ML14252A176

Comment (00022) of Carol Izant on DTE Electric Co., Fermi, Unit 2; Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement

ML14252A176
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	08/29/2014
From:	Izant C Alliance to Halt Fermi 3
To:	Rules, Announcements, and Directives Branch
References
79FR36837 00022, NRC-2014-0109
Download: ML14252A176 (17)

Text

'7w--A ('56 Page 1 of 1 PUBLIC SUBMISSION As of. September 03, 2014 Received: August 29, 2014 Status: PendingPost Tracking No. ljy-8e2f-huyu Comments Due: August 29, 2014 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2014-0109 License Renewal Application; Fermi 2 Comment On: NRC-2014-0109-0003 2

DTE Electric Co., Fermi 2; Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statemen*

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,,Ti Document: NRC-2014-0109-DRAFT-0016 Comment on FR Doc# 2014-15281 Submitter Information Name: Carol Izant Submitter's Representative: Carol Izant Organization: Alliance to Halt Fermi 3 General Comment To Whom It May Concern:

Attached are the comments being submitted by the Alliance to Halt Fermi 3 (ATHF3) in regard to Fermi 2 Docket ID NRC-2014-0109 License renewal Application. Please confirm receipt by return email. Thank You.

Sincerely, Carol Izant, Co-Chair Alliance to Halt Fermi 3 19455 Middlesex Southfield, MI 48076 cogknot@yahoo.com I-i'9 Fri Attachments Docket ID NRC-2014-0109 SUNSI Review Complete Template = ADM - 013 E-RIDS= ADM-03 https://www.fdms.gov/fdms-web-agency/component/contentstreamer?objectld=090000648185002d&for...

09/03/2014

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Docket No. 50-341; NRC-2014-0109 Fermi Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 (Fermi 2)

License Renewal Application (LRA)

Applicant/Licensee: DTE Electric Co. (DTE Energy Co.)

Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) Scoping Process Public Comment August 29, 2014 Submitted to:

http://www.regulations.gov Docket ID NRC-2014-0109 Submitted by:

Alliance To Halt Fermi-3 (ATHF3)

Board of Directors Livonia, Michigan U.S.A.

http://www.nofermi3.org

==

Introduction:==

The Alliance To Halt Fermi-3 (ATHF3) is a 501(c)3 organization located in Southeast Michigan, representing numerous individual and organizational members residing or located within a fifty (50) mile radius of Fermi, Unit 2. According to the Bylaws, the stated Purpose of the organization is, in part, to: "Encourage and demand the shutdown of DTE Energy's existing Fermi-2 nuclear reactor as soon as possible; [and] Encourage and advocate development of renewable energy sources, energy efficiency, and conservation programs as alternatives to nuclear power."

Preface:

The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) precludes the U.S. NRC from licensing any new nuclear power plant or re-licensing any existing nuclear power plant if it would be "inimical... to the health and safety of the public." 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d).

The Alliance To Halt Fermi-3 (ATHF3) unconditionally opposes the relicensing of Fermi, Unit 2 and expects the following standards to be met regardless, with the ultimate goal of shutting down and decommissioning the nuclear reactor as soon as possible:

1) Heightened security to protect against attack from the air, water, and land.

2) Safer storage of spent fuel until all spent fuel is moved offsite; this entails reducing the spent fuel pool to its original low-density, open-frame design and placing the bulk of the spent fuel in hardened dry casks (Hardened On-Site Storage -- HOSS).

3) Reduction of allowable radioactive emissions/releases into the environment.

4) Monitors ---- real-time air monitors installed offsite in sufficient numbers linked by computer to the State with regular public reports; enhanced environmental monitoring by the State with regular public reports.

5) Replacement of the water cooling system with one not harmful to Lake Erie's fragile ecosystem.

6) Updafed, post-Fukushima Emergency Planning, including expanding the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).

7) Installation of a hardened, filtered vent in order to address the well-known and unresolved design vulnerability of the GE Mark 1 BWR pressure suppression containment system.

8) Conformance and compliance with all technical specifications required for new reactors.

9) The NRC must follow and enforce its own regulations and become a more effective regulator to protect people and the environment --- Severe Accident consideration of spent fuel pools is a prime example.

10) Independent reevaluation and audit of the need for continued electric power generation from Fermi, Unit 2 in the first place.

(The above principles are adapted from Pilgrim Watch.)

Public Comment:

It is the official position of the Alliance To Halt Fermi-3 (ATHF3) that each of the following ITEMS must be admitted within the Scope for consideration by the U.S. NRC as part of the SEIS and Environmental Review of the Fermi, Unit 2 LRA. ATHF3 contends that the issues raised here, new and old alike, are material, significant, central (not peripheral), site-specific, and, in some cases, unanalyzed. Federal law (NEPA) requires the NRC to apply a "hard look" analysis for evaluating the reasonably foreseeable environmental and public health consequences of the proposed relicensing action and to consider the potential impacts of mitigating or fundamental alternatives. ATHF3 believes that a 20-year License Renewal of Fermi, Unit 2 (2025 - 2045) would inherently have significant and potentially catastrophic implications which have been incompletely or erroneously analyzed;. therefore, ATHF3 contends that further analysis is called for.

ITEM #1 GE Mark 1 BWR design flaws:

Three General Electric (GE) nuclear engineers resigned their well-paid positions in the 1980's due to their strong fears and misgivings about Severe Accident consequences resulting from inherent safety design deficiencies in the GE Mark 1 Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) --- Fermi, Unit 2's reactor and spent fuel pool as well as the Fukushima Dai-ichi reactors and pools are all based on the GE Mark I BWR design. In fact, Fermi, Unit 2 is the largest reactor of its kind in the world, with an unusually large quantity of spent fuel re-racked and stored precariously in an elevated and vulnerable pool.

