ML14261A111
| ML14261A111 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 09/22/2014 |
| From: | Stephen Dinsmore, Daniel Frumkin, Jay Robinson, Markhenry Salley NRC/NRR/DRA/AFPB, NRC/NRR/DRA/APLA, NRC/RES/DRA/FRB |
| To: | |
| Frumkin D | |
| References | |
| Download: ML14261A111 (85) | |
Text
Braidwood and Byron Multiple Spurious Operations Task Interface Agreement 2013-02 2014 NEI FP Information Forum - Plenary 2 Daniel M. Frumkin Senior Fire Protection Engineer NRC/NRR/DRA/AFPB
TIA 2013-02 concluded that Braidwood and Byron have a single spurious licensing basis.
... [O]ne spurious operation of a valve to occur per single fire.
... [A] compliance backfit could not be pursued in a timely manner with the available information.
2
The TIA also discussed factors that NRC considered in making that determination.
[Single spurious appropriate if the NRC]
reviewed and approved the consideration of a single spurious actuation, and there exists a cognizable and technically-defensible NRC safety basis for the NRCs approval.
3
June 24, 2014, NEI letter expressed concerns with the NRCs characterization of the issue.
... NEI believes that licensees should consider multiple spurious actuations, we disagree with the NRCs characterization that the agency has always interpreted its rules to require consideration of multiple spurious actuations.
The treatment of spurious actuations will be addressed on a plant by plant basis.
One spurious actuation or signal...
Comanche Peak ML14178B222
... [A]ny and all spurious operations...
one-at-a-time basis (i.e., non-concurrent).
Susquehanna 5
NFPA 805 Transition (Plenary Six)
Jay Robinson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NFPA 805 Transition U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Performance Based Fire Protection Standard for Nuclear Power Plants
- 2001 Edition of NFPA 805
- Transition Process
- 2 Pilot Plants
- Amendment Requests Submitted in 2008
- Amendments Issued in 2010
- 27 Requests After the Pilots
- 29 Total Requests
NFPA 805 Transition Year No. of Requests Received No. of Site Audits Completed No. of Ongoing Reviews (Peak)
No. of Reviews Completed
(* = estimated) 2008 2
2009 2
2010 2
2011 7
2 7
2012 8
7 9
2013 9
7 20 2
2014 1
6 21 8*
2015 1
3 15 12*
2016 1
1 4
3*
2017 1
2 2018 2
1*
2019 1
1*
NFPA 805 Transition
- 2014 (Today)
- Received 27 of 29 Requests
- Completed 27 of 29 Acceptance Reviews
- Completed 21 of 29 Audits
- Current Workload of 19 Requests
- Completed Review of 8 of 29 Requests
NFPA 805 Transition
- 2019
- 29 Requests
- 46 Reactor Units
- 46% of U.S. Nuclear Fleet
- 5 Withdrawn Requests
- Approximately 2 Years to Complete Each Review
NFPA 805 License Amendment Requests Lessons Learned (Plenary Nine, Session B)
Jay Robinson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NFPA 805 Lessons Learned NFPA 805
- Performance Based Fire Protection Standard for Nuclear Power Plants
- 10 CFR 50.48 (c) 2001 Edition of NFPA 805 License Amendment Request Process
- Standard License Changes
- Complex License Changes
- One Year vs. Two or More Year Review Process
- Requests for Additional Information
- Site Audit
- Safety Evaluation
- Denial/Approval
- Amendment Issuance
NFPA 805 Lessons Learned
- NFPA 805 License Amendment Process
- 29 Requests Submitted Over 8 Years 2 Pilot Applications in 2008 27 Non-Pilot Applications beginning in 2011 Last Application Received in 2016 All Reviews Completed by 2019 Reviews include acceptance review, supplements, on-site audits, requests for additional information, safety evaluation, license condition development, issuance.
