L-14-036, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

ML14365A138
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	12/17/2014
From:	Korsnick M Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, Exelon Generation Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FLL-14-036
Download: ML14365A138 (72)

Text

AMaria Korsnick 4Senior 1Exe0on Generation Vice President, Northeast Operations Chief Nuclear Officer, CENG 100 Constellation Way Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC Baltimore.MD 21202 410-470-5133 Office 443-213-6739 Fax www.exeloncorp.com maria.korsnick@exeloncorp.com 10 CFR 50.54(f)

FLL- 14-036 December 17, 2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69 NRC Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318

Subject:

Exelon Generation Company, LLC Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

References:

1. NRC Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3,of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012

2. Nuclear Energy Institute Letter to US NRC, Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations dated April 9, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13101A379

3. US NRC Letter to Nuclear Energy Institute, Electric Power Research Institute Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic", dated May 7, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13106A331

4. US NRC (E Leeds) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," May 9, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14111A147

5. Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 - Seismic. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: May 2013. 3002000704 A o 10

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 17, 2014 Page 3 scope relay review in accordance with the schedule provided in the October 3, 2013 letter from the NEI to the NRC (Reference 7). This commitment was based on the NRC screening CCNPP "Out" based on the adequacy of its IEEEE submittal. In Reference 4, the NRC has screened CCNPP "In", based on its unfavorable judgment of the CCNPP IPEEE adequacy. EGC considers it appropriate to retract its commitment to perform the full scope relay chatter review made in Reference 6.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments. If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Douglas E. Lauver, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (410) 495-5219.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 1 7 th day of December 2014.

Respectfully, Mary G. Korsnick MGK/GGM

Enclosure:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report cc: Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NRC Project Manager, Calvert Cliffs NRC Regional Administrator, Region I NRC Resident Inspector, Calvert Cliffs S. Gray, MD-DNR

Enclosure Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report

EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE 50.54(f) INFORMATION REQUEST REGARDING FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1: SEISMIC for the CALVERT CUFFSNUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, MD, 20657 FacilityOperatingLicense No. DPR-53 and DPR-69 NRC Docket No. 50-317 and 50-31S A-- Exelon.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon)

PO Box 805398 Chicago, IL 60680-5398 Prepared by.

Stevenson &Associates 1646 North Litchfleld Road, Suite 250 Goodyear, AZ 85395 Report Number 14Q4242-RPT-004, Rev. 2 Preparer. Sarner E-Bahey. Ph D -~ q/8iK 12=9)014 Reviewer A.Karavausslanls 12&92014 Approver: A Kareousalanls 12/902014 Lead Responsible Frank Higgins Engineer Branch Manager: Chris Dabry Senior Manager Design Engineering:

Ben Scut Xv /awl Corporate Acceptance: Jeffrey S.Clark

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 2 of 33 EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE 60.54(f) INFORMATION REQUEST REGARDING FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1: SEISMIC FOR THE CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 Document Type: Report Report Number. 14Q4238-RPT-004 Project Name:

Exelon ESEP for Calvert Cliffs Job No.: 14Q4242 Client: ' ExeLon.

This document has been prepared in-accordance with the S&A Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 17 and project requirements:

Revision Record: . .

Revision Prepared by/ Reviewed by/ Approved b/ t r'Desciptioh of Revisibn No. Date Date Date I Yg Same7El.Bahey, A.Karavoussianis A.Karavoussianis

,Incorpo rate Client's editoral comments Ph.D 12/5/2014. .. 12/512014. 1215/2014.'

2

• Incorporate. Client's editorial comments Sa-meEI-:Bahey,. A.Karhvoussianis A: Karaveussianis.

' h.D 12/91201AJ ,. 12A9*2014 12/9/2014 SA Stevenson & Associates .

DOCUMENT APPROVAL.SHEET CONTRACT NO.

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 3 of 33 Table of Contents PURPOSE AND OBJECTtVE 6.................................

6 2 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies....... 7 3 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL ................ .. '.. .....*......2 3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL ............................................................. 12" 3.1.1 ESEL Development ............................................................. .. 13 3.1.2 . Power Operated Valves .................................. ................ 14 3.1.3 _,FP4I-qI~xps ...... n...... ............ .......... 1 3.1.4 Term ination Cabinets ....................... ....... .................. .... ....................... .... ;:.'A 3.1.5 Critical lnstrumentatio.lndict ... ............ .................

3.1.6. Phase 2and Phase 3 Piping.Connections ................................................... 15.

3.2 Justification . thft the primary means for FLEXt for use Equipment pf moasoroE implementa'tion nt '.... ..

...... '.* .... ........ ........................ L............. .... .................................. ... .......... 115 ' i 4 , Ground MotiQn.R~espons~e Spe.ctrumn(GMRS)....:.*.;...:.............,..........1 4Subrund'Wt .

F tt00..ed....t.he . ensee........................................

4.1. Plot of GMRS Submitted by e icese....... " ... .:....... ........... 16 4.2 Com parison to SSE ............................................................................................. 18 5 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) ...................... ..........

56.1,.. Description ofIR!LGMf.. ............. 2,.*

5.2 Method to "siaeIR ..... .'*"; ' ".22' '

.2 M to. ethod ate ISRS ,. ....................... . ....

Estim .......... . ....... ................. . . ...... 22.

6 SeismicMargin Evaluation Approach,,.:,..................... ............................ ý.23 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used . . .... ............. 3 6.2 HCLPF ScreeningProcess....................  :............ ...................... ...... ........ 23 6.3 Se;lismit Wal kdown.-..: .. 24,:,-h 24 6.3.1 Walkdown Approach ... ..

L ..................... ........................... ................................. 24 6.3.2 A'p'pIca'_t f "Previous P nfoation......, . .'.. .... 25 6.3.2 Appiiati*)*:*f'~evi~ *W-*ikd.-I.f....t.o..:.;.:....:............ *. ... 14....226 6.3.3 WSignficantWalkdown Findings ....... ........ ....  ;............... .........

6.4 HCLPF Calculation Proc.s ... 2 6 .35 n,-t...

t.....

Sngd fi t Walkdo n f indings ............................................ ...... ....... 2o...

6.6 Tabulated..SEL. HLPF Values.including Key failure modes) ............... Z 7 Inaccessible Items .rocess.......................... ... .......................................................... 28 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible For Walkdowns ............................... 28

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 4 of 33 7.2 Planned Walkdown I Evaluation Schedule I Close Out ..................................... 28 8 ESEP Conclusions and Results ........................................................................ 29 8.1 Supporting Information ...................................................................................... 29 8.2 Summary of ESEP Identified and Planned Modifications ................................. 30 8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule................................ ............................ 30 8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments ..... ........ .................... 3...............0............

30 9 References .................................................................. . .......................... 31 10 Attachments ....................................................................................................... Al 10.1 Attachment A Calvert Cliffs Unit I and Common Area ESEL .......................... Al 10.2 Attachment B Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 ESEL ................................................................ B1 10.3 Attachment C ESEP HCLPF Valuesand Failure Modes Tabulation Unit I and Common Area .......................................................................................... ........ C1 10.4 Attachment D ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation Unit 2 .......... D1

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 5 of 33 List of Tables and Figures List of Figures Figure 4.1-1 Calvert Cliffs GMRS (5% Damping) ..................................... .... 17 Figure 4.2-1 Calvert.Cliffs GMRS.vs. SSE (5% Damping). ............... 19 Figure 5.1-1 Calvert Cliffs RLGM, GMRS & SSE (5% Damping); . .. 22 T,0 hie b" 1-k9,aig leCNP 2.1 a .................... 9 Table 2.2 CCNPP Phase 2 FLEX Strategy Summary ..................... 10 Table 2.3 CCNPP Phase 3 FLEX Strategy Summary....................... 11 Table 4.1-1 Calvert Cliffs GRS (5% Damping)....................................... 16 Table 4.2-1 Calvert GMRS vs. SSE (5% Damping) ............................................ 18 Table 5.1-1 Ratio between GMRS and SSE (5% Damping) ................................. 20

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 6 of 33 I PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 1I, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework forprotection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued: a 50.54(f) letter on March 12,2012 (Ref. 1) requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by ail U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevalUate the seismic' hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required. Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic-probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment,(SMA). Based upon the assessment results, the NRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary..

This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP)." The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Ref. 1) to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core and containment following' beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in theL.NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704,,Seismic Evaluation Guidance- Augmented Approach for the Resolution of:.

Fukushima Near-Term' Task Force Recommendation 2:1: SeiSmic (Reft 2).

The objective-of this report is.to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is iritended to'enable NRC tb understand the inputs used,,-h.e evaluatian.s-performed, and the decisionsmade as a result of.the interim evaluations. -,

Per Reference 22, -abrief summary of the FLEX. seismic implementation strategies and the equipment selection process and Expedited SeismicjEquipment: List (ESEL) are provided in Sections 2 and'3&.

." ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.

S. , .. . .

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 7 of 33 2 BRIEF

SUMMARY

OF THE FLEX SEISMIC IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES *

' TheCaf,ttli#tffs FLEX response strategies f6r Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Remov/al, Re~a~tdn'r entory Conftolilong-trtn' Subcriticality, Core Cooling and Heat

,Reiroval (Modes 5 aid 6), Containment Function and Spent:Fuel Pool Control'are. .

sumn'farized below. This. summaryis dedvedfrom the Overall Integrated-Plan (OIP) in.

Response toi the March .12, 2012, Coommission Order EA-12-049 (Ref, 3).

FlexPhase 1', flirt six hobs;"'stratdgy relies oh installed'plant, equipment. Reactor core cooling, ,and heat removal is'achieved via-steam release from the Steam Generators (SGs) with $QG maketip from the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFVVP) durig FL.EX Phase I with suction from the fuly protected #12 Cpndensate Storage Tank*, RCS heat removal is controlled,through local manual operation of the Atmospheric Dump valves (ADV's) and local control of the.TDAFW pumps. RCS C0oo1own to 350 F/250psia with a corrbsponding ste'am Generfati' pressure"Of aopi*oxlmatel y 12pisia is'the initial goal. Realtor Invehfory'controt relies On allowing the Safety Injection-Tnhks to discharge into the'Reactor CoolahS!SVstem (RCS) if needed. .' -

In Mode 5 or 6 if the steaM g'bnerators are'unavailable RCS invent6r yan berhia fntaihed by gravity feed of the RefuiIng Water Tiank"(R-VVT)"*o by-use'0f p6itable flex'pumps...

aligned to injection points to the RCS. .

1*Key repctor parameters ,are obtained via-DC. powered instrmentation.ADCload 1Qyed stripping strategy, is e.. p.... toexten*,battery

... d..t.e

... x n , .baf life.

r . i.., :

No specific, ContainmentcoroWl is.irequired in Phase ,1 as b*th..eipperature;and pressure stay within design limit-.for.tpe first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> pftho ev.e~rt.- Key Containmet  :

Parameters are obtained from DC powered instrumentation.

NO specic Spent Fuel PdoI Ivel oitr6"l"reqiUire-l in".Phait-e I as both temnperatuir and' levtel stay Within design lmitrfhrft1'fitesV651h6urs of theevent. (asugst11ing the wotcdase -',

heat load). Sperit Fuel, Pool,'le~el;is'obtairied .from.the'.hewWide;range-Spent Fuel 'PooQ:I.

level instrumentation installed under Commission Order EA-12-051.

Flex Phase2, hu, 11 6 t6 24, strartegy'telieqe ohlnitanl"a 'eip.mentand FLEXp'teimn portable.,equipment. If thb Stream' Gen'erator (SGs)r'dr avdaible raiactor core cobling.

and. heat r6emvaflarb achiievedviiistebrf" releas' froh'themSGiiL local manual operation of the ADVs and with SG makeup from the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater .A Pump (TDAFWP) during FLEX Phase 2 with suction from the fully protected #12 Condensate ;StorageT -bnR., FLE:Pdrt* ef.usiresedlto replenish. the:#12 CST. - -

The Phase 2 altermte'sttategyil.ci Udes;SG:cooling~water:make-up via! a FLEX portable, pump, with suction from an alternate water sources such as any other surviving CST,,.. e Fire Protection System water storage tanks, Well Water System or the Chesapeake Bay as a last resort. Reactor inventory control and heat removal is accomplished by SIT tank injection. One FLEX portable 500KW 480VAC diesel generator per unit is installed and connected to a 480 VAC Load Center. This repowered Load Center will provide power to battery chargers, SIT tank MOVs, and a charging pump for inventory restoration. An alternate inventory control method is with a FLEX portable pump connected to the HPSI piping via the FLEX mechanical connections located in the Auxiliary Building. Boration for shutdown margin is not needed for up to 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br />, however, shutdown margin is

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 8 of 33 maintained by use of boric acid storage tanks with subsequent RCS injection using the Charging Pumps or a FLEX portable pump.

In Mode 5 or 6 if the steam generators are unavailable RCS inventory can be maintained by gravity feed of the RWT or by use of portable flex pumps aligned to injection points to the RCS.

Key reactor parameters are obtained via DC powered instrumentation or use of a 100KW 480 VAC generator powering a reactor MCC and the inverters backup bus. (This is the alternate strategy to load center repower)

No specific Containment control is required in Phase 2 as both temperature and pressure stay within design limit for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the event. Key Containment Parameters are obtained from DC powered instrumentation.

No specific Spent Fuel Pool level control is required in Phase 2 as both temperature and level stay within design limit for the first 65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br /> of the event. Spent Fuel Pool level is obtained from the new wide range Spent Fuel Pool level instrumentation installed under Commission Order EA-12-051.

Flex Phase 3, greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, strategy relies on installed plant equipment, FLEX portable equipment, and off-site equipment from the National SAFER Response Center (NSRC). Reactor core cooling and heat removal are accomplished by continued use of the Phase 2 Strategies. Restoration of these 4KV buses allows for restoration of more 480V busses for further redundancy. Key reactor parameters are obtained via DC powered instrumentation or use of a vital AC instrumentation supported by portable FLEX or NSRC generators.

No specific Containment control is required in Phase 3 -asboth temperature and pressure stay within design limit for the first 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />sof the event.

Key containment parameters are obtained via DC powered instrumentation or use of a vital AC instrumentation supported by portable FLEX generators.

Spent Fuel Pool makeup is provided using either FLEX or NSRC portable pumps attached to exiting piping via flex mechanical connections. Spent Fuel level is obtained from the new wide range Spent Fuel Pool level instrumentation installed under Commission Order EA-12-051.

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• 14Q4242-RPT-OO,4 Rev. 2-.

