ML13312A719
| ML13312A719 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1993 |
| From: | Wong H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13312A718 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-93-30, 50-361-93-30, 50-362-93-30, NUDOCS 9310260049 | |
| Download: ML13312A719 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000206/1993030
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-206/93-30, 50-361/93-30, 50-362/93-30
Docket Nos.
50-206, 50-361, 50-362
License Nos.
Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company
Irvine Operations Center
23 Parker Street
Irvine, California 92718
Facility Name:
San Onofre Units 1, 2 and 3
Inspection At:
San Onofre, San Clemente, California
Inspection Conducted:
August 31 through September 24, 1993
Inspectors:
F. R. Huey, Enforcement Officer
Approved By:
c1-J
_
i
____
H. J. Wong, Chief
Date Signed
Reactor Projects Sect nII
Inspection Summary:
Inspection at San Onofre on August 31 through September 2. 1993: and in-office
review of licensee provided materials through September 24, 1993 (Report Nos.
50-206, 361, 362/93-30)
Areas Inspected: A special, unannounced inspection of the circumstances
associated with licensee-identified discrimination against a contract
maintenance employee.
Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) Items:
None
Results, General Conclusions and Specific Findings:
The inspector determined that the licensee apparently violated the
discrimination prohibitions of 10 CFR 50.7, "Employee Protection," in that on
two occasions, in October 1991 and February 1992, contractor personnel
employed at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station were either denied
employment or threatened with adverse job action as a result of their having
participated in activities protected by 10 CFR 50.7.
Significant Safety Matters and Summary of Apparent Violations:
The two examples of discrimination against contractor personnel employed at
San Onofre are apparent violations of 10 CFR 50.7.
9310260049 931001
PDR ADOCK 05000206
G
1.
Persons Contacted
DETAILS
Southern California Edison Company
R. Krieger, Vice President and Site Manager
B. Katz, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
W. Frick, Nuclear Safety Concerns Program (NSC) Supervisor
S. Brown, NSC Coordinator
W. Marsh, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- R. Rosenblum, Vice President, Engineering and Technical Services
- G. Gibson, Supervisor, Onsite Nuclear Licensing
- Denotes those participatingin exit discussion on September 27, 1993.
The inspector also contacted other licensee employees during the course
of the inspection.
2.
Review of Discrimination Concerns
a.
Background
On August 5, 1992,
NRC Region V requested Southern California
Edison Company (SCE)
to respond to concerns identified by a
Bechtel millwright that he had been discriminated against for
raising safety concerns while working at San Onofre, and that he
was being "blackballed." In particular, the Bechtel millwright
claimed that, on February 4, 1992,
he had expressed several
concerns involving problems with a Unit 3 condensate pump work
order (MO 91061928000), and on February 5, 1992, he was threatened
with adverse job action by his general foreman because he had
raised his concerns with Bechtel management. The specific
concerns involved inadequacies in the work order, improperly
torqued bolts, and performance of work without proper paperwork.
On September 3, 1992, SCE responded to the NRC request, indicating
that:
(1) SCE was aware of the alleged discrimination as a result of
the Bechtel millwright having utilized the licensee's
Nuclear Safety Concerns (NSC) program on February 7, 1992.
(2) SCE had investigated the concern and had concluded that the
Bechtel millwright had been threatened with adverse job
action by a Bechtel general foreman in violation of SCE
policy.
(3) SCE sent a letter to Bechtel management on March 23, 1992,
notifying it of the violation, emphasizing the seriousness
of employee discrimination, and requesting prompt Bechtel
corrective action. SCE noted that the involved Bechtel
general foreman had been counseled about his improper
actions and had been transferred from San Onofre.
(4) SCE took action with Bechtel to ensure that the Bechtel
millwright was not "blackballed," and was eligible for
rehire whenever contract millwrights were again required at
San Onofre.
On August 11, 1993, the NRC Region V Office of Investigations
Field Office completed their review of this discrimination concern
and confirmed the SCE conclusion that the Bechtel millwright had
not been "blackballed."
b.
NRC Review of the Bechtel Millwright NSC File
The NRC inspector reviewed the NSC file associated with the
Bechtel millwright's discrimination concern (NSC File 92-002) and
identified that:
(1) Although specifically involved in work on a non safety
related condensate pump at the time the discrimination took
place, the Bechtel millwright was engaged in protected
activity, as defined by 10 CFR 50.7, in that he raised a
safety concern involving a condensate pump which, if true,
would have led to improper maintenance on a component whose
failure could challenge safety-related systems.
