ML15118A054
| ML15118A054 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/1995 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Thompson D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15118A049 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-95-24, 50-270-95-24, 50-287-95-24, 50-369-95-26, 50-370-95-26, 50-413-95-23, 50-414-95-23, NUDOCS 9601190031 | |
| Download: ML15118A054 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1995024
Text
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UNITED STATES
o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
Report Nos: 50-413/95-23, 50-414/95-23, 50-369/95-26, 50-370/95-26,
50-269/95-24, 50-270/95-24 and 50-287/95-24
Licensee:
Duke Power Company
ATTN: M. S. Tuckman
Senior Vice President
Nuclear Services
P. 0. Box 1007
Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1007
Docket Nos.:
50-413, 50-414, 50-369
License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52
50-370, 50-269, 50-270
and 50-287
and DPR-55
Facility Names: Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Power Stations
Inspection Cond cted: Nove ber 13-17, 1995
Inspec ,or:
/
-I
J9
Day d Thomps n, Safeguards Inspector, DRS
Date Signed
Accompanying Pers
e : Lori tratton, Safeg rds Inspector, DRS
Approved by:
/ 1 -' 2
7
Pau
.
Fr drickson, Chief
Date Signed
Special Inspection Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
This announced inspection was conducted at the Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee
Nuclear Stations, as well as at the Corporate Office in Charlotte, North
Carolina. The licensee's Access Authorization Program, as required by 10 CFR
73.56, was inspected. Specifically, background investigations, psychological
evaluations, and the training of supervisors were evaluated. The inspectors
also reviewed the licensee's appeal process, and the protection afforded
personal information. In addition, audits of contractors were reviewed.
Results:
Two violations were identified. First, the licensee was granting unescorted
access before all required elements of the Access Authorization Program were
satisfied. This is noted as Non-Cited Violation 95-23-01, 95-26-01, and
.95-24-01
(paragraph 2.b.). Secondly, the licensee allowed a vendor to
continue to grant unescorted access after the program had been found
unacceptable during a licensee audit. This is noted as Violation 95-23-02,
9601190031 951222
PDR ADOCK 05000269
G)
95-26-02, and 95-24-02 (paragraph 2.h.)
Two strengths were noted in the
areas of appeals (paragraph 2.g.) and record control (paragraph 2.e.).
The
licensee has an excellent appeal process which was evidenced by the licensee's
detailed form documenting the appeal hearing. In addition, the licensee was
providing excellent control of access authorization records. Records are
secured and access limited to those individuals with direct responsibility for
implement the Access Authorization Program. As noted in the Non-Cited
Violation and the Violation, problems were identified with the process of
granting unescorted access and with ensuring that vendor audit findings were
promptly resolved.
SII
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- A. Barnette, Human Resources Specialist, Organization Effectiveness,
Duke Power Company (DPC)
- S. Copp, Manager, Regulatory Affairs, DPC
- R. Cross, Technical Specialist, Regulatory Compliance, McGuire Nuclear
Station
- C. Edwards, Human Resources Associate, DPC
- R. Eller, Nuclear Security, DPC
- S. Francis, Quality Assurance Specialist, DPC
- F. Johnson, Human Resources Consultant, DPC
- J. Jones, Human Resources Associate, DPC
- D. Myers, Organization Effectiveness, DPC
- D. Rogers, Human Resources Associate, DPC
- I. Rose, Manager, Workforce Processing, DPC
- J. Winn, Human Resources Manager, DPC
- Attended exit interview
The NRC inspectors also interviewed 36 randomly chosen licensee and
contractor personnel, to include supervisors, at the Corporate Office
and at the three nuclear stations.
2.
Access Authorization Program (AAP) (TI 2515/127)
On April 25, 1991, the Commission published 10 CFR 73.56, Personnel
Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants, which
required licensees to fully implement their AAP by April 27, 1992. By
letter dated July 1, 1994, the licensee submitted Revision 0 to the
Catawba, McGuire and Oconee Physical Security Plans committing to the
requirements of 10 CFR 73.56 and NRC Regulatory Guide 5.66, Access
Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants.
The Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) has published
NUMARC 89-01, "Industry Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Access
Authorization Programs," dated August 1989, which was adopted by NRC's
Regulatory Guide 5.66 as an Appendix.
a.
AAP Administration
The licensee's AAP is solely managed and implemented at the
Corporate level by the Manager of Workforce Processing. All AAP
functions, procedures and records are found at the Corporate
Office. Site/Location Security has primary responsibility for
implementing and administration of the program for authorizing
unescorted access into the protected areas at the respective
stations. Site Organization Effectiveness (OE) personnel are
responsible for processing all incoming and outgoing workers of
2
Duke Power Company, its subsidiaries, and non-licensee
(vendor/contractor, NRC, and INPO).
There are no AAP personnel,
procedures, or records at the nuclear stations.
Contractors which provide screening of their own employees are
required to furnish the licensee with any derogatory information.
The Manager of Workforce Processing or the designee makes the
determination as to the suitability of the applicant. Appeals
(see paragraph 2.g.) are the responsibility of the Manager of
Workforce Processing.
The licensee's AAP administration appeared to be adequate and
effective. There were no violations of regulatory requirements
identified in this area.
b.
Background Investigations
The Manager of Workforce Processing is responsible for the Duke
Power Company Access Authorization Program. The seven nuclear
access specialists who report to this supervisor are responsible
for processing the applications for authorization of access. The
background investigations for the licensee are conducted by a
contractor or corporate personnel.
Self-screening contractors
perform their own background investigations or utilize a
subcontractor.
The human resources specialist and associates who prepare the
access authorization documentation were interviewed and found
knowledgeable of the licensee's and NRC's AAP requirements.
Records of adjudication of unfavorable termination were reviewed
and the documentation was found to be in accordance with NRC and
the licensee's requirements. Background investigations appeared
to be thorough and well documented. The licensee follows "Access
Authorization Program," Revision 7, dated October 16, 1995, a
procedure which clearly delineates the process of obtaining and
processing fingerprints and the review of resulting information.
The procedure provides a matrix for adjudicating unfavorable
information. The procedure was adequate, except for Paragraph 6,
which stated that "when temporary unescorted access authorization
is granted, a "T"
will be added to the "clearance authorization"
field on the Security Training System (STS). After the five-year
background investigation has been completed the "T" will be
changed to a "Y."
The "T" designates temporary unescorted access.
The "Y" designates final unescorted access. The inspectors
determined that the five-year background investigation is
completed before the fingerprints were returned from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
Therefore, the personnel who were
granted temporary unescorted access were being granted final
unescorted before the criminal history check was complete.
3
Paragraph 6.4 of NUMARC 89-01 states in part that prior to
granting temporary unescorted access, the licensee must show
evidence that a request (fingerprint card) for a criminal history
check has been submitted to the NRC. Paragraph 7.1, states in
part that prior to granting unescorted access the following must
be considered, "a criminal history without adequate evidence of
rehabilitation which establishes untrustworthiness or
unreliability."
10 CFR 73.57, states in part, "the criminal history records check
shall be used prior to making a determination for granting
unescorted access."
Contrary to the above, the licensee was granting individuals who
only met the criteria for temporary unescorted access, final
unescorted access by changing the "T," temporary unescorted access
to a "Y", final unescorted access, prior to the criminal history
check being returned from the FBI.
The inspectors, in a sample review of the unescorted access
records, did not identify any individuals who were transferred
with a final unescorted access authorization prior to the criminal
history check being completed.
Prior to the inspectors' departure
the licensee took immediate corrective action to discontinue
granting unescorted access prior to the criminal history check
being returned.
This NRC iden Section v.aton is not being cited
because criteria specified in Section V.A of the NRC Enforcement
Policy were satisfied (NCV 95-23-01, 95-26-01, and 95-24-01).
C.
