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MONTHYEARML13354B8792013-12-31031 December 2013 Acceptance Review Results License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Reactor Generating Plants Project stage: Acceptance Review ML14014A2792014-01-15015 January 2014 Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action License Amendment Request to Adopt National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Reactor Generating Project stage: Acceptance Review ML14204A8002014-07-24024 July 2014 Regulatory Audit in Support of the License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based, Fire Protection Program Project stage: Other ML14233A3662014-08-28028 August 2014 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Project stage: RAI ML14295A3072014-10-27027 October 2014 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Project stage: RAI MNS-14-090, Response to August 28, 2014 NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program2014-11-12012 November 2014 Response to August 28, 2014 NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Project stage: Request MNS-14-095, Response to August 28, 2014, NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program2014-12-12012 December 2014 Response to August 28, 2014, NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Project stage: Request MNS-15-002, Response to August 28, 2014, & October 27, 2014, NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program2015-01-26026 January 2015 Response to August 28, 2014, & October 27, 2014, NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Project stage: Request ML15099A5872015-04-14014 April 2015 Duke Energy Slides for April 14 Meeting on NFPA-805 for Catawba, McGuire and Robinson Project stage: Meeting ML15125A3282015-05-0808 May 2015 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Project stage: RAI ML15147A6282015-06-18018 June 2015 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Project stage: RAI MNS-15-052, Response to June 18, 2015, NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program2015-07-15015 July 2015 Response to June 18, 2015, NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Project stage: Request ML15225A4892015-08-18018 August 2015 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Project stage: RAI MNS-15-066, Response to NRC June 18, 2015 and May 8, 2015 Requests for Additional Information Re License Amendment Request to Implement Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program2015-08-20020 August 2015 Response to NRC June 18, 2015 and May 8, 2015 Requests for Additional Information Re License Amendment Request to Implement Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Project stage: Request MNS-15-070, Response to August 18, 2015, NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program2015-09-0909 September 2015 Response to August 18, 2015, NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Project stage: Request MNS-15-099, Submittal Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program2016-01-14014 January 2016 Submittal Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Project stage: Request MNS-16-039, Submittal Revising Attachment s of License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program2016-04-26026 April 2016 Submittal Revising Attachment s of License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Project stage: Request ML16175A0222016-07-12012 July 2016 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Project stage: RAI MNS-16-077, Responding to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program2016-09-29029 September 2016 Responding to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Project stage: Request ML16302A1122016-11-0404 November 2016 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program (CAC Nos. MF2934 and MF2935) Project stage: RAI ML16077A1352016-12-0606 December 2016 Issuance of Amendments Regarding National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805 Project stage: Approval 2015-06-18
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000369/20230042024-01-31031 January 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2023004 and 05000370/2023004 ML24019A1392024-01-25025 January 2024 TSTF 505 and 50.69 Audit Summary ML24019A2002024-01-24024 January 2024 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information for NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection IR 05000369/20234022023-12-14014 December 2023 Material Control and Accounting Program Inspection Report 05000369/2023402 and 05000370/2023402 ML23317A2272023-11-17017 November 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Transmittal of Dam Inspection Report - Non-Proprietary ML23317A3462023-11-14014 November 2023 Duke Fleet - Correction Letter to License Amendment Nos. 312 & 340 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-554, Revision 1 IR 05000369/20230032023-10-24024 October 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2023003 and 05000370/2023003; and Inspection Report 07200038/2023001 IR 05000369/20240102023-10-13013 October 2023 Notification of McGuire Nuclear Station Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Report 05000369, 370/2024010 IR 05000369/20230102023-10-13013 October 2023 Age Related Degradation Inspection Report 05000369/2023010 and 05000370/2023010 ML23256A0882023-09-25025 September 2023 Issuance of Alternative to Steam Generator Welds IR 05000369/20233012023-09-20020 September 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station - NRC Examination Report 05000369/2023301 and 