- Staggered License Amendment Submittal Approach
NFPA 805 Lessons Learned
- Audits
- Requests for Additional Information
- Technical Issues
NFPA 805 Lessons Learned
- Safety Evaluation
- License Condition
- Final Reviews
- Amendment Issuance
Perspective on New Fire PRA Methods Stephen Dinsmore Senior Reliability and Risk Analyst U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission PRA Licensing Branch 1
PRA Methods Definition
- A PRA method is an orderly arrangement of well defined steps that yield a predictable result
- Some steps involve activities such as walking down an area
- Some steps involve selecting values from a given population of input values
- Some steps involve combining activity results with input values to yield a result (y = a + bx + cx2)
- Any change to the steps could be considered a new method 2
New Methods in NFPA-805
- The NRC discussed but decided not to delegate authority to accept new methods to the Industry Peer Review Teams
- Therefore any new method that is used in an NFPA-805 evaluation should be reviewed by the staff to determine if it is acceptable
- Each new method is discussed extensively by NRR PRA and fire protection engineers and with NEI in public meeting and/or with licensees during audits and LAR reviews
- NRC Staff formally documents acceptability and reason for acceptability 3
Review of New Methods
- Review and disposition of new methods is very resource intensive for both NRC and industry.
- Because LAR submittals overlap, some new methods deemed unacceptable are often used in a number of LARs
- Different Licensees sometimes propose different alternatives to methods deemed unacceptable creating more new methods
- If it does not appear feasible to develop and document a technical defensible justification within a short, fixed schedule the NRC staff may not accept a method that might eventually be deemed acceptable.
4
Disposition of New Methods
- At transition all methods are supposed to be acceptable to the NRC (roll-up RAI identifying all new acceptable and unacceptable methods)
- Unacceptable methods not having a significant impact on transition change in risk estimate are allowed before self-approval (freeze point).
- Methods which were acceptable but which are changed (due to evolving understanding) are treated on a case by case basis with the intention of minimizing re-work to only significant changes (freeze point).
- After transition, new methods determined to be acceptable by the NRC Staff may be incorporated into the PRA without additional NRC Staff approval 5
10CFR50 Definition of method
- 50.46(c)(2) An evaluation model is the calculational framework for evaluating the behavior of the reactor system during a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA). It includes one or more computer programs and all other information necessary for application of the calculational framework to a specific LOCA, such as mathematical models used, assumptions included in the programs, procedure for treating the program input and output information, specification of those portions of analysis not included in computer programs, values of parameters, and all other information necessary to specify the calculational procedure.
6
ELECTRICAL ENCLOSURE HEAT RELEASE RATE TESTING Mark Henry Salley P.E.
Chief, Fire Research Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Challenges
- Very Fast Track Project
- Reprioritized Work and Diverted Resources from other projects
- October 1 to 16, 2013 Federal Government Shutdown
- Occurred early in testing & forced Stop/Start of program
- Pushed testing back into Winter
- Colder than Normal Winter
- Temperature varied from 60ºF to 20ºF
- National Institute Standards and Technology (NIST) Test Facility (Building 205) still under renovation/expansion
- Contracted Naval Test Facility
- Despite Challenges, NIST/NRC Researchers completed the testing September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 2
Industry Rumors -
NRC Test Plan September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 3
Even Better Industry Rumors - Rocket Fuel September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 4
Actual Test Set-up
- NIST and NRC Personnel
- Chesapeake Beach Detachment (US Navy Facility)
- Mock-ups Using Real NPP Cabinets
- TVA Bellefont
- Eight Enclosures
- 6 Vertical Cabinets
- 2 Benchboards
- Goal was Realistic Fires September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 5
Test Instrumentation and Parameters
- Oxygen Consumption Calorimetry
- NIST Portable Hood
- Cables:
- Qualified
- Unqualified Cables
- Ignition Sources:
- Electric Igniter
- Cartridge Heater
- Propane Line Burner
- Acetone Pan
- 1 kW to 30 kW
- Ventilation
- Louvers / Doors
Results
- 112 Experiments Conducted
- Minimum Ignition Energy: 10 to 30 kW
- Peak HRR: <600 kW
- Majority tests much less
- Some Support for 12 minute Growth Rate after Flaming
- Nominal Burning Duration on order 20 minutes
- Final Report
- NIST preparing the Final Report
- NUREG/CR-XXXX Heat Release Rates of Electrical Enclosure Fires (HELEN-FIRE)
- To be published Concurrent with Working Group Report September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 7
Fire Testing - Cabinet HRR =125 kW 8
Future Work/Questions ?