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.*: ~Paie 9 of 33

• I Table 2-1I:C1'dPP' Ohase l"'UEX Strat'e'g'Summary',  %

SafetyFunctioA .. F.., " ' . ;PrImaryMbthod-: .. '., .. .. - , Alternate Method Reactor Core Cooling & Heat .TDAFW pumps with suction fro.m CST., -Use standby TDAFW pump - if Removal -Steam SGs via local manual ADV " needed

"." RC$. cooldown to,350°F.I 250psia SG I0psia -.. up FLEX portable AFW

.Set

...... pumps such that final suction D J ' and discharge connections can

... . " "- , ".. . .. .. bei accomplished in < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

c* RCS lnverilto.ybCob*iio HeAt 'Ai6w Si Ts 'inject ino RCS If heedecr upon . ":V SGs - Use of FLEX Portable E Removal, . .

• r:- '.!'m tidnrof 6oldbwn t6 35&,F-l.,250psla Pumps toprovide RCS makeup 0- . '.,,'W/lOSG~s 1j-,RWTgravity feed.,, .ad injectiiflow Key Reactor Parameters -Temperature, pressure, level (RCS, SG, SIT)

'Use existirg battery powered indicntiOdn. ':., . "

,El.en4*~i'pg with9eepDCIoad stripping - . .Jo ,a Containment Pressure Control & .*. ... eqjw l pressure andhremperature -Nonmperature below limits for 72 Remove Heat . ..

• e I,,rd_,for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> ::

'*' ""*::i:*.. "o***"- * ;= *, "'"' .*'... 4*'

.None required - pressure and

' "r hours ' "

. Key ContainmenteParamntei *... ,,T p..erle e:. ýtt.rd Iresiure ndicatioo] powered, !Temperature and pressure U°*;*

,**.. 0.. :.. *::;.!.,**.. .. ' YavtJb . ......I.,,,,- 2j,.

ss., '""*.. .

'-, i..,;......  : ,"... i. !:."............

indication

, powered via vital

_ Spent Fuel Cooling -None required until T+65 hours (worst:cge) , . -. No'neirqlirn:l'until T+65 hours 0 SFP Parameter *SFP Wide Range Level Indicator *SFP Wide Range Level Indicator a.

0)

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 10 of 33 Table 2-2: CCNPP .Phase 2 FLEX Strategy Summary Safety Function Primary Method Alternate Method Reactor Core Cooling & *TDAFW pumps with.suction from CST -Use standby TDAFW pump - if needed Heat Removal -Steam SGs via local manual ADV -Move available tank fluid with FLEX (SID Mode with Steam -Replenish CST with FLEX portable pump portable pump to SIG Generators Available) -Obtain water from Chesapeake Bay RCS Inventory Control & ,SITs inject into RCS (if needed) after cooldown -Move RWT fluid with FLEX portable pump Heat Removal, (Shutdown to 350°F / 250psia to HPSI headers - use boric acid Modes with Steam .Repower SIT MOVs via vital 48oVAC MCC$' batching tanks to provide Boric Acid Generators Not Available) powered by FLEX portable 480V DG

• Repower a Charging pump via vital 480VAC Load Center powered by FLEX 480V DG

• W/O SGs -RWT gravity feed Key Reactor Parameters .500KW 480VAC FLEX generator repower one .100KW 480VAC FLEX generator repower Vital Load center to repower battery charger one MCC feeding Inverter backup bus and SIT MOVs Containment Pressure -None required - pressure and temperature -None required - pressure and Control & Remove Heat below limits for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> temperature below limits for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Key Containment -Temperature and pressure indication powered -Temperature and pressure indication Parameters via vital buses . powered via vital buses Spent Fuel Cooling -None required until T+65 hours -None required until T+65 hours SFP Parameter -SFP Wide Range Level Indicator .SFP Wide Range Level Indicator e.

L.

U)

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 I Page 11 of 33 Table 2-3:CCNPP'Phasii3 FLEX "trateg

"'Smmary Safety F*nction '" Primary Methdd"". ." Alternate Method Reactor Core olig & .7.. , . .*. TDAFW pumps with suction frormCST -Use standby TDAFW pump - if needed Heat Removal' .- ,. . Steam SGs via.local manual'ADV' -Move available tank fluid withFLEX

.(S/D Mode With Ste'apn.., -Replenish CST With FLEX portable pu mp: portable pump to SIG Generators Available) -Obtain water from Chesapedke Bay S SIventory Control & inject rot RCS (if neeiied)afterc;olldowhn -Move RWT fluid with F.E), portat~ie pump

,Heat Removal, (ShJtdown, to 350 F 0 S a. ,.... .. to HPSI eaders - use boric'acid

" Modes with Steam .Repower S'IT: MOVs Viavitai 40VA&MCts'i." batching tanks to provide Boric Acid p Generators Not Available) powered by FLk*'portabfe '48D.V,'.G.

,Repower aCharging-p ump via vital 480VAC Load Center *ower*d bY Fl-X..-80V D"

• _W/O SGs -RWT gravity feed .' .. >.".. "

K~ey.Reactrarameters.,, . 500KW.480V F..LFEX generator repow'wer.one. * .100KW 48oVAC FLEX generator iepower Vatal L6'ad' ,*ete'r to' r6poW e'r batte.iy charger one MCC feeding Inverter backup bus

...... . * ... . .... .. . . . .. . . ... and S IT.MO Vs ..

C-None required - prssur ' and temperature -None required - pressure and

• Control & Remove Heat below limits for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> ....... ' . . . temperature below limits for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> E-

-Temperature and pressure indication powered., -Temperature and pressure indication 0 Parameters via vital buses powered via vital bus~es U , . . "".-. "- ÷ . '  : . ' "

c Spent Fuel Cooliing " -None required until T+65 hours -None required until T+65 hours SFP Parameter *SFP Wide Range Level'*ndctýr 'SFP Wide Range Level Indicator U-.,

rn

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 12 of 33 3 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND ESEL The selection of equipment for the ESEL followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 (Ref. 2).

The ESELs for Unit 1 and Unit 2 are presented in Attachments A and B, respectively-3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as outlined in the Calvert Cliffs Overall Integrated Plan ý(OiP)(Ref.3),

and August 2013(Ref.4a), February 2014 (Ref. 4b), and August 2014 (Ref. 4c) six month updates, in Response to theMarch 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 (Ref. 3). The OIP provides the Calvert Cliffs FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis forequipment selected for the ESEP.

The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied upon for the FLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of core cooling and containment integrity consistent with the Calvert Cliffs OIP (Ref. 3). FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope per EPRI 3002000704 (Ref. 2). The' overall list of planned FLEX modifications and the scope for' -

consideration herein is limited to those required to support core cooling, reactor coolant-inventory and sub-criticality, and containment integrity functions. Portable and pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed)' are excluded from the ESEL per EPRI 3002000704 (Ref.

2).

The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2.of EPRI 3002000704 (Ref. 2).

1. The scope of components is, limited to that required to accomplish the core cooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-2:of EPRI 3002000704. The, instrumentation monitoring requirements for core cooling/containment safety.functions are.

limited to those outlined Ien the EPRI 3002000704 guidance, and are a subset of those outlined in the Calie'rt Cliffs OIP (Ref. 3).

2. The scope of,:components is, limited to installed plant equipment, and FLEX connections necessary to imnlpeme'nt the Calver-t Cliffs QIP (Ref73).as described in Section 2.

3. The scope of components assumes the creditedFLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those requiredto support a single. FLEX success path (i.e.,

either "Primary" or "Back-up/Alternate").'...

4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified. -Selection of the ,"Back-up/Alternate".

FLEX success.path must be justified.............,..,:!..

5. Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recovery strategies are excluded.

6. Structures, systems, and components excluded er the EPRA 3002000704 (Ref. 2) guidance are:

Structures (e.g. containment, reactor building, control building, auxiliary building, etc.),

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2

........ . . -Page 13 of 33

" Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and.their supports, .*. *.....

• Manual valves and rupture disks.

• Power-operated valves.not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies. *.. . ..

• SNuclar steamsupplsystem components (eig. reactor pressure vessel arid intderals, reactor coolant pumps and seals, etc.) .. .- ., * ,

7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, then only one train component (generally 'A' train) is included in the ESEL.

3 . 3,

. .. * .. , ... ... *~. . ... . .. 3-. .3 3.

3.1.1 ESEL-Development .' . ,

" :

• 333

.3:* i ,"'.* =. *  : . " ' .. " 3.:" ., 3333,:

' 3*'

"-' " "'3"3... . ' L ' ' ' *. -

The ESEL was deyeloped by reviewing the oI (Ref.. 3)!t determine thelnajor equipm.nr involved in the F.E.*..rateies. The bases fQr the. palvert OaI-are the actions iientifiedi in the following site procedures: - ,

EOP 4 Calvert Cliffs .Nuclear P.lant Power Plant Technical Procedure Unit One EOP-7 Station.

Blackout Revision 1*7 ., . "' 'l' ..., . . . . .3 '.' .. ... . ,

EOP 2 Galvert Cliffsj"Nuclear,Piant Rower. Pilant Te~cnical Procedure-Unit Two EOP-7 Station.,,.

Blackout Revrsion .7 ",. . '.:  :. . . .* .. " . ..

EOP-?T-B Calvert Cliffs Nuclear"P.laint; Power Plant Station! Blackout, EOP:-.7 .Technical Basis Revision 21 Action Value Basis D'ocuments Ven -i- ous -

These procedures have been.irh, place,:or:severalyears and:contain guidanceý of how to cope with an extended loss of oftsitek eI 3OP4-7 i's tifi'iganbeehUs6d dart'or`p9ra`in in multiple sirmnU`lator sc6,naios 11{e fTd.dnllsi l*ecni"*1 ba sis boVidesithe ba:6l'roind ahd-supporting'engiheering;. WVVeni istrridnhbnna obrpfpt f te rdcriqh1 pbintL ;ite dentified in the Technical Basis a supporting engineering document, Action Value BasisDotcuenet (AVBby' is created. This 'dOcument s prodicce bV'e rrn.,n it e te..

instrumentation and associated ]Astruient quiificatlons 6 e.1 Q, SI6mic, PAM1 ,PAM2.

Engineering standard ES&011rdvides airie-16kion -d'thesd varioJs6'blassifications.'As aft, example PAM!f tneans an instruet is t{*vpo eant-Uwifl be available as long as.C podwer, Station Batteries, are available. These documents are also used to identify specific parame!d values*whiteatiori needsl0be take ,,andlth-'basis4for that vialue,: Aslan example, AVBD EOP

-09.02 identifies the level at which the AFW pump suctionineeds to tbransferredito an' alternate sourceand~the-basisifor-that:Ievei .: , . " , ., -. -,

The referenced AVBD's.were used. to identif the instruments ,elected f0r the ESEL The items on the EtEL include the transmit er in the fieli as well as the various panels containing the.,,

necessary indications. Only one channel of instruments was evaluated as defined on page 3-3 of EPRI 30020b0704 (Ref 2)> .. 3

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 14 of 33 As these procedures are all approved and have an engineering basis they were used in conjunction with the OIP to generate the ESEL. It was not necessary to retrace these previously engineered actions through the P&ID's and logic diagrams as they have all been previously verified.

Connection points identified in the'OIP for Phase 2 and 3 actions were included in the ESEL. At Calvert the electrical connections are being made via connection device (modified breaker) which will be placed In a spare cubicle, during Phase 2 or 3, on the designated load centers. All of these load centers are included in the ESEL as well as downstream load centers needed to perform Phase 2 and 3 FLEX activities. These components were verified by review of the plants single line electrical drawings.

Major mechanical, electrical, components, flowpaths and valves identified in the ESEL are the same as those identified in the EOPand the OIP. The ESEL used the guidance as outlined in EPRI 3002000704 (Ref. 2) and the appropriate exemptions as discussed below.

3.1.2 Power Operated Valves Page 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704 (Ref. 2) notes that power operated Valves not required to change state are excluded from the'ESEL. Page 3-2 also notes that "functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase I equipment should be considered (e.g. RCIC/AFW trips)." TO addressthis concern, the following guidance is applied in the Calvert Cliffs ESEL for functional failure modes associated with power operated valves:

" Power operated valves that remain energized during the Extehded Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) events (such as' DC powered valves), were included on the ESEL.

• Power operated valves not required to change state as part ofthe FLEXW',itigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic event also causes the ELAP event; therefore, the valves are incapable of'spurious operation as they would be de-energized.

• Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategiesdUn"lr'ng Plh'ase "1, and arte reenergized and operated during subsequent Phase 2 and 3 strategies, were not evaluated for spurious valve operation as the seismic event that caused the ELAP has passed before the valves are re-powered.

3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 (Ref. 2).

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 15 of 33 3.1.4, Termination Cabinets -

Termination cabinets, including cabinets necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phage 3 connections, provide consolidated locations for permanently connecting multiple cables. The termination cabinerts prid the internal connections provide a completely passive funtion; however, the cabinpts~are included in the ESEL to,ensure industry, powtedge on.,

panel/anchorage failurg-yiýlnerabi.lities is addressed.

3.1.5..Critical Instrumentation.lndice'tcrs  ;- . .-

Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panelslcabinets and are included,'fts seliarate dbr6mpbnents; f-owever,; seisnlic evalUaition of the insti"rhent~indication may be in'cluded inith'e pahetiabinet' eisrniic evaluationTdlue2 .of-th-boc)k. . -

,,.- * ,a. . *.. .. ... ..., ; _ .: t', . . - . ' " , ,. '"if, . . .. " :t * . a'*

3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections Item 2 in Section 2.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in thqeESEl* "pclues j "... FLEX connections necessary to implement the Calvert Cliffs OIP (Ref. 3)-as describ6l'in Section 2."

Itemi3 in Section-...1l-also notes.ht ".Thesope.,qflcompnents assumes the -credited FLEX ,

connection modifications.are inmplemented;anpd are limited to those required tq support a singleL..

FLEX-success.path (i.pj.eithearPrimary" or "pBck-uptAltemp.e")."... ,a- .

Item 6 in Septiqr-21 .aboveg-gpe no, txptain,that "Piping.-lpJing,. qnduit, HVAC, and their supports" are,,exctuded frm nthe.SE.Lscqp in.accor,danc.,,with EýR. .O2300200704 (Ref: 2).

Theref,ore piping anda pipe suppor ate with **F.EX P.hase*2 apd Plape*3 connections are excluded from thes.opef 1hES .evalutior, .However; anpy otivp valves in FLEX Phase 2..a d.;hase-3 ,Gonnectipn..flow p*tI @re i udedin t l, . ,.

