ML13210A028

[7] WHEN Boration is COMPLETE, THEN PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE, in AUTO.

RO RO rotates 1-HH-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE from the BOR position two positions to the left to the AUTO position.

[8] TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL, to START.

[8.1] CHECK Red light is LIT.

RO When the boration stopped automatically, 1-HS-62-140A VCT MAKEUP CONTROL received a STOP signal. To enable AUTO makeup, 1-HS 140A VCT MAKEUP must be rotated the right to the START position.

[9] RETURN 1-FC-62-139, BA TO BLENDER [1-M-6], to desired flow rate.

RO If the RO elected to maintain the flow rate already established in the makeup control system, then no adjustment will be made.

The following actions are taken from SOI-27.01, Condenser Circulating Water SOI-27.01 System, Section 8.7.1, Removing East Condenser Water Box from Service.

CAUTIONS

1) When CCW Pump(s) are RUNNING, only one Water box may be removed from service.

2) Maximum of two CCW Pumps may be RUNNING when either Water box is isolated.

3) This section may be performed while the unit is online. During the time that only one water box is in service, unusually high condenser backpressures may occur. Operation in this condition should be below the line of the Backpressure vs. Load limitation Curve below. While load below 35% is recommended, the actual power during performance is at the Shift Managers discretion.

NOTE Automatic level control may not respond as quickly as desired when removing a waterbox from service. Manual level control may be used if required.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 6 of 56 Event

Description:

Power reduction to 35% using 1-GO-4, Normal Power Operation, to remove the East Side Water box from service. East Side Water box to be removed from service using SOI-27.01, Condenser Circulating Water System, Section 8.7.1, Removing East Condenser Water Box from Service.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[1] IF Manual Hotwell level control is necessary, THEN PERFORM the following: (N/A Unused Blanks)

[1.1] PLACE Hotwell level control, 1-LIC-2-3, DUMPBACK TO CST FROM HW PMP DISCHARGE, in MANUAL [1-M-2].

SRO may request that the BOP take manual control of hotwell level.

As directed by the SRO, the BOP will locate 1-LIC-2-3, DUMPBACK TO CST FROM HW PMP DSCH, and slide the selector switch from the A BOP position (right) to the M position (center).

[1.2] PLACE Hotwell level control, 1-LIC-2-9, AUTO MAKEUP FROM CST TO HW, in MANUAL [1-M-2].

The BOP will locate 1-LIC-2-9, AUTO MAKEUP FROM CST TO HOTWELL, and slide the selector switch from the A position (right) to the M position (center).

SRO may elect to leave hotwell controls in AUTO and enter N/A for the step.

[2] ENSURE Steam Dumps are NOT in service to the Main Condenser.

1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP CONTROL OFF-ON-BYPASS A [1-M-4] to OFF

1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP CONTROL OFF-ON-BYPASS B [1-M-4] to OFF BOP BOP locates 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A and rotates the handswitch from the mid position (ON) to the left to the OFF/RESET position.

BOP locates 1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B and rotates the handswitch from the mid position (ON) to the left to the OFF/RESET position.

[3] CLOSE 1-ISV-2-706, MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM LINE ISOL

[T3H/720].

BOP When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to isolate 1-ISV-2-706 for the East water box. Console Operator reports back that 1-ISV-2-706, MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM LINE ISOL is CLOSED.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 7 of 56 Event

Description:

Power reduction to 35% using 1-GO-4, Normal Power Operation, to remove the East Side Water box from service. East Side Water box to be removed from service using SOI-27.01, Condenser Circulating Water System, Section 8.7.1, Removing East Condenser Water Box from Service.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[4] ENSURE CCWP(s) stopped as required and PERFORM the following (N/A handswitches NOT repositioned):

BOP The SRO determines which of the 3 running CCW pumps will be shutdown. BOP locates the controls for the selected CCW pump and stops the CCW pump by placing the handswitch in the CLOSE VALVE position.

When contacted as the Outside AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the report that one of the 3 running CCW pumps will be shutdown.

CAUTION Condenser Vacuum and associated Turbine Operating Parameters should be monitored during the performance of the following step due to reduced cooling capability.

[5] CLOSE 1-FCV-27-77, EAST COND CCW OUTLET [1-M-15].

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-27-77A, EAST COND CCW OUTLET and rotates the handswitch to the left to the CLOSE position. BOP observes the RED light is DARK and the GREEN light is LIT.

[6] CLOSE 1-FCV-27-55, EAST COND CCW INLET [1-M-15].

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-27-55A, EAST COND CCW INLET and rotates the handswitch to the left to the CLOSE position. BOP observes the RED light is DARK and the GREEN light is LIT.

NOTE The following step may be performed at any time during the rest of this section.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 8 of 56 Event

Description:

Power reduction to 35% using 1-GO-4, Normal Power Operation, to remove the East Side Water box from service. East Side Water box to be removed from service using SOI-27.01, Condenser Circulating Water System, Section 8.7.1, Removing East Condenser Water Box from Service.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[7] WHEN Condenser Vacuum and Hotwell levels have stabilized, THEN ENSURE Hotwell level control, 1-LIC-2-3, DUMPBACK TO CST FROM HW PMP DISCHARGE and 1-LIC-2-9, AUTO MAKEUP FROM CST TO HW are in AUTO [1-M-2].

If previously directed by the SRO to take manual control of level, the BOP will locate 1-LIC-2-3, DUMPBACK TO CST FROM HW PMP DSCH, BOP and slide the selector switch from the M position (center) to the A position (right).

The BOP will locate 1-LIC-2-9, AUTO MAKEUP FROM CST TO HOTWELL, and slide the selector switch from the A position (right) to the M position (center).

If controls were left in AUTO, the BOP determines that each controller is in the A position EXAMINER: The BOP may contact the Turbine Building AUO and direct the performance of Steps 8, 9 and 10 in one call.

[8] PERFORM the following:

BOP When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to open 1-VTV-27-515, CCW EAST SIDE CONDENSER INLET WATER BOX VENT and 1-VTV-27-517, CCW EAST SIDE CONDENSER OUTLET WATER BOX VENT.

CAUTION Extreme care should be used when draining water boxes to avoid flooding foundation sump area.

NOTE Valves in 8.7.1[9] and 8.7.1[10] may be opened more than one turn if required to accommodate inlet or outlet valve seat leakage, provided that drain sump capacity is NOT exceeded.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 9 of 56 Event

Description:

Power reduction to 35% using 1-GO-4, Normal Power Operation, to remove the East Side Water box from service. East Side Water box to be removed from service using SOI-27.01, Condenser Circulating Water System, Section 8.7.1, Removing East Condenser Water Box from Service.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[9] PERFORM the following:

BOP When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to throttle open 1-DRV-27-591, CCW INLET WATER BOX DRAIN and 1-DRV-27-593, CCW OUTLET WATER BOX DRAIN.

[10] WHEN water boxes are drained, THEN PERFORM the following:

BOP SRO determines that this step will remain open.

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 2.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 10 of 56 Event

Description:

1-FCV-62-74, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM CIV-A, closes due to a blown fuse.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

17-B, 125 DC VITAL BATT BD I ABNORMAL CKTS ISOLATED 247-A, LTDN HX RET FLOW LO 1-XX-55-6E, CNTMT ISOL STATUS PNL, A Window 66, FCV-62-74 is DARK.

VCT level dropping, with NO corresponding PZR level change.

Auto-makeup when VCT level reaches 21%.

Diagnoses and announces the closure of letdown orifice 1-FCV-62-74, and RO loss of normal letdown flow.

Announces 17-B, 125 DC VITAL BATT BD I ABNORMAL CKTS ISOLATED.

When the BOP dispatches AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the requests to determine the cause of 17-B annunciator.

BOP Console Operator reports back that there is a blown fuse on 125V DC Vital Battery Board 1, 0-FU-236-1/A8, associated with 1-FCV-62-74.

If directed to replace the fuse, the Console Operator will repeat back the request, then report that the replacement fuse has also blown.

May enter and direct actions of ARI 17-B, 125 DC VITAL BATT BD I SRO ABNORMAL CKTS ISOLATED.

Enters and directs actions of AOI-20, MALFUNCTION OF PRESSURIZER SRO LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM.

The following actions are taken from ARI 17-B, 125 DC VITAL BATT BD I ARI 17-B ABNORMAL CKTS ISOLATED.

EXAMINER: Copies of 145W600-62-2 CVCS Schematic Diagram and 1-45W703-5A Connection Diagram are contained in Scenario 1, Attachment 1.

CAUTION Power loss to some feeders or placing HS-3-945-A in OFF could cause a unit trip.

NOTE HS-3-945-A & HS-30-1080 [Vital Batt Bd Rm I] are MANUALLY actuated to isolate various system 3 and 30 valves for Appendix R-Fire Safe Shutdown.

[1] IF Vital Battery Bd I is lost, THEN GO TO AOI-21.01, LOSS OF 125V SRO DC BATTERY BD I.

BOP determines that Vital Battery Bd 1-I is NOT lost.

[2] DISPATCH Operator to determine cause of alarm.

When the BOP dispatches AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the requests to determine the cause of 17-B annunciator.

BOP Console Operator reports back that there is a blown fuse on 125V DC Vital Battery Board 1, 0-FU-236-1/A8, associated with 1-FCV-62-74.

If directed to replace the fuse, the Console Operator will repeat back the request, then report that the replacement fuse has also blown.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 11 of 56 Event

Description:

1-FCV-62-74, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM CIV-A, closes due to a blown fuse.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[3] REFER TO SOI-236.01, 125V DC BATTERY BOARD I, for system BOP operating instructions.

SRO [4] NOTIFY Work Control to initiate corrective action, if necessary.

[5] IF High or Low Voltage condition exists, THEN REFER TO 0-SI-236-SRO 21 for performance.

The following actions are taken from AOI-20, MALFUNCTION OF AOI-20 PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM.

NOTE Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step.

1. CHECK charging in service.

RO RO determines that 1A-A CCP is running and that 1-FI-62-93A CHARGING FLOW indicates approximately 80 gpm.

2. CHECK pzr level program signal NORMAL (green pen):

1-LR-68-339 RO RO locates 1-LR-68-339 and determines that the GREEN pen is proper program level.

3. ENSURE 1-XS-68-339E selected to OPERABLE channels for control and backup:

RO locates 1-XS-68-339E, PZR LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL SELECT and observes the switch is in the LI-68-339 & 335 (mid) position.

LT-68-339 & 335 OR

LT-68-335 & 320 OR

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 12 of 56 Event

Description:

1-FCV-62-74, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM CIV-A, closes due to a blown fuse.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. CHECK letdown in SERVICE

1-FCV-62-69 OPEN RO locates 1-HS-62-69A, RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT and observes the valve open by RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

1-FCV-62-70 OPEN RO locates 1-HS-62-70A, RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT and observes the valve open by RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

1-FCV-62-77 OPEN RO RO locates 1-HS-62-77A, LP LETDOWN ISOL CIV-A, and observes the valve open by RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

Letdown orifice OPEN RO determines that 1-HS-62-74, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM CIV-A lights are DARK.

Letdown flow NORMAL RO locates 1-FI-62-82, LETDOWN FLOW and determines that the indicator is at ZERO.

SRO enters RNO.

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE pzr heater banks D and C ON.

RO locates 1-HS-68-341H, BACKUP HEATERS C and determines that the heaters are on by observing the RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

RO RO locates 1-HS-68-341F, CONTROL HEATERS D and determines that the heaters are on by observing the RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

ESTABLISH charging and letdown:

REFER TO Attachment 1 EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System, Attachment 1, ALIGNMENT OF CHARGING AND LETDOWN.

1.1 Establish Charging and Letdown A. IF charging NOT established, THEN PERFORM the following:

SRO SRO determines that the conditions of the step are not met and continues to Step B.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 13 of 56 Event

Description:

1-FCV-62-74, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM CIV-A, closes due to a blown fuse.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior B. ENSURE letdown isol valves OPEN:

1. 1-FCV-62-69, CVCS LETDOWN ISOLATION.

RO locates 1-HS-62-69A, RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT and observes the valve open by RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

2. 1-FCV-62-70, CVCS LETDOWN ISOLATION RO RO locates 1-HS-62-70A, RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT and observes the valve open by RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

3. 1-FCV-62-77, CVCS LP LETDOWN ISOLATION.

RO locates 1-HS-62-77A, LP LETDOWN ISOL CIV-A, and observes the vale open by RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

C. PLACE 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP 1-TCV 192 CNTL, in MANUAL at 25% OPEN.

RO 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL is placed in MANUAL by lifting the toggle switch from the AUTO position, the toggle is pushed to the right to open the valve to 25% (as read on the controller.)

D. PLACE 1- HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, in MANUAL at 40-50% OPEN if using 75 gpm orifice (20-30% OPEN if using 45 gpm orifice).

RO 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL is placed in MANUAL by lifting the toggle switch from the AUTO position, the toggle is pushed to the right to open the valve to 40-50% (as read on the controller).

E. ESTABLISH 75 gpm or greater charging flow while maintaining seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm for each RCP using 1-FCV 93 and 1-FCV-62-89.

RO RO establishes 75 gpm charging flow on 1-FI-62-93A, and 8 to 13 gpm on 1-FI-62-1A, RCP 1 SEAL SUP FLOW, 1-FI-62-14A, RCP 2 SEAL SUP FLOW, 1-FI-62-27A, RCP 3 SEAL SUP FLOW, and 1-FI-62-40A, RCP 4 SEAL SUP FLOW.

F. OPEN letdown orifices as needed:

1-FCV-62-72 (45 gpm)

1-FCV-62-73 (75 gpm).

RO selects 1-HS-62-73A, LETDOWN ORIFICE B 75 GPM - CIV-A, and RO rotates the selected handswitch to the right to the OPEN position, and holds the handswitch OPEN until the RED light is LIT and the GREEN light is DARK.

1-FCV-62-74 (75 gpm).

1-FCV-62-76 (5 gpm).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 14 of 56 Event

Description:

1-FCV-62-74, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM CIV-A, closes due to a blown fuse.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior G. ADJUST 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, for desired press, (320 psig at normal letdown temp), and PLACE in AUTO.

RO 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL toggle switch is moved to the right to close the valve and raise pressure to 320 psig. 1-HIC 81A is placed in AUTO by pushing the toggle switch down to the AUTO position.

H. PLACE 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL, in AUTO.

RO 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL, is placed in AUTO by pushing the toggle switch down to the AUTO position.

I. RETURN pzr level to program.

RO RO makes periodic adjustments to 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL and 1-HIC-62-89A, CHG HDR - RCP SEALS FLOW CONTROL to return PZR level to program level.

J. WHEN ready to return 1-FCV-62-93 to AUTO control, THEN RO PERFORM Section 1.2 1.2 Establish AUTO Control of 1-FCV-62-93 A. RETURN 1-FCV-62-93 to AUTO.

RO 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL, is placed in AUTO once PZR level is on program if required.

EXAMINER: After completing Attachment 1, ALIGNMENT OF CHARGING AND LETDOWN, the applicants will return to AOI-20, Subsection 3.2, at Step 4 RNO.

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED: (continued)

IF pzr level rising uncontrolled due to 1-PCV-62-81 failed closed, THEN

1) CLOSE letdown orifices.

2) CLOSE charging valves 1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV-62-91 SRO 3) EVALUATE placing excess Letdown in service:

REFER TO SOI-62.01,CVCS-Charging and Letdown.

4) WHEN ready to LOCALLY CONTROL 1-PCV-62-81, THEN REFER TO ATTACHMENT 1 in conjunction with SOI-62.01, CVCS-Charging and Letdown.

SRO determines that the remainder of Step 4 RNO is N/A.

5. ENSURE pzr level returning to program:

CONTROL 1-HIC-62-93A in MAN as necessary

MAINTAIN regen hx letdown temp < 380 °F.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 15 of 56 Event

Description:

1-FCV-62-74, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM CIV-A, closes due to a blown fuse.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. CHECK pzr heaters ENERGIZED:

a. Control Heaters D red light LIT.

RO observes handswitch 1-HS-68-341F, CONTROL HEATERS D RED light LIT.

RO b. Backup Heaters C red light LIT.

RO places handswitch 1-HS-68-341H, BACKUP HEATERS C in the OFF position, then may place the handswitch to the ON position for boron concentration control. Handswitch 1-HS-68-341H is then returned to P-AUTO position.

7. ENSURE operable channel selected for recording with 1-XS-68-339B [1-RO M-5]:

RO observes that 1-XS-68-339E is selected LT-68-335.

8. CHECK 1-HIC-62-93A in AUTO.

RO RO checks that 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL, was placed in AUTO as a result of performing Attachment 1, ALIGNMENT OF CHARGING AND LETDOWN.

EXAMINER: The list of Tech Specs contained in AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System, Step 9 DOES NOT address the failure of 1-FCV-62-74, which is a containment isolation valve. The SRO must evaluate Tech Spec LCO 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves and determine that CONDITION A must be applied.

LCO 3.6.3, CONDITION A, With One or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable except for purge valve or shield building bypass leakage not within limit, Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months AND Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated once per 31 days for isolation devices outside containment AND Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment.

9. REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation - not applicable

3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation SRO determines that 3.3.3, Function 11, Containment Isolation Valve Position is applicable. Enters CONDITION A, One or more Functions SRO with one required channel inoperable, restore required channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

3.4.9 Pressurizer - not applicable

3.5.2, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) not applicable

TR 3.1.4 Charging Pump, Operating - not applicable

10. NOTIFY Work Control to remove any failed channel from service.

SRO SRO determines that there are no failed channels to be removed from service.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 16 of 56 Event

Description:

1-FCV-62-74, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM CIV-A, closes due to a blown fuse.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

11. INITIATE repairs to failed instrument/circuitry.

When the SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back request for a troubleshooting and repair package to investigate the cause of the blown fuse which affected 1-FCV-62-74.

SRO 12. RETURN TO instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 3, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 3.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 17 of 56 Event

Description:

1A ERCW supply header breaks in the Yard. Requires entry into AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW). Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

223-A, ERCW HDR A SUP PRESS LO 223-B, ERCW PMP A-A DISCH PRESS LO 223-C, ERCW HDR 1A STRAINER P HI 225-E, TR-A/B ERCW TO C&SS COMPR FLOW HI 226-B, ERCW PMP D-A DISCH PRESS LO 1-FI-67-61, 1A ERCW SUP HDR FLOW drops from 3000 gpm to 1000 gpm.

BOP Diagnoses and announces the 1A Supply header leak in the yard.

May dispatch AUO to determine the location of the ERCW leak.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the BOP request to look for the ERCW leak in the yard. Console Operator reports a large amount of water in the yard, coming from an underground source.

Enters and directs actions of AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling SRO Water.

The following actions are taken from AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling AOI-13 Water, Section 3.4, Supply Header Rupture in Yard Downstream of Strainer or Plugged Strainer.

CAUTION MOVs with power normally removed may not travel to full closed position under high flow conditions, local verification of isolation may be required.

NOTE All supply headers may return normal if supply header pressure was initially high with strainer backwash being successful in reducing supply header pressure and restoring affected supply header flow.

1. CHECK supply header pressure high with any strainer DP alarm LIT.

BOP BOP observes and reports that 223-C, ERCW HDR 1A STRAINER P HI is LIT BOP 2. INITIATE strainer backwash for appropriate strainer(s) in alarm.

3. CHECK hdr press LO alarm, DARK:

ERCW HDR A SUP PRESS LO [223-A]

BOP BOP observes and reports that 223-A, ERCW HDR A SUP PRESS LO is LIT.

ERCW HDR B SUP PRESS LO [229-A]

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 18 of 56 Event

Description:

1A ERCW supply header breaks in the Yard. Requires entry into AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW). Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PERFORM the following for yard rupture:

a. START additional pumps as required.

BOP BOP may start additional Train A ERCW pumps.

b. DISPATCH personnel to determine location of rupture.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to determine the location of the rupture.

4. DISPATCH AUO, with radio, to the Rx MOV Bds.

BOP When contacted as and AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to go to the RX MOV boards and to standby.

NOTES

Both Train A Supply Headers may indicate below normal pressure, visual verification may be required.

IPS strainer room sump alarm LIT may indicate rupture downstream of strainer in strainer room.

5. CHECK Supply Header 1A flow at expected value for existing plant conditions.

BOP BOP locates 1-FI-67-61, 1A ERCW SUP HDR FLOW and determines that flow is lower than normal (near zero on meter).

5. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED PERFORM the following:

a. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A, c/7B, 1-FCV-67-22.

When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A, c/7B. The Console Operator reports the breaker closed after entering rwr05.

b. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/8A, 1-FCV-67-81.

When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A, c/8A. The Console Operator reports the breaker closed after entering rwr03.

c. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/11B, 1-FCV 147.

When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A, c/11B. The Console Operator reports the breaker closed after entering rwr12.

d. IF Strainer Cross-tie in use with:

2A-A Strainer out of service OR

Strainer room flooded, THEN GO TO Appendix F.

When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to determine if Strainer Cross tie is in use. Console Operator reports that the Strainer Cross-tie is NOT in use.

(Continued on next page) 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 19 of 56 Event

Description:

1A ERCW supply header breaks in the Yard. Requires entry into AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW). Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (Continued from previous page)

5. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

e. ENSURE at least one strainer discharge header Cross-Tie isolation valve closed:

1-ISV-67-1117 OR

2-ISV-67-1119 When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to ensure that 1-ISV-67-1117 OR 2-ISV-67-1119 is CLOSED.

Console Operator reports that 1-ISV-67-1117 is CLOSED.

f. ENSURE 2-FCV-67-147, CCS Hx C Sup From Hdr 2B, OPEN.

BOP locates and verifies the valve is open.

BOP g. OPEN 1-FCV-67-147, CCS Hx C Sup From Hdr 1A.

BOP locates 1-HS-67-147A, CCS HX C SUP FROM HDR 1A, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the OPEN position. BOP observes RED light is LIT and the GREEN light is DARK.

h. CLOSE 1-FCV-67-22, Strainer 1A-A Inlet.

BOP locates 1-HS-67-22A, STRAINER 1A-A Inlet and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position. BOP observes RED light is DARK and the GREEN light is LIT.

i. CLOSE 1-FCV-67-81, AB Supply Hdr 1A.

