ML13345B278

Comment (00355) of Lewis Cuthbert from the Alliance for a Clean Environment on PR-51, Waste Confidence - Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel

ML13345B278
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	12/09/2013
From:	Cuthbert L Alliance For A Clean Environment
To:	NRC/SECY/RAS
SECY RAS
References
78FR56775 00355, NRC-2012-0246, PR-51
Download: ML13345B278 (29)

Text

1 Rulemaking1CEm Resource From:

RulemakingComments Resource Sent:

Wednesday, December 11, 2013 1:58 PM To:

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FW: ACE Nuclear Waste Storage Comments - Docket ID No. NRC-2012-0246 Attachments:

ACE 12-13 COMMENTS TO NRC - NUCLEAR WASTE.docx DOCKETED BY USNRCOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY SECY-067 PR#: PR-51 FRN#: 78FR56775 NRC DOCKET#: NRC-2012-0246 SECY DOCKET DATE: 12/10/13 TITLE: Waste ConfidenceContinued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel COMMENT#: 00355 From: aceactivists@comcast.net [1]

Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2013 11:01 AM To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject:

ACE Nuclear Waste Storage Comments - Docket ID No. NRC-2012-0246 Attached: ACE's 26 pages of written comments referenced by Dr. Cuthbert at NRC's final public comment meeting 12-9-13 by phone.

Please acknowledge receipt of these comments.

We have summarized our many significant concerns about the high-level radioactive wastes stored at Limerick Nuclear Plant in dangerous fuel pools and casks, and we outlined the many valid reasons we oppose NRC's plan for transport and interim storage. We believe NRC's transport and interim storage plan is really about NRC helping Exelon and other nuclear plant owners to avoid full and permanent financial responsibility and liability for their high-level radioactive wastes.

Residents in our region have already been forced to live with the unacceptable risks of a defacto high-level radioactive waste dump, with wastes stored in fuel pools made of substandard cement and liners that are corroding and thinning at rates up to 10 times higher than expected, and steel in casks that can corrode in as little as 4 to 52 weeks based on corrosives in the air from Limerick's cooling towers.

ACE made a list of requests. This includes a request for NRC to do a site-specific radioactive waste study at Limerick and for NRC to NOT exempt Limerick (as planned) from NRC's new waste rules.

Over the past few years, NRC has failed to take responsible action regarding Limerick's on-site deadly radioactive wastes, and has even failed to respond to our specific questions and concerns.

2 We also provided NRC with a body of evidence showing why transport of high-level radioactive waste from Limerick is even worse than on-site storage. It would present the public with even greater risks to more residents.

We expect NRC to give full and fair consideration to all of our comments, suggestions, and requests included in the attached written comments.

Dr. Lewis Cuthbert ACE President

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1 December 9, 2013 E-Mail: Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov To:

Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff From: The Alliance For A Clean Environment (ACE)

Dr. Lewis Cuthbert, President Re:

Nuclear Waste Storage Comments - Docket ID No. NRC-2012-0246 The Alliance For A Clean Environment (ACE) is an independent grassroots environmental group.

For over a decade we investigated Limerick Nuclear Plant's high-level radioactive waste fuel pools, casks, and risks associated with transportation. In written testimony for Limerick Nuclear Plant's Environmental Impact Statement, October 25, 2011, ACE submitted to NRC comprehensive summaries on Limerick's high-level radioactive wastes. Since 2011, NRC failed to respond to serious concerns. NRC also failed to answer questions we raised recently about Limerick's use and storage of new high-burn nuclear fuel.

A body of evidence has been compiled on the ACE website, www.acereport.org, Section

1. 9: "High-Level Radioactive Wastes: A Ticking Time Bomb". This, combined with our recent findings from NRC's own safety evaluations for Limerick Nuclear Plant relicensing, support significant concerns.

ACE rejects NRC'S Generic Environmental Impact Study to make long-term conclusions for nuclear waste storage at Limerick Nuclear Plant or any other nuclear plants in our nation ACE rejects NRC's plan to exclude Limerick from new rules resulting from this NRC Nuclear Waste Study ACE is submitting this 26-page summary of our previous and current findings which support our requests to NRC to:

1. Conduct a site-specific nuclear waste environmental impact study at Limerick Nuclear Power Plant, prior to completing this court-ordered nuclear waste study, based on all serious threats and concerns summarized in these written comments and other still unresolved waste concerns raised previously with NRC.

2. Provide an accountable schedule for speedy removal of Limerick's high-level radioactive wastes from fuel pools into hardened on-site cask storage.

3. Stop Limerick's use of high-burn fuel based on unacceptable increased risks from its long term storage.

4. Stop the production of deadly nuclear waste for which there is no actual safe solution, based on astronomical endless costs to the public for transport, storage, and security.

5. Recommend legislation to hold nuclear owners accountable in perpetuity for all costs associated with radioactive wastes left on site after closure.

2 ACE calls on NRC to protect the public's long-term health and financial interests by acknowledging reality - There Is NO SAFE SOLUTION.

1. Stop allowing lethal radioactive wastes for which there is no safe solution to be produced

2. Require nuclear wastes to be stored safer on sites where they were produced

3. Stop the extremely dangerous transport and interim storage scheme that:

Would drastically increase risks for a catastrophic transport disaster Would result in additional locations that store these high-level radioactive wastes which are some of the most deadly materials on earth. Nuclear plants would still have this waste on site.

ACE Strenuously Objects To Nuclear Waste Transport and Interim Storage:

It transfers ownership and costs to the public for transport, plus endless storage and security It absolves reactor owners of responsibility and liability It makes room for more lethal wastes for which there is no safe solution There is no benefit to the public, only unjust increased costs and risks.

The minute deadly radioactive wastes are transported off-site from nuclear plants, the public is forced to bear the astronomical financial burden for nuclear waste transport, storage, and liability forever.

The nuclear industry is against permanent on-site hardened storage of nuclear waste to avoid what should be their financial responsibility to pay for unending storage and security, as well as liability.

NRC's Interim Storage scheme creates a misleading illusion of a solution.

This is NOT a solution. In fact, it drastically increases risk of a nuclear waste disaster.

We would end up with more deadly radioactive wastes at more locations throughout our nation, facing devastating consequences from radioactive contamination due to a natural disaster or terrorist attack.

The public would be forced to forever pay for security at all these new locations, to guard this lethal waste from a terrorist attack.

New locations would now also face radioactive contamination from a natural disaster.

Risks are not eliminated from current sites, where wastes would still be stored.

ACE COMPILED A BODY OF EVIDENCE FOR THESE COMMENTS, SHOWING WHY NUCLEAR WASTE TRANSPORT IS TOO DANGEROUS!

Nuclear Wastes, Some of the Most Deadly Materials on Earth, Should NOT be Transported On Our Nation's Highways and Railroads.

Transport creates extraordinary, unnecessary, and unacceptable health and financial risks for the public.

Our nation's seriously degrading roads, bridges, and train tracks add to the inherent risks from natural disasters.

Transport sets up vast numbers of inviting targets for terrorists, for which guarantee of safety is not realistic. Security will not be adequate, available, or affordable.

Thousands of radioactive waste shipments in trucks and trains would be vulnerable to radioactive disasters throughout our nation due to:

ACCIDENTS - There is serious cause for concern: (1) DOE acknowledges that accidents will happen; (2) Even low speed accidents can crack brittle metal tubing and unseat or damage a valve or seal, releasing radioactive particulates to the environment; (3) Fires from truck or rail accidents increase probability of devastating radioactive releases; (4) Terrorist attacks with planes, missiles, or

3 bombs can ignite transport vehicles, causing fires that release radiation; (5) Lax security has already been documented - "Security Breach on Nuclear Waste Train." (4-30-02)

Each fuel assembly contains 10 times the long-lived radioactivity released by the Hiroshima bomb.

Trucks contain 1 to 4 fuel assemblies Trains contain up to 24 fuel assemblies Nuclear waste casks could emit significant radiation just in transport. Thermal images of traveling nuke wastes suggest just getting stuck near a shipment is dangerous.

DOE Knows Accidents Will Happen DOE estimates at least 50 accidents could occur during shipments of the nation's radioactive wastes DOE's own data estimated that transporting several thousand shipments of the nation's nuclear waste off nuclear sites would result in between:

70 to 310 accidents - over 1000 incidents - would occur during truck shipments 50 to 260 accidents - over 250 incidents - would occur by train shipments The American Petroleum Institute says at least 15 accidents are expected each year with thousands of truck shipments Facts refute deceptive NRC studies claiming nuclear waste transport is totally safe Independent studies show the kind of damage that can be done by transporting nuclear fuel.

Even a low speed accident could unseat a valve or damage a seal, releasing radioactive particulates to the environment An accident could crack brittle metal tubing around the fuel The more severe the accident, the more radiation would be released to the environment Consequences of Nuclear Waste Transport Accidents or Terrorists Attacks Size of region impacted for public health and safety along transportation routes (DOE Report):

50 Miles (80 kilometers) for Accident Conditions

.5 mile (800 meters) on either side of the transportation right of way (non-accident conditions)

A severe accident involving one radioactive waste cask, releasing a small amount of radiation would:

Contaminate about 42 square miles for well over a year, with devastating economic consequences in an urban setting (DOE Report)

Take over a year to attempt to clean up radioactive residue (DOE Report)

Economic consequences estimated at $2 Billion (1980 NRC study)

Radiation doses from an accident or terrorist attack breaching transport containers (1 yard away) could result in devastating impacts:

Lethal radiation doses from high-level radioactive waste transport (500 rem) could result when exposed for less than 3 minutes Cancer or genetic damage risk increases after just 30 seconds (100 rem)

NRC's pamphlet says 10 years after waste is removed from reactors, an unshielded radiation dose could exceed 20,000 rems per hour 5,000 rems can cause incapacitation and death within a week Regulations For Radioactive Transportation Accidents Are UNprotective 8-22 A burning truck carrying radioactive material was not reported until 10-31-13. It took over two months for this dangerous incident to be disclosed to the public.