Mr. Harold Denton, a former senior NRC reactor safety official, forecasted that the GE Mark 1 BWR design has a probability of catastrophic containment failure of 90%.

On March 11, 2011, an official of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) proclaimed to millions worldwide on CNN's "Situation Room" with Wolf Blitzer that a catastrophic rupture at Fukushima Dai-ichi was extremely unlikely. However, three (not just one) catastrophic explosions and meltdowns occurred there, constituting a 100% failure rate at the multi-unit site, as opposed to Mr. Denton's predicted percentage of 90%.

Yet, even in the wake of that unprecedented radiological disaster in Japan, the U.S. NRC has still failed to issue an Order to require installation of hardened, filtered vents on all GE Mark 1 BWR's. Thus, the NRC's response approach remains utterly deficient and inadequate, and ATHF3 contends that this unresolved Matter must be addressed within the Scope of the Safety and Environmental Reviews of the Fermi, Unit 2 LRA. The SEIS must address the potential impacts of Severe Accident scenarios involving catastrophic failure of Fermi, Unit 2's pressure suppression containment system and must provide a thorough analysis of mitigation and fundamental alternatives to the proposed relicensing action.

In support of the above contention, ATHF3 submits into the docket the following comments from the public record:

U.S. NRC Senior Official, Chuck Casto NRC's Operation Center Fukushima Transcript, ML12052A108 March 16, 2011 CHUCK CASTO [Deputy Regional Administrator]: "[...]

if we end up with a molten core and then you talk about the time for the concrete to disassociate, you know, that NUREG says it's a couple of inches an hour, you know. And, of course, that Mark I containment is the worst one of all the containments we have, and it's literally, you know, this NUREG tells you that in a station blackout you're going to lose containment. There's no doubt about it."

Also in support of this contention, ATHF3 puts forth and believes the following statements to be factual based on the public docket:

A) That the Fukushima Dai-ichi Lessons Learned Recommendations, including station blackout mitigation, have not been incorporated into the Fermi, Unit 2 design.

B) That higher power output levels at Fermi, Unit 2 increase the risk of core melt through because of reactor penetrations placed on the bottom of the reactor in the BWR design.

Furthermore, ATHF3 submits into the docket the following article:

"Nuclear Safety: Jaczko Calls for Phaseout in US, Says Plants Aren't Safe,"

Stephanie Cooke, Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, March 29, 2013.

The overwhelming weight of evidence presented in the above cited article, including statements attributed to two former NRC Commissioners including a former Chairman, argues strongly and compellingly for an extremely cautionary approach to considering any further reactor License Renewal Applications. The SEIS must genuinely address fundamental alternatives.

ITEM #2 Electricity Demand Forecast in Michigan:

It is the official position of ATHF3 that the NRC must independently reevaluate and audit the need for continued electric power generation from Fermi, Unit 2 in the first place (and apply the same principle to assess the need for constructing the new Fermi, Unit 3 as well). A proper SEIS analysis of supply and demand would conclude that the State of Michigan does not need to add any new baseload electric generating capacity now or for the foreseeable future.

In 2006, the Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC) published a study called "Michigan's 21 st Century Electric Plan." The essential conclusion is: "Michigan's total electric generation requirements are expected to grow at an annual average rate of 1.3 percent from 2006 to 2025 - from 112,183 gigawatt hours (GWh) to 143,094 GWh."

GWh is the abbreviation for GigaWatt-hours, a reasonable unit for measuring the amount of electrical power consumed each year in Michigan. 100,000 GWh is equal to 100 million megawatt-hours (MWh) or 100 billion

of the moi'e familiar (to those of us who pay household electrical bills) kilowatt-hours (KWh).

The MPSC forecast is the basis for everything else in the report. It is the forecast DTE Energy Co. (DTE) accepted and used as the justifying reason for adding Fermi, Unit 3's generating capacity of roughly 11,000 GWh per year. In other words, DTE said this new nuclear power plant would be needed to supply some 7.7%

of Michigan's electrical demand in 2025, the year in which Fermi, Unit 3 was supposed to come on line, according to DTE's initial license application.

As we are now eight years past the publication date of the MPSC study, we can get an idea of how accurate the forecast has been. The most recent year for which actual data about electrical demand in Michigan is available from the U.S. Energy Information Administration is 2012; information for 2013 should be available in the fall of 2014.

In 2012, actual electrical demand in Michigan was 104,107 GWh. According to the MPSC's projection, it was supposed to be 131,746 GWh for that year. Reality was short of the projection by 27,639 GWh, or 26.50%

below where the MPSC and DTE imagined it would be. What in fact happened is that electrical demand in Michigan peaked in 2007 at 109,927 GWh. During the next two years, because of the global economic crisis and recession, electrical demand declined sharply, bottoming out at 98,121 GWh in 2009. In 2010, demand recovered a bit, to 103,649 GWh, and has remained essentially flat (plus or minus less than 1%) during the shaky economic "recovery" since then.

The number to which we should pay close attention is 27,639 GWh. That is the difference, in 2012, between the MPSC/DTE expectations and actual demand. Given the potential generating capacity of Fermi, Unit 3 and the actual power currently produced by Fermi, Unit 2, Michigan's actual demand for electricity indicates that even if Fermi, Unit 3 is never built and Fermi, Unit 2 is permanently shut down, DTE still has the margin to close a couple of its dirtiest coal-fired generators as well.