05000370/2023301 ML23230A0652023-08-31031 August 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Relief Request Use of Later Edition of ASME Code ML23195A0782023-08-29029 August 2023 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-554, Revision 1 IR 05000369/20230052023-08-25025 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 (Report 05000369/2023005 and 05000370/2023005) IR 05000369/20230022023-07-28028 July 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2023002 and 05000370/2023002 IR 05000369/20234202023-07-24024 July 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 050003692023420 and 050003702023420 ML23206A0092023-07-24024 July 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station Operator Licensing Written Examination Approval 05000369/2023301 and 05000370/2023301 ML23207A0762023-07-14014 July 2023 EN 56557 - Update to Part 21 Report Re Potential Defect with Trane External Auto/Stop Emergency Stop Relay Card Pn: XI2650728-06 ML23159A2712023-06-20020 June 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 - Relief Request Impractical Reactor System Welds ML23237A2672023-06-13013 June 2023 June 13, 2002 - Meeting Announcement - McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations 50-369, 50-370 and 50-413, 50-414 ML23159A0052023-06-0505 June 2023 56557-EN 56557 - Paragon - Redlined ML23115A2122023-05-0101 May 2023 Review of the Spring 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML23118A0762023-05-0101 May 2023 Approval for Use of Specific Provision of a Later Edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI IR 05000369/20230012023-05-0101 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2023001 and 05000370/2023001 ML23094A1832023-04-18018 April 2023 Audit Plan TSTF-505, Rev. 2, RITSTF Initiative 4B & 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization & Treatment of Structures, Systems & Components for Nuclear Power Reactors (EPIDs L-2023-LLA-0021 & L-2023-LLA-0022) ML22332A4932023-03-10010 March 2023 William States Lee III 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Relocation of the Emergency Operations Facility IR 05000369/20220062023-03-0101 March 2023 Annual Assessment Letter for McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 (NRC Inspection Report 05000369/2022006 and 05000370 2022006) IR 05000369/20220042023-01-30030 January 2023 Mcguire Nuclear Station - Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2022004 and 05000370/2022004 IR 05000369/20224202023-01-11011 January 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000369/2022420 and 05000370/2022420 ML22356A0512022-12-14014 December 2022 Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division, Letter Regarding Potential Efect in a Configuration of the 11/2 Inch Quick Disconnect Connector Cable Assemblies Supplied to Duke Energy (See Attached Spreadsheet) for a Total of 460 of Connectors Only Suppl ML22347A1512022-12-13013 December 2022 William B. Mcguire Nuclear Station Notification of Licensed Operator Initial Examination 05000369/2023301 and 05000370/2023301 ML22340A6662022-12-0808 December 2022 Summary of November 30, 2022, Public Meeting with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC for McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2 Proposed LAR to Adopt TSTF-505, Rev. 2 and 10 CFR 50.69 Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems ML22290A1012022-11-29029 November 2022 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 326 and 305, Regarding Changes to Technical Specification 3.4.3, Reactor Coolant System Pressure Temperature Limits ML22096A0032022-11-18018 November 2022 McGuire Nuclear Station and Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Authorization of RA-19-0352 Regarding Use of Alternative for RPV Head Closure Stud Examinations ML22256A2532022-11-14014 November 2022 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-541, Rev. 2 IR 05000369/20220032022-10-27027 October 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2022003 and 05000370/2022003 IR 05000369/20220112022-09-29029 September 2022 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000369/2022011 and 05000370/2022011 ML22266A0782022-09-26026 September 2022 William B. Mcguire Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Relief Request ML22258A0302022-09-15015 September 2022 Evacuation Time Estimate Reports ML22242A0022022-09-12012 September 2022 Issuance of Amendments to Adopt TSTF 569, Revision 2, Revise Response Time Testing Definition IR 07200038/20220012022-09-12012 September 2022 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Report 07200038/2022001 ML22230B6132022-09-0101 September 2022 Review of the Draft Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant and McGuire Nuclear Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Decommissioning Funding Plans IR 05000369/20220052022-08-29029 August 2022 Updated Inspection Plan for McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 05000369/2022005 and 05000370/2022005 IR 05000369/20220022022-07-26026 July 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2022002 and 05000370/2022002 ML22215A2502022-07-25025 July 2022 EN 55960 - Update - Curtiss Wright ML22164A0362022-07-19019 July 2022 Mcguire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Issuance of Amendments to Revise the Conditional Exemption of the End-Of-Cycle Moderator Temperature Coefficient Measurement Methodology (EPID L-2021-LLA-0198) Public ML22175A0162022-06-24024 June 2022 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information for NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection ML22046A0222022-06-14014 June 2022 Issuance of Amendments to Adopt TSTF-439, Eliminate Second Completion Times Limiting Time from Discovery of Failure to Meet an LCO ML22111A3112022-05-16016 May 2022 Letter Issuing Exemption to McGuire IR 05000369/20224012022-05-12012 May 2022 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000369/2022401 and 05000370/2022401 2024-01-31