Behavioral Observation Program (BOP)
Paragraph 9.0 of NUMARC No. 89-01, Continual Behavior Observation
Program, requires that supervisors be given training in the
detection of aberrant behavior, to include signs of drug and
alcohol abuse as well as observing personnel for changing
behavioral traits and patterns indicative of an adverse trend of
their trustworthiness and reliability. Additionally, Paragraph
9.0 also requires that individuals with unescorted access
authorization must be notified of their responsibility to report
any arrest that may impact upon their trustworthiness.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's test for training
supervisors in detecting aberrant behavior. The inspectors
verified that aberrant behavior training is provided to
supervisors when they are appointed to a supervisory position and
annually during the site nuclear employee training. The
inspectors noted during this review (and substantiated during
interviews of supervisors) that the training for detecting
aberrant behavior was largely based upon detecting the signs of
drug and alcohol abuse. There appeared to be little training
relative to the behavioral changes indicative of a lack of
trustworthiness and reliability of personnel.
The licensee
4
acknowledged the inspectors' observation and were considering
adding questions to the site access training test to re-enforce
the need to apply aberrant behavior as part of the Access
Authorization Program.
Additionally, the individuals were interviewed as to their
understanding of personnel reliability and their responsibility to
report any arrest. The individuals appeared to have a recall of
this responsibility but were confused as to the extent necessary
to report any arrest. The inspectors reviewed the nuclear
employee test and again did not find a test question to re-enforce
the trainees need to remember what arrest to report. Overall, the
personnel interviewed recalled that their responsibility for
reporting any arrest varied from any contact with law enforcement
personnel to the need to report only felony convictions. The
licensee acknowledged the inspectors' observation and stated that
they would consider adding questions on arrest requirements to the
site access test.
There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this
area.
d.
Psychological Testing
The licensee and the contractors administer the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory 2 (MMPI) which, if warranted, is
followed by a clinical interview. The inspectors reviewed testing
procedures and visited facilities at the licensee's Corporate
Office, and at the McGuire, Catawba, and Oconee stations. All
personnel responsible for testing required positive identification
from the applicant. Facilities accommodated the proctoring of the
tests, were appropriately secure, and test materials were secured
when not in use, except at Catawba where the inspector found that
the cabinet in which the tests are stored was not locked because
the key to the cabinet was missing. The licensee took immediate
corrective action to secure the cabinet.
Required certification of successful completion of the MMPI was
present in all records reviewed. The licensee's practice of
psychological testing was determined to be adequate.
There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this
area.
e.
Records and Privacy Information
Review of records, discussion with licensee and contractor
personnel, and review of records storage facilities and methods
disclosed that information was safeguarded against unauthorized
disclosure and accessible only to those involved in the access
authorization process or those auditing the program.
5
The records did not appear well organized and for the inspectors
to determine the actual date that elements of the AAP had been
completed, required the licensee to search other supporting
documentation. The licensee stated that they would consider
adding documentation to the records to reflect the dates each
element of the AAP is completed, in the form such as a checklist.
The records contained adequate documentation to support the AAP.
There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this
area.
f.
Clearances
Prior to the onsite portions of this inspection, the NRC's
Resident Inspectors provided randomly chosen names of 36
individuals (licensees and contractors) who had authorized
unescorted access to each of the licensee's nuclear stations. The
clearance files for these individuals were reviewed at the
Corporate Office.
The inspectors reviewed clearance records for personnel who had
been grandfathered, transferred, reinstated, newly hired, updated,
and temporarily authorized access. Records were accurate and
supported a decision to authorize or deny authorization.
Duke Power Company can accept the results of the entire unescorted
AAP or any part thereof conducted by a contractor or vendor
provided that the contractor or vendor meets the requirements of
this program and that it makes its records available for auditing
by Duke Power Company or its designated representative.
Clearances were well documented and supported with appropriate
documentation. There were no violations of regulatory
requirements noted in this area.
g.
Revocations/Denials and Appeals
The inspectors reviewed several revocations or denial of access
requests issued in 1994 and 1995. It was noted that in all
occasions the reasons were explained to the applicant, and the
review process for appeal was clearly stated. Examples of appeals
being upheld were reviewed. It was noted that Corporate
Organization Effectiveness is responsible for the appeals process
and psychological assessment. The licensee has established an
Appeals Panel which is made up of other designated managers of
Duke Power Company who are equivalent or senior to, and
independent of the Manager of Workforce Processing who made the
initial decision to deny or revoke unescorted access. The
determination from the Appeals Panel is final.
