ML13308B492
| ML13308B492 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre |
| Issue date: | 08/25/1976 |
| From: | Fogarty D SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103060544 | |
| Download: ML13308B492 (7) | |
Text
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egufato~y C
Southern California Edison.Qompany P. O; BOX 800 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVEN DAVID J. FOGARTY ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 917 VsC PRESIDENT August 25, 1976 0.-13tc U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V Office of Inspection and Enforcement Walnut Creek Plaza, Suite 202 1990 North California Boulevard Walnut Creek, California 94596 Docket 50-206 Attention: R. H. Engelken, Director
Dear Sir:
This letter describes a reportable occurrence concerning the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Chemical and Volume Control System.
Submittal is in accordance with the reporting requirement stipulated in Section 6.9.2.b(2) of the Technical Specifications.
Following a normal shutdown on Friday, July 30, 1976 to repair a steam generator tube leak, at approximately 9:00,a.m. on July 31 a blockage was discovered in the boric acid transfer pump discharge line between the boric acid transfer pumps and the charging pump suction header. Corrective action was initiated, the blockage was removed and the line was returned to service on August 1, 1976.
The blockage occurred at a point where the transfer pump discharge line penetrates the concrete roof of the auxiliary building. The roof at this point is approximately three feet thick. An investigation disclosed that this three foot section of line is not heat traced or insulated and is susceptible to precipitation of the boric acid solution. This condition was aggravated by the fact that an isolation valve (CV-334) was leaking and permitted a relatively high concentration of boric acid (12%) from the boric acid storage tank to remain in the transfer pump discharge line.
During the course of this condition the applicable technical specifi cation requirements were met, as two other boric acid injection lines were available for use if required.
-2 To prevent a recurrence of this situation, heat tracing and insulation will be installed on the portion of the transfer pump discharge line pene trating the auxiliary building roof and CV-334 will be repaired. All work will be completed no later than the forthcoming refueling outage. As an interim measure the transfer pump discharge line will be flushed weekly until the above modifications are completed.
Sincerely,
Attachment:
Licensee Event Report cc:
Director, NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Director, NRC Office of Management Information and Program Control
4 xeglatory Southern California Edison Company R. O. BOX 800 SEP 131976 10 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE DAVID J. FOGARTY ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770 August 25 fr
-t SEP~
IY 3197 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission itke Region V Office of Inspection and Enforcement Walnut Creek Plaza, Suite 202 1990 North California Boulevard Walnut Creek,' California 94596 Docket 50-206 Attention: R. H. Engelken, Director
Dear Sir:
This.letter describes a reportable occurrence concerning the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Chemical and Volume Control System.
Submittal is in accordance with the reporting requirement stipulated in Section 6.9.2.b(2) of the Technical Specifications.
Following a normal shutdown on Friday, July 30, 1976 to repair a steam generator tube leak, at approximately 9:00 a.m. on July 31 a blockage was discovered in the boric acid transfer pump discharge line between the boric acid transfer pumps and the charging pump suction header. Corrective action was initiated, the blockage was removed and the line was returned to service on August 1, 1976.
The blockage occurred at a point where the transfer pump discharge line penetrates the concrete roof of the auxiliary building. The roof at this point is approximately three feet thick. An investigation disclosed that this three foot section of line is not heat traced or insulated and is susceptible to precipitation of the boric acid solution. This condition was aggravated by the fact that an isolation valve (CV-334) was leaking and permitted a relatively high concentration of boric acid (12%) from the boric acid storage tank to remain in the transfer pump discharge line.
During the course of this condition the applicable technical specifi cation requirements were met, as two other boric acid. injection lines were available for use if required.
9340 Y/0 30 (0c t/4
-2 To prevent a recurrence of this situation, heat tracing and insulation will be installed on the portion of the transfer pump discharge line pene trating the auxiliary building roof and CV-334 will be repaired. All work will be completed no later than the forthcoming refueling outage. As an interim measure the transfer pump discharge line will be flushed weekly until the above modifications are completed.
Sincerely,
Attachment:
Licensee Event Report cc:
Director, NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Director, NRC Office of Management Information and Program Control
Southern Californiar Edison Company P. O.'BOX 800 2244 WALNUTGROVE AVENUE DAVID J. FOGARTY ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770 TELEPHCNE
-~C.