BOP locates 1-HS-67-81A, AB SUPPLY HDR 1A and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position. BOP observes RED light is DARK and the GREEN light is LIT.

j. **GO TO Step 9

9. ENSURE Strainer inlet isolation CLOSED for affected supply header:

A Train Supply Header rupture:

1-FCV-67-22

2-FCV-67-22 BOP B Train Supply Header rupture:

1-FCV-67-24

2-FCV-67-24 BOP locates 1-HS-67-22A, STRAINER 1A-A INLET, and determines the valve is CLOSED by observing the RED light is DARK and the GREEN light is LIT.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 20 of 56 Event

Description:

1A ERCW supply header breaks in the Yard. Requires entry into AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW). Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. ALIGN backup ERCW supply to DGs without normal supply:

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-67-68A, DG 1A-A BACKUP SUP (FCV-67-73 for C-S) and rotates the handswitch to the right to the OPEN position. BOP observes RED light LIT and GREEN light DARK.

BOP locates 2-HS-67-68A, DG 2A-A BACKUP SUP (FCV-67-73 for C-S) and rotates the handswitch to the right to the OPEN position. BOP observes RED light LIT and GREEN light DARK.

11. CHECK in-service ERCW header pressures and flows return to expected values for existing plant conditions.

BOP BOP observes ERCW header pressure at approximately 130 psig, and 2A ERCW flow is approximately 4500 gpm. 2B ERCW flow is approximately 6000 gpm, and 1B ERCW flow is approximately 1200 gpm.

12. CHECK pump amps NORMAL.

BOP BOP observes Train A ERCW pumps at 57 to 58 amps.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 21 of 56 Event

Description:

1A ERCW supply header breaks in the Yard. Requires entry into AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW). Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

13. REFER TO Tech Specs:

3.4.6, RCS Loops-Mode 4.

Not applicable, since the plant is in Mode 1.

3.7.8, Essential Raw Cooling Water System.

With the ERCW headers cross-connected, entry into LCO 3.0.3 is required. When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to place the unit, as applicable, in:

SRO a. MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months ;

b. MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months ; and

c. MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days 0.0103 hours 6.117725e-5 weeks 1.40785e-5 months .

3.8.1, AC Sources-Operating.

Condition C. Two required DGs in Train A inoperable may be entered.

However, LCO 3.0.3 is the most limiting and a Safety Function Determination may be required in this situation.

OR 14.10 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment 14.10.2 With one or more of the breakers and/or valves specified in design output documents not in the noted position or condition, return the breakers and/or valve to the required position within 30 days.

14. INITIATE repair.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator repeats back the request for a work package to troubleshoot and repair 1A ERCW Header.

EXAMINER: The crew brief is optional. The next event, Event 4, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 4.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 22 of 56 Event

Description:

1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL automatic controller output fails, causing PZR spray valves to open and all heaters to deenergize.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

90-A, PZR PRESS HI Diagnoses and announces the failure of 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS RO MASTER CONTROL.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System.

RO RO locates 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL and places in MANUAL. RO makes adjustments to close PZR spray valves and energize PZR heaters.

Enters and directs actions of AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure SRO Control System.

The following actions are taken from AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer AOI-18 Pressure Control System, Section 3.1, Pressure Transient Due to Instrument or Controller Malfunction.

NOTE Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step

1. CHECK PZR pressure STABLE or TRENDING to desired pressure:

RO RO reports that pressure was dropping initially.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PLACE PZR master controller 1-PIC-68-340A in MANUAL and RESTORE press to normal.

If not already performed, the RO places 1-PIC-68-340A in MANUAL and adjusts the controller output to close PZR spray valves and to RO energize heaters.

IF PZR pressure drop due failed PORV/Safety or Spray valve, THEN GO TO Section 3.2.

SRO determines that the PORV/Safety valves and the spray valves are not failed and continues with this section.

2. ENSURE 1-XS-68-340D selected to OPERABLE channels for control and backup:

PT-68-340 & 334 OR RO

PT-68-334 & 323 OR

PT-68-340 & 322 RO determines that 1-XS-68-340D is selected to operable channels, PT-68-340 & 334.

3. CHECK PZR press STABLE or RISING.

RO After taking MANUAL control, the RO reports PZR pressure trend.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 23 of 56 Event

Description:

1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL automatic controller output fails, causing PZR spray valves to open and all heaters to deenergize.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. DETERMINE if PZR heaters and sprays are operating properly:

RO a. CHECK master control controlling sprays and heaters.

b. CHECK PZR press greater than 2250 psig.

4.b. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

b. WHEN PZR press is greater than 2250 psig, THEN PERFORM Step 4.c.

c. ENSURE all PZR heaters OFF

d. ENSURE PZR sprays maintain RCS press on program.

5. ENSURE operable channel selected for recording with 1-XS-68-340B.

RO RO reports that 1-XS-68-340B, PZR PRESS RECORDER CHANNEL SELECT, is selected to PT-68-334, which is operable.

6. ENSURE TR-68-2A placed to operable channel using 1-XS-68-2B, T RCDR TR-68-2A LOOP SELECT [1-M-5].

RO RO reports that 1-XS-68-2B, T RCDR TR-68-2A LOOP SELECT is selected to Loop 1, which is operable.

7. CHECK PZR level at or trending to PROGRAM.

RO RO reports PZR level is on program.

8. NOTIFY Work Control to remove any failed channel from service and repair any failed controllers.

SRO determines that there are NO failed channels to be removed from SRO service.

SRO may elect to call Work Control at this time. When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator repeats back the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1-PIC-68-340A.

9. WHEN pressurizer pressure stable and equipment status supports returned to normal, THEN ENSURE the following in AUTO:

PZR Master controller SRO

PZR spray controllers

All heater groups SRO determines that this step will remain open until repairs have been made to 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 24 of 56 Event

Description:

1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL automatic controller output fails, causing PZR spray valves to open and all heaters to deenergize.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

3.3.1, RTS Instrumentation - not applicable.

3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation - not applicable

3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System - not applicable

3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits - SRO states that CONDITION A was SR entered when pressure dropped below 2214 psig, and was exited when pressure was returned to greater than 2214 psig.

3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits - not applicable

3.4.9, Pressurizer - not applicable

3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves - not applicable

3.4.11, Pressurizer Power -Operated Relief Valves- not applicable

11. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator repeats back the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1-PIC 340A.

SRO 12. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 5, is initiated by a phone call from the Console Operator, acting as the Shift Manager.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to making the call to begin Event 5.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 25 of 56 Event

Description:

EHC leak develops. Requires entry into ARI 24-A, EHC TANK LEVEL HI/LO. Requires entry into AOI-17, Turbine Trip.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The EHC leak will cause the crew to evaluate conditions, manually trip the turbine, and then take the actions of AOI-17, Turbine Trip.

Indications:

24-A, EHC TANK LEVEL HI/LO 24-B, EHC TANK LEVEL LO-LO BOP Diagnoses and announces the EHC TANK LEVEL HI/LO.

BOP May dispatch an AUO to the EHC skid to determine the cause of the alarm.

SRO May enter and direct actions of ARI 24-A, EHC TANK LEVEL HI/LO.

May enter and direct actions of ARI 24-B, EHC TANK LEVEL LO-LO, and SRO direct the BOP to manually trip the turbine.

ARI 24-A The following actions are taken from ARI 24-A, EHC TANK LEVEL HI/LO.

CAUTION Appropriate MSDS must be referenced and required PPE used when investigating electro-hydraulic control system leaks.

[1] DISPATCH Operator to determine cause of alarm.

BOP When the BOP contacts an AUO, repeat back the request to determine the cause of the alarm. Report that there is a large leak in the EHC piping.

[2] IF level is low, THEN NOTIFY Work Control to initiate corrective action to add EHC fluid to tank.

SRO When the SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to add EHC fluid to the tank.

[3] IF evidence of EHC fluid leakage exists, THEN

[3.1] DETERMINE source of leakage, AND ISOLATE respective EHC SRO line (if possible).

[3.2] EVALUATE continued Turbine operation with EHC line isolated.

[4] IF EHC fluid leakage exists AND cannot be corrected, THEN SRO EVALUATE unit shutdown per AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction.

[5] IF evidence of water in-leakage exists, THEN PLACE standby heat BOP exchanger in service, and ISOLATE RCW to leaking heat exchanger.

SRO [6] NOTIFY Work Control to initiate corrective action, if necessary.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 26 of 56 Event

Description:

EHC leak develops. Requires entry into ARI 24-A, EHC TANK LEVEL HI/LO. Requires entry into AOI-17, Turbine Trip.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ARI 24-B The following actions are taken from ARI 24-B, EHC TANK LEVEL LO-LO.

CAUTION Appropriate MSDS must be referenced and required PPE used when investigating electro-hydraulic control system leaks.

NOTE LO-LO LEVEL must be manually reset with 86/LFT on JB 673 EHC panel before lo-lo alarm will clear.

[1] ENSURE Operator DISPATCHED to EHC tank to determine cause of alarm.

BOP When the BOP contacts an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to determine the cause of the alarm. Report that there is a large leak in the EHC piping.

[2] DISPATCH Operator to observe turbine main (TV/GV) and reheat valves.

BOP When the BOP contacts an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to observe the turbine main (TV/GV) and reheat valves. Report that the valves are currently open, and that the main control room will be contacted if valves begin to close.

[3] IF level reduces to less than or equal to 7.6 inches from tank bottom, OR IF main or reheat valves start to close THEN IF Unit power is > P9, THEN Manually TRIP the Reactor, AND GO TO 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection OR IF Unit Power is P9, THEN Manually TRIP Turbine, REMOVE EHC pumps from service, and GO TO AOI-17, TURBINE TRIP.

SRO If contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for EHC tank level. Report that level is at 6 inches and dropping.

If contacted as an AUO to remove EHC pumps, the Console Operator will repeat back the request and stop the EHC pumps using tcr01.

SRO will order a turbine trip after receiving the latest EHC tank level, and enter AOI-17, Turbine Trip.

[4] IF excessive EHC leakage exists, OR IF EHC pressure drops THEN SRO INITIATE unit shutdown per AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction.

SRO [5] NOTIFY Work Control to initiate corrective action.

[6] IF possible to isolate leaks THEN ISOLATE applicable EHC line, AND SRO EVALUATE continued Turbo-generator operation.

[7] IF EHC fluid needs to be added to tank, THEN NOTIFY Work Control to SRO initiate corrective action to add fluid.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 27 of 56 Event

Description:

EHC leak develops. Requires entry into ARI 24-A, EHC TANK LEVEL HI/LO. Requires entry into AOI-17, Turbine Trip.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from AOI-17, "Turbine Trip, Section 3.2, AOI-17 "Turbine Trip WITHOUT a Reactor Trip."

1. ENSURE turbine trip: [C.1]

All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

BOP RO observes that lights on 1-XX-47-1000 EHC CONTROL for individual throttle and governor valves are GREEN.

NOTE T-avg is expected to be higher than T-ref and will vary as a function of reactor power.

2. ENSURE steam dump or S/G PORV operation NORMAL.

BOP BOP reports that the SG PORVs are in operation, since the Steam Dumps were turned off when the water box was taken out of service.

3. WHEN Rx power less than 15%, THEN PLACE control rods in MANUAL.

RO RO observes reactor power on 1-NR-92-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER and rotates 1-RBSS, ROD BANK SELECT to MANUAL after reactor power is reduced to less than 15%.

4. ANNOUNCE turbine trip over PA system.

SRO SRO announces the turbine trip over the PA system.

5. DISPATCH turbine building NAUO to perform Attachment 1.

BOP When contacted as the TB AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to perform AOI-17, Attachment 1.

CAUTION Care should be taken to avoid excessive rod insertion. If resulting Reactor power is less than desired, rod withdrawal is only allowed to zero startup rate or maintain Reactor power at current level

6. REDUCE reactor power to within feedwater capabilities, and MAINTAIN zero startup rate:

Between 6 and 10% with MFW in service, OR RO

Less than 4% with AFW in service.

RO reduces reactor power to between 6 and 10%. RO does not exceed a zero stable startup rate when withdrawing control rods to stabilize power.

7. ENSURE main generator PCBs OPEN:

PCB 5084

PCB 5088

8. ENSURE station service TRANSFERRED:

6.9 kV Unit Bds.

RCP Bds.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 28 of 56 Event

Description:

EHC leak develops. Requires entry into ARI 24-A, EHC TANK LEVEL HI/LO. Requires entry into AOI-17, Turbine Trip.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. CLOSE extraction steam FCVs to #1 and #2 feedwater heaters. [C.2]

BOP locates the #1 heater extraction steam isolation valves on panel 1-M-2 (A1 HS-5-21A, B1 HS-5-23A, and C1 HS-5-25A) and rotates each handswitch from the P-AUTO position to the left to the CLOSE position. BOP observes the RED lights are DARK and the BOP GREEN lights are LIT.

BOP locates the #2 heater extraction steam isolation valves on panel 1-M-2 (A2 HS-5-30A, B2 HS-5-32A, and C2 HS-5-34A) and rotates each handswitch from the P-AUTO position to the left to the CLOSE position. BOP observes the RED lights are DARK and the GREEN lights are LIT.

10. ENSURE MFW mode switch, 1-HS-3-45, in LONG CYCLE RECIRC.

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-3-45. MFW-MODE SWITCH, and rotates the handswitch to the right from the NORMAL position to the LONG CYCLE RECIRC position.

CAUTION AFW pump operation under low flow conditions should be minimized to avoid pump impeller damage.

11. CHECK TDMFW pump in service.

BOP determines that the 1A MFP is in service.

a. OPEN bypass reg valves to establish flow, and PLACE in AUTO.

BOP locates the bypass reg valve controls, opens each bypass reg valve and then places each controller in AUTO.

b. ENSURE MFW reg valves in MANUAL, and SET controller output to ZERO.

BOP locates the main feed reg valves, transfers the controllers to BOP MANUAL and CLOSES each main feed reg valve.

c. CHECK S/G NR levels returning to 38%.

BOP observes SG level trends and reports current status.

d. ENSURE one MFW pump RESET.

Since power had been reduced to 35%, only the 1A MFPT was in service and RESET.

e. REMOVE AFW from service if Started.

Since there has been no feedwater isolation signal generated, AFW will NOT be in service.

12. CONTROL S/G press with dumps:

a. CHECK condenser available:

Permissive C-9, CONDENSER AVAILABLE, LIT [65-E].

MSIVs OPEN.

BOP reports that the SG PORVs are in operation, since the Steam Dumps were turned off when the water box was taken out of service.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 29 of 56 Event

Description:

EHC leak develops. Requires entry into ARI 24-A, EHC TANK LEVEL HI/LO. Requires entry into AOI-17, Turbine Trip.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a. CONTROL press with S/G PORVs.

- GO TO Step 13.

BOP reports that the SG PORVs are in operation controlling pressure.

13. CHECK RCS press NORMAL:

a. PZR press greater than 2210 psig.

b. PZR press less than 2260 psig.

RO reports RCS pressure is NORMAL, between 2210 and 2260 psig.

EXAMINER: When the applicants perform AOI-17, Step 14, the Console Operator will insert Event 7, which results in a large break LOCA. At that point, the applicants will go to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

14. ENSURE PZR level TRENDING to 25%.

RO RO observes pzr level trend on 1-LR-38-339 and determines that level is reducing to 25%.

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 6.

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27Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 30 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA, requiring entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and subsequent transition to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Phase B isolation fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

95-F, RCS LOOSE PARTS DETECTED 144-A, ICE COND INLET DOOR OPEN RCS pressure dropping rapidly PZR level dropping rapidly Multiple containment radiation alarms (upper and lower containment)

BOP Diagnoses and announces the loss of reactor coolant.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety RO Injection.

Performs actions to silence annunciators and clear breaker disagreement BOP lights.

SRO Enters and directs the actions of E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

1-E-0 The following actions are taken from 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

NOTE Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS.

Status Trees / SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR A GREEN light LIT on panel 1-M-4.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR B GREEN light LIT on panel 1-M-4.

RO checks 1-52BYA, BYPASS BKR A lights DARK.

RO checks 1-52BYB, BYPASS BKR B lights DARK.

RPIs at bottom of scale.

RO RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor 1 and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 for indication that all SHUTDOWN and CONTROL bank rods are inserted.

Neutron flux DROPPING.

RO observes neutron flux trending down on 1-NR-92-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER. May also observe levels decreasing on 1-NI-92-135A, CH I NEUTRON MON % PWR, and 1-NI-92-136A, CH II NEUTRON MON % PWR.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

RO RO observes that lights on 1-XX-47-1000 EHC CONTROL for individual throttle and governor valves are GREEN.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

27Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 31 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA, requiring entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and subsequent transition to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Phase B isolation fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

CSST (offsite),

OR D/G (blackout).

RO RO observes that 1-HS-57-41A, 1716 NORMAL - 6.9 SD BD 1A-A FROM CSST C RED light is LIT, GREEN light is DARK (breaker closed) and 1-EI-57-39, 6.9 SDB 1A-A VOLTS indicates approximately 7000 volts.

RO observes that 1-HS-57-71A, 1728 NORMAL - 6.9 SD BD 1B-B FROM CSST D RED light is LIT, GREEN light is DARK (breaker closed) and 1-EI-57-66, 6.9 SDB 1B-B VOLTS indicates approximately 7000 volts.

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RO b. Both trains SI ACTUATED.

1-XX-55-6C

1-XX-55-6D EXAMINER: 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendices A, B and Attachments 1 through 5 are included as Attachment 2. During performance the appendices and attachments the BOP will contact multiple AUOs to perform the following actions:

1. Perform Attachment 1, Ice Condenser AHU Breaker Operation.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to perform 1-E-0, . Console Operator will wait, and report that Attachment 1 is complete.

2. DISPATCH AUO to shutdown Upper and Lower CNTMT rad monitors USING 1-SOI-90.02, Gaseous Process Radiation Monitors When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to shutdown Upper and Lower CNTMT rad monitors USING 1-SOI-90.02, Gaseous Process Radiation Monitors.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

27Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 32 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA, requiring entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and subsequent transition to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Phase B isolation fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 1 Initiate manual Containment Phase B isolation prior to exiting 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Critical 5. PERFORM Appendixes A and B, 1-E-0, pages 16-25.

Task 1 BOP determines that Containment Phase B isolation has NOT occurred, by observing 1-XX-55-6C, MASTER ISOL SIGNAL STATUS PNL, Window 3 B light DARK, and 1-XX-55-6D, MASTER ISOL SIGNAL STATUS PNL, Window 3 B light DARK.

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-30-64A, B & CNTMT VENT ISOL and 1-HS-30-64B, B & CNTMT VENT ISOL, and simultaneously rotates the handswitches to the RIGHT to the ACTUATE position.

BOP determines that Containment Phase B isolation has occurred, by observing 1-XX-55-6C, MASTER ISOL SIGNAL STATUS PNL, Window 3 B light LIT, and 1-XX-55-6D, MASTER ISOL SIGNAL STATUS PNL, Window 3 B light LIT.

SRO 6. ANNOUNCE reactor trip and safety injection over PA system.

7. ENSURE secondary heat sink available with either:

Total AFW flow greater than 410 gpm, OR RO It is expected that Adverse Containment (>2.81 psig) conditions will exist soon after the entry into 1-E-0. When announced, the crew will use the bracketed parameter values.

At least one S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

8. MONITOR RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F using:

RCS Loop T-avg with any RCP running, RO OR

RCS Loop T-cold with RCPs out-of-service.

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27Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 33 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA, requiring entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and subsequent transition to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Phase B isolation fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF temp less than 557°F, THEN ENSURE steam dumps and S/G PORVs CLOSED.

IF cooldown continues, THEN CONTROL total AFW flow to maintain greater than 410 gpm UNTIL NR level in at least one S/G greater than 29% [39% ADV].

IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN RO

PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

The steam dumps are OFF due to the earlier evolution which removed a water box from service.

CLOSE MSIVs.

ENSURE MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

IF RCS temp greater than 564°F, THEN ENSURE either steam dumps or S/G PORVs OPEN.

9. ENSURE excess letdown valves CLOSED:

1-FCV-62-54 RO

1-FCV-62-55 RO observes GREEN lights LIT on handswitches 1-HS-62-54A, EXCESS LTDN ISOL, and 1-HS-62-55A, EXCESS LTDN.

10. CHECK pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

RO observes 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV 340A, in P-AUTO position and CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

RO observes 1-HS-68-334A, PZR PORV 334, in P-AUTO position and RO CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

RO observes 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A, is OPEN, GREEN light is DARK, RED light is LIT.

RO observes 1-HS-68-332A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 334, is OPEN, GREEN light is DARK, RED light is LIT.

11. CHECK pzr safety valves CLOSED:

EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitors.

RO observes response of 1-TI-68-330, SAFETY 68-563 TAILPIPE TEMP, RO 1-TI-68-329, SAFETY 68-564 TAILPIPE TEMP, and 1-TI-68-328, SAFETY 68-565, stable at approximately 110F.

BOP may observe 1-XI-68-363, PZR VALVES ACOUSTIC MONITOR lights are DARK for 1-XI-68-363 (68-563), 1-XI-68-364 (68-564) and 1-XI-68-365 (68-565).

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

27Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 34 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA, requiring entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and subsequent transition to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Phase B isolation fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. CHECK pzr sprays CLOSED.

RO RO observes the pzr spray valves closed by GREEN lights LIT for 1-XI-68-340B, PZR SPRAY LOOP 2 and 1-XI-68-340D, PZR SPRAY LOOP 1.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

13. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

The RCPs may have been tripped prior to reaching this step in 1-E-0, due to the initially sharp drop in RCS pressure to less than 1500 RO psig OR the manual actuation of the Containment Phase B signal.

a. Phase B signals DARK [MISSP].

b. RCS pressure greater than 1500 psig.

14. CHECK S/G pressures:

All S/G pressures controlled or rising.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressures are controlled. May also RO observe trends on 1-PR-1-2, SG 1 & 2 PRESS PSIG, and 1-PR-1-23, SG 3 & 4 PRESS PSIG to assess this step.

All S/G pressures greater than 140 psig.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressures are greater than 140 psig.

