ML14169A258

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Part 21 - Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve Not Exhausting Properly
ML14169A258
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 06/16/2014
From: Royer B
ASCO Valve
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML14169A258 (8)


Text

0611612014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Pave I Part 21 (PAR) Event # 49895 Rep Org: ASCO VALVE INCORPORATED Notification Date I Time: 03/11/2014 13:00 (EDT)

Supplier: ASCO VALVE INCORPORATED Event Date I Time: 03/11/2014 (EDT)

Last Modification: 06/16/2014 Region: 1 Docket #:

City: AIKEN Agreement State: Yes County: License #:

State: SC NRC Notified by: BOB ARNONE Notifications: THOMAS FARNHOLTZ R4DO HQ Ops Officer: CHARLES TEAL PART 21 GROUP EMAIL Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section:

21.21 (a)(2) INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION PART 21 - SCRAM SOLENOID PILOT VALVE NOT EXHAUSTING PROPERLY The following was excerpted from a fax received from ASCO Valve, Inc.:

"Problem Description "GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) customer Energy Northwest reported that an ASCO scram solenoid pilot valve (SSPV) Catalog number HVL26600001OJ 115/60, GE-H part number 107E6022P014, serial number A272718-054, CRD-SPV-1 18/1043 did not exhaust properly. The valve had been installed in Energy Northwest's Columbia facility for approximately 7 months and had been cycled 60-70 times. Energy Northwest's internal investigation revealed the pilot head assembly spring was not in the groove of the associated core.

"Conclusion "Various tests were performed to rule out possible manufacturing non-conformances in the spring or core. The successful completion of these tests has established that when the spring is properly installed on the core, the spring will not come off in service. We have not yet identified any other conditions that could cause the spring to come off the core, except for improper assembly.

"This configuration of spring and core design was used on the original 090405 scram valve. There has not been any design change to this core assembly since its inception in 1959. This spring/core assembly makes up the bulk of ASCO core solenoid offering. It is used across all of ASCO valve ranges in the Commercial, Nuclear, Military, and Petrochemical markets. ASCO has supplied over 10 million valves to these markets over the entire product offering. This Includes over 50,000 Nuclear Qualified Valves. With the exception of the 1994 and 2012 events, a review of ASCO return records found no other cases of this condition where a spring disengaged from the core.

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0611612014 U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission Operations CenterEvent Report Pa-ce 2 "Since ASCO does not have adequate knowledge of the actual installations and operating conditions of these valves, it was not able to be determined if this could create a 'Substantial safety hazard' as defined in 10 CFR Part

21. This information is intended to provide interim investigation results.

"If you have any questions, you can contact Bob Arnone at 803-641-9395."

      • UPDATE FROM LARS GACAD TO JOHN SHOEMAKER VIA FACSIMILE ON 6/16/14 AT 0855 EDT ***

"Closure and

Conclusion:

Various tests were performed to rule out possible manufacturing non-conformances in the spring or core. The successful completion of these tests has established that when the spring is properly installed on the core, the spring will not come off in service. We have not yet identified any other conditions that could cause the spring to come off the core, except for improper assembly.

"This configuration of spring and core design was used on the original 090405 scram valve. There has not been any design change to this core assembly since its inception in 1959. This spring/core assembly makes up the bulk of ASCO core solenoid offering. It is used across all of ASCO valve ranges in the Commercial, Nuclear, Military, and Petrochemical markets. ASCO has supplied over 10 million valves to these markets over the entire product offering. This includes over 50,000 Nuclear Qualified Valves. With the exception of the 1994 and 2012 events, a review of ASCO return records found no other cases of this condition where a spring disengaged from the core.

Since ASCO does not have adequate knowledge of the actual installations and operating conditions of these valves. It was not able t o be determined if this could create a 'substantial safety hazard' as defined in 10 CFR Part

21. This information is intended to provide interim investigation results.

"If you have any questions, you can contact Bob Arnone at 803-641-9395."

Notified R4DO (Hay) and Part 21 Group via email.

Jun. 16. 2014 8:34AM ASCO Valve Operations No.0173 P. I EMERSON. ASa Industrial Automation numaTill.

Facsimile ASCO Valve, Inc.

1561 Columbia Highway Aiken, SC 29801 T (803) 641-9353 F (803) 641-8290 www.asconumahis.com To: NRC Documents Control Desk No. of Pages (including cover sheet) 6 Company: NRC Fax Number: 301-816-5151 Date June 16, 2014 From: Bob Royer Phone: 803-641-9394 Comments: To whom it may concern:

Attached is the final letter regarding event number ML14079A026 to the NRC Document Control Desk; including one referenced exhibit. If there are any questions, and/or the transmission is not legible, please call 803-641-9394.

Sincerely, Bob Royer Technical Service Supervisor

Jun. 16. 2014 8:34AM ASCO Valve Operations No. 0173 P. 2 4

EMERSON.