(2) In response to the safety concern, a Bechtel general foreman
threatened adverse job action (i.e. the millwright was told
that he would not be rehired for work at San Onofre if he
continued to talk to Bechtel management about job problems),
in apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.7. Although the Bechtel
general foreman appears to have been primarily upset that
the millwright had not used the chain of command and had not
given his immediate supervision an opportunity to resolve
his concern before talking to senior management, his
statements were discriminatory and had a chilling effect on
the involved employee.
(3) Prior to this incident, SCE had provided training to the
Bechtel general foreman on prohibitions against
discrimination. Specifically, he viewed a film by the SCE
Chairman discussing the NSC program in January 1986, and he
received refresher training in January 1992. However, as
evidenced by the discrimination by the Bechtel general
foreman, it appears that neither SCE nor Bechtel had
adequately trained the foreman to properly recognize the
discriminatory nature of his actions. For example, although
the Howard Allen safety film viewed by the Bechtel foreman
during his initial site training provided a clear message
that all employees have a right to bring safety concerns to
higher level management without fear of retribution, the
film was only viewed once in January 1986.
Periodic
2
refresher training did not reemphasize this message, nor did
periodic training provide emphasis on how supervisors should
be able to recognize and avoid different forms of
discrimination, using case basis examples that directly
relate to the supervisor's area of responsibility.
Prior
to this NRC inspection, SCE had recognized this problem and
had initiated actions to retrain all contractor supervisors
working at San Onofre, providing them with specific case
examples of how supervisors could avoid unintentional
discrimination. SCE is also considering revision to
contract documents to more clearly define SCE expectations
and requirements associated with discrimination.
C.
NRC Review of Inter-Con Security Services Employee NSC File
The inspector reviewed the 38-NSC files opened by SCE since
January 1991, and noted one additional instance of discrimination
against contractor personnel employed at San Onofre (NSC File 91
019). Specifically, on October 21, 1991, an Inter-Con Security
Services manager terminated the employment of a contract security
employee after he raised concerns about the appropriateness, and
the radiological and environmental safety of his post assignment
within the Unit 1 containment airlock. The inspector review of
this file identified that:
(1) SCE determined, and NRC agrees, that the contract security
employee was involved in protected activity, as defined by
SCE also determined that the employee was
wrongfully terminated by the contractor manager, after he
raised a safety concern. In particular, on October 21,
1991, the contract security employee objected to his
assignment inside the Unit 1 containment airlock, in support
of outage related maintenance activities. He noted that
security personnel had not previously been required to
remain inside the airlock, and he raised concerns about his
radiological and environmental safety during extended
periods inside of the airlock. In response to the
employee's continuing questioning of the appropriateness of
his assignment within the airlock, the Inter-Con manager
became upset and fired the employee on the spot.
The SCE
investigation concluded that the Inter-Con manager appeared
to have made no attempt to obtain the assistance of other
personnel, such as HP technicians or safety engineers, to
answer the employee's concerns. While it appears that the
Inter-Con manager, at least in part, had been upset that the
employee had begun a habit of being absent from work when he
was assigned to an undesirable post, nevertheless, SCE
concluded, and NRC agrees, that the manager's actions were
discriminatory and had a chilling effect on the involved
employee.
(2) Prior to November 22, 1991, SCE notified Inter-Con of the
violation, emphasizing the seriousness of employee
discrimination and requesting prompt corrective action,
including reinstatement of the involved contract security
employee. The employee was reinstated and the involved
Inter-Con manager was counseled about his improper actions.
(3) SCE did not have specific training records for the Inter-Con
manager available during the inspection. However, as noted
in paragraph 2.b.(3) above, for the case of the Bechtel
foreman, it appears that SCE had not adequately trained the
Inter-Con manager to properly recognize the discriminatory
nature of his actions. As also discussed in paragraph
2.b.(3),.SCE is taking action to correct this deficiency.
d.
Inspection Conclusions
The inspector concluded that the two examples of discrimination by
contractor supervisors involved an apparent violation of 10 CFR
50.7 (50-361/93-30-01).
3.
Exit Discussion
On September 27, 1993, an exit discussion was held with the licensee
representatives identified in Paragraph 1. The inspectors summarized
the inspection scope and findings as described in the Results section of
this report.
4