15. CHECK for RUPTURED S/G

All S/Gs narrow range levels CONTROLLED or DROPPING.

RO informs the SRO that S/G narrow range levels are controlled after RO observing PAM narrow range level instruments (black labels).

Secondary side radiation NORMAL from Appendix A.

BOP informs the SRO that secondary radiation levels are normal after performing Appendix A, Step 8.

16. CHECK cntmt conditions:

Cntmt pressure NORMAL.

RO reports containment pressure is abnormally high.

Radiation NORMAL from Appendix A.

BOP BOP informs the SRO that containment radiation recorders were not normal prior to isolation.

Cntmt sump level NORMAL.

Cntmt temp ann window DARK [104-B].

SRO enters RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED column.

16. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

- GO TO 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

27Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 35 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA, requiring entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and subsequent transition to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Phase B isolation fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: During the performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, entry conditions for FR-P.1, Pressurized Thermal Shock will be met. 1-FR-P.1, Pressurized Thermal Shock, actions are contained on Page 37.

The following actions are taken from 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary 1-E-1 Coolant.

EXAMINER: As the RCS leak becomes larger, containment temperature and pressure will rise sharply. 265-A UPPER CNTMT RE-271/272 RAD HI and 265-B LOWER CNTMT RE-273/274 are expected to alarm, since testing has shown rad monitor to give unreliable indication for up to 10 minutes following a rapid increase or decrease in containment temperature. The alarms will clear after the initial temperature transient.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

EXAMINER: The RCPs may have been stopped previously.

1. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

a. Phase B DARK [MISSP].

1. a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RO

a. STOP all RCPs. ** GO TO Step 2.

SRO 2. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart.

NOTE Time since initiation of event is defined by performance of Step 3.

3. RECORD current time to mark initiation of LOCA and determination of SRO time for hot leg recirc.

4. CHECK S/G pressures:

All S/G pressures controlled or rising.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressures are controlled. May also RO observe trends on 1-PR-1-2, SG 1 & 2 PRESS PSIG, and 1-PR-1-23, SG 3 & 4 PRESS PSIG to assess this step.

All S/G pressures greater than 140 psig.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressures are greater than 140 psig.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

27Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 36 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA, requiring entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and subsequent transition to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Phase B isolation fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. MAINTAIN Intact S/G NR levels:

a. MONITOR levels greater than 29% [39% ADV].

BOP informs the SRO that S/G narrow range levels are controlled after BOP observing PAM narrow range level instruments (black labels).

b. CONTROL intact S/G levels between 29% and 50% [39% and 50%

ADV].

BOP acknowledges the need to control SG levels between 39 and 50%.

EXAMINER: The status of secondary radiation may have already been reported as normal by the BOP during performance of 1-E-0 Appendix A.

6. CHECK secondary radiation:

S/G discharge monitors NORMAL.

Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitors NORMAL.

S/G blowdown rad monitor recorders NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

7. ENSURE cntmt hydrogen analyzers in service:

PLACE 1-HS-43-200A in ANALYZE [M-10].

BOP places 1-HS-43-200A, H2 ANALYZER A FAN to the ANALYZE position on panel 1-M-10.

PLACE 1-HS-43-210A in ANALYZE [M-10].

BOP places 1-HS-43-210A, H2 ANALYZER A FAN to the ANALYZE position on panel 1-M-10.

CHECK low flow lights NOT lit [M-10].

BOP checks 1-XI-43-200, LO FLOW - ANAL A, WHITE light is DARK.

BOP checks 1-XI-43-210, LO FLOW - ANAL B, WHITE light is DARK.

LOCALLY CHECK low analyzer temp lights NOT lit AND RESET local alarm panel. [North wall of Train A 480V SD Bd rm].

When contacted as the Control Building AUO the Console Operator repeat back request to check low analyzer temp lights, and reports that the lights are NOT LIT.

8. MONITOR pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

RO observes 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV 340A, in P-AUTO position and valve CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

RO observes 1-HS-68-334A, PZR PORV 334, in P-AUTO position and RO valve CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

RO observes 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A, OPEN, GREEN light is DARK, RED light is LIT.

RO observes 1-HS-68-332A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 334, OPEN, GREEN light is DARK, RED light is LIT.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

27Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 37 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA, requiring entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and subsequent transition to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Phase B isolation fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: Containment pressure may not be below 2.0 psig when the operators evaluate this step initially. Since it is a continuous action step, when containment pressure does drop below 2.0 psig, the actions will be performed.

9. DETERMINE if cntmt spray should be stopped:

a. MONITOR cntmt pressure less than 2.0 psig.

b. CHECK at least one cntmt spray pump RUNNING.

c. RESET cntmt spray signal.

d. STOP cntmt spray pumps, and PLACE in A-AUTO.

e. CLOSE cntmt spray discharge valves 1-FCV-72-2 and 1-FCV- 72-39.

9. a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO WHEN cntmt pressure is less than 2.0 psig, THEN PERFORM Sub steps 9b thru e.

10. ENSURE both pocket sump pumps STOPPED [M-15]:

1-HS-77-410.

1-HS-77-411.

BOP observes handswitch 1-HS-77-410, POCKET SUMP PMP A GREEN light is LIT, and 1-HS-77-411, POCKET SUMP PMP B GREEN light is LIT.

11. CHECK SI termination criteria:

a. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65ºF [85ºF ADV].

RO RO determines that subcooling is less than 85ºF by observing 1-TI-68-105, RCS SUBCOOLING indications.

a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

- GO TO Caution prior to Step 12.

CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action will be required to restart the SI pumps and RHR pumps due to loss of SI start signal.

12. RESET SI and CHECK the following:

RO resets SI signal by depressing 1-HS-63-134A, SI RESET TR A and 1-HS-63-134B one at a time.

SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.

RO observes and reports that Window 70-A, SI ACTUATED is DARK.

AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT.

RO observes and reports that Window 70-B, AUTO SI BLOCKED is LIT.

13. DETERMINE if RHR pumps should be stopped:

a. CHECK RCS pressure greater than 150 psig.

b. CHECK RHR suction aligned from RWST.

c. CHECK RCS pressure stable or rising.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

27Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 38 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA, requiring entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and subsequent transition to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Phase B isolation fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

c. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE CCS from RHR heat exchanger 1-FCV-70-153 and 1-FCV-70-156 OPEN.

BOP rotates 1-FCV-70-156 RHR HX 1A OUTLET to the right to the BOP OPEN position. Ensures RED light is LIT and GREEN light is DARK.

CLOSE SFP heat exchanger A CCS supply 0-FCV-70-197.

BOP rotates 0-FCV-70-197, SFP HX A SUPPLY to the left to the CLOSE position. Ensures RED light is DARK and GREEN light is LIT.

GO TO Step 14.

14. CHECK pressure in all S/Gs controlled or rising.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black RO labels) and determines that pressures are controlled. May also observe trends on 1-PR-1-2, SG 1 & 2 PRESS PSIG, and 1-PR-1-23, SG 3 & 4 PRESS PSIG to assess this step.

15. CHECK RCS pressure stable or dropping.

RO RO observes RCS pressure on 1-XI-68-100, RVLIS - ICCM PLASMA DISPLAY and determines that pressure is stable.

16. MONITOR electrical board status:

a. CHECK offsite power available.

BOP b. CHECK all shutdown boards ENERGIZED by offsite power.

c. PLACE any unloaded D/G in standby USING 1-SOI-82 Diesel Generators.

EXAMINER: AOI-17, Turbine Trip, Section 3.3, BOP Realignment is contained as .

17. INITIATE BOP realignment:

REFER TO 1-AOI-17, Turbine Trip.

SRO assigns 1-AOI-17, Turbine Trip to the BOP for performance on a BOP not to interfere basis.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to perform AOI-17, Attachment 1, Turbine Building NAUO Duties Following A Turbine Trip.

EXAMINER: 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Appendices are contained as .

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

27Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 39 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA, requiring entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and subsequent transition to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Phase B isolation fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

18. INITIATE 480V board room breaker alignments USING the following:

Appendix A (1-E-1), CLA Breaker Operation.

Appendix B (1-E-1), 1-FCV-63-1 Breaker Operation.

Appendix C (1-E-1), 1-FCV-63-22 Breaker Operation.

When contacted as the Control Building AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request, and then report that Appendix A through C have been performed. Console Operator enters remote functions sir01, sir14 and sir06 to perform actions.

EXAMINER: When the swapover setpoints are reached, the automatic swapover will NOT OCCUR.

19. ENSURE RHR available for cntmt sump recirculation:

Power to at least one operable RHR pump AVAILABLE.

Cntmt sump valve 1-FCV-63-72 or 1-FCV-63-73 to operable RHR pump AVAILABLE.

20. EVALUATE plant equipment status:

REFER TO Appendix D (1-E-1), Equipment Evaluation.

21. CHECK Aux Bldg radiation for loss of RCS inventory outside cntmt:

a. Area monitor recorders 1-RR-90-1 and 0-RR-90-12A Aux Bldg points NORMAL.

BOP BOP reports that Aux Bldg area radiation levels are normal.

b. Vent monitor recorder 0-RR-90-101 NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

BOP reports that Aux Bldg vent radiation levels are normal.

22. NOTIFY Chemistry of event status and plant conditions.

SRO When SRO contacts Chemistry, the Console Operator will repeat back information supplied.

23. DETERMINE if RCS cooldown and depressurization is required:

SRO a. CHECK RCS pressure greater than 150 psig.

b. ** GO TO 1-ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

24. PREPARE for switchover to RHR cntmt sump:

a. ENSURE power restored to 1-FCV-63-1 USING Appendix B (1-E-1),

1-FCV-63-1 Breaker Operation.

When RO dispatches the Control Building AUO to perform Appendix B, the Console Operator will repeat back the request. The Console RO Operator will enter remote function rhr14 to restore power to 1-FCV-63-1.

b. CHECK RWST level less than 34%.

RO observes RWST level and reports that level is dropping.

c. ** GO TO 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

27Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 40 of 56 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA, requiring entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and subsequent transition to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Phase B isolation fails to actuate.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-FR-P.1 The following actions are taken from 1-FR-P.1, Pressurized Thermal Shock.

RO 1. CHECK RCS pressure greater than 150 psig.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RO IF RHR pump injecting greater than 1350 gpm to RCS, THEN RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

27Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 41 of 56 Event

Description:

Automatic swapover fails to occur. RO manually initiates swapover sequence.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment ES-1.3 Sump.

CAUTION

ECCS flow to RCS must be maintained at all times to ensure adequate core cooling.

Transfer to recirculation mode may cause high radiation in the Auxiliary Building.

NOTES

Performance of this Instruction is a higher priority than performance of the FRs because it maintains ECCS pump suction.

The transfer sequence should be performed without delay. Implementation of FRs is delayed UNTIL transfer sequence is completed or transitioned from.

1. ENSURE both RHR pumps RUNNING.

SRO RO observes that 1A-A and 1B-B RHR pumps are running.

2. ESTABLISH CCS to RHR heat exchangers [M-27B]:

a. ENSURE RHR heat exchanger outlet valves 1-FCV-70-153 and 1-FCV-70-156 OPEN.

b. CLOSE SFP heat exchanger A CCS supply 0-FCV-70-197.

c. ENSURE CCS flow to ESF supply header and greater than 5000 gpm.

Train A: 1-FI-70-159

Train B: 1-FI-70-165

d. MONITOR level in CCS surge tanks.

3. CHECK RWST level less than 34%.

RO RO observes RWST level is less than 34%.

4. CHECK cntmt sump level greater than or equal to 16.1 %.

RO RO observes cntmt sump level greater than 16.1%.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

27Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 42 of 56 Event

Description:

Automatic swapover fails to occur. RO manually initiates swapover sequence.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 2 Transfer to cold leg recirculation and establish one train of ECCS recirculation flow prior to exiting ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump.

EXAMINER: When the swapover setpoints are reached, the automatic swapover will NOT OCCUR.

Start of 5. ENSURE automatic switchover complete:

CRITICAL

a. ENSURE cntmt sump valves1-FCV-63-72 and 1-FCV-63-73 OPEN.

TASK 2 RO rotates handswitch 1-HS-63-72A to the right to the OPEN position.

RO observes that 1-HS-63-72A RED light is LIT and GREEN light is RO DARK, and informs the SRO that the valve is open.

RO rotates handswitch 1-HS-63-73A to the right to the OPEN position.

RO observes that 1-HS-63-73A RED light is LIT and GREEN light is DARK, and informs the SRO that the valve is open.

b. ENSURE RWST to RHR suction valves 1-FCV-74-3 and 1-FCV-74-21 CLOSED.

c. INITIATE power restoration to 1-FCV-63-1 USING Appendix A (ES-1.3), 1-FCV-63-1 Breaker Operation.

CAUTION If RWST level drops to 8%, then any charging, SI or cntmt spray pump taking suction from the RWST must be stopped.

RO 6. MONITOR RWST level greater than 8%.

7. DETERMINE if cntmt spray should be stopped:

a. MONITOR cntmt press less than 2.0 psig.

7.a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RO WHEN cntmt press less than 2.0 psig, THEN PERFORM Substeps 7b thru e. **GO TO Step 8.

8. DETERMINE if ONE train cntmt spray should be stopped:

a. CHECK BOTH trains cntmt spray delivering flow.

RO b. RESET cntmt spray signal.

c. STOP ONE cntmt spray pump AND PLACE in A-AUTO.

d. CLOSE spray discharge valve for stopped pump.

9. MONITOR RCS press less than 1350 psig.

RO RO observes RCS pressure on 1-XI-68-100 RVLIS - ICCM PLASMA DISPLAY and determines that pressure is less than 1350 psig.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

27Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 43 of 56 Event

Description:

Automatic swapover fails to occur. RO manually initiates swapover sequence.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION If a valve fails during the transfer sequence, any corrective action should be postponed UNTIL transfer is complete, EXCEPT as required to satisfy each step.

NOTE Each transfer sequence action is identified by a number on the control board (e.g. #1).

Critical Task 2 (continued)

Transfer to cold leg recirculation and establish one train of ECCS recirculation flow prior to exiting ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump.

Critical 10. (#1) ISOLATE SI pump miniflow:

Task 2

CLOSE 1-FCV-63-3.

RO rotates 1-HS-63-3 to the left to the CLOSE position.

CLOSE 1-FCV-63-175.

RO rotates 1-HS-63-175 to the left to the CLOSE position.

CLOSE 1-FCV-63-4.

RO rotates 1-HS-63-4 to the left to the CLOSE position.

Critical 11. (#2) ISOLATE RHR crossties:

Task 2

CLOSE 1-FCV-74-33.

RO RO rotates handswitch 1-HS-74-33 to the left to the CLOSE position.

CLOSE 1-FCV-74-35.

RO rotates handswitch 1-HS-74-35 to the left to the CLOSE position.

Critical 12. (#3) ALIGN charging pump and SI pump supply from RHR:

Task 2

OPEN 1-FCV-63-6.

RO rotates handswitch 1-HS-63-6 right to the OPEN position.

OPEN 1-FCV-63-7.

RO RO rotates handswitch 1-HS-63-7 right to the OPEN position.

ENSURE 1-FCV-63-177 OPEN.

RO determines 1-HS-63-177 is OPEN observing the RED light is LIT and GREEN light is DARK.

NOTE 1-FCV-63-8 and 1-FCV-63-11 are interlocked with the SI pump miniflows being full closed.

Critical 13. (#4) ALIGN RHR discharge to charging pump and SI pump suction:

Task 2 RO a. OPEN 1-FCV-63-8.

RO rotates handswitch 1-HS-63-8 right to the OPEN position.

Critical b. OPEN 1-FCV-63-11.

Task 2 RO RO rotates handswitch 1-HS-63-11 right to the OPEN position.

Critical RO 14. DO NOT CONTINUE this Instruction UNTIL Steps 10 thru 13 complete.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

27Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 44 of 56 Event

Description:

Automatic swapover fails to occur. RO manually initiates swapover sequence.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION If RCS press is greater than 1350 psig, the SI pumps should NOT be restarted because the recirc path is isolated.

15. RESTART any charging pumps and SI pumps as necessary.

RO RO determines that NO pumps were stopped, so SRO continues to next step.

CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action will be required to restart the SI pumps and RHR pumps due to loss of SI start signal.

Critical 16. (#5) RESET SI, and CHECK the following:

Task 2 RO depresses 1-HS-63-134A SI RESET TR A and 1-HS-63-134B, SI RO RESET TR B and observes the following:

SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.

AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT.

17. IF offsite power is lost, THEN

a. PLACE charging pumps in PULL TO LOCK.

b. RESTART RHR pumps.

SRO c. RESTART charging pumps.

d. IF RCS press less than 1350 psig, THEN RESTART SI pumps.

RO observes RCS pressure on 1-XI-68-110 RVLIS - ICCM PLASMA DISPLAY and determines that pressure is less than 1350 psig.

CAUTION ECCS pump discharge flow and motor amps should be monitored WHILE closing the RWST suction valves.

Critical 18. (#6) ISOLATE charging pump suction from RWST:

Task 2 a. CLOSE 1-LCV-62-135.

RO pushes 1-HS-62-135 handswitch in, and then rotates the handswitch to the left to the CLOSED position.

b. CLOSE 1-LCV-62-136.

RO pushes 1-HS-62-136 handswitch in, and then rotates the RO handswitch to the left to the CLOSED position.

c. ENSURE 1-HS-62-135A in A-AUTO (pushed in).

RO determines that the handswitch for 1-HS-62-135 has remained in the pushed-in position.

d. ENSURE 1-HS-62-136A in A-AUTO (pushed in).

RO determines that the handswitch for 1-HS-62-136 has remained in the pushed-in position.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

27Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 45 of 56 Event

Description:

Automatic swapover fails to occur. RO manually initiates swapover sequence.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical 19. (#7) ISOLATE SI pump suction from RWST:

Task 2 RO

CLOSE 1-FCV-63-5.

RO rotates handswitch 1-HS-63-5A to the left to the CLOSED position.

End of 20. (#8) ISOLATE RHR suction from RWST:

Critical a. ENSURE power restored to 1-FCV-63-1 USING Appendix A (ES-1.3),

Task 2 1-FCV-63-1 Breaker Operation.

RO b. CLOSE 1-FCV-63-1.

RO may contact Control Building AUO to check on status of 1-E-1, Appendix B performance. The Console Operator reports that power to 1-FCV-63-1 has been restored.

EXAMINER: When 1-FCV-63-1, RWST TO RHR ECCS SUCTION is CLOSED, inform applicants that another crew will continue from this point, and terminate the scenario.

END OF SCENARIO 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 SM US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going - Name AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb = 982 ppm Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

Manway leak on East Side Condenser Water box.

SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

US/SM review late SI report (SQN and WBN only)

Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Train A/Channel I Work Week 40% power, MOL. Control Bank D at 156 steps. Reduce power to 35% at 1%/

min. using 1-GO-4, Normal Power Operation, to remove the East Side Water box from service to repair a manway leak. The East Side Water box is to be removed from service using SOI-27.01, Condenser Circulating Water System, Section 8.7.1, Removing East Condenser Water box from Service.

A Reactivity plan is provided by Reactor Engineering for the power change. EOOS risk matrix is GREEN.

Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only)

Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items)

Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs)

Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs)

Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs)

SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA)

Relief Time: _________________________________ Relief Date: ______________

Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties:

Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station)

Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week)

Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked)

Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs)

TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [01-14-2011]

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 SM US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going - Name AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb = 982 ppm Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

Manway leak on East Side Condenser Water box.

SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

US/SM review late SI report (SQN and WBN only)

Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Train A/Channel I Work Week 40% power, MOL. Control Bank D at 156 steps. Reduce power to 35% at 1%/

min. using 1-GO-4, Normal Power Operation, to remove the East Side Water box from service to repair a manway leak. The East Side Water box is to be removed from service using SOI-27.01, Condenser Circulating Water System, Section 8.7.1, Removing East Condenser Water box from Service.

A Reactivity plan is provided by Reactor Engineering for the power change. EOOS risk matrix is GREEN.

Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only)

Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items)

Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs)

Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs)

Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs)

SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA)

Relief Time: _________________________________ Relief Date: ______________

Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties:

Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station)

Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week)

Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked)

Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs)

TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [12-19-2011]

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2012-12 NRC Examination Scenario 1 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

1. ENSURE Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 331 by performing the following actions:

a. Select ICManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate IC 331.

c. Right click on IC 331.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC 331.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen:

Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value fw27d lcv-6-105b fail position M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 100 rh02 failure of auto transfer to containment sump M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active fw28b lcv-6-190b fail M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 100 fw27c lcv-6-105a fail position M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 100 cs05 failure of phase b to actuate on hihi cntmt pressure M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active hs-62-74a-1 22200 regen htx letdown iso(green) O 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off 00:00:00 hs-62-74a-2 22200 regen htx letdown iso(red) O 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off 00:00:00 hs-62-74a hs-62-74a regen heat exch letdown isolation valve O 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 close 00:00:00 xx-55-6eg-66 i/o var. status light pnl 1m6 O 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2012-12 NRC Examination Scenario 1 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value xx-55-6er-66 i/o var. status light pnl 1m6 O 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off On mux_21c040 17-b 125 dc vital batt bd i abnormal M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 On None rwr03 power to appendix r valve 67-81 R 21 00:00:00 00:00:00 on off rwr05 valve fcv-67-22 breaker position R 22 00:00:00 00:00:00 close open rwr12 power to appendix r valve 67-147 R 23 00:00:00 00:00:00 on 00:00:00 tcr01 eh fluid pumps control switch R 30 00:00:00 00:00:00 off auto rw16a ercw supply header 1-a break in yard M 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 80 0 rcr05 prz pic 68-340 local/control room control R 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 remote local pic-68-340a_ai 03250 rcs przr press control O 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 32.9102 tc01 ehc tank low-level M 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive th02c loca - cold leg loop 3 M 6 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 0

5. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

6. ENSURE the Train A Week - Channel I sign is placed on 1-M-30.

7. Place simulator in FREEZE.

8. ENSURE Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Reactivity Briefing Book MOL (Middle Of Life) is provided to the crew as part of the Turnover Package, and that the MOL placards are on 1-M-6, below the Boric Acid and Primary Water Integrators.

