ML14184B413
| ML14184B413 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/2014 |
| From: | Weber T Arizona Public Service Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| References | |
| 102-06877-TNW/TMI | |
| Download: ML14184B413 (8) | |
Text
- taps 10 CFR 50.59 I10 CFR 72.48 Palo Verde 102-06877-TNW/TMI Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 52034 June 27, 2014 Phoenix, AZ 85072 Mali Station 7636 ATTN: Document Control Desk Tel: (623) 393-5764 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Units 1, 2, & 3 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
Docket Nos. STN 50-528/529/530 and 72-44 10 CFR 50.59, 10 CFR 72.48, and Commitment Change Annual Reports and Notifications Enclosed please find the Arizona Public Service Company (APS) 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 report for January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013. The Commitment Change Report is for the period of January 1, 2013, through June 27, 2014.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2), APS is providing a brief description and summary of the evaluations required by 10 CFR 50.59(d)(1) for each change completed during the period. This report contains the evaluations written during 2013, regardless of the implementation status of the evaluated action, and is included as an enclosure to this letter.
In accordance with 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2), APS is reporting that there were no changes completed during the period that were required to be reported pursuant to 10 CFR 72.48.
In accordance with the APS commitment management program, APS is reporting one NRC commitment change made during the period that was not otherwise reported. The Commitment Change Report is included as Enclosure 2 of this letter.
No new commitments are being made to the NRC by this letter. Should you need further information regarding this submittal, please contact Thomas N. Weber, Regulatory Affairs, Department Leader, at (623) 393-5764.
Sincerely, Thomas N. Weber Department Leader, Regulatory Affairs TNW/TMJ/hsc
Enclosures:
- 1. 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 Report January 2013 - December 2013
- 2. Commitment Change Report January 2013 - June 2014 A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance e7 Ce 7
Callaway
- Comanche Peak
- Diablo Canyon
- Palo Verde
- Wolf Creek
102-06877-TNW/[IMJ June 27, 2014 NRC Document Control Desk Annual 10 CFR 50.59, 10 CFR 72.48, and Commitment Change Report Page 2 cc:
M. L. Dapas J. K. Rankin M. M. Watford M. A. Brown V. L. Ordaz NRC Region IV Regional Administrator NRC NRR Project Manager (electronic and hard copy)
NRC NRR Project Manager (electronic and hard copy)
NRC Senior Resident Inspector for PVNGS (electronic)
Director, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation
ENCLOSURE I PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 Report January 2013 - December 2013
10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 REPORT (JANUARY 2013 through DECEMBER 2013)
Log Doc Doc Number Description Summary Type E-1 0-0007 LDCR 1 0-F047 Evaluates the third cycle use of eight (8)
This change does not require prior Rev. 2 Westinghouse lead fuel assemblies (LFAS) in the NRC approval in accordance with Palo Verde Unit 3 Cycle 18 (U3C18) Core. The 10 CFR 50.59(c)(1).
scope includes, the 4 degree F increase in peak clad temperature in the emergency core cooling system performance evaluation models and the increase in peak cladding oxidation upon fuel design limits.
E-1 1-0007 LDLB 15.6.2.ROOO Addresses changes to the evaluation of double-This change does not require prior Rev. 1 LDCR 2011-F029 ended break of a letdown line outside containment NRC approval in accordance with described in PVNGS UFSAR chapter 15.6.2.
LDCR 2012-F003 CALC 13-NC-ZY-0247 R.009 E-1 2-0001 PROC 40AL-9RL4A R.035 Temporarily lowers the Pressurizer Pressure This change does not require prior Rev. 1 Control System (PPCS) master setpoint in NRC approval in accordance with response to Pressurizer Safety Valve (PSV) 10 CFR 50.59(c)(1).
leakage.
E-1 2-0006 PROC 40ST-9EC03 R. 15 Reviews the compensatory measures to be taken This change does not require prior Rev. 0 PROC 40AP-9ZZ20 R. 05 in the event of a loss of cooling function of the NRC approval in accordance with Essential Safety Feature (ESF) equipment room 10 CFR 50.59(c)(1).
Air Handling Units (AHUS) HJA-Z04 or HJB-Z04.
Reviews the DMWO 3270069 Reviews the replacement of the - Legacy This change does not require prior Rev. 0 Honeywell Plant Computer (PC) system and NRC approval in accordance with associated software with a new Rolls Royce 10 CFR 50.59(c)(1).
