ML14181A805
| ML14181A805 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1996 |
| From: | William Orders, Shymlock M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14181A803 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-96-01, 50-261-96-1, NUDOCS 9603050113 | |
| Download: ML14181A805 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1996001
Text
SREG(,
UNITED STATES
o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
Report No.: 50-261/96-01
Licensee:
Carolina Power & Light Company
P. 0. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket No.:
50-261
License No.:
Facility Name: H. B. Robinson Unit 2
Inspection Conducted: January 1-20, 1996
Lead Inspector:
)d24A.- k---
/
1,
T. Ordels, Senior Resident Inspector
Date Signed
Other Inspector: J. Zeiler, Resident Inspector
J. Coley, Region II Inspector (3.1.1; 3.1.2; 3.3.1)
W. Miller, Region II Inspector (2.3; 3.1.3; 3.3.2; 4.2.1;
4.2.2; 5.1.3.1)
Approved by:
__
_
_
_
_
__,1
'-49k
Milton B. Shymfck, Chief
Date Signed
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
SCOPE:
Inspections were conducted by resident and regional inspectors in the areas of
plant operations which included Engineered Safety Features Walkdown
Auxiliary Feedwater System, Effectiveness of Licensee Control in Identifying,
Resolving, and Preventing Problems; maintenance and surveillance which
included A CVCS Charging Pump Packing Leakage Repairs, RHR Pump Room Cooler
HVH-8A Replacement, Spent Fuel Building Exhaust Air Handling Unit,
Surveillance Observations of OST 302-1 Service Water Component Test and, Close
Out of Open Issues; engineering which included ESR 95-00929, Rev. 3, RHR Pump
Room Cooler Equipment Evaluation, Expert Operability Analysis Number 96-01,
ESR 96-00028, Rev.1, Evaluate Replacement Motor for HVH-5A and, Close Out of
Open Issues; and plant support Physical Security Program, Radiological
Protection Program, Inadequate Training on New Personnel Contamination
Monitors, Fire Protection Program and, Motor Driven Fire Pump Test.
ENCLOSURE 2
9603050113 960216
PPR ADOCK 05000261
G
2
RESULTS:
Plant Operations
Walkdown inspection of the Auxiliary Feedwater System verified that the system
was operable and, except for two valves found to be throttled as opposed to
fully open, the system was well maintained. The misalignment of these valves
was identified as Violation 50-261/96-01-01 (paragraph 2.3).
Maintenance
Plant corrective maintenance was properly controlled and coordinated and was
conducted in accordance with applicable approved instructions by knowledgeable
and skilled craft personnel (paragraph 3.1).
The initial measurement method
used to determine the minimum wall thickness for RHR pump room cooler piping
was identified as being weak (paragraph 3.1.2).
The effectiveness of licensee
corrective actions to resolve instrument line configuration problems
associated with Residual Heat Removal flow transmitter FT-605 was determined
to be weak. However, management attention and planned corrective actions to
address these, as well as other transmitter configuration problems was now
evident (paragraph 3.3.1).
Engineering
Several engineering evaluations reviewed in detail were considered to be
detailed, utilized conservative assumptions, and were developed and approved
in accordance with licensee administrative requirements (paragraph 4.1).
In general, the engineering staff was effective and timely in responding to
plant problems and interfacing with operations. However, an example was
identified where a detailed evaluation of worn equipment parts and abnormal
noise heard in the A Charging Pump was not planned until questioned by the
inspectors (paragraph 3.1.1 and 4.1).
Plant Support
Initial plant personnel training on new Radiation Control Area exit
contamination monitors was ineffective. Subsequent training and instructions
were provided which corrected this condition (paragraph 5.1.2.1).
The motor driven fire pump was satisfactorily tested using a well written
procedure, performed by conscientious test personnel who demonstrated a
knowledge of the fire protection water system and the test requirements
(paragraph 5.1.3.1).
REPORT DETAILS
1.0
PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee Employees:
- Clark, B., Manager, Maintenance
Clements, J., Manager, Site Support Services
- Crook, D., Senior Specialist, Licensing/Regulatory Compliance
Gudger, D., Senior Specialist, Licensing/Regulatory Programs
Hinnant, C., Vice President, Robinson Nuclear Plant
- Keenan, J., Director, Site Operations
Krich, R., Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- Meyer, B., Manager, Operations
- Miller, G., Manager, Robinson Engineering Support Services
- Moyer, J., Manager, Nuclear Assessment Section
- Stoddard, D., Manager, Operating Experience Assessment
Warden, R., Superintendent, Plant Support Assessment
Wilkerson, T., Manager, Environmental Control
- Young, D., Plant General Manager
Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations,
engineering, maintenance, and chemistry/radiation personnel.
NRC Personnel:
W. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector
- J. Zeiler, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.0
PLANT OPERATIONS (71707 and 92901)
2.1
Plant Status
The unit operated at or near full power for the entire report period with no
major problems.
2.2
Plant Operations Observation Activities
The inspectors evaluated licensee activities to determine if the facility was
being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements. These
activities were assessed through direct observation of ongoing activities,
facility tours, control room observations, discussions with licensee
personnel, evaluation of equipment status, and review of facility records.
