ML13308A400
| ML13308A400 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/2013 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | NextEra Energy Duane Arnold |
| Randal Baker | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML11354A409 | List: |
| References | |
| ES-301, ES-301-1 | |
| Download: ML13308A400 (18) | |
Text
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Page 1 of 2 Facility: __________DAEC NRC___________________ Date of Examination: 4/13_____
Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: ___1______
Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*
Conduct of Operations R, D COO1: PERFORM REACTOR COOLANT LEAKAGE CALCULATIONS PER STP 3.0.0-01 The candidate will be provided Drywell sump readings following sump pump downs. The candidate will then be directed to perform drywell leakage calculations per STP 3.0.0.01. The candidate is then expected to determine that the unidentified leakage rate is outside the limits of the STP and refer to OI 920, Drywell Sump System.
K/A Generic 2.1.7, Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
IMPORTANCE: 4.4 / 4.7 Conduct of Operations S, D,M COO2: Perform Control Rod Exercise Test Prerequisites Surveillance Test Procedure STP 3.1.3-01 WK1, Control Rod Exercise is scheduled to be performed.
The candidate will verify that perquisites are met for performing the surveillance. One thermal limit will not meet the requirements of the procedure.
K/A Generic 2.1.19 Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status.
IMPORTANCE: 3.9/3.8 DAEC NRC RO Admin Outline 01-11-13.doc
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Page 2 of 2 Equipment Control R, N EC01: Using mechanical drawings determine the isolation boundaries for leak on the Core Spray system.
The candidate will be provided a report from the A Core Spray pump room that V-21-0007, Core Spray Pump Discharge Check Valve, is leaking into the room.
Using station P &IDs the candidate will determine the valves that must be closed to isolate the leak on V 0007.
K/A Generic 2.2.4, Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings.
IMPORTANCE: 3.4 / 4.7 Radiation Control R, D RC01: Inspection of High Radiation Areas And Determine Personnel Entry Requirements The candidate will be informed that entry into the Skimmer Surge Tank Room Basement is required to close and hang a clearance on the A Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Vent Valve. A survey map will be provided and the candidate will be directed to address the radiological aspects of performing the job.
K/A Generic 2.3.12, Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc IMPORTANCE: 3.2 Emergency Procedures/Plan N/A Not used NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)
DAEC NRC RO Admin Outline 01-11-13.doc
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Page 1 of 3 Facility: __________DAEC NRC___________________ Date of Examination: 4/13____
Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: ___1______
Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*
Conduct of Operations R, D COO1: Review STP 3.4.2-01, Daily Jet Pump Operability Test The candidate will be required to review a completed Jet Pump Operability Surveillance. The candidate is expected to determine that the performer made two errors in evaluating plant data and that two LCOs have been exceeded resulting in two inoperable Jet Pumps.
The required Tech Spec actions will be determined.
K/A Generic 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
IMPORTANCE: 4.4 / 4.7 Conduct of Operations D, S COO2: Determine Risk and the Resultant Protected Systems for Removing a Safety Related Piece of Equipment from Service.
The candidate will be informed that STP NS13C012, SBGT Charcoal Bed Deluge System Functional Test is scheduled to be performed. The candidate will determine impact on SBGT operability, any associated change in risk or core damage frequency, and if any equipment should be guarded IAW OP-AA-102-1003, Guarded Equipment.
K/A Generic 2.1.2, Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation.
IMPORTANCE: 4.1 / 4.4 Generic 2.1.13, Knowledge of facility requirements for controlling vital/controlled access.
IMPORTANCE: 2.5 / 3.2
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Page 2 of 3 Equipment Control S, N EC01: Determine Tech Spec Implications for an Inoperable System Valve The candidate will determine the Tech Spec implications of the breaker for RHR Valve MO-1933, Inboard Torus Spray, tripping while the valve is being stroked for operability testing. Three separate LCOs are expected to be identified: inoperable Torus Spray subsystem, inoperable containment isolation valve, and inoperable position indication for a containment isolation valve. The candidate will also be expected to initiate required LCO paperwork.
