ML14055A352
| ML14055A352 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 02/10/2014 |
| From: | Batovsky D ABB |
| To: | Masters A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 49813 | |
| Download: ML14055A352 (2) | |
Text
02/10/2014 Part 21 (PAR)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page I Event#
49813 Rep Org: ABB INC Notification Date I Time: 02/10/2014 17:36 (EST)
Supplier: ABB INC Event Date I Time: 02/10/2014 17:36 (EST)
Last Modification: 02/10/2014 Region:
1 Docket #:
City:
CORAL SPRINGS Agreement State:
Yes County:
License #:
State:
FL NRC Notified by: DENNIS BATOVSKY Notifications: ANTHONY MASTERS R2DO HQ Ops Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER ROBERT DALEY R3DO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY PART 21 GROUP EMAIL 10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i)
DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 REPORT - INSTRUCTION LEAFLET FOR SUBJECT RELAYS MAY BE DEFICIENT The following Part 21 Report was received via facsimile:
"On December 12, 2013, ABB determined that that its Instruction Leaflet 41-682.11 (effective September 2002) for the subject relays may be deficient with regards to the external diagram connection.
"With the relay connected per the typical connections shown in the instruction leaflet and the relay having verified a synchronous condition for a period of time ranging from several minutes to hours the main element contact identified as 'CVX-I' may become stuck in the closed position. Again, this situation is dependent on each customer's control power connection scheme and may be more prevalent in certain applications, such as fast bus transfer or tie breaker applications. In cases where the contact remains closed, it may result in an unwanted connection of two asynchronous systems when the command to connect them is issued, leading to equipment damage and possible bodily injury or death. We will be updating our instruction leaflet in February 2014, to reflect the addition of an interposing contact in the control circuit to prevent this condition.
"ABB's records indicate that 15 relays were supplied to Exelon (Clinton Nuclear Station), 4 relays were supplied to Duke Energy (Oconee Nuclear Station) and 10 relays were supplied to ABB d.o.o. (Slovenia).
"ABB has determined, as of the date of this notification, that it does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine if a defect exists, and therefore in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(b), is making this notification simultaneously to our customers so they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, in accordance with 10 CFR 21(a)."
954" 05:27:21 p.m.
02-10-2014 A lilt}
February 10, 2014 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
10 CFR Part 21 Notification of Potential Defect CVX & CVX-1 Relays - Instruction Leaflet Information Notification By: ABB Inc.
4300 Coral Ridge Drive Coral Springs, FL 33065
Dear Sir or Madam:
This notification is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR § 21.21(d) (3) (ii) with respect to a failure to comply or existence of a potential defect and its evaluation.
On December 12, 2013, ABB determined that that its Instruction Leaflet 41-682.11 (effective September 2002) for the subject relays may be deficient with regards to the external diagram connection.
With the relay connected per the typical connections shown in the Instruction Leaflet and the relay having verified a synchronous condition for a period of time ranging from several minutes to hours, the main element contact identified as "CVX-1" may become stuck in the closed position. Again, this situation is dependent on each customer's control power connection scheme and may be more prevalent in certain applications, such as fast bus transfer or tie breaker applications. In cases where the contact remains closed, it may result in an unwanted connection of two asynchronous systems when the command to connect them is issued, leading to equipment damage and possible bodily injury or death. We will be updating our Instruction Leaflet in February 2014 to reflect the addition of an interposing contact in the control circuit to prevent this condition.
ABB's records indicate that 15 relays were supplied to Exelon (Clinton Nuclear Station), 4 relays were supplied to Duke Energy (Oconee Nuclear Station) and 10 relays were supplied to ABB d.o.o. (Slovenia).
ABB has determined, as of the date of this notification, that it does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine if a defect exists, and therefore in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 21.21(b), is making this notification simultaneously to our customers so they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 21(a).
Please contact our Customer Support Department of ABB's Distribution Automation Division in Coral Springs, Florida at 1-800-222-1946 should you have any questions regarding this notification.
Very truly yours, aennis BDatovsky QBuraiyan nage Managing Director Quality Manager