The inspectors
noted that members on the Appeals Panel are trained. Also noted
by the inspectors was a new practice of documenting supporting
appeal panel results. Most of the 36 individuals interviewed on a
6
random basis knew of the appeal process; several of the
contractors did not know that there was an appeal process.. The
inspectors further determined that there were no test questions of
the appeal process during nuclear employee training. The licensee
advised the inspectors (and it was verified in various documents)
that at the time a person is informed of the denial or revocation
the licensee provides in writing the right to appeal.
The appeal process was noted as a strength. There were no
violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.
h.
Audits
The inspectors randomly reviewed four audits of contractors' AAPs;
one was a small local vendor, and the others were major industry
wide contractors. For major contractors, the auditors utilized
audit procedures furnished by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI).
The three audits of the licensee's AAP for major contractors were
reviewed by the inspectors and found to be acceptable.
The inspectors noted that the Duke Power auditors from the Quality
Assurance, Supplier Verification Section, had conducted an audit
of the small local vendor's program in 1992 and 1993. During
those two audits the auditors used a locally developed checklist.
The auditors found minor access authorization records
discrepancies and noted during the 1992 audit the vendor had
failed to establish a method for adjudication of derogatory
information. During the 1993 audit, the auditors found the vendor
did not have Continual Behavior Observation forms in the
individuals' records, as required by their procedure. The audit
findings for both of these audits were forwarded to the vendor for
corrective action. The vendor responded to the audit findings and
the corrective action was deemed, by the auditors, as appropriate
to correct the deficiencies.
On August 5, 1994, while conducting the annual audit, the auditors
noted that the vendor records contained numerous inaccuracies
concerning the background information program, reference checks,
and criminal history checks. Additionally, the auditors found
that the two findings noted above continued to exist and that the
previous corrective action had not been effective.
Based on the auditors' findings, the audit was terminated and the
vendor informed that records needed to be corrected and that the
auditors would return to complete the audit in one to three
months. The inspectors noted that the auditors also informed the
Manager of Workforce Processing, who is responsible for the vendor
program of their findings. The inspectors noted that the auditors
did not provide the vendor a written report of the findings from
the August 1994 audit. The inspectors further determined that the
auditors had not followed up on the audit until eight months later
and when the audit was conducted in April 1995, the auditors
7
determined that the vendor continued to have many of the same
concerns as noted in the August 1994 audit. Again the auditors
terminated the audit, without providing a report to the vendor.
On July 13, 1995, 11 months after the original audit, the auditors
returned and re-audited the vendor program, which was determined
to be satisfactory.
During discussion with the auditors the inspectors determined that
the licensee did not have a procedure for conducting audits of
vendor programs. The licensee indicated that they were in the
process of developing a procedure for auditing vendors and that
they would use the NEI checklist during future audits. They
further stated that they would conduct a 100 percent audit of the
small vendor's records starting on December 5, 1995.
10 CFR 73.56, "Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for
Nuclear Power Plants," requires licensees to establish and
implement a program for granting unescorted access to protected
and vital areas, with a program objective of providing high
assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are
trustworthy and reliable.
NUMARC 89-01, Attachment A, establishes the guidelines for
auditors to use to meet the minimum audit criteria to provide a
high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are
trustworthy and reliable.
Contrary to the above, although the licensee had conducted audits
of the small vendor program the licensee had not provided the
vendor with the results of the audit and had allowed the vendor to
continue to implement the AAP after determining that the vendor's
program failed to assure that individuals who were granted access
by the vendor were trustworthy and reliable. This is noted as a
violation of regulatory requirements (VIO 95-23-02, 95-26-02, and
95-24-02).
Exit Interview
The Exit Interview was held at the Corporate Office on November 17,
1995, with those so noted in paragraph 1 in attendance. The licensee
was advised of the results of the inspection and the findings concerning
the inadequate procedure guidance and the inadequate vendor program.
The licensee was informed that these two issues were potential
violations of regulatory requirements. The licensee was also informed
that the records security and their appeals process were strengths. The
licensee was notified on December 7, 1995, that there would be one non
cited violation concerning background investigations, and a Severity
Level IV violation concerning the audit program. Dissenting comments
were not received from the licensee.