[Table view] Category:Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARML23151A3482023-05-30030 May 2023 Duke Fleet - Request for Additional Information Proposed Alternative for Pressurizer Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) ML23142A2732023-05-22022 May 2023 Duke Fleet - Request for Additional Information Proposed Alternative for Steam Generator Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) ML23030B9032023-01-30030 January 2023 Formal Release of RAIs for McGuire Unit 1, Relief Request Impractical RPV Rx Coolant System Welds, Due March 1, 2023 (Email) ML23017A2232023-01-13013 January 2023 Request for Additional Information (RAI) Issuance for McGuire Unit 1 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report (Email) ML22175A0162022-06-24024 June 2022 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information for NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection ML22115A1412022-04-25025 April 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Duke Common EOF Relocation - Request for Addition Information ML22102A2962022-04-13013 April 2022 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure Response to Request for Additional Information ML22063B1782022-03-0909 March 2022 Request for Additional Information Regarding LAR for Revision to the Conditional Exemption of the End of Cycle Moderator Temperature Coefficient Measurement Methodology (EPID L-2021-LLA-0198) NON-PROPRIETARY ML22010A0732022-01-0606 January 2022 50.59 Inspection Information Request ML21354A8612021-12-15015 December 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - Duke Fleet Request RA-19-0352 - Alternative for RPV Closure Stud Exams (L-2020-LLR-0156) ML21267A2782021-09-23023 September 2021 50.59 Inspection Information Request ML21252A0532021-09-0808 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Formal Release of Rais, 30 Day Response, Mcguire Relief Request, Ref: Later Edition Addenda ASME Code, Section XI, 50.55a(g)(4)(iv) ML21103A0542021-04-13013 April 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Extension to Request for Additional Information AMS Topical Report AMS-TR-0720R1 ML21067A6742021-03-0505 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Final Request for Additional Information AMS Topical Report AMS-TR-0720R1 ML21049A2632021-02-0404 February 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - Duke Energy Fleet License Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Plan ML21020A0682021-01-20020 January 2021 Notification of an NRC Fire Protection Team Inspection (FPTI) (NRC Inspection Report 05000369/2021011 and 05000370/2021011) and Request for Information (RFI) ML20346A0212020-12-10010 December 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Formal Release of RAIs - License Amendment to Change TS 3.8.1 Due Jan. 29, 2021 ML20323A4072020-11-18018 November 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - Brunswick License Exemption Request from 10CFR73 Annual Force on Force Exercise Requirements (EPIC L-2020-LLE-0180) ML20216A3512020-08-0303 August 2020 Mcquire U-1 ISI RFI ML20101L3132020-04-10010 April 2020 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information ML20071D0962020-03-0505 March 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 Delay in Update of the Code of Record for in Service Inspections ML20050D3382020-02-21021 February 2020 Letter RAI 1 MAGNASTOR-Catawba and McGuire Exemptions with Enclosure ML19354B6372020-01-0707 January 2020 Exemption Request for NAC Magnastor Cask Loaded to Incorrect Helium Backfill Density Request for Additional Information ML19011A1372019-01-10010 January 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Duke Energy Fleet RAIs - Relief Request 18-GO-001 - Proposed Alternative for Depth Sizing Qualification Examination of Welds (L-2018-LLR-0117) ML19007A3422018-12-21021 December 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Duke Energy Fleet Draft RAIs - Relief Request 18-GO-001 - Proposed Alternative for Depth Sizing Qualification Examination of Welds (L-2018-LLR-0117) ML18352A8052018-12-18018 December 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - MRP-227 Review ML18306A9372018-11-0202 November 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Esps LAR ML18285A0812018-10-11011 October 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - TORMIS LAR RA-18-0011, Response to Request for Supplemental Information Regarding Duke Energy'S Response to GL 2016-01 Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools2018-05-30030 May 2018 Response to Request for Supplemental Information Regarding Duke Energy'S Response to GL 2016-01 Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools ML18138A4662018-05-18018 May 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - TORMIS LAR ML18088B2822018-03-29029 March 2018 Requalification Program Inspection - McGuire Nuclear Station ML18057A2182018-02-23023 February 2018 Enclosurequest for Additional Information (Letter to A. Zaremba Request for Additional Information for Review of Duke Energy'S Decommissioning Funding Plan Update) ML17331B1492017-11-21021 November 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Nsws One-Time