.,. , !- a re trc ude inJ a 3.2 .Justjfication for. se of Equip!.p0enttht is ,not.tl primapympansfor FEX,,..

implementation No alternate equipment is ,u ed to support,.he Pnmary Means" forf.[exFimprentatin.

,,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.....-'

.,..  !' ." ....-.. .. ,. .... "'*=

.. ,.,...' ".5: G ,,.t.. - .*,.."".., -,_..,. ..

7 b.

-I .. , "'.. ... * ';":,t " ' .. ::  ;' :..  :' .. * ... a..

v .. -.. , ,.,

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 16 of 33 4 GROUND MOTION RESPONSE SPECTRUM (GMRS) 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee In accordance with Section 2.4.2 of the SPID (Ref. 14), the licensing design basis definition of the SSE control point for CCNPP is used for comparison to the GMRS. March submittal report (Ref. 6) lists the Calvert Cliffs SSE PGA to be 0.15g.

The GMRS per the March submittal report (Ref. 6) is tabulated and graphed below:.

Table 4.1-1 Calvert Cliffs GMRS (5% Damping)

Freq. (Hz) *;G*GRS 7 Fq (Hz) 'MRS (unsca'led, g) (unscaled, g) 100 0.112 3.5 0.176 90 0.115 3 0.164 80 0.119 2.5 0.148 70 0.124 2 0.143 60 0.13 1.5 0.128 50 0.138 1.25 0.117 40 0.149 1' '.0.097 35 0.157 0.9 0.087 30 0.168 0.8 0.0827 25 0.185 0.7 0.0795 20 0.18 0.6 0.065 15 0.182 0.5 0.0568 12.5 0.188 0.4 0.0454 10 0.188 0.35 0.0398 9 0.194 0.3 0.0341 8 0.2 0.25 0.0284 7 0.204 0.2 0.0227 6 0.203 0.15 0.017 5 0.2 0.125 0.0142 4 0.185 0.1 0.0114

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2

.. Page 17 of 33 0.25 0.2

__~~ __I H II.

..*?

DI 0.15 +l 0.

I -k I I 0 "S a ,1 .. :. . 10~ 100

-FrequencylHz)

( '.

Figure 4.1-1 Calvert Cliffs GMRS ,o%Damping)

V'.' .

• , ". { :': ' + A, " .S , ...

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 18 of 33 4.2 Comparison to SSE As identified in the March submittal report (Ref. 6), the GMRS exceeds the SSE in the 1-10 Hz range as shown in the table and graph below:

Table 4.2-1 Calvert GMRS vs. SSE (5% Damping)

Freq. (Hz) SSE (g) GMIRS (g) 10 0.16 0.188 9 .0.168 0.194 8 0.179 0.2 7 0.188 0.204 6 0.197 0.203 5 0.212 0.2 4 0.222 0.185 3.5 0.226 0.176.

3 0.226 0.164 2.5 0.217 0.148 2 0.198 0.143 1.5 0.166 0.128 1.25 0.145 0.117 1 0.123 0.097 0.9 0.112 0.087 4_6_O. _ .0.104 0.0827 0.7 0.095 0.0795 0.6 0.085 0.065 0.5 0.074 0.0568 0.4 0.063 0.0454 0.35 0.057 0.0398 0.3 0.049 0.0341 0.25 0.041 0.0284 0.2 0.029 0.0227 0.15 0.018 0.017 0.125 0.012 0.0142 0.1 0.008 0.0114

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 19 of 33

• ."*,' 0.25s 0.2 0.15 w

CL 0.1 0.05 0

rreque~icy (Hz) ..

2:

Figure-4.2-1 Caert-Cliffs G.MRS vs. SSE (5°* Damping)

UJ W - tl 4:7-ý ýA

,~. a ,

CR~k . :-,~.9...4'.

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 20 of 33 5 REVIEW LEVEL GROUND MOTION (RLGM) 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected The RLGM for Calvert Cliffs was determined in accordance with Section 4 of EPRI 30020000704 (Ref. 2), and Generation of Scaled In-Structure Response Spectra for CCNPP (Ref. 21) as being derived by linearly scaling the SSE by the maximum ratio of the GMRS/SSE between the 1 and 10 hertz range.

The ratio between the GMRS and SSE at 5% damping is tabulated below.

Table 5.1-1 Ratio between GMRS and SSE (5% Damping)

Freq. (Hz) SSE (g) GMRS (g) GMRSISSE 10 .. 10.160.. . 0.1.88 1.17 9 0.168 0.194 1.15 8 0.179 0.200 1.12 7 0.188 0.204 1.09 6 0.197 0.203 1.03 5 0.212 0.200 . 0.94 4 0.222 0.185 0.83 3.5.. 0.226 0.176 0.78 3 0.226 0.164 0.73 2.5 0.217 0.148 . 0.68 2 -0.198. 0:143 ..... :0.72 1.5 '0.166 0.128 0.77 1.25 0.145 0.117 0.81

1. 0.123 0.097 0.79 0.9 0.112.- 0.087 0.78 0.8. 0A.04 . 0.0827 0.80 0.7 0.095 0.0795 0.84 0.6 0.085 0.065 0.76 0.5 0.074 0.0568 0.77 0.4 0.063 0.0454 0.72 0.35 0.057 0.0398 0.70 0.3 0.049 0.0341 0.70 0.25 0.041 0.0284 0.69 0.2 0.029 0.0227 0.78 0.15 0.018 0.017 0.94 0.125 0.012 0.0142 1.18 0.1 0.008 0.0114 0.81

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 21 of 33 The maximum ratio between the 5% damping GMRS and horizontal SSE occurs at 10 Hz and equals 1.17. '"

The resulting RLGM based on increasing the horizontal SSE by the maximum ratio of 1.17 is plotted below.

Table 5.1 Calvert Cliffs RLGM (5% Damping)

... 100 ' '16 V '3.5 2 .1

- 0.264 90 0.176 3 0.264

".80 : ; :2, 1.,6 : ,"2.5 0.253.

70 76 2 0.232 60 0.176 1.5 0.194

,,50., 0'1"76 1251/4 - 0.170.

4.40 0.176 1- 0.144

.-3 5 .... 0.-1-77 . .. .g 13 ,

'30 ... .'77 .. 08; 0.122' 25 -I. . .'0 177- . .6:.: *-1 t.

20 -1.78.06 099 15 0-178 01.5.:.- 0.087 125 0*)78 70') 06.074

.. 0;3 510 0.067;

9. . 197 0.3. 0.057

8 . .20 o.Z5 . .0. 8.

'U. Q.2, 0.034.

.... .. o 01 o.021.-

0

. 624'

.... "0- 014 - -.

4 0*259; 01. 0.0094, 2 -Z'

• 1.'

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 22 of 33 0.3 -

0.25 0.2-0M

.15 -

0.1 -

0.05, 0-0.1 1-. *.

Frequency (Hz)

- 1 100 Figure 5.1-1 Calvert Cliffs RLGM, GMRS &SSE (5% Damping) 5.2 Method to Estimate ISRS The method used to-derive the ESEIP in-structure response spectra (ISRS)'was to scale the existing ssE-based iS'RS obaihd from DCALC No. CA04085, Rev. 0 (Ref. 18) by the maximu.m ratio.of..1.!7. The. sca!ed JSRS" WS determined for all buildings and elevations where ESEL items are located at Calvert Cliffs.

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 23 of 33 6 SEISMIC MARGIN EVALUATION APPROACH It is necessary to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the demand characterized by-the RILGM. The seismic capacity is characterized as the peak ground acceleration (PGA) for which there is a high confidence of a low probability of failure (HCLPF); The PGA is associated with a specific spectral shape, in this case the 50/o-damped RLGM spectral shape... The HCLPF capacity must be equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA. The criteria for seismic capacity determination are given in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 (Ref. 2).

There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:

1. Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM) methodology of EPRI NP-6041, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin (Revision 1) (Ref. 7).

2. Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959, Methodology for Developin6 Seismic Fragilities (Ref. 8).

For Calvert Cliffs, the deterministic approach using the CDFM methodology of EPRI NP-6041 (Ref. 7) was used to determine.HC..C.PFs$ ,... . .

6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used Calvert Cliffs conservatively applied the methodology of EPRI NPO41 (Reft. -)t6 all items on the ESEL. The screening walkdowns used the screening tables from Chapter 2 of EPRI NP-6041 (Ref. 7). The walkdpwns were conducted by erngineerýwho as a minimum attendep the SQUG Wallkdown Screening and Seismic EvaluatiorTaIning *0*6-rs "hu.waelkownswere documented. on

-. ' .IScreening'

ý."", ' .- :: .. t Evaluation

. .. , I*.' " Work

." '.-, 6t,

ý fr-,B041 fro

-ýr ,- I1l

-)"

I"* -. ;'1- - ' '. "(Ref. 7).' Ain*ichoage"

ý`bfkfs- -; :'

capacity calculations us*d the CDFM critenai fr6mr PRI NP-6041 (Ref. 1) with Calvert'Cliffs specific allowables and material strengths used as applicable. Se" s ic, demand was based on the RLGM provided in Table 5.1-2 and Figure 5.1-1.

6.2 HCLPF Screening Process The peak spectral acceleration for the RLGM equals to 0.264 g (Table 5.1-2). The screening tables in EPRI NP-6041 (Ref. 7) are based on ground peak spectral accelerations of 0.8g and 1.2g. All Calvert Cliffs ESEL components were screened against the caveats of the <0.8g column of Table 2-4 of NP-6041 (Ref. 7). For components located 40 feet above grade,

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 24 of 33 screening based on ground peak spectral acceleration is not applicable and additional consideration is required. In accordance with Appendix B of EPRI 1019200 (Ref. 19),

components that are above 40 feet from grade and have corresponding ISRS at the base of component not in exceedance of 1.2g in the component frequency range of interest may be screened using the caveats of the 1st screening column.

6.3 Seismic Walkd0Wn Approach 6.3.1 Walkdown Approach Walkdowns for Calvert Cliffs were performiled in accordance with the crteria provided in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 (Ref. 2), which refers to EPRI NP-6041 (Ref. 7) for the Seismic Margin Assessment process., Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041 (Ref. 7) describe the seismic walkdown criteria, including the following key criteria.

"The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should Owalk by" 100% of all components which are reasonablyaccessible and iK non-radioactiveor low radioactiveenvironments. Seismic capabilityassessmentof components which are inaccessible,in high-radioactive' environments, orpossibly within contaminatedcontainment, will have to rely more on alternatemeans such as photographicinspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, andpossibly, smallerinspectionteams and more hurriedinspections. A' 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each cOmponent, nor does it mean requiringan electrician or othertechnician to de-energize and opeh*ca.binets or panels for detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown is not intended to be a QA orQCreview or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.

If the SRT has a reasonable basis for ass.uming that,the group of components are similar and are similarly anchored,then it is only necessaryto inspect one component out of this group. The "similarity-basis"should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capabilitypreparatorywork (Step 3),by reference to drawings,calculationsor specificatiobs.: The brie dcoiponentfor each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probablydoes mean de-energizing andopening cabinets orpanels for this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the ins'pection to be performed while the plant is in operation. At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorageshould be thoroughly inspected.

The walkdown procedureshould be performed in an ad hoc manner. Foreach class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurationswith the construction drawings and/orspecifications. If a one-to-one correspondenceis found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as the

.*14Q4242-RPT-004 7 . Rev. 2 Page 25 of 33 SRT becomes I cj

. p,. nfident dn' thapthe tha th cohsiiv6tion I. - pattem is *typical."'. This

".,-_' .*" This

.. .procedure ,*, for...h inspectionishoufdbe repeatedfor each component'class; althou6gL, during the actuaPI

!ivafkdown the SRT may be inspectinog several classes of components in parallel. If serous exceptions to the drawings orquestionableconstruction Ipractices are fOund then the system or component class must be inspectedin closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.

The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers,lack of similarty, anchorage which is~different..

from that shown on drawings or prescribedin criteria for that component, potential SI

[Seismic Interaction]' (Ref 2, page 5-4) problems, situationsthatmare at odds with the team members' past experience, and any other areasof serious seismic concern. If any such concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thorough inspediion Will havye to iinreased.

eincrease in sample'size which: should be' inspctded will.deleid upon the num.ber of outlier' bnd dlffereht anchorig~s,ea.,

which are observed. It is up to the SR* to ultimately select the samnple size'since they*

are the ones who are responsible for the seismic 6dequacy of & elements which thy'

-. sprwep~f.om the marjin review. A.ppendixD,gives.guidance for samplipg selection"of

,P, RI..300?000.704 (f,,2) ,which refers tq.EPRI NPr6O4..(Ref. 7)for the. Seismic Margin Assessment process. Pages.2-26-through 2,.,Opf,,RI, NP-6041, (Ref.,r)

- despribe the seismcwal,,dyvncitcri inuding.the following key criteria. -,

The Calved CHffs walkdowns included as aminimum a 1d0 / wailk-by 4 f alt items on the ESEL except as rioted in Sedtion 7.0. rAy prevwous waIdown information that was relied upon for SRT jugmentips document~d in Sectionh6.3.2. ESEF'WalIkdWn anSncr~ening Report (Ref.

20) documents the walkdowni reneiptS.t

',A'lii~ti.

W aklw'I " " ....

6.3.2'. "Abbli'6tiori'f PreVious lrifbirmatien tWIkd6W . " I,* .'

-, ' i ':" ' . . -  :, "" *: * -  :', ' '" .',. -'" ". ,  ; '.1" Previous seismic walkdowns wereo.used to, suppQft~t.he .9, sis..aiatons; .Somme of the comp.onents on the ESEL.,were included, in1thlTT ,2:.esnri -walkdQwns.4ReV1,6).-.*

Several ESEL items were, previusl w*al *dui .th alvert Cliffs S'eisnmicli EEE, program. Those walkdowrh results. wi nl th foiloiin s w . tonflrm t kre'e~ee that the previous walk own niclusio, re., a"'e, valid. '

A walk by was performed to confirm that the equipment material condition and c6nfiguration is consistent withjthe walKdown, conclusions and that no new significant interactions related to block walliý orpiping attached to tanks -xistt.

Ifthe ESEL item wf"asscre6hned o0i'based on th'e-preý6u"SWalkdoWn;'that screeninglevaluiation w~s_ reviewed'and reconflirmed____._ for the ESEP."... -"*... ' .~.. . *"* ""'. . 7-"

EPRI 3002000704 (Ref. 2) page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and 'piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements." Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 (Ref. 14)."

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 26 of 33 The seismic walkdowns for Calvert Cliffs included as a minimum a walk-by of all the components on the ESEL with the exception of the items inside containment as they were not accessible at the time of the walkdowns.