Industrial Automation ASCO Valve, Inc.

1561 Columbia Highway Aiken. SC 29801 USA T (803) 641-9200 F (803) 641-9290 wwwasconumatics.com June 13, 2014 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-001

Subject:

Final Report on HVL26600001O J Valve Reference A - ML14079A026, Interim Letter to the NRC. Dated March 11 2014

Background

On March 11th 2014, ASCO Valve issued an Interim Report to the NRC regarding solenoid valve model number HVL 266000010J (Ref A). The Interim Report discusses the ongoing investigation into the failure of a Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve (SSPV) to shift to the de-energized position upon loss of power. The initial inspection revealed that a spring had become disengaged from the core. ASCO conducted a series of tests to determine the root cause but was not able to complete this testing within the 60 day time frame and issued an Interim Report inaccordance with 10 CFR Part 21 guidelines. This letter provides an update on the status of the testing.

Summary of Additional Testing:

ASCO has completed additional testing noted in Reference A.The additional testing was intended to determine the maximum number of cycles an improperly installed spring could stay engaged on the core when installed in the SCRAM Solenoid Pilot Valve configuration. Based on the results of the testing ASCO was not able to determine the maximum number of cycles an improperly installed spring could stay engaged on the core.

However, the testing shows most cases of an improperly installed spring will disengage very early into the life of the valve. However there were some cases where the improperly installed spring did not disengage and remained in place throughout the testing.

Closure and

Conclusion:

The additional testing has not provided any conclusive data to alter our previously reported findings that the only way to be certain that a spring is properly installed on a core is visual inspection of the spring/core assembly. All SSPV's produced after November 2012 have been subjected to this inspection at dedication.

ASCO does not recommend inspection in the field as dis-assembly of the top retaining nut may cause a piece of the nylon thread lock to fall down into the core/plugnut area and cause improper and/or noisy operation.

ASCO recommends that valves be returned for further evaluation at the earliest convenience.

ASCO notes that a properly installed conforming spring will not come off the core during service. In addition, since the issuance of the interim report, ASCO has not identified, or received reports of, any additional occurrences of this issue.

Notice: This report is the property of ASCO Valve, Inc. and may not be reproduced without authorization from ASCO Valve, Tnc., nor may excerpts be printcd end distributed. This document must be returned immediately upon request,

Jun. 16. 2014 8:34AM ASCO Valve Operations No. 0173 P. 3 ASCO Valve, Inc., Florham Park, NJ RMA 58314 / CR #9176 Since ASCO does not have adequate knowledge of the actual Installations and operating conditions of these valves, itcould not be determined ifthis could create a "substantial safety hazard" as defined in 10 CFR Part

21. This information is intended to provide investigation results.

If you have any questions, you can contact Bob Royer at 803-641-9394.

Sincerely, Lars Gacad Vice President Quality Americas ASCO Valve Inc.

Attachment Notice: This report is the property of ASCO Valve. Inc. and may not be reproduced without authorization from ASCO Valve, Inc., nor may excerpts be printed and distributed. This document must be retumned immediately upon request.

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Jun. 16. 2014 8:34AM ASCO Valve Operations No. 0173 P. 4 EMERSON lncl~i~rrtaI Aijinimutltn ASCO Valve, Inc.

1561 Columbia Highwy Alkerý SC 29801 USA T (803) 641-9200 F (803) 641-92g0 Www.asconumaUcs.com March 11th, 2014 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

Interim Report on HVL266000010J Valve Reference A - ASCO letter to GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy dated Nov. 9, 2012.

Problem

Description:

GE Hitachi Nudlear Energy (GEH) customer Energy Northwest reported that an ASCO scram solenoid pilot valve (SSPV) Catalog number HVL266000010J 115/60, GE-H part number 107E6022P014, serial number A272718-054, CRD-SPV-118/1043 did not exhaust properly. The valve had been installed in Energy Northwest's Columbia facility for approximately 7 months and had been cycled 60-70 times. Energy Northwest's internal investigation revealed the pilot head assembly spring was not in the groove of the associated core.

Cause Analysis:

Energy Northwest dis-assembled the valve for inspection and determined that the core spring was disengaged from the core assembly. In addition, the diaphragm assemblies of the valve were inspected and Energy Northwest determined them to conform to specifications. Inspection also found small amounts of foreign material in the valve internals. This foreign material (found as brass debris) is typically generated during dis-assembly and would not affect the function of the valve.

ASCO received the loosely assembled valve from Energy Northwest on RMA 58315. The core, spring, and Solenoid Base Sub-Assembly were inspected by ASCO Quality Assurance. All components were verified to be in compliance with specifications. A spring cycle test was performed and confirmed that a properly installed spring will not detach from the core assembly.

This test was performed with the solenoid both vertical and horizontal. An additional 42 valves from the same order were subsequently inspected during this investigation and all were properly assembled.