- Need a better understanding of the actual combustion phenomena inside the enclosure and its effect to surroundings outside the enclosure.
- NRC and NIST currently scoping project
- For further information contact:
- David W. Stroup U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Telephone: 301-251-7609 David.Stroup@nrc.gov September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 9
DELORES-VEWFIRE Mark Henry Salley, P.E.
Branch Chief, Fire Research Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Determining the Effectiveness, Limitations, and Operator Response for Very Early Warning Fire Detection Systems in Nuclear Facilities
Current Status of Project -
Draft Report
- DELORES-VEWFIRE
- Determining the Effectiveness, Limitations, and Operator Response for Very Early Warning Fire Detection Systems in Nuclear Facilities
- Report is currently undergoing internal NRC review
- NRR review
- Peer-reviewed expected
- To be published Draft for Public Comment
- Late 2014, Early 2015 2
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Final Report Will Include:
- Need/Objective
- Fundamentals
- Operating Experience
- Experimental Approach
- Experimental Results
- Human Factors and Human Reliability Analysis
- Risk Scoping Study
- Conclusions/Recommendations September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 3
Need and Objectives
- Need
- Lack of applicable test data and documented operating experience
- Objectives A.
Effectiveness of in-cabinet, area wide, and main control room VEWFD system applications, including an evaluation of system applicability for various NPP applications B.
Comparison between common detection systems currently used in NPPs and VEWFD systems C.
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) response and effectiveness of equipment used to locate pre-fire source D.
System availability and reliability E.
System response to common products of combustion applicable to NPP F.
Evaluation of in-cabinet VEWFD system layout and design versus system response G.
Bounding probability numbers to assess risk benefits of the installation of a VEWFD system in various applications September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 4
FP Defense-In-Depth
- All fire protection programs at U.S. NPP are based on the concept of defense-in-depth
- Appendix R and NFPA 805
- Ensures both the probability and consequences of fires and explosions are minimized
- Three Echelons of Fire Protection Defense-in-Defense 1.
Prevent fires from starting 2.
Rapidly detect and suppress fire that do occur 3.
Design safety systems to ensure essential safety functions can be performed VEWFD System Are the VEWFD Systems Fire Detection or Fire Prevention?
For this presentation VEWFD will be used interchangeable with incipient fire detection September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 5
Projects Approach
- Review of operating experience and literature completed prior to test plan development
- Vendors and EPRI commented on test plan September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 6
Classical Fire Stages September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 7
Preheating Gasification / Pyrolysis Established Burning (Sustained Ignition)
Flame Spread Fully Developed Extinction Fire Growth Smoldering (material dependant)
Incipient Steady State Decay Duration of Incipient Stage is Highly Variable Testing designed to evaluate detection technologies ability to response prior to flaming conditions
Applications Evaluated
- 1. In-Cabinet (shown)
- 2. Area-wide a)
Ceiling b)
Air Return
- Main Control room not shown but could use any of these applications September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 8
Literature Review
- Site Visits
- US Nuclear
- TMI, Robinson, Harris,
- Canadian Nuclear
- Bruce, Pickering, Darlington,
- US Non-Nuclear
- Procedural Review and Plant Questionnaire
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 9
Operating Experience
- Literature Review
- Lots of publically available information but with very specific applications, typically
- Telecommunications where high air flows
- Comparison of VEWFD to other types of enhanced detection such as sensitive spots, video image detection, and beam detection
- Evaluation of prediction capability of computational fluid dynamic codes such as Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) against experimental set September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 10
Testing
- Approach
- Three aspirated smoke detection (ASD) system evaluated
- Two light scattering type
- configured to very early warning (VEW) per NFPA 76 for laser based units
- One cloud chamber type
- configured to vendor recommendations. Vendor did not provide information on how to meet NFPA 76 sensitivity requirements.