The inspectors evaluated the operating staff to determine if they were
knowledgeable of plant conditions, responded properly to alarms, and adhered
2
to procedures and applicable administrative controls. Selected shift changes
were observed to determine that system status continuity was maintained and
that proper control room staffing existed. Routine plant tours were conducted
to evaluate equipment operability and to assess the general condition of plant
equipment.
2.3
Engineered Safety Features Walkdown - Auxiliary Feedwater System
The inspectors performed a review and walkdown inspection of the accessible
portions of the AFW System to verify system operability and to determine if
the system alignment procedure conformed to plant drawings and the as-built
configuration. This evaluation and inspection used the following documents:
Drawing Nos. G-190197, Sheets 1 - 4, Feedwater, Condensate, and Air
Evacuation System Flow Diagram
System Description SD-027, Feedwater System (Revision 15, 12/6/95)
Updated FSAR, Section 10.4.8
OP-402, AFW System (Revision 38, 6/29/95)
OP-402 Attachment 9.1, AFW Valve Checklist
Based on review of the feedwater system flow diagrams and the 'W System valve
alignment checklist procedure, appropriate valves were found to be included in
the checklist procedure.
During the walkdown inspection of the AFW System, the inspectors reviewed the
following:
alignment of electrical breakers to the AFW pumps and MOV valves
and alignment of principle valves in the system; installation of hangers and
supports; closure of valves to drain and vent pipe openings and installation
of pipe caps; labeling and identification of pumps, valves, and components;
and lubrication levels in all visible oil and lubrication devices. The AFW
piping system was inspected for leakage. The housekeeping in the AFW System
areas was inspected to determine if transient combustibles were stored in the
areas.
The equipment condition of the AFW system was good and no major system leaks
were noted. Several small minor leaks were noted but the licensee had
previously identified these leaks and had submitted work requests to correct
them. Housekeeping in these areas was satisfactory.
One discrepancy was identified. Two valves, AFW-110, AFW Pump A Recirculation
Isolation Valve, and AFW-111, AFW Pump B Recirculation Isolation Valve, were
found by the inspector to be in a throttled position, approximately 40 percent
closed or 60 percent open. The AFW System Valve Checklist, OP-402 Attachment
9.1, requires these valves to be in the full open position.
3
These discrepancies were reported to the Shift Supervisor. The Shift
Supervisor promptly sent an Auxiliary Unit Operator t o check these valves.
The operator confirmed that these valves were not fully op,..
The valves were
subsequently opened. In addition, all of the AFW valves in the AFW pump room
were also promptly checked and verified by Operations to be correctly aligned.
The inspector reviewed the most current valve alignment checklist for the AFW
System which was completed on June 1, 1995. This checklist indicated that
these valves had been inspected and independently verified to be in the fully
open position. Procedures OMM-1, Operations - Conduct of Operations, and PLP
030, Independent Verification, required that correct valve positions should be
determined and verified by hands-on checking of the valve, except for valves
located in radiation areas for ALARA concerns. The licensee issued Condition
Report 96-0126 to review this event, determine the cause, and to identify
action necessary to prevent recurrence. One of the actions in process by the
licensee was an evaluation to determine if any work activities had required
these valves to be realigned since completion of the June 1995 valve
checklist. At the conclusion of this inspection the Condition Report was
still in review.
The AFW System was operable and the throttling of valve Nos. AFW-110 and AFW
111 had no operational effect on the AFW System since restrictive orifices
were installed downstream from these valves. However, the failure to maintain
the alignment of an engineered safety system in accordance with design
drawings, procedures and operational requirements could result in a
potentially serious problem. Therefore, this item is identified as Violation
50-261/96-01-01, AFW System Valve Misalignment.
The calibration data for AFW System instrumentation was also reviewed by the
inspectors. Current calibration records (ie., stickers) were not installed on
AFW instrumentation but, were maintained by calibration procedures controlled
by the I&C Department. The inspectors reviewed the calibration data for a
sample of five pressure instruments (PI-1425, PI-1426, PI-1478-1, PI-1479-1,
and PI-1480-1) and verified that these instruments were included in the
licensee's routine calibration program and that the calibration for each of
these instruments was up to date.
The inspectors reviewed the completed test procedures for the MDAFW pumps,
OST-201-A, MDAFW System Component Test - Train "A" (Monthly), and OST-201-B
MDAFW System Component Test - Train "B" (Monthly), which were completed on
January 3, 1996, and January 16, 1996, respectively. The results of these
completed tests indicated that the MDAFW pumps met the acceptance criteria.
The inspectors did not note any discrepancies in the completed test
procedures. The most recent test on the turbine driven AFW pump was
satisfactory and was witnessed by the NRC. The results of this test were
documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-261/95-30.
Based on this evaluation, the AFW System was operable and, except for the two
misaligned valves, the system appeared to be well maintained.
Within the area inspected, one violation was identified.