K/A: Generic 2.2.22, Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
IMPORTANCE RO 4.0 SRO 4.7 Radiation Control R, M RC01 Determine Personnel Eligibility to Perform Rad Area Task The candidate will be provided information regarding a task to be performed in a high radiation area and a list of five operators available to perform the task. The candidate will calculate the dose that will be received and select the operators eligible to perform the task.
The candidate is also expected to determine whether an increase in the DAEC Administrative Dose Limit is required and to initiate the required authorization form IAW ACP 1411.17, OCCUPATIONAL DOSE LIMITS AND UPGRADES.
K/A Generic 2.3.4, Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.
IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 3.7 NOTES: A somewhat similar JPM was used on the 2011 as the SRO RC JPM. This JPM is different in that the task conditions are significantly different. Also in this JPM the SRO has to evaluate 3 different operators and make a decision as to which operators are eligible to perform the task. Finally, the evaluation required has been significantly expanded in that the background information provided now includes skin and lens exposure and also the last 5 years of dose for each operator.
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Page 3 of 3 Emergency Procedures/Plan S, M EP01: Classify an Event and Implement the Emergency Plan as Required The candidate will be given a set of conditions and directed to classify the event and perform the necessary control room actions IAW the Emergency Plan. Actions will include developing the initial notification form, activating the ERO pagers and evacuating the site of all non essential personnel.
K/A Generic 2.4.38, Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator if required.
IMPORTANCE: 2.4/4.4 NOTES: A somewhat similar JPM was run during the 2011 NRC exam in that it also required a classification and later, a reclassification. However the initial conditions of this JPM are different and require that a different EAL be declared.
Also this JPM goes beyond the initial classification to subsequent actions in the Emergency Plan.
NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 1 of 5 Facility: ___________DAEC NRC__________________ Date of Examination: __4/13______
Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: ______1_______
Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S-1: START A RECIRC MG SET AND RECIRC PUMP A, M, S 1 - Reactivity Control The candidate will be required to start an idle Recirc Pump while the plant is operating at power IAW OI 264 REACTOR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM. Following the pump start, the discharge valve will fail to open. The candidate is expected to diagnose the failure and trip the MG set IAW Precaution 17 of OI 264 which states that pump shall not be operated with pump discharge valve closed, except when starting up or shutting down the pump.
K/A 202001 Recirculation System A4.02, Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: System valves IMPORTANCE: 3.5 /3.4 Notes: A Recirc Pump Start JPM was conducted for the 2009 NRC exam. However that JPM was with the reactor shutdown and was not an alternative path.
Additionally there is one alternative path, Recirc Pump start JPM in the DAEC bank (JPM 202001-08). This JPM involves a failure of the Recirc MG set field breaker to close following the start of the MG set. This bank JPM was modified so that the field breaker closes but the Recirc Pump discharge valve fails to open.
S-2: LPCI Initiation While in Shutdown Cooling. EN, D, L, S 2- Reactor Water Inventory The plant was in cold shutdown with the B loop of RHR in SDC Control when a LOCA resulted in a LPCI initiation signal. Due to the Group 4 Isolation signal and the SDC configuration, RHR will not automatically inject. No other source of injection will be available.
The candidate will be directed to manually inject with RHR IAW OI 149, Section 5.2, LPCI Initiation While in Shutdown Cooling.
K/A SYSTEM: 203000 RHR/LPCI: Injection Mode A4.02, Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: System Valves IMPORTANCE: 4.1 /4.1 DAEC NRC RO INPLANT-SIMULATOR JPMS OUTLINE, REV 01-25-13.DOC
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 2 of 5 S-3: Manual Arming of LLS A, N, S, L 3 - Reactor Pressure Following a reactor scram and MSIV Isolation, the candidate will be Control directed to manually arm the LLS relief valves OI 183.1 QRC1, Manual Arming of LLS. When proper operation of the LLS valves is verified the candidate is expected to determine that LLS is not functioning properly and then disarm LLS.
K/A SYSTEM: 239002 Relief/Safety Valves A1.04, Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the RELIEF/SAFETY VALVES controls including: Reactor pressure IMPORTANCE: 3.8 / 3.8 S-4: HPCI PUMP DISCHARGE TRANSFER FROM THE CST to EN, L, D, S 4 - Heat THE REACTOR VESSEL Removal from the Reactor HPCI will be initially aligned for pressure control. The candidate will Core be directed to realign HPCI and inject into the vessel IAW section 9.2 of OI 152, HPCI System.