System. The proposed change is applicable to Units 2 and 3.
E-1 3-0002 DMWO 2579403 Reviews the replacement of the Legacy Core This change does not require prior Rev. 0 Monitoring Computer portion of the Plant NRC approval in accordance with Monitoring System (PMS), including the Honeywell 10 CFR 50.59(c)(1).
computer system along with the associated process input units (PlUs) and local control stations. The CMC processor will be replaced with Intel based redundant computers. This change also includes software replacement.
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10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 REPORT (JANUARY 2013 through DECEMBER 2013)
Log Doc Doc Number Description Summary Type E-13-0006 VDP Al 7994 Reviews the addition of Westinghouse Electrical This change does not require prior Rev. 0 Company (WEC) suppliers documents to the NRC approval in accordance with PVNGS Design Basis. This included the stress and 10 CFR 50.59(c)(1).
fatigue analysis for the Unit I Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom head shell and Bottom I_
Mounted Instrument (BMI) nozzles.
ACRONYM N/ABBREVIATION LIST DFWO Deficiency Work Order DMWO Design Modification Work Order LDCR Licensing Document Change Request CECOR Combustion Engineering Core (CECOR) method for estimating the Palo Verde reactor power distributions NOTE: There were no 10 CFR 72.48 evaluations in 2013.
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ENCLOSURE 2 Commitment Change Report January 2013 - June 2014
COMMITMENT CHANGE BOP ESFAS TESTING The commitment change related to BOP ESFAS testing frequency below was finalized June 25, 2014.
Commitment Number:
RCTSAI 7673 Source Document(s):
Action H Response (ANPP-19591-PE PA6) APS response to open items concerning PVNGS ESF load sequencer (Dated 12-03-81)
Existing Commitment
Description:
BOP ESFAS System will be fully tested at least every 18 months at time of refueling. Tests will include testing of all sequence modes and ESFAS logic circuits. Sequencer timing will also be checked.
Revised Commitment
Description:
BOP ESFAS System will be fully tested at periodicities defined by the surveillance frequency control program. Tests will include testing of all sequence modes and ESFAS logic circuits. Sequencer timing will also be checked.
Justification of Change:
The commitment stated in RCTSAI 7673 was originally made by APS in a letter dated December 3, 1981. This letter addressed the APS responses to open items from a design review meeting between the NRC and APS which addressed questions about the reliability and design of the BOP ESFAS sequencer. Review of this letter and related documents from the PVNGS Safety Evaluation Report (SER) shows that the NRC concerns that led to the commitment were focused on the reliability of this first of a kind microprocessor based sequencer system in the PVNGS electrical power distribution systems. Section 8.4.6 of the UFSAR Safety Evaluation Report and Supplement 5 also address the Load Sequencer.
The NRC Staff concluded that the ESF load sequencer design was acceptable.
License Amendment 188 implemented the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (SFCP) at PVNGS (Technical Specification 5.5.18). The program provides an NRC-approved process for changing the frequency of testing for surveillance requirements. Changes to the BOP ESFAS System Testing were addressed in Surveillance Test Risk-Informed Documented Evaluations (STRIDEs) 7, 15 and 16. STRIDEs 7, 15 and 16 provide justification to change the frequency of testing from 18 months to 18 months on a STAGGERED test basis (one train per outage).
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COMMITMENT CHANGE BOP ESFAS TESTING (continued)
The reliability of the components (discussed in the deterministic review in STRIDE 7) summarizes the results for a 10 year test history ending in March 2012. During the review period, there were 46 performances of Integrated Safeguards Testing, including A and B trains in all 3 Units. Each of these surveillances encompassed the testing/verification of 164 components. Thus, the total number of component tests during the review period was 46 x 164 =
7,544 individual component tests/verifications. Source Documents/Databases were reviewed to identify any work activities that were initiated during the performance of the surveillances. The work activities were reviewed to identify any deficiencies or failures with the components that could be considered as surveillance test failures. Of this, there were 16 such instances in the 10 year period. When compared to the total number of 7,544 individual component tests over the last 10 years, the 16 failures noted represent an extremely low 0.2%
failure rate. Of the 16 failures identified, none were the result of a load sequencer failure. Thus, the success rate of the surveillance tests has been excellent. No failures were found that had causal factors either associated with, or affected by, testing frequency.
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