LAR (CACs MG0242 and MG0243, EPID L-2017-LLA-0299) ML17317B0932017-11-13013 November 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Irlt (CACs MF9020 and MF9021; EPID L-2016-LLA-0032) ML17230A1512017-08-15015 August 2017 Notification of Inspection of Inspection and Request for Information ML17192A4842017-07-11011 July 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Duke Energy Fleet RAIs Alternative for Reactor Pressure Vessel Flange Threads Examination (MF9513 to MF9521) ML17135A0322017-05-12012 May 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire TSTF-197 ML17114A4992017-04-17017 April 2017 Emergency Preparedness Inspection and Request for Information ML16302A1122016-11-0404 November 2016 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program (CAC Nos. MF2934 and MF2935) MNS-16-077, Responding to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program2016-09-29029 September 2016 Responding to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-informed Performance-Based Fire Protection Program ML16228A2612016-08-15015 August 2016 Email - McGuire Unit No. 1: Request for Additional Informati- Relief Request 16-MN-003 Alternative to Defect Removal Prior to Performing Temporary Repair Activities on Three-Inch-Diameter Nuclear Service Water System Piping. ML16194A2862016-07-12012 July 2016 E-Mail - Mcguirai Ice Condenser Door Position Alternate Verification, (ML16089A228) CAC Nos. MF7526 and MF7527 ML16175A0222016-07-12012 July 2016 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program ML16014A6882016-01-20020 January 2016 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Action Level Scheme ML15348A2602015-12-17017 December 2015 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Use an Alternative Fission Gas Gap Release Fraction ML15320A3862015-11-19019 November 2015 RAI LAR to Adopt TSTF-523 ML15314A3592015-11-10010 November 2015 Duke Energy Draft RAIs Request to Adopt TSTF-523 (CAC Nos. MF6413-MF6422) ML15314A3562015-11-10010 November 2015 E-mail from J. Whited to A. Zaremba Duke Energy Draft RAIs License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-523 (CAC Nos. MF6413-MF6422) ML15289A5552015-10-26026 October 2015 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension ML15289A5852015-10-26026 October 2015 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Regarding Residual Heat Removal System 2023-05-30
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 June 18, 2015 Mr. Steven D. Capps Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078-8985
SUBJECT:
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2: REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO IMPLEMENT A RISK-INFORMED, PERFORMANCE-BASED FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM (TAC NOS. MF2934 AND MF2935)
Dear Mr. Capps:
By letter dated September 26, 2013 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML13276A126), Duke Energy. Carolinas, LLC (Duke) submitted a license amendment request to change its fire protection program to one based on the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard-805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants," 2001 Edition.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory*Commission staff is continuing its review and has determined that
Sincerely, rQ~,~~nt Project *Manager Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAI)
ADOPTION OF NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION STANDARD 805 FOR FIRE PROTECTION DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC (DUKE)
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-369. 50-370 By letter dated September 26, 2013 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML13276A126), Duke submitted a license amendment request to change its fire protection program to one based on the National Fire Protection Association Standard-805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants," 2001 Edition (NFPA 805). The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff is continuing its review and has determined that additional information is needed in the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) area as follows.
Follow-ups to November 12, 2014, December 12, 2014, and January 26, 2015, February 27, 2015, and March 13, 2015 PRA McGuire RAI Responses PRA RAI 03.a.01 The response to PRA RAI 03.a provides the results of an uncertainty analysis on the total fire core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF), that includes accounting for state of knowledge correlations, but no corresponding results are provided for delta-risk. Provide the results of the uncertainty analysis impact on the delta risk results and discuss if the RG 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis" risk guidelines are met using the mean results.
PRA RAI 03.b.01 The response to PRA RAI 03.b identifies that the following RAI responses resulted in changes to the PRA:
- FM RAI 04 The response mentions the following RAls as being discussed in parts A or D:
- FM RAI 01.j The response lists some RAls which were "addressed" in the aggregate PRA, other RAls for which the PRA was "adjusted" in the aggregate PRA, and finally some RAls that are "discussed." The difference between addressed, adjusted, a.nd discussed is not explained and oftentimes the responses to the original RAls do not describe what specific changes were or could be made to the PRA. Part b of RAI 3 requested a summary of the disposition of each issue in the aggregate PRA and the post-transition PRA. This was not provided. Please provide a table with the requested information.
