ML13330B190

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Clarifies 870331 Response to RA Scarano 870128 Concerns Re Containment Working Conditions & Access/Egress Using Airlock (Allegation RV-86-A-0103),per RA Scarano 870408 Request
ML13330B190
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 04/10/1987
From: Baskin K
Southern California Edison Co
To:
NRC/IRM
References
NUDOCS 8704140347
Download: ML13330B190 (2)


Text

Southern California Edison Company P. 0.

BOX 800 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770 KENNETH P. BASKIN TELEPHONE VICE PRESIDENT April 10, 1987 818-302-1401 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

Docket No. 50-206 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1

References:

A.

Letter, R. A. Scarano (NRC) to Kenneth P. Baskin (SCE),

Allegation No. RV-86-A-0103, dated January 28, 1987 B.

Letter, Kenneth P. Baskin (SCE) to NRC Document Control Desk, dated March 31, 1987 The enclosure to Reference A provided a statement of concerns relating to the Unit 1 containment working conditions and access/egress using the airlock, and requested that SCE investigate these concerns. The enclosure to Reference B provided the results of the SCE investigation in response to this request.

In the process of closing the SCE Nuclear Safety Concern No.87-006, which was opened by the SCE Quality Assurance Department to track this item, it was noted that several statements in Reference B could be misinterpreted. In order to ensure a comprehensive and unambiguous response to Reference A, the following additional information is presented.

With regard to Reference B, item l.a, associated with personnel awareness of containment temperature prior to containment entries at Mode 3 or higher, the containment temperature is continuously monitored by instrumentation which reads out in the Control Room. Furthermore, significant experience over many years of operation and performing at-power entries, have enabled Health Physics, Operations and Maintenance to anticipate generally expected conditions. Therefore, it is common practice for temperature to be assessed or surveyed through such measures as verification from the Control Room readout, temperature measurements in containment, prior experience, or by interviews with personnel making entries. For maintenance activities, the Maintenance Division ensures that temperature considerations are accounted for (as appropriate) in the tailboard briefings that take place prior to containment entry.

8704140347-870410 PDR ADOCK 05000206 P

PDR

-2 With regard to Reference B, item l.h, associated with the periodic training classes on heat stress, approximately 266 personnel have been trained. The classes have been attended by Telecommunications personnel, Material and Administrative Support personnel, and Maintenance personnel; however, Maintenance personnel have been the principal attendees, primarily because they perform most of the strenuous activities in containment. Supervisors select personnel from their organization to attend these classes based upon their evaluation of the need for such training. Not all personnel who work in containment require or receive this training. Furthermore, additional training in the form of a special briefing was conducted at the March 18, 1987 Unit 1 Outage Planning meeting by Station Safety Division personnel, which included handouts of the heat stress "guidelines."

This briefing was conducted to sensitize personnel involved in scheduling outage activities to the problems associated with working in a harsh environment.

With regard to Reference B, item 3, associated with the containment telephone system, eight telephones are located inside containment as follows - near-the Personnel Hatch [Operating Deck], "B" doghouse wall [Operating Deck], near RCP "A" [14 ft level], near RCP "C" [14 ft level], near the RHR pumps [-10 ft level], near the Letdown Heat Exchanger [-10 ft level], inside the "B" doghouse wall [54 ft level], and inside the Personnel Hatch itself. One telephone instrument is located on the outside of containment near the Personnel Hatch.

The Security Officer at the Personnel Hatch is in radio contact with the Security Officer at the Escape Hatch. On November 24, 1986, SCE initiated action to install an additional telephone outside containment near the Escape Hatch.

As discussed with Mr. Scarano on April 8, 1987, we hope this additional detail will be useful in completion of your assessment of the issue. Should you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely, cc:

Mr. J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, USNRC Region V)

Mr. R. A. Scarano (Director, RS&S, USNRC Region V)

Mr. F. R. Huey (Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC)