ML14176A577
| ML14176A577 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 03/10/1981 |
| From: | Jape F, Julian C, Weise S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14176A575 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-261-81-05, 50-261-81-5, NUDOCS 8103240822 | |
| Download: ML14176A577 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000261/1981005
Text
6jk REG(
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
Report No. 50-261/81-05
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
411 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, NC
27602
Facility Name:
H. B. Robinson Unit 2
Docket No. 50-261
License No. DPR-23
Inspection at H. B. Robinson site near Hartsville, South Carolina
Inspectors:
F Japo
Date Signed
S. Weise cDate
Signed
Approved by:
(..
--
/:5
C. Julian,-'Acting Section Chief, RRPI Division
Date Signed
SUMMARY.
Inspection on February 17-20, 1981
Areas Inspected
This routine, announced inspection involved 52 resident inspector-hours on site
in the areas of IE Bulletin and LER. followup, previous enforcement matters
followup, routine operations and plant tour.
Results
Of the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in four
areas; one violation was found in one area (Violation
-
failure to provide a
procedure, paragraph 4).
O18 240
8'0-9-
DETAILS
1..
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- R. Starkey, Plant Manager
- W Crawford, Manager, Operations and Maintenance
- H. S. Zimmerman, Manager, Technical and Administration
F. Lowery, Operati-ons Supervisor, Unit 2
- J.:-CurlTey,7 Engineering -Supe-rv iso r
- B.
1
asdell; ,Traini ng Speciadlist
W. Farmer, Engineer
M. Page, Project Engineer
R. McGirt, Senior Generation Specialist
- Attended exit interview
2. Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 19, 1981, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee commented that
the need for a procedure identified in the violation of paragraph 4 was an
item idpantified by.. CP&L for review after the transient of January 29,.1981..
Other items. di scussed..were*ac.knowl.edged without si gnif icant comment..
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
a. (Cl1os ed). Violation .Severity.level. V. Item 50-261/80-36-01..
This i tem
concernedthe licesee's.failUre to have a procedure foSeoperation of
theBcore subcooling meter.. Theinspector verified completion of the
alicensee's corrective action as stated,in the CP&L response dated
February 13, 1981 to Inspection Report 50-261/80-36.
b.
(Closed) Deviation Item 50-261/80-36-02.
This item concerned the
licensee s failure to have a description on the use of steam tables in
the plant Emergency Instructions. The inspector verified completion of
the licensee's corrective action as stated in the CP&L response dated
February 13, 1981 to Inspection Report 50-261/80-36.. The new operating
procedure, though not in the Emergency Instruction, meets the intent of
the desired corrective action.
4. Event Follow-up
On January 29, 1981, H B.- Robinson Unit 2 experienced a transient due to
system problems. The transient was compli
cated by the."c" pressurizer spray valve sticking slightly open and by an
- s IsFab1e 100-120 gatlon
pec-
minute primary leak through a
nletdown
line drain
valve
y
inside containment. At
s
the onset of the transient, a momentary Safety
Injection (SI) signal.' was received due to a steam flowspike -related to the
2
EHC problems, and T average being below 543 degrees F (about 540 degrees F).
During the recovery from the Engineered Safety Features (ESF)
actuation,
resulting from the SI signal,
the operators attempted to re-establish
letdown flow prior to resetting and opening the instrument air containment
- isolation valves.
Instrument air is the operating fluid for the letdown
line air operated valves.
The inspector's investigation revealed three contributing factors to this
operator oversight.
1) The complexity of resetting ESF equipment and systems isolated by ESF
actuation was increased following-the extensive ESF modifications made
during the August --. October, .1980 refueling outage.
These nodifi
cations require additional operator action to restore ESF
and
ESF-isolated systems.
2)
No formal operator training was conducted on the above modifications.
Training consisted of routing the individual modification packages to
the licensed operators for review.
3)
No written procedure exists for recovery from an inadvertent SI
actuation nor for returning safety systems to normal after any ESF
actuation. Written procedures to return safety systems to normal
following off-normal conditions are required by Section 5.3.3 of ANSI
N18.7-1972. and Technical. Specification 6.8.1.
This failure to
establish ..and. ..
implement required
procedures... is
a
violation.
(50-261/81-05-01).
5.
Plant Tour and Routine Operations
a. The inpector toured the control room during the inspection. Control
room manning met Technical Specificaiton requirements.
Inspection
activities included observation of selected instrumentation to assure
- operation within required limits and discussion of annunicator alarms
with a licensed operator.
No problems were identified.
b. The inspector reviewed the following operating logs and records for the
period February 17-20, 1981 to ascertain that plant operations were in
conformance with technical specifications and administrative licensee
requirements:
1)
Shift Foreman logbook
2) Control Room Operator logbook
3) Auxiliary Operators - Inside and Outside Data logs
4) Equipment-Inoperable Reports,.
No problems were identified.
c..
-The containment..spray system. lineup was verified in accordance with
olant status and operatina crocedures.
3
d. The isolation valve seal water (IVSW) system was inspected.
Findings were acceptable except as follows:
1)
The two nitrogen bottles used to supply nitrogen to the IVSW system
were not pressurized to greater than 1000 psig as required by plant
operating procedure OP-45. On February 11, 1981, one nitrogen bottle
was empty and had been since the previous day.The other bottle was at
about 930 psig. A review of inside operator's logs showed this bottle
below 1000 psig since February 9, 1981. A work request to refill the
bottles had been written, but no action taken.
The IVSW system is
requi red to : be
operable by Technical Specification 3.3.6.
The
inspector., requested the licensee take co-rective action and provide
data to verify system operability during the period of low nitrogen
supply pressure. The nitrogen bottles were replaced on February 11,
1981,
and an analysis verifying system operability was completed on
February 24, 1981.
The inspector reviewed the analysis and found no.
probl ems.
2)
The nitrogen supply from an auxiliary building nitrogen header to the
IVSW system was isolated by clearance #638 on May 30, 1979.
This
nitrogen supply capability is described in plant modification #474 - a
change to the FSAR.
Investigation revealed that this nitrogen supply
was isolated due to failure of the modification to pass post-instal
1ation acceptance tests. . Further investigation revealed this and other
modifications were initiated to qualify the IVSW system as meeting the
requirements of paragraph III.c..3 of Appendix J of 10 CFR 50. This is
documented in CP&L letters.of March 15,1979 and April 20, 1979 to the
Division of Operating Reactors of the Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.(NRR).
The March letter committed CP&L to completing the
modtfications during the refueling outage of May - July 1979.
In an'
April 23, 1979, letter, Operating Reactors Branch #1 of the Office of
NRR found the proposed LVSW system acceptable.for 10 CFR 50 Appendix J
requirements.
-Based on. review of the above documents, the inspector
concluded this isolated nitrogen supply is not required for IVSW
operability.
However, the inspector questioned the practice of leaving
this modification unresolved and isolated for nearly two years and
noted that the IVSW operating procedure (OP-45)
was written assuming
operation of the isolated nitrogen supply.
The licensee committed to
perform testing on the modification during the next scheduled outage
(May 1981 -steam generator tube inspection). Based on the results of
this testing,- the licensee will develop a course of action to resolve
this issue.
- This. is.an inspectop- folowup i.tem. (50261/81-05.O1
6. IE Bulletin Followup
Th-e inspector reviewed the licensee s responses of August 23,
1980,
December 15, 1980, and January 19, 1981 to IE Bulletin 80-15, "Possible Loss
of Emerge cy otification.System (ENS) with Loss of Offsite Power".
The
.
4
licensee has modified the ENS to receive power from load centers supplied by
the emergency buses. The inspector verified that the modifications were
completed as described in the CP&L supplemental response of January 19,
1981.. A separate emergency power source test was not conducted, however, a
successful plant.blackout test was completed August 12, 1980.
The inspector
verified that the administrative actions were completed as reported in the
CP&L response letter of August 23, 1980.
This item is closed.
7.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
The inspector reviewed six LER's for consistency with the requirements of
Technical Specificatfon section 6.9. The inspector examined the licensee's
analysis of theieVent, correcttve action taken,.and discussed the LER's with
licensee representatives.
The following LER's were reviewed;
a..
LER 79-26 BLAW Knox Snubber Failure:
Through documentation review, the
inspector verified the shafts in all five BLAW Knox Snubbers were
replaced with proper shaft material and returned to operable condition.
The item is clo.sed.
b.
LER 79-38 Engine Driven Fire Rump in Degraded Mode: This pump and its
fuel supply have been replaced.
This item is closed.
c. LER's 79-35, 79-37, 79-39, 79-40:
These LER's concern portions of
systems identified a.s being-overstressed under DBE conditions due to
computer re-analysis.in. accordance with IE Bulletin 79-14. These. LER's
are closed. Corrective action will be verified as part of the review
d.
LER 79-11 CROM Canopy Seal Leaks:
The inspector reviewed this item and
its. supplemental report.
Additional Teaks have been reported in LER
80-19. All. related canopy seal leakage occurrances were addressed in
Inspection Report 50-261/80-23,
and the Ticensee and vendor are
continuing to revfew the problem. LER 79-11 is closed, and LER 80-19
will remain open pending results of the licensee's review.