4
2.4
Effectiveness of Licensee Control in Identifying, Resolving, and
Preventing Problems
The inspectors evaluated certain activities of the Plant Nuclear Safety
Committee to determine whether the onsite review functions were conducted in
accordance with TS and other regulatory requirements. In particular, the
inspectors attended meetings conducted on January 10 and January 16, 1996. It
was ascertained that provisions of the TS dealing with membership, review
process, frequency, and qualifications were satisfied. The minutes from these
meetings were reviewed to confirm that decisions and recommendations were
accurately reflected.
3.0
MAINTENANCE (61726, 62703, and 92902)
3.1
Maintenance Observations
The inspectors observed safety-related maintenance activities on systems and
components to determine if the activities were conducted in accordance with
regulatory requirements, approved procedures, and appropriate industry codes
and standards. The inspectors reviewed associated administrative, material,
testing, and radiological control requirements to determine licensee
compliance. The inspectors witnesses and/or reviewed portions of the
following maintenance activities:
3.1.1 A CVCS Charging Pump Packing Leakage Repairs
On January 4, the licensee initiated planned maintenance to repair leakage
identified from the secondary stuffing box packing of the A positive
displacement CVCS charging pump.
TS 3.2.2 requires only two of the three
charging pumps be operable while operating at power, therefore, maintenance
could be performed on the A charging pump without entering a TS LCO while it
was inoperable.
The repair activity was performed under WR/JO 95-AQCA1.
Corrective
Maintenance procedure CM-034, Charging Pump Stuffing Box Maintenance, was used
to disassemble, replace the packing, and reassemble the pump. In addition to
the packing, engineering personnel also decided to replace all three fluid
cylinder plungers due to the extended service life already experienced with
the existing plungers. During the subsequent post-maintenance testing, the
pump did not develop the expected flow rate and an abnormal noise was heard
from inside the pump casing. Based on these irregularities, the licensee
decided to disassemble the pump and replace the internal suction and discharge
check valves. It was believed that these valves were not seating properly
resulting in the problems experienced. This work was performed under WR/JO
96-AABD1 using procedure CM-035, Charging Pump Maintenance Valve Disassembly
and Reassembly. The inspectors witnessed aspects of work activities
associated with WR/JOs 95-AQCAl and 96-AABD1 and verified the following: 1)
the pump was properly cleared (tagged out) by operations personnel, 2) proper
approvals were obtained prior to beginning work, 3) the proper revision of CM
034 was utilized and being followed, 4) required tools were properly
calibrated and utilized, 5) correct parts were used, and, 6) personnel were
qualified and knowledgeable.
5
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the vendor manual for the pump (Union
Pump Company) and verified that applicable assembly and reassembly guidance
was incorporated into CM-034 and CM-035. Based on these inspection
activities, no discrepancies were identified. However, after the pump was
tested and returned to service following the check valve replacement, the
inspectors noticed a distinct metallic ping noise originating from inside the
pump. This noise appeared to be connected with the opening and closing of the
suction or discharge check valves and was not characteristic in the B or C
charging pumps. To obtain additional information on the cause of the noise in
the pump, the inspectors discussed this observation with the system engineer.
The inspectors learned that while engineering had looked briefly at the valves
as they were removed, a detailed evaluation of the worn valve parts had not
been conducted. This was due primarily because a decision was made based on
service life of the valves to replace them with new ones. The inspectors
requested to see the old valves to determine whether the wear on these valves
would indicate why this pump made a metallic noise while the others did not.
The inspectors were told that the valves had been thrown in radwaste, but they
would be retrieved for the licensee's engineering support and the inspectors
to examine. The inspectors subsequent examination revealed that two of the
discharge valves had significant wear on the inboard and middle guide
indicating the discharge valve seat may have a slight irregularity in its
seating surface. Subsequent discussions with the previous system engineer for
the charging pumps indicated that the A pump had always made a metallic noise
while operating, however, a detailed evaluation of this condition and its
potential impact-to the pump had never been performed. The inspectors
believed that the noise could be an indication of a problem that may be
contributing to the valve ware. Following discussions with the mechanical
engineering manager regarding these concerns, the licensee indicated that a
more detailed evaluation of the pump noise and valve wear would be performed.
Regardless of the conclusions of this investigation, the inspectors considered
that engineering had not been proactive or thorough in evaluating potentially
adverse pump conditions (i.e., abnormal pump noise and worn equipment parts)
when they were initially identified.
3.1.2 RHR Pump Room Cooler HVH-8A Replacement
This corrective maintenance involved the replacement of one of the RHR pump
room coolers (HVH-8A) due to an excessive service water tube leak. The
maintenance was performed under WR/JO 95-AQC1.
The inspectors witnessed
aspects of the work activities and verified the following: 1) proper approvals
were obtained prior to beginning work, 2) approved procedures/instructions
were used and followed, 3) correct parts and tools were used, 4) required
tools were properly calibrated, 5) safety and radiation controls were
observed, 6) personnel were qualified and knowledgeable, and, 7) supervision
and QC was adequate. When the service water lines were disconnected from the
cooler and taken to the hot machine shop for modification, pipe wall corrosion
was found in the copper service water piping. During the initial evaluation
process to determine whether the pipe could be used again, a rapid response
team engineer was assigned to support the work activities.