This refutes industry and NRC claims that nuclear materials transportation is absolutely secure In fact it suggests many nuclear transport accidents / incidents can be going unreported to NRC or the public It confirms major GAPS in nuclear reporting systems Despite the fiery emergency, NRC was not informed. There was no requirement for this major truck fire to be reported. Fires, even on nuclear materials trucks, are not required to be reported to NRC.

Many radioactive transport accidents and incidents can be going unreported

4 Truck drivers are programmed, basically taught, to do everything they can to avoid the media, that the media is like terrorism HISTORY OF NUCLEAR WASTE TRANSPORT "INCIDENTS" and "ACCIDENTS" REFUTES NRC AND INDUSTRY CLAIMS THAT TRANSPORT IS SAFE A body of evidence below shows that NRC cannot guarantee safe transport of nuclear wastes. In fact, the transporting "spent" nuclear fuel record in the U.S. suggests intentional deceit by NRC and the nuclear industry.

Incidents / Accidents Already Happened 72 transport "Incidents" and accidents were documented by Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects - "Reported Incidents Involving Spent Fuel Shipment, 1949 to 1996" "Incidents" can be quite significant, according to Dr. Marvin Resnikoff's 1983 book, "The Next Nuclear Gamble: Transportation and Storage of Nuclear Waste..."

One incident led to radiation contamination of hundreds of miles of PA Highways in 1981. It went unreported for 5 days. NRC never took action.

Hazardous Materials Trains in our nation have derailed causing massive contamination and widespread evacuations. If these were nuclear waste trains, radioactive contamination could have caused a major long-term disaster and dead zone.

Nuclear Waste "Incidents" and "Accidents" Documented By Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects in 1996 "Reported Incidents Involving Spent Fuel Shipment, 1949 to 1996" 72 Total "Incidents" 4 Involved "accidental radioactive material contamination beyond the vehicle" 13 Traffic Accidents 49 accidental container surface contaminations 2 incidents with no description Leaking rail cask contaminated "small areas" at 3 rail yards Leaking truck cask contaminated a terminal - a "slow drip" while stored in transportation terminal Poor documentation made it difficult to get full disclosure on past accidents, supposedly classified from the public for "reasons of national security".

Cover Up? Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) failed to report many incidents listed above, admitting only 8 occurred, claiming only 4 involved containers loaded with highly radioactive nuclear fuel.

"Incidents" can actually be quite significant, according to Dr. Marvin Resnikoff's 1983 book, "The Next Nuclear Gamble: Transportation and Storage of Nuclear Waste..."

NRC uses intentionally misleading language to describe transport accidents, deceptively calling significant accidents - "incidents". Examples:

TRUCK CASK - Cask became severely contaminated which was used 4 months earlier to ship a leaking fuel assembly from N.J. It was delivered to a California nuclear plant 8-20-80.

Radiation level in the truck driver's cab was over twice the maximum legal limit During decontamination radiation was emitted 11 to 40 times the legal radiation limit When a worker opened the cask, highly radioactive water poured out, emitting up to 100 rems/hour of radiation, a dose high enough to be lethal after 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> of exposure After wiping up the moisture, an even higher dose was observed 300 rems/hour Release of just several gallons of water from this cask could cost billions for clean-up RADIATION CONTAMINATED HUNDREDS OF MILES OF PA HIGHWAY - 1981 Cask at Oyster Creek, N.J. was found to have radioactive surface contamination, even though it was empty and had not shipped fuel for 5 months.

Heavy paint was applied for next journey to Ohio

5 Water soluble paint began to dissolve during a rain storm in PA Amount and levels of radiation released will never be known The "incident" was not reported for 5 days - then NRC took no action HIGH SURFACE RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION INCIDENTS Radiation levels were 90 times the legal limit when arriving in casks delivered to Wisconsin Management failed to inform workers NRC did not require decontamination until AFTER the shipments were completed FAULTY CASKS USED FOR MORE THAN 5 YEARS National Atomic Commission allowed faulty casks to transport high-level radioactive wastes more than 300,000 miles Nuclear Waste Truck Stolen - November 2013 While the incident of stolen radioactive waste reported 12-4-13 happened at a gas station in Mexico, it reveals another concern related to terrorists Deteriorating Infrastructure Makes Transport Far Too Risky It is not safe to transport deadly radioactive wastes on our nation's deteriorating roads and bridges.

Example: PA's Crumbling Roads and Bridges In 2013, PA's governor admitted roads and bridges are "crumbling" In 2011, PA bridges were among the worst in the nation (Philadelphia Inquirer), with two of every five PA bridges structurally deficient or functionally obsolete. The safety factor suggests NO radioactive wastes should be transported across PA bridges PA leads the country in the number and percent of spans of roads and bridges deemed structurally deficient More than 1/2 of PA's major urban roads are in "poor" or mediocre condition (American Society for Civil Engineers report)

Radioactive Waste Transport in PA Unacceptable The PA Department of Transportation does not have funding for adequate maintenance of the vast portions of badly deteriorated roads and dangerous bridges PA is 2nd in the nation for the number of nuclear reactors, and therefore 2nd for the highest amount of high-level radioactive wastes that would be transported In other states bridges have already collapsed and roads have already crumbled. What if radioactive waste transportation vehicles were involved?

Many states, like PA, are facing funding crises, making it unlikely all structurally deficient roads and bridges will be made safe enough to safely transport deadly radioactive wastes Terrorist Attacks - Deadly radioactive wastes cannot, and will not, be guarded as well along transport routes as at a nuclear plant site.

The largest casks carry the equivalent of some 200 Hiroshima bombs in a long-lived radiological equivalent Some call radioactive waste transport a potential "Mobile Chernobyl, vulnerable to terrorist attacks with planes or missiles (even from afar). Bombs ignited on transport vehicles could cause catastrophic radioactive fires, releasing massive radiation, contaminating and making uninhabitable very large areas of the transport route.

Army testing proves transport casks can be penetrated with a missile Jet plane fuel from a deliberate crash into a transport vehicle could cause a devastating fire, even with a small plane Lax Security Documented

6 It is absurd for the nuclear industry to claim their wastes are self-protecting due to risk of radiation exposure. This ignores reality, including the real potential for airplane and missile attacks.

Evidence confirms that "Waste Trains" are not adequately protected from terrorists, "Security Breach on Nuclear Waste Train." 4-30-02 Durham, N.C.

Inmates Jump Wrong Train, Revealing Vulnerability. If these people intended to cause serious harm, they were in perfect position. Terrorists would not have boarded the train unarmed.

Defenders did not deny access. If those who boarded the train had been attackers carrying explosives who were willing to sacrifice their lives, there would have been a serious problem.

Fire And Nuclear Waste Transport Fires due to truck or rail accidents increase probability of disastrous radioactive releases.

Accidents or terrorist attacks could trigger fires during truck or train transport.

There is significant potential for a fire resulting from a transportation accident involving high-level radioactive wastes. This could have similar consequences as radiological weapons.

If a truck or train accident resulted in a fire, spent fuel rods could heat up, self-ignite and burn in an unstoppable fire. Numerous scientific experts warn that burning fire on zirconium cladding of nuclear waste can trigger an exothermic reaction.

It's important to extinguish fires within 1/2 hour. Yet confusion, a lack of understanding radiation risks, and deciding who is responsible for cleanup and public health in a radioactive emergency elevate risks.

Shipping containers are only designed to withstand a 1/2 hour fire at a temperature of 1475 degrees. NEI's inadequate testing was only 90 minutes at 2000 degrees.

Rail fires could burn for hours, sometimes days, at temperatures considerably higher Heat could vaporize some of the radioactive materials and sweep them up into the air Persons downwind can inhale radioactive particles, later developing cancer or genetic defects Burning Truck Hauling Nuclear Load Flies Under The Radar A burning truck hauling a nuclear load flew under the radar in Ohio 8-22-13. (Not reported until October 31, 2013) Despite the fiery emergency, there was no requirement to immediately inform NRC to independently determine if radiation was released.

This incident did not turn into a disaster, but it could have. It refutes claims that nuclear materials transportation is absolutely safe.

Extreme Weather Conditions Increase Risk Of Transport Disasters Earthquakes, tornadoes, and hurricanes are getting far stronger and much more frequent, drastically increasing risk of transport accidents In 2011, all PA weather records were broken for snow, ice, heat, and rain, clearly increasing risks for transportation accidents which could be disastrous if they involve nuclear waste. Since PA is 2nd in numbers of nuclear reactors, more wastes would be transported than in other states, increasing the odds of disaster.

Earthquake Faults and Fracking Nuclear waste on Limerick's site faces serious threats from loss of water and power from an earthquake. Limerick was built directly over an earthquake fault with 4 others within 17 miles.

Transport of large volumes of this waste off-site during an earthquake could also create a catastrophic disaster.

Fracking is known to trigger earthquakes. To date, over 4200 wells have been approved for fracking in PA. PA would be transporting large volumes of waste since it has the 2nd highest number of nuclear plants.

"High-Burn Nuclear Fuel" Is Not Transportable. Limerick and Other Nuclear Plants Using High-Burn Fuel Must Be Required To Stop

7 Due to increased radioactivity and decay heat in spent fuel Due to increased corrosion, thinning, and brittleness of fuel cladding Due to increased damage and rupture of fuel rods in the reactor vessels, leading to damage in the form of pinhole leaks and small cracks that can lead to breaching of fuel cladding.

NRC has known about the potential for damage from this fuel for several years.

NRC has NO PROOF use of High-Burn fuel is safe, yet negligently allows its use to continue.

NRC's decision to allow this to continue abandons public interests while it further jeopardizes safe storage and transport. It is clearly motivated by economic benefit to the nuclear industry.

"Spent fuel that may have degraded after extended storage may present new obstacles to safe transport".

According to the National Academy of Engineering of the National Academy of Sciences, The technical basis for the spent fuel currently being discharged (high utilization, burn-up fuels) is not well established".

"NRC has not yet granted a license for the transport of the higher burnup fuels discharged from reactors."

This even more dangerous waste could be transported whether or not NRC grants a license for that.

Evidence shows why with higher burn-up, nuclear fuel rods undergo several very risky changes that include:

Increasing oxidation, corrosion and hydriding of the fuel cladding.

