ML14079A028

Part 21 - Allen Bradley Type 700RTC Relay Spuriously De-Energizing

ML14079A028
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford, FitzPatrick
Issue date:	03/13/2014
From:	Jarrell J Entergy Operations
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
49911
Download: ML14079A028 (5)

Text

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-.-------- J-. Commission flnerations.Centler Event Rpnnrt

-r----- Pagop 1 Part 21 (PAR) Event# 49911 Rep Org: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION Notification Date I Time: 03/13/2014 14:46 (EDT)

Supplier: QUALTECH NP Event Date I Time: 03/12/2014 16:00 (CDT)

Last Modification: 03/13/2014 Region: 4 Docket #:

City: KILONA Agreement State: Yes County: License #:

State: LA NRC Notified by: JOHN JARRELL Notifications: MARC FERDAS R1DO HQ Ops Officer: DONG HWA PARK KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE R2DO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY DAVE PASSEHL R3DO 10 CFR Section: THOMAS FARNHOLTZ R4DO 21.21(d)(3)(i) DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 GROUP EMAIL PART 21 - ALLEN BRADLEY TYPE 700RTC RELAY SPURIOUSLY DE-ENERGIZING "This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning an apparent deviation from dedicated manufacturing specifications.

"On 10/17/2013, it was determined that there have been multiple inadvertent actuations of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) equipment over the previous seven months. These equipment inadvertent actuations are occurring due to Allen Bradley type 700RTC relays spuriously de-energizing. The failure mode causes the relays to intermittently de-energize causing the associated equipment to perform its ESFAS function, not adversely impacting steady state plant operations.

"The failed relays have been sent to the qualifying vendor and two other failure analysis laboratories for testing.

The results were reviewed by Waterford 3 engineers and although the failure mode could not be repeated in the laboratory, the laboratories identified less than adequate solder joints on the relay control circuit and a failed capacitor. The cause of the failed capacitor was identified as less than adequate installation practices during manufacturing. Engineering has determined that effects of these deviations, combined with installation in an application near the qualifying vendor's maximum specified environmental conditions, relevant to elevated voltage and ambient temperatures, has resulted in accelerated aging effects on the sub-components of the relays. The failures have been observed on relays that have been in-service greater than three years.

"Entergy concluded that for the applications for which the failure mode has been observed, and for other applications where these relays have been installed for more than 3 years, the failures did not result in a substantial safety hazard. However, on 3/12/2014, Entergy completed an evaluation concluding that, had this relay type been installed in other safety related normally energized applications for greater than 3 years, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard. Compensatory measures to preclude the malfunction of these relays, until

03/13/2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Page 2 long-term corrective actions are completed, have been implemented. As an interim measure the installed time for these relays is limited to 3 years or less, The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed the same day, 3/12/2014.

"Waterford 3 has determined that the only other Entergy nuclear facility utilizing these Allen Bradley relay types, possibly in a safety related application, is at James A. Fitzpatrick, to which this condition has been communicated."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

03/11/2014 19:54 5647396678 VP: OFFICE PAGE 61 PAGE 1 OF 2 NRC FORM 381 REACTOR PLANT U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000)

OPERATIONS CENTER EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN #

NRC OPERATION TELEPHONE NUMBER: PRIMARY - 301-816-5100 or 800-532-346r, BACKUPS - [1st] 301-g51-0550 or 800-449-3694*.

r2ndi 301-415-0550 and [3rdl 301-415-0553 *Licensees who maintain their own ETS ara provided these telephone numbers, NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #

Waterford 3 John Jarrell 504-739-6685 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER/MODE BEFORE POWER/MODE AFTER 1600 CDT 03/12/2014 100% / MODE 1 100% / MODE 1 EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS I-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR S0.72(h)(1) (v)(A)_ Safe S/I Capability AINA GENERAL1EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC ED TS DeMelatoii AOEV U lv(B) RHR Cpab~llfty AINE LU SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) v C) Cornrol of Rad Releas. AJNC F

.i ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT ALEIAAEC UNU/AEC ED (1) TS ReqWred So/

Ilfv)(A)ECCS DlachO7ge to RCS ASHU ACCOS (v)(O)

(xII)

Accident Mitgatin Ofmslte Medical AIND AMED 50,72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next columnns) [] (ivXB) RPS Atuti.on (scram) ARPS (xii) L.e Comn/'At/Re.p ACOM

[ PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DODD 0i (xi) Offltle Notificbaon APRE 50-Day Optional I1 CFR 50.73(a)(1)

Ul MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50,72(b)(3) U Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV Q FITNESS FOR DUTY HFIT U (OiXA) Degraded CondItion ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identffy)

OTHER UNSPECIFIED REOMT. (see last olurnn) Ii (jl)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA Z 10 CFR 21.21(dX3Xi) Defect NONR INFORMATION ONLY NNF 1 (ivXA) Specified Semrn Actuation AESF UQ NONR DESCRIPTION This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning an apparent deviation from dedicated manufacturing specifications.