9. WHEN prompted by the Chief Examiner, place the Simulator in RUN.

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2012-12 NRC Examination Scenario 1 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

1 n/a Power reduction to 35% using 1-1-GO-4, Normal Power Operation Section 5.3, Unit Shutdown from 100% to 30%

Reactor Power.

When contacted as Chemistry, repeat back the request to establish SG monitoring per CM-5.02, Hideout Return Sampling and Analysis.

n/a Removing East Side Water Box from service.

When contacted as an AUO:

Repeat back the request to isolate 1-ISV-2-706 for the East water box. Report back that 1-ISV-2-706, MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM LINE ISOL is CLOSED.

Repeat back the report that one of the 3 running CCW pumps will be shutdown.

Repeat back request to perform Steps 8, 9 and 10 of SOI-27.01, Section 8.7.7.

OR Repeat back the request to open 1-VTV-27-515, CCW EAST SIDE CONDENSER INLET WATER BOX VENT and 1-VTV-27-517, CCW EAST SIDE CONDENSER OUTLET WATER BOX VENT.

Repeat back the request to throttle open 1-DRV-27-591, CCW INLET WATER BOX DRAIN and 1-DRV-27-593, CCW OUTLET WATER BOX DRAIN.

2 1 Blown fuse 0-FU-236-1/A8, which results in the closure of 1-FCV-62-74, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM CIV-B, and loss of normal letdown.

When the BOP dispatches AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the requests to determine the cause of 17-B annunciator.

Console Operator reports back that there is a blown fuse on 125V DC Vital Battery Board 1, 0-FU-236-1/A8, associated with 1-FCV-62-74.

If directed to replace the fuse, the Console Operator will repeat back the request, then report that the replacement fuse has also blown.

When the SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back request for a troubleshooting and repair package to investigate the cause of the blown fuse which affected 1-FCV-62-74.

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2012-12 NRC Examination Scenario 1 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

3 3 1A ERCW Supply header rupture in the Yard.

When contacted as an AUO:

Repeat back the request to look for the ERCW leak in the yard. Report a large amount of water in the yard, coming from an underground source.

Repeat back the request to go to the RX MOV boards and to standby.

Repeat back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A, c/7B. Report the breaker closed after entering REMOTE FUNCTION rwr05.

Repeat back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A, c/8A. Report the breaker closed after entering REMOTE FUNCTION rwr03.

Repeat back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A, c/11B. Report the breaker closed after entering REMOTE FUNCTION rwr12.

Repeat back the request to determine if Strainer Cross tie is in use. Reports that the Strainer Cross-tie is NOT in use.

Repeats back the request to ensure that 1-ISV-67-1117 OR 2-ISV-67-1119 is CLOSED. Reports that 1-ISV-67-1117 is CLOSED.

When contacted as Work Control, repeat back the request for a work package to troubleshoot and repair 1A ERCW Header rupture.

4 4 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL automatic output fails.

When contacted as Work Control, repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1-PIC-68-340A.

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2012-12 NRC Examination Scenario 1 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

5 5 EHC leak develops.

When the BOP contacts an AUO:

Repeat back the request to determine the cause of the alarm. Report that there is a large leak in the EHC piping.

Repeat back the request to observe the turbine main (TV/GV) and reheat valves. Report that the valves are currently open, and that the main control room will be contacted if valves begin to close.

Repeat back the request for EHC tank level. Report that level is at 6 inches and dropping.

To remove EHC pumps, the Console Operator will repeat back the request and stop the EHC pumps using tcr01 on Event 30.

When the SRO contacts Work Control, repeat back the request to add EHC fluid to the tank.

6 5 Turbine trip due to loss of EHC.

When contacted as the TB AUO, repeat back the request to perform AOI-17, Attachment 1. The Console Operator will enter Schedule file AOI-17-BOP to perform local actions of Attachment 1.

When contacted as the STA, repeat back the request to perform TI-127.

7 6 Large break LOCA.

When contacted as an AUO:

Repeat back the request to perform 1-E-0, Attachment 1. Report that Attachment 1 is complete.

Repeat back the request to shutdown Upper and Lower CNTMT rad monitors USING 1-SOI-90.02, Gaseous Process Radiation Monitors. Report that the Upper and Lower CNTMT Rad monitors are shutdown.

Repeat back request to check low analyzer temp lights. Report that the lights are NOT LIT.

Repeat back the request to perform AOI-17, Attachment 1, Turbine Building NAUO Duties Following A Turbine Trip.

Repeat back the request, Console Operator enters remote functions sir01, sir14 and sir06 to perform actions, and then reports that Appendix A through C have been performed Repeat back the request to perform 1-E-1, Appendix B. The Console Operator will enter remote function rhr14 to restore power to 1-FCV-63-1.

When SRO contacts Chemistry, the Console Operator will repeat back information supplied.

Scenario 1 Attachment 1 1-45W600-62-2, WIRING DIAGRAMS CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL SYS SCHEMATIC DIAGRAMS 1-45W703-5A, WIRING DIAGRAMS 125V VITAL BTRY BOARD I PNL 4 CONNECTION DIAGRAM SHEET 5A

Scenario 1 Attachment 2 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix A, B and Attachments 1 through 5.

Scenario 1 Attachment 3 AOI-17, Turbine Trip.

Section 3.3, BOP Realignment.

Scenario 1 Attachment 4 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Appendix A through D

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Watts Bar March 2013 Scenario No. 2 Op Test No.: 1 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Run Time:

Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOL conditions. RCS Boron Concentration is 757 ppm. Control Bank D rods are at 220 steps. EOOS risk matrix is GREEN.

Turnover: Train B/Channel II Work Week. Window 23-A, TURB/GEN VIBRATION HI/HI-HI is lit. Bearing 9 indicates 10.1 mils, and Bearing 10 indicates 9.0 mils and an OPDP-9, Emergent Issue, meeting is in progress to determine compensatory actions. 1B-B CCP is in service to equalize run time.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description No.

1 ni07c I-RO Power Range N42 fails high. Requires entry into 1-AOI-4, Nuclear TS-SRO Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

2 rp18h C-BOP Loss of 120V AC to Eagle Rack 8. Requires performance of 1-AOI-44, TS- SRO Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires BOP to take actions transfer Steam Dump controls and to defeat 1-R-8 inputs to DCS. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

3 lic-68-339 C-RO 1-LIC-68-339A, CHRG FLOW/PZR LEVEL CONTROL fails, causing 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL to close.

Requires RO to take manual control of 1-FIC-62-93A to restore charging flow. Requires performance of AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System.

4 rx09d I-BOP 1-FT-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW, fails low. Requires BOP to place SG 4 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve and 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL. Requires performance of 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Subsection 3.5, Failure of Automatic S/G level control. Requires BOP to take actions to defeat 1-FI-1-28A, SG 1 STEAM FLOW.

5 n/a N-BOP/SRO Shift Manager contacts the SRO and directs a load reduction using AOI-R-RO 39. Rapid Load Reduction, to 90% at 2%/min. to attempt to reduce main turbine vibration.

6 tu02i M-ALL When load has been reduced to 93%, Bearing 9 indicates vibration rises rp01c to 14 mils, requiring the reactor and turbine to be tripped When the manual reactor trip is attempted, an ATWS occurs. Requires performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

7 ms02a M-ALL Main steam line break outside containment occurs after actions of 1-FR-ms04a S.1 to terminate boration have been accomplished. All MSIVs fail to ms28b automatically close, requiring manual closure. MSIV 1 fails to close until ms28c after transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, is made.

ms28d Requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, then 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2 - Summary Initial Condition 100% power, MOL conditions. RCS Boron Concentration is 757 ppm. Control Bank D rods are at 220 steps. EOOS risk matrix is GREEN.

Turnover Train B/Channel II Work Week. Window 23-A, TURB/GEN VIBRATION HI/HI-HI is lit.

Bearing 9 indicates 10.1 mils, and Bearing 10 indicates 9.0 mils and an OPDP-9, Emergent Issue, meeting is in progress to determine compensatory actions. 1B-B CCP is in service to equalize run time.

Event Description 1 N42 POWER RANGE fails high. Requires RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place rod control in MANUAL. Requires performance of 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires defeat of inputs to DCS. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation, for multiple functions.

2 Loss of 120V AC to Eagle Rack 8. Requires performance of 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions.

Requires BOP to take actions transfer Steam Dump controls and to defeat 1-R-8 inputs to DCS.

Requires Tech Spec evaluation, and entry into LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Actuation Instrumentation, and LCO 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring System Instrumentation for multiple functions.

3 1-LIC-68-339A, CHRG FLOW/PZR LEVEL CONTROL fails, causing 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL to close. Requires RO to take manual control of 1-FIC-62-93A to restore charging flow. Requires performance of AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System.

4 1-FT-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW, fails low. Requires BOP to place SG 4 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve and 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL.

Requires performance of 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Subsection 3.5, Failure of Automatic S/G level control. Requires BOP to take actions to defeat 1-FI-1-28A, SG 1 STEAM FLOW.

5 Shift Manager contacts the SRO and directs a load reduction using AOI-39. Rapid Load Reduction, to 90% at 2%/min. to attempt to reduce main turbine vibration. When turbine load is reduced to 93%, Bearing 9 vibrations rise to 14 mils, requiring the reactor and turbine to be tripped.

6 When the manual reactor trip is attempted, an ATWS occurs. Requires performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

7 Main steam line break outside containment occurs after actions of 1-FR-S.1 to terminate boration have been accomplished. All MSIVs fail to automatically close, requiring manual closure. MSIV 1 fails to close until after transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, is made. Requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, then 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2 - Critical Task Summary Critical Task Description 1 Insert negative reactivity into the core by inserting control rods.

2 Manually trip the main turbine before dryout of the steam generators (3 of 4 SGs less than 26% Wide Range.)

3 Manually start the AFW pumps prior to exiting 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

4 Manually isolate the faulted SG (SG 1) prior to exiting 1-E-2, Faulted SG Isolation.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 4 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range N42 fails high. Requires entry into 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

83-A POWER RANGE OPERPOWER ROD WD STOP 83-D PLANT COMPUTER GENERATED ALARM (SEE ICS) 83-E POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION 90-B PZR PRESS LO-DEVN BACKUP HTRS ON 115-C POWER RANGE FLUX HI 115-E POWER RANGE FLUX RATE HI Control rods inserting at 72 steps per minute.

RO Diagnoses and announces Power Range N42 Failure.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 1-AOI-4 to place rod control in RO MANUAL and observes no rod motion.

Enter and direct actions of 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions, SRO Section 3.4, Power Range Monitor Malfunction.

The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation 1-AOI-4 Malfunctions, Section 3.4, Power Range Monitor Malfunction.

NOTE Steps 1and 2 are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps.

1. PLACE control rods in MANUAL.

RO RO places 1-RBSS ROD BANK SELECT in MAN.

2. CHECK rod motion STOPPED.

RO RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor 1 and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 for indication that all rod motion has stopped.

3. CHECK S/G levels NORMAL BOP BOP observes narrow range levels are stable on 1-FR-3-35, SG 1, 1-FR-3-48, SG 2, 1-FR-3-90, SG 3 and 1-FR-3-103, SG 4, BLUE indications.

NOTE Control rod withdrawal may not be possible if a PRM has failed high due to the 103% Rod Withdrawl Stop (C-2) (Annunciator window 83-A).

4. MAINTAIN T-avg and T-ref within 3°F.

RO RO determines that Tavg and Tref are within 3°F.

5. DEFEAT failed PRM functions using the appropriate attachment:

REFER TO Attachment 1, Defeat N-41 PRM Function At NIS Rack.

REFER TO Attachment 2, Defeat N-42 PRM Function At NIS Rack RO SRO enters and directs actions of 1-AOI-4, Attachment 2.

REFER TO Attachment 3, Defeat N-43 PRM Function At NIS Rack

REFER TO Attachment 4, Defeat N-44 PRM Function At NIS Rack.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 5 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range N42 fails high. Requires entry into 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions, Attachment 3, Defeat N-42 PRM Function at NIS Rack.

NOTE The following annunciators may be affected by defeating a PRM channel:

[67-C] N-42 OVERPOWER ROD STOP BYPASSED.

[82-E] NIS CHANNEL IN TEST.

[83-A] POWER RANGE OVERPOWER ROD WD STOP.

[83-E] POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION.

[115-C] POWER RANGE FLUX HI.

[115-E] POWER RANGE FLUX RATE HI.

A. PERFORM the following steps for N42 PRM:

1. PLACE DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR switch for UPPER SECTION to PRN42.

RO RO locates DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR switch and rotates the switch from the NORMAL position to the right to the N42 position.

2. PLACE DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR switch for LOWER SECTION to PRN42.

RO RO locates DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR switch and rotates the switch from the NORMAL position to the right to the N42 position.

NOTE On the following step, annunciator window 83-A, POWER RANGE OVERPOWER ROD WD STOP will clear (if channel failure was high) and window 67-C, N-42 OVERPOWER ROD STOP BYPASSED, will come into alarm.

3. PLACE ROD STOP BYPASS switch to BYPASS N42.

RO RO locates ROD STOP BYPASS switch and rotates the switch from the mid position to the right to the N42 position.

4. PLACE POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch to BYPASS N42.

RO RO locates POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch and rotates the switch from the mid position to the right to the N42 position.

NOTE On the following step, annunciator window 83-E, POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION, will clear and annunciator window 82-E, NIS CHANNEL IN TEST, will come into alarm.

5. PLACE COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch to N42.

RO RO locates COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch and rotates the switch from the NORMAL position to the right to the N42 position.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 6 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range N42 fails high. Requires entry into 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE On the following step, annunciator window 115-E, POWER RANGE FLUX RATE HI, will clear if the positive rate trip light is LIT.

6. IF POSITIVE RATE TRIP is LIT, THEN RESET RATE MODE switch.

RO determines that POSITIVE RATE TRIP is LIT on 1-IDWR-92-N42A, RO POWER RANGE UPPER N42A and rotates the switch to the LEFT to the RESET position. RO observes POSITIVE RATE TRIP light DARK, and 115-E POWER RANGE FLUX RATE HI clear.

7. PLACE N-42 in Maintenance Bypass using DCS Operator Display:

RO performs actions using the DCS Operator Display trackball.

a. SELECT BYPASSED TRANSMITTERS" from the BOP MENU.

RO b. SELECT 1LPY0920412Q.

c. SELECT MAINT BYP SIGNAL B for 1LPY0920412Q.

d. CONFIRM MAINT BYP SIGNAL B changes from gray to red.

e. VERIFY yellow BYP displayed above column B.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions, Section 3.4, Power Range Monitor malfunction, at Step 6.

6. ENSURE 1-NR-92-145 recording an operable power range channel.

RO RO observes 1-NR-92-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER and determines that PR N42 is NOT selected.

NOTE Inputs to 1-TR-68-2A include power range monitor, pressurizer pressure, T and Tavg. Selection of an operable channel should consider other failures in addition to the failed power range monitor channel.

7. ENSURE 1-TR-68-2A placed to operable T/OTT/OPT channel using 1-XS-68-2B, T RCDR TR-68-2A LOOP SELECT [1-M-5].

RO RO observes 1-XS-68-2B T RCDR TR-68-2A LOOP SELECT and determines that Loop 1 is selected.

8. INITIATE repairs on failed channel.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for PR N42.

CAUTION Allowing at least 5 minutes between any rod control input (i.e., Tavg, Tref, or NIS) changes and placing rods in AUTO, will help prevent undesired control rod movement.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 7 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range N42 fails high. Requires entry into 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The crew may reposition Control Bank D back to its original position of 220 steps withdrawn prior to returning rod to AUTO.

9. WHEN AUTO rod control desired, THEN:

a. ENSURE Tavg and Tref within 1°F.

RO observes 1-TR-68-2B, TREF & AUCT TAVG - °F, and determines that Tavg and Tref are within 1°F.

b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication [1-M-4].

RO RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor 1 and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 and determines that a zero demand is present.

c. PLACE control rods in AUTO.

RO locates 1-RBSS, ROD BANK SELECT and rotates the handswitch to the right from the MAN position to the AUTO position.

10. NOTIFY Work Control to have IM trip failed channel bistables.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to have the bistables tripped for PR N42.

11. REFER TO Tech Specs:

3.3.1-1, Rx Trip System (RTS) 2.a. Power Range Neutron Flux - High Condition D. One Power Range Neutron Flux-High channel inoperable. Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months AND Reduce THERMAL POWER to 75% RTP within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months ; OR Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months AND Perform SR 3.2.4.2 every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months .

3.a. Power Range Neutron Flux Rate - High Positive Rate Condition E. With one channel inoperable, place the channel in SRO trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR be in Mode 3 in 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months .

6. Overtemperature T Condition W. Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months .

EXAMINER: P-7 remains operable.

16.c. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8 Condition S. With ONE channel inoperable, verify the interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months OR be in Mode 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months .

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 8 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range N42 fails high. Requires entry into 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

11. REFER TO Tech Specs: (Continued) 16.d. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9 Condition S. With ONE channel inoperable, verify the interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months OR be in Mode 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months .

16.e. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 SRO Condition R. With ONE channel inoperable, verify the interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months OR be in Mode 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months .

3.2.4 Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR).

SR 3.2.4.2 Verify QPTR is within limit using the movable incore detectors, once within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter.

When contacted as Reactor Engineering, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for performance of 1-SI-0-22, Incore QPTR.

CAUTION Power fuses should NOT be removed during the performance of IMI-160 until affected PRM channel is in DCS BYPASS.

12. WHEN notified bistables are tripped, THEN CHECK lights and alarms referenced in Appendix A are LIT.

SRO Bistables are not expected to be tripped during the scenario. The SRO will hold this step open.

13. NOTIFY Operations Duty Manager and Rx Engineering of failed channel.

When contacted as the Operations Duty Manager, the Console SRO Operator will repeat back that PR N42 has failed.

When contacted as Reactor Engineering, the Console Operator will repeat back that PR N42 has failed. Performance of 1-SI-0-22, Incore QPTR, may be discussed.

14. DO NOT CONTINUE with this Instruction UNTIL failed PRM repair is completed.

SRO The SRO will hold this procedure open until repairs have been completed.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 2, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 9 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range N42 fails high. Requires entry into 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 2.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 10 of 51 Event

Description:

Loss of 120V AC to Eagle Rack 8. Requires performance of 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires BOP to take actions to defeat 1-R-8 inputs to DCS and to transfer Steam Dump Controls to STM PRESS mode. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

58-B,SG FEEDWATER FLOW HI 61-C,SG 2 STM-FW FLOW MISMATCH 63-C, SG 4 STM-FW FLOW MISMATCH 66-E, C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK 67-D, PROT SET II BYPASS 82-F, DCS TROUBLE 110-F, PROT SET TROUBLE 112-F, PROT SET II CHANNEL FAILURE 117-A, SG 2 PRESS LO 119-A, SG 4 PRESS LO 121-A, SG 2 PRESS NEG RATE 123-A, SG 4 PRESS NEG RATE 1-XX-55-6A, RX TRIP-SI STATUS Window 36, TURBINE PWR >P13 PS-1-72A DARK RO Diagnoses and announces the failure of 1-PT-1-72.

RO Diagnoses and announces the failure of Eagle Rack 1-R-8.

SRO Enters and directs actions of1-1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions.

The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 1-AOI-44 Malfunctions.

CAUTION Rack failure with existing OOS loops may result in some controls forced to MANUAL by DCS logic.

NOTE DCS should auto bypass out of range inputs. Partial failures require manual BYPASS using DCS Operator Display.

1. IDENTIFY rack associated with failure:

REFER TO ALARM printer.

BOP may refer to the alarm printer to determine that Rack 8 has failed.

ENTER EGLRCK Turn-on code into ICS computer screen (failed rack RO/ BOP will have red lights next to any status):

BOP may enter turn on code EGLRCK or an equivalent to call up the Eagle Rack displays on ICS. If called up, then determines from the ICS screen that Rack 8 has failed.

REFER TO Appendix A to identify failed rack from bistable pattern Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 11 of 51 Event

Description:

Loss of 120V AC to Eagle Rack 8. Requires performance of 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires BOP to take actions to defeat 1-R-8 inputs to DCS and to transfer Steam Dump Controls to STM PRESS mode. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE Additional bistables lit in row may indicate a power or Logic Control Panel (LCP) failure. (PROT SET TROUBLE lights 19, 39, 59, & 79 are not bistables)

RO 2. CHECK bistable indications NORMAL.

2. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

- GO TO Section 3.2, Response to LCP or Output Failure.

SRO SRO determines the failure is in Protection Set II/Channel 2 from reports provided by the RO and BOP.

SRO selects Section 3.2.8, 1-R-8 from Diagnostic Table.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions, Section 3.2.8, 1-R-8 Failure.

CAUTION All analog outputs from failed rack are FROZEN in place (providing power supply has not failed). This may include inputs to recorders.

NOTE Instrument loop inputs to U1118 and U2118 may be affected by LCP failure.

IMI-99.008 may be referenced for 1-R-8 Eagle 21 loop identifiers and failure responses.

1. VERIFY Feedwater controls in AUTO and CONTROLLED.

BOP BOP observes BLUE AUTO lights LIT on each of the MFW Reg valve controllers. BOP observes SG levels on program.

2. PERFORM the following to bypass Rack 8 inputs to DCS:

BOP performs actions using the DCS Operator Display trackball.

a. SELECT BOP MENU.

b. SELECT EAGLE CHANNEL BYPASS.

BOP c. SELECT 1-R-8 to bring up bypass overlay.

d. SELECT BYPASS EAGLE RACK 1-R-8.

e. SELECT BYPASS EAGLE RACK 1-R-8 on popup to bypass of Rack 8 inputs to DCS.

f. VERIFY component(s), listed in BYPASS EAGLE RACK 1-R-8 overlay, indicate yellow BYPASSED condition.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 12 of 51 Event

Description:

Loss of 120V AC to Eagle Rack 8. Requires performance of 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires BOP to take actions to defeat 1-R-8 inputs to DCS and to transfer Steam Dump Controls to STM PRESS mode. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. PLACE Steam Dumps in STEAM PRESS mode:

a. PLACE steam dump controls OFF:

1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A.