Oxidation reduces cladding thickness, while hydrogen (H3) absorption of the cladding to form a hydrogen-based rust of the zirconium metal from the gas pressure inside the rod can cause the cladding to become brittle and fail.

Higher internal rod gas pressure between the pellets and the inner wall of the cladding leading to higher fission gas release.

Pressure increases are typically two to three times greater.

Elongation or thinning of the cladding from increased internal fission gas pressure.

Structural damage and failure of the cladding caused by hoop (circumferential) stress.

Increased debris in the reactor vessel, damaging and rupturing fuel rods.

Cladding wear and failure from prolonged rubbing of fuel rods against grids that hold them in the assembly as the reactor operates (grid to rod fretting).

A significant increase in radioactivity and decay heat in the spent fuel.

A potentially larger number of damaged spent fuel assemblies stored in pools.

Upgraded pool storage with respect to heat removal and pool cleaning. Requiring as much as 150 years of surface storage before final disposal.

FINANCIAL INJUSTICE Property Values Decline Along Nuclear Waste Transportation Routes Experience Shows Courts in New Mexico, Colorado, Tennessee, Washington, and Ohio already awarded property damages for reduced values Disclosure Laws in Most States Require That Buyers Be Told If Property Is On A Transportation Route Residents could be "stuck" with property they can't sell along a nuclear waste transportation route. This is an unacceptable and unnecessary injustice.

Many PA communities would be exposed to frequent shipments of large amounts of nuclear wastes transported to interim storage facilities, likely for far longer than 25 years Public Health and Safety Impact From Radioactive Waste Transportation (DOE Estimates) 50 Miles (80 kilometers) for Accident Conditions

.5 mile (800 meters) on either side of the transportation right of way for non-accident conditions Consequences could be devastating to the economy and public health from a severe radioactive waste transport accident in an urban setting. Even a small radiation release in a rural setting would contaminate 42 square miles for over 1 year Insurance Does NOT Cover Radiological Incidents or Accidents Homeowners insurance will not cover loss of real estate use or personal property caused by radiological accidents or terrorist attacks Health insurance may not cover some illnesses related to long-term or permanent radiological damage or other long-term serious illnesses caused by a radioactive waste transport accident

8 Who will reimburse victims of a nuclear waste transport accident or terrorist attack?

Vast numbers of people could lose everything from radioactive contamination Size of region impacted for public health and safety along transportation routes is 50 miles according to a DOE report A severe accident involving 1 radioactive waste cask, releasing a small amount of radiation would contaminate about 42 square miles for well over 1 year, with devastating economic consequences in an urban setting (DOE Report)

Economic consequences estimated at $2 Billion (1980 NRC study)

Many people could lose their homes, businesses, possessions, and health from just one radioactive waste transportation accident that turns into a radioactive fire Neither the nuclear industry, nor state or federal governments are obligated to compensate the vast numbers of victims who could lose everything due to nuclear waste transport accidents or terrorist attacks The Nuclear Industry Won't Pay A Dime The nuclear industry is no longer responsible for any costs associated with nuclear waste after it leaves the site, including any costs associated with nuclear waste transportation accidents Cash-Strapped States Can't Pay States do not have adequate budgets to cover astronomical long-term relocation costs or for widespread radiation clean-up costs, required after a serious radioactive waste transport accident The federal Price Anderson Act does not cover nuclear waste transportation accidents The current Republican Congress is unlikely to provide relocation or clean-up costs It is more likely they will deny risks. You can't see, smell, or feel radiation contamination.

Many Congressmen were reluctant and very slow to help other Americans in major emergencies.

Vast numbers of Sandy victims are still homeless, and the devastation from that hurricane was easy to see.

Local Rights Are Being Steamrolled To Allow Dangerous Nuclear Waste Transport Many jurisdictions already officially opposed nuclear waste transportation through their communities to protect the health and financial interests of their citizens, including Philadelphia, Bucks County, and Falls Township in PA NRC is doing the bidding of the nuclear industry and compromised politicians by supporting transport and interim storage of nuclear wastes. NRC is making dangerous decisions that benefit the nuclear industry, but that can be devastating to taxpayers.

PA State Senate Republicans are attempting to take away the rights of local municipalities to say NO to nuclear waste transport on behalf of nuclear industry interests Local officials should have the right to say no to transporting deadly radioactive wastes through their communities to protect public safety, health, and financial interests At stake for victims of high-level radioactive waste transport accidents or terrorist attacks - health and potential total loss of property, homes, businesses, and all possessions for generations Unfair, Unethical, Immoral Financial Injustice NRC abandons public interests with this scheme to transfer all the astronomical costs and endless financial responsibility for nuclear wastes onto taxpayers The nuclear industry made a fortune producing lethal high-level radioactive wastes. They should be held financially responsible to store their own wastes on the site where it was produced in the safest way possible.

Why should taxpayers be forced to foot the bill for massive amounts of nuclear waste transport, and endless storage and security, virtually forever? EPA set a million year health standard for a nuclear dump.

Any nuclear plant owner who refuses should have its operating permit revoked immediately Safety Is A Dangerous Illusion - To Claim Otherwise Is Intentional Deceit NRC cannot guarantee safe transport or storage of high-level radioactive wastes

9 NRC cannot guarantee transported storage containers will remain safe for 50 years, the time they are expected to last. There is no proof.

NRC cannot guarantee storage containers will be replaced in time to protect public health and safety. There may be no federal funds to do that or a future Congress may refuse to provide funding.

NRC cannot guarantee that increasingly dangerous weather events will not cause a catastrophe in transport or in interim off-site storage NRC cannot guarantee there will not be a terrorist attack Moving Nuclear Wastes Won't Solve Nuclear Waste Problems At Nuclear Plants It is an outright lie for the nuclear industry and their supporters to claim transport to another location will remove nuclear waste storage threats at nuclear plants As long as nuclear plants operate, deadly radioactive wastes will pile up on site Transport won't reduce the number of radioactive waste sites, it just adds enormous risk at more locations, to the already unprecedented threats from high-level radioactive wastes The evidence shows why it is both indefensible and unreasonable for NRC to suggest that transport and interim storage is a solution Transport and interim storage is an irrational pea and shell game that ignores the additional unnecessary health and financial risks it presents to the public Moving wastes only benefits nuclear plant owners, allowing them to avoid accountability for their deadly wastes U.S. Conference of Mayors Resolution June, 2012 The U.S. Conference of Mayors called on DOE to focus on storage of radioactive waste on-site, as the best opportunity for communities to avoid further health and environmental impacts from waste from nuclear facilities A truck or railway accident or terrorist attack involving transported nuclear waste could render entire cities and surrounding areas uninhabitable Transporting radioactive materials across the nation on major interstates, highways, and railways will expose countless communities across the country to hazardous radiation A recent DOE study estimated over 800 adults would die from cancer due to radiation emitted from the trucks in the Northwest region alone Off-site waste at other sites are projected to have significant adverse long-term impacts on the groundwater, which ultimately impacts other bodies of water Transport Is An Immoral, Unethical, Unnecessary Risk Evidence above reveals the insanity of transporting tens of thousands of casks of lethal high-level nuclear wastes across the nation on our nation's degrading highways and railroads, potentially affecting the health, safety, and financial well-being of 100 million Americans who live within a mile or two of likely transport routes Given the potential for a radioactive waste transport accident on our highly degraded infrastructure and the ever-growing threat of terrorism, it is insane to risk loss of health, homes, and businesses for so many people through radioactive waste transport We urge NRC to consider inherent risks for a Mobile Chernobyl Times 2.

STOP NUCLEAR WASTE TRANSPORT TO INTERIM STORAGE SITES.

WE URGE NRC TO CHOOSE THE LEAST BAD SOLUTION: STORE IT ON-SITE "SAFER" REQUIRE NUCLEAR PLANT OWNERS TO DRY-STORE HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE WHERE IT IS, IN THE SAFEST POSSIBLE WAY

10 WHY FUEL POOLS MUST BE UNLOADED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE INTO ONSITE STORAGE EVIDENCE BELOW SHOWS WHY NRC MUST REQUIRE NUCLEAR PLANT OWNERS TO REMOVE HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM FUEL POOLS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND MOVE IT TO ON-SITE DRY STORAGE Spent Fuel Pools:

Are A Catastrophe Waiting To Happen Are Vulnerable to Meltdown From Loss of Water and/or Loss of Power Through Accidents, Natural Disasters, or Terrorist Attacks by Plane or Missile Are Packed And Can Be Turned Into Weapons of Mass Destruction Spent Fuel In Pools Contains More Radioactivity Than Reactors Spent Fuel Rods Give Off Enough Radiation To Kill People In Seconds Pools Are At High Risk From Loss of Water Accidents Loss of Water Can Be Caused By Penetration by Aircraft or Missiles, Or By Extended Loss of Power Due To Natural Disasters.

Health and Economic Impacts Of Extended Loss of Water In Spent Fuel Pools Like Limerick's Limerick's design is similar to reactors in meltdowns at Fukushima.

Roof-top fuel pools are highly vulnerable to loss of power and cooling water from an earthquake or other natural disasters, in addition to a variety of attacks by terrorists With loss of cooling water, Limerick's fuel rods can heat up, self-ignite, and burn in an unstoppable fire, causing tens of thousands of deaths up to 500 miles away, according to a 2000 NRC study Health and Financial Costs Would Be Astronomical Limerick Nuclear Plants Fuel Pools Are A Major Threat To Public Health, Safety, And The Economy In The Greater Philadelphia Region, The 2nd Most Populated Region Around A Nuclear Plant.

A meltdown in a spent fuel pool could cause fatal radiation-induced cancer in thousands of people as far as 500 miles from the site.

