ML14227A912
| ML14227A912 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/13/2014 |
| From: | Bill Dean Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Wamser C Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| Kim J | |
| References | |
| EA-02-026, EA-06-137, TAC MF3307 | |
| Download: ML14227A912 (4) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR -REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 Mr. Christopher J. Wamser Site Vice President December 13, 2014 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station P.O. Box 250 Governor Hunt Road Vernon, VT 05354
SUBJECT:
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION-RESCISSION OF INTERIM COMPENSATORY MEASURE B.1.a IN EA-02-026, "ORDER FOR INTERIM SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY COMPENSATORY MEASURES" AND RECISSION OF EA-06-137, "ORDER REQUIRING COMPLIANCE WITH KEY RADIOLOGICAL MITIGATION STRATEGIES" (TAC NO. MF3307)
Dear Mr. Wamser:
By letter dated February 25, 2002 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML020510305), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Order EA-02-026 to all operating nuclear power reactor licensees. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC supplemented the security measures required for protection against the design-basis threat at nuclear power reactor facilities through a series of security orders. These orders, including Order EA-02-026, established new requirements for specific training; access authorization enhancements; and enhancements to defensive strategies, mitigative measures, and integrated response.
The NRC amended Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR) Parts 50, 52, 72, and 73, including Appendices B and C to Part 73, through a final rule ("Power Reactor Security Requirements") published in the Federal Register on March 27, 2009 (74 FR 13,925). The*
rulemaking codified generically applicable security requirements previously issued by orders and updated the existing power reactor security requirements. The rule became effective on May 26, 2009.
By letter dated November 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111220447), the NRC partially rescinded Order EA-02-026. The requirements of the Order EA-02-026 addressed by Interim Compensatory Measure (ICM) B.1.a involved operator training for specific security initiated events that were not covered by proposed or existing regulations and remained in effect.
By letter dated June 20, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML061600023), the NRC issued Order EA-06-137 to various operating nuclear power reactor licensees, including Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY). It required those licensees to implement certain key radiological protection mitigation strategies for the purpose of mitigating the effects of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) for the reactor vessel.
'1,
By letter dated September 23, 2013, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) submitted Notification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations for the VY. In this letter, Entergy provided notification to the NRC of its intent to permanently cease power operation at the end of the current operating cycle, which is expected to occur in the fourth calendar quarter of 2014. In addition, Entergy indicated their intent to supplement the letter certifying the date on which operations have ceased, or will cease, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 )(i) and 10 CFR 50.4(b)(8).
Section Ill of Order EA-02-026 and Section Ill of Order EA-06-137 provide the NRC's Director of
- the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation the authority to relax or rescind any or all of the conditions of the Order upon demonstration by the licensee of good cause.
On December 18, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13365A007), Entergy requested rescission of ICM 8.1.a in Order EA-02-026 and rescission of Order EA-06-137 in its entirety for VY based on VY's transition from an operating reactor to non-operating reactor.
In this letter, Entergy cited the following reasons to demonstrate good cause for the rescission of ICM 8.1.a of the Order EA-02-026 and Order EA-06-137:
VY will permanently cease power operations at the end of the fourth calendar quarter of 2014, and there will be no further refueling outages or startups. Upon docketing of the 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 )(i) and (ii) certifications, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer authorize operation of the reactor or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. As a result, there is no longer a need to address the specific security initiated event in ICM 8.1.a of the Order EA-02-026, which is primarily associated with reactor operation.
Once VY has been permanently defueled and the certifications required by 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 )(i) and (ii) have been submitted, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer authorize operation of the reactor or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. After this occurs, a LOCA will no longer be possible and the primary containment has no design function. Therefore, Order EA-06-137 is not applicable because core damage will no longer be a concern.
The NRC staff notes that once VY is permanently shutdown and defueled, the primary security focus is the protection of the spent fuel. The specific security-initiated event addressed in ICM 8.1.a of the Order EA-02-026 does not have any immediate effect on the storage or cooling of spent fuel.
In addition, the NRC staff recognizes that VY will maintain mitigation strategies for the protection of spent fuel pursuant to condition 3.N of its license. License condition 3.N requires VY to develop and maintain strategies and staff training to address large fires and explosions that includes protection of the spent fuel. The NRC staff has determined that rescinding of ICM 8.1.a in Order EA-02-026 will not reduce the capability of the licensee to mitigate any consequences from the specific security initiated event described in Order EA-02-026, even in the unlikely case that the event could have some effect on the systems used for storage and cooling of spent fuel. The operations staff will continue to receive training on mitigation strategies related to the protection of spent fuel.
The* NRC staff has determined that rescinding of Order EA-06-137 requiring compliance with Key Radiological Mitigating Strategies at VY will no longer be necessary since core damage will not be possible once all fuel is removed from the reactor vessel. Therefore, the requirements to maintain procedures and training in accordance with Order EA-06-137 are not applicable.
For the reasons discussed above, the NRC staff concludes that good cause has been demonstrated to rescind ICM B.1.a in Order EA-02-026 and to rescind Order EA-06-137 in its entirety. Therefore, upon docketing of the 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1 )(i) and (ii) certifications for permanent cessation of operations and removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, the NRC rescinds ICM B.1.a in Order EA-02-026 and rescinds Order EA-06-137 in its entirety for VY.
Sincerely, William M. Dean, Director Office of ~uclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-271 cc: Listserv
- Concurred via email OFFICE DORL!LP4-2/PM DORLILPL 1-1/LA Tech Editor*
NSIR/MWSB/BC JLD/JOMB/BC NAME JKim KGoldstein JDougherty SWastler JBowen (MHalter for)
DATE 08/19/14 08/19/14 08/18/14 08/20/14 8/28/14 OFFICE OE OGC-NLO DORLILP4-2/BC DORLID NRR/D NAME DFurst DCylkowski DBroaddus MEvans WDean DATE 9/15/14 9/29/14 11/21/14 12/8/14 12/13/14