BOP locates 1-HS-1-103A STM DUMP FSV A and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the OFF RESET position.

1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B.

BOP locates 1-HS-1-103B STM DUMP FSV B and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the OFF RESET position.

b. PLACE steam dump mode switch in STEAM PRESS.

BOP locates 1-HS-1-103D STEAM DUMP MODE and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the STEAM PRESS position.

c. ENSURE steam dump demand indicator 1-XI-1-33 reading ZERO.

BOP BOP locates 1-XI-1-33, STEAM DUMP DEMAND and observes demand signal dropping to ZERO.

d. PLACE steam dump controls to ON:

1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A.

BOP locates 1-HS-1-103A STM DUMP FSV A and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the ON (mid) position.

1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B.

BOP locates 1-HS-1-103B STM DUMP FSV B and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the ON (mid) position.

e. ENSURE steam dump press controller, 1-PIC-1-33 in AUTO, AND ADJUST to 84% (1092 psig).

BOP locates 1-PIC-1-33, STM DUMP PRESS CONTROL and checks setpoint set at 84%.

NOTE The following instrument loops are affected by this failure:

Feedwater Flow Loops, LPF-3-48B &103B.

Steam Flow Loops, LPF-1-10B & 28B.

Steam Press Loops LPP-1-9B & 27B.

Turb Impulse Pressure Loop LPP-1-72 including Steam Dump C-7 Intlk.

Cont Sump Level Loop LPL-63-181 including Auto Recirc Intlk on Cont Sump HI level Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 13 of 51 Event

Description:

Loss of 120V AC to Eagle Rack 8. Requires performance of 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires BOP to take actions to defeat 1-R-8 inputs to DCS and to transfer Steam Dump Controls to STM PRESS mode. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. REFER TO TECH SPECS:

3.3.1 for Modes 1 and 2

16. Reactor Trip System Interlocks, f. Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-13, Condition S. With one channel inoperable, verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months OR Be in Mode 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months .

3.3.2 for Modes 1, 2 and 3 3.3.2.1.e., Steam Line Pressure-Low, Condition D, One channel inoperable, Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months AND Be in MODE 4 within 84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months .

3.3.2.4.d.(1), Steam Line Isolation, Steam Line Pressure-Low, Condition SRO D, One channel inoperable, Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months AND Be in MODE 4 within 84 hours9.722222e-4 days 0.0233 hours 1.388889e-4 weeks 3.1962e-5 months .

3.3.2.7.b, Containment Sump Level - High, Condition K, One channel inoperable, Place channel in bypass within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months AND Be in MODE 5 within 108 hours0.00125 days 0.03 hours 1.785714e-4 weeks 4.1094e-5 months .

3.3.3 for Modes 1, 2 and 3 Function 7 Containment Sump Water Level (Wide Range)

Function 24 Steam Generator Pressure Condition A, With One or more Functions with one required channel inoperable, restore required channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

TR 3.3.7 >15% RTP

5. INITIATE repairs to failed rack.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back request to troubleshoot and repair Eagle Rack 1-R-8.

6. CHECK indications normal for other Eagle 21 rack(s).

RO/BOP RO selects EAGLE 21 MENU on the ICS Display, and monitors the other Eagle 21 Racks. Reports that all other racks are NORMAL.

RO/BOP 7. MONITOR any alternate indications available for inputs lost to lit alarms.

SRO 8. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew brief is optional. The next event, Event 3, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 14 of 51 Event

Description:

Loss of 120V AC to Eagle Rack 8. Requires performance of 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires BOP to take actions to defeat 1-R-8 inputs to DCS and to transfer Steam Dump Controls to STM PRESS mode. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 3.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 15 of 51 Event

Description:

1-LIC-68-339A, CHRG FLOW/PZR LEVEL CONTROL fails, causing 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

101-E, RCP SEAL SUPPLY FLOW LO 108-A, CHARGING FLOW HI/LO 1-FI-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW indicates charging flow is dropping.

RO Diagnoses and announces the loss of charging flow.

May take manual control of 1-HIC-62-93 and raise charging flow to normal RO values.

May dispatch AUO locally to check 1-FCV-62-93 controller.

When dispatched as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back RO the request to locally check 1-FCV-62-93A controller. The Console Operator will report that there is no apparent problem with the 1-FCV-62-93 controller.

May take manual control of 1-LIC-68-339, CHRG FLOW/PZR LEVEL RO CONTROL, and attempt to adjust charging flow.

RO May enter and take actions of ARI 108-A, CHARGING FLOW HI/LO Enters and directs actions of AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level SRO Control System.

The following actions are taken from ARI 108A, CHARGING FLOW ARI 108-A HI/LO.

[1] IF ALL the following conditions exist:

Any RCP Thermal Barrier Out-of-Service

In-Service Charging pump trips RO

RCP seal injection flow required THEN IMMEDIATELY START available charging pump to restore seal flow.

RO determines that the conditions for this step are not met, and continues to the next step.

[2] CHECK 1-FI-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW [1-M-5] to determine if flow is high or low.

RO RO observes flow on 1-FI-62-93A and determines that flow is (or was) low.

[3] CHECK 1-LI-68-320, -335A, and -339A, PZR LEVEL [1-M-4].

RO RO observes PZR LEVEL on 1-LI-68-320, 1-LI-68-335A, and 1-LI 339A and determines that PZR level is normal.

[4] IF PZR Level Control System malfunction, THEN GO TO AOI-20.

SRO SRO determines that 1-HIC-62-93A did not respond correctly in AUTO and enters AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 16 of 51 Event

Description:

1-LIC-68-339A, CHRG FLOW/PZR LEVEL CONTROL fails, causing 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[5] IF charging flow is low, THEN CHECK letdown temperature AND EVALUATE increasing charging flow OR ISOLATE letdown.

RO RO may have already taken manual control of 1-HIC-62-93A and restored charging flow to normal.

[6] IF charging is lost, THEN IMMEDIATELY ISOLATE letdown per SOI-62.01.

RO RO determines that the conditions for this step are not met, and continues to the next step.

[7] DETERMINE cause of problem AND INITIATE corrective action, as necessary.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator repeats back the request for a work package to troubleshoot and repair 1-HIC-62-93 and/or 1-LIC-68-339.

SRO [8] REFER TO SOI-62.01 for CVCS system operation.

The following actions are taken from AOI-20, Malfunction of AOI-20 Pressurizer Level Control System.

NOTE Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step.

1. CHECK charging in service.

RO RO locates and observes that the 1A-A CCP is running, 1-HS-62-90 and 1-HS-62-91 are OPEN (RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK).

EXAMINER: If no action was taken to raise charging flow when 108-A, CHARGING FLOW HI/LO was received, then the crew will enter and take actions of Step 1 RNO. If charging flow was returned to normal, then the SRO will continue to Step 2.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF charging flow ABNORMAL

Flow low or isolated

Window 110A LIT RO THEN, ISOLATE letdown:

1) CLOSE letdown orifice(s)

2) CLOSE 1-FCV-62-69

3) CLOSE 1-FCV-62-70

2. CHECK pzr level program signal NORMAL (green pen):

1-LR-68-339 RO RO locates 1-LR-68-339, PZR LEVEL %, and determines that the GREEN pen is normal, at approximately 60%.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 17 of 51 Event

Description:

1-LIC-68-339A, CHRG FLOW/PZR LEVEL CONTROL fails, causing 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. ENSURE 1-XS-68-339E selected to OPERABLE channels for control and backup:

LT-68-339 & 335 OR

LT-68-335 & 320 RO OR

LT-68-339 & 320 RO observes the PZR level indications and determines that all of the level transmitters are functioning properly and that 1-XS-68-339E is selected properly.

4. CHECK letdown in SERVICE

1-FCV-62-69 OPEN RO locates and observes that 1-HS-62-69, RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT, is OPEN (RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK).

1-FCV-62-70 OPEN RO locates and observes that 1-HS-62-70, RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT, is OPEN (RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK).

1-FCV-62-77 OPEN RO RO locates and observes that 1-HS-62-77, LP LETDOWN ISOL CIV-A, is OPEN (RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK).

Letdown orifice OPEN RO locates and observes that 1-HS-62-74, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75GPM CIV-A, is OPEN (RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK).

Letdown flow NORMAL RO locates 1-LI-62-82, LETDOWN FLOW and observes flow at approximately 75 gpm.

EXAMINER: If no action was taken to raise charging flow when 108-A, CHARGING FLOW HI/LO was received, then the crew will enter and take actions of Step 1 RNO, which directs the operator to isolate letdown. Step 4 RNO addresses returning letdown to service.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 18 of 51 Event

Description:

1-LIC-68-339A, CHRG FLOW/PZR LEVEL CONTROL fails, causing 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE pzr heater banks D and C ON.

RO locates 1-HS-68-341H, BACKUP HEATERS C and determines that the heaters are on by observing the RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

RO locates 1-HS-68-341F, CONTROL HEATERS D and determines that the heaters are on by observing the RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

ESTABLISH charging and letdown:

REFER TO Attachment 1 SRO implements Attachment 1 actions.

RO IF pzr level rising uncontrolled due to 1-PCV-62-81 failed closed, THEN

1) CLOSE letdown orifices.

2) CLOSE charging valves 1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV-62-91

3) EVALUATE placing excess Letdown in service:

REFER TO SOI-62.01,CVCS-Charging and Letdown.

4) WHEN ready to LOCALLY CONTROL 1-PCV-62-81, THEN REFER TO ATTACHMENT 1 in conjunction with SOI-62.01, CVCS-Charging and Letdown.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System, Attachment 1, ALIGNMENT OF CHARGING AND LETDOWN.

1.1 Establish Charging and Letdown A. IF charging NOT established, THEN PERFORM the following:

SRO SRO determines that the conditions of the step are not met and continues to Step B.

B. ENSURE letdown isol valves OPEN:

1. 1-FCV-62-69, CVCS LETDOWN ISOLATION.

RO locates 1-HS-62-69A, RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT and observes the valve open by RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

2. 1-FCV-62-70, CVCS LETDOWN ISOLATION RO RO locates 1-HS-62-70A, RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT and observes the valve open by RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

3. 1-FCV-62-77, CVCS LP LETDOWN ISOLATION.

RO locates 1-HS-62-77A, LP LETDOWN ISOL CIV-A, and observes the valve open by RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 19 of 51 Event

Description:

1-LIC-68-339A, CHRG FLOW/PZR LEVEL CONTROL fails, causing 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior C. PLACE 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP 1-TCV 192 CNTL, in MANUAL at 25% OPEN.

RO 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL is placed in MANUAL by lifting the toggle switch from the AUTO position, the toggle is pushed to the right to open the valve to 75% (as read on the controller.)

D. PLACE 1- HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, in MANUAL at 40-50% OPEN if using 75 gpm orifice (20-30% OPEN if using 45 gpm orifice).

RO 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL is placed in MANUAL by lifting the toggle switch from the AUTO position, the toggle is pushed to the right to open the valve to 40-50% (as read on the controller).

E. ESTABLISH 75 gpm or greater charging flow while maintaining seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm for each RCP using 1-FCV 93 and 1-FCV-62-89.

RO RO establishes 75 gpm charging flow on 1-FI-62-93A, and 8 to 13 gpm on 1-FI-62-1A, RCP 1 SEAL SUP FLOW, 1-FI-62-14A, RCP 2 SEAL SUP FLOW, 1-FI-62-27A, RCP 3 SEAL SUP FLOW, and 1-FI-62-40A, RCP 4 SEAL SUP FLOW.

F. OPEN letdown orifices as needed:

1-FCV-62-72 (45 gpm)

1-FCV-62-73 (75 gpm).

1-FCV-62-74 (75 gpm).

1-FCV-62-76 (5 gpm).

RO selects 1-HS-62-74A, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM - CIV-A, and rotates the selected handswitch to the right to the OPEN position, and holds the handswitch OPEN until the RED light is LIT and the GREEN light is DARK.

G. ADJUST 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, for desired press, (320 psig at normal letdown temp), and PLACE in AUTO.

RO 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL toggle switch is moved to the right to close the valve and raise pressure to 320 psig. 1-HIC 81A is placed in AUTO by pushing the toggle switch down to the AUTO position.

H. PLACE 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL, in AUTO.

RO 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL, is placed in AUTO by pushing the toggle switch down to the AUTO position.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 20 of 51 Event

Description:

1-LIC-68-339A, CHRG FLOW/PZR LEVEL CONTROL fails, causing 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I. RETURN pzr level to program.

RO RO makes periodic adjustments to 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL and 1-HIC-62-89A, CHG HDR - RCP SEALS FLOW CONTROL to return PZR level to program level.

J. WHEN ready to return 1-FCV-62-93 to AUTO control, THEN PERFORM Section 1.2 RO SRO determines that 1-FCV-62-93 will remain in MANUAL until repairs are completed.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System, beginning at Step 5.

5. ENSURE pzr level returning to program:

CONTROL 1-HIC-62-93A in MAN as necessary RO

MAINTAIN regen hx letdown temp < 380 °F.

RO controls pzr level using 1-HIC-62-93A in MANUAL. RO maintains 1-TI-62-71, REGEN HX OUTLET LTDN TEMP less than 380F by adjusting charging flow with 1-HIC-62-93A.

D 6. CHECK pzr heaters ENERGIZED:

a. Control Heaters D red light LIT.

RO locates 1-HS-68-341F, CONTROL HEATERS D, and observes the RO heaters are ON (RED light is ON and the GREEN light is DARK).

b. Backup Heaters C red light LIT.

RO locates 1-HS-68-341H, BACKUP HEATERS C, and observes the heaters are ON (RED light is ON and the GREEN light is DARK).

7. ENSURE operable channel selected for recording with 1-XS 339B [1-M-5]:

RO Since none of the level channels have failed, 1-XS-68-339B is selected to record an operable channel.

8. CHECK 1-HIC-62-93A in AUTO.

RO RO reports that 1-HIC-62-93A is in MANUAL and will not control in AUTO.

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED; WHEN desired to return 1-HIC-62-93A to AUTO, THEN PERFORM SRO ATTACHMENT 1, Section 1.2.

SRO determines that this step will remain open until repairs are complete.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 21 of 51 Event

Description:

1-LIC-68-339A, CHRG FLOW/PZR LEVEL CONTROL fails, causing 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL to close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.

Not applicable

3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.

Not applicable SRO

3.4.9 Pressurizer Not applicable

3.5.2, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS)

Not applicable

TR 3.1.4 Charging Pump, Operating Not applicable

10. NOTIFY Work Control to remove any failed channel from service.

SRO SRO determines that since no channels have failed, this step is N/A.

11. INITIATE repairs to failed instrument/circuitry.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, if not previously performed, the Console Operator repeats back the request for a work package to troubleshoot and repair 1-HIC-62-93 and/or 1-LIC-68-339.

SRO 12. RETURN TO instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew brief is optional. The next event, Event 4, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 4.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 22 of 51 Event

Description:

1-FT-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW, fails low. Requires BOP to place SG 4 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve and 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL.

Requires performance of 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Subsection 3.5, Failure of Automatic S/G level control. Requires BOP to take actions to defeat 1-FI-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

1-FI-3-103B, SF 4 FEED FLOW dropping 1-LI-3-42 SG 1 LEVEL, 1-LI-3-39 SG 1 LEVEL, and 1-LI-3-38 SG 1 LEVEL a decreasing trend.

BOP Diagnoses and announces the failure of 1-FI-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW.

May place 1-FIC-3-103, SG 4-MFW REG VLV in MAN and OPEN the valve BOP to restore Feedwater flow to normal, by matching feedwater flow to the feedwater flow to the other SGs.

May place 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in BOP MANUAL and raise feedwater pressure on 1-PI-3-1, #1 HTR INLET PRESS to restore D/P program.

Enters and directs actions of 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, SRO Section 3.5, Failure of Automatic S/G Level Control.

The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, 1-AOI-16 Section 3.5, Failure of Automatic S/G Level Control.

1. RESTORE S/G level(s)

a. ENSURE failed MFW reg or bypass reg valve in MANUAL.

BOP locates 1-FIC-3-103, SG 4-MFW REG VLV and then places in MAN and OPENS the valve to restore feedwater flow to normal, by matching BOP feedwater flow to the feedwater flow to the other SGs

b. CONTROL feedwater flow on affected S/G(s) to maintain S/G level on program.

BOP adjusts 1-FIC-3-103, SG 4-MFW REG VLV, periodically to return SG 4 level to program.

2. EVALUATE placing control rods in MANUAL.

SRO SRO directs the RO to place 1-RBSS ROD BANK SELECT in MANUAL.

3. CHECK MFW pumps recirc valves CLOSED.

BOP locates 1-FIC-3-70, MFWP A RECIRC CONTROL, and determines BOP from the controller that the recirc valve is closed.

BOP locates 1-FIC-3-84, MFWP B RECIRC CONTROL, and determines from the controller that the recirc valve is closed.

NOTES

Bypass reg. valve may be manually positioned up to 0.85 x 106 lb/hr flow to dampen oscillations in feedwater flow in loop of affected main reg valve.

A power tilt in the affected core quadrant may occur due to a rise in bypass flow. Flows above 84,500 lbm/hr in the bypass line will invalidate the value of computer point U1118.

BOP 4. CHECK SG levels on bypass reg valve control.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 23 of 51 Event

Description:

1-FT-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW, fails low. Requires BOP to place SG 4 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve and 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL.

Requires performance of 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Subsection 3.5, Failure of Automatic S/G level control. Requires BOP to take actions to defeat 1-FI-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO GO TO Step 7.

BOP 7. MONITOR MFPT speed normal for current power level EXAMINER: Step 7 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED actions are included since the MFP Speed control circuit may be affected by the failure.

7. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PLACE MFPT Master Speed Control in MANUAL, THEN ADJUST speed as necessary.

BOP BOP locates 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL and places the controller in MANUAL, then raises feedwater pressure on 1-PI-3-1, #1 HTR INLET PRESS to restore D/P program.

8. CHECK S/G levels returning to PROGRAM.

BOP BOP reports that SG levels are returning to program.

NOTE A LO FW FLOW WTR HAMMER annunciation [59-C] will be received when any main feedwater flow drops to less than 0.76 x 106 lb/hr.

9. CHECK window 59-C DARK.

BOP BOP reports 59-C is DARK.

NOTE

Failed channels are manually placed in Maintenance Bypass in preparation for repair. Two channels of an input in Bypass will result in affected controller forced to manual control.

It is possible for the DCS voter to bypass a good instrument loop, if the failed loop value is actually closer to the non-affected SG parameters it is compared with.

10. CHECK DCS has bypassed a good instrument loop, instead of a failed one.

BOP BOP determines from DCS display that DCS has correctly bypassed the failed channel.

10. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO GO TO Step 12.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 24 of 51 Event

Description:

1-FT-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW, fails low. Requires BOP to place SG 4 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve and 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL.

Requires performance of 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Subsection 3.5, Failure of Automatic S/G level control. Requires BOP to take actions to defeat 1-FI-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. CHECK level control channels NORMAL using control board indications and DCS Operator Display:

S/G pressure.

S/G level.

S/G feed flow.

S/G steam flow.

BOP identifies 1-FI-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW as the failed indicator.

12. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP performs actions using the DCS Operator Display trackball to place 1-FI-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW in Maintenance Bypass.

PERFORM the following to place any failed channel(s) in Maintenance Bypass:

a. NAVIGATE to affected input screen on DCS Operator Display.

b. SELECT channel to be bypassed.

c. SELECT appropriate MAINT BYP SIGNAL button.

d. CONFIRM MAINT BYP SIGNAL button changes from gray to red.

e. VERIFY input has yellow BYP displayed.

f. REPEAT steps as necessary to place all appropriate failed channels in Maintenance Bypass

13. CHECK press compensation channel(s) NORMAL.

SRO SRO determines that the pressure compensation channels have already been evaluated.

14. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator repeats back the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1-FI-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW.

15. WHEN auto rod control desired, THEN:

a. ENSURE T-ave and T-ref within 1°F.

RO observes T-avg and T-ref within 1F on 1-TR-68-2B, TREF & AUCT TAVG - °F.

b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication [1-M-4].

SRO RO observes that there is a zero demand indicated on the PASSIVE SUMMER ROD DEMAND on both CERPI displays.

c. PLACE rods in AUTO.

RO rotates 1-RBSS from the MANUAL position to the right to the AUTO position.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 25 of 51 Event

Description:

1-FT-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW, fails low. Requires BOP to place SG 4 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve and 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL.

Requires performance of 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Subsection 3.5, Failure of Automatic S/G level control. Requires BOP to take actions to defeat 1-FI-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

16. WHEN affected S/G controlling inputs NORMAL, THEN ENSURE the following:

a. Affected input restored from bypass. (1-SOI-98.01)

b. MFW reg valve in AUTO.

c. TDMFP Speed Control in AUTO SRO determines that after the failed steam flow channel is placed in MAINTENANCE Bypass, the TDMFP Speed Control may be returned to AUTO, if MANUAL had been selected.

SRO 17. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 5.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 26 of 51 Event

Description:

Shift Manager contacts the SRO and directs a load reduction using AOI-39. Rapid Load Reduction, to 90% at 2%/min. to attempt to reduce main turbine vibration.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: This event is initiated by the Console Operator (in the role of Shift Manager) contacting the SRO and directing a load reduction to 90% at 2%/min. using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, to attempt to reduce main turbine vibrations.

EXAMINER: When the BOP depresses the Turbine Control GO pushbutton, the severity of the Main Turbine vibration will increase to 14 mils after a 3.5 minute time delay (turbine load at approximately 93%).

AOI-39 The following actions are taken from AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction.

CAUTION Over boration may result in excessive rod withdrawal, T-avg lower than desired, and AFD oscillations.

NOTE

Rod Control should remain in automatic for T-avg Control

Reactivity Briefing Sheet, Thumb Rules (page 3), lists boration flows and volumes for different reduction rates.

Effect of boration will lag behind turbine load reduction and can be compensated for by temporarily increasing boric acid flow rate above recommended rate.

1. INITIATE a manual boration:

a. DETERMINE recommended boration flow rate and volume from Reactivity Briefing Sheet:

RO determines that approximately 90 to 100 gallons of boric acid are required.

b. INITIATE normal boration:

1) ADJUST BA flow controller, 1-FC-62-139, to desired flow rate.