K/A SYSTEM: 206000 High Pressure Coolant Injection System A4.04, Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Major System Valves.
IMPORTANCE 4.4 /4.4 S-5: AIR PURGE COOLING OF THE DRYWELL N, S, L 5-Containment Following a loss of Well Water, the candidate will be directed to Integrity perform Air Purge Cooling of the Drywell IAW AOP 408, Well Water System Abnormal Operation, Attachment 1. The candidate will be required to reset a Group 3 isolation signal in order to perform the lineup.
K/A SYSTEM: 223001 Primary Containment System and Auxiliaries.
A2.10, Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SYSTEM AND AUXILIARIES ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: High drywell temperature.
IMPORTANCE: 3.6 / 3.8 DAEC NRC RO INPLANT-SIMULATOR JPMS OUTLINE, REV 01-25-13.DOC
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 3 of 5 S-6: B STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY TEST N, A, S, EN 6 - Electrical The candidate will be directed to continue the already in progress STP 3.8.1-05B B STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY TEST.
The candidate will parallel the diesel to bus 1A4 and raise load as directed by the STP. Alarm 1C08B B-2, B DIESEL GENERATOR 1G-21 PHASE OVERCURRENT OR GROUND FAULT will annunciate as engine loading is raised. The candidate is expected to respond IAW the ARP, unload the generator and remove it from service.
K/A 264000 Emergency Generators, Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET) ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Synchronization of the emergency generator with other electrical supplies.
IMPORTANCE: 3.6/3.6 S-7 Withdraw Control Rods During Reactor Startup A, M, S 7-Instrumentation The candidate will be directed to continue withdrawing control rods during a reactor plant startup. While withdrawing a control rod, rod position indication will be lost due to a failed reed switch. The Rod Worth Minimizer will insert control rod blocks preventing any additional rod movement. The candidate is expected to respond initially IAW AOP 255.1, Control Rod Movement / Indication Abnormal. After diagnosing the reed switch failure, the candidate is expected to enter a substitute position into the RWM to allow the startup to continue.
K/A SYSTEM: 201006 Rod Worth Minimizer System (RWM)
A4.06, Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Selected rod position indication.
IMPORTANCE: 3.2 / 3.2 Note: DAEC bank JPM 201006-03 also involves entering a substitute rod position. However the initial conditions of the bank JPM were just that the reed switch had failed and the operator was directed to enter the substitute position IAW the procedure.
This bank JPM was modified by changing the initial conditions such that a reactor startup is in progress and the candidate is directed to continue the startup by rd withdrawing control rods. While withdrawing the 3 control rod a rod position indicating reed switch will fail.
The candidate is then required to use an Alarm Response Procedure, an Abnormal Operating Procedure and system knowledge to diagnose the reed switch failure and determine that a substitute position must be entered in order to continue the startup.
DAEC NRC RO INPLANT-SIMULATOR JPMS OUTLINE, REV 01-25-13.DOC
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 4 of 5 S-8: Perform Required Actions for SBGT Overheating A, D, S 9-Radioactivity Release Following an auto start of a Standby Gas Treatment train, the candidate will be informed that the train is overheating. The candidate will then be directed to perform a Manual Cooldown of the SBGT train IAW section 9.1 of OI 170, Standby Gas Treatment System. Carbon bed temperatures will then exceed 255 degrees.
The candidate is expected to transition to section 9.2 of OI 170, FILTER UNIT OVERHEATING/EMERGENCY OVERHEATING and initiate deluge.
K/A SYSTEM: 261000 Standby Gas Treatment System A2.03, Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: High train temperature IMPORTANCE: 2.9 /3.2 In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
P-1: Perform Required Actions for RPV Injection with the SBLC D, E, R, L 2- Reactor Test Tank. Water Inventory Control The candidate will be directed to inject the contents of the SBLC test tank during low RPV level conditions. The tank will be injected IAW AIP 406, Injection with SBLC.