- One sensitive light scattering spot-type configured to VEW NFPA 76 sensitivities
- Two conventional spot-type detectors (ION, PHOTO)
- Variety of common materials found in NPP electrical enclosures were tested
- Materials were slowly heated above pilot ignition point
- Over 350 tests completed September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 11
Human Factors (HF) and Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)
- Overall objective: Provide improved and more detailed HRA
- Challenge: Not a traditional HRA context
- All human actions are taken without a reactor trip; post trip actions are typical concern
- Very limited use of VEWFD in US NPPs
- Limited information on how incipient fire detectors are implemented
- Limited information about the duration of the incipient fire stage, thus time available to respond
- Limited information to estimate time required for human actions
- No standard requirements (usually strong influence on HRA), e.g.
- Alarm panel design and placement
- Amount of information available to operators regarding location of alerting detector
- Actions prescribed in procedures
- Training required for MCR and field action
- Priority of incipient alarm vs. both other activities and conventional fire alarms
- Formal HF analysis (including task analysis) needed to support HRA September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 12
Risk Scoping Study Fire Scenario Risk Equation
= x,lx,l, i
Frequency of fire scenario i Ped,jli Conditional probability of damage to critical equipment set (target set) j give the occurrence of fire scenario i PCD,kli,j Conditional probability of core damage due to plant response scenario k given fire scenario i and damage target set j
,l= x,l SFi severity factor for fire source i Pns,jli probability of non-suppression prior to damage to target set j give ignition source i September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 13
Risk Scoping Study
- Event tree approach determined to be most consistent method of quantifying the probability of non-suppression associated with smoke detection capabilities among variety of applications.
- Two Event Trees
- In-Cabinet
- Area-Wide
- All available sources of information used to estimate event tree parameters September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 14 NS Fire Damage Outside Cabinet Pr(non-supp)
NS Fire Damage Outside Cabinet OK Cabinet Damage NS Fire Damage Outside Cabinet OK Cabinet Damage NS Fire Damage Outside Cabinet OK Cabinet Damage NS Fire Damage Outside Cabinet OK Cabinet Damage OK Cabinet Damage OK Cabinet Damage NS Fire Damage Outside Cabinet OK Cabinet Damage OK No Damage Beyond Initiating Component
System Performance Measures
- Reliability estimate
- Uses data from US, Germany, and Vendors
- Similar to EPRI 1016735 estimate
- Availability estimate
- Based on information from site visits
- Site outage times vary substantially 2 to 28hrs/yr/detector
- Early implementation issues identified
- Failure to open air sampling ports
- Failure to refill deionized water bottle
- Suggest using generic estimate (on the order of reliability estimate) if inadequate plant operating experience with ASD, other wise use plant specific availability estimate
- System Effectiveness
- Based on test data, measures the ability of the detector system response to hazardous conditions September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 15
Suppression
- Two types of suppression modeled in event tree
- Enhanced suppression smoke detection system and operator response function properly for incipient fire
- Conventional suppression to model failure of VEWFD system or fast developing fire September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 16
Preliminary Insights
- VEWFD systems are good fire detection systems
- Not all smoke detection is created equal
- Performance among ASDs varied by application and material type
- Conventional ION spot-type detectors performance comparable to one type of ASD tested for in-cabinet naturally ventilated configurations
- Due to lack of definitive and quantitative information on duration of incipient phase, a timing-based quantitative risk assessment approach was discarded.
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 17
Next Step
- Look for Federal Register Notice (FRN) requesting public comment on Draft Report
- Issue Final Report, 2015 NRC Project Manager Gabriel Taylor, P.E.
e-mail: gabriel.taylor@nrc.gov September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 18
Mark Henry Salley P.E.
