ML14181A192
| ML14181A192 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 02/17/1994 |
| From: | Merschoff E NRC/IE, NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Orser W Carolina Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| EA-94-024, EA-94-24, NUDOCS 9402280054 | |
| Download: ML14181A192 (5) | |
Text
FEB I 7 JW Docket No. 50-261 License No. DPR-23 EA 94-024 Carolina Power and Light Company ATTN:
Mr. W. S. Orser Executive Vice President Nuclear Generation P. 0. Box 11551 - Mail Code: CPB 12 Raleigh, NC 27602 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
CONFIRMATION OF MEETING ARRANGEMENTS - ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE H. B. ROBINSON -
DOCKET NO. 50-261 This letter confirms the telephone conversation between Mr. C. R. Dietz of Carolina Power and Light Company and Mr. H. 0. Christensen of my staff on February 15, 1994. The Enforcement Conference is to be conducted at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Region II office in Atlanta, Georgia, at 10:00 a.m. on March 14, 1994. The purpose of the conference is to discuss deficiencies in management control of refueling and restart activities identified by the Nuclear Regulator Commission Augmented Inspection Team at your H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant during the period November 20, 1993 to December 6, 1993. The apparent violations to be addressed during this enforcement conference are listed in the enclosure to this letter.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely, (Original signed by Jon R. Johnson for)
Ellis W. Merschoff, Director Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/encl:
M. P. Pearson Plant Manager H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant P. 0. Box 790 Hartsville, SC 29550 cc w/encl: (cont'd - See page 2) 9402280054 940217 PDR ADOCK 05000261 G
Carolina Power and Light 2
FEB 1 7 j994 Company (cc w/encl cont'd)
H. W. Habermeyer, Jr.
Vice President Nuclear Services Department Carolina Power & Light Company P. 0. Box 1551 -
Mail OHS7 Raleigh, NC 27602 W. Dorman, Acting Manager Regulatory Compliance H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant P. 0. Box 790 Hartsville, SC 29550 Max Batavia, Chief Bureau of Radiological Health Dept. of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, SC 29201 Dayne H. Brown, Director Division of Radiation Protection N. C. Department of Environment, Commerce & Natural Resources P. 0. Box 27687 Raleigh, NC 27611-7687 H. Ray Starling Manager -
Legal Department Carolina Power and Light Co.
P. 0. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Karen E. Long Assistant Attorney General State of North Carolina P. 0. Box 629 Raleigh, NC 27602 Robert P. Gruber Executive Director Public Staff -
NCUC P. 0. Box 29520 Raleigh, NC 27626-0520 Public Service Commission State of South Carolina P. 0. Box 11649 Columbia, SC 29211 bcc w/encl -
(See page 3)
Carolina Power and Light 3
FEB 17 994 Company (bcc w/encl -
cont'd)
H. Christensen, RH B. Mozafari, NRR Document Control Desk NRC Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5421 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, SC 27562-9998 DOCUMENT NAME:
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ENCLOSURE
- 1.
There were five examples of inadequate procedures or failure to follow procedures as required by Technical Specification 6.5.1.1.1:
- a.
Procedure GP-005, Power Operations, requires periodic comparison of core delta T, and turbine first-stage pressure to NI indications during power ascension. On November 14, 1993, while ascending to 20 percent power, the operating crew did not follow this step and did not take required actions when there was a greater than 5 percent difference.
- b.
The intermediate range nuclear instruments were not calibrated with the new rod stop and high trip setpoints as set forth in Procedure EST-050, Refueling Startup Procedure, prerequisite step 3.10 prior to the reactor being taken critical on November 12, 1993.
- c.
On November 14, 1993, the operating crew, conducting a power ascension did not follow Step 7 of GP-005, Power Operations, which blocks the intermediate range reactor trip and intermediate range overpower rod stop function by depressing the two Logic Trip Defeat pushbuttons. Instead, this was accomplished by placing the level trip switch on intermediate range instrument NI-36 in the bypass position.
- d.
On November 14, 1993, operators did not implement Precaution Step 4.15 of GP-005, and operated for more than 5 minutes below 520 rpm.
- e.
Procedure FMP-002, "Nuclear Instrumentation Post Refueling Adjustment Determination," which was used to calibrate the power range nuclear instrumentation, prior to the startup of the unit November 14, 1993, was not adequate because the procedure contained an improper methodology for predicting Power Range nuclear instrument currents.
- 2.
The reactor power was increased by approximately 10 percent, on November 14, 1993, from approximately 20 percent to approximately 30 percent, within a fifteen minute period. This exceeded the limit of 3 percent per hour described in Robinson Technical Specification 3.10.7.1.
- 3.
There were four examples where adequate measures were not established to ensure that purchased materials and services conformed to requirements.
- a.
Nuclear fuel purchased for refueling outage 15 was not built to specifications in that gadolinium rods were not installed in the proper quadrants in six fuel assemblies.
- b.
The computer design data furnished to Robinson by the fuel vendor for cycle-16 fuel load was in error in that it did not include the gadolinium rod overlays for the new fuel.
The licensee failed to identify this discrepancy until after fuel was installed and the 30 percent power flux maps were taken.
Enclosure 2
- c.
Measures used by the licensee to oversee vendor fuel handling activities in the Robinson spent fuel pool during refueling outage 15 were inadequate in that they failed to prevent or to identify the breaking of the fuel assembly measurement tool and resultant introduction of foreign material into a fuel assembly.
- d.
The licensee did not include review and approval of fuel handling procedures developed for measuring nuclear fuel rod and assembly lengths and for removal and reinstallation of fuel assembly upper tie plates. These procedures were used by the vendor.