6
The engineer directed maintenance personnel to obtain the minimum pipe wall
thickness. The method selected was to use inside calipers for the pipe
internal surface and outside calipers which would fit in the thread root of
the outside portion of the pipe. The inspectors observed the measurements
being taken and questioned how this method could determine minimum wall
thickness. What was being obtained was the average wall thickness since the
good side of the pipe wall was being averaged with the bad.
In addition, the
corroded area of the pipe also had some significant pits which were not being
considered in the measurement method. The engineer instructed a maintenance
technician to obtain a needle point micrometer in order to consider the pipe
pits in the measurement method. The inspectors later learned that a materials
engineer had examined and rejected the pipe due to it not meeting minimum
thickness criteria. The inspectors determined that this measurement was
properly obtained. The inspectors considered the methods used to take the
initial measurements of the pipe minimum wall thickness to indicate a weakness
in the licensee's evaluation of pipe discontinuities which could have resulted
in defective material possibility being reinstalled into the system.
The licensee subsequently substituted 316L stainless steel pipe for the copper
pipe. Work was completed for the service water pipe modification and the
service water pipe was reconnected to the cooler.
3.1.3 Spent Fuel Building Exhaust Air Handling Unit
The Fuel Handing Building, including the Spent Fuel Pool area, has two
ventilation systems. The system normally in operation uses supply fan HVS-2
and exhaust fan HVE-15. The emergency system uses two different fans, supply
fan HVS-4 and exhaust fan HVE-15A. Exhaust fan HVE-15A also includes an
electric heater and charcoal filter unit. The emergency ventilation system is
normally only operated during fuel movement in the spent fuel pool.
Both of
these systems discharge to the plant stack.
On January 16, during the performance of fuel movement and fuel inspection
activities in the spent fuel pool, air handling supply fan HVS-4 and exhaust
fan HVE-15A tripped. The fuel inspection activities were discontinued and
WR/JO 96-AAGH1 was issued to investigate and determine why these fans had
tripped.
The maintenance investigation per WR/JO 96-AAGH1 found that the electrical
connecting leads to the motor winding within the motor raceway terminal box
for fan HVE-15A had been loose and shorted to ground. This short caused the
breaker for fan HVE-15A to trip. The inspectors monitored the repair
activities. The repair activities included replacement of approximately 50
feet of power cable from the motor for fan HVE-15A to the motor starter,
connecting the power cables to the motor leads, megger testing of the power
supply wiring and the wiring for the motor to fan HVE-15A, verification of
correct motor rotation, and post maintenance testing by running the fan for
several hours to assure proper operation.
The inspectors reviewed the completed work package and noted that appropriate
hold points had been included in the WR/JO and that appropriate inspection and
verification had been performed by a QC Inspector or independent verifier. No
7
discrepancies were noted. The licensee issued a condition report for
additional review of this event to determine the root cause of the motor fan
failure and to determine what additional actions were warranted.
3.2
Surveillance Observations
The inspectors evaluated certain surveillance activities to determine if these
activities were conducted in accordance with license requirements. For the
surveillance test procedures listed below, the inspectors determined that
precautions and LCOs were adhered to, required administrative approvals and
tagouts were obtained prior to test initiation, testing was accomplished by
qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure, test
instrumentation was properly calibrated, the tests were completed at the
required frequency, and the tests conformed to TS requirements. Upon test
completion, the inspectors verified that the recorded test data was complete,
accurate, and met TS requirements, test discrepancies were properly documented
and rectified, and the systems were properly returned to service.
Specifically, the inspectors witnessed and/or reviewed portions of the
following test activities:
OST 302-1
Service Water Component Test - Quarterly
3.3
Close Out Issues
3.3.1 (Closed) VIO 50-261/94-17-02:
Failure to Correct Improperly Routed
Instrument Sensing Lines While Troubleshooting Repetitive Gas Binding of
RHR Flow Indicator
The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated September 14, 1994.
As a result of the FT-605 air entrapment issue, some of the sensing line
piping was rerouted to provide the slope of 1 inch rise per foot as
recommended by the vendor (Rosemount). The licensee performed a walkdown of
all flow transmitter sensing lines (in July, 1994) and determined that the
sensing lines were either routed properly or were evaluated as acceptable. On
November 26, 1995, flow transmitter (FT-605) was again reported to be
indicating a flow of up to 900 gpm with no flow in the RHR system. This event
occurred shortly after the flow transmitter had been dry calibrated. At this
point the licensee discovered that not all the sensing lines were properly
sloped. The remaining sensing lines for this transmitter were determined to
be properly routed at that time. However, during the investigation of the
Significant Condition Report (No. 95-2800) generated for this latest event,
the engineer discovered that one utility had found that performing wet
calibrations and backfilling from the bottom of the transmitter were effective
and a cost efficient means of resolving air entrapment difficulties in sensing
lines which do not have the recommended slope. These recommendations,
however, were not implemented as corrective action for FT-605.