A 2004 Study by Dr. Edwin Lyman, Senior Scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, Concluded:

As many as 44,000 near-term deaths from acute radiation poisoning 518,000 long term deaths from cancer Deaths could occur among people living as far as 60 miles downwind A 2003 study by Dr. Frank Von Hippel, Director of Science and Global Security at Princeton University, concluded that:

A successful terrorist attack on a spent fuel storage pool could have consequences "significantly worse than Chernobyl" A catastrophic spent fuel fire could release a radiation plume that could contaminate 8 to 70 times more land than Chernobyl. (Would include the entire Philadelphia Metropolitan Region)

A January 2003 study by Dr. Gordon Thompson, Director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies (entitled Robust Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Neglected Issue of Homeland Security) reviewed ways spent fuel pools are vulnerable to attack.

11 Dr. Thompson concluded a nuclear fire in the spent fuel pool (of Indian Point Unit 2) would would release enough Cesium-137 to render about 95,000 square kilometers of land uninhabitable," (covering about 75% of New York State and into, segments of NJ and CT)

SPENT FUEL FIRES Experts Say: "A Spent Fuel Fire Can Contaminate 8 To 70 Times More Land Than Chernobyl" Spent Fuel Must Be Seen As Pre-Deployed Radiological Weapons

" With Loss of Water, Spent Fuel Rods Heat Up, Self-Ignite And Burn in an Unstoppable Fire "Zirconium Cladding - Can Trigger a Reaction and Fire Which Can Burn Away Cooling Water" Limerick's Fuel Rods Are At Risk For Loss Of Water And Fire:

NRC failed to require Limerick to follow the safest fire safety regulations. NRC allowed Limerick to use a second set of less stringent standards, determined to be "safe enough". That constitutes regulatory negligence, given the potential consequences.

Limerick's fuel pools are outside the containment and vulnerable to a 9/11 type terrorist attack and fire from jet fuel. Yet, NRC failed to require Exelon to guard against this type attack.

There is not an ample water supply to avoid meltdowns in the fuel pools. The closest body of water available to try to deal with leaking fuel pools is dangerously depleted due to Limerick's cooling tower use over decades.

The Fukushima catastrophe shows why fuel must be removed from pools as soon as possible, regardless of costs to the nuclear industry, especially in reactor designs like Limerick's, similar to Fukushima's.

Loss of cooling water or power for Limerick's fuel pools, or a terrorist attack could have long-term devastating impacts on the future environment and public health in the entire Greater Philadelphia Region. An accident or terrorist attack on massive amounts of the most deadly materials on earth stored in fuel pools at Limerick Nuclear Plant could render the entire Philadelphia Region uninhabitable for centuries, if not forever.

THE LIMERICK EXAMPLE PROVIDES EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE REMOVAL OF WASTE IN FUEL POOLS Limericks Fuel Pools are OVERLOADED, far beyond the original design basis since at least 2006 Over an estimated 1,000 metric tons of these lethal wastes are vulnerable to fire from meltdowns or terrorist attack, potentially creating a disaster 100 times worse than Hiroshima Pools are filled with radioactive fluids that can boil away due to an accident, natural disaster, or terrorist attack, introducing large volumes of radiation into the air Pools are vulnerable to a 9/11 type terrorist attack with a plane or missile. An attack on Limericks fuel pools could result in an unstoppable radioactive fire, with potentially worse consequences than Chernobyl. That kind of attack could lead to an unstoppable radioactive fire which could impact people hundreds of miles away, according to an NRC study (2000). Pools are outside the reinforced containment structures for the reactors.

Cement used to construct Limerick's fuel pools is documented to be substandard NRC'S FAILURE TO REQUIRE EXELON TO IMMEDIATELY REMOVE ALL 5-YEAR OR OLDER WASTES FROM LIMERICK'S FUEL POOLS FASTER SHOULD BE CONSIDERED REGULATORY MALPRACTICE, ESPECIALLY AFTER WATCHING THE FUEL POOL DISASTER UNFOLDING AT FUKUSHIMA.

12 NRC'S INACTION RELATED TO LIMERICK'S FUEL POOLS CONSTITUTES GROSS NEGLIGENCE NRC IS AWARE OF LIMERICK'S FUEL POOL DESIGN FLAWS AND RISKS FOR CATASTROPHE NRC knows Limerick's fuel pools are corroding and thinning at rates 2 to 10 times faster than originally estimated, yet NRC has allowed Exelon to wait for over a decade to even recoat the pools NRC was informed by Limerick's safety inspector, that Limerick's fuel pools were poured with substandard cement, and why that should concern NRC related to earthquake risk at Limerick.

NRC should also see why this increases the risk from a terrorist missile or plane strike.

NRC knows Limerick is among the nation's nuclear plants most at risk from earthquakes with a fault right under the site and four others within 17 miles, and that alarms went off in the control room at Limerick from the 9-23-11 Virginia earthquake, and yet NRC is allowing Exelon to wait 3 years (until 2017) to even complete an earthquake risk study.

NRC knows there is not enough water available to adequately deal with extended loss of water and potential meltdowns in Limerick's fuel pools NRC knows there is not enough back-up power available on site, to simultaneously prevent meltdowns in Limerick's 2 reactors and 2 fuel pools Knowing about unfixable design flaws at Limerick and watching the fuel pool disaster in Fukushima's similar fuel pool design, NRC is failing to require Exelon to build on-site casks faster at Limerick for removal from pools NRC is planning to relicense Limerick, knowing each year Limerick operates tons more of this deadly waste will be produced and there is no safe way to deal with this lethal waste NRC INEXPLICABLY IGNORES UNPRECEDENTED RISKS FROM LIMERICK'S FUEL POOLS AND REFUSES TO DO AN UPDATED REVIEW FOR LIMERICK'S SPENT FUEL STORAGE, DESPITE COMPELLING EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO NRC THAT CLEARLY IDENTIFIES THE NEED.

Comprehensive evidence of Limerick's fuel pool risks was submitted in written testimony by ACE for NRC's public hearing record for Limerick's EIS 11-26-13, and updated in written testimony for NRC's public hearing record 6-24-13 Summaries were also provided in correspondence to NRC Commissioner Borchardt 8-5-13 In 2012, the federal court said NRC should consider potential environmental effects of leaks and fires involving spent fuel pools. Despite the inherent risks from Limerick's fuel pools identified and summarized by ACE, NRC is ignoring the order to re-think the environmental impact of storing radioactive wastes in Limerick's fuel pools.

In 2013 NRC's Neil Sheehan said in an e-mail to the Mercury newspaper, that NRCs new rules about spent fuel storage are not likely to affect Limericks Environment Impact Statement. He said:

"There is no expectation that Exelon would have to conduct a new review of spent fuel storage at Limerick" (Mercury - March 8, 2013)

"Limerick nuke plant relicensing unlikely to be affected by new spent fuel rules (Mercury - March 13, 2013)

NRC Is Jeopardizing Our Future When Failing To Address Major Issues and Concerns Related to Limerick's Fuel Pools:

1. Corrosion and Thinning Documented in Limericks Fuel Pool Liners at Rates up to 10 times Faster than Anticipated

2. High-Level Radioactive Wastes Stored in Limericks Fuel Pools Beyond Design Capacity

3. Limerick Previous Accepting Waste From Other Nuclear Plants - Permit Changed in 2012 Without A Hearing

4. Structural Deficiencies in the Concrete of Limerick's Fuel Pools

5. Limericks Fuel Pools Are Similar to Those That Exploded at Fukushima - High Above Reactors With NO Containment

6. Inadequate Alternative Back-Up Power

7. Fuel Pool Instrumentation

13

8. Spent Fuel Pools Are At High Risk For Meltdowns From Loss of Cooling Water Due To:

Earthquakes, Cracking, Aging, Brittle, Deteriorating, Substandard Cement Leakage and Evaporation Explosion Inside or Outside Pool Building Terrorist Acts With Planes Or Missiles - Fuel Pools Are Not Protected Against Air Strikes or Missiles Aircraft or Missile Impact Siphoning Pumping Accidental or Deliberate Drop of Fuel In Transfer See: Spent Fuel Pools Pose A Danger - Associated Press - March 17, 2011 The Following Detailed Summaries Reveal NRC's Gross Negligence, And The Need For NRC To Take Immediate Action To Reduce Risks.

CORROSION and LOSS of THICKNESS in LIMERICK'S SPENT FUEL POOLS NRC caved in to Exelon, ignoring NRC's own objections to Exelon's request to delay coating of Limerick's fuel pools. NRC plans to ignore documented cracking, corrosion, pitting, and cavitations in Limerick's fuel pools holding the most deadly materials on earth, related to relicensing approval. Limerick could be relicensed with no guarantee Exelon ever can or will coat or provide other protective measures on Limerick's fuel pools.

NRC told Exelon that to delay coating the degraded fuel pool areas is unacceptable.

NRC outlined "Substantial Corrosion" and loss of thickness issues in Limerick's fuel pool liners.

(Documented in 7-20-12 NRC letter to Exelon)

The documented corrosion rate is far higher than original corrosion rate calculations for fuel pools Pitting corrosion rates are unpredictable (usually 2 to 10 times more than the general corrosion rates)

In spite of cracking, corrosion, pitting, and cavitations in Limericks fuel pools, documented by NRC:

1. Exelon requested deferring protective measures like coating until Limerick's current licenses expires (a delay of 12 to 17 years)

2. Exelon proposes inspection only every 10 years GROSS NEGLIGENCE: NRC CAVED IN TO EXELON NRC officials made the inexplicable decision to allow delayed coating of Limerick's fuel pools, despite NRC staff's conclusion that to delay coating fuel pools was unacceptable. Despite proven adverse impacts on the safety and integrity of Limerick's fuel pools and associated unprecedented threats to public health and safety, NRC revised regulations to accommodate Exelon's requests to delay coating Limerick's fuel pools.

We believe it is negligent for NRC to assume Limerick's fuel pools will remain safe until Exelon agrees to re-coat them. Corrosion has already been documented at rates far faster than originally calculated. ACE asked NRC to provide the names and contact information for NRC officials who made this dangerous decision. To date: NO NRC RESPONSE ACE Asked NRC To Explain Why NRC Assumes Limerick's Fuel Pools Can Be Re-Coated.

Explain the exact process in detail that Exelon would use to coat liners, now or in the future.

Answer critical questions below:

a. Won't all radioactive water and radioactive wastes need to be removed from fuel pools for repair and coating?