K/A E/APE 295031 Reactor Low Water Level EA 1.08, Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL :
Alternate injection systems:
IMPORTANCE 3.8 / 3.9 P-2: Shift CRD Flow Control Valves. D, R 1 - Reactivity Control Following an air leak on the in-service CRD flow control valve, the candidate will be directed to shift CRD FCVs IAW OI 255, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System, Section 6.2.
K/A SYSTEM: 201001 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System A2.07 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM ;
and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Flow control valve failure.
IMPORTANCE: 3.2 / 3.1 DAEC NRC RO INPLANT-SIMULATOR JPMS OUTLINE, REV 01-25-13.DOC
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 5 of 5 P-3: Establish Alternative Power to 125 VDC and 250 VDC D, E, L 6 - Electrical Chargers.
Following a station blackout, the candidate will be directed to repower the 125VDC and 250 VDC battery chargers using alternate AC power IAW AOP 301.1, Station Blackout, Attachment 10.
K/A E/APE 295003, Partial or Complete Loss of A.C. Power AA1.04 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF A.C.
POWER: D.C. electrical distribution system.
IMPORTANCE 3.6 / 3.7
@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/1/1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA 1/1/1 (S)imulator DAEC NRC RO INPLANT-SIMULATOR JPMS OUTLINE, REV 01-25-13.DOC
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 1 of 5 Facility: ___________DAEC NRC__________________ Date of Examination: __4/13______
Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: ______1_______
Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S-1: START A RECIRC MG SET AND RECIRC PUMP A, M, S 1 - Reactivity Control The candidate will be required to start an idle Recirc Pump while the plant is operating at power IAW OI 264 REACTOR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM. Following the pump start, the discharge valve will fail to open. The candidate is expected to diagnose the failure and trip the MG set IAW Precaution 17 of OI 264 which states that pump shall not be operated with pump discharge valve closed, except when starting up or shutting down the pump.
K/A 202001 Recirculation System A4.02, Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: System valves IMPORTANCE: 3.5 /3.4 Notes: A Recirc Pump Start JPM was conducted for the 2009 NRC exam. However that JPM was with the reactor shutdown and was not an alternative path.
Additionally there is one alternative path, Recirc Pump start JPM in the DAEC bank (JPM 202001-08). This JPM involves a failure of the Recirc MG set field breaker to close following the start of the MG set. This bank JPM was modified so that the field breaker closes but the Recirc Pump discharge valve fails to open.
Not Used for SRO-I 2- Reactor Water Inventory Control S-3: Manual Arming of LLS A, N, S, L 3 - Reactor Pressure Following a reactor scram and MSIV Isolation, the candidate will be Control directed to manually arm the LLS relief valves OI 183.1 QRC1, Manual Arming of LLS. When proper operation of the LLS valves is verified the candidate is expected to determine that LLS is not functioning properly and then disarm LLS.
K/A SYSTEM: 239002 Relief/Safety Valves A1.04, Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the RELIEF/SAFETY VALVES controls including: Reactor pressure IMPORTANCE: 3.8 / 3.8 DAEC NRC SRO-I INPLANT-SIMULATOR JPMS OUTLINES, REV 01-25-13.DOC
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 2 of 5 S-4: HPCI PUMP DISCHARGE TRANSFER FROM THE CST to EN, L, D, S 4 - Heat THE REACTOR VESSEL Removal from the Reactor HPCI will be initially aligned for pressure control. The candidate will Core be directed to realign HPCI and inject into the vessel IAW section 9.2 of OI 152, HPCI System.
K/A SYSTEM: 206000 High Pressure Coolant Injection System A4.04, Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Major System Valves.
IMPORTANCE 4.4 /4.4 S-5: AIR PURGE COOLING OF THE DRYWELL N, S, L 5-Containment Following a loss of Well Water, the candidate will be directed to Integrity perform Air Purge Cooling of the Drywell IAW AOP 408, Well Water System Abnormal Operation, Attachment 1. The candidate will be required to reset a Group 3 isolation signal in order to perform the lineup.
K/A SYSTEM: 223001 Primary Containment System and Auxiliaries.