Even if Michigan's electrical demand were magically to resume a growth rate of 1.3% per year, actual absolute demand would be short of imagined demand by significantly more than 27,639 GWh per year by 2025. As there is no particular reason to believe that growth in electrical demand will resume at all, the obvious conclusion is that the Fermi nuclear reactors are not needed.

In addition, Michigan Governor Snyder's energy task force report (published 2013) concluded the electrical grid can carry up to 30% of its power from renewable sources (wind, solar and hydro) without needing to be upgraded. The actual experience of Germany, as well as other nations in Europe which have less solar potential than Michigan, has shown that an upgraded electrical grid can carry 50% or more energy from renewable sources. Note that the cost of upgrading Michigan's electrical grid to this standard is far less than the $15 Billion projected cost (before typical overruns) of building Fermi, Unit 3.

Of course, Fermi's uranium fuel is not mined in Michigan, so nuclear fuel importation permanently drains money out of the state. On the other hand, fuel for alternatives such as wind and solar costs nothing, so long as the sun shines on Michigan. The cost of generating electricity in Michigan from wind and solar is purely the cost of building and maintaining the turbines and solar panels. For comparison, $15 Billion would purchase a little over $3,900 in solar panels for every household in Michigan --- that includes every household in the entire state, not just every household in DTE's service area. The Fermi, Unit 2 SEIS must adequately discuss alternatives to the proposed action.

Furthermore, the potentially astronomical cost of permanently managing Fermi, Unit 2's spent fuel and the inherent danger of a reactor core meltdown during the reactor's operating life must be properly considered within the Scope of this Environmental Impact Statement. Even if everything goes according to plan - no meltdown or other serious accident - nuclear reactors mean enormous cleanup costs in the future. California Edison recently estimated the cost of decommissioning its two reactors at San Onofre, California at $4

Bi'llion. There is no long-term solution for disposing the spent fuel, so the $4 Billion plan anticipates only temporary, onsite, dry cask storage; real permanent disposal will cost more. It is reasonable to comparably estimate the decommissioning cost for Fermi, Unit 2 at $2 Billion; however, the actual cost might be more since there is more spent fuel. If Fermi, Unit 2's operating license is extended, then the best-case decommissioning cost will rise because more spent fuel will be generated. Whatever the actual cost, the public is stuck with it. It's the price of avoiding a Fukushima-type disaster. Extending Fermi, Unit 2's license for twenty more years also greatly increases the chance of a serious core meltdown.

In summary, the State of Michigan does not need electrical power supply from DTE's Fermi facility. Insurmountable dangers and decommissioning costs will continue to increase as long as Fermi, Unit 2 is operated. The only sensible course is to let Fermi, Unit 2's operating license expire without renewal and start the decommissioning process at the earliest possible date --- and, likewise, abandon the misguided plan to build Fermi, Unit 3. Nuclear power reactors are an irreversible mistake we do not need to keep repeating. It is certainly possible and sensible to get most of Michigan's electrical power from clean and renewable sources. That's the plan both business and government should be pursuing. We should not be subsidizing DTE Energy Co.'s obsolete 20th Century business plan in the 21 st Century.

ITEM #3 Emergency Planning:

Within the Scope for review, the SEIS for the Fermi, Unit 2 LRA must include an updated and realistic analysis of evacuation time estimates (ETE) and economic consequences of a Severe Accident, using correct input data and assumptions in order to draw correct conclusions about the costs versus benefits of possible mitigation alternatives or fundamental alternatives to the proposed action.

ATHF3 contends that the following information must be considered in order to prepare a proper EIS assessment:

Meteorology: The Fermi, Unit 3 COLA (Part 5, Appendix 4 "Emergency Plan: Radiological Monitoring and Assessment," Feb. 2014) incorporates the Raddose-V software program to "provide real-time (as the release is occurring), site specific predictions of atmospheric transport and diffusion... determined using a variable trajecton, plume simulation model, along with real-time or simulated scenario meteorological data....

Raddose-V is currently in-use at the Fermi site [that is, Fermi, Unit 2]." (emphasis added). ATHF3 agrees that the "variable trajectory" plume distribution model is more realistic and appropriate for the Fermi site than a "straight-line Gaussian" model would be, due to the Fermi site's lakeshore and riverside location (see, for example, Dr. Bruce Egan's testimony in support of the New York Attorney General's Intervention against the Indian Point LRA); however, ATHF3 contends that, for the same reason, the Fermi site's location necessitates a wider (larger) Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) than is currently proposed by the Applicant/Licensee (DTE) and endorsed by the NRC. A "variable trajectory" model recognizes the uncertainties of predicting plume behavior, especially near bodies of water, and the Fermi site is also located near many major metropolitan urban communities. In other words, a "variable trajectory" model and a larger EPZ go hand-in-hand. Thus, while DTE's SAMA analysis assumes a 10-mile EPZ probabilistic model, ATHF3 contends that a 50-mile EPZ would be a more realistic and appropriate starting point for Fermi, Unit 2's location and would, importantly, yield different results. In fact, ATHF3 asserts that DTE's arbitrary and unrealistic EPZ probabilistic modeling served conveniently for underestimating and minimizing projected consequences of a Severe Accident. Therefore, further analysis is called for, under NEPA.