RO adjusts 1-FC-62-139 to a value which corresponds to 27 to 40 gpm.

2) ADJUST BA batch counter 1-FQ-62-139 to required quantity.

RO RO adjusts 1-FQ-62-139 BA BATCH COUNTER as follows:

1. Depresses and holds the black pushbutton.

2. While holding the pushbutton, the applicant raises the red translucent cover.

3. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant enters value determined in a. above (90-100 gallons) in the display.

4. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant lowers the red translucent cover, and then releases the pushbutton.

Step continued on next page.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 27 of 51 Event

Description:

Shift Manager contacts the SRO and directs a load reduction using AOI-39. Rapid Load Reduction, to 90% at 2%/min. to attempt to reduce main turbine vibration.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (Continued from previous page)

1. INITIATE a manual boration: (Continued)

b. INITIATE normal boration:

3) PLACE mode selector 1-HS-62-140B to BOR.

RO locates 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE and rotates the handswitch to the right 2 positions to BOR.

4) () PLACE VCT makeup control 1-HS-62-140A, to START.

RO locates 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the START position.

5) VERIFY desired boric acid flow indicated on 1-FI-62-139.

RO locates 1-FI-62-139, BA TO BLENDER FLO and observes 27 to 40 gpm.

CAUTION

Condenser Backpressure limits are on page 5.

TURBINE MANUAL Operation requires continuous operator monitoring and control.

LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM may be made worse if steam dumps are actuated. AOI-11 requires T-ave and T-ref be maintained within 3°F.

NOTE If the initiating condition is corrected, the power reduction may be terminated

2. ESTABLISH a turbine load reduction rate less than or equal to 5%/min:

a. PLACE turbine in IMP IN.

BOP depresses the IMP IN button, and monitors the change to IMP IN complete. REFERENCE DISPLAY indicates current turbine power.

b. SET a desired load in the SETTER with the REFERENCE CONTROL.

BOP BOP sets 90% in the SETTER by depressing the REFERENCE CONTROL button.

c. SET the LOAD RATE at less than or equal to 5%/min.

BOP sets the LOAD RATE thumbwheel to 2%.

d. () DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

BOP informs the SRO that the turbine is ready for the load decrease.

SRO directs the BOP to depress the GO pushbutton.

NOTE AFD green target band can be monitored using ICS Turn On code DOGHOUSE.

3. MONITOR rod position:

Rods above Lo-Lo insertion limit

AFD within Target Band Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 28 of 51 Event

Description:

Shift Manager contacts the SRO and directs a load reduction using AOI-39. Rapid Load Reduction, to 90% at 2%/min. to attempt to reduce main turbine vibration.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart.

SRO When contacted as the Shift Manager, Console Operator will repeat back the request to refer to EPIP-1.

5. NOTIFY the Load Coordinator of the required load reduction and expected ramp rate SRO When contacted as the Load Coordinator, the Console Operator repeats back the information concerning the load reduction.

7. CHECK rate of power reduction is rapid enough for existing plant conditions.

SRO SRO determines that load reduction rate is correct based on direction provided by the Shift Manager.

EXAMINER: The next event, Event 6, will be entered when power has been reduced to approximately 93% AUTOMATICALLY.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 29 of 51 Event

Description:

When load has been reduced to 93%, Bearing 9 indicates vibration rises to 14 mils, requiring the reactor and turbine to be tripped When the manual reactor trip is attempted, an ATWS occurs. Requires entry into 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

After actions of 1-FR-S.1 have been accomplished, requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, and then ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Diagnoses and announces the change in Bearing 9 vibrations, and BOP determines that the HI-HI vibration limit has been exceeded.

Direct the RO to manually trip the reactor and perform IMMEDIATE SRO ACTION STEPS of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Diagnoses and announces the ATWS condition after attempting to trip the RO reactor from 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP on 1-M-6.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 1- FR-S.1, NUCLEAR POWER RO GENERATION/ATWS, and manually inserts control rods.

After IMMEDIATE ACTIONS are performed, may dispatch AUOs to locally open the reactor trip breakers, the Rod Drive M-G set input breakers, and the Rod Drive M-G set output breakers.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to OPEN reactor trip breakers and MG set output breakers in RO the MG set rooms.

When contacted as an additional AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to OPEN breakers to MG sets on the 480V unit boards A and B.

After receiving these requests the Console Operator will wait 2 minutes, and then open the reactor trip breakers.

EXAMINER: When the Console Operator receives the communication from the RO dispatching personnel to open the reactor trip breakers locally OR to open the MG set supply breakers, the Console Operator will wait 2 minutes, then will remove malfunction rp01c to clear the ATWS, and enter malfunctions rp51a and rp51b to open the reactor trip breakers.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 1- FR-S.1, NUCLEAR POWER BOP GENERATION/ATWS, and manually trips the main turbine.

Enters and directs actions of 1- FR-S.1, NUCLEAR POWER SRO GENERATION/ATWS.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 30 of 51 Event

Description:

When load has been reduced to 93%, Bearing 9 indicates vibration rises to 14 mils, requiring the reactor and turbine to be tripped When the manual reactor trip is attempted, an ATWS occurs. Requires entry into 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

After actions of 1-FR-S.1 have been accomplished, requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, and then ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from 1-FR-S.1, NUCLEAR POWER 1-FR-S.1 GENERATION/ATWS.

CAUTION RCPs should not be tripped UNTIL reactor power is less than 5%.

NOTE Steps 1 and 2 are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps.

1. ENSURE Reactor Trip:

Reactor trip and bypass breakers RO OPEN.

RPIs at bottom of scale.

Neutron flux DROPPING.

Critical Task 1 Insert negative reactivity into the core by inserting control rods.

Critical 1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

Task 1 Manually TRIP reactor.

IF reactor will NOT trip, THEN INSERT control rods.

RO RO observes rods inserting at 72 steps per minute in AUTOMATIC.

When the rod speed slows to 48 steps per minute, the RO transfers from AUTO to MAN on 1-RBSS, ROD BANK SELECT. After selecting MAN, the RO inserts rods at 48 steps per minute by holding 1-FLRM, ROD MOTION CONTROL to the IN position.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

Critical Task 2 Manually trip the main turbine before dryout of the steam generators (3 of 4 SGs less than 26%

Wide Range.)

Critical 2. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

Task 1 Manually TRIP turbine.

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-47-24, TURBINE TRIP, and rotates the handswitch to the right to the TRIP position.

3. CHECK AFW pumps operation:

a. Both MD AFW pumps RUNNING.

b. TD AFW pump RUNNING.

c. LCVs in AUTO or controlled in MANUAL.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 31 of 51 Event

Description:

When load has been reduced to 93%, Bearing 9 indicates vibration rises to 14 mils, requiring the reactor and turbine to be tripped When the manual reactor trip is attempted, an ATWS occurs. Requires entry into 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

After actions of 1-FR-S.1 have been accomplished, requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, and then ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 3 Manually start the AFW pumps prior to exiting 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

Critical 3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

Task 1 Manually START pumps and open valves as necessary.

BOP locates 1-HS-3-118A, AFW PMP A-A and rotates the handswitch BOP to the right to the START position. BOP locates 1-HS-3-128A, AFW PMP B-B and rotates the handswitch to the right to the START position. BOP locates 1-HS-46-56A-S, T-D AFW T&T VLV and rotates the handswitch to the right to the OPEN position.

4. INITIATE RCS Boration:

a. ENSURE at least one centrifugal charging pump RUNNING.

RO observes that the 1B-B CCP is running (1-HS-62-104A, CCP B-B (ECCS) handswitch RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK).

b. OPEN RWST outlet valves 1-LCV-62-135 and 1-LCV-62-136.

RO locates 1-HS-62-135A, RWST TO CHARGING PMPS SUCTION, and pushes the handswitch in, then rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the OPEN position.

RO locates 1-HS-62-136A, RWST TO CHARGING PMPS SUCTION, and BOP pushes the handswitch in, then rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the OPEN position.

c. CLOSE VCT outlet valves 1-LCV-62-132 and 1-LCV-62-133.

RO locates 1-HS-62-132A, VCR TO CHARGING PMPS SUCTION, and pushes the handswitch in, then rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position.

RO locates 1-HS-62-133A, VCR TO CHARGING PMPS SUCTION, and pushes the handswitch in, then rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position.

(Continued on next page)

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 32 of 51 Event

Description:

When load has been reduced to 93%, Bearing 9 indicates vibration rises to 14 mils, requiring the reactor and turbine to be tripped When the manual reactor trip is attempted, an ATWS occurs. Requires entry into 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

After actions of 1-FR-S.1 have been accomplished, requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, and then ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (Continued from previous page)

4. INITIATE RCS Boration:

d. OPEN BIT outlet valves 1-FCV-63-25 and 1-FCV-63-26.

RO locates 1-HS-63-25A, BIT OUTET, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the OPEN position.

RO locates 1-HS-63-26A, BIT OUTET, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the OPEN position.

e. CHECK BIT flow.

RO locates 1-FI-63-170, BIT FLOW, and reports approximately 200 gpm flow.

f. PLACE BA pumps in FAST speed.

RO locates 1-HS-62-230D, BA PMP A SPEED, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the FAST position.

RO locates 1-HS-62-232-D, BA PMP B SPEED, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the FAST position.

g. Throttle OPEN emergency borate valve 1-FCV-62-138 to maintain boric acid flow greater than 35 gpm.

RO locates 1-HS-62-138A, EMERG BORATE, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the OPEN position while observing flow on 1-FI-62-137A, EMER BORATE FLOW rise to greater than 35 gpm.

5. CHECK PZR pressure less than 2335 psig.

RO RO locates PZR PRESS indicators (1-PI-68-340A, 1-PI-68-334, 1-PI 323, and 1-PI-68-322) and reports pressure less than 2335 psig.

6. VERIFY Cntmt Vent Isolation:

Train A GREEN.

Train B GREEN.

RO reports that the CNTMT VENT ISOLATION has NOT occurred.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 33 of 51 Event

Description:

When load has been reduced to 93%, Bearing 9 indicates vibration rises to 14 mils, requiring the reactor and turbine to be tripped When the manual reactor trip is attempted, an ATWS occurs. Requires entry into 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

After actions of 1-FR-S.1 have been accomplished, requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, and then ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PERFORM the following:

a. ENSURE containment purge supply and exhaust fans STOPPED.

[M-9]

BOP goes to 1-M-9 and determines that 1-HS-30-1A, CNTMT PURGE SUP & EXH FANS 1A AND FCO-30-1A & 1B, 1-HS-30-4A, CNTMT PURGE SUP & EXH FANS 1B AND FCO-30-4A & 4B, and 1-HS BOP 11A, INSTR RM PURGE SUP & EXH FANS AND FCO-30-11A & 11B are in the STOP, PULL-TO-LOCK position.

b. CLOSE dampers. [M-9]

BOP locates 1-HS-30-37, LWR CNTMT PURGE EXH PRESS RLF and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position.

BOP locates 1-HS-30-40, LWR CNTMT PURGE EXH PRESS RLF and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position.

7. IF AFW flow established, THEN

a. PLACE 1-HS-3-45 to LONG CYCLE RECIRC.

BOP locates 1-HS-3-45, MFW - MODE SWITCH, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the LONG CYCLE RECIRC position.

b. PLACE MFW Bypass Reg Valves in AUTO.

RO BOP locates 1-LIC-3-35A, SG 1 MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL, 1-LIC 48A, SG 2 MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL, 1-LIC-3-90A, SG 3 MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL, and 1-LIC-3-103A, SG 4 MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL and observes the AMBER MAN light LIT. BOP depresses each AUTO/MAN pushbutton and observes the BLUE AUTO light LIT.

8. IF SI actuated OR required, THEN PERFORM Steps 1 through 6 of 1-E-0 SRO Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, as time allows.

SRO assigns the BOP 1-E-0, Steps 1 through 6.

EXAMINER: Actions taken prior to Step 9 may have already caused the reactor trip breakers to be open. If AUOs were dispatched earlier, and the 2 minute time has elapsed, then the reactor will be tripped.

If NOT, then the SRO will implement Step 9 RNO actions.

9. ENSURE the following trips:

RO a. Reactor Trip.

RO determines that a reactor trip has occurred.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 34 of 51 Event

Description:

When load has been reduced to 93%, Bearing 9 indicates vibration rises to 14 mils, requiring the reactor and turbine to be tripped When the manual reactor trip is attempted, an ATWS occurs. Requires entry into 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

After actions of 1-FR-S.1 have been accomplished, requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, and then ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 9.a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a. DISPATCH operator to locally trip reactor:

OPEN reactor trip breakers and MG set output breakers [MG set RO room].

OPEN breakers to MG sets [480V unit boards A and B].

RO may have addressed dispatching operators to locally trip the reactor prior to this step.

BOP b. Turbine Trip.

RO 10. MAINTAIN rod insertion UNTIL rods fully inserted.

11. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart for ATWS event.

SRO When contacted as Shift Manager to refer to EPIP-1, Console Operator will acknowledge the request.

12. MONITOR reactor subcriticality:

a. CHECK Power range channels less than 5%.

RO observes 1-NR-90-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER, and determines that Power Range power level is less than 5%.

SRO b. CHECK Intermediate range startup rate NEGATIVE.

RO observes 1-NI-35D, IR STARTUP RATE DPM and 1-NI-36D, IR STARTUP RATE DPM and determines that startup rate is negative.

c. ** GO TO Step 21.

SRO goes to Step 21.

21. TERMINATE emergency boration:

a. PLACE BA transfer pumps in SLOW speed.

RO locates 1-HS-62-230D, BA PMP A SPEED, and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the SLOW position.

RO locates 1-HS-62-232-D, BA PMP B SPEED, and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the SLOW position.

b. CLOSE emergency borate valve 1-FCV-62-138.

RO locates 1-HS-62-138A, EMERG BORATE, and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position while observing flow on 1-FI-62-137A, EMER BORATE FLOW go to zero gpm.

c. IF alternate boration opened, THEN Locally CLOSE 1-ISV-62-929.

RO reports that alternate boration was NOT opened.

NOTE If the reactor is verified to be subcritical, Status Trees may be implemented for other Red or Orange paths Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 35 of 51 Event

Description:

When load has been reduced to 93%, Bearing 9 indicates vibration rises to 14 mils, requiring the reactor and turbine to be tripped When the manual reactor trip is attempted, an ATWS occurs. Requires entry into 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

After actions of 1-FR-S.1 have been accomplished, requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, and then ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

22. IMPLEMENT other Red or Orange paths identified on Status Trees SRO SRO determines that there are no RED or ORANGE paths on the Status Trees.

EXAMINER: When the crew begins to perform actions of Step 23, the Console Operator will enter the steam line break outside containment on SG 1.

23. IF SI actuated, THEN RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

SRO SRO enters 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, at Step 1.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 36 of 51 Event

Description:

Main steam line break outside containment on SG 1 occurs after actions of 1-FR-S.1 to terminate boration have been accomplished. All MSIVs fail to automatically close, requiring manual closure. SG 1 MSIV fails to close manually from the control room. Requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, then 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-E-0 The following actions are taken from 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

NOTE

Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS

Status Trees / SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR A GREEN light LIT on panel 1-M-4.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR B GREEN light LIT on panel 1-M-4.

RO checks 1-52BYA, BYPASS BKR A lights DARK.

RO checks 1-52BYB, BYPASS BKR B lights DARK.

RPIs at bottom of scale.

RO RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor 1 and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 for indication that all SHUTDOWN and CONTROL bank rods are inserted.

Neutron flux DROPPING.

RO observes neutron flux trending down on 1-NR-92-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER. May also observe levels decreasing on 1-NI-92-135A, CH I NEUTRON MON % PWR, and 1-NI-92-136A, CH II NEUTRON MON % PWR.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

BOP RO observes that lights on 1-XX-47-1000 EHC CONTROL for individual throttle and governor valves are GREEN.

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

CSST (offsite),

OR D/G (blackout).

BOP RO observes that 1-HS-57-41A, 1716 NORMAL - 6.9 SD BD 1A-A FROM CSST C RED light is LIT, GREEN light is DARK (breaker closed) and 1-EI-57-39, 6.9 SDB 1A-A VOLTS indicates approximately 7000 volts.

RO observes that 1-HS-57-71A, 1728 NORMAL - 6.9 SD BD 1B-B FROM CSST D RED light is LIT, GREEN light is DARK (breaker closed) and 1-EI-57-66, 6.9 SDB 1B-B VOLTS indicates approximately 7000 volts.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 37 of 51 Event

Description:

Main steam line break outside containment on SG 1 occurs after actions of 1-FR-S.1 to terminate boration have been accomplished. All MSIVs fail to automatically close, requiring manual closure. SG 1 MSIV fails to close manually from the control room. Requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, then 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RO will announce that the window 70-A, SI ACTUATED is LIT.

b. Both trains SI ACTUATED.

1-XX-55-6C

1-XX-55-6D EXAMINER: 1-E-0, Appendices A and B are contained as Attachment 1 to this scenario.

5. PERFORM Appendixes A and B ,1-E-0, pages 16-30 BOP If not previously performed, the SRO assigns BOP to perform Appendices A and B.

SRO 6. ANNOUNCE reactor trip and safety injection over PA system.

7. ENSURE secondary heat sink available with either:

Total AFW flow greater than 410 gpm, RO OR

At least one S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

8. MONITOR RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F using:

RCS Loop T-avg with any RCP running, RO OR

RCS Loop T-cold with RCPs out-of-service.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 38 of 51 Event

Description:

Main steam line break outside containment on SG 1 occurs after actions of 1-FR-S.1 to terminate boration have been accomplished. All MSIVs fail to automatically close, requiring manual closure. SG 1 MSIV fails to close manually from the control room. Requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, then 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IF temp less than 557°F, THEN ENSURE steam dumps and S/G PORVs CLOSED.

IF cooldown continues, THEN CONTROL total AFW flow to maintain greater than 410 gpm UNTIL NR level in at least one S/G greater than 29% [39% ADV].

RO takes manual control of AFW LCVs and reduces AFW flow.

IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN

PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

RO rotates 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A, and 1-HS-103B STEAM DUMP FSV B to the left to the OFF RESET position.

CLOSE MSIVs.

RO RO determines that the MSIVs are OPEN based on RED lights LIT on handswitches.

RO rotates each MSIV handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position and observes GREEN and BLUE lights LIT on MSIV 2, MSIV 3 and MSIV 4 handswitches. MSIV 1 fails to close manually.

EXAMINER: BOP may dispatch an AUO to attempt to isolate MSIV 1 from the Aux Control Room or by pulling fuses. The Console operator will repeat back request, but delay actions until after transition to 1-E-2 is made and Step 5 is completed.

ENSURE MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

IF RCS temp greater than 564°F, THEN ENSURE either steam dumps or S/G PORVs OPEN.

9. ENSURE excess letdown valves CLOSED RO

1-FCV-62-54

1-FCV-62-55

10. CHECK pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

RO observes 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV 340A, GREEN light LIT, RED light DARK.

RO RO observes 1-HS-68-334A, PZR PORV 334, GREEN light LIT, RED light DARK.

RO observes 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A, GREEN light DARK, RED light LIT.

RO observes 1-HS-68-332A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 334, GREEN light DARK, RED light LIT.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 39 of 51 Event

Description:

Main steam line break outside containment on SG 1 occurs after actions of 1-FR-S.1 to terminate boration have been accomplished. All MSIVs fail to automatically close, requiring manual closure. SG 1 MSIV fails to close manually from the control room. Requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, then 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

11. CHECK PZR safety valves CLOSED:

EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitors.

RO RO observes response of 1-TI-68-330, SAFETY 68-563 TAILPIPE TEMP, 1-TI-68-329, SAFETY 68-564 TAILPIPE TEMP, and 1-TI-68-328, SAFETY 68-565, stable.

12. CHECK PZR sprays CLOSED.

RO RO observes the GREEN lights are LIT for 1-XI-68-334B, PZR SPRAY LOOP 2 and 1-XI-68-334D, PZR SPRAY LOOP 1.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

13. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

RO a. Phase B signals DARK [MISSP].

b. RCS pressure greater than 1500 psig.

14. CHECK S/G pressures:

All S/G pressures controlled or rising.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressure on SG 1 is NOT controlled. May BOP also observe trends on 1-PR-1-2, SG 1 & 2 PRESS PSIG, and 1-PR 23, SG 3 & 4 PRESS PSIG to assess this step.

All S/G pressures greater than 140 psig.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressure is low on SG 1.

14.RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO IF S/G pressure low OR dropping uncontrolled, THEN GO TO 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

The following actions are taken from 1-E-0, Faulted Steam Generator 1-E-2 Isolation.

CAUTION If a faulted S/G is NOT needed for RCS cooldown, it should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions.

1. ENSURE all MSIVs and MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

RO determines that the MSIVs are OPEN based on RED lights LIT on BOP handswitches.

RO rotates each MSIV handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position and observes GREEN and BLUE lights LIT on each handswitch.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 40 of 51 Event

Description:

Main steam line break outside containment on SG 1 occurs after actions of 1-FR-S.1 to terminate boration have been accomplished. All MSIVs fail to automatically close, requiring manual closure. SG 1 MSIV fails to close manually from the control room. Requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, then 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: 1-HS-1-4A, MSIV SG 1 will not respond when placed in CLOSE. After the AUO is dispatched to perform 1-E-2, Attachment 1, the Console Operator will delay closing the MSIV until performance of Step 5 is complete.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

Manually CLOSE valves.

IF valves can NOT be closed, THEN Locally REMOVE power to valves:

DISPATCH NAUO to perform Attachment 1 (1-E-2).

NOTE If it is known that a steam leak exists in the Turbine building, the following step should NOT be performed until the affected steam header is depressurized.

2. PLACE steam dump controls OFF:

1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A.

1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B.

SRO observes that the steam dump controls were placed in the OFF position during 1-E-0 performance.

3. CHECK for at least one Intact S/G:

Any S/G pressure controlled or rising, OR BOP

Any S/G pressure greater than P-sat for RCS incore temperature.

BOP determines that SG 1 is FAULTED and that the remaining SGs are INTACT based on SG pressure response.