ASCO had investigated a similar occurrence in October, 2012 on RMA 53914 (GEH CAR #

58997). That investigation concluded that this was an isolated case of an improperly assembled spring. Corrective action was implemented by ASCO on November 9, 2012, involving an additional inspection step to verify the spring was installed properly on all valves that use the conical spring/core assembly. Ref. A. Prior to October 2012, the only other similar occurrence was in 1994 at Commonwealth Edison's Dresden facility, At that time ASCO determined it was an isolated case and implemented an additional quality inspection step of the core and spring assembly to verify proper installation of the spring.

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Jun. 16. 2014 8:34AM ASCO Valve Operations No. 0173 P. 5 Interim Action:

Prior to 2010, these valves were manufactured in ASCO's Florham Park facility, and it was general practice to have Quality inspect the spring/core assembly. Such inspection would have discovered the misassembly of the spring in the Energy Northwest valve. In 2010, manufacturing of these valves was transferred to the Aiken facility. The spring/core assembles of valves manufactured at the Aiken facility were not inspected until the additional inspection step described above was implemented starting November 9, 2012.

From March 29, 2010 through November 9, 2012, 449 SSPV's were manufactured at the Aiken facility. 45 valves were recently returned to ASCO on RMA's 58315, 58449 and 58472. 44 valves were inspected and determined to have properly installed springs. The remaining one is the subject of this report. Two valves were reworked on RMA 53914 of Nov. 2012 and three returned on RMA 54714 were scrapped. Thus, 401 of the 449 original SSPV's remain to be inspected.

Pending the completion of the investigation described below, ASCO believes that the only way to verify that a spring is properly installed on a core is visual inspection of the spring/core assembly. ASCO does not recommend inspection to be performed in the field as dis-assembly of the top retaining nut may cause a piece of the nylon thread locker to fall down into the core/plugnut area. and cause improper operation and noise- ASCO believes it is unlikely that other SSPV valves are affected. In order to further support the investigation, it is requested that valves removed from installation or inventory be returned for further evaluation at the earliest convenience.

GEH ASCO Valve Year Shipment Complete Catalog Number PO Number OB No. SIN Date 2010 2011 2012 HV266000010J115/60JA 437028521 213561 A171767 Apr09 2010 50 HV26600001OJ115/60JA 437028521 213579 A321861 Mar 29 2010 50 HV266000010J115/60EA 437046605 477985 A726654 Mar 11 2011 3 Jan- Feb HV266000010J115/60EA 437058358 651136 A113888 2012 158*

Jul - Sep 551680 A793691 2011S108

.HV266000010R115/60KA 437051484 HV26600001OJ1 115/60KA 437067889 802504 A272718 Sep 28 2012 80*

  • Included 2 valves that were reworked and 3 that were scrapped.
    • Of the 80 valves shipped on GEH PO 437067889, 45 have been returned on RMA's 58315, 58449 and 58472. A complete list of serial numbers for affected valves still in the field will be supplied to GEN for transmittal to their customers.

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Jun. 16. 2014 8:34AM ASCO Valve Operaltions No, 0173 P. 6 Continuing ASCO Investigation:

ASCO is performing additional tests to attempt to determine the maximum number of cycles an improperly installed spring can handle in the particular application of the SSPV operating conditions. In bench testing, ASCO confirmed that an improperly installed spring can in some cases outlast the qualified cycle life of the valve when rapidly cycled. This condition is now being tested in the actual operating conditions of the operating plant. This testing can take up to 3 months (end of June 2014) to complete. ASCO believes it is unlikely that other SSPV valves are affected. In order to further support the investigation, it is requested that valves removed from installation or inventory be returned for further evaluation at the earliest convenience.

Closure and

Conclusion:

Various tests were performed to rule out possible manufacturing non-conformances in the spring or core- The successful completion of these tests has established that when the spring is properly installed on the core, the spring will not come off in service. We have not yet identified any other conditions that could cause the spring to come off the core, except for improper assembly.

This configuration of spring and core design was used on the original 090405 scram valve.

There has not been any design change to this core assembly since its inception in 1959. This spring/core assembly makes up the bulk of ASCO core solenoid offering. It is used across all of ASCO valve ranges in the Commercial, Nuclear, Military, and Petrochemical markets. ASCO has supplied over 10 million valves to these markets over the entire product offering. This includes over 50,000 Nuclear Qualified Valves. With the exception of the 1994 and 2012 events, a review of ASCO return records found no other cases of this condition where a spring disengaged from the core.

Since ASCO does not have adequate knowledge of the actual installations and operating conditions of these valves, it was not able to be determined if this could create a "substantial safety hazard" as defined in 10 CFR Part 21. This information is intended to provide interim investigation results.

Ifyou have any questions, you can contact Bob Amone at 803-641-9395, Sincerely, Lars Gacad Vice President Quality Americas Asco Valve Inc.

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