05000286/LER-2014-002, Regarding Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable Essential Service Water (SW) Header as a Result of a Socket Weld Leak in Code Class 3 SW Piping
| ML14087A009 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/10/2014 |
| From: | Ventosa J Entergy Nuclear Operations, Indian Point |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-14-022 LER 14-002-00 | |
| Download: ML14087A009 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER, Invalid Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 2862014002R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Entergy Indian Point Energy Center 450 Broadway, GSB P.O. Box 249 Buchanan, N.Y. 10511-0249 Tel (914) 254-6700 John A. Ventosa Site Vice President Administration NL-14-022 March 10, 2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk 11545 Rockville Pike, TWFN-2 F1 Rockville, MD 20852-2738
SUBJECT:
Licensee Event Report # 2014-002-00, "Technical Specification (TS)
Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable Essential Service Water (SW)
Header as a Result of Socket Weld Leak in Code Class 3 SW Piping" Indian Point Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-286 DPR-64
Dear Sir or Madam:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. (ENO) hereby provides Licensee Event Report (LER) 2014-002-00. The attached LER identifies an event where there was a Technical Specification (TS) Prohibited Condition due to an inoperable essential Service Water (SW) header as a result of discovering a socket weld leak in Code Class 3 SW Piping, which is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). This condition was recorded in the Entergy Corrective Action Program as Condition Report CR-IP3-2012-02193.
There are no new commitments identified in this letter. Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Robert Walpole, Manager, Regulatory Assurance at (914) 254-6710.
Sincerely, JAV/cbr cc:
Mr. William Dean, Regional Administrator, NRC Region I NRC Resident Inspector's Office Ms. Bridget Frymire, New York State Public Service Commission
Abstract
On July 16, 2012, during operator rounds, a Service Water (SW) leak was discovered on a socket weld elbow of a three quarter inch diameter sample pipe connected to the 31 Component Cooling Water (CCW)
Heat Exchanger (Hx)
SW discharge pipe upstream of sample valve SWN-49-1.
The leak was too small to quantify.
The leak is on a component classified as ASME Section XI Code Class 3.
The weld leak was evaluated and determined not applicable to acceptance under Code Case N-513-3.
The condition was determined to have no impact on SW cooling safety function.
The affected SW header was declared inoperable and Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.9 (SW System) entered until the applicable CCW loop for the 31 CCW Hx was isolated.
TS 3.7.8 (CCW System) was entered for one CCW loop inoperable.
At the time this condition was identified the condition was not recognized as being reportable.
The apparent cause was crevice corrosion due to exposure of unlined carbon steel to brackish SW (chloride) environment in low flow or stagnant vent/drain piping. The corrective action was a complete replacement of the affected piping assembly during the TS allowed outage time (AOT).
The event had no significant effect on public health and safety.
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
In November 2013, the NRC performed a Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection at Indian Point.
In that inspection, the NRC identified that a past service water leak in 2008 was not reported to the NRC as a License Event Report in 2008.
Entergy received a non-cited violation (NCV) for this issue.
Entergy included a discussion of the 2008 SW leak in the November 12, 2013 LER.
This 2008 Unit 2 SW leak was not in the same location as the SW system leaks discussed in LER-2013-004.
The plant did not enter TS 3.0.3 as the piping was isolated for ultrasonic examination prior to determining the pipe was inoperable.
The condition was recorded as "no reportability determination required" therefore, past reportability was not assessed and no LER was submitted.
The condition in 2008 would not now require an LER as the past reporting criteria of three years has been exceeded.
CR-IP2-2013-04346 recorded this finding As a result of the NCV, Entergy wrote a condition report and performed an extent of condition review.
During the extent of condition review, Entergy identified the condition which is the subject of this LER.
On November 12, 2013, Entergy submitted LER-2013-004 for a Unit 2 Technical Specification prohibited condition due to an inoperable SW header as a result of the discovery on September 11, 2013, of pin hole leaks in Code Class 3 SW piping/elbows that supported three radiation monitors.
As part of an extent of condition review, the NRC identified prior SW system leaks in radiation monitor piping in the SW pipe chase that was recorded in CR-IP2-2008-04268 on September 17, 2008.
This 2008 Unit 2 SW leak was not in the same location as the SW system leaks discussed in LER-2013-004.
The plant did not enter TS 3.0.3 as the piping was isolated for ultrasonic examination prior to determining the pipe was inoperable.
Safety Significance
This event had no significant effect on the health and safety of the public. There were no actual safety consequences for the event because there were no accidents or events during the degraded condition.
There were no significant potential safety consequences of this event.
The leakage from the affected SW piping assembly was within the capability of the SW system to provide adequate SW flow to SW loads.
The degraded piping was on the discharge of the heat loads therefore any failure would not prevent the SW cooling function.
Any catastrophic failure of the degraded piping as a result of a transient, accident or event could result in potential flooding.
The leaking elbow was located above the Boric Acid Batch Tank berm.
Any leakage would likely be to the berm whose contents would be directed to the liquid waste collection system.
In addition, a SW leak in the PAB area outside the berm would drain to the PAB sump.
Any flooding condition could be identified and mitigated as the PAB sump has a high level alarm that actuates an alarm on the PAB sump alarm panel in the unit 2 NPO office and at the Waste Disposal Panel (Flood 15 foot Elevation, Flood 68 foot Elevation).
Alarm Response Procedure ARP-014 (PAB Flooding) requires operator acknowledgement of the alarm, notification of the Control Room and initiation of action to eliminate the cause of the flooding.
Procedure 2-ARP-004 (Waste Disposal Panel) also includes actions to respond to WDP PAB Sump Pump Hi level alarm.
The ARP actions include isolation of any source of flooding.
The affected SW piping assemble is located between isolation valves which would allow operators to isolate the leak once alerted.
In addition to PAB Sump level alarms, periodic operator rounds (Nuclear Rounds) include Waste Disposal Alarm Panel tested/verification thereby providing another means to identify SW piping leakage.