Evacuation Time Estimates (ETE): DTE's evacuation time estimates are unrealistically low because the estimates rely on (1) an arbitrary and scientifically inappropriate probabilistic model for the Fermi site --- a 10-

mile EPZ and minimal "shadow evacuation zone" and (2) the incorrect and unwise assumption that not everyone within ten miles of the Fermi site would have to evacuate, rather only those in the peak radiation plume. DTE minimized "shadow evacuation" of those outside the 10-mile EPZ, and DTE's ETE input parameters failed to consider instances of serious road construction delays, severe Michigan snow conditions (beyond 20% impairment), and other pertinent factors including questionable local preparedness response capabilities required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1). Even after the Fukushima Dai-ichi disaster proved that the EPZ should be significantly expanded, DTE's analysis relies on the inappropriate, absurd and discredited 10-mile EPZ --- see Endnotes. Ironically: (a) the NRC's inconsistent guidelines (Dec. 2013) require Emergency Planning within fifty (50) miles of each plant for preventing the ingestion of releases, "such as through bans on contaminated food and water," according to the Congressional Research Service (Jan. 2014); and, (b) while the Raddose-V program is capable of calculating deposition at receptors in the 50-mile ingestion pathway, which appears to include, in the U.S., about 8 counties in Michigan and 8 counties in Ohio, DTE's Emergency Plan executes arrangements in support of emergency preparedness with only two county governments -- Monroe Co.

and Wayne Co., Michigan.

Thus, ATHF3 contends that the Applicant/Licensee's Emergency Plan is inadequate, and, therefore, further analysis is called for, under NEPA.

Economic Consequences: DTE's cost calculations assume an arbitrary and scientifically inappropriate EPZ probabilistic model for the Fermi site and, as a result, that a radiological release will affect only a relatively small area. Proper inputs specific to the Fermi site indicate a far larger affected area ---- potentially including the densely populated centers of Metro Detroit (MI), Ann Arbor (MI), Monroe (MI), Toledo (OH) and Windsor (ON); such scenarios would result in longer evacuation times and greater costs and consequences. Radiation plume exposure from a prolonged or delayed evacuation and consequent projected health-related costs in the affected population would be greater if an appropriate probabilistic model and correct input parameters were used in DTE's ETE. ATHF3 contends that realistic and reasonably foreseeable scenarios were ignored or underestimated by the Applicant/Licensee's cost-benefit analysis. Importantly, a proper Severe Accident analysis significantly affects whether local communities will receive commensurate safety enhancements. Furthermore, ATHF3 contends that actual long-term recovery, remediation and redevelopment costs in a Severe Accident could be astronomical and that no reliable or credible cost analysis currently exists, given the uncertainties about long-term habitability criteria and cleanup standards. Therefore, ATHF3 contends that the development of a long-term cleanup policy and strategy must be completed as a prerequisite for any further licensing or relicensing actions.

ATHF3 has a contrarian point of view on the basic validity of the MACCS and MACCS2 codes as a proper diagnostic tool to assess economic costs and consequences. ATHF3 refers to expert testimony supporting Pilgrim Watch's Petition to Intervene against the PNPS LRA: David Chanin, who coded the cost model of the MACCS and MACCS2, stated (Chanin Declaration for Pilgrim Watch, June 2007, ML071840568) that, "I have spent many many hours pondering how MACCS2 could be used to calculate economic costs and concluded it was impossible. (and) Speaking as the sole individual who was responsible for writing the FORTRAN in question, which was done many years prior to my original work in SAND 96-0957, I think it's foolish to think that any useful cost estimates can be obtained with the cost model built into MACCS2..The economic cost numbers produced by MACCS2 have absolutely no basis. If you want to discuss economic costs, I'd be glad to discuss SAND 96-0957, but the "cost model" of MACCS2 is not worth anyone's time."

For a cost analysis which supports ATHF3's argument, ATHF3 points to Sandia National Laboratory's CRAC-2 Report, "Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences," (1982). The report stated that a core meltdown at Fermi, Unit 2 would have the following consequences: 8,000 "Peak Early Fatalities," 340,000 "Peak Early Injuries," 13,000 "Peak Deaths from Cancer," and $136 billion in property damage costs. Note that these 1982 numbers are unadjusted for demographic and monetary inflation trends and do not account for the current or foreseeable amount of spent fuel stored onsite.

Thus, given all of the above, ATHF3 contends that there are facts at issue which can affect whether or not the proposed action or any particular alternative is cost-effective, and, therefore, further analysis is called for, under NEPA.

Endnotes:

(1)

Elaborating on the inadequacy of the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) as a probabilistic model or tool for properly estimating reasonably foreseeable costs and consequences of a Severe Accident, ATHF3 submits the following statement from the public record:

http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/03/158441.htm Statement by U.S. Ambassador John V. Roos on Japan's Earthquake and Tsunamis Remarks (excerpt) - Tokyo, Japan March 16, 2011 The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of Energy and other technical experts in the U.S. Government have reviewed the scientific and technical information they have collected from assets in country, as well as what the Government of Japan has disseminated, in response to the deteriorating situation at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant. Consistent with the NRC guidelines that apply to such a situation in the United States, we are recommending, as a precaution, that American citizens who live within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant evacuate the area or to take shelter indoors if safe evacuation is not practical.

We want to underscore that there are numerous factors in the aftermath of the earthquake and Tsunami, including weather, wind direction and speed, and the nature of the reactor problem that affect the risk of radioactive contamination within this 50 mile (80 km) radius or the possibility of lower-level radioactive materials reaching greater distances.