6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings Consistent with that guidance from NP-6041 (Ref. 7), no significant outliers or anchorage concerns were identified during the CalveIt Cliffs seismic walkdowns. The following findings were noted during the walkdowns.

Several block walls were identified in the proximity of ESEL equipment. These block walls were assessed for their structural adequacy to withstand the seismic loads resulting from the RLQM. For any cases where the block wall represented the HCLPF failure mode for.an ESEL item, it is noted in the tabulated HCLPF values in Attachments C and D described in Section 6.6.

• The component 1PI-3988 was:screened in due to the fact that mcLunting :is missing a manufacturer screw, howaver the anchorage was judged adequate and no HCLPF was calculated for the component. The missing screw is required to be replaced in order for the component to.be screened out and.a-HCLPF greater than the RLGM could be credited: CR-2014¶W03666 was entered into Corrective action process.

Work Order C92642395 has been generated. to replace missing screw; therefore IPI-3988 will screen out as the HCLPF wili.be greater, than RLGM...

6.4 :HCLPF Calculation Process "

ESEL items were evaluated.-using the. criteria in EPRI NP-6041 (Ref. ,7).. Those evaluations included the following steps:  :.. ,.. . , .*

• Performing seismic'capabiliýty wilkdowns for 'equipment to evaluate the equipment installed plant conditions

• Performing screening evalUations using the s6reening tables, in EPRI NP-6041 (Ref. 7) as described in Section 6.2,and '

• Performing HCLPF calculations considering various-failure modes4tat include both structural failure modes (e.g. anchorage, load path etc.) and functional failure modes.

All HCLPF calculations were performed Using the CDFM methodology and are documented in CDFM'HCLPF calculation (Ref. 9.

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 27 of 33 Anchorage for non-valve components was evaluated either by SRT judgment or CDFM HCLPF calculation (Ref. 9).

6.5 Functional Evaluation of Relays No relays existed in the Calvert Cliffs ESEL, therefore, no evaluations were performed for relay functionality.

6.6 Tabulaed ESEL HC1LPF'Values (including Koy faifure mnodds~* '.

Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values including the key failure modes are included in Attachment C for"1bnit 1 and commoinr-4itemia-nd"in" ,ttalirmerntb foFUfiif 2' italY's.

• For itemstcreened out-using NP26041 (Ref.,7):scr eningtables, the screening level is P provided as -(0 53g).tindthe failure mode is listed',as .Screened outV. The PGA associated with the 1 5'screeninglanem iscalculated by obtaining the ratio between the penakspectral_ acceleration of the,1 screening-,ane,(O.8J), and RLGM*peek spectra abcelerationr (0.264g),' thehi multiplying it-by the RLGMrPGA (0..175g). as follows; (0.aglO.264g)*O:175g=O.53g\ 'Henceany anchorage.HCLPF-caloulated is:beyond 0.53g.

F-or itefnVfthat were'srei=hed out ýusing' SMA analysis' ih-,the) checklists and-no'HCLPFs

-were caloulated,-.a HCLP ,Rvalueof."x.RLGM h is.aýsigned'tl .th*emponent :and the

-failutemodeis listedias,."S.eened, out".. i--. ,\L 'i:

• For items ab~i 40 febtVhich are sireened outIfnr OnbhOrag,, the 'assoiated PGA is calculated by obtaining the ratio between the peak spectral acceleration of the 2 nd screening lane (1 .2g) multiplied by 1.5 for above 40 feet criteria, and ISRS peak spectra acceleration above 40 feet (1.25g) per section 5.2 in Refrence 20,t%.Aenmutp.lying it by:

the RLGM PGA (0.175g) as follows; (1.2g*1.5/1.25g)*0.175g=0.252g. The failure mode is also listed as "Screened out".

SFor items' wher6 anbhorage C6ntrol's thtehCPF value'iýthejHCLPF, valuels:.listed in.thfe.

table and the failure mode is noted as "Anchorage Capacity". ,

• For items where .* : ';anchorage r'."* *,.HCLPF

. .. , " was, calculated

• ,.*.-.* -,, . .' to be s,: -( higher

-...-. .. -than

.- ..the PGA.

. ) .'1 . ,"

associated wMh the sseeningane peE; RI NP6- 1'(Ref. 7), the anch orage is not identified as the critical failure mode and the failure mode ishnoted as "Ecýiuipm'6int Capacity as thpe'anchorage do0.es*.t.tforo the .,pacity-and an equiprent HCLPF capacity of 0.53g ( 1 st screening lane) is assigned to the equiPment.

• For items whose capacities were controlled by nearby blockwalls as the nearby r lower than, the 'equlprhent and the anchorage apacities, a bld6kwal1*lCtPF vglue of 6.i75g'ialculited' oer 14Q4242-CAL-002 (Ref."9) (Ref. 9) is assigned to the compor epjt. The failure mode is noted ,as "Interaction with Blockwalls"..

• For components were functionality controls' the capacity a HCLIF value of "<RLGM" is.o assigned to the component, and the failure mode is noted as "Furnctionalit,".

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 28 of 33 7 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible For Walkdowns All items located inside containment were inaccessible. Photos of Unit I containment items were used for the screening and HCLPF evaluations. No photos were available for the Unit 2 items, Calvert Cliffs states that the two units are sufficiently similar to bd considered identical; therefore Unit 1 screening,'and HCLPF-evaluations were applied to Unit 2 containment items.

7.2 Planned Walkdown I Evaluation. Schedule I Close Out Since all items that were inaccessible during the ESEP were resolved by alternative means (i.e.

confirmatory photos and similar states) to the satisfaction of the SRT, no.additional walkdowns are required. .... .. .

I , -, . ý.. "'... . , " ý ... .

'.... .. "..'2.

• 2.,

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page-29 of 33 8 ESEP CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTS 8.1 Supporting Information Calvert Cliffshalsprrmed the le P, as qn interim ac ton in response j0 the NRC's 50.54(f)

Screening and.Pripntization,lefttpridattedMay,9,, 201.4 (Ref. 13). Itwa.iperformed using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI;300200Q7r04 (R0f02). -n ...

The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and.-potbntiail nr-bri modifications of I2la1t equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is'padrbf the overall dC alvert Cliffs respdhse to'1he NRC's 50564(f) letter(Ref. 1). On March 12, 2014, NEI submitted to the NRC results of a study (Ref. 11) of seismic cord'damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "site-specific seismic hazards show that there has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants" based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such, the "current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."

The NRC's May 9, 2014 NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter (Ref. 13) concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the GI-1 99 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in GI-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."

An assessment of the change in seismic risk for Calvert Cliffs was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014 NEI letter (Ref. 11) therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter (Ref. 13) also apply to Calvert Cliffs.

In addition, the March 12, 2014 NEI letter (Ref. 11) provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of SSCs inherently contain margin beyond their design level, (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs, and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.

The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely.

This has been borne out for those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes.

The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within structures, systems and components (SSCs). These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including:

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 30 of 33

• Safety factors applied in design calculations

• Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs

• Bounding synthetic time histories for in-structure response spectra calculations

• Broadening criteria formn-structure response spectra Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis ..

Bounding requirements in codes and standards

• Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel)

• Bounding testing requirements Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and, reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range These design practices combine to result in margins such that the tSCs wIll continue t fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.

8.2 Summary of ESEP Identified and Planned Modifilations, The results of the Calvert Cliffs ESEP performed as an iptenm ,action in response to.the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Ref. 1) using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704 (Ref. 2) show that all equipment evaluated are adequate in resisting the seismic loads expected to result from the site RLGM. Therefore, no plant modifications are required as a result. of the Calvert Cliffs ESER.

8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule No modifications are required.

8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments . ..

Noregulaor .t........... requir Noegiatry commitmentsare require. " .. ..... " .... I

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2

.... . Page 31.of 33 9 REFERENCES

1. NRC (E Leeds and M Johnson) Ltt.9 r to..All Power Reactor, Licensesps et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendations 2.1,!2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task-ForceReview of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012

2. SeiSmi* Evaiu~~ri'Gu'id1ae: AugM'nteld Approach fr~the' Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 - Seismic. EPRI, P1alo Alto!*CA:ýMay 2013. 3002000704 f

3. Letter from M; G. Korsnick (CENG) toDocuiment .Control Desk-(NRC),.Suipplement to Overall Integrated Plan for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, dated March 8, 2013 -

4. (a) Letter'from E. D'. Dein (CENG)'to";Docdmdnt. Control Desk'(NRC), Calvert Cliffs

-Nucle~rP6wer Planit; Uhitsil 'and 2-ix-M*ntlStatu-s Report-in Response to March 12,

-2012 Commission Qrder ModifyiQg Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis'External'Events '(Ordr Number EA-12-049),'dated August 27, 2013 (ADAMS AccessionNo- ML` 132 ,278*. ,

(b) Letter from M. G. Korsnick (CENG) to Document Control Desk (NRC), February 2014 Six-Month Status .Repo6t in'A esonse to March 12",12012 Cbrimissieft Order.-

Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Deiign-B'asi External EleDt- Fder lumler EA-124109) , ated Februa1y 27, 2014 O(,DAMSAes(Won No. MI14069AS18) - . .

(c) Letter from M. G. Korsnick (CENG) to Document Cotlrol!Desk.NR. August 2014.

Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-1 -"04)O)ý, idd iUgUst26,;201,'1'4:"

5. Reference Deleted.

6. Seismic Hazard and Screening Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Iecommendaton 2.1: S ismi- for tlhe Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant dated 3/12/14, (S&L. Report SL-0.12325, Revision 0)

7. A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1, August 1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA. EPRI NP 6041

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 32 of 33

8. Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities, August 1991, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA.

1994, TR-103959

9. 14Q4242-CAL-002 Rev. 1 "Seismic Capacity of Components for ESEP"

10. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-0098, Development of Crteria for Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants, published May 1978

11. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC, "Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for the Operating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States", March 12, 2014

12. Nuclear. Energy Institute (NEI), A. Pietrangelo, Letter to D. Skeen of the USNRC, "Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations", April 9, 2013

13. NRC (E Leeds) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident," May 9, 2014

14. Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: February 2013 (EPRI 1025287)

15. NRC (E Leeds) Letter to NEI (J Pollock), "Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," as an Acceptable Altemative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations," May 7, 2013

16. NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittals

a. Letter from M. G. Korsnick (CENG) to Document Control Desk (NRC),"Response to IOCFR 50.54(f) Request for Information, Recommendation 2.3, Seismic" Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Dated November 27, 2012

b. Letter from M. G. Korsnick (CENG) to Document Control Desk (NRC),"Response to IOCFR 50.54(f) Request for Information, Recommendation 2.3, Seismic" Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Dated November 27, 2012

14Q4242-RPT-004 Rev. 2 Page 33 of 33....

17. Calvert Cliffs Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)

18. DCALC No. CA04085, Rev. 0" Numeric (Digitized) Seismic Response Spectras"

19. EPRI Technical Report (TR) 1019200, "Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update" December-2009. ., .. .... *.* .

20. S&A Calculation 14Q4242-RPT-002 Rev. 0 "ESEP Walkdown and Screening Report for Calvert Cliffs" .

21. 14Q4242-CALU001 :Rev. "4Gene'atlin.of.Scaled In-Structure,.Response Spectra for CCNPP"

.22. CCNPP trpnsmittal ler to S for sectiohs 2.and_3 for the ESEP Report dated 12/2/2601*

23. CCNPP transmittal to S&A for Attachments A and B for the ESEP Report via email received on.10/30/2014 J

" " " *" " - * '. *," * , ,,U  ;,; "* *..; ',...P. . " '.?

". .: " .' -... . ..'. .*.i '* *'* . :.<, ,'*.. ,: ... . ... ' .p'

. .." : .. * .. * ..i' *"

" ":* .. ,,,. , . ..- . ;"', P ... , .. " " "" '. . . " : ; ].*

1/4............... . , . 7:: i....  :,- ,.

10 ATTACHMENTS 10.1 Attachment A Calvert Cliffs Unit I and Common Area ESEL (Ref. 23)

Page Al of A8

Calvert Cliffs Unit I and Common Area ESEL "ESEL perating State N0es!Comments.

IeNu er *.)Equipment 0 r* aid Noeiofiin Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Manual in EOP-0 Plant Trip, EOP-7 1 11 TDAFW Pump Standby service Sation Blackout TDAFVV Pp Steam Supply Manual in Instrument for local manual 2 1PI-3986 Press Standby service operation of AFW Manual in Instrument for local manual 3 1P1-4501 TDAFW Pp Discharge Press Standby service operation of AFW Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Manual in EOP-0 Plant Trip, EOP-7 4 12 TDAFW Pump Standby service Sation Blackout TDAFW Pp Steam Supply Manual in Instrument for local manual 5 1PI-3988 Press Standby service operation of AFW Manual in Instrument for local manual 6 1P1-4502 TDAF'W Pp Discharge Press Standby service operation of AFW 12 S/G Atmospheric Dump Manual in EOP-0 Plant Trip, EOP-7 13 1CV3939 Valve Standby service Sation Blackout 11 S/G Atmospheric Dump Manual in EOP-0 Plant Trip, EOP-7 14 1CV3938 Valve Standby service Sation Blackout EOP-0 Plant Trip, EOP-7 17 12 CST Condensate Storage Tank In service In service Sation Blackout 18 0LT5610 12 CST Level Indication In service In service 1LIA-5610 on Panel 1C04 19 0LT5611 12 CST Level Indication In service In service 1LIA-5611 on Panel 1C04 1A01 AP14KV BUS 11 2000 KW DG from NSRC 20 (1BUS1AO1) In service Energized connection point 1A04 AP/4KV BUS 14 2000 KW DG from NSRC 21 (1BUSIA04) In service Energized connection point Page A2 of A8

Calvert Cliffs Unit I and Common Area ESEL ESEL mESEL . . Equipmbnt Operating State NotbslComments 1D01 22 (1BUS1D01) AP/125 VDC BUS 11 In service Energized Powerto VitalAC Inverter I1 1002 23 (1IBUSI D02) AP/125 VDC BUS 12 In service Energized Power to Vital AC Inverter 12 1D05 AP/BATTERY CHARGER 11 24 (1CHGR11) In service Energized Power to DC Bus 11 1D06APBTEYCAGR1 25 (1CHGR12) AP/BATTERY CHARGER 12 In service Energized Power to DC Bus 12 ID07 AP/BATTER0 CHARGER 13 26 (1CHGR13)

I D08 A In service- Energized Power to DC Bus 21 1008 AP/BATTERY CHARGER 14 27 (1CHGR14) In service. Energized Power to DC Bus 22 1D03/1004 API125VB.ERY11 28 (1BATTID0314)

• In service Energized Power to DC Bus 11 1D09/1110 ,AP/125V BATTERY 12 29 (1BATTID09110) In service Energized Power to DC Bus 12 1D11 AP/,125 VDC CONTROL Power to Vital AC Inv 1 and 30 (1PNL1D1I) PANEL 11 In service Energized 21 1012 API125 VDC CONTROL . . Power to Vital AC Inv 13 and

-.31 (1PNLID12) PANEL 12 In service Energized 23 1D13 AP/125 VDC.CONTROL Vital Instrumentation Power 32 . (1PNL1D13) PANEL 13 In service Energized Supply 1D14 .AP/125 VOC CONTROL Vital Instrumentation Power 33 (1PNL1D14) PANEL 14 In service Energized Supply

-1D15. API125 VDC CONTROL . Vital Instrumentation Power

34 (1PNL1D15) PANEL 15 . In service Energized Supply 1016 AP/125 VDC CONTROL. Vital Instrumentation Power 35 - (1PNL1D16) PANEL 16 in service Energized Supply.