As long as Limerick continues to operate, 2 more tons each year of this deadly radioactive waste will need to be cooled in Limerick's fuel pools for at least 5 years Limerick's fuel pools are already overloaded, far beyond design basis, with this waste that requires cooling for a minimum of five years, to avoid combustion resulting in a devastating radioactive fire

b. Where would the radioactive wastes currently stored in the pools go until pools are coated? That waste will still need to be cooled.

c. Where will the massive amount of radioactive water go when drained for recoating?

To date: NO NRC RESPONSE to any questions above

14 Additional ACE Questions - NO NRC RESPONSE

1. Did anyone except Exelon ever inspect fuel pool liners for cracking, corrosion, pitting, and cavitations?

2. Were fuel pool liners ever inspected by NRC?

3. How does NRC justify inspection only every 10 years, when pitting corrosion rates have proven to be much greater than original rate calculations?

LIMERICK'S FUEL POOLS ARE PACKED, FAR BEYOND DESIGN BASIS, CONTAINING FAR MORE THAN FUKUSHIMA'S AND OLDER US NUKES:

Limericks Fuel Pools Contain Far More Assemblies Than Other U.S. Nuclear Plants, Including Exelon's Three Mile Island and Oyster Creek.

Compared to Fukushima:

More Than Twice As Much In 2 Limerick Fuel Pools Than 4 At Fukushima.

6,203 Assemblies - 2 LIMERICK FUEL POOLS (Estimated Spent Fuel At Limerick 1,143 Tons) 2,400 Assemblies - 4 FUKUSHIMA FUEL POOLS Information Above From The Institute for Policy Studies by Bob Alvarez, "Spent Nuclear Fuel Pools in the U.S.: Reducing the Deadly Effects of Storage" Appendix A: Site Specific Estimates of Radioactivity in U.S. Spent Fuel Page 26 Source: DOE/EIS-0250, Appendix A, Tables A-7, A-8, A-9, & A-1 TO DATE: NRC FAILED TO ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.

WHY DO LIMERICKS FUEL POOLS CONTAIN SO MANY MORE FUEL ASSEMBLIES THAN OTHER NUCLEAR PLANTS OPERATING LONGER?

Did Limerick ever take spent fuel from other nuclear plants?

Did Limerick ever take spent fuel from Three Mile Island after the partial meltdown?

NRC's 5-18-12 written response to ACE about quantity of fuel used at Limerick was puzzling.

"Exact amounts of 'special nuclear material' in a licensee's possession is considered to be security sensitive information and not permitted to be released to the public."

1.

We believe the public has a right to know how much waste is at Limerick and where it came from.

2.

Approximately 2 tons produced each year for the 28 years Limerick operated should be 56 tons, NOT 1,143 tons. Explain in detail. Why is there so much more from two Limerick reactors than 4 Fukushima reactors?

3.

Even if it is 2 tons per reactor per year, the amount stored in Limerick's pools should only be 106 Tons, NOT 1,143 Tons.

This discrepancy needs to be fully understood by the public. If the amount of waste used per reactor each year can be estimated, there is NO LOGICAL REASON NRC should refuse to provide the public with approximate totals. Anyone should be able to do the math, including terrorists and NRC. NRC's response made us wonder what is really going on.

Did Limerick's Operating License Amended 12-19-11 Allow Limerick To Receive and Possess Spent Fuel Rods From Other Nuclear Plants? YES OR NO Limerick's Operating License Permit Was Amended (12-19-11). Language Included To Allow Limerick to Receive and Possess Fuel Assemblies and Fuel Channels From Other Nuclear Plants, Such As That Already Received From Shoreham Decades Earlier.

Exact language (Below) Is From Limerick's Amended Operating Permit 12-19-11 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC DOCKET NO. 50-353 LIMERICK GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 167 License No. NPF-85 Page 3 (4) Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (5) Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility, and to receive and possess, but not separate, such source, byproduct, and special nuclear materials as contained in the fuel assemblies and fuel channels from the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.

DID NRC ALLOW LIMERICK TO ACCEPT HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM OTHER NUCLEAR PLANTS DECADES AGO, BUT JUST CHANGE LIMERICKS OPERATING PERMIT TO ALLOW THAT 12-19-11?

15 ACE Requested Detailed Explanations From NRC, But Didnt Even Receive A Response To The Following Questions:

1.

Why Would Limerick Have Its Operating License Amended In 2011 To Receive and Possess Radioactive Waste From Other Nuclear Plants, When Limerick Already Received These Wastes From Shoreham and Possibly TMI?

2.

Did receipt and possession of Shoreham's waste violate Limerick's original operating permit?

3.

When Limerick received waste from Shoreham decades ago, wasnt that in violation of Limericks operating permit?

4.

This Is A Major Permit Change, Which Adds Dramatically to The Risk In Our Entire Region and the Transportation Route. Why Wasnt The Public Widely Informed With An Opportunity To Comment and Have A Public Hearing?

How long will it take Exelon to remove most of Limerick's deadly wastes from dangerous fuel pools and store it in above ground casks?

STRUCTURALLY SUBSTANDARD CEMENT IN LIMERICK'S FUEL POOLS Defective concrete in Limerick's fuel pools could have serious adverse effects on the structural adequacy to prevent leaks and meltdowns triggered by an earthquake or a terrorist attack with a plane or missile.

NRC's 5-12 response to ACE acknowledges the structural defect from the concrete pour of Limerick's fuel pools, but refers to a decades old unsubstantiated NRC "assumption" that it would have no adverse effect on the structural adequacy.

NRC'S "ASSUMPTION" IS FAULTY AND UNSUBSTANTIATED. NRC's "assumption" was indefensible from the beginning, but it's worse now, with increasing threats from earthquakes and terrorist attacks with planes or missiles on the stories high fuel pools. We remind NRC that if Limerick's fuel pools suffer cracks and cooling water starts to leak, it can be the beginning of a catastrophic disaster.

ALTERNATIVE BACK-UP POWER IS INADEQUATE TO PREVENT SIMULTANEOUS MELTDOWNS IN FUEL POOLS AND REACTORS AS WAS NEEDED AT FUKUSHIMA.

It Appears Limerick Will Be EXEMPTED From NRCs Post-Fukushima Station Blackout Rule; And That Back-Up Power To Prevent Meltdowns At Limerick Is Still Woefully Inadequate The Fukushima disaster proves there could be four simultaneous meltdowns at Limerick and that a constant energy supply is vital for cooling water and other operations to prevent meltdowns In 2013, two years after Fukushima, NRC has still not required Exelon to have indefinite back-up power to prevent potential meltdowns in Limericks two reactors and two fuel pools New NRC rules say there must be indefinite back-up power, yet it does not appear that indefinite back-up power is available at Limerick for fuel pools or reactors NRCs new station blackout rules do not apply to plants licensed to operate prior to July 21, 1988, which includes Limerick, according to NRCs website, Last Reviewed/Updated, Friday, March 01, 2013 After Fukushima, we learned only 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of back-up power for Limerick could be woefully inadequate to attempt to prevent meltdowns, yet it appears that is all that is still required at Limerick.

In 2011, Ex-NRC chairman Jaczko said, " I'm not convinced four hours is reasonable to restore off-site power" We also realized in a worst case scenario, there could be meltdowns simultaneously, in both reactors and both fuel pools at Limerick from loss of power, then loss of water After what happened at Fukushima, NRC required indefinite back-up power capabilities. In March, 2012, a year after Fukushima, NRC made new rules requiring a plan to indefinitely survive blackouts, to keep reactors cool during an electric failure.

16 NRC then revised the rule, allowing Exelon to avoid costs of providing indefinite blackout capability at Limerick Nuclear Plant Blackouts at nuclear plants have been caused by blizzards, tornadoes, raccoons, and a bird In April 2012, ACE first asked NRC about the numbers of Limerick's back-up generators and the available time of operation for each March 21, 2013, ACE again asked NRC for specific answers about the length of time of Limerick's capability to provide back-up power for both generators and fuel pools simultaneously, in the case of a black-out from natural disasters or terrorist attacks.

Despite repeated requests, NRC has provided no evidence that Limerick has more than four hours of back-up power for each reactor or any back-up for fuel pools Still NO NRC ANSWERS To Specific ACE Questions Below Related To Back-Up Power to Prevent Meltdowns Does Limerick have access to back-up generators for Limerick's 2 reactors and 2 fuel pools operating simultaneously? If not, why not?

Are all back-up generators planned for Limerick stored on-site? If not, did NRC verify planned back-up generators will actually be available and how long it would take to get them operating on site?

How many times a year are capabilities of generators tested (on and off-site)? There have been many problems with start-up of generators, including a fire at Limerick in 2007.

What is the exact amount of time Limerick can cope with station blackout? Is it still only 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />?

If not, what is the new minimum capability required for each generator at Limerick?

How long will fuel last that is stored on site (using generators for 2 reactors and 2 fuel pools)?

What is the plan if power can't be restored within the required time to restore power?

NRC should require Exelon to comply with the new NRC rule for indefinite back-up power for Limerick Nuclear Plant. Limerick should be required to prepare for the worst case scenario and have indefinite back-up power, enough for both reactors and fuel pools simultaneously to minimize devastating environmental harms.

INADEQUATE FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION TO DETECT LOSS OF WATER TO PREVENT MELTDOWNS.

March, 2012, Older reactors with General Electric Co (GE) design containment structures like Limerick's (similar to those that failed at Fukushima) were ordered by NRC to have sturdier venting systems to prevent damage to reactor cores. NRC rules required Exelon to install new, more reliable instrumentation at Limerick, to measure Limerick's spent fuel cooling pools - no later than within 2 refueling cycles.

Exelon was given 60 days to respond.

Limerick's spent fuel instrumentation may only be capable of monitoring under normal conditions.

Spent fuel pools rely on maintenance of an adequate inventory of water under accident conditions to provide containment to prevent meltdowns, as well as for cooling and shielding Emergency responders need reliable information on water in spent fuel pools to prioritize emergency actions At Fukushima responders were without reliable instrumentation to determine water level in the spent fuel pool This caused concerns that the pool may have boiled dry, resulting in fuel damage. Fukushima demonstrated confusion and misapplication of resources that can result from inadequate instrumentation.