(2)

ATHF3 contends that the Fermi site must have, at minimum, a readily-expandable 50-mile-radius evacuation plan that can be implemented instantly and effectively in a severe accident that indiscriminately exposes the public to significant radioactive releases. Southeast Michigan needs a comprehensive regional evacuation plan with routes, destinations, immediate notification, long-term housing facilities and financial support for displaced and relocated families and individuals, competent medical care for victims of radiation exposure, full disclosure of real-time radioactive release measurements and plume tracking, and funding for adequate event-response capabilities including assistance and preparation for evacuation of vulnerable populations such as indigent and limited-mobility individuals of all ages and for all reasons. The evacuation plan must be coordinated with the entire Great Lakes region, including Michigan, Ohio and Ontario, Canada. The plan must be a realistic, four-season strategy with contingencies for severe weather conditions and impaired visibility/driving conditions; the plan must have flexibility to accommodate and adapt to unexpected road construction delays or other foreseeable scenarios. It should not be assumed that the residents located within the perimeter "shadow evacuation zone" will react any differently from those in the central Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). The regional emergency communications capabilities must be augmented. During and following

an emerg6ncy event, there must be no suppression of public information and no transmission delay. To meet this standard, major infrastructural changes must be implemented immediately. The public does not accept effectively being told to shelter in place and suck it up.

(3)

Evacuate Monroe County in two-lane traffic?

The Michigan Department of Transportation is considering whether the City of Monroe, MI (immediately near the Fermi site) can reconfigure S. Monroe Street (M-125) and reduce the traffic flow from five lanes to three. While this would add about 30 parking spots, it could create a serious problem if there were ever an emergency at Fermi. M-125 is an evacuation route for Fermi, as well as an alternate route should there be an accident on 1-75. More than 1,400 people have signed an on-line petition against this reconfiguration.

ITEM # 4 Public Health Impacts:

Within the Scope for review, the SEIS for the Fermi, Unit 2 LRA must include an updated and realistic analysis of current and projected public health impacts of authorized, routine, by-design radioactive releases by Fermi.,

Unit 2 into the surrounding environment. ATHF3 considers this issue to be in the category of "Significant New Unknown and Unanalyzed Conditions." The SEIS must consider new and updated public health data, unavailable at the time of issuance of the original Operating License; further, the SEIS must adequately consider Mitigation Alternatives which could significantly reduce the alleged environmental and public health impacts of Fermi, Unit 2's operations. Thus, further analysis is called for, under NEPA.

In support of this contention, ATHF3 submits into the docket the following public health impacts study by the Radiation and Public Health Project (RPHP):

Potential Health Risks Posed By Adding A New Reactor At The Fermi Plant: Radioactive contamination from Fermi 2 and changes in local health status, pages 1 - 21, January 10, 2012, Joseph J. Mangano, MPH, MBA, Executive Director, Radiation and Public Health Project (RPHP).

http://www.beyondnuclear.org/storage/Mangano corrected Fermi report Jan 11 2012.pdf Additionally, making the case for scoping and material relevance, ATHF3 submits revised excerpts from the following press release issued by the Fermi, Unit 3 COLA Intervenors:

February 2, 2012 NEW REPORT SHOWS INCREASE IN CANCERS AND MORTALITIES SINCE FERMI 2 NUCLEAR PLANT START UP Thursday -- Monroe, MI -- A new report submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) shows dramatic increases in cancer and mortalities in Monroe County since the start-up of the Fermi 2 nuclear plant. Using data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the report was prepared by Joseph Mangano, MPH, MBA, Executive Director of the Radiation and Public Health Project (RPHP).

One of the most shocking statistics shows that cancer death rates of young people (up to age 24) living in Monroe County exceeded the U.S. national rate by 28% from 1985 to 2008, a large shift from 1979 to 1984, when the county rate was 24% below the national average. Cancer death rates for 25 to 44 year olds in Monroe County also jumped, from 22% below the U.S. national average to 4% above the national average. In 1985,

Fermi 2 loaded fuel and began low power testing; full commercial operation began in January 1988.

There were nineteen (19) health indicators reviewed including infant mortalities, low birth weights and hospitalizations that showed increased incidence in Monroe County, compared to the U.S. national average. Ten (10) of these indicators were statistically significant, and four (4) others approached significance.

"These patterns in Monroe County raise serious questions about whether emissions from Fermi 2 harmed local residents," says Joseph Mangano. "Before any decision is made on the future of [nuclear power in Southeast Michigan,] unusual health patterns such as these must be studied thoroughly by federal and state health officials, and findings reported to the public," Mangano concluded.

Nuclear power plants emit numerous radioactive isotopes not only from accidents, but also as part of routine "normal" operations. In 2002, Fermi 2 was 10th highest in the U.S. for airborne emissions of Iodine-131 and 7th highest for Strontium-89. In 2007, Fermi 2 was 13th highest in emissions of Tritium. Fermi 2 experienced a serious accident Christmas Day 1993 that resulted in a discharge of two million gallons of slightly radioactive water into Lake Erie. The drinking water intakes for the City of Monroe and Frenchtown Township are located 1/4 mile downstream from the plant. Radioactive isotopes can bio-accumulate and bio-concentrate in the food chain much like DDT, PCB's and dioxins.

The Mangano Report was prepared for submission to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) during the proposed Fermi 3 nuclear plant Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) public comment period. Mangano calls for more study before approval of a new Fermi 3 nuclear plant that is proposed adjacent to Fermi 2 and the closed Fermi 1. For these reasons, a growing Coalition of Fermi 3 Intervenors have called for Baseline Health Studies of Monroe County in order that elevated cancers from a proposed Fermi 3 could be measured.

The Mangano findings regarding Fermi 2 are consistent with studies from around the world, including:

A recent French study on childhood leukemia, posted at:

http://www.beyondnuclear.org/home/2012/1 / 12/french-study-finds-childhood-leukemia-doubled-around-nuclear.html And the 2008 German study on childhood leukemia, posted at:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2696975/?tool=pubmed Both of these studies report elevated incidence of cancers associated with proximity to nuclear power plants.