1017 AP/125 VDC. CONTROL Vital Instrumentation Power 36 (1PNLID17) PANEL 17 In service Energized Supply Page A3 of A8

. Calvert Cliffs Unit I and Common Area ESEL .....

~,*

Ite li ir N um,',' r_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,

-Operatings/BM 1Y 1".. " " P:20VAC VITALtDISTC*m"er " "

"Y..". .. A. VAC VITAL DIST - Vital Ibstrumentation Power 37 (1PNLI'0I) PANE,L 11 Inservice E ergized Supply,.,'

iY01AOW "" 11 VutI Ilustrumentation Power 38 (1INV1Y(I1A) .... In service.. Energized Supply.",

1 .Y02...API1 V.A.C..ITAL DIST . Vital Ihstrumentation"Power 39 (1PNLIY02) PANEL 12--. In seric Energized Supply..

Y02A  : AP

.I.V.RTER i- - Vit 4 Instrumentatioff-Power 40 (11NVIY02A) - ,., In service. Energized Suppl,

,1Y03 . 2., APIP20 VACzVITAL DIST .. Vitalitnrumentation Power 41 (1PNL1Y03) PANEL 13 .... in-service Energized Supply

.'-. 1.Y03A'-. . P/IRER 1:3; - - Vital InstrumentationPower 42 (1INViYO3A) ___________1___ . .... 1_ In service -Energized Supply

, 4IY04.. - "AP/I.f2VACPVITAL DIST _ Vital Instrumentation.1Power 43 (1PNLIY04) PANEL 14 IAn service Energized Supply 1 .Y4A) : -APiNVE .iain~triJmentation TER n'... Power 44.,..! : 1Y0 4A -14V 4(NI.Y04A) ".in serve Energized Supply

.1Y0.1-1*.1" -: APN12. VACVITALDIST "itdIntrumentation I Power 45,1 . (,IPNLlY01-1) PANEL j.: ',rin.9etvT Ehbrgized Supply" 1.Y02-1. AP120.VACTAL PANEL 12- -Vital v instrumentation Power 46 .; (IPNL1Y,2-1) 1  : .:::; Tifh'rvi( . Erergized Supoly.,

1YI1- VP.1-iO.VAC INVERTER Vital InstrumentationdPower..

47 (1BUS1y'11) BACKUP BUS 11 . .frse- i ',Enbegized Sup-ly-IC03 ICICONDENSATE AND -.. ....

(1PNLIC03) FEEDWATER CONTROL . " . . Main Cbntrol panel -Various 76 . -, In service- "ir eiice OIPind:cators and cofitrols

. . 1C04 I-/AUXILIARY FEEDWATER .71 (1PNL1*C04) ': C'td ROL - ..... .. Main'60ntrol panel -Various

._77 .. ____. ____...

.___ _si_,

,___._."-"____,__ .'In service O IP indicators and controls Page A4 of A8

Calvert Cliffs Unit I and Common Area ESEL

,ESELOprating State Notes/Comments 1COS (1PNL1C05) IC/REACTIVITY CONTROL Main Control panel -Various 78 In service In service OIP Indicators and controls IC06 IC/REACTOR COOLANT (1PNL1C06) SYSTEM CONTROL Main Control panel -Various 79 In service In service OIP Indicators and controls 1C07 ICICHEMICAL AND VOLUME (1PNLIC07) CONTROL Main Control panel -Various 80 In service In service DIP indicators and controls 1C08 IC/ENGINEERING (1PNL1C08) SAFEGUARDS CONTROL I Main Control panel -Various 81 In service I_ In service OIP indicators and controls 1C09 IC/ENGINEERING (1PNL1C09) SAFEGUARDS CONTROL Main Control panel -Various 82 In service In service ,OIP Indicators and controls 1C010 (1PNL1CI0) " IC/ENGINEERING SAFEGUARDS'CONTROL ""MainControl panel -Various 83 ___ .1_AE AD-O R In service In service OIP indicators and controls 92 11 A SIT 11 A Safety Injection Tank In service In service EOP47 Station Blackout 11 A Safety Injection Tank 93 1-SI-624-MOV Outlet In service. In service EOP-7 requires isolation 94 1LT321 11 A SIT Level Transmitter In service In service 1LI-321 on Panel 1C09 95 1PT-321 12 A SIT Pressure Transmitter In service In service 1PI-321 on Panel 1CO9 96 11:B SIT 11 B Safety injection Tank In service In service EOP-7 Station Blackout 11 B Safety Injection Tank 97 1-SI-614-MOV -Outlet In service In service EOP-7 requires isolation 98 1LT311 11 B SIT Level Transmitter In service in service 1LI-311 on Panel 1C09 99 1PT-311 12 A SIT Pressure Transmitter In service In service 1PI-311 on Panel 1C09

,100 12 A SIT 12 A Safety Injection Tank In service In service EOP-7 Station Blackout 12 A SafetyInjection Tank 101 1-SI-644-MOV. Outlet In service in service EOP-7 requires isolation Page AS of A8

CalveitCliffs Uhltkard Co'mmon rea ESEL

,Ite mN u mbCer1 ,-6 e ¶..ý No t e , en .

,o 44k seipienFnEWvc L-4 nPnl0 102 1LT341 12 A SIT Level Transmitler In.sey Inservice 1LI-341 .on Panel 1009

- 103 'IPT-i-41' 12 A SIT Pressure Transrmitter in se~ice in service 41PI-341 or Panel 1C09 104 12B SIT" 12 B Safet7 Iniection Tank ...... In service In service EOP-7 Station Blackout 12 B Safety Injection Tank ..

. 105 1-SI-634WMOV Outlet ,, In service. -In service EOP-7 requires isolation

• 106 ' 11T3:31.* 1-"f2 B SIT U2vel Transmitter In service .In service. 1LI-331 on. Panel 1C09 107 1PT-331 12 B SIT Pressure Transmitter -.In service-. In service 1PI-331 on Panel 1C09 Steam Generator Safety t. . . -;

124' -IPT-"1013A Y" Chan 6eiiPr'-suf; -Inservice In.service 1PI-1013A on Panel 1C03 Steam Generator Safety " . . 1":.

125, 1PT'-1023A Channel Pressure  :. . ,inservice..lI.service 1 1PI-1023Aon Panel 1C03

. .7 "'Steam.GenerAtor Wide Range 126 1LT-1124A Level. In service In service 1LI-1124A on Panel 1C04

' " "-:-'-: 'PAMS-- 1PNL2C182A, TT in 127 . 11-nTTA112HA Hot Leg emp 11 In service In service 1PNLC43E

' * .. PAMS- 1PNL2C182A,'Tr'in

..125 , Tr-JI12CA Cold Leg Temp 11'A . . lnrsevlce,. Iserce 1PNILC43E

. .- r. - ... ': ". . .. ... ........... . PAMS-1PNL2C182A, TTin 129 *.. 'TT22HA Hot Leg Temp 12:  %'-. Irnservice ,In service 1PNLC43E PAMS - 1PNL2C182A, TT in 1h0o '. i1-122TA. . Cold LegTemp12A In service .Inservice'l1PILC43E 131. . ...... '1F-4509A 'SGSteam T~rain XFW-Fl ': *Stab. Inhservice 1FIl4509A:on 1PNLC43B 132

• I 1FT:4510A 'SG Stearmr'rain AFW'0lW4-': .. ta*- ; Ih.gervice. 14iW5I0A on .1PNLC43B...-

133 : i*Lt-f1OX - '0ressurLevel : . . . lr - erviice I'-Lt I- on Panel ICO6 13.4 lLT-110Y .Pressurizer LeveIn selrvice, .. .1L1-110Y-1 on Panel.C006 135 1LT-103 . .Pressuriner,,Level " - , ... In si§Ni.q i perM-e 1U-I&03;on Panel 1C06 1,36 ... 1PT-105A " rPressurizer Pressure. . inservice, In service1 P1105A on Panel 1C06 137 . 1NXO01 WR Log power Charnels-l. ", . In sevice- In service PAMS, Panel 1C05..

138 1NX002 WR Log power Channels,.i., 'In in'ervice Seirvce PAMS, Panel 1C05'

.139 INX003- WRLog-power Channels In service In service. . PAMSI Panel 1005.

Page A6 of AB

Calvert Cliffs Unit I and Common Area ESEL SESEL * -

N m 6ia rng tate. Notes.Comrniets 140 1NX004 WR Log power Channels In service In service PAMS, Panel 1CO5 Containment Wide Range 141 1PT-5307 Pressure In service In service 1PI-5307 on Panel 1C09 Containment Wide Range 142 1PT-5310 Pressure In service In service IPI-5310 on Panel 1C09 143 1TE-5309 Containment Dome Temp In service In service 1TE-5310 on Panel 1C09 1V1-11 (1-E1-144 211) 11 Vital DC Bus Voltage In service In service Panel 1C24 1VI-12 (1-El-145 212) 12 Vital DC Bus Voltage In service In service Panel 1C24 Various Indications required for OIP'execution-RX power, 165 IPNLlC182A PAMS In service In service level pressure Various Indications required for OIP execution-RX power, 166 1PNL1C182B PAMS In servce In service level pressure OLT2001 . .EOP-7, AOP-6F Loss of SFP 172 Spent Fuel pool Level 111 In service In service Cooling.

0LT2002 EOP47,'AOP-6F Loss of SFP

.173 . Spent Fuel pool Level 21 In service In service Cooling EOP-7, AOP-6F Loss of SFP 174 0LT2003 New SFP WR level Standby In service Cooling 0L12003A .. EOP-7, AOP-6F Loss of SFP 175 New SFP WR level Standby In service Cooling 0LT2004 EOP-7, AOP-6F Loss of SFP 176 New SFP WR level Standby In service Cooling 0L12004A EOP-7, AOP-6F Loss of SFP 177 New SFP WR level Standby In service Cooling Page A7 of A8

Cbveirt Cliffs Uhit I and Common Area ESEL ESEL* . , " r ..

.tem.. OI -erting Statef;i *5:,-.,;NotesCdmrmentseh

• , . ... - EE&4:AOP-6F Loss of SFP 178 LNewSFP WR level Standby In service Cooling 0L12004 "= c :' EOP-7. AOP-6F Loss of SFP

• 179. . .. New:SFP WR level Standby ,i tn.se~rice Cabling.

' .. .B0IA A'480VBJS

'. 11A.........- PotentiaiP500 KW DG 180 (1BUSIB01A) 148. In service Energized conneotlon point IB1BB AP/40v BUS 11B Battery Charger Power API.OVB

.. 1

.BUS1B..B) . ,. . , supply, 500 KW DG 181 ... In service Energized Connection Point

. B..A AP/480V BUS 14A Battery Charger Power 1 (1BUS1B04A) 14A In eUS supply, 500 KW DG 182 .In service Energized Connection Point 1B04B AP/480V BUS 14B Potential 500 KW DG 183 (1BUS1B04B) In service Energized connection point 188 I CV-4670 TDAFW Pump Stm Supp Isol Open Open EOP-07 189 1*.*V-4070A TAO'WPump Stm Supp Isol Open  ;.Open .EQP-07.

190 , 1CV-4071 TDAFW Pump Stm Supp Isol Open" Open - EOP-07 191 1CV-4071A ,'DAFWPPmp T S9tMSupp Isol Open , Open EOP-07

. A B1B004 . AP/48OV MOTOR CONTROL Power, tqSIT Outlet Isolation 19 (1MCC,04R) CENTER 104R: .Ice Energized valve&'

I B014 AP/48OV MOTOR CONTROL - Power to.SIT Outlet Isolation 197 (i MC!114R) CEINTER. .14R, An-servIce -Energized valves' 200 1PNL1C13 SW,SRW,CCW Pa'nel In service In serQice SFP Level and Temp

. ',.:', ,.I ,.' . .* ,....*v I. . ... ,

I Page A8 of A8

10.2 Attachment B Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 ESEL (Ref. 23)

Page B1 of B7

Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 ESEL ES ELCý 6dZgV Item .Number ___ mn prtigSaeNtsWmets Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Manual in EOP-0 Plant Trip, EOP-7 7 21 TDAFW Pump Standby service Sation Blackout Manual in Instrument for local manual 8 2PI-3986 TDAFW Pp Steam Supply Press Standby service operation of AFW Manual in Instrument for local manual 9 2PI-4501 TDAFW Pp Discharge Press Standby service operation of AFW Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Manual in EOP-0 Plant Trip, EOP-7 10 222TDAFoW Pump D Standby service Sation Blackout Manual in Instrument for local manual 11 2PI-3988 TDAFW Pp Steam Supply Press Standby service operation of AFW Manual In Instrument for local manual 12 2PI-4502 TDAFW Pp Discharge Press Standby service _op2eration of AFW 2CV3939 Manual in EOP-0 Plant Trip, EOP-7 16 21 SIG Atmospheric Dump Valve Standby service Sation Blackout Manual in EOP-0 Plant Trip, EOP-7 16 2CV3938 22 SIG Atmospheric Dump Valve Standby service Sation Blackout 2A01 API4KV BUS 21 2000 KW DG from NSRC 48 (2BUS2A01) In service Energized connection point 2A04 AP/4KV BUS 24 2000 KW DG from NSRC 49 (2BUS2A04) In service Energized connection point 2D01 Power to Vital AC Inverter 50 (2BUS2DO1) AP/125 VDC BUS 21 In service Energized 22 2D02 Power to Vital AC inverter 51 (2BUS2D02) API125 VDC BUS 22 In service Energized 24 200312D04 2DO312DO4 AP/1 25V BATTERY 21 52 (2BATT2D03104) In service Energized Power to DC Bus 21 Page B2 of B7

Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 ESEL i ;ESEL .* -:! *:;:.,'..;.; .* * :**.,  :-.* *"*.'