On 10117/2013, it was determined that there have been multiple inadvertent actuations of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) equipment over the previous seven months, These equipment inadvertent actuations are occurring due to Allen Bradley type 700RTC relays spuriously de-energizing. The failure mode causes the relays to intermittently de-energize causing the associated equipment to perform its ESFAS function, not adversely impacting steady state plant operations.

The failed relays have been sent to the qualifying vendor and two other failure analysis laboratories for testing. The results were reviewed by Waterford 3 engineers and although the failure mode could not be repeated in the laboratory, the laboratories identified less than adequate solder joints on the relay control circuit and a failed capacitor. The cause of the failed Capacitor was identified as less than adequate installation practices during manufacturing. Engineering has determined that effects of these deviations, combined with installation in an application near the qualifying vendors maximum specified environmental conditions, relevant to elevated voltage and ambient temperatures, has resulted in accelerated aging effects on the sub-components of the relays. The failures have been observed on relays that have been in-service greater than three years.

Entergy concluded that for the applications for which the failure mode has been observed, and for other applications where these relays have been installed for more than 3 years, the failures did not result in a substantial safety hazard. However, on 3/12/2014, Entergy completed an evaluation concluding that, had this relay type been installed in other safety related normally energized applications for greater than 3 years, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard. Compensatory measures to preclude the maffunction of these relays, until long-term corrective actions are completed, have been implemented. As an interim measure the installed time for these relays is limited to 3 years or less. The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed the same day, 3/12/2014.

Waterford 3 has determined that the only other Entergy nuclear facility utilizing these Allen Bradley relay types, possibly in a safety related application, is at James A. Fitzpatrick, to which this condition has been communicated.

NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR El YES (Explain above) [ NO NRC RESIDENT UEl U NOT UNDERSTOOD? YES STAT ; " U D ALL SYSTEMS ES NO (Explain above)

LOC L FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?

VP: OFFICE PAGE 02 03/11/2014 19:54 5847396676 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PAGE 2 OF 2 I DAflifl nemm-AL FECAOi flfl- C UV flD FIL INIii AnAlira 3

• -ýanfrwnuwc. PTUWu An.a .W~~A..# J-L ý I-5 ~~pm

[] LIQUID RELEASE fIGASEOUS RELEASE L] UNPLANNED RELEASE [] PLANNED RELEASE j] ONGOING [3 TERMINATED

[7 MONITORED []UNMONITORED [] OFFSITE RELEASE [] T. S. EXCEEDED [] RM ALARMS [3 AREAS EVACUATED

[3PERSONNEL EXPOSED OR CONTAMINATED [] OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS RECOMMENDED -slate release path indewepdfon Release Rate (Ci/sec)  % T. S, UMIT HOD GUIDE Total Activity CI)  % T. S. LIMIT HOO GUIDE Noble Gas 0.1 Cilsec 1000 C0 Iodine 10 uClc _ _ 0.01 Ci Particulate I uCi/sec I mCi Liquid (excluding &M num and dissolved noble gases) 10 uCimin 0.I Cl Liquid (trifium) 0.2 Ci/min ,, S Ci Total Activity , ,_._J PLANT STACK CONDENSERIAIR EJECTOR MAIN STEAM UNE SG SLOWDOWN OTHER RAO MONITOR READINGS ALARM SETPOINTS

% T. S. UMIT (7f avlcahle)

RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS: (spec/fi de&aiWL/expwanatons should be covered in event descpilpion)

LOCATION OF THE LEAK fe,g.. So 4t valve, pi, etc.)

LEAK RATE UNITS: gpm/gpd T. S. LIMITS SUDDEN OR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE TIME COOLANT ACTIVITY PRIMARY SECONDARY AND UNITS:

LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (Contned from front)

03/11/2014 19:54 5047396678 VP: OFFICE PAGE 63 OTHER SOV AGENCIES El 0Z 0] MODE OF OPERATION ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK MEDINPFRESS RELEASE ]UNTIL CORRECTED: N/A RESTART DATE. N/ IES ONO NRC FORM 361 (1 2-2000)