On November 29, 1995, following an investigation of a discrepancy in Safety
Injection system accumulator LT indication, engineering personnel discovered
that, between October 28, 1995, and November 3, 1995, both of the LTs for the
C accumulator had been offset upscale to the extent that the actual level was
6 to 7% lower than indicated. This event was caused by failure to implement
8
adequate calibration procedures for the accumulator LTs and inadequacies in
the configuration of the transmitter piping and tubing. This resulted in
difficulties in removing trapped gasses. The licensee reported the event in
LER 95-009-00, dated December 29, 1995 and issued a Significant Condition
Report (CR 95-02762).
Violation 50-261/95-30-01 was issued for inadequate
procedures.
Corrective actions for these issues included a field walkdown and maintenance
history review on all safety related differential pressure transmitters (flow
and level). The purpose of the walkdown was to provide information on the
actual field installed configuration of the process sensing tubing. The
licensee identified the corrective actions as item #2 on the Robinson Nuclear
Plant "Top Ten" Equipment Issues List. This required that all safety related
transmitters be identified, walkdowns be performed of all accessible tubing
configurations, a history search be performed for problem instruments, a "hit
list" of problem instruments be established, a corrective action plan
developed for each problem instrument, and establish the industry standard for
the calibration of differential pressure transmitters cells (i.e. dry, wet,
backfill, etc.).
Since the corrective action in LER 95-009-00 for the
accumulators level transmitters will re-evaluate the corrective actions taken
on Violation No. 50-261/94-17-02 (FT-605), the inspectors considered this
violation closed. The adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions to
address this and other transmitter configuration inadequacies will be tracked
as part of the closeout review for LER 95-009-00 and VIO 50-261/95-30-01.
3.3.2 (Closed) LER 261/94-003-02: Technical Specification Required Shutdown
Due to Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperability
This event occurred on February 18, 1994, when a locking pin for the
modulating air damper to EDG B came loose and was propelled through the
engine's air system damaging the scavenging air blower and turbocharger. The
damaged components were replaced and EDG B was returned to service.
The corrective action for this event included enhancements in the
investigation procedures for plant events. The NRC review and evaluation of
this event resulted in the issuance of Violation 50-261/94-08-02. This issue
was documented in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-261/94-04 and 94-08. The
licensee's corrective actions to prevent recurrence for the violation and the
corrective action for this LER are the same. The corrective action for the
violation was reviewed and found acceptable, and was closed as documented in
NRC Inspection Report 50-261/95-29. Therefore, based on this previous review,
LER 94-003-02 is closed.
3.3.3 (Closed) LER 50-261/94-006-00: Manual Reactor Trip Due to Electro
Hydraulic System Oil Leak
On April 3, 1994, with the unit operating at full power, a load reduction was
initiated due to a leak in the E-H oil system. The E-H oil pumps tripped on
low E-H oil level and the operators manually tripped the reactor prior to an
9
automatic reactor trip on load reduction. The cause of this event was the
failure of an 0-ring which was incorrectly installed in a turbine governor
valve. Following the unit's shutdown, all of the other E-H Control System
turbine valve 0-rings were replaced.
The corrective actions taken for this LER included: covering this event in the
craft training program, counselling of individuals responsible for the
improperly assembled turbine valve, and inclusion of the E-H Control System
into the plant's preventive maintenance program.
The inspectors reviewed Adverse Condition Report 94-0598 and verified that the
corrective actions discussed above had been completed. This LER is closed.
3.3.4 (Closed) LER 50-261/94-011-01:
Technical Specification 3.0:
Emergency
Diesel Generator Inoperability, and,
(Closed) LER 50-261/94-015-01:
Technical Specification 3.0:
Emergency
Diesel Generator Inoperability
These LERs identified a number of dates in which the plant was operating at
full power with one EDG out of service for maintenance and the redundant EDG
out of service for approximately three hours per day to meet the operability
testing requirements of the TS.
During these testing evolutions, off site
power was available to the unit and operators were located in the room of the
EDG being tested with the ability to manually place the EDG in service should
off-site power be lost.
To resolve this issue, the licensee submitted a TS change request to the NRC
that eliminated, in most cases, the requirement to test the redundant EDG when
one of the two EDGs is inoperable. The inspector reviewed the TS and verified
that this change had been incorporated into the TS by Amendment 158.
Based on
this review, these LERs are closed.
4.0
ENGINEERING (37551 and 92903)
4.1
Engineering Support Activities
Throughout the inspection period, engineering evaluations of problems and
incidents were reviewed and discussions were held with engineering personnel
to assess the effectiveness of the licensee's controls for identifying,
resolving, and preventing problems. The following engineering evaluations
were reviewed:
4.1.1 ESR 95-00929, Rev. 3, RHR Pump Room Cooler Equipment Evaluation
Due to excessive service water tube leakage, the licensee decided to replace
the cooler associated with HVH-8A. The RHR room coolers, HVH-8A and HVH-8B,
are designed to limit the RHR pump room temperature increase during a design
basis accident.