Chief, Fire Research Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Risk significant contribution in PRA analysis 2
3 Electrical Enclosures-Failure Modes September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Current State-of-the-Art Limitations
- Single methodology for all enclosures 480V to 4160V
- Initial arcing fault can cause destructive unrecoverable damage to the faulting device
- Copper ejecta and plasma and/or mechanical shock will cause adjoining/adjacent equipment to trip open
- Assumes next upstream over-current protection device will trip open
- Robinson event illustrated the potential for failure of the upstream breaker and extended consequence 4
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Current State-of-the-Art Methodology NUREG/CR-6850, Appendix M (2005)
Method based on one well documented fire event at San Onofre in 2001; defines zone of influence (ZOI)
Components within ZOI are assumed to instantly fail or ignite Input to fire PRA model How well do the Robinson and Onagawa events fit this model?
5 September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Recent HEAF Events in US NPPs 6
Waterford 1995 Diablo Canyon 2000 Buss Bar Prairie Island 2001 SONGS 2001 Columbia 2009 Buss Bar Robinson 2010 September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Onagawa NPP, Japan Great East Earthquake and Tsunami, 2011
- Onagawa NPP closest plant to Epicenter
- 2 HEAFs
- Seismic Induced HEAF
- Possibly combustion products
- Multiple sections of Medium Voltage switchgear damaged
- Fire could not be suppressed and was allowed to burn out (~7hrs) 7 September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
JNES Test 1 480V 8
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Test Parameters
- Relevant Information
- Voltage
- Power Level
- Damage Zone
- Blast Damage vs. Enduring Fire Damage
- Heat Release Rate (HRR)
- Event Duration
- Furthest extent of damage
- Thermal (i.e. ensuing fire damage / smoke damage)
- Physical ( i.e. thrown cabinet door, shrapnel) 9 September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Instrumentation and Measurements
- Slug calorimeters
- Plate Thermometers
- Oxygen Consumption Calorimetry
- Pressure sensors
- High speed photography/Video
- FLIR TR300 thermal imaging camera
- Oxygen Consumption Calorimetry
- Current and voltage waveform measurement September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 10
International HEAF Testing Schedule
- HEAF events have occurred and are expected to continue in the future
- Data from experimental testing will assist in developing more realistic tools to model the risk in fire PRAs
- Project led by NRC-Joint Analysis of Arc Fires (Joan of Arc Fire)
Timeline 2012-2013 2013-2015 2014-2016
- Equipment Collection
- Establish Lab Contracts
- Establish OECD Contracts
- Perform actual Testing at KEMA o
June 2014 o
November 2014 o
TBD 2015
- Document and Analyze Test Program
- Publish International Report 11 September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Questions ?
- For further information contact
- Nicholas B. Melly U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Telephone: 301-251-7916 Nicholas.Melly@nrc.gov September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 12
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION Mark Henry Salley P.E.
Chief, Fire Research Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
OECD -The Fire Events Data Base project
- Participation of 12 Member Countries 2
Canada Czech Republic Finland France Germany Japan Korea Netherlands Spain Sweden Switzerland US
- Reporting threshold roughly equivalent to US LER level fires, however can vary by country
- Many member country licensee's directly reporting the specific details of each fire scenario September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
OECD -The Fire Events Data Base project 3
- Establishes a Framework for multi-national co-operation in sharing event information useful to fire risk assessment
- Seismic Fire interaction data such as the Onagawa Event
- Open lines of communication between members countries.
