton:
This letter summiiesthe views of the.U.S Department of Energy regarding theie 91
-system. reliability impact in. the Virginia Carolinas CVACAR sub-regional area of the Southeastern Electric Ieliability Council when Ocone Nucear Units 2 and 3 are required tm efremoved ftrgau. ervice simultaneously to implement the "Lessons Learned Short-Term" requirements. This'simultaneous outage would occur forEh*e th-6ee weeks beginning February 16, 1980.
I want to reiterate the fact that a shutdown of large generating units, such as these, at a time other than planned, will pose a risk that the operating utility will have insufficient capacity to meet its consumer's demands. Available energy supply from the generating units remaining in service and fuel resources could be constrained or insufficient to supply customer energy requirements during the outage period.
The necessary margin of reserve generating capacity is variable for different operating systems,.different areas of the country, and different times of the year.
Electric utilities typically plan for a level of reserves that consider construction slippages, necessary or planned maintenance, or forced or unexpected outages.
Operating reserves are normally provided to insure against the loss of the single largest power source on the system and for certain system operating needs. The analysis done of the anticipated VACAR situation is from the perspective of adequacy of operating reserves considering possible support from other electric systems.
's 0 3 00 2.1
The 'review of available information* regarding the simultaneous outage of two Ocohee nuclear units in the February 15, 198.0.,
to March 15, 1980, periodindicates that the VACAR and Duke Power Company systems will stand the risk of severe system reliability impacts unless at.least 1700 MW of power are assured in February and 700 MW of power are assured in March from neighboring systems.
There has been no information presented for review that indicates a commitment of such ah assured supply, although data reported to the DOE Monitoring Center indicates that some capacity may be available from the Southern Company,. American Electric Power, and Pennsylvania-New.Jersey-Maryland systems. Duke has indicated in phone conversations with DOE that, should two Oconee Units be simultaneously shut down in the latter part of March, the outages of two large fossil units planned for that time could be rescheduled to lessen the adverse reliability impacts. The power requirements of the VACAR region are very sensitive to the weather.in the month
- of March.
If this month is colder than expected, the potentially severe reliability impacts may extend until the end of the month.
DOE was informed on January 29, 1980, that the outage of Oconee Unit 1 will be extended until February.17. When Unit 1 returns to service, Unit 2 will be shut down for refueling and, modification.
The reliability of the VACAR and Duke Power Company systems will be inadequate if Oconee Units 2 and 3 are removed from service, as scheduled, prior to Unit 1 returning to service, even if a power supply from neighboring systems is assured.
The current analysis differs from the evaluation performed by DOE for NRC Docket No. 50-206 (San Onofre) in that the San Onofre data had already accounted for forced outages. As a result of.
this difference and differences in system configurations and locations, a direct comparison of the two evaluations is not possible.
The evaluation of the VACAR area during the month of February, with the simultaneous outage of two Oconee units, shows an operating reserve margin of 8.3 percent (2,160 MW).
The lower loads projected for March would improve this operating margin to 12.0 percent (2,845 MW).
These margins would be below the desired levels to provide reliable service without an assured power supply from neighboring regions.
- Information utilized was that contained in the letter of January 15, 1980,.from William 0. Parker of Duke Power Company to Mr. Harold R.
Denton and Mr. Richard Weiner; the letter of January 15, 1980, from Mr. Paul H. Mann of Duke Power Company to Mr. Richard Weiner; the Duke Power Company's answer to Order to Show Cause; the January 10, 1980, letter from Mr. William R. Brownlee of SERC to Mr. Harold Denton; the letter of.January 17,.1980, from Mr. Robert Fischbach of the North Carolina Utilities Commission to Mr. Harold Denton; the January 17, 1980, letter from Mr. Henry G. Yonce of the South Carolina Public Service Commission to Mr. Harold Denton; and information periodically.filed with the Department of Energy by electric utilities.
3 The VACAR utilities have a generation mix that includes approxi mately 3,000 MW of hydroelectric generation and 2,100 MW of combustion turbines.
These types of resources cannot be depend.ed
- upon to supply energy requirements over an extended period because of storage requirements.
DOE has also reviewed some currently filed operating information for utilities in the VACAR region.
This data indicates the amount of capacity on forced outage and capacity constrained by partial outages at the time of the monthly peak load.
For the winter.1978-79 period, the forced outages averaged 3,000 MW while partial outages amounted to an average of 2,500 MW.
The latest available data for December 1979 show a total of approximately 5,000 MW unavailable due to forced and. partial outages.
Based on this actual data, it appears that information presented.
by Duke Power Company may be too conservative and that an operating reserve margin in VACAR must be at least 15 percent to assure reliable service.
The only non-VACAR resources that are included in the above evaluation is a purchase of 114 MW by Duke Power Company from the Southeastern Power Administration. The VACAR region has substantial transmission ties to other regions and could continuously import up to 2,000 MW. An assured source of power from outside the region, when two Oconee units are shut down, will improve the VACAR reserve margin.
Utilizing a significant portion of the region's transfer capability for continuous support limits the capability to import additional power should another unexpected event occur.
In order to have an adequate operating reserve margin of 15 percent in February, VACAR would need assured imports from other regions totaling 1,724 MW or 86.2 percent of their transfer capability.
In March the requirements would be 721 MW which represents 36.1 percent of the capacity of the transmission ties.
DOE has also evaluated the effect of a simultaneous shutdown of two Oconee units on the Duke Power Company system. The expected February Duke operating reserve margin is a negative 1.0 percent with the simultaneous outage of two Oconee units.
The March situation would only improve to an 8.5 percent operating reserve margin. These margins are not considered to be sufficient to.provide adequate system reliability. The Duke situation is similar.to the VACAR analysis in that an assured source of power from another utility, either outside VACAR or another.VACAR member, could provide the necessary augmentation to internal reserves for Duke to provide reliable service to its customers.
4 This analysis deals only with electric system reliability and energy supply; it does not consider the need to reduce operating costs and conserve oil or natural gas.
The simultaneous outage of Oconee Units 2 and 3 will..probably result.in increased costs to the consumers of electricity in the Carolinas because of the resulting increased use of oil and gas.
The above represents an analysis done utilizing the available data.
Circumstances in this power study situation can change on a daily basis, but this evaluation recognizes the more probable variations.
Any dramatic changes in the relevant time frame will recuire further evaluation.
I will appreciate notification of your decision regarding the shutdown of Oconee Units 2 and 3 to implement the TMI "Short-Term" Lessons Learned changes.
Sincerely, Richard E. Weiner, Director Division of Power Supply and Reliability Economic Regulatory Administration