This cooling function provides protection for the associated
RHR components (RHR pump, valves, and cables) located in the room. The ESR
and associated 10 CFR 50.59 were developed to justify the RHR system
operability with one of the RHR room coolers, HVH-8A, out of service. The
10
analysis was conducted assuming HVH-8A was out of service for period of time
not to exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The evaluation considered the room temperature to be
below 113 F when the postulated design basis accident began. As long as the
starting room temperature remained below 113'F, the temperature gradient
during the accident would not exceed the maximum allowed temperature for the
most limiting safety-related components in the room. One of the main concerns
addressed was the effect on the RHR pump motor bearing oil and grease which
can degrade at the higher temperatures. Based on recently changing these
lubricants, the Environmental Qualification concerns were not considered to be
a problem. As a precaution, however, a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> cooler inoperability period
was recommended to ensure the quality of the lubricants would not degrade to a
questionable status over the duration of the design basis accident.
4.1.2 Expert Operability Analysis Number 96-01
On January 8, during the performance of MST-903, Station Battery Charge
Monthly, the licensee identified on Battery A that cells 33, 34, and 35 were
slightly below the 67*F acceptance criteria required by the procedure. A 72
hour operability determination was initiated for engineering to determine the
impact of this condition on the operability of Battery A.
The inspectors reviewed Operability Determination 96-01 which indicated that
Battery A was capable of supporting its required electrical loads even if the
electrolytic temperature of all of the battery cells were to reach 55'F.
Therefore, Battery A was considered past-operable since none of the battery
cells approached this temperature. The cause of the lower than normal
electrolyte temperature was due to the close proximity of outside makeup air
that was directed on these cells. In order to prevent this from recurring, a
temporary baffle was constructed using plastic to prevent the makeup air from
blowing directly on the battery cells. Periodic monitoring ensured that
battery cell temperatures remained above 67.F. The licensee planned to
install a permanent baffle arrangement in the near future. Based on this
review, the inspectors determined that the disposition of this operability
issue was adequate.
4.1.3 ESR 96-00028, Rev.1, Evaluate Replacement Motor for HVH-5A
This engineering evaluation was to evaluate the equivalency for a replacement
motor for one of the Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cooling Fans, HVH-5A. These
cooling fans are not safety-related, but provide necessary cooling of the
Control Rod Drive Mechanisms during power operation. On January 20, the HVH
5A motor failed unexpectedly due to a motor short. An identical replacement
motor was not available. The replacement motor differed in that the Full Load
Amperes was slightly lower and the RPM was slightly higher than the original.
The evaluation was detailed in its consideration of motor equivalency. Those
items reviewed in the equivalency determination included: seismic, both
electrical and mechanical characteristics, system interfaces, and design
impact. The replacement motor was determined to be equal to or exceeded the
original motor in all respects.
Based on these inspections, the engineering evaluations were determined to be
detailed, utilized conservative assumptions, and were developed and approved
in accordance with licensee administrative requirements.
Besides the weakness in engineering support for not initiating a more detailed
evaluation of worn equipment parts and abnormal noise heard in the A CVCS
Charging Pump following maintenance, the engineering staff was effective and
timely in responding to plant problems and interfacing with operations.
4.2
Close Out Issues
4.2.1 (Closed) LER 50-261/94-004-00:
Auxiliary Building Outside Design Basis
Due to Positive Pressure Conditions
On March 12, 1994, during an outage, containment purge and the auxiliary
building supply and exhaust fans were in operation while testing was in
progress on an EDG. The EDG testing required the EDG supply and exhaust fans
to be in service. This configuration resulted in a decrease in the exhaust
flow from the auxiliary building due to back pressure from the plant stack,
thereby, creating a positive pressure condition in the Auxiliary Building.
This positive pressure condition for the auxiliary building was contrary to
the design basis for the building.
The corrective action for this item included a change to Procedure OST-401,
EDGs (Slow Speed Start), to require the monitoring of the auxiliary building
pressure indicator for negative pressure during operational testing of the
EDGs. If the building pressure is not negative, the door to the EDG room
being tested is required to be closed and the auxiliary building supply fan
(HVS-1) shutdown. If negative pressure still can not be maintained,
Operations is required to perform the following: inform Engineering of the
condition, determine reporting requirements, and start recording the room
temperature hourly for Auxiliary Building Rooms El and E2.
The inspector reviewed Adverse Condition Report 94-0488 on this event and
Procedures OST-401, EDG (Slow Speed Start) (Revision 45, 7/18/95), OST-409,
EDG (Rapid Speed Start) (Revision 17, 7/18/95), OST-410, EDG A (24 Hour Load
Test) (Revision 5, 1/5/96), and OST-411, EDG B (24 Hour Load Test) (Revision
5, 1/12/96) and verified that this corrective action had been completed. This
item is closed.
4.2.2 (Closed) LER 50-261/94-008-00: Condition Outside Design Basis Due to
Control Room HVAC Inoperability
On May 7, 1994, with the unit operating at full power, flow balancing was
being performed on the auxiliary building HVAC system. During the process of
flow balancing, the licensee discovered that the pressure in a room adjacent
to the control room exceeded the pressure that would exist in the control room
in the event of an emergency pressurization mode of operation. This condition
was outside of the plant's design basis.
12
Following an NRC evaluation, this item was identified as Deviation 50-261/94
14-01.
The licensee responded to this deviation by letter dated July 15,
1994.
'lie corrective action for the deviation included revisions to testing
procedures to reflect the requirements of the Technical Specifications and the
FSAR commitments. This corrective action was reviewed by the NRC and found
acceptable and the deviation was closed by NRC Inspection Report 50-261/95-04.
The corrective action for this deviation is essentially the same as the
corrective action for LER 94-008-00. This LER is closed.
Subsequently, LER 50-261/94-008-01 (Supplemental) was issued which revised and
expanded the analysis and corrective actions identified in the original LER.
These additional items were addressed by the NRC through escalated enforcement
action and have not yet been reviewed by the NRC.
LER 94-008-01 remains open
and will be evaluated during the review of the corrective actions for the
escalated enforcement violation.
4.2.3 (Closed) VIO 50-261/93-10-01:
Failure to Establish Adequate Procedures
to Verify Proper AMSAC Operation After Microprocessor Replacement
On April 20, 1993, the resident inspectors identified that complete logic
testing of the AMSAC circuitry was not being performed after the A AMSAC
channel's microprocessor was replaced and the channel was returned to service.
The post-maintenance test procedure that was performed did not include testing
of the output logic contacts associated with the A channel.
This was
determined to be a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requiring
activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures.
The licensee responded to this violation via letter dated July 1, 1993.
Corrective actions involved revision to Special Procedure SP-1198, AMSAC
System Test, to incorporate steps for testing the output logic contacts. In
addition, the licensee determined that when SP-1198 was originally developed,
it had not been reviewed by the proper engineering individual responsible for
the AMSAC circuitry. Engineering personnel were counseled on the importance
of assuring qualified individuals are utilized to review procedures.
The inspectors reviewed WR/JOs 93-AESZ1 and 93-AEKL1, which were performed
April 23 and May 6, 1993, respectively, using the revised procedure to test
the output logic contacts of the A and B train AMSAC channels. This testing
verified that the contacts were operating properly. Based on this review,
this item is closed.
4.2.4 (Closed) IFI 50-261/93-10-02:
Lack of Spare Parts Could Result in
Prolonged Unavailability of AMSAC
During review of maintenance related to replacing the microprocessors for the
AMSAC circuitry, the inspectors noted that spare microprocessors were
unavailable and the vendor no longer manufactured the components. Due to
microprocessor unavailability approximately three weeks elapsed before another
microprocessor could be obtained and the B AMSAC channel returned to service.
The inspectors were concerned that future failures of the microprocessors
could lead to prolonged unavailability of the AMSAC system.
13
The inspectors reviewed ESR 9500048 which was initiated to address the AMSAC
spare parts unavailability and discussed the status of the licensee's progress
in resolving this issue. In July 1995, the licensee located a vendor which
could refurbish the microprocessors. At that time, the vendor supplied the
licensee with two spare microprocessors. Two additional microprocessors were
sent to the vendor for refurbishment. These parts were returned in December
1995. Therefore, the licensee presently has four spare parts available.
Based on the availability of a vendor which can supply the licensee with
refurbished microprocessors, this IFI was closed.
5.0
PLANT SUPPORT (71707, 71750 and 92904)
5.1
Plant Support Activities
The inspectors conducted plant tours, work activity observations, personnel
interviews, and documentation reviews, to determine if plant physical
security, radiological protection, and fire protection programs, were properly
implemented.
5.1.1 Physical Security Program
The inspectors toured the protected area and observed the protected area
fence, including the barbed wire, to ensure that the fence was intact and not
in need of repair. Isolation zones were maintained and clear of objects which
could shield or conceal personnel.
Personnel and packages entering the
protected area were searched by detection devices or by hand for firearms,
explosive devices, and other contraband. Vehicles were searched, escorted,
and secured as required. No deficiencies were identified in this area.
5.1.2 Radiological Protection Program
The inspectors observed radiological control activities to ensure that they
were conducted in accordance with regulatory and licensee requirements.
Observations included personnel entry and exit from the Radiation Control
Area, proper donning of radiological monitoring instrumentation and protective
clothing when entering the RCA and contaminated areas, and, proper
radiological area postings and controls. No deficiencies were identified in
this area.
5.1.2.1 Inadequate Training on New Personnel Contamination Monitors
On December 29, 1995, the licensee completed construction of a new RCA
Processing Area. The old processing area was removed from service following
activation of the new area. This new RCA entrance was relocated closer to the
Auxiliary Building and should allow easier access of personnel and equipment
into and out of the RCA. In addition to remodeling, new exit personnel
contamination monitors were installed to replace the existing PCM-1 monitors.
On January 4, the inspectors observed traffic into and out of the new
processing area and noted numerous instances where personnel failed to
properly use the personnel contamination monitors during exit of the RCA.
14
These instances involved improper placement of the hands such that the
opposite side of the palms were not scanned by the monitors.