A2.10, Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SYSTEM AND AUXILIARIES ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: High drywell temperature.
IMPORTANCE: 3.6 / 3.8 S-6: B STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY TEST N, A, S, EN 6 - Electrical The candidate will be directed to continue the already in progress STP 3.8.1-05B B STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY TEST.
The candidate will parallel the diesel to bus 1A4 and raise load as directed by the STP. Alarm 1C08B B-2, B DIESEL GENERATOR 1G-21 PHASE OVERCURRENT OR GROUND FAULT will annunciate as engine loading is raised. The candidate is expected to respond IAW the ARP, unload the generator and remove it from service.
K/A 264000 Emergency Generators, Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET) ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Synchronization of the emergency generator with other electrical supplies.
IMPORTANCE: 3.6/3.6 DAEC NRC SRO-I INPLANT-SIMULATOR JPMS OUTLINES, REV 01-25-13.DOC
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 3 of 5 S-7 Withdraw Control Rods During Reactor Startup A, M, S 7-Instrumentation The candidate will be directed to continue withdrawing control rods during a reactor plant startup. While withdrawing a control rod, rod position indication will be lost due to a failed reed switch. The Rod Worth Minimizer will insert control rod blocks preventing any additional rod movement. The candidate is expected to respond initially IAW AOP 255.1, Control Rod Movement / Indication Abnormal. After diagnosing the reed switch failure, the candidate is expected to enter a substitute position into the RWM to allow the startup to continue.
K/A SYSTEM: 201006 Rod Worth Minimizer System (RWM)
A4.06, Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Selected rod position indication.
IMPORTANCE: 3.2 / 3.2 Notes: DAEC bank JPM 201006-03 also involves entering a substitute rod position. However the initial conditions of the bank JPM were just that the reed switch had failed and the operator was directed to enter the substitute position IAW the procedure.
This bank JPM was modified by changing the initial conditions such that a reactor startup is in progress and the candidate is directed to continue the startup by rd withdrawing control rods. While withdrawing the 3 control rod a rod position indicating reed switch will fail.
The candidate is then required to use an Alarm Response Procedure, an Abnormal Operating Procedure and system knowledge to diagnose the reed switch failure and determine that a substitute position must be entered in order to continue the startup.
S-8: Perform Required Actions for SBGT Overheating A, D, S 9-Radioactivity Release Following an auto start of a Standby Gas Treatment train, the candidate will be informed that the train is overheating. The candidate will then be directed to perform a Manual Cooldown of the SBGT train IAW section 9.1 of OI 170, Standby Gas Treatment System. Carbon bed temperatures will then exceed 255 degrees.
The candidate is expected to transition to section 9.2 of OI 170, FILTER UNIT OVERHEATING/EMERGENCY OVERHEATING and initiate deluge.
K/A SYSTEM: 261000 Standby Gas Treatment System A2.03, Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: High train temperature IMPORTANCE: 2.9 /3.2 DAEC NRC SRO-I INPLANT-SIMULATOR JPMS OUTLINES, REV 01-25-13.DOC
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 4 of 5 In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
P-1: Perform Required Actions for RPV Injection with the SBLC D, E, R, L 2- Reactor Test Tank. Water Inventory Control The candidate will be directed to inject the contents of the SBLC test tank during low RPV level conditions. The tank will be injected IAW AIP 406, Injection with SBLC.
K/A E/APE 295031 Reactor Low Water Level EA 1.08, Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL:
Alternate injection systems:
IMPORTANCE 3.8 / 3.9 P-2: Shift CRD Flow Control Valves. D, R 1 - Reactivity Control Following an air leak on the in-service CRD flow control valve, the candidate will be directed to shift CRD IAW FCVs OI 255, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System, Section 6.2.
K/A SYSTEM: 201001 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System A2.07 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM ;
and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Flow control valve failure.
IMPORTANCE: 3.2 / 3.1 P-3: Establish Alternative Power to 125 VDC and 250 VDC D, E, L 6 - Electrical Chargers.
Following a station blackout, the candidate will be directed to repower the 125VDC and 250 VDC battery chargers using alternate AC power IAW AOP 301.1, Station Blackout, Attachment 10 K/A E/APE 295003, Partial or Complete Loss of A.C. Power AA1.04 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF A.C.