Additionally, ATHF3 demands an SEIS analysis of the significant public health impacts of predictable accidental radioactive releases which can be expected to occur periodically due to human error or mechanical failure for the entire duration of Fermi, Unit 2's licensed operations. As an example, at least one hundred gallons of radioactive floodwaters (contaminated wastewater) reached the Monroe County public sewer system in December 2010 when a wastewater holding tank valve malfunctioned at Fermi, Unit 2.

ITEM #5 Thermal discharges into Lake Erie:

Within the Scope for review, the SEIS for the Fermi, Unit 2 LRA must include an updated and realistic analysis of current and projected public health impacts of authorized, routine, by-design thermal discharges by Fermi, Unit 2 into the surrounding environment. ATHF3 considers this issue to be in the category of "Significant New

Unknown and Unanalyzed Conditions." The SEIS must consider new and updated environmental and public health data, unavailable at the time of issuance of the original Operating License; further, the SEIS must adequately consider Mitigation Alternatives which could significantly reduce the alleged environmental and public health impacts of Fermi, Unit 2's operations. Thus, further analysis is called for, under NEPA.

In support of this contention, ATHF3 submits into the docket the following analysis fromn the U.S. NRC, pertaining to the Fermi Nuclear Power Plant:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has stated in Draft NUREG-2105, volume 1, October 2011, page 2-228: "Public and occupational health can be compromised by activities at the Fermi site that encourage the growth of disease-causing microorganisms (etiological agents). Thermal discharges from Fermi into the circulation water system and Lake Erie have the potential to increase the growth of thermophilic organisms. These microorganisms could give rise to potentially serious human concerns, particularly at high exposure levels." (emphasis added).

Indeed, the U.S. NRC has been vindicated, as the above analysis has proved to be both correct and prescient. The Governor of the State of Ohio recently declared a "State of Emergency" (summer 2014) in response to a clean drinking water supply crisis in and around the City of Toledo, Ohio. There is no doubt about the significance of this public health crisis. The question is to what extent Fermi, Unit 2 operations contributed to the conditions which led to the crisis in the first place, and what are the prospects for the future. ATHF3 contends that one significant contributing factor is the routine thermal discharges from Fermi, Unit 2 which add cumulative stress impacts to the fragile ecosystem of Lake Erie's shallow western basin and shoreline. Lake Erie already suffers from numerous environmental stressors, including pollution from agricultural runoff (such as phosphorus), sewage overflows and routine, authorized releases of industrial toxic chemicals (including releases originating from Fermi, Unit 2). In addition, thermal pollution from nearby power plants is a known contributing factor to the conditions which produce toxic algal blooms and consequent hypoxic dead zones. The exact and precise extent to which Fermi, Unit 2 normal operations are directly causative, not just correlative, of significant environmental and public health impacts is "unknown and unanalyzed." Therefore, ATHF3 hereby invokes NEPA requirements and contends that a "hard look" and further analysis is called for, as a precondition for approval of the Applicant/Licensee's Fermi, Unit 2 License Renewal Application (LRA).

Additionally, ATHF3 demands an SEIS analysis of the environmental and public health impacts of the NRC's decision to approve Fermi, Unit 2 License Amendment No. 196, which allows an increase in thermal power from the facility. The largest algae blooms on Lake Erie occur in the shallow, warm water near DTE's nuclear and coal-fired power plants.

ITEM # 6 Radiation Protection Standards:

With attribution to Beyond Nuclear, a recognized Fermi Intervenor, ATHF3 demands a "hard look" review of environmental radiation protection standards for nuclear power operations at Fermi, Unit 2 in order to assess the adequacy of current and proposed U.S. EPA guidelines.

Citation:

40 CFR 190 EPAHQ OAR 2013-0689; FRL-9902-200AR "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations, " U.S. Environmental Protection AgencY (EPA).

If EPA issues new radiation exposure guidelines for nuclear facilities, it needs to protect women and children, particularly the vulnerable female infant, from exposure. Current EPA standards do not do this.

EPA itself recognizes that "the risk per unit dose [for radiation induced cancer] has generally increased over the years." This is why it is important that human health, not the financial health of the nuclear industry, drive any changes that EPA makes to radiation exposure standards. Any changes need to not only reflect this increase risk per unit dose, but also need to protect humans during their most vulnerable life stage: childhood.

The current EPA averaged risk of cancer could underestimate the risk to children and infants by 2-5 times, possibly more. A female infant is seven times more vulnerable than an adult male. Since she is the most sensitive to radiation, the standards should be set to protect her. Falling short of this goal would fail to afford the female infant the equal protection she deserves.

EPA must also begin to integrate longer-term strategies for assessing multi-generational impacts of chronic exposure to low radiation doses. These impacts, although they show up much more slowly, could represent a weakening of the human genome and an increase in diseases such as cystic fibrosis, muscular dystrophy, neural tube defects, congenital heart defects, coronary heart disease, essential hypertension, diabetes mellitus and more. Cancer isn't the only disease endpoint EPA should be considering, especially since artificial radioactivity has been continually released for three or four generations now.

If EPA turns a blind eye to longer-term genetic impacts, or refuses to set standards to protect the female infant, it will fail in its duty to protect public health and the environment. It will instead be allowing industry to "take" the health of our children in service of industry profits.

ITEM #7 Severe Accident Analysis of Fermi, Unit 2's Spent Fuel Pool:

ATHF3 hereby appeals to the U.S. NRC for reconsideration of a misguided ASLB ruling which is described below and which pertains directly and materially to the Scope of this relicensing action, including the Fermi, Unit 2 LRA Environmental Review and SEIS.

Submitted for

Reference:

--- The Petitions, Contentions and legal filings pertaining to a Petition to Intervene (Contentions 1 - 5) and subsequent adjudication, in the Matter of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) License Renewal Application (2006 - ) -- Docket No. 05000293 (including Pilgrim Watch's Motion to Intervene, Contention 4, May 2006 - ADAMS Accession Number ML061630125). Petitioners included Pilgrim Watch (http://www.pilgrimwatch.org) and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office of Attorney General.

Basis:

The ASLB and the NRC Staff have failed to apply their own rules and regulations pertaining to Severe Accidents involving spent fuel pools, which are vulnerable structures integral to a facility's normal operation. Consistently and incorrectly, the NRC has argued that all spent fuel issues are Category 1 and, therefore, "off the table" for practical purposes, having been generically resolved for all plants and not subject to further analysis in any relicensing proceeding. However, the NRC Rules say otherwise. The NRC applies the wrong section of the Rules and consequently misinterprets the whole regulation. The correct and appropriate interpretation of 10 CFR 51.53 is found in Section 5, not Section 6, in NUREG - 1437 (GEIS). Section 6 of the GEIS specifically deals with "The Uranium Fuel Cycle and Solid Waste Management" under normal operations; Section 5 deals with "Environmental Impacts of Postulated Accidents," including Category 1 generic "Design-Basis Accidents" and Category 2 site-specific "Severe Accidents." Section 5 includes definitions of "severe" and "accident" and does not limit these to reactor core accidents. Section 5 focuses on potential consequences to determine whether or not a potential accident is severe ---- and, thus, under Section 5, spent fuel pool fires are a Category 2 issue, within the Scope of a site-specific Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMA) analysis and, therefore, are a fundamental part of an Applicant's Environmental Report (ER) and subject to NEPA SEIS review and remedy. In other words, it is the consequences of an accident, not the source or cause, which determines whether such accident is properly categorized as "Severe."

Of course, spent fuel pools typically contain a large inventory of high-level radioactive waste (HLRW) with an inherent and undisputed potential for catastrophic consequences in the context of an accident; ironically, a spent fuel pool event could conceivably cause a reactor core accident, thereby greatly magnifying cumulative consequences. Thus, the idea that a spent fuel pool is somehow outside the realm and scope of a SAMA analysis or SEIS and that even if mitigation alternatives are readily available and cost-effective (which they are) the plant nevertheless need not consider them, is ridiculous and absurd.

As a consequence of several re-racks implemented as part of an extremely misguided, NRC-endorsed policy, the Fermi, Unit 2 spent fuel pool currently stores approximately twice the amount of spent fuel as it was originally designed to hold (4600 vs. 2300 design), resulting in a precariously vulnerable condition which must be actively managed at all times. Indeed, Fermi, Unit 2 has the largest spent fuel pool capacity of any operating boiling water reactor in the country -- hence, the potentially greater magnitude of consequences of severe leaks, fires, or other structural breaches of the pool. Adding to the danger is the fact that the GE Mark 1 BWR design locates the spent fuel pool on the 5th floor, in an elevated, structurally vulnerable position. It is reasonable to estimate that, during the 20-year License Renewal period, Fermi, Unit 2 would generate an amount of spent fuel from normal operations equal to about fifty percent (50%) of that which it produced during the original 40-year Operating License period. At the same time, the current "structured coordination" between the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and the NRC appears to be heading towards potentially indefinite "continued storage" of spent fuel with no technical specifications in place, now or for the foreseeable future.

Given that the Applicant/Licensee is charged with the primary responsibility for safely and securely handling its own high-level radioactive waste (HLRW) generated during the licensed life of the reactor, ATHF3 contends that there is a "gap of accountability" in DTE's plan as it is currently written in the Fermi, Unit 2 LRA and associated documents. The NRC's SEIS must finally address the unaddressed issue of financial accountability to the public taxpayers and utility ratepayers, who deserve a seat at the table on the issue of whether to assume new, additional, and uncertain future long-term liabilities implicit in the LRA.

Under 10 CFR 2.309, a Petitioner is required to show that the issue raised in a Contention is within the Scope of the proceeding. Contentions that seek compliance with NEPA must be based on the Applicant's Environmental Report (ER). (10 CFR 2.309(f)(2)). Under 10 CFR part 51 (c)(3)(ii), the Applicant is required to provide an ER that contains analyses of the environmental impacts of the proposed action associated with license renewal and the impacts of operation during the renewal term for those issues identified as Category 2 issues. "Severe Accidents" are listed as a. Category 2 issue in the applicable section on "Postulated Accidents." Contentions implicating Category 2 issues ordinarily are deemed to be within the Scope of License Renewal proceedings. See Turkey Point, supra at 11-13.

In conclusion, ATHF3 contends that DTE's Fermi, Unit 2 LRA Environmental Report (ER) utterly fails to address Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives which could substantially reduce the risks and consequences associated with onsite storage of high level radioactive waste (HLRW), especially, spent fuel pool water loss and fires. Likewise, the NRC's site-specific SEIS must address, within the scope of review, the significant environmental and public health consequences of a Severe Accident involving Fermi, Unit 2's spent fuel pool and include an analysis and discussion of mitigating and fundamental alternatives.

ITEM #8 Endangered Species at the Fermi site:

Within the Scope for review, the SEIS for the Fermi, Unit 2 LRA must include an updated analysis of current and projected impacts of operations at Fermi, Unit 2 on the threatened and endangered species of fish and wildlife (flora and fauna) which rely on the Fermi site for habitat and ecosystem services. ATHF3 considers this issue to be in the category of "Significant New Unknown and Unanalyzed Conditions." The SEIS must address the current list of state and federally-protected species, updated since the time of issuance of the original Operating License; further, the SEIS must adequately consider Mitigation Alternatives which could significantly reduce the environmental impacts of Fermi, Unit 2's operations. Thus, further analysis is called for, under NEPA.