• item. Number *' ,J iM~k-urgi~g~r qdi.e . .,. -_e oNotiWsCommet

. p -, ** *:;*.

53 (2D05R21) APIBATTERY CHARGER 21 n Power to DC Bus 21 and 53 (2CHGR21) In service Energized battery 21 2D06

• Power to DC Bus 22 and 54 (2CHGR22) AP/BATTERI CHARGER 22 In service Energized battery 22

,55____ (2CHGR23) AP/MATTERY CHARGER 23 In service Energized Power to DC Bus 11 2D08 APIBATrERY CHARGER 24 55 (2CHGR24) In service Energized Power to DC Bus 24 2D09/2D10 57 (2BATT2D010) AP/125V BATTERY 22 in service, Energized Power toDC Bus 22 2D11 AP/125 VDC CONTROL PANEL 21 Power to Vital AC Inv 12 58 (2PNL2D1 1) In service Energized and 22 2D12 APi125 VDC CONTROL PANEL 22 Power to Vital AC Inv 14 59 (2PNL2D12) In service Energized and 24 2013 3Vital Instrumentation Power 2D13 API125 VDC CONTROL PANEL 23 In'service Energized Supply 2D14 P 2 Vital Instrumentation Power 61 (2PNL2D14) AP.125 VDC CONTROL PANEL 24 In service - Energized Supply, 2D15 Vital instrumentation Power 82 (PNL215) AP/125 VOC CONTROL PANEL 25 62 (2PNL_2D_15) _P DCONTROPNEL2 In service Energized Supply 2D16 Vital Instrumentation Power "63 (2PNL2D16) AP125 VC CONTROL PANEL26Supply 2D17 API/12 .5VDC CONTROL PANEL 27 Vital Instrumentation Power 64 (2PNL2D17) In service Energized Supply 2Y01.. Vital Instrumentation Power 6I (2PNL2Y01)

(2PL2D7) AP/125 VAC,\A DONTRO PANEL 27 In service Energized Supply 2Y01-1 AP/120 VAC VITAL DIST PANEL Vital Instrumentation Power 66' (2PNL2Y01-1) 21-1 In service Energized Supply 2Y01AA Vital Instrumentation Power 67 (21NV2Y01A) AP/INVERTER 21 In service Energized Supply Page B3 of B7

Calvert Cliffs Unit 21SEL

• ESEL * *:': *"-.* * .:.' .S:i  ;.o.,: *-* I**,

• • !; * * : ,, ... " + "' * *' *. ....

Item Number ..-' p'en. .w*:o- . *- . p* er .b - NotesIComments" quip0nin 0.- aIgS~af, t 68 (22Y02' , VAC'"TAL01- PAEL22Vital V Instrumentation Power 68 (2PNL2Y02)-.'." In service Energized Supply -

69 (2PNi2Y02_) .: 'AP/1 20 VAC:VITAL DIST NE-" "Vital I.nstrumentation Power

69. (2 NLIn service Energized Supply

- ~2Y02A APAN R 22ital. Instrumentation Power 70", 21NV2Y02A) APJINVERTER 22 In service Energized Supply 20 2Y03 ' .AP/120:VAC.VITAL DIST PANEL:;23 RVitalfnstrumentation Power 71 2PNL2V03y In service Energized Supply

.2YQ3A AIINVERTER 23, 'Vital Jnrstrumentation Power 72... PVE .... In service Energized Supply

. V D . .... ". .. Vital Instrumentation Power 73 7VL3A- (2PNL2Y04) AP10VCVTL0S AE 2 In service Energized Supply 2Yi'4Ay. 'AP/INVERTER 24 ...... . Vital Instrumentation Power 7 (21NV2Y.4A) ,-- In service - -*EnergizedSupply

. 2Y1I,' 1). , . ,F/120ŽJAC *I.ER' R*ACKU " " Vital Instrumentation Power 75 (2BS2y1) BUS 21- In-service Energized Supply I 2003..-

.. BUS 2 .d.  : ... **.:.-.-, :. i

,..'- .. =:v **

... 2C03 ".: ... "';.. I"C/,CONDENS ATE AND ..'_..' . ..

.P03) FEEDWATER CONTDO - . ..... Main Control panel -Various 8 4....... "84 , ,.___.,_.___,_:_... COO ,i., .,.-FEEWATE " In serJ1 :e In service OIP indicators

.. and_.-.,controls__ .

-.2004?*. IC/AUXILIARY FEEDlATER, 85 (2PNL2C04) ' ,. CONTROL-- , ~M-ain Control panel -Various 85 In service Iniervice OIP *indicators and controls 2005 . '" IIEAi (2PNL20.5.) IC/REACTiI CONTROL Main 9,ontrol panel -Various 86 '.. 2P2 . i , -I*:se'rVik -', *h service oIp indicators and controls

"- 2C06':. IC/REACTOR COOLANTISYSTEMW "' ,:--

. .. j.

(2PN. 06) CONTROL": , . Main' Control panel -Various 87 " ...... In service in service DIP indicators and'controls Page B4 of B7

Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 ESEL ESEL Equl Ite Nmir ipmiment Opem tate

,Note/c'ommints 2C07 IC/CHEMICAL AND VOLUME (2PNL2CO7) CONTROL Main Control panel -Various 88 In service In service OIP indicators and controls 2C08 IC/ENGINEERING SAFEGUARDS (2PNL2CO8) CONTROL Main Control panel -Various 89 In service In service OIP indicators and controls 2C09 IC/ENGINEERING.SAFEGUARDS (2PNL2C09) CONTROL Main Control panel -Various 90 In service In service OIP indicators and controls 2C10 IC/ENGINEERING SAFEGUARDS (2PNL2C10) CONTROL

• Main Control panel -Various 91 In service In service OIP indicators and controls 108 21 A SIT 21 A Safety Injection Tank In service In service EOP-7 Station Blackout 109 2-SI-624-MOV 21 A Safety Injectiori Tank Outlet In service In service EOP-7 requires isolation 110 2LT321 21 A SIT. Level Transmitter In service In service 2LI-321 on Panel 2C09 111 2PT-321 12 ASIT Pressure Transmitter' .Inservl In service 2PI-321 on Panel 2C09 112 21 B SIT 21 B Safety Injection Tank Jn service In service EOP-7 Station Blackout 113 2-SI-614-MOV 21 B Safety Injection Tank Outlet In service'" In service EOP-7 requires isolation 114 2LT311 21 BSIT Level Transmitter In service.. In service 2LI-311 on Panel 2C09 115 .2PT-31.1 12 A SIT Pressure Transmitter In service In service 2PI-311 on Panel 2C09 116 22A SIT 22 A Safety Injection Tank In service In service EOP-7Station Blackout 117 2-SI-644-MOV 22 A Safety Injection Tank Outlet In service In service EOP-7 requires isolation 118. .2LT341, .22 A SIT Leyel Transmitter In service _ In service 2LI-341 on Paner2C09 119 2PT-341 12 A SIT PressureTransmhitter . In service In service 2P1-341 on Panel 2C09 120 22 B SIT 22 BSafety. Injection Tank In service In service EOP-7 Station Blackout

_ 121 2-SI-634-MOV 22 BSafety Injection Tank Outlet In service In service EOP-7 requires isolation 122 2LT331 22 B SIT Level Transmitter In service In service 2LI-331 on Panel 2C09 123 2PT-331 12 B SIT Pressure Transmitter In service In service - 2PI-331 on Panel 2C09 2VI-21 (2-E21-146 221) 21 Vital DC Bus Voltage In service In service Panel 2C24 S*..* " .Page B5 of B7

Calvert' Cliffs Unit 2 ESEL 2Vi-22 (2-E1-1.47 2222 . 22 Vital DC Bus Voltage In service .. In service -Panel.2C24 1 Steam Generator Safety Channel . . ..

148 2PT-1013A Pressure -IRsetvice..,. In service 2PI-l.l3A on Panel 2C03-Steam Generator Safety Channel . .

49 2PT-1023A . Pressure" : ". .... In service In service -2P1I1023A on Panel 2C03 150 2LT-1124A Steam Generator Wide.Range Level ip service, In service 2L1-1,124A on Panel 2C04 t - ,PAMS - 2PNL2C182A, "T

":15 " 2T'-112HA ' F-tot Leg"Tii.2-l1.. In service In service in 2PNLC43E 1Z- .' <**.  !'-:' PAMS - 2PNL2C182A, TT 152 2"t-TICA Cold Leg Temp 21A In service ';:-" In service In 2PNLC43E 1.,., Leg Tem:o. . In" " PAMS - 2PNL2C182A, TT 153 " 2T~122HA .""" -Hot. Leg Te~p;*2 .... .lrvic...i In service in 2Pt&C43E 15,'.. . " .. &old L' ... " A. - . " '""C PAMS-2PNL2CI.2A, T-r "154 "2T122'CA - (od Leqt '22A ....... '"'- "In servic-, In service in 2PNLC43E i56 2FT-4509A SG Stea TrainrAFW Flo*v . ' -Inf.serVice -. in service. .2FI-4509A on 2PNLC43B.

1 2FT4510A . SG SteamkTfainAFw Flaw . In "ei'ce in service 2FI4510A on 2PILC43B

5 "'-:' *LT-I10X * "' 1rmssurize. Level- - 'i-nservi6 i servide' ýLl-I-10x'-1 on Pnel 2C06 Ji58!"; 21>liOY -. - iressui,4i ev~ I.n inice-- n service 2kL-110Y.1 on Pknel.2CO6 "5.-- *2LT1I3' P0essurl3erieV . " lh sevi*e -. In service 2Li 103 on Panel 2C06 160: -. 2T105A Pressurizer Preissure In.

i in service 2PI05AOon Panl12C06 1i611 " 62..... )(NXO01 WR Log power' Channeis .. *  : nsei nsrOe.: ev~

• AM*S;'Panel 2C 05:

In.lnservicePane.......

16 Log power Channels .- " 'in s 7i.7 in service PAMS, Phnel 2C05 163 2NX003 "' WR Logpowef-Channels' In s'.hi service PA MS:Panel2C05*

-164 2NX004 "R Log power Channels - . tn:s'evice': In service PAMS, Panel 2C05

- ..i .

~

.*-~

Vanots lnhdicatiohs required for OIP executionmRX 167 ... 2PNL2C182A . PAMS . " - " I.-service.- In service power level pressure Vanrous Indications required

.. " ... .. J for 6IP execution-RX 168 PAMS . Inserice Iri service power, level pressure Page B6 of B7

Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 ESEL IEm Number E, Equipment."'

U I O e.trtng*

iiiig State. " iO-eC met Notes/Cormments 169 2PT-5307 Containment Wide Range Pressure In service In service 2PI-5307 on Panel 2C09 170 2PT-5310 Containment Wide Range Pressure In service In service 2PI-5310 on Panel 2C09 171 2TE-5309 Containment Dome Temp In service In service 2TE-5310 on Panel 2C09 2B01A AP/480V BUS 21A Potential 500 KW DG 184 (2BUS2B01A) In service Energized connection point 2B01B Battery Charger Power (2BUS2B01B) API480V BUS 21B supply, 500 KW DG 185 In service Energized Connection Point 2B04A Battery Charger Power (2BUSB04A) AP/4BOV BUS 24A supply, 500 KW DG 186 In service Energized Connection Point 2B04B AP/480V BUS 248 Potential 500 KW DG 187 (2BUSB04B) In service Energized connection point 192 2CV-4070 TDAFW Pump Stm Supp Isol Open Open EOP-07 193 2CV-4070A TDAFW Pump Stm Supp Isol Open Open EOP-07 194 2CV-4071 TDAFW Pump Stm Supp Isol Open Open EOP-07 195 2CV-4071A TDAFW Pump Stm Supp Isol Open Open EOP-07 2B004 API480V MOTOR CONTROL Power to SIT Outlet 198 (2MCC204R) CENTER 204R In service Energized Isolation valves 2B014 API480V MOTOR CONTROL Power to SIT Outlet 199 (2MCC214R) CENTER 214R In service Energized Isolation valves Page B7 of B7

10.3 Attachment C ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation, Unit I and Common area

-4 ... ' .4' U%?i 1.

a .i

,:.~

,. t j- i , ,

i-', -.'*

. .'I. .,. , . ;.1.

• 1'..

'C)

('4 r

I...

I.

.. 2

'j* <-1< 2.

Page CI of C11

ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation, Unit I and Common area 178 0 0L12003 Screened out, 0.53g analysis Interaction with Component Anchorage HCLPF is 175 .0 OL12003A o0.175g Blockwalls calculated per(e.9 14Q4242-CAL-002

• (Ref. 9) 179 0 012004 Screened out. 0.53g, Component screened by SRT 17.... re u.

... . analysis 177 0 0L12004A Screened out 0.53g' Component screened by SRT analysis Component screened by SRT 172 0' OLT2001 Screened out 0.53g u

. .... "judgment Component screened by SRT 173 0 .0LT2002 .... Scrdened Out 0.53g "'jdmn 173 0judgment 0Interaction with Component Anchorage HCLPF is 174 0 0LT20031 ..... Bockwallswi 0.175... calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (Ref. 9) 176 0 0LT2004..... Screened

.... out 0.53g:,analysis-Component sreened by SRT i[8 ,0LT561 0 Screened out.-;... 0.53g. Component screened by SIRT

-.. ,analysis

. 'Component screened by SRT 19 0 0LT5611 Screened out. O.-53g 19- 0. 0 1 -. analysis Component Anchorage HCLPF is

92. 1 11 A SIT Anchorage 0.21 ig calculated per 14d4242-CAL-002 Capacity . - (Ref.9)

Component Anchorage HCLPF is

. 96 1... B SITAnchorage-96 " " "i...11 BSITQapacity

.. Anchrap  : :.. 0.21 1g .*.-

pcalculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002

• ' * . ,," * (Ref. 9) ,.

Page C2 of Cl1

SEPiiIPF Values and Fail'UreModes Tabulation, Unit I and Common area MI Anchorage - Component Anchorage HCLPF is t I 11 TDAFW 0.51g calculated per 14Q4242-CAq-002

.Capacy ..

(Ref.-9)'

.Anchoage ' -Comp~nent Anchorage HCLPF is 100 1 12ASIT 0.21 1g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002

• .ap.aI.* '. .' . -(Ref. 9)

Component;Anchorage HCLPF is

.104, '-1 7 -12BSI Anchage .