Exelon's response was due by May 12, 2012. Orders were issued by NRC August 30, 2012.

ACE ASKED IF HAS EXELON REPLACED LIMERICK'S FUEL POOL LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION. IF SO, WHEN? IF NOT, WHY NOT? (To Date: NO NRC RESPONSE)

LIMERICK'S PACKED FUEL POOLS ARE VULNERABLE TO EARTHQUAKES Limerick's fuel pools are stories high over the reactors, similar to Fukushima's There is no protective containment such as exists around the reactors Shaking from earthquakes can cause cracking in cement of fuel pools leading to leaks

17 Power and cooling water sources can be disrupted by damage in the miles of underground pipes due to an earthquake Eventually consequences from an earthquake can lead to radiation leaks and meltdowns There is an earthquake fault under the Limerick site, with four others within 17 miles of the site Still, NRC gave Exelon until 2017 to deal with earthquake risks at Limerick To date: NO Responses from NRC to ACE concerns below What exactly will Exelon do to reduce threats of cracking of brittle cement in Limerick's fuel pools?

Given the consequences, whatever can be done should be required immediately. Why would NRC allow Exelon to wait until 2017 to complete a study, when the 8-23-11 Virginia earthquake felt in Limerick's control room shows it is far too risky to wait?

Summary:

Large volumes of Limericks high-level radioactive wastes produced since 1985, are among the most deadly materials on earth and are being stored in fuel pools and casks on the Limerick site. Limerick has become a defacto radioactive waste dump that will remain dangerous virtually forever. (EPA gave storage for high-level radioactive waste a million-year health standard). As long as Limerick operates, tons more of this deadly waste will be produced each year.

Limericks Spent Fuel Pools Are Packed Beyond Design Basis, And Vulnerable Limericks Spent Fuel Pools Are At High Risk From Loss of Cooling Water Through Leaks Due To The Many Valid Threats Identified Release of Radiation From Limerick's Fuel Pools Could Render The Entire Greater Philadelphia Region Uninhabitable For Generations Health and Economic Impacts Of A Fuel Pool Accident or Terrorist Attack Could Be Astronomical NRC's Regulatory Oversight Of Fuel Pools Is Failing To Reduce Risks At Limerick and Elsewhere UNDENIABLE EVIDENCE ABOVE CONFIRMS WHY EXELON SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO IMMEDIATELY START TO BUILD ENOUGH CASKS, IN THE SAFEST WAY POSSIBLE, TO DRY-STORE ALL THE WASTES THAT CAN SAFELY BE REMOVED FROM LIMERICK'S FUEL POOLS UNTIL LIMERICK'S FUEL POOLS CAN BE EMPTIED, EXELON SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO GUARD AGAINST AIR AND MISSILE STRIKES A TERRORIST ATTACK COULD TRIGGER MELTDOWNS IN LIMERICK'S FUEL POOLS, YET VULNERABLE LIMERICK FUEL POOLS ARE NOT PROTECTED FROM TERRORISTS' MISSILES OR AIR STRIKES.

NRC REFUSED TO PROVIDE A RISK ASSESSMENT FOR TERRORISTS ACE REPEATEDLY URGED NRC TO PROVIDE A RISK ASSESMENT FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS ON CASKS.

Limerick has the 2nd most densely populated region in the U.S.

NRC was negligent in failing to provide a risk assessment for terrorist attacks related to above ground storage of high-level radioactive wastes at Limerick Nuclear Plant A Federal Court Ordered NRC To Assess Terrorist Threats In California. A 2006 U.S. Court of Appeals 9th Circuit decision forced NRC to assess the threat of a terrorist attack on above ground storage at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant in California. Similar threats exist at Limerick Nuclear Plant.

ACE Asked NRC To Consider The Same Threats As Were Required At Diablo Canyon:

1)

The threat posed by a land-based vehicle bomb.

2)

A ground assault with the use of an insider

3)

A water-borne assault

4)

A large aircraft impact similar in magnitude to the attacks of September 11, 2001

18 NRC inexplicably claimed an assessment was not necessary at Limerick, dismissing harmful health impacts from radiation exposure and irrationally claiming a significant release of radiation affecting the public is not reasonably expected to occur. Army testing suggests otherwise. NRC also ignored potential for rods overheating and combusting.

Specific Issues Not Included For A Risk Assessment For Limerick's Updated EIS:

1)

Limerick is not guarded against airplane or missile attacks

2)

Nuke waste housing can be penetrated by missiles (proven by army testing)

3)

THREE AIRPORTS are too close to Limerick Nuclear Plant Army testing proves missiles can penetrate casks Pilots take lessons at Limerick Airport, only 1 mile away Helicopters fly into the Limerick Airport from which missiles could be launched

4)

An industrial railroad runs through the nuclear plant site Industrial rail tracks run directly through the nuclear plant property, providing a way for terrorists to enter the site undetected

5)

A large portion of the site is bordered by the Schuylkill River Limerick Nuclear Plant property is bordered by the Schuylkill River (over a long distance), presenting a difficult, if not impossible challenge, for too few guards.

6)

Too few guards have to cover Limerick's 600 acres

7)

Heavily populated region surrounds Limerick Nuclear Plant - Almost 8 Million people within 50 miles WHY THE SAFEST DRY-CASK STORAGE AND MOST STRINGENT REGULATORY OVERSIGHT ARE REQUIRED FOR ON-SITE DRY STORAGE EVIDENCE BELOW SHOWS WHY ON-SITE CASK STORAGE AT LIMERICK NUCLEAR PLANT PRESENTS LONG-TERM ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND PROVIDES COMPELLING EVIDENCE THAT MUST NOT BE IGNORED BY NRC.

CASK ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE CONSIDERED BY NRC :

Casks Are Threatened by Natural Disasters like Earthquakes, Tornadoes, and Floods If air flow vents get clogged from severe weather events and remain clogged for an extended period, rods can overheat and combust Extremely heavy casks were shifted on their base during the North Anna earthquake Corrosion of steel holding Limericks high-level radioactive waste rods is a huge concern. NRC is well aware of Limericks highly corrosive air as a result of chlorine and other corrosives massively released into the air from Limerick cooling towers with 44 million gallons of steam every day.

Corrosion over time may make it impossible to remove rods in the event of a problem with leaking, for transport, or in the event of combustion Containers are expected to last 50 years - wastes stay dangerous over a million years What will happen if corrosion makes it impossible to remove the wastes into new containers every 50 years?

How much of this deadly high-level radioactive waste will be stored in how many of these casks on the Limerick site by 2029? 2049?

Limerick is using new high-burn fuel which impacts the outer covering of the fuel TO AVOID RADIOACTIVE WASTE INTERNAL COMBUSTION AND FIRES INSIDE CASKS, NRC SHOULD STOP ALLOWING LIMERICK NUCLEAR PLANT TO REMOVE WASTES PRIOR TO THE FIVE YEARS IN POOLS CALLED FOR BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF THE CASK SYSTEM.

NRC is allowing risky removal of fuel rods to accommodate Exelon's profits. This is yet another example of NRC lowering safety protections at Limerick Nuclear Plant to accommodate Exelon's profits. Clearly Exelon wants to load casks more quickly to free space and make room for more.

19 Early removal is far too risky. The less cool down time in fuel pools, the thermally hotter and more radioactive the waste - the more risk of internal combustion and an unstoppable radioactive fire.

Even if older rods are wrapped around newer rods that have been cooling in pools less than five years (as we have been told is being done at Limerick), there is no proof that this deviation from the 5-year technical specification requirement will not lead to combustion and fire over time.

Removing Limericks Radioactive Rods Sooner Than The 5-Year Technical Specification Requirement Jeopardizes Workers' Health and Safety.

Since 2006, when Exelon first tried to convince the public that cask storage was safe, NRC and Exelon repeatedly stated 5 years was required to safely remove fuel rods from Limerick's fuel pools.

However, that 's not what is happening at Limerick since 2010. May 6, 2010 - Exelon Employee At A Limerick Open House Said: Older and newer "spent fuel rods" are removed from Limerick's fuel pools at the same time. Older rods are stored outside newer rods in assemblies (sometimes 1-year old).

This could have been going on since 2008. Limerick's Independent Fuel Storage Installation was placed in service starting July 21, 2008.

NRC Deception Speaks Volumes Dry cask technical specifications state: Radiation shielding and thermal heat removal require around 5 YEARS, minimum, cool down time in the pool before transfer to dry casks.

1. Yet, June 16, 2006, NRC in a letter to ACE claimed 1 year storage in the fuel pool at Limerick was sufficient before removal for above ground storage.

2. July 13, 2006 at a meeting in Limerick NRC again clearly stated cool down time before removal from fuel pools was at least 5 years.

3. July 25, 2006 ACE received an e-mail from NRC:

NRC inexplicably said cooling time in the pool is: 1 year or 3 years or 5 years From: James Trapp - NRC Date: 07/25/06 07:04:34 NRCs Pamphlet Proves How Dangerous Nuclear Power Plant High-Level Radioactive Waste Is.

10 years after removal of spent fuel from a reactor:

Radiation dose 1 meter away from a spent fuel assembly exceeds 20,000 Rems Per Hour 5,000 Rems would be expected to cause immediate incapacitation and death within 1 week Information From: NRCs own pamphlet NUREG/BR-0216, Rev.2 May 2002 Removing spent fuel rods from pools to load dry casks far sooner than the 5-year requirement is an extremely dangerous experiment that needs to be stopped at Limerick. While it frees space in pools for new wastes to make more money for Exelon, it presents unacceptable risks to workers and the public.

Consider The Following:

211 Radioactive Poisons found in every 10-yr. old irradiated fuel bundle (Canadian Study)

Polonium 210 - Just 1 of 211 - the type that poisoned Alexander Litvinenko in 2006 is an alpha emitter with the ability to become airborne. 1 Gram could poison 100 million people - Extremely dangerous in milligrams or micrograms.

Biological 1/2 life in humans is 30 to 50 days Targets organs - liver and spleen. Short-term exposure carries long-term risk of death from cancer.