In support of this contention, ATHF3 submits into the docket the following information:

The Bald Eagle, the Eastern Fox Snake and the Mississauga Rattlesnake live at the Fermi site and must be included in the SEIS and the Applicant's LRA.

Also at the Fermi site are two bird species (Red Knot and Piping Plover) and two bat species (Northern Long-Eared Bat and Indiana Bat).

Other species at the Fermi site include:

Karner Blue Butterfly Eastern Prairie fringed Orchid Three species of mussels: Northern Riffleshell, Snuffbox Mussel, and the Rayed Bean.

In a nine month study, the Fermi, Unit 2 Cooling Water Intake impinged 3,102 live fish and more than 62.5

million fish eggs and larvae. This significant impact to the ecosystem of Lake Erie's western basin must be addressed in the SEIS.

ITEM #9 Fukushima Lessons Learned:

U.S. NRC Order EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (BDBEE)" (ML12054A736), pertains to this contention, in part, as follows:

Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Tier I Recommendation:

Mitigating Strategies for BDBEE (4.2)

Related reference:

Fermi, Unit 3 COLA Part 10 License Condition 3.8.2 states:

The strategies for mitigating prolonged station blackout conditions "must be capable of: [in part] Maintaining core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities for Fermi 3 during and after an event affecting both Fermi Units 2 and 3." In other words, DTE must be prepared to handle a multi-unit emergency event.

ATHF3 believes that such plans are a necessary and desirable goal but mere fantasy and delusion; therefore, the NRC must not endorse thinning overall safety margins by locating a new reactor and spent fuel pool (Fermi, Unit 3) immediately adjacent to an aging, Fukushima-style GE Mark 1 BWR with all of its well-known inherent design flaws augmented by a re-racked, overpacked, elevated spent fuel pool. Fermi, Unit 2 has generated nearly 600 metric tons of high-level radioactive waste containing 90 million curies, stored onsite.

In the context of Fukushima Lessons Learned, and presuming the Fermi, Unit 3 COLA as it actively stands, ATHF3 raises the issue of safety margins for multi-unit events, including Design-Basis Threats and Events (DBT) as well as Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (BDBEE). Indeed, multi-unit risks and uncertainties include unexpected events, accidents or occurrences, which may produce synergistic, compounding and emergent scenarios involving catastrophic failure of mission-critical systems. ATHF3 contends that the NRC's site-specific SEIS must comprehensively analyze reasonably foreseeable risks, consequences, mitigation strategies and fundamental alternatives to the extent required by NEPA. ATHF3 considers this issue to be in the category of "Significant New Unknown and Unanalyzed Conditions" such that further analysis is called for, based on NEPA "hard look" requirements and previous federal court rulings.

For the purpose of assessing the Scoping admissibility of this issue for the SEIS, the simple fact that, by any reasonable measurement, the environmental and public health costs and consequences of the Fukushima Dai-ichi disaster were/are "significant" means that the legal threshold is met for this SEIS Scoping Process. As

radioacti~'e debris from the March 2011 Japanese tsunami continues to wash ashore along the West Coast of North America, nobody can doubt the "significance" of the 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi multi-unit nuclear power plant disaster or its applicability to every nuclear power plant on earth, particularly those reactors of the Fukushima-design including the Fermi, Unit 2 GE Mark 1 BWR. Therefore, ATHF3 contends that the scoping threshold is met and exceeded for the purpose of determining issue admissibility for the SEIS. Of course, ATHF3 reserves the prerogative to comment further on the adequacy and completeness of the NRC's analysis of this or any other relevant concern upon issuance of the Draft SEIS in 2015.

ITEM #10 First Nations Treaty Rights:

All of the following recognized First Nations (Native American) communities have treaty rights at Fermi, Unit

2. Each of these communities has legal standing in the Matter of the Fermi, Unit 2 LRA relicensing proceeding. ATHF3 contends that the SEIS must adequately address the impacts of continued operations at Fermi, Unit 2 on the health and well-being of the standing population:

Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma Wyandotte Nation Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians of Michigan Ogema Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians Delaware Nation Hannahville Indian Community Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians Bay Mills Indian Community Lac Vieux Desert Tribe Forest County Potawatomi Community of Wisconsin Shawnee Tribe Match-e-be-nash-she-wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians of Michigan Huron Potawatomi, Inc.

Keweenaw Bay Indian Community Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians Members of the above U.S. federally-recognized communities have treaty rights to hunt, fish and gather in the area of the Fermi, Unit 2 nuclear power plant. ATHF3 is concerned that if the NRC approves the proposed Fermi license extension, the health, safety and quality of life of the native population would be adversely affected. Numerous species of plants, fish, wild game and migratory birds are already being polluted by Fermi, Unit 2's routine discharges which bioaccumulate, thus making unhealthy or inedible the entire local food supply for current and future generations.

In additi6n, ATHF3 believes that the U.S. NRC should officially recognize the legal standing of the Walpole Island First Nations (WIFN), who reside within a 50-mile-radius of Fermi, Unit 2. WIFN is an unceded island located between Michigan and Canada, populated by natives who were never captured and who never surrendered; they are sovereign entities. However, the NRC has refused to allow WIFN to legally intervene in Fermi licensing proceedings because the NRC considers them to be Canadians not entitled to NRC-recognition or to U.S. treaty rights.