Capabity.. , . .... -:" .0.21.i;1g

.. :;;, u ... ,(R er14Q4242-CAl,,002

,**.calculated, (. ef. 9)*

.... ,... ..... Component Anchorage HCLPF is 17 ..  ; 12 CST' 0.6

-3qnchorag. calcullited per 14Q4242-CAL-002 Capacity (Ref. 9)

Anchra7 ý-Compdnent Anchorage HCLPF is 4 12TDAFW~ Anhoag 0.5Igl_ calculated per 14Q4242-CAL2-002

.... I Anchoragei~with - ,(Ref. 9)

AInteraction: wth

" '"Component Anchorage HCLPF is 20 "...

"......1 - TDAF .

. . B*o-B cIk 1 l.. 0. 175g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002

-a*aiy..

. .. . .(Ref. 9)

- ter.~ w ,th,-" - Component Anchorage HCLPF is

-I A01 Interactin with -

0 1.75g ca lculated per 14Q4242 -CAL-002 196 '.* >.~ 1

'+,'"

(.I.UC1A04-$)

.*r.... 1* .........

B0.,

~04 : :..... ...BI ",7 withb

....Interaction ........ ........... .. -....S I . * (Ref. ) I-197 - . Component Anchorage HCLPF is

19. 1 0. 3g5 calcated per .(-iQ4242-CAL,-002 9 . . "

(1'M CCIB S A ,) Bloc wap. . ,. .

-.-- . , . i. Component Anchorage HCLPF is

- * +-'" . . - ." * . ,,+ *

• 180 AChorages C a pac ity u.52g; calculated per R 14Q4242-CAL002 Q. 4..

..M .92 (1 BU SC11 4A )

Page C3 of Cll

ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation, Unit I and Common area Component Anchorage HCLPF is

. 1B11013B Anchorage 181 I (1BUSIB301B3) Capacity 0.52g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 I (Ref. 9) 1B04A Anchorage Component Anchorage HCLPF is 182 1 A apcity 01BU 0.52g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (IBUSIBO04A) Capacity '" (Ref.

(e.9 9)

'Component Anchorage HCLPF is 183 1 1B04B Interactionwith 0.175g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (1BUSIB04B) Biock'walls (Ref. 9)

Component Anchorage HCLPF is 83 83 1ICOIO 1 (1PNLICIO) Interaction with Blockwalls 0.,175g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (Ref. 9) 1C03 Interaction With Component Anchorage HCLPF is 76 1 0.175g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (1PNLIC03)... Blockwalls (Ref. 9) .

1 C Component Anchorage HCLPF is 77 1 ...... IJnteraction with . .175g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (IPNLICo4) Blockwalls (Ref. 9)

S. -Component Anchorage HCLPF is 78 78 11005 (1PNL1C05)C1 Interaction oca with..

Blockwalls' "0.175g*(e.9 calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (Ref. 9)

,- 1006 Interaction with" Component Anchorage HCLPF is 79 (1PN LIC06) Blockwalls 0.175g calculated per(e.9 14Q4242-CAL-002

- - (Ref. 9) nt o wh -" Component Anchorage HCLPF is 80 is ,1C07 Interaction with' 0 175g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (IPNLIC07) Blockwalls (Ref. 9)

Component Anchorage HCLPF is 8C08 1 Interaction 0.175§ "calculated per 1404242-CAL-002 81 1 (1PNLICO8) Blockwalls (Ref. 9)

Page C4 of Cll

r - ... i

.abulatin, ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation, Unit 1 and Common area Unit and onmon are "1PC09 Interaction with 82 1 (1PNL1C09) 0: 175g calculated per 14Q4242-CAIL-002 Blockwalls (Ref. 9) 1' .

.+' ** ' 1* C24A

• Screened - *j

, ,Component screened by SRT

("PNL1C24A) .... 0 analysis i,. .

I..e.acti.n. . .Component-Anchorage HCLPF is

-* .- '" ' : Interaction with 1,4. 1,. 1" 9398 k .175g calciulated per 14Q4242-CAL-002

. (Ref. 9)

..... ... IComponentAnchorage HCL F is 130. .1 ........

.1-. .+. , 4,alclated

+',CV3.939 -.- * + ".,

Blockw alls -.- .,1,75j per 14Q4242-CAL-002 Component(Rfscreened 9)* by SRT 1189. 1T. .ICV-4070 Screened out .. aa53gl analysig 189 ' 1 - 1CV-4070A cn Screened outt - 0g 0......053.!.. ... Component

.. screened by SRT

.' , . - .. , analysis

. ' '..- X.. '.:-Component screened by S IRT 190 "1:1CV-407! Screenepd out 01.53g: a. uae r analysis.

... -0.-. "10g C omponent scree ned by S iRT

",'I ,CV.-4(0171A 2, -. acpientd otv 4. 1g c...e per 1442alysi canplysis 171 ,, 1D01

• in'-----Component.Anchorage HCLPF is Anchora6ge6,_

apit 2 ,;: .Ql,,9g! calculated per 14Q4242-CAU-002

'" ' * + *'* *': "**- '* .. (Ref. 9 1...

... ........................-. Component Anchorage.HCLPF is 4 1 (Rl)' a"21gl calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002

-. (AO'AUSD03I) o> apacity'"-,

apa"",y t "

Rf9 (Ref. 9)

.* .. ........ ..... ............ *... .... ...... . .. ...Com ponenf Anch orage HCLPF is (lCHR11)

Capaity(Ref. 9)

Page C5 of Cl1

ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation, Unit I and Common area I.,ompon"nI P, nunoragL n.Llrr i1 kD06 Anchorage 25 I 0.52g calculated per 14Q4242ZCAL-002 (1CHGR12) Capacity (Ref. 9) 1D07 Anchorage Component Anchorage HCLPF is 26 1r (1CHGR13) Capacity 0.52g calculated per(Ref.

14Q4242-CAL-002 9)

(Ref. 9)

Component Anchorage HCLPF is 27 "1 1D08 Anchorage 0.52g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (ICHGR14) Capacity (Ref. 9) 1D09/ID1O Component Anchorage HCLPF is 29 1 (IBATTID09/I Equipment. 0.53g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002

0) . Capacity (Ref. 9) 30 1D! 1 Screened out >RLGM 'Component screened by SRT (1PNLID11) analysis 1D12 Component screened by SRT 31N.... Screened out .. ..>RLGM.

32, 32 Dl 138Scendot (1PNLID12) Scrend.ut...Manalysis >.RG Component screened by SIRT 32 10D14

• Screened out >RLGM Component screened by SRT 33 1 (IPNLIDI4) 'Screened out. >ýRLGM analysis 35:'34 ,1 (PLD.4

~101I5 Screened Scendot out RL,

>LMComponent screened by SRT (IP-LI-,6) - ' analysis (1PNLID15) analysis

,.,(ipNL!D15) .,. analysis 35ID,, SD1e out >RLGM Component screened by SRT 11

• Component screened by SIRT 3616 Screened out >RLGM 36 1 1017 , Screened out >RLGM Component screened by SRT (1PNLID17).. ... .... analysis Anchorage Component Anchorage HCLPF is 131 1 1.1 I,FT-4509A C0.3g.' , ., calculated per(Ref.

"*,.:Capacity 14Q4242-CAL-002 9)

-Rf 9 Page C6 of Cll

. ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes TabulatiOn,'UnitlI and bommdJn area Screened out 0.53g *s-omponent screene

1. 1. analysis 135135.....LT-..103.

1t:ib i:ce'ereidbi' - .. sreenedou......RLGM '>.' M Component screened by SI*T analysis Component screened by SRT 133 1 1-LT-11OX . .. .....ly out. . . ...0.53g

....... Screened a s is 134

" 1:.'Euimet

"' "; ' GCompqnentAndhorage HCLPF is 134 , Equapaty Capacity 0.53g, calculated Oer 14Q4242-CAL-002

'S.

. - :*..1 ...

": .... .. . .. . . .. ....... .. ......... *. .;., -.* * .= . .(.. ef.Re

. 99 Conr1pohie~t screened by SPT 126 - .:.

. -,,4 1LT-1124A" Screened out.:`-' ;,,0.53gn

• sc

analysis S 98".*-" '";*' * " 1.LT.I.1 . .... Equip,*e ri ... ~..... ..~*-

I *pt-' )omponený t"*...' Anchorage HCLPF is 98 1- 1LT311 0.53g  :' calculated Oer 14Q4242-CAL-002

.. ... Capacity

... (Ref 9)

"LT"1 Equipment,0:Component Anchorage HCLPF is

• t9 -:.........

... . 1-T3 -1 ....... Equipmient.... ... .0 5 g! ....

94 "-..; ... .. .... 53g4.- -Calculated -er 14Q4242-CALL002 0;----r----..

Caoaitv.4 - 4;*(Ref. 9)

"106" .... 1 ...... 1T "- 3 *=.. ... ..

nco~g*'... *.,'.,..Au8.3*g Component c

,alculated Anchorage-HCLPF I~er 14Q4242*CAL*-002is C**.-

apacity:. " "" , (Ref. 9)

MCohoponent Anchor-ge *CLl*F is

. quipmien't g ... . .-. ý.I 102 1 1LT341 ^ I 0.53g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL,-002

• Capacity ......... **(Ref..9."

438

. ..... .. 137 i~xol 1N02.

,ne.u,~ I 1 .... .creend out 7

0 &3compornent

. ....... Component.

- screened by an 1ysis b.. SRT

~

• Sr.ee.d!  ;.ot -1 ". Component screened by SIRT t 139 1ll""' 1 NX0*0 i. Screened out" 0.53g'

. .'1 .... ,alysis Page C7 of ClI

ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation, Unit I and Common area 140 1 1NX004 Screened out 0.53g analysis Component screened by SIRT 2 1 1PI-3986 Screened out >RLGM " analsi analysis s Pressure Indicator is missing a 5 1 IPI-3988. Functionality >RLGM manufacturer screw NOTE 1 1PI-4501 Screened out >Component screened by SRRT

>RLGM analysis 6 1 1 PI-4502 Screened out >RLGM *Component screened by SRT analysis 200 .1 1PNLIC13 Screened out ....... 053g Component screened by SRT 200,1 Screene I out ....,analysis "Equipmrnt . Component-Anchorage HCLPF is 165 1 IPNLIC182A Capac -,0.53g, calculated per 14Q4242-CAL002 (Ref. 9)

Component Anchorage HCLPF is 166 1 1PNLIC182B Equipment 0.53g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002

. ,Capacity

.(Ref. 9)

Component Anchorage HCLPF is 124. 1 IT-1013A --0.53g: - calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002

.Capacity, (Ref. 9)

.. Component screened by SRT 125 ,1, IPT-1023A Screened out

~analysis >RLGM Component screened by SRT 136 1 1PT-10SA Screened out 0.53g . analysis Com onent Anchorage HCLPF is 99 1 1PT-311 Equipment 0.53g', calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002

.Capacity. (Ref.. 9)

Page C8 of Cl1

E*EP"HICLPF Valbes and Failure Modes' Tabulation, Unit I and Coibn area

.quipmenl.

95 1PT-321, "0.53g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002

.. Capacity (Ref. 9)

! Component Anchorage HCLP,F is 107 1... i~i.-!"!r= o .Anch°iaage,

• 3 i". - ...

apa~~y *T-,; .:::,*-0.183g [

calculated per-14Q4242-CAL-002 (Ref. 9i,

- -- -ComponenftAnchor~ge HGCLPF is 103 1 . 1PT-341 -, "..quipren . 0.53g alculated ger -*Q4242-CAL-U02 SCapaity (Ref. 9).

-out- .. g Com'ponept screened by SRT 141 . 1PT-5307, "creened out -5" analysis.

42 AP-30  :,; -:.,c -- *  :,Component screened b9-SIlT 1ScrPT-531u _eened out 0.53gay

'97*:' 97__-.. I V

• 1L..6 en. ou*o. *

• RG

-*l:*1*SL*4MV?:!Scieene~dout '.Component * *, .v screened by SRT analysis 3 , '-* ~~ ,- --+*iSF-624MOV ~

• .:; .. Screend Sre~ .out...o,

,,- >RLG-M ............- Component screened by SRT analysis

o. j ,:. . I, 105 ...

........1

-" . 1-SI-634-MOV

...... .. .... ........Screened .... out ... >R........

>RLGM

.. .. . . .........Componewt .....-+/- screened , . by. . SRT

• ianatys S'"Criond , sdreenecr'by SýT 101 .* 1-SI-644-MOV Scendout' 1 : "~'IRLGM Cýi~n~ analysis I ,'.L. .1 -* *,,Component screeried:by SRT I

128 1 1TT-112CA Screenqd out 0.53g} analysis. Cohiponentiis Rule & Box

..... *.. .. .......toIP NLtC43E -. .

• . ,.,.1 4 Component screened by SRT 127 .1,*,-:1--'..1.2HA - Srreenqd-out.-...53g.-- analysis. Componentis Rule of Box

' " * .... . "'

• t*',; , .... * ;to,1 PNLICr43E .-

", Component screenied by SIT

-S

'130- 1. 1TT22CA - Screeneldout - 0.53g V.. analysis. Componentis-Rule of Box to 1PNLIC43E Page C9 of Cl1

ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation, Unit I and Common area ES

• omponem screenw-y -. K I 1TT122HA Screened out analysis. Component is Rule of Box to 1PNLIC43E Component screened by SRT analysis (Above 40 feet)

Component screened by SRT analysis. Component is Rule of Box to IPNLIC24A Page C10 of Cl1

ESEP HCLIPF Values aid Failure Modes Tailati6n, uWIt1 And :ommn'on area Componeht screened. by

'44' .>RLGiM

-. 1

-P. I(ilN`'

,I.V I T UQ. '04A) I Screened out:.,. analysis

• i. 1......Interactionnt ". Component Anchorage HCLPF is L.

47' 1'wall

.(1BUS ....

1 Y11) ,

0.26g c~lculated pRer 14Q4242-.AU-002

"(Ref.

( 9) 9Blockwalls Note..1: Work order C92642395 replaces missing screw, therefore equiptent will sdreen-out.

- .7 . 7 ., , -. " - "

• ""*. :. .r* ." :.*.

• . 2~

V. 22 2 ... ...: .;.. .. ". :,- : - -

..... ) I"

~2 2~ ,~.... ~

~2. '-r7 S.......4..........

. r 2

~

\ .-. .~~ 2 -

-- ~......................>.:7 7

, . ~ <'r7'.;..2 2

2. ..

~~ 1' 0 .

2. .