The inspectors brought each of these instances immediately to the attention of
RC personnel on duty in the processing area. The individuals exiting
improperly were detained by RC personnel and instructed on re-exiting the
monitors properly. As a result, none of the individuals exited without
properly using the monitors.
The inspectors reviewed the training/instruction provided for plant personnel
on how to properly use the monitors.
Information on the opening of the new
RCA entrance area was communicated to plant personnel via the weekly plant
newsletter (Robinson Review).
The inspectors reviewed this newsletter article
and noted that it included information regarding the proper use of the
monitors.
However, the inspectors determined that this was an ineffective
mechanism for providing guidance on the use of the monitors, especially since
this newsletter is not required reading by plant personnel. After discussions
with RC management personnel regarding the problems observed, the licensee
decided to provide additional instructions on the proper use of the monitors
at upcoming plant employee safety meetings. These meetings were held with all
plant employees. The inspectors periodically monitored personnel exiting the
RCA during the remainder of the report period and did not observe any further
instances of inadequate monitoring.
5.1.3 Fire Protection Program
The inspectors periodically reviewed aspects of the licensee's fire protection
program including fire brigade staffing controls, flammable materials storage,
housekeeping, control of hazardous chemicals, and maintenance of fire
protection equipment. No discrepancies were identified.
5.1.3.1 Motor Driven Fire Pump Test
On January 18, the inspectors witnessed the performance of OST-622, Fire
Suppression Water System Motor Driven Fire Pump Test (Annual). The test met
the acceptance criteria and verified that the motor driven pump started
between 95 and 105 psig and developed a minimum flow of 2,500 gpm at a
pressure of 125 psig or greater. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure
and noted that the procedure was well written and met the general industry
practice for the test of fire pumps. The test procedure required the pump to
be tested at shut-off head with no flow, rated head at rated flow, 150 percent
of rated flow at 65 percent of rated head, and at two additional points on the
original test curve.
This test was performed by two fire protection technicians, two system
engineers and two auxiliary unit operators. The test personnel
conscientiously performed the test and the system engineers and fire
technicians appeared to be knowledgeable of the system and the test
requirements.
Within the area examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
15
6.0
EXIT
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 25, 1996, with
those persons indicated by an asterisk in paragraph 1. The inspectors
described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
A listing of inspection findings is provided.
Proprietary information is not
contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the
licensee.
Type/Item Number Status
Description and Reference Paragraph
VIO 96-01-01
Open
AFW System Valve Misalignment (paragraph 2.3).
VIO 94-17-02
Closed
Failure to Correct Improperly Routed Instrument
Sensing Lines While Troubleshooting Repetitive
Gas -Binding of RHR Flow Indicator (paragraph
3.3.1).
LER 94-003-02
Closed
Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to
Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperability
(paragraph 3.3.2).
LER 94-004-00
Closed
Auxiliary Building Outside Design Basis Due to
Positive Pressure Conditions (paragraph 4.2.1).
LER 94-006-00
Closed
Manual Reactor Trip Due to Electro-Hydraulic
System Oil Leak (paragraph 3.3.3).
LER 94-008-00
Closed
Condition Outside Design Basis Due to Control
Room HVAC Inoperability (paragraph 4.2.2).
LER 94-011-01
Closed
Technical Specification 3.0:
Emergency Diesel
Generator (EDG) Inoperability (paragraph 3.3.4).
LER 94-015-01
Closed
Technical Specification 3.0:
Emergency Diesel
Generator (EDG) Inoperability (paragraph 3.3.4).
VIO 93-10-01
Closed
Failure to Establish Adequate Procedures to
Verify Proper AMSAC Operation After
Microprocessor Replacement (paragraph 4.2.3).
IFI 93-10-02
Closed
Lack of Spare Parts Could Result in Prolonged
Unavailability of AMSAC (paragraph 4.2.4).
7.0
-
ALARA -
As Low As Reasonably Achievable
AMSAC -
ATWS Mitigation Actuation Circuitry
CFR
-
Code of Federal Regulations
-
Corrective Maintenance
CP&L -
Carolina Power & Light Company
16
CR
-
Condition Report
CVCS -
Chemical and Volume Control System
ECCS -
-
E-H
-
Electro-Hydraulic
-
Engineering Service Request
FSAR -
Final Safety Analysis Report
-
Engineered Safety Feature
FT
-
Flow Transmitter
gpm
-
gallons per minute.
HVAC -
Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning
HVE
-
Heating Ventilation Exhaust
HVS
-
Heating Ventilation Supply
-
Instrumentation & Control
IFI
-
Inspector Followup Item
LCO
-
Limiting Condition for Operation
LER
-
Licensee Event Report
LT
-
Level Transmitter
MDAFW -
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
-
Motor Operated Valve
OMM
-
Operations Management Manual
OP
-
Operating Procedure
OST
-
Operations Surveillance Test
PLP
-
Plant Program
,*
-
Quality Control
RC
-
Radiation Control
-
Radiation Control Area
-
-
Special Procedure
TDAFW -
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
TM
-
TS
-
Technical Specifications
-
Violation
WR/JO -
Work Request/Job Order