PRA RAI 12.01 In PRA 12, the NRC staff noted the discussion in license amendment request (LAR)
Section V.2.7 that describes two main control room (MCR) abandonment on loss-of-habitability scenarios. The NRC staff requested "[a)n explanation of how the [conditional core damage probabilities] CCDPs account for the range if probabilities for properly shutting down the plant, and discussion of how they were applied in the scenario analysis." Three different levels of fire severity were provided as examples illustrating the source of the range of shutdown probabilities. The response stated, in part, that:
"Each MGR abandonment scenario encompasses the range of results. from few functional failures to multiple functional failures, each condition (b.i, b.ii, & b.iii) leading to the most severe end state where the SSF is the sole remaining success path after abandonment. In the MNS Fire PRA, for the abandonment scenarios, the number of fire induced failures and spurious operations is based on the panel of origin that produces the highest conditional core damage probability (CCOP). Therefore, the abandonment scenarios account for the worst case impacts on the SSF regardless of a potentially more favorable outcome."
The response further clarifies that:
. .. main control board frequency was applied in the quantification of the abandonment scenario for the main control board (MCB) fire. The remaining fire area wide ignition frequency (including.
electrical cabinet and transient frequency), was applied to the abandonment scenario for the non-MCB fires in the control room."
Although the response to states that two scenarios are modelled (one following MCB fires and another following non-MCB fires) it is unclear whether a single CCDP/CLERP is used for the two abandonment scenarios. No discussion or justification was provided as to why not accounting for the range of probabilities in the fire PRA will result in a well characterized or conservative risk change-in-risk estimate. The NRC staff requests the following information to determine whether accounting for the range of probabilities for properly shutting down the plant following loss of MCR habitability would change the acceptable change-in-risk estimates to unacceptable estimates.
a) Identify the fire frequency, CCDP, and conditional large early release probability (CLERP) assigned to each abandonment scenarios for both the compliant and the variant plant.
b) Explain any differences between the compliant and the variant plant PRA models for these abandonment s.cenarios.
c) A claim of "worst case impact" is insufficient when the meaning of worst case can vary as it does with c~ange-in-risk calculations. Summarize hol/\! the change in risk calculation is performed and justify that the change-in-risk estimates from these loss of habitability abandonment scenarios is well characterized or conservative.
PRA RAI 13.01 The response to PRA RAI 13 discussed how the change-in-risk was calculated for fire areas (other than the MCR and cable room) that are designated as safe shutdown facility (SSF) areas in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R Section 111.G.3. This response yvas augmented with information provided in the slides for the public meeting on April 14, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15099A587), which included further explanation about how the compliant and post-transition plants for these areas were modelled in the Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (FPRA). Based on the methods used by McGuire in the FPRA as described in the meeting, please provide the following:
a) Confirm that the equipment damaged by each fire in each SSF area has been identified using the McGuire fire damage methodology and is assumed to fail in the FPRA.
b) Confirm that all applicable equipment undamaged by each fire is nominally available to mitigate the fire, i.e., is credited in the PRA model. Summarize any differences between the nominally available equipment in the complaint versus the variant plant.
c) Confirm that each of the SSF fire areas has been reviewed by the NRC and has been determined to meet the alternative shutdown option in Section 111.G.3 of Appendix R and all the criteria laid out in Section 2.4 b) of RG 1.205, "Risk-Informed, Performance Based Fire Protection For Existing Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants." Provide any limitations and conditions associated with any of the areas and, if any, clarify why such
issues are addressed by or not relevant to the FPRA analysis.
d) Summarize the procedures and process used by the operating crews to mitigate fires in the SSF areas using the surviving equipment in the area.
e) Provide the procedural step(s) including the decision guidelines directing the operating crews to make the decision to activate the SSF and subsequently establish control of the plant at the SSF.
f) Summarize the proceduralized steps directing the operating crews to transfer command and control from the MCR to the SSF.
g) Summarize the operating training in the activation and the use of the SSF .
. h) LAR Section V.2.6 and the response to PRARAI 13 state that the MCR is only abandoned (i.e., command and control is transferred to the SSF) on loss of control room habitability. Clarify this statement in light of the April 14, 2015, presentation and the statement that the SSF is a PCS as defined in RG 1.205 that indicates that command and control must be transferred to the SSF on loss of control.
i) Explain how the variance from deterministic requirements (VFDRs) within the SSF areas were identified. LAR Section W .2.1 and the response to PRA RAI 13 explains that, generally, the compliant plant for both abandonment and non-abandonment scenarios was evaluated by "toggling" off or excluding basic events to remove the fire-induced failures associated with the VFDRs. Clarify, relative to the variant plant model, how excluded basic events are identified and removed from the compliant plant
. quantification.