S.-..- 4-...-~.. ........ ~..-.

r r .~

Page C11 of C11

10.4 Attachment D ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation, Unit 2 Page D1 of D1O

ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation, Unit 2 Anchorage uomponem Ancnorage MIL;LrI- IS 108 2 21 A SIT 0.211g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 Capacity (Ref. 9) 7- . .Component Anchorage HCLPF is 112 2 21 B SIT Anchorage 0.211 g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 Capacity (Ref. 9)

Component Anchorage HCLPF is 7 2 21 TDAFW Capacity 0.51g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (Ref. 9)

Component Anchorage HCLPF is 116 2 22 A SIT Anchorage 0.211 g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 Capacity (Ref. 9)

Component Anchorage HCLPF is 120 2 22 B SIT Anchorage 0.21 1g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 Capacity (Ref. 9)

Component Anchorage HCLPF is 10 2 22 TDAFW Anchorage 0.51g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 Capacity (Ref. 9) 2A01 Interaction with Component Anchorage HCLPF is 48(2BS2AO) Blockwalls 0.175g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (Ref. 9) 2A04 Interaction with Component Anchorage HCLPF is 49 2 ( O4 Itrciwith 0.175g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (2BUS2A04) Block'walls (Ref. 9) 213004 Interaction with Component Anchorage HCLPF is 198 2 2B004 Itrctwith 0.175g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (2MCC204R) BlockwalIls (Ref. 9)

Component Anchorage HCLPF is 199 2 2B014 Anchorage 0.33g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (2MCC214R) Capacity (Ref. 9)

Page D2 of D10

ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation, Unit 2

. 2B01A Anchorage 184 2 0.52g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (2BUS2BO1A) Capacity (Ref. 9)

Component Anchorage HCLPF is

• 185 2 2B1301B Anchorage 0.52g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL,002 (2B3US2B1B01) Capacity * ; * (Ref.

(e.9 9)

.,Component'Anchorage HCLPF is 186 2 2B104A Anchorage p0.52g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 S (2BUSB4A) CapacityRef. 9) 18 2B04B Anchorage ..... Component Anchorage HCLPF is (2BUSB04B) 'Capacity O0.52g

• calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (Ref. 9) 2ne owComponent Anchorage (Ref. 9) HCLPF is 85 2 ( 2C03O .. n ctwiths 0.175g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL.002 2(2PNL2C03) .. Blockwalls (Ref. 9) 2C04 :Interaction with Component Anchorage HCLPF is 85 2 0.175g' calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (2PNL2CO4) ..... Blockwalls .(Ref. 9).

2C05 .Interaction with Component Anchorage HCLPF is

-86 2 (2PNC0) ,Blckl 0.175g

. calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 S "(Ref. 9)1 2C06 Interaction with Component Anchorage HCLPF is

.87 .2 with 0175g 0:(2PNC0 calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 Bloc.als -(Ref. 9)

... Component Anchorage HCLPF is 89 2 2C07 Interaction 0.175g: 14Q4242-CAL-002 calculated per(Ref. 9)

(2PNL2CO7) Blockwalls 2C08:

Iterctin *h ........ *... -componentAnchorage HCLPF is 89 2 0:175g . calculated, per 14Q4242-CAL4*02

89. 2 (2PN1_2C08) Biockwalls ,," ' ... (e.9!  ;

(Rf.9 Page D3 of D1O

ESEP HCLPF Values ind Failure Mo~des Tabulatli',* Unit 2

• ,*'.o*tI " -. *, ,, .* * -* . *1 *.*r .

-Interaction with* ,,om.ponenm ^ncnorage lLLrI- IS 960 Blockwalls fl F0175g: cIputated per 14Q4242-CAL-002

-(2PNL2CO9)

(Ref. 9)

.-4-. -

'2010G interaction with"' -- Component Anchorage HCLIF is

• (-2PNL2C10) B*ock~

Blockwalls

• _.

,:0.175g :calcujatkd per 14Q4242-CAU-002 16 -2 .. , 2CV3108 Interaction with" :'cpnn 'LFi Acorg (Ref. 9) 1tomponent Anchorage HCLPF is 1Blockwlls2 2CV, 0175g .. calQulated er 14Q4242-'CAIL-002

'(Ref. 9) f52. - CV399~ Interaction with*

19..P. ! "2 " :";" ! 2CV39*3 C , :rrderactioh crn witllý;' iComponent .. ,. Anchorage HCF b , is 35 .,  ! Blockw~allso.tCm175gp ,*(e.9,ncalculated o see

,ed24 b*y

• ,' ". *er.'~nayi

* , ,;,

...r.  ; ,;:."... ', ianalysis; analysiý

."Component screened by SRT

-194. ;.,2' *2.CV.-40O: .Screenedi out O.59g ' .... ... Component-screened ' aa. ,.

!:.. . . ... . . .. k... ..... . ... * * . .,-* ... by SIRT

.. 193' .',

._"..-_2__,___._'_____-__70_....._Sc__eenlo___......._....._0_53_g_

194 2 2CV-4071' Screened out 0.53g Component screenedb SRT 195  : . .2,-: 2C V-4071A, -

S creened out '-l P!' _:.1.53g !.

o...

_.R. nent anatysis

.an ys s9ree)ed  ;

... :0 2D01 2. .Anchorag6*Cm ponent Anchorage HCLPF is 51 Capadity ' .u., 9(2BUS20i) g calcyjated per 14Q4242-CAL;-002

'(Ref. 9)

.52 2 ....

- ( .,* gp .2..o ....-.Equipment

,.',-Anchorage ' ,', -s. C ormponent Anchorage HcLPF is

4) apacy ., ..- ,.1 g -;calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002

.- (2BUS2D02) i.* (paC

~(Ref. 9) ,

":*;; ::2D03/2D04 , qimn" -- : ** *Q"o Ponent Anchorgtge HCLPF is

"52":.-2 : (2-BA'ft2D0:i10 .i...:3 n-caaital.* I6er 14Q4:242bAlý-002

,"9culated id ":* *:*,4) ,Pt, (Ref. 9) .

Page D4 of D1O

ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes, Tabulation, Unit 2 2D05 Anchorage uomponent Ancnorage H.;L-'I- Is 53 2 0.52g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (2CHGR21) Capacity (Ref. 9)

• Anchog .Component Anchorage HCLPF is 54 2 2D06 Anchorage 0.52g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (2CHGR22) , CapacitY (Ref. 9)

Component Anchorage HCLPF is 55 2 2007 Anchoragep 0.52g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 (2CHGR23) -Capacity (Ref. 9) 2008 AnchoraComponent Anchorage HCLPF is 56 2 (2D08 (2CHGR24) Anchoragep Capacity ,0.52g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-0O2 (Ref. 9) 57 2 2D0912D10 .Equipr~ent Component Anchorage HCLPF is 57 2B0/2010 Cupait 0.53g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 2 (2BATT2D0IO) Capacity ' (e.9

~(Ref. 9) 5 2 2D11 Component screened by SRT (2PNL2D1 1) Screened out >RLGM analysis 59 . 20122 < Screened out >RLGM: *Compoaent screened by SRT 59 2 (2PNL2D12) Screened o R analysis 2D13 Component screened by SRT

. .. (2PNL2D13) S.r .e ..ut....

. .. ... analysis

, 2D14 Component screened by SRT 61 2 , (2PNL2D4) Screened out $RLGManalysis

" 2D15 S o Component screened by SRT 62 2 (2PNL2D15) .Sreened out" " >RLGM alysis 2' 2016 oComponent screened by SRT 63 .2 (2PND16) Screened out . RLGM . analysis 2D17 Component screened. by SRT (2PNL2D17) Screened out >RLGM* analysis Page D5 of D10

ESEP HC'LPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation, Unit 2 2" 0539 uomponent screenea analysis +

I 2 ';,2FT"4510A Screened out " >IGM... Component screenedbyST

,.. (. analysis 159 2 2LT-103 Screened out >RLGM Component screened by SRT

.' . ..... . . .. . . . " analysis 157 ' 2LT-110X; Screened out 6.'.53g . Corronent screened'by S T

. .... analysis "158.... 2"" 2LT-IY Equipment gomponent Anchorage HCLPF is 156:" 2.. 2 b Capit 0.53g .calculated per 14Q4242-CAý-002 (Ref. 9)

, '150) 1'.-i........'"'2 ... .2.L.T,1?-,

. '" 4*ýj2 A , .p*reenedl "Seene outr'o o  :  :*53g.'" *aayi .- Component screened by ...... SRT

• . anblysis

i  :.**-.-;.:, ...... 1. .. ....

5quiprqent . '...

. ' . " ComponentAnchorage HCLPF is 1 "'1' 22 . 2LT311 .,..1,c , 53g a* lated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 Capacity (Ref.9)

... ....* ... i .. . .. ,I . . . . .........-......... .. ... '........

,...p.e,., I Cbmponent Anchorage IICLPF is 110 2 2LT321 0.53g c"lcu'lated Oer 14Q4242-CAL.-002

.p.. ..-.. Ref. 9)--.,

t 3:.

M, r~ -  : *",

C.'ompnbrnt Anchorage HCLPF is 122" z ~31 -. nhrg -(I 183g,-- - aIa4 tedpe4Q4242-CAiL4002 Capacity ,I(e.9 2 .-  : . .:.... .... ... *..... . . .. ....... . ... ...... . ..i. .. . Qmon .~ m ponent dHCLPF Anchorage n h r g H L F is Ia 2, 2L/T41 .t53g calculatqd iOer 14Q4242-CAL-002 L.~..Z2.. . -apaq~ -.......- (Ref. 9) 2  ;-2Z.O ".Cmponent screened by SRT 161  :.*-,2 2NX001 Screened oui ~analysis 0.53g analysis

.5.. S. -. " Component sbreenedby SRT 162 12: 2NX002' Screened out 0.53g - analysis Pb I-* * .... "' analysis Page D6of D10

ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation, Unit 2 163 2 2NX003 Screened out O.53g analysis Component screened by SRT 1.64 2. 2NXW0

..... Screened .analysis, out 0.53ganlis -

Component screened by SIRT 8 2 2PI-3986 Screened out >RLGM'alys

.1 2 2PI-3986 Screened out >RLGM .com ponentanalysis screened by SRT

.11 2 2PI-3988 Screened out >RLGM "Component screened by SRT analysis 9 .*i2 .2PI-4501 "Scieened'out ' RG Component screened by. SRTi r* '. . . ... "" *analysis 12 2 2PI-4502 Screened out' >RLGM ' Component screened by SRT analysis Equipment .Component Anchorage HCLPF is 167 2 2PNL2C182A Equipment 0.53g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 Cat(Ref. 9) 168 2 2PNL2C182B Elquipment i Component Anchorage HCLPF is 0.53g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 C..

Capacity (Ref. 9)'

Component Anchorage HCLPF is

4. 2PT-1013A Equipment- -0.53g calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 Capacity (Ref. 9) 49:'2. 2P.T-1023 ....... creene .... >RLGM Component screened by SRT 149- , 2,T-2 ,. Screened.out ....... analysis 160 2- 2PT-105A Screened out -

0.53g Componentanalsi screened Sby SIRT

. ..... *analysis Component Anchorage HCLPF is 115 2 2PT-311 Equipment . 0.53g. calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002

~., ,(Ref.  : Capacity 9).

Page D7 of D10

E

ESEP H'C&PF I valuies Vus ah*c' Failure Fir eal ",'I Unit Modes'Tbulatl~n Unit 2 Equipment1 yy.mpuIIUIL[ ]L;ncnotrage M,Lr-r ibs calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 111 2 2PT-321 0.53g Capaqity_ (Ref. -9)

Component Anchorage HCLPF is

" ' "2T;.331- 4 A" p pa"chrage- 0 183g calculated per 14Q4ý42-CAL-002 123 ..

" .-.'.. ity --

-. (Ref. 9)

" :.... ""- 23 1 * *-: .quipment,... .' ;- 53 -Component Anchorage HCLPF is 119 2 . Pt 341

'I q.Timn ,_

Capacity O:53g ,"calcultted per 14Q4242-CAI.-002 (Ref. 9) 2PT-53,7

, -, Component screened by SRT 169 .'2 2PT-5307: Screened out >RLGM analysis 170... .0 g

.. ,Component screened ýby SIRT 170 .2 2PT-5310, Screened out  ; 0.53aay, . analysi,

'13-

. -2"-

2SI-614WMQV 1.,t&eenel out'

_i-....

" ,LGM . Component screened, by SRT

... Corn analysis O ". 2'.-. -2.S"24-Mv .

Screene-.........t ..-- .Componet screened by SRT I,..  : " "-... 'analysis 121. - . Z ' Component screened by SRT

.,121 . 2 .- S-63LM

,-/* ... T:*:,! *out.:..

Screened

..:: :.t *V"...... ::, . >RLGMI . ......... 1. analysiý .... ..

... .. . . 7" *' . .,,D .

117..S'-. .... "* re...n...out ' ....- Comlpdnent sdreened'by SRT 117 ;2 2-SI-644-MOV Screene out . RLGMi ianalysii 1712,,,n o 2 ,2,...,Component screened: by SRT 1n analysis (Above 40 ft)

. . . - *- " ,, Compondnt screened by SPT 152 2TT-1 12CA Screene. out 0.53g j analysis. Component is Rule of Box

. . ' . .' ..... .. to;2PNL2C43E

. "" . i .. ,,r!.,, i *:;! :*.,,.'.. *Component screened by SRT 151 2' 2TT-1 12HA Screened out 0.53g analysis. Component! is Rule of Box S-. . . to2PNL2C43E Page D8 of D1O

ESEP HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation, Unit 2 L;omponent screenea Dy -sK I 2TT122CA .Screened out : analysis. Component is Rule of Box to 2PNL2C43E analysis. Component is Rule of Box to 1PNLIC24A Component screened by SRT analysis. Component is Rule of Box to 1PNLIC24A Page D9 of D10

"SEl'OI.CLPF Values'anai Failure Modes "rabudation, Unit 2 LoUiIIlUII*I]t PMI.lG[UI dI~t I-*,,*I l, Y-0 73 . 2Y04 -.Anchorage.

,2. 0.-.28g cailculated per 1i4Q424-WAI.-002

,(2PNL2YO4) Capacity (Ref. 9)

-.2Y04A .Cornponent scree~ned by §RT 74 2, ) " 4A .Screened outs 4' - >RLGM

,(2lN'V*YON4A) I analysil's 5.2.............

... ... . Componerft Anchorbge-HCLPF is Interaction with 0.175g .;:',calculated per 14Q4242-CAL-002 7.(2BUS2Y11) Blockwalls.,*: ,-

. (Ref. 6)

..uc ~ .4'.-.- -

1 01 L

_J _4 qJ Cý'L-":

%Y" 1':.'4 ý.j t A Page DIO of DIO