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-213-572-2796 August 25, 1976 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission K.
Region V Office of Inspection and Enforcement AR REGU6 Walnut Creek Plaza, Suite 202 I
64k 1990 North California Boulevard
'P Walnut Creek, California 94596 Dokt50-206 Attention: R. H. Engelken, Director
Dear Sir:
This letter describes a reportable occurrence concerning the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Chemical and Volume Control System.
Submittal is in accordance with the reporting requirement stipulated in Section 6.9.2.b(2) of the Technical Specifications.
Following a normal shutdown on Friday, July 30, 1976 to repair a steam generator tube leak, at approximately 9:00 a.m. on July 31 a blockage was discovered in the boric acid transfer pump discharge line between the boric acid transfer pumps and the charging pump suction header. Corrective action was initiated, the blockage was removed and the line was returned to service on August 1, 1976.
The blockage occurred at a point where"the transfer pump discharge line penetrates the concrete roof of the auxiliary building.
The roof at this point is approximately three feet thick.
An investigation disclosed that this three foot section of line is not heat traced or insulated and is susceptible to precipitation of the boric acid solution.
This condition was aggravated by the fact that an isolation valve (CV-334) was leaking and permitted a relatively high concentration of boric acid (12%) from the boric acid storage tank to remain in the transfer pump discharge line.
During the course of this condition the applicable technical specifi cation requirements were met, as two other boric acid injection lines were available for use if required.
8782
-2 To prevent a recurrence of this situation, heat tracing and insulation will be installed on the portion of the transfer pump discharge line pene trating the auxiliary building roof and CV-334 will be repaired. All work will be completed no later than the forthcoming refueling outage. As an interim measure the transfer pump discharge line will be flushed weekly until the above modifications are completed.
Sincerely,
Attachment:
Licensee Event Report cc: Director, NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Director, NRC Office of Management Information and Program Control
ICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK:
(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1 6
LICENSEE LICENSE EVENT NAME LICENSE NUMBER TYPE TYPE I0Lc.IAJI.
(T1L01s TI 1o 10 [0-1 0 01 01 010 1-1 1o0 1411 111 1 1 013 7
8 9 14 15 25 26 30 31 32 REPORT REPORT CATEGORY TYPE SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE 01coN'T [1J L0 [L I
015-1 6 1-1 0 121 0 16 101713111716 0 18 2I 1
27 6 7
6 57 58 59 60 61 68 69 74 75 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION Following a normal shutdown, a blockage was discovered in the boric acid transfer 7
8 9 80 03 I pump discharge line. The blockage, crystalized boric acid solution, was cleared.
7 8 9 80 04 I This event is nonrepetitive. Redundant systems meeting Technical Specification 7
8 9 80 requirements were operable (75-20).
7 8 9 80 08 I I
7 8 9 PRIME 80 SYSTEM CAUSE COMPONENT COMPONENT CODE CODE COMPONENT CODE SUPPUER MANUFACTURER VIOLATION 07 [l.. CH IHI El Al TjE IRI I J I WI 11 2101 L
7 8 9 10 11 12 17 43 44 47 48 CAUSE DESCRIPTION Blockage occurred because the three foot section of pipeline penetrating the concrete I 7
8 9 80 09 Iroof of the Auxiliary Building is not heat traced or insulated and is susceptable to 7
8 9 80 1M I precipitation of boric acid solution. Leakage of concentrated boric acid past the 7
8 9 80 FACILITY METHOD OF STATUS
% POWER OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 1 Lij L010 10 1 1 NA Lj I Attempted operation 7 8 9
10 12 13 44 45 46 80 FORM OF ACTIVITY COI TENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE 12
[J
[zJ NAI NA 7 8 9
10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION.
1 l0 0 l z
0 I
NA 7
8 9 11 12 13 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 10 lolol l NA 7
89 11 12 80 OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES NA 7
89 80 LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION E
1Z NA 1
7 8 9 10 80 PUBLICITY Event released to standard publicity list.
7 89 80 ADDITIONAL FACTORS Cause description - continued 1q 8
storage tank isolation valve CV-334 aggravated this condition. Heat tracing and 7
8 9 80 19 [ insulation will be added next s heduled refueling.
7 89 80 NAME:
H. L. Ottoson PHONE: 714-492-7700 GPO 881.667