PRA RAI 13.02 The response to PRA RAI 13 states that the compliance assessment for fire'areas 01 (UI and U2), 02, 03, 04 (U1 and U2), 13 (U1 and U2), 14 (U1 and U2), 19, 20, 21 {U1 and U2), 24 (U1 and U2), and 25 (UI and U2) relies upon transfer of primary command and control to the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) as the Nuclear Safety Performance (NSP) success strategy (i.e., the NSP success path).
- a) Clarify how the 10 CFR 50.48{c) rule (including the NFAP-805 Standard as incorporated by reference) and associated guidance, allows the assignment of the remotely located
. SSF facility as the single NSP success for all fires in some fire areas outside of the MCR.
b) The response to RAI 13.b states, the, "[p]er MNS plant procedures, only control room habitability due to the fire will cause a complete abandonment of the MCR (as opposed to implementing SSF functions while maintaining command and control in the MCR as discussed in the response to PRA RAI 13.a)." According to the guidance in RG 1.205, all actions to recover NSP successes strategies and taken outside of the MCR while maintaining command and control in the MCR are recovery actions. Why are there no recovery actions identified for these areas?
c) How and when (i.e., in what PRA accident sequences) is the NSP SSF success strategy tor the aforementioned fire areas modelled in the compliant plant PRA model, and in the post-transition plant PRA model.
PRA RAI 19.a.01 The response to PRA RAI 19.a states that the response to PRA RAI 03 would use the methods in draft FAQ 14-0009 to evaluate propagation of fires outside of well-sealed and robustly-secured motor control centers (MCCs) greater than 440 volts. The analyses described in draft FAQ 14-0009 has changed considerably since the first draft dated July 1, 2014. To resolve this issue use the method described in the final version of FPRA FAQ 14-0009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15119A176).in the FPRA and provide updated results as part of the aggregate change-in-risk analysis requested in PRA RAI 03.
- PRA RAI 19.b.01 The response to PRA RAI 19.b states that internal spurious operations (hot shorts) within well-sealed MCCs were removed from the FPRA when the unrelated severity factor of 0.2 was removed. The RAI response asserts that the results are overly conservative after removing the severity factor to justify removing hot shorts. A general claim of overly conservative is insufficient to justify changing modelling assumptions. Guidance on including fire-induced spurious hot short in the panel wiring's conductor bundles within a cabinet is available in NUREG/CR-7150, "Joint Assessment of Cable Damage and Quantification of Effects from Fire (JACQUE-FIRE)," Volume 1, Section 6.6.3, and Volume 2, Section 7.4. To resolve this issue apply the guidance in NUREG/CR-7150 in the FPRA and provide updated results as part of the aggregate change-in-risk analysis requested in PRA RAI 03.
PRA RAI 24 During final review of the implementation items, it was discovered that McGuire's Implementation Item 12 program does not provide confidence that the final change in risk from transition meets the acceptance guidelir:ies. The licensee proposes that "If the revised Fire PRA shows a risk increase of greater than 1E-07 for GDF or 1E-08 for LERF then enter the results into the corrective action program to determine the cause of the risk increase and determine corrective actions." Entering an increase greater than the self-approval guidelines into the corrective action program does not provide confidence that the final result of any corrective action will be a transition change in risk that is consistent with the acceptance guidelines. Furthermore, unanticipated risk increases greater than the self-approval guideline generally need to be reduced by fixing the cause of exceedance (i.e., the change itself),
otherwise the results and the proposed change (if any) should be submitted to the NRG staff according to the license condition. Provide an Implementation Item to verify that the cumulative change-in-risk does not exceed RG 1.174 guidelines once all the modifications
- and procedural implementation items are completed.
ML15147A628 *via E-mail OFf.ICE NRR/LPL2-1/PM NRR/LPL2-1/LA NRR/APLNBC NRR/LPL2-1/BC NRR/LPL2-1/PM SRosenberg*
NAME BMartin SFigueroa RPascarelli BMartin (LFields for)
DATE 06/18/15 05/28/15 06/18/15 06/18/15 06/18/15