- Project trends have lead to the development of other international programs-OECD HEAF testing project 0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
NPP Fire Events Updated FEDB (US)
OECD Database (International)
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
International Insights September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 4
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
Batteries Reactor Coolant Pump Transients Main Control Board Cable fires Diesel Generators Air Compressors Battery Chargers Dryers Electric Motors Electrical Cabinets (non HEAF)
HEAF for low voltage electrical cabinets (480-1000 V)
HEAF for medium voltage electrical cabinets
(>1000 V)
HEAF for Segmented Bus Ducts NPP Fire Initiator Comparisons International Insight OECD Database (International)
FEDB Update (US)
Testing in Cooperation with the OECD
- OECD FIRE Project - TOPICAL REPORT No. 1
- Analysis of High Energy Arcing Faults, HEAF
- NEA/CSNI/R(2013)6
- Non-negligible contribution
- 48 out of the in total 415 fire events collected in the International NPP database up to mid-2012 represent HEAF induced fire events (over 10%)
- Each country is providing a detailed analysis of past events in an effort to classify the ZOI 5
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
JNES High Energy Arc Fault (HEAF) Testing
- Multiple tests performed at KEMA power test Labs, Chalfont PA intended to recreate the Onagawa NPP, HEAF event
- 2 HEAFs postulated
- Multiple sections of Medium Voltage switchgear damaged
- Fire Duration of 7 Hours
- Key Insight-Aluminum Oxidation effects-tests have shown that the aluminum bus bars oxidized in the Onagawa accident were significant contributors to the HEAF event
- Joint NUREG/IA to be published in 2015 6
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
JNES Test 1 480V 7
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
JNES High Energy Arc Fault (HEAF) Testing & OECD HEAF Testing Project
- NEA testing program allowed for the NRC to perform measurement and instrumentation testing prior to the OECD/CSNI Joan of Arc Testing Program
- Japanese testing currently ongoing at KEMA power test Labs, Chalfont PA
- Japan Next tests tentatively scheduled the week of Feb 9th, 2015
- Collaboration meeting Feb 16th, 2015 in at NRC 8
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
- Japan - Japan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA)
- Agreement implemented in 2012 between USNRC and JNES
- JNES is now a part of Japan Nuclear Regulatory Authority
- Exchange information
- Temporary assign personnel to facilities to conduct research
- Execute joint programs and projects
- Use facilities
- Include other forms agreed upon
- Projects:
- Comparison of fire PRA results
- Sharing NPP OpE
- Laboratory fire tests
- Fire testing of spent fuel shipping containers
- Nitrated organics analyses
- Data and experimental results on soot and HEPA filter clogging
- Consolidated Fire and Smoke Transport (CFAST) and Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) computer code results and experience
- Fire/smoke effects on digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems 9
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Questions ?
- For further information contact
- Nicholas B. Melly U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Telephone: 301-251-7916 Nicholas.Melly@nrc.gov September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 10
NRC FIRE RESEARCH OVERVIEW Mark Henry Salley P.E.
Chief, Fire Research Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Goal of this Presentation
- Provide a High Level Overview of NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) Fire Research Activities
- Detailed Presentations on Specific Research Topics will be covered in other Plenary's
- Ashley and I will try to minimize duplication on joint NRC-RES/EPRI projects 2
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
A word about Partnerships &
Collaborations
- Fire Addendum for Fire Risk Research
- Oldest and Longest Running Addendum under the MOU
- National Institute Standards and Technology (NIST)
- Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories
- Sandia National Laboratories
- Brookhaven National Laboratories
- International Partnerships
- The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
- Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations
- Japan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA)
- Agreement implemented in 2012 between USNRC-RES and JNES
- JNES is now a part of Japan Nuclear Regulatory Authority
- Academia
- University of Maryland 3
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Fire Modeling - Part 1
- Nuclear Power Plant Fire Modeling Analysis Guidelines (NPP FIRE MAG) NUREG-1934 EPRI 1023259, November 2012
- Fire Dynamic Tools (FDTs) Quantitative Fire Hazard Analysis Methods for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program NUREG-1805, Supplement 1, July 2013
- Refresh of all the Spreadsheets
- Both English and SI Units
- New Chapter on Thermally-Induced Electrical Failure (THIEF) of Cables 4
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Fire Modeling - Part 2
- Consolidation of the 1985 Sandia National Laboratories/Factory Mutual Main Control Room and Electrical Cabinet Fire Test Data, NUREG-2164
- Completed and currently in Publication
- Verification and Validation of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, NUREG-1824, Supplement 1,
- Out for Public Comment, Fall 2014
- Detailed Presentation in another plenary 5
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Fire Detection
- Determining the Effectiveness, Limitations, and Operator Response for Very Early Warning Fire Detection Systems in Nuclear Facilities (DELORES-VEWFIRE) NUREG-XXXX
- Detailed Presentation in another plenary
- Modeling Smoke Detector Actuation
- Project in planning phase with NIST 6
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
- Cable Heat Release Ignition, and Spread in Tray Installations during Fire (CHRISTIFIRE) NUREG/CR-7010
- Volume 1: Horizontal Trays, July 2012
- Volume 2: Vertical Shafts and Corridors, December 2013
- Volume 3 : Studying Ignition, Small Scale Cable Coatings, Tray Covers, Work currently on going
- Volume 4: In planning stages.
- Supports Fire PRA and Fire Modeling projects
- NIST principle researchers 7
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI Electrical Cable Fire Hazards
- Testing performed in Fall /Winter
- Draft NUREG/CR-XXXX Heat Release Rates of Electrical Enclosure Fires (HELEN-FIRE) under development
- Working Group with EPRI
- Detailed Presentation in another Plenary
- High Energy Arc Fault (HEAF)
- Detailed Presentation in another Plenary
- A Literature Review of the Effects of Smoke from a Fire on Electrical Equipment NUREG/CR-7123, July 2012 8
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI Electrical Enclosure Fire Hazards
Electrical Circuit Performance - Part 1
- Cable Response to Live Fire (CAROLFIRE) NUREG/CR-6931,April 2008
- 3 Volumes
- Kerite Analysis in Thermal Environment of FIRE (KATE-FIRE)
NUREG/CR-7102, December 2011
- Direct Current Electrical Shorting in Response to Exposure Fire (DESIREE-FIRE) NUREG/CR-7100, April 2012
- Electrical Cable Test Results and Analysis During Fire Exposure (ELECTRA-FIRE) NUREG-2128, September 2013
- Consolidation major experiment programs of recent time 9
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Electrical Circuit Performance - Part 2
- Joint Assessment of Cable Damage and Quantification of Effects from Fire (JACQUE-FIRE) NUREG/CR-7150 EPRI 1026424, 3002001998
- Volume 1 Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT),
October 2012
- Volume 2 Expert Elicitation Exercise, May 2014
- Volume 3
- Project just starting
- Detailed Presentation in another plenary
- Response Bias of Electrical Cable Coatings at Fire Conditions (REBECCA-FIRE) NUREG/CR-XXXX,
- In draft
- Publish Winter, 2014 10 September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Fire Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)
- EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines NUREG-1921 EPRI 1023001, July 2012
- Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines for Main Control Room Abandonment
- Follow on NUREG-1924 Joint Project
- Just getting Started
- A Framework for Low Power/Shutdown Fire PRA NUREG/CR-714, September 2013 11 September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Compensatory Measures
- Compensatory and Alternative Regulatory Measures for Nuclear Power Plant FIRE Protection (CARMEN-FIRE)
- Completed and currently in Publication September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 12
Fire PRA Training
- Five Class Modules:
- NRC Hosting 2014 at White Flint Headquarters
- August 18 thru 22, 2014
- September 29 thru October 3, 2014
- NRC and EPRI are discussing training plans for 2015
- EPRI sponsor Spring 2015, Charlotte, NC.
- NRC sponsor Fall 2015, Rockville MD.
- Methods for Applying Risk Analysis to Fire Scenarios (MARIAFIRES) 2012 Draft report under development 13 September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Knowledge Management
- Three Mile Island Accident of 1979 Knowledge Management Digest NUREG/KM-0001, December 2012
- Revision currently in progress
- The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Fire of 1975 Knowledge Management Digest NUREG/KM-0002, May 2013
- Fire Protection and Fire Research Knowledge Management Digest NUREG/KM-0003, January 2014
- 2002 Davis-Besse Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation Knowledge Management Digest NUREG/KM-0005, February 2014
- Hydrogen Knowledge Management Digest NUREG/KM-00XX,
- Just started project
- Severe Accident Experts 14 September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI
Questions ?
September 21-24, 2014, Milwaukee, WI 15