POWER: D.C. electrical distribution system.
IMPORTANCE 3.6 / 3.7
@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U DAEC NRC SRO-I INPLANT-SIMULATOR JPMS OUTLINES, REV 01-25-13.DOC
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 5 of 5 (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/1/1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA 1/1/1 (S)imulator DAEC NRC SRO-I INPLANT-SIMULATOR JPMS OUTLINES, REV 01-25-13.DOC
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 1 of 3 Facility: ___________DAEC NRC__________________ Date of Examination: __4/13______
Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: ______1_______
Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function 1 - Reactivity Not Used for SRO-U Control 2- Reactor Water Inventory Not Used for SRO-U Control S-3: Manual Arming of LLS A, N, S, L 3 - Reactor Pressure Following a reactor scram and MSIV Isolation, the candidate will be Control directed to manually arm the LLS relief valves OI 183.1 QRC1, Manual Arming of LLS. When proper operation of the LLS valves is verified the candidate is expected to determine that LLS is not functioning properly and then disarm LLS.
K/A SYSTEM: 239002 Relief/Safety Valves A1.04, Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the RELIEF/SAFETY VALVES controls including: Reactor pressure IMPORTANCE: 3.8 / 3.8 4 - Heat Removal from Not Used for SRO-U the Reactor Core 5-Containment Not Used for SRO-U Integrity DAEC NRC SRO-U INPLANT-SIMULATOR JPMS OUTLINES, REV 01-11-13.DOC
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 2 of 3 S-6: B STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY TEST N, A, S, EN 6 - Electrical The candidate will be directed to continue the already in progress STP 3.8.1-05B B STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY TEST.
The candidate will parallel the diesel to bus 1A4 and raise load as directed by the STP. Alarm 1C08B B-2, B DIESEL GENERATOR 1G-21 PHASE OVERCURRENT OR GROUND FAULT will annunciate as engine loading is raised. The candidate is expected to respond IAW the ARP, unload the generator and remove it from service.
K/A 264000 Emergency Generators, Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET) ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Synchronization of the emergency generator with other electrical supplies. IMPORTANCE:
3.6/3.6 7-Not Used for SRO-U Instrumentation S-8: Perform Required Actions for SBGT Overheating A, D, S 9-Radioactivity Release Following an auto start of a Standby Gas Treatment train, the candidate will be informed that the train is overheating. The candidate will then be directed to perform a Manual Cooldown of the SBGT train IAW section 9.1 of OI 170, Standby Gas Treatment System. Carbon bed temperatures will then exceed 255 degrees.
The candidate is expected to transition to section 9.2 of OI 170, FILTER UNIT OVERHEATING/EMERGENCY OVERHEATING and initiate deluge.
K/A SYSTEM: 261000 Standby Gas Treatment System A2.03, Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: High train temperature IMPORTANCE: 2.9 /3.2 In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
DAEC NRC SRO-U INPLANT-SIMULATOR JPMS OUTLINES, REV 01-11-13.DOC
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 3 of 3 P-1: Perform Required Actions for RPV Injection with the SBLC D, E, R, L 2- Reactor Test Tank. Water Inventory Control The candidate will be directed to inject the contents of the SBLC test tank during low RPV level conditions. The tank will be injected IAW AIP 406, Injection with SBLC.
K/A E/APE 295031 Reactor Low Water Level EA 1.08, Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL :
Alternate injection systems:
IMPORTANCE 3.8 / 3.9 P-2: Shift CRD Flow Control Valves. D, R 1 - Reactivity Control Following an air leak on the in-service CRD flow control valve, the candidate will be directed to shift CRD FCVs IAW OI 255, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System, Section 6.2.
K/A SYSTEM: 201001 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System A2.07 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM ;
and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Flow control valve failure.
IMPORTANCE: 3.2 / 3.1 6 - Electrical Not Used for SRO-U
@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/1/1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA 1/1/1 (S)imulator DAEC NRC SRO-U INPLANT-SIMULATOR JPMS OUTLINES, REV 01-11-13.DOC