4. IDENTIFY Faulted S/G based on ANY of the following:

Any S/G pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner, OR

Any S/G pressure less than 140 psig, OR

S/G enclosure temps high:

BOP 1) T1002A for 2 and 3,

2) T1003A for 1 and 4.

Local indication of break in any of the following:

Main steam lines,

Main feedwater lines,

Other secondary piping.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 41 of 51 Event

Description:

Main steam line break outside containment on SG 1 occurs after actions of 1-FR-S.1 to terminate boration have been accomplished. All MSIVs fail to automatically close, requiring manual closure. SG 1 MSIV fails to close manually from the control room. Requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, then 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION

If the turbine-driven AFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, steam supply to the turbine-driven AFW pump must be maintained from one S/G.

RCS cooldown requires the availability of at least one S/G.

EXAMINER: After performance of Step 5, the Console Operator will close 1-HS-1-4A, MSIV SG 1.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 42 of 51 Event

Description:

Main steam line break outside containment on SG 1 occurs after actions of 1-FR-S.1 to terminate boration have been accomplished. All MSIVs fail to automatically close, requiring manual closure. SG 1 MSIV fails to close manually from the control room. Requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, then 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 4 Isolate the faulted steam generator (SG 1) prior to exiting 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Critical 5. ISOLATE Faulted S/G:

Task 4 a. ISOLATE AFW flow to Faulted S/G.

BOP rotates 1-HS-3-164A, SG 1 SUPPLY LCV-3-164 CNTL from the AUTO position to the ACC. RESET MODULATE position. The BOP then rotates 1-HS-3-164A, SG 1 SUPPLY LCV-3-164 CNTL to the CLOSE position and PULLS the switch OUT.

BOP rotates 1-HS-3-174A, SG 2 SUPPLY LCV-3-174 CNTL from the AUTO position to the ACC. RESET MODULATE position. The BOP then rotates 1-HS-3-173A, SG 2 SUPPLY LCV-3-174 CNTL to the CLOSE position and PULLS the switch OUT.

b. ENSURE MFW ISOLATED to Faulted S/G:

MFW isolation and bypass isolation valves CLOSED.

BOP observes 1-HS-3-33A, SG 1 MFW ISOL VLV, 1-HS-3-47A, SG2 MFW ISOL VLV, 1-HS-3-87A, SG 3 MFW ISOL VLV and 1-HS-3-100A, SG 4 MFW ISOL VLV, RED lights are DARK, GREEN lights are LIT BOP observes 1-XI-3-236, SG 1 MFW BYP ISOL VLV, 1-XI-3-239, SG2 MFW BYP ISOL VLV, 1-XI-3-242, SG 3 MFW BYP ISOL VLV and 1-XI 245, SG 4 MFW BYP ISOL VLV, RED lights are DARK, GREEN lights BOP are LIT

MFW reg and bypass reg valves CLOSED.

BOP observes 1-XX-3-35 MFW REG, RED lights are DARK, GREEN lights are LIT.

BOP observes 1-XX-3-35A BYP REG, RED lights are DARK, GREEN lights are LIT.

MFPs TRIPPED.

BOP observes 1-HS-46-9A, MFPT A TRIP-RESET and 1-HS-46-36A, MFPT B TRIP-RESET RED lights are DARK, GREEN lights are LIT.

BOP observes 1-HS-3-200A, Standby MFWP Switch, RED light is DARK, GREEN light is LIT.

c. ENSURE Faulted S/G PORV CLOSED.

BOP may rotate 1-HS-1-6, SG 1 PORV PCV-1-5 from the P-AUTO position to the CLOSE position. BOP observes the RED light is DARK, GREEN light is LIT.

d. ENSURE Faulted S/G blowdown ISOLATED.

BOP may rotate 1-HS-1-7/181 SG 1 BLOWDOWN VLVS from the P-AUTO position to the CLOSE position. BOP observes RED light is DARK, GREEN light is LIT.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 43 of 51 Event

Description:

Main steam line break outside containment on SG 1 occurs after actions of 1-FR-S.1 to terminate boration have been accomplished. All MSIVs fail to automatically close, requiring manual closure. SG 1 MSIV fails to close manually from the control room. Requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, then 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE TD AFW pump steam supply should NOT be aligned from a S/G with a known primary to secondary leak if other AFW sources are available.

BOP 6. ENSURE TD AFW pump being supplied from Intact S/G.

BOP 7. MONITOR CST volume greater than 200,000 gal.

EXAMINER: When 1-HS-1-4A, MSIV SG 1, is closed RCS temperature should stabilize, then begin to rise.

8. WHEN RCS temperature is stable or rising following Faulted S/G blowdown, THEN ADJUST Intact S/G PORV controllers in AUTO to:

P-sat for the highest RCS temp (one or more RCPs running)

Not applicable, since the RCPs were previously stopped due the RCS pressure less than 1500 psig.

OR P-sat for the highest T-cold temp (no RCPs running)

BOP BOP or RO will check 1-TI-68-18, LOOP 1 CL TEMP, 1-TI-68-41, LOOP 2 CL TEMP, 1-TI-68-60, LOOP 3 CL TEMP and 1-TI-68-83, LOOP 4 CL TEMP to determine the highest T-cold temperature. The BOP or RO will then refer to steam tables or the ICS computer to determine the saturation pressure.

The BOP will then lower the setting of 1-PIC-1-13A, SG 2 PORV FCV 12, 1-PIC-1-24A, SG 3 PORV FCV-1-23, and 1-PIC-1-31A, SG 4 PORV FCV-1-30 to the saturation pressure identified.

9. CHECK secondary side radiation:

During performance of 1-E-0, Appendix A, the BOP reported that all secondary radiation monitors are normal.

S/G discharge monitors NORMAL.

Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitors NORMAL.

S/G blowdown rad monitor recorders NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

S/G sample results by Chemistry.

SRO may have requested samples of all SGs prior to this point in the scenario.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 44 of 51 Event

Description:

Main steam line break outside containment on SG 1 occurs after actions of 1-FR-S.1 to terminate boration have been accomplished. All MSIVs fail to automatically close, requiring manual closure. SG 1 MSIV fails to close manually from the control room. Requires transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection, then 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. CHECK SI termination criteria:

a. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65ºF [85ºF ADV].

b. CHECK secondary heat sink available with either:

Total feed flow to Intact S/Gs greater than 410 gpm, OR

At least one Intact S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

RO/ BOP c. CHECK RCS pressure stable or rising.

d. CHECK pzr level greater than 15% [33% ADV].

It is possible that PZR level may not be greater than 33% when the crew reaches this step. If PZR level is less than 33%, the crew will transition to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, instead of ES-1.1, SI Termination. Entry into either will be the termination point for this scenario.

EXAMINER: Scenario will be terminated at this point, upon the transition to either 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant or ES-1.1, SI Termination.

d. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RESTORE pzr level:

1) ATTEMPT to stabilize RCS pressure with normal pzr sprays.

2) ** GO TO Step 11.

e. GO TO 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination.

SRO When the transition to ES-1.1, "SI Termination, is directed by the SRO, inform the applicants that another crew will continue from this point.

11. GO TO 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

SRO When the transition to 1-E-1, " Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, is directed by the SRO, inform the applicants that another crew will continue from this point.

END OF SCENARIO Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 SM US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going - Name AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb=759 ppm Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

Train A/Channel I Work Week. Window 23-A, TURB/GEN VIBRATION HI/HI-HI is lit. Bearing 9 indicates 10.1 mils, and Bearing 10 indicates 9.0 mils and an OPDP-9, Emergent Issue, meeting is in progress to determine compensatory actions. 1B-B CCP is in service to equalize run time.

SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

US/SM review late SI report (SQN and WBN only)

Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

100% power, MOL conditions. RCS Boron Concentration is 759 ppm. Control Bank D rods are at 220 steps.

Train A/Chanel I Work Week. EOOS risk matrix is GREEN.

Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only)

Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items)

Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs)

Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs)

Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs)

SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA)

Relief Time: _________________________________ Relief Date: ______________

Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties:

Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station)

Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week)

Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked)

Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs)

TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [01-14-2011]

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 2 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 SM US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going - Name AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb = 759 ppm Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

Train A/Channel I Work Week. Window 23-A, TURB/GEN VIBRATION HI/HI-HI is lit. Bearing 9 indicates 10.1 mils, and Bearing 10 indicates 9.0 mils and an OPDP-9, Emergent Issue, meeting is in progress to determine compensatory actions. 1B-B CCP is in service to equalize run time.

SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

US/SM review late SI report (SQN and WBN only)

Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

100% power, MOL conditions. RCS Boron Concentration is 759 ppm. Control Bank D rods are at 220 steps.

Train A/Chanel I Work Week. EOOS risk matrix is GREEN.

Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only)

Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items)

Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs)

Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs)

Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs)

SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA)

Relief Time: _________________________________ Relief Date: ______________

Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties:

Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station)

Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week)

Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked)

Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs)

TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [01-14-2011]

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-03 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

1. ENSURE Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 332 by performing the following actions:

a. Select ICManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate IC 332.

c. Right click on IC 332.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC 332.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen:

Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value tu02j main turbine high vibes exciter brg #10 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 60 60 tu02i main turbine high vibes gen. brg #9 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 67.5 67.5 rp01c manual and automatic reactor trip signal failure (atws) M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active ms04a fail close 1-4 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active ms28b fail auto close 1-11 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active ms28c fail auto close 1-22 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active ms28d fail auto close 1-29 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active Page 47 of 51

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-03 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value ni07c pr channel output signal failure pr chnl 3 M 1 00:00:00 00:00:00 120 99.5 rp18h loss of 120vac to eagle rack #8 M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive tu02i main turbine high vibes gen. brg #9 M 21 00:03:30 00:00:45 100 67.5 rp51a reactor trip breaker rta trip M 22 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive rp51b reactor trip breaker rtb trip M 22 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive lic-68-339 lic-68-339 pressurizer level controller lic-68-339 O 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 1 3 rx09d main steam flow transmitter failure ft-1-28a M 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 86.0175 ms02a main steam line break outside containment sg #1 M 5 00:00:00 00:01:00 20 0

5. ENSURE Event 21 is loaded. IF NOT then create Event 21 = tc_go==1 Turbine GO pushbutton depressed.

6. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

7. ENSURE the Train A Week - Channel 1 sign is placed on 1-M-30.

8. Place simulator in FREEZE.

9. ENSURE Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Reactivity Briefing Book MOL (Middle Of Life) is provided to the crew as part of the Turnover Package, and that the MOL placards are on 1-M-6, below the Boric Acid and Primary Water Integrators.

10. WHEN prompted by the Chief Examiner, place the Simulator in RUN.

Page 48 of 51

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-03 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

1 1 NIS Power Range N42 failure.

When contacted as Work Control, repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for PR N42.

When contacted as Work Control, repeat back the request to have the bistables tripped for PR N42.

When contacted as the Operations Duty Manager, repeat back that PR N42 has failed.

When contacted as Reactor Engineering, repeat back that PR N42 has failed. Performance of 1-SI-0-22, Incore QPTR, may be discussed.

2 2 Loss of 120V AC to Eagle Rack 8.

When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back request to troubleshoot and repair Eagle Rack 1-R-8.

3 3 1-LIC-68-339 fails, causing 1-HIC-62-93A to reduce charging flow.

When contacted as an AUO, repeat back the request to locally check 1-FCV-62-93A controller. Report that there is no apparent problem with the 1-FCV-62-93 controller.

When contacted as Work Control, repeat back the request for a work package to troubleshoot and repair 1-HIC-62-93 and/or 1-LIC-68-339.

4 4 1-FT-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW, fails low When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator repeats back the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1-FI-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW.

5 n/a Rapid power reduction to ease turbine vibration. Vibrations rise and the SRO directs the RO to trip the reactor.

Reactor fails to trip (ATWS).

When contacted as the Load Coordinator, the Console Operator repeats back the information concerning the load reduction.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to OPEN reactor trip breakers and MG set output breakers in the MG set rooms.

When contacted as an additional AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to OPEN breakers to MG sets on the 480V unit boards A and B.

After receiving the first request, the Console Operator will wait 2 minutes and then open the reactor trip breakers.

Page 49 of 51

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-03 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

6 6 Main steam leak outside containment SG 1.

When contacted as an AUO, report that there is a large cloud of steam outside the plant outside the Service Building roll-up door.

When contacted as an AUO to attempt to isolate MSIV 1 from the Aux Control Room or by pulling fuses, repeat back request, but delay actions until after transition to 1-E-2 is made and Step 5 is completed.

When Step 5 is complete, remove malfunction ms04a to allow 1-HS-1-4A, MSIV SG 1 to close.

Page 50 of 51

Scenario 2 Attachment 1 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix A, B and Attachments 1 through 5.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Watts Bar March 2013 Scenario No. 3 Op Test No.: 1 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Run Time:

Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOL conditions. RCS Boron Concentration is 757 ppm. Control Bank D rods are at 220 steps. EOOS Risk matrix is GREEN.

Turnover: 1-FI-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW failed low during the last shift. Channel has been removed from DCS. 1A-A Containment Spray pump is out-of-service for motor winding inspection. LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray, was entered 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago. The 1A-A Containment Spray pump is expected to be returned to service within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . 1A-MFP vibrations are elevated, and an AUO is monitoring the turbine and pump hourly. Operations Management is meeting to discuss the plan for the 1A MFP.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description No.

1 rx11a 0 C-RO 1-PT-1-73, % HP TURBINE POWER TR A fails low. Requires TS-SRO performance of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System.

Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

2 cc07c C-BOP C-S CCS Pump shaft shears. The BOP will manually start the TS-SRO 2B-B CCS pump using 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

3 hic-62-81a_ai C-RO 1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, closes due to a controller failure. Requires entry into ARI 110-B LO PRESS LTDN FLOW/PRESS HI. Requires manual operation of 1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL to maintain pressure.

4 n/a R-RO Load reduction to 75%, at 2%/min using AOI-39, Rapid Load N-BOP/SRO Reduction.

5 fw18a C-BOP 1A MFP vibrations rise to 10 mils, requiring the 1A MFP to be TS-SRO tripped. Requires performance of 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Subsection 3.4 Loss of TDMFP Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load). AFD limits are exceeded, requiring a Tech Spec evaluation.

5a fw98 C-BOP Standby Main Feedwater Pump fails to auto start. Requires BOP to manually start the pump.

6 fw51b M-ALL 1B MFP trips due to a loss of lube oil pressure, resulting in a loss of feedwater and a main turbine trip. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring the RO to manually trip the reactor.

7 fw21a M-ALL Loss of Secondary Heat Sink occurs, requiring performance of fw22b 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. 1A-A MD AFW fwr27 pump discharge piping ruptures. 1B-B MD AFW Pump is steam bound. TD AFW pump trip and throttle valve linkage fails. Requires Standby Main Feedwater pump to be placed in service to restore the heat sink.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 3 - Summary Initial Condition 100% power, MOL conditions. RCS Boron Concentration is 757 ppm. Control Bank D rods are at 220 steps.

Turnover 1-FI-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW failed low during the last shift. Channel has been removed from DCS. 1A-A Containment Spray pump is out-of-service for motor winding inspection. LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray, was entered 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago. The 1A-A Containment Spray pump is expected to be returned to service within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

1A-MFP vibrations are elevated, and an AUO is monitoring the turbine and pump hourly.

Operations Management is meeting to discuss the plan for the 1A MFP.

Event Description 1 1-PT-1-73, % HP TURBINE POWER TR A fails low. Requires RO to place 1-RBSS, ROD BANK SELECT in MAN. Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System.

Requires Tech Spec evaluation, and entry into LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation.

2 C-S CCS Pump shaft shears. The BOP will manually start the 2B-B CCS pump using 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

3 1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, closes due to a controller failure. Requires entry into ARI 110-B LO PRESS LTDN FLOW/PRESS HI. Requires manual operation of 1-PIC 81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL to maintain pressure.

4 Shift Manager contacts the SRO and directs a load reduction to 95%, using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, in preparation for removing the 1A MFP from service.

5 1A MFP vibrations rise to 10 mils, requiring the 1A MFP to be tripped.

Requires entry into 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Subsection 3.4 Loss of TDMFP Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference.

5a Standby Main Feedwater Pump fails to auto start. Requires BOP to manually start the pump, since turbine load is greater than 800 MWe.

6 1B MFP trips due to a loss of lube oil pressure, resulting in a loss of feedwater and a main turbine trip. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring the RO to manually trip the reactor The Turbine trip causes a reactor trip signal to be generated. The automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring the RO to manually trip the reactor.

7 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink occurs, requiring performance of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. 1A-A MD AFW pump discharge piping ruptures. 1B-B MD AFW Pump is steam bound. TD AFW pump trip and throttle valve linkage fails. Requires Standby Main Feedwater pump to be placed in service to restore the heat sink.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 3 - Critical Task Summary Critical Task Description 1 Manually trip the reactor from the control room prior to entry into 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

2 Perform actions of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, to place the Standby Main Feedwater Pump in service and establish flow into at least one SG before RCS bleed and feed is required.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 4 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-1-73, % HP TURBINE POWER TR A fails low. Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The Chief Examiner cues the Console Operator to enter Event 1.

Indications:

94-A TAVG-TREF DEVIATION Diagnoses and announces the failure of 1-PT-1-73, % HP TURBINE RO POWER TR A.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control RO System, and places 1-RBSS, ROD BANK SELECT in MAN position.

Enters and directs actions of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control SRO System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod Bank Movement.

ARI 94-A The following actions are taken from ARI 94-A TAVG-TREF DEVIATION.

RO [1] CHECK Loop Tavg on 1-TI-68-2E, -25E, -44E, and -67E [1-M-5].

[2] IF Tavg is less than or equal to 561°F, THEN PERFORM 1-SI-68-34 RO within 30 minutes.

RO [3] CHECK Tref & Auct Tavg recorder 1-TR-68-2B [1-M-5].

[4] IF control rods are in AUTO, THEN:

[4.1] PLACE control rods in MANUAL AND RESTORE Tavg to Tref RO using rods OR ADJUST turbine load to match Tavg with Tref.

[4.2] REFER TO AOI-2.

The following actions are taken AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control AOI-2 System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod Bank Movement.

NOTE Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step

1. STOP uncontrolled rod motion:

a. PLACE control rods in MAN.

If not already performed, the RO locates 1-RBSS, ROD BANK SELECT and rotates the handswitch to the left from the AUTO position to the RO MAN position.

b. CHECK control rod movement STOPPED.

RO locates 1-MON-85-5000/1 CERPI MONITOR 1 and 1-MON-85-5000/2, CERPI MONITOR 2 and determines that rod motion has stopped.

2. MAINTAIN T-ave on PROGRAM. (Reference Attachment 1)

() USE control rods.

() ADJUST turbine load.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 5 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-1-73, % HP TURBINE POWER TR A fails low. Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. CHECK loop T-ave channels NORMAL.

RO RO locates 1-TI-68-2E, LOOP 1 TAVG, 1-TI-68-25E, LOOP 2 TAVG, 1-TI-68-44E, LOOP 3 TAVG and 1-TI-68-67E, LOOP 4 TAVG and determines that the TAVG channels are NORMAL.

4. CHECK Auct T-avg NORMAL on 1-TR-68-2B.

RO RO locates 1-TR-68-2B, TREF & AUCT TAVG - F, and determines that the GREEN pen indicating AUCT TAVG is NORMAL.

5. CHECK NIS power range channels NORMAL.

RO RO locates 1-NI-41B, PR FLUX % POWER, 1-NI-42B, PR FLUX %

POWER, 1-NI-43B, PR FLUX % POWER, 1-NI-44B, PR FLUX % POWER and determines that the NIS PR channels are NORMAL.

6. CHECK the following:

Turbine impulse pressure channel 1-PI-1-73, NORMAL.

RO locates 1-PI-1-73, % HP TURBINE POWER TR A, and determines that the indication has failed low.

T-ref and Auct T-avg NORMAL on 1-TR-68-2B (Reference Attachment 1).

RO locates 1-TR-68-2B, TREF & AUCT TAVG - F, and determines that the RED pen is indicating TREF is NOT NORMAL.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 6 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-1-73, % HP TURBINE POWER TR A fails low. Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 6.RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PLACE steam dumps in pressure mode as follows:

a. PLACE steam dumps to OFF.

BOP locates 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A and rotates the handswitch from the mid position (ON) to the left to the OFF/RESET position.

BOP locates 1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B and rotates the handswitch from the mid position (ON) to the left to the OFF/RESET position.

b. PLACE mode selector HS to STEAM PRESS.

BOP locates 1-HS-1-103D, STEAM DUMP MODE, and rotates the handswitch from the TAVG position to the right to the STEAM PRESS position.

c. ADJUST steam dump demand to zero.

BOP BOP locates 1-XI-1-33, STEAM DUMP DEMAND and observes a zero demand signal.

d. PLACE steam dumps to ON.

BOP locates 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A and rotates the handswitch from the OFF/RESET position to the right to the ON position.

BOP locates 1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B and rotates the handswitch from the OFF/RESET position to the right to the ON position.

e. ENSURE controller set at 84% (1092 psig).

BOP locates 1-PIC-1-33, STM DUMP PRESS CONTROL, and observes that 84% is set on the dial.

f. WHEN conditions allow, THEN REFER TO SOI-1.02 and PLACE steam dumps in TAVG Mode.

SRO announces that the steam dumps must remain in STM PRESS until repairs are complete.

7. MONITOR core power distribution parameters:

Power range channels

Flux Indicators RO

T-ave

Loop T

Incore TCs

Feed flow/Steam flow

8. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

SRO When the SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1-PT-1-73.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 7 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-1-73, % HP TURBINE POWER TR A fails low. Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. REFER TO Tech Specs:

3.1.1, Shutdown Margin

3.1.5, Rod Group Alignment Limits

3.1.6, Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits

3.1.7, Control Bank Insertion Limits

3.2.1, Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor

3.2.2, Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor SRO

3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio

3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference

3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation Function 16.f, Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-13. Condition S. With One channel inoperable, verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months OR Be in Mode 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months .

3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation

10. NOTIFY Chemistry of any reactor power changes greater than 15% in SRO one hour.

SRO determines that this step is not applicable.