CASK DESIGN FLAWS - A SERIOUS CONCERN OVERLOOKED BY NRC A Nuclear Engineer Warned ACE About Design Flaws In Casks For Storing Limerick's High-Level Radioactive Wastes. ACE Reported The Information To NRC. Sadly, Design Flaws Were Denied Or Ignored.

THE NUCLEAR ENGINEER WHISTLE BLOWER CALLED LIMERICK CASK TECHNOLOGY "OLD AND DOWNRIGHT DANGEROUS"

1.

Cask Design Flaws Cement Blocks, Assembled Together, Are Not The Safest Housing For Enclosing Deadly Nuclear Fuel, Not Even Anchored to the Concrete Floor

20 Industry Workers Claim NUHOMS Concrete Enclosure Falls Apart and Container Is Breeched Under a Boeing Airplane Strike

2.

Corrosion of Steel Can Eventually Cause Nuclear Wastes to Collapse On Their Own Safe Storage Depends on Airflow. Air Around Limerick Is Likely Highly Corrosive. It's Only a Matter of Time Before Invisible and Inaccessible Steel Tubes Turn to Rust.

40 Ton Radioactive Waste Containers, "Filled With The Nastiest Of Manmade Stuff", Are Placed And Rest Unfastened On A Set Of Steel Columns

3.

Wastes May Not Be Able To Be Retrieved Rods Are Being Removed From Pools at Limerick Years Before NRC Regulations First Required. Rods Stored In Casks Too Hot Can Heat Up And Cause Fire.

Containers Are Expected To Last 50 Years, While Wastes Are Deadly Hundreds Of Thousands Of Years This Nuclear Engineer Said Casks May Be A Sitting Duck In Case of a Crashing Aircraft PROVEN CORROSION CONCERNS ARE A RECIPE FOR DISASTER Research validates ACE concerns about corrosion of steel storing deadly wastes at Limerick Nuclear Plant. No one knows how long it will take for nuclear waste storage containers to break down from corrosion and eventually leak - It is only a matter of time. How long will it take for steel to corrode that holds high-level radioactive wastes above ground in our back yard at Limerick Nuclear Plant?

NRC PROVES CORROSION FROM LIMERICKS COOLING TOWERS CORRODES STEEL AND CAUSES CRACKING IN 4 TO 52 WEEKS June 12, 2012 RAI B.2.1.25-1.1 Stress Corrosion Cracking for stainless steel surfaces in an outdoor air environment in auxiliary and steam and power conversion systems.

LIMERICKS NPDES PERMIT SAYS:16,000 TO 58,000 lbs per day of CHLORINE (sodium hypochlorite) are used at Limerick Nuclear plant Exelon told NRC even though CHLORINE is ADDED to COOLING TOWERS AS SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE, there is no concern (for stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel surfaces) because COOLING TOWER PLUME IS DIRECTED AWAY FROM THE PLANT NRC Responses to Exelon:

Studies and industry operating experience in chloride-containing environments have shown that stainless steel exposed to an outdoor air environment can crack at temperatures as low as 104 to 120 degrees F, depending on humidity, component surface temperature, and contaminant concentration and composition Cracking can occur in 4 to 52 weeks NRC cannot conclude recent inspections are sufficient to demonstrate an aging effect will not occur during the period of extended operation A prevailing wind does not result in the absence of contaminant deposition by the cooling tower plume Information has not been provided on the potential for chloride contamination from the onsite soil or nearby agriculture and industrial sources NRC lacks sufficient information to conclude that stress corrosion cracking cannot occur in stainless steel components located in an outdoor air environment.

Corrosion can make it difficult, if not impossible, to move Limericks extremely heavy casks. To date, there is no proof Limericks radioactive fuel rods can be moved safely after years of exposure to corrosive air.

NRCS DENIAL AND NEGLIGENCE COULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO DISASTER RELATED TO LIMERICKS CASKS NRC admits there were fabrication deficiencies in materials used for Limericks canisters and concrete, but refuses to call them flaws, and claims they were corrected, even though that may not be entirely accurate. While the company was fined a nominal amount, in years to come, we could find cask design flaws could lead to a radioactive disaster.

July, 2006 Areva, the company making Limerick casks, received a Notice of Violation, documenting specific problems with casks already in place, yet NRC allowed casks for Limerick to continue to be built by this company November, 2006 in a whistle blower letter it was revealed that there were specific concerns about casks planned to be used at Limerick

21 In an 11/06 letter to ACE, both NRC and Transnuclear (Areva) admitted there would be corrosion and settling of ground beneath 40 ton casks, yet NRC failed to require air testing in the vicinity of casks for corrosives against metals being used for casks REGULATORY NEGLIGENCE: NRC'S 2005 STUDY FOUND PROBLEMS WITH CORROSION RATES OF METALS USED TO STORE NUCLEAR WASTE, YET NRC STOPPED THE RESEARCH INSTEAD OF ADDRESSING THE CORROSIVE STEEL 2006 Testimony to Congress by Public Citizen - Provided evidence of scientific misconduct by NRC and DOE related to corrosion rates of metals used to store nuclear wastes In 2005 NRC found problems with the corrosion rates of metals used to store nuclear waste, yet failed to address the corrosion problems Research identifying corrosion problems was stopped, not the use of steel that would corrode 2006 NRC dismissed important evidence identified by ACE related to corrosion of steel planned to hold Limericks high level radioactive wastes in above ground casks Every day Limerick adds massive amounts of toxic chemicals to cooling tower waters MSDS sheets identify 10 of them to be corrosive, some highly corrosive and some specifically corrosive to steel There is NO FILTRATION to prevent corrosive chemicals from entering the air from cooling tower steam Synergistic combinations of the corrosive additives can result in a serious corrosive threat to people and everything exposed to the drift from the cooling towers (44 million gallons every day), including steel holding deadly radioactive wastes stored inside casks that require cooling with outdoor air Corrosive air enters casks holding high-level radioactive waste rods stored in steel NRC admits corrosion will happen, yet dismissed ACE concerns without site-specific testing of cooling tower emissions for specific and conversion corrosives NRCs dismissive, misleading, and irresponsible conclusions defy logic. They can lead to irreparable disaster in our region EARTHQUAKE THREATS TO CASKS The earthquake in Virginia proved heavy cement casks, each weighing many tons, can be jarred and even moved. Casks at a nuclear plant 12 miles from the epicenter of the August 23, 2011 earthquake in VA were moved by the earthquake.

There is an earthquake fault directly under the Limerick site with two others within 2 miles. Two other earthquake faults are very close to Limerick. One 9 miles away is active. The other is 17 miles away.

After a natural disaster like an earthquake, there is no proof that this deadly waste will be able to be removed safely, especially after corrosion has taken place. None have ever been removed after a long period of time.

What could happen if damaged or overheating fuel rods in casks cannot be removed because of jarring from an earthquake? No one knows. Its like playing Russian Roulette.

Summary Concerns and Questions About Spent Fuel Stored In Above Ground Casks That NRC Should Address Clogged air flow vents from natural disasters like earthquakes, tornadoes, or floods, for an extended period, causing rods to overheat and combust Corrosion of steel holding wastes making it impossible to remove wastes in the event of internal combustion Containers are expected to last only 50 years - while wastes stay dangerous over a million years, leading to radioactive leaks that could cause future devastating harms What guarantee is there that aging, corroded containers can or will be replaced? Who will pay?

How much of this deadly waste will be sitting in our back yard by 2029 when Limerick's current license expires?

Or 2049 if Limerick's license is extended?.

NRC MUST PROVIDE IMPROVED REGULATIONS AND OVERSIGHT FOR DRY STORAGE Limericks dangerous and deadly radioactive wastes will likely remain in our backyard forever, posing serious threats to us and future generations. Containers holding these deadly wastes are estimated to safely contain the waste for only 50 years, when the wastes remain deadly for hundreds of thousands of years.

NRC SHOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO REDUCE RISKS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING CONCERNS:

UNDETECTED CORROSION

22 INABILITY TO REMOVE IN CASE OF FIRE OR NATURAL DISASTER FAULTY CONCRETE LAX NRC OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT EASY TERRORIST TARGET WE CONSIDER IT REGULATORY MALPRACTICE FOR NRC TO EXCLUDE LIMERICK FROM THE OUTCOME OF NRC'S NUCLEAR WASTE STUDY AND NEW RULES Given the extreme dangers and destruction faced by the entire Greater Philadelphia Region from storage of massive amounts of all of Limerick's deadly high-level radioactive wastes in fuel pools and casks on the Limerick site, NRC would be negligent to ignore these unprecedented long-term risks to the environment and dense population in Limerick's Environmental Impact Statement.

Risks at Limerick will continue to grow as Limerick produces 2 tons more of high-level radioactive wastes every year Limerick continues to operate.

Background:

June 8, 2012 - NRC was ordered to re-think the environmental impact of storing radioactive wastes (spent-fuel) at nuclear plants.

THE 2012 COURT DECISION REQUIRED RE-THINKING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF STORING RADIOACTIVE WASTES AT NUCLEAR PLANTS. LIMERICK CANNOT BE EXCLUDED FROM THE OUTCOME OF NRC'S STUDY AND NEW RULES.

NRC's Neil Sheehan said 3-13-13, that NRC's study and new rules are not likely to affect Limerick's Environmental Impact Statement. NRC's Neil Sheehan made the inexplicable and astounding statement in an e-mail to the Mercury March 8, 2013, "There is NO EXPECTATION that Exelon would have to conduct a new review of spent fuel storage at Limerick." Sheehan said, "Limerick nuke plant relicensing unlikely to be affected by new spent fuel rules" (Pottstown Mercury - March 13, 2013).

(Mercury - December 29, 2012 "Limerick nuke plant re-licensing delayed by courts")

NRC wrote, "The Appeals Court ruled that in evaluating risks from on-site storage of spent fuel, NRC should have considered the potential environmental effects in the event a permanent repository for disposing is never built and found other deficiencies with the agencys consideration of leaks and fires involving spent fuel pools.