11. WHEN ready to restore repaired T and loop T-avg channels, THEN:

PUSH IN 1-XS-68-2D, T CHANNEL DEFEAT and SELECT AWAY from all channels.

PUSH IN 1-XS-68-2M, TAVG CHANNEL DEFEAT, and SELECT AWAY from all channels.

SRO determines that his step is not applicable.

CAUTION Allowing at least 5 minutes between any rod control input change (i.e., T-ave, T-ref, or NIS) and placing rods in AUTO, will help prevent undesired control rod movement.

12. WHEN auto rod control desired, THEN:

a. ENSURE T-ave and T-ref within 1°F.

SRO b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication [1-M-4].

c. PLACE rods in AUTO.

SRO determines that this step is not applicable.

13. WHEN conditions allow auto PZR level control, THEN ENSURE PZR SRO level returned to normal program, AND PLACE 1-FCV-62-93 in AUTO.

SRO determines that this step is not applicable.

SRO 14. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 8 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-1-73, % HP TURBINE POWER TR A fails low. Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The crew brief is optional. The next event, Event 2, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 2.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 9 of 43 Event

Description:

C-S CCS Pump shaft shears. The BOP will manually start the 2B-B CCS pump using 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

242-D, CCP 1B-B GEAR & OIL CLR FLOW LO 242-E, SIP 1B-B OIL CLR FLOW LO 244-E, RHRP 1B-B MECH SEAL HX FLOW LO 246-D, RHR HX 1B-B RET FLOW LO BOP Diagnoses and announces the failure of C-S CCS pump to pump forward.

May place the C-S CCS pump in STOP, PULL-TO-LOCK, and start the 2B-BOP B CCS pump.

May dispatch an AUO to investigate the C-S CCS pump.

RO/BOP When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator reports that there is damage to the C-S CCS pump coupling and shaft. Shaft appears to be broken.

Enters and directs actions of 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water SRO (CCS).

The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component 1-AOI-15 Cooling Water (CCS), Section 3.2, Loss of CCS Flow.

1. CHECK at least one U-1 Train A header supply pump RUNNING AND pumping forward:

1A-A BOP

1B-B BOP locates 1-HS-70-46A, CCS PMP 1A-A, and determines that the pump is running based on the RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK. BOP locates 1-PI-70-24A, CCS HX A SUP PRESS and determines that pressure is normal, and that the 1A-A CCS pump is pumping forward.

CAUTIONS

CCP may survive for only 10 to 12 minutes after loss of CCS to lube oil cooler.

RCPs can be operated for up to 10 minutes after loss of CCS flow.

2. CHECK 1A Train flows NORMAL

CCS Low Flow alarms on 0-M-27 CLEAR.

BOP BOP observes that there are NO low flow alarms LIT on Train A, and reports conditions are normal.

CAUTION Seal injection should NOT be reestablished to RCP seals on a total loss of cooling due to probable damage to the seals. Appendix A of ECA-0.0, Loss of Shutdown Power, has guidance to isolate RCP seals.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 10 of 43 Event

Description:

C-S CCS Pump shaft shears. The BOP will manually start the 2B-B CCS pump using 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. CHECK thermal barrier flow OR seal injection flow established.

BOP determines thermal barrier flow is established by observing 1-BOP FI-70-115, TH BAR 1 FLOW, 1-FI-70-105, TH BAR 2 FLOW, 1-FI-70-95, TH BAR 3 FLOW, and 1-FI-70-124, TH BAR 4 FLOW.

SRO may request that the RO report current RCP seal injection flows.

4. CHECK any Train B header supply pump RUNNING AND pumping forward:

C-S.

2B-B.

BOP locates 2-HS-70-51A, CCS PMP C-S NORMAL ACB and determines that the pump is running based on the RED light LIT, but there are multiple low flow alarms indicating the C-S CCS pump is not pumping forward.

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

START available Train B CCS pump If not already accomplished, the SRO directs the BOP to start the 2B-B CCS pump. It is not expected for the SRO to perform the actions to align CCS pump 1B-B to Train B header at this time.

Since starting the 2B-B CCS pump restores flow, actions to swap from BOP 1B-B CCP to 1A-A CCP are not required.

OR REFER TO SOI-70.01, Component Cooling Water (CCS), to align CCS pump 1B-B to Train B header as necessary.

ENSURE CCP 1A-A Running.

IF B Train CCS flow cannot be restored, THEN STOP and LOCKOUT CCP 1B-B.

5. PLACE any non-operable or tripped CCS pump in STOP/PULL-TO-LOCK.

BOP If not already accomplished, the SRO may direct the BOP to place the C-S CCS pump in STOP/PULL-TO-LOCK.

6. CHECK only one TBBP running.

BOP locates 1-HS-70-131A, THRM BAR BSTR PMP 1A (TBBP) and observes that the pump is running with RED light LIT and GREEN light BOP DARK.

BOP locates 1-HS-70-130A, THRM BAR BSTR PMP 1B (TBBP) and observes that the pump is NOT running with RED light DARK and GREEN light LIT.

7. CHECK TWO U-1 Train A header supply pumps RUNNING:

1A-A BOP

1B-B BOP reports 1A-A CCS pump is in service on Train A.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 11 of 43 Event

Description:

C-S CCS Pump shaft shears. The BOP will manually start the 2B-B CCS pump using 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE at least one of the following CLOSED to avoid excessive flow:

RHR HX A, 1-FCV-70-156, BOP locates 1-HS-70-156A, RHR HX 1A OUTLET, and determines that the valve is closed by GREEN light LIT, RED light DARK.

SFP HX A, 0-FCV-70-197.

8. CHECK A and B side Surge Tank levels between 57% and 85%.

BOP BOP locates 1-LI-70-63A, U1 SURGE TANK A SIDE LEVEL and 1-LI 99A, U1 SURGE TANK B SIDE LEVEL and reports levels approximately 66%.

9. REFER TO Tech Spec 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water System (CCS).

SRO SRO enters LCO 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water System (CCS)

CONDITION A, One CCS train inoperable, restore the CCS train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

10. NOTIFY Work Control to initiate repairs.

SRO When the SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for C-S CCS pump.

SRO 11. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew brief is optional. The next event, Event 3, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 3.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 12 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, closes due to a controller failure.

Requires entry into ARI 110-B LO PRESS LTDN FLOW/PRESS HI. Requires manual operation of 1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL to maintain pressure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

110-B, LO PRESS LTDN FLOW/PRESS HI.

247-A, LTDN HX RET FLOW LO Announces rising pressure on 1-PI-62-81, and diagnoses the failure of 1-RO PIC-62-81A LETDOWN PRESSURE CONTROL to control in AUTOMATIC.

Enters and directs actions of ARI 110-B, LO PRESS LTDN FLOW/PRESS SRO HI.

The following actions are taken from ARI 110-B, LO PRESS LTDN ARI 110-B FLOW/PRESS HI.

[1] CHECK letdown flow, 1-FI-62-82, and letdown pressure, 1-PI-62-81 [1-M-6].

RO RO observes letdown flow lowering on 1-FI-62-82 and letdown pressure is rising on 1-PI-62-81.

NOTE If 1-PCV-62-81 has failed, SOI-62.01 may be referenced to bypass the valve.

[2] ENSURE 1-PCV-62-81 is maintaining 320 to 350 psig on 1-PI-62-81.

RO places 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, in MANUAL and returns letdown pressure to approximately 320 psig by opening RO the valve slowly.

If contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, the Console Operator acknowledges the request to locally inspect 1-PCV-62-81. Report back that there are no obvious problems at the controller and that the valve appears to be responding to manual signals.

[3] ENSURE proper orifice(s) are aligned to supply letdown flow 45 to 120 gpm.

RO With letdown flow at 75 gpm, the RO ensures that either 1-FCV-62-73 or 1-FCV-62-74 is open.

[4] IF conditions persist, THEN, CONSIDER taking normal Charging and Letdown out of service and placing excess letdown in service per SOI-SRO 62.01, CVCS - CHARGING AND LETDOWN.

SRO determines that letdown pressure can be maintained with 1-HIC-62-81A in MANUAL, and does not isolate charging and letdown.

Contacts Work Control to repair 1-PCV-62-81, LETDOWN PRESSURE CONTROL.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator repeats the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1-PCV-62-81, LETDOWN PRESSURE CONTROL.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 13 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, closes due to a controller failure.

Requires entry into ARI 110-B LO PRESS LTDN FLOW/PRESS HI. Requires manual operation of 1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL to maintain pressure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The crew brief is optional. The next event, Event 4, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 4.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 14 of 43 Event

Description:

Load reduction to 75%, at 2%/min using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

Console Operator, acting as the Shift Manager, calls and directs the crew to begin a load reduction to 75% at 2%/min in order to prepare for removal of the 1A Main Feedwater Pump from service.

The following actions are taken from AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, Section AOI-39 3.2, Reactor power is greater than 50%.

CAUTION Over boration may result in excessive rod withdrawal, T-avg lower than desired, and AFD oscillations.

NOTE

Rod Control should remain in automatic for T-avg Control

Reactivity Briefing Sheet, Thumb Rules (page 3), lists boration flows and volumes for different reduction rates.

Effect of boration will lag behind turbine load reduction and can be compensated for by temporarily increasing boric acid flow rate above recommended rate.

1. INITIATE a manual boration:

a. DETERMINE recommended boration flow rate and volume from Reactivity Briefing Sheet:

RO determines the recommended boration flow rate is between 27 to 40 gpm and the volume to add is 319 gallons of boron.

b. INITIATE normal boration:

1) ADJUST BA flow controller, 1-FC-62-139, to desired flow rate.

RO adjusts 1-FC-62-139 to the value corresponding to the flow rate for the selected load reduction rate.

2) ADJUST BA batch counter 1-FQ-62-139 to required quantity.

RO adjusts 1-FQ-62-139 BA BATCH COUNTER as follows:

1. Depresses and holds the black pushbutton.

RO 2. While holding the pushbutton, the applicant raises the red translucent cover.

3. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant enters 000319 in the display.

4. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant lowers the red translucent cover, and then releases the pushbutton.

3) PLACE mode selector 1-HS-62-140B to BOR.

RO rotates 1-HS-62-140B VCT MAKEUP MODE from AUTO to the right to BOR position.

4) () PLACE VCT makeup control 1-HS-62-140A, to START.

RO rotates 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL to the right to the START position.

5) VERIFY desired boric acid flow indicated on 1-FI-62-139.

RO observes the desired flow on 1-FI-62-139, BA TO BLENDER FLOW 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 15 of 43 Event

Description:

Load reduction to 75%, at 2%/min using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION

Condenser Backpressure limits are on page 5.

TURBINE MANUAL Operation requires continuous operator monitoring and control.

LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM may be made worse if steam dumps are actuated. AOI-11 requires T-ave and T-ref be maintained within 3°F.

NOTE If the initiating condition is corrected, the power reduction may be terminated

2. ESTABLISH a turbine load reduction rate less than or equal to 5%/min:

a. PLACE turbine in IMP IN BOP depressed the IMP IN pushbutton and observes the transfer from IMP OUT to IMP IN control complete.

b. SET a desired load in the SETTER with the REFERENCE CONTROL.

BOP depresses the reference control (down) button to reduce the BOP setter display to less than 75% load or as directed by the SRO.

c. SET the LOAD RATE at less than or equal to 5%/min.

BOP selects the load reduction rate directed by the SRO using the LOAD RATE % PER MIN thumbwheel selector. It is expected that a load reduction rate of 2-4%/minute will be used

d. () DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

BOP depresses the REFERENCE CONTROL GO button.

NOTE AFD green target band can be monitored using ICS Turn On code DOGHOUSE.

3. MONITOR rod position:

Rods above Lo-Lo insertion limit

AFD within Target Band

4. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart SRO SRO contacts the Shift Manager and Console Operator repeats back request that EPIP-1 be evaluated.

5. NOTIFY the Load Coordinator of the required load reduction and expected ramp rate SRO When the SRO contacts Load Coordinator, the Console Operator will repeat back the information provided.

6. MONITOR T-avg and T-ref:

T-ave trending to T-ref.

Mismatch less than 5°F.

7. CHECK rate of power reduction is rapid enough for existing plant SRO conditions.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 16 of 43 Event

Description:

Load reduction to 75%, at 2%/min using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. NOTIFY Cnds Demin AUO of impending pmp shutdowns.

SRO When contacted as the Cnds Demin AUO, repeat back the information provided concerning the plant shutdown.

9. WHEN rated thermal power change exceeds 15% in one hour, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate 1-SI-68-28.

SRO When SRO contacts Chemistry, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to perform 1-SI-68-28.

When power has been reduced to 93%, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 4 and Event 4a.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4, 4.a Page 17 of 43 Event

Description:

4.) 1A MFP vibrations rise to 10 mils, requiring the 1A MFP to be tripped. Requires entry into 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Subsection 3.4 Loss of TDMFP Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load). AFD limits are exceeded, requiring a Tech Spec evaluation.

4.a.) Standby Main Feedwater Pump fails to auto start. Requires BOP to manually start the pump.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

53-D, TURBINE VIBRATION HI 54-D, PUMP VIBRATION HI BOP Announces the high vibration condition on the 1A MFP pump and turbine.

May call up the ICS screen MFPT A VIBRATION on the SECONDARY BOP MINICS screen.

Informs the Unit Supervisor that the vibration readings are at 10 mils, which BOP requires the 1A MFP to be stopped.

May enter and direct actions of ARI 53-D or 54-D. When informed of the SRO magnitude of the vibrations, orders the BOP to trip the 1A MFP.

Enters and directs actions of 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, SRO Section 3.4, TDMFWP Trip OR Loss of Flow at Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

ARI 53-D The following actions are taken from ARI 53-D, TURBINE VIBRATION HI.

NOTE MFP vibration can be monitored at 1-L-792 [el. 755] and on computer screens MFPTVIBA and MFPTVIBB.

BOP [1] DETERMINE affected MFPT from Windows 50-A and 50-B.

BOP [2] MONITOR affected pump vibration on the ICS or 1-L-792 [el. 755].

[3] DISPATCH Operator to:

[3.1] CHECK for sounds of vibration or rubbing.

[3.2] CHECK lube oil temperature and ADJUST as necessary.

[3.3] RESET local indicator at 1-L-792 [el. 755].

[4] EVALUATE Unit load and condition, and ADJUST MFPT speed to SRO lower vibration, if possible.

[5] IF alarm valid and vibration is greater than or equal to 5 mils, THEN SRO EVALUATE Unit load reduction to allow MFPT removal from service.

BOP [6] IF vibration is greater than or equal to 10 mils, THEN trip the MFPT.

SRO [7] NOTIFY Work Control to initiate corrective action, if necessary.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4, 4.a Page 18 of 43 Event

Description:

4.) 1A MFP vibrations rise to 10 mils, requiring the 1A MFP to be tripped. Requires entry into 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Subsection 3.4 Loss of TDMFP Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load). AFD limits are exceeded, requiring a Tech Spec evaluation.

4.a.) Standby Main Feedwater Pump fails to auto start. Requires BOP to manually start the pump.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ARI 54-D The following actions are taken from ARI 54-D, PUMP VIBRATION HI.

NOTE MFP vibration can be monitored at 1-L-792 [el. 755] and on computer screens MFPTVIBA and MFPTVIBB.

BOP [1] DETERMINE affected MFPT from Windows 50-A and 50-B.

BOP [2] MONITOR affected pump vibration on the ICS or 1-L-792 [el. 755].

[3] DISPATCH Operator to:

[3.1] CHECK for sounds of vibration or rubbing.

[3.2] CHECK lube oil temperature and ADJUST as necessary.

[3.3] RESET local indicator at 1-L-792 [el. 755].

[4] EVALUATE Unit load and condition, and ADJUST MFPT speed to SRO lower vibration, if possible.

[5] IF alarm valid and vibration is greater than or equal to 5 mils, THEN SRO EVALUATE Unit load reduction to allow MFPT removal from service.

BOP [6] IF vibration is greater than or equal to 10 mils, THEN trip the MFPT.

SRO [7] NOTIFY Work Control to initiate corrective action, if necessary.

The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, 1-AOI-16 Section 3.4, TDMFWP Trip OR Loss of Flow at Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

1. () IF loss of S/G level is imminent, THEN TRIP reactor, and ** GO TO SRO 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

2. ENSURE failed MFPT TRIPPED.

BOP BOP previously tripped the 1A MFP manually.

BOP 3. CHECK turbine load less than or equal to 1000 MWe (85%).

4. PLACE tripped MFWP recirc valve controller in MANUAL, and CLOSE recirc valve.

BOP BOP locates 1-FIC-3-70, MFWP A RECIRC CONTROL, and depresses the AUTO/MAN pushbutton. The BOP observes MAN is backlit in YELLOW. BOP depresses the RAMP and << pushbuttons to close the valve.

BOP 5. CHECK turbine load less than 800 MWe (67%).

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4, 4.a Page 19 of 43 Event

Description:

4.) 1A MFP vibrations rise to 10 mils, requiring the 1A MFP to be tripped. Requires entry into 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Subsection 3.4 Loss of TDMFP Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load). AFD limits are exceeded, requiring a Tech Spec evaluation.

4.a.) Standby Main Feedwater Pump fails to auto start. Requires BOP to manually start the pump.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: Standby Main Feedwater Pump auto start circuit fails. The Standby Main feedwater Pump can be started manually by the BOP.

5. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE Standby MFWP running.

BOP determines that the Standby MFP has failed to start and BOP manually starts the pump by rotating 1-HS-3-300A to the right to the START position. BOP observes the RED light LIT and the GREEN light DARK.

() IF Standby MFWP NOT available, THEN REDUCE turbine load to less than 800 MWe with valve position limiter.

6. ENSURE MFPT speed rising to control S/G P and levels on BOP program.

CAUTION Continued load reductions below 800 MWe should be done using normal turbine controls at less than or equal to 5% min.

NOTE Load will NOT change until VALVE POS LIMIT light is cleared.

7. ENSURE adequate feed flow for existing conditions:

Feed flow greater than or equal to steam flow.

S/G levels returning to program.

BOP 8. MONITOR Tavg trending to within 3°F of Tref.

CAUTION Runback may result in exceeding Tech Spec 3.2.3 limits on Axial Flux Difference (AFD).

9. MAINTAIN AFD within limits. () INITIATE boration as required RO REFER TO ATTACHMENT 1, Manual Boration.

EXAMINER: Boration should be in progress performed as a part of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4, 4.a Page 20 of 43 Event

Description:

4.) 1A MFP vibrations rise to 10 mils, requiring the 1A MFP to be tripped. Requires entry into 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Subsection 3.4 Loss of TDMFP Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load). AFD limits are exceeded, requiring a Tech Spec evaluation.

4.a.) Standby Main Feedwater Pump fails to auto start. Requires BOP to manually start the pump.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. ENSURE tripped MFP turbine condenser valves CLOSED:

Pump A, 1-FCV-2-205 and 210.

OR BOP

Pump B, 1-FCV-2-211 and 216.

BOP determines that 1-FCV-2-205, MFPT A CONDENSER OUTLET and 1-FCV-2-210, MFPT A CONDENSER INLET closed automatically.

11. MONITOR reg valves controlling S/G levels on program.

BOP BOP determines that SG levels are returning to program.

12. LOCALLY MAINTAIN oil temp between 110 and 130°F on running Standby MFP using 1-THV-24-948.

BOP When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to locally maintain SBMFP oil temperature between 110 and 130°F using 1-THV-24-948. Console Operator reports that oil temperature is currently 118°F.

EXAMINER: Since the steam dump controls are in STEAM PRESSURE mode at this time, the SRO may elect to:

1.) Not reset C-7 interlock OR 2.) Direct the BOP to place the steam dump controls in OFF prior to resetting C-7.

13. ENSURE reset of C-7:

a. CHECK C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK annunciator LIT. [66-E]

BOP will verify C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK (66-E) is LIT.

b. ENSURE steam dump valves have zero demand.

BOP will verify STEAM DUMP DEMAND 1-XI-1-33 indicates zero. Since BOP 1-PT-1-73 failed LOW, and Steam Dumps are in STM PRESS Mode, there is a large Tavg-Tref mismatch in the control circuit, which would cause the valves to open when the1-HS-1-103D is passed through the Tavg mode. BOP should discuss options with SRO.

c. RESET loss-of-load interlock with steam dump mode switch.

BOP will rotate STEAM DUMP MODE switch 1-HS-1-103D to the left and verify C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK (66-E) is DARK.

14. ENSURE Condensate System Pumps in service as necessary:

REFER TO 1-GO-4, Normal Power Operation.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4, 4.a Page 21 of 43 Event

Description:

4.) 1A MFP vibrations rise to 10 mils, requiring the 1A MFP to be tripped. Requires entry into 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Subsection 3.4 Loss of TDMFP Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load). AFD limits are exceeded, requiring a Tech Spec evaluation.

4.a.) Standby Main Feedwater Pump fails to auto start. Requires BOP to manually start the pump.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

15. IF reactor power dropped by greater than or equal to 15% in one hour, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate power change sampling SRO requirements.

When contacted as Chemistry, the Console Operator repeats back the request to perform power change samples.

16. CHECK VALVE POS LIMIT LIT.

BOP BOP determines from 1-XX-47-1000, EHC DISPLAY that the RED VALVE POS LIMIT is LIT.

17. RETURN valve position limiter to normal:

a. ENSURE TURBINE in IMP OUT.

BOP locates the IMP-OUT pushbutton on 1-XX-47-1000 and determines that the light is NOT LIT. BOP depresses the pushbutton to transfer from IMP-IN to IMP-OUT mode.

b. () REDUCE turbine load setpoint using REFERENCE CONTROL (lower) AND GO button until VALVE POS LIMIT LIGHT NOT LIT.

BOP BOP locates the REFERENCE CONTROL on 1-XX-47-1000, EHC CONTROL. BOP depresses the REFERENCE CONTROL pushbutton and reduces REFERENCE display to a value slightly less than the indicated VALVE POSITION LIMIT on 1-XX-47-2000 EHC DISPLAY.

BOP selects a load rate using the LOAD RATE % PER MIN.

c. SET valve position limiter to 95%.

After the VALVE POSITION LIMIT RED light is DARK, the