NRC indicated an intention to respond with a new analysis to be completed within 24 months, including for Limerick NRC intended to develop an environmental impact statement and a revised waste confidence decision and rule on the temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel On Sept. 6, 2012, the NRC announced it would not fight the June 8, 2012 ruling by the U.S. District Court of Appeals, finding that NRC could not ignore the possibility that the federal government may never build a national repository for Americas spent nuclear fuel Other important facts in the article:

In 2006, Exelons Limerick plant already reached its design capacity and beyond, forcing dry storage canisters to be built on-site. Ground was broken in 2007 for a dry cask storage system now storing the plants older, colder spent fuel.

All the fuel ever used at Limerick since it began operating remains on site to this day. It will remain radioactive for thousands of years.

Spent fuel storage should have brought about a two-year relicensing delay by NRC Until the recent challenge in court, NRC took the negligent position that spent fuel was so safe, it was not to be considered in re-licensing, but a court decision overturned NRC's irrational conclusion NRDC petitioned the Atomic Licensing and Safety Board, arguing, among other things, that the reactors should not be re-licensed without a new, site-specific environmental impact review IT IS INDEFENSIBLE FOR NRC TO USE A GENERIC EIS IN NRC'S DRAFT, WHEN THIS NEGLIGENTLY IGNORES THE KINDS OF SITE-SPECIFIC RISKS WE IDENTIFIED ABOVE FOR LIMERICK NUCLEAR PLANT

23 IT IS INDEFENSIBLE FOR NRC TO EXCLUDE LIMERICK FROM NEW RULES AS A RESULT OF NRC'S NUCLEAR WASTE STUDY NRC CANNOT JUSTIFY IGNORING LIMERICK SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS FROM MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES STORED AT LIMERICK EACH YEAR LIMERICK OPERATES MANY TONS MORE OF LIMERICKS DEADLY HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES WILL BE PRODUCED. VOLUMES MORE WILL INCREASE RISK IF LIMERICK IS RELICENSED.

THE OUTCOME OF NRCS COURT-ORDERED HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE STUDY MUST BE INCORPORATED INTO LIMERICKS FINAL EIS, REGARDLESS OF THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED 2 YEARS IS NOT ADEQUATE FOR A VALID RELIABLE RADIOACTIVE WASTE STUDY!

NOTE: NRC'S own technical staff estimated it would take until 2019 for data collection and analysis of impacts of long-term storage of spent fuel. That is 6 years, not 2 years as currently planned in NRC's rushed study.

NOTE: Dr. Makhijani, an independent expert, and others said:

NRC will not be able to gather information within 2 years.

THE BODY OF EVIDENCE ACE PROVIDED IN THESE COMMENTS REVEALS A LONG LIST OF UNANSWERED RADIOACTIVE WASTE QUESTIONS, ISSUES, AND CONCERNS THE CONSEQENCES OF NRC'S REGULATORY NEGLIGENCE CONCERNING HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES COULD HAVE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES TO OUR REGION, OUR NATION, AND THE WORLD A 6-YEAR RADIOACTIVE WASTE STUDY SHOULD BE IMPERATIVE IF IMMEDIATE PRECAUTIONARY ACTIONS RECOMMENDED IN THIS REPORT ARE NOT TAKEN Spent nuclear fuel remains highly dangerous, virtually forever. It contains long-lived radioactive materials that can seriously contaminate the environment and harm public health if released. Plutonium-239 can be used to make nuclear weapons if separated from the other materials in the fuel. Plutonium-239 has a half-life of over 24,000 years.

The NRC should consider alternatives to minimize the risks of storage of spent nuclear fuel and high level waste, including placement below ground level, elimination of the current practice of high-density storage of spent fuel in pools, and more robust designs for storage casks.

The environmental impact statement should assess the radiological risk arising from a range of conventional accidents or attacks, including those conducted by terrorists.

The rushed two-year timeframe for environmental review falls far short of the 2019 estimate of NRCs own technical staff for data collecting and analysis on the impacts of long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel NRC currently lacks sufficient information to reach scientifically, well-founded conclusions about the impacts of such storage NRC also lacks information regarding the impacts associated with the eventual disposal of spent nuclear fuel According to Dr. Makhijani, the NRC will not be able to gather this information within its truncated, self-imposed two-year timeframe

24 The short timeframe provided for environmental review will also not permit post-Fukushima information about U.S. reactors to be fully collected and evaluated Current federal law requires that the NRC conduct a comprehensive environmental impact statement (EIS) study before issuing a revised Waste Confidence Decision ACE concurs with the 24 groups that on January 3, 2013, requested a full review of the three issues outlined in June 2012 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that would take at least seven years. This was originally projected by the NRC staff, and likely considerably longer.

1. long-term storage risks for spent nuclear fuel

2. spent fuel pool fire risks

3. spent fuel pool leakage risks ACE agrees that:

1. NRC is unnecessarily rushing the Nuclear "Waste Confidence" process and NOT satisfying court-ordered requirements

2. NRC's incomplete process should trigger continued suspension of all reactor licensing and re-licensing In

Conclusion:

The only real solution to the problem of lethally radioactive waste that remains a hazard for more than a million years is to stop generating more.

NRC must stop allowing nuclear plants to produce deadly radioactive wastes for which there is no safe solution.

The only solution to the high-level radioactive waste (HLRW) problem is to not generate irradiated nuclear fuel in the first place Nuclear power can be completely phased out of the U.S. economy by 2040, and replaced by efficiency and renewables, without any further technological breakthroughs required, and for the same percentage of our Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as we currently spend on dirty, dangerous, and expensive fossil fuels and nuclear power For nuclear wastes that already exist, NRC must require Hardened On-Site Storage (HOSS).

ACE joined many other groups across the nation, endorsing the Statement of Principles for Safeguarding Nuclear Waste at Reactors. Densely-packed, vulnerable HLRW storage pools, at risk of catastrophic fires and radioactivity releases, should be emptied into on-site dry cask storage that is "hardened": designed and built well, safeguarded against accidents, fortified against attacks, and protected against leakage into the environment.

This should be expedited as a national security top priority In locations where hardened safe storage (HOSS) is not safe (places vulnerable to flooding, for example),

hardened dry cask storage should be done as close to the wastes' point of generation as possible, as safely as possible HOSS must be monitored and retrievable HOSS cannot be a permanent measure on the sea coasts and fresh water sources (rivers, lakes, reservoirs) of our country, due to rising sea levels and risk of leakage into our vital drinking water supplies

25 NRC's assumption that "indefinite storage" at reactor sites can go on literally forever, without a loss of institutional control, is absurd.

Dr. Makhijani of IEER, has pointed out, one of the oldest continuous human institutions in the world, the Catholic Church, is only 2,000 years old. Plutonium-239, for one, will remain hazardous for at least 240,000 years.

NRC "indefinite storage" scenario is delusional.

It assumes dry cask storage -- cask pads, inner canisters, and the dry casks themselves -- will be replaced once every 100 years, forevermore into the future NRC assumes that Dry Transfer Systems will be built (and also replaced every 100 years), since pools will have been dismantled during decommissioning, by at most 60 years after permanent reactor shutdown But NRC has not dealt with the very real risk that the irradiated nuclear fuel will so degrade with age that such transfer operations cannot be carried out safely or smoothly This is especially a risk with "high burn-up fuel," that has spent more time in an operating reactor core, and is thus significantly more radioactive and thermally hot NRC has also not provided the price tag for such future transfer and replacement operations NRC's "centralized interim storage" proposal is a despicable Environmental Injustice to any community victimized with massive lethal waste storage.

NRC claims in its GEIS to observe Environmental Justice (EJ) principles, and yet this plan is a blatant violation of EJ.

NRC downplays risks of pool fires by erroneously assuming that surrounding populations will be successfully evacuated.

Densely populated regions near nuclear plants like Limerick, clearly cannot be evacuated safely For example: NRC knew before Limerick construction was completed that within 30 miles Limerick had over double the population density than could be evacuated safety. Now there are four times as many people. In 2011, PA Safety Officials informed NRC that the Infrastructure could not support safe evacuation.

Nuclear utilities are allowed to store HLRW in pools for many decades after reactors permanently shut down, in order to defer the costs of dry cask storage as far off into the future as possible, despite the inherent risks At the same time, NRC allows utilities, via exemptions from regulations, to do away with 10-mile radius emergency planning zones (EPZs) within as soon as 12 to 18 months post-reactor shutdown. This, despite the lingering risk of storing HLRW in pools at such shutdown reactor sites.

How can populations be evacuated, if EPZs have been dismantled?!

NRC also downplays risks of fuel pool fires by inaccurately assuming that a drain down accident (or attack) involves the complete drain down of the fuel pool.

Dr. Gordon Thompson, Institute for Resource and Security Studies (IRSS) pointed out, any technically competent person should have known since 1979 that a partial drain down of the pool is actually a worse-case scenario, for the leftover water in the bottom of the pool would block convection current air flow which would help cool the irradiated nuclear fuel, leading to faster heat up to the ignition point

26 NRC ignores dangerous, deadly, and costly transportation risks including:

- Loading and Unloading

- Extraordinary health, environmental, and financial risks on-site and along the route

- Train and truck accidents are of major concern, especially for fire from fuel Reprocessing is not a solution. It has been an abysmal costly failure, creating larger radioactive waste streams and pollution.

Reprocessing is extremely polluting, risky, and costly to taxpayers Increases Volume of Radioactive Waste Expensive for Taxpayers/Ratepayers A BODY OF EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THERE IS NO SAFE SOLUTION. THE ONLY LOGICAL THING TO DO IS STOP MAKING RADIOACTIVE WASTE AT LIMERICK AND OTHER NUCLEAR PLANTS.

WE ASK NRC TO DO A SITE-SPECIFIC NUCLEAR WASTE STUDY FOR LIMERICK'S HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE, PRIOR TO NRC'S COMPLETION OF THE COURT-ORDERED NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE STUDY We request that NRC post ACE written comments on its website, under Nuclear Waste Storage Comments Docket ID No. NRC-2012-0245 and Inform ACE by E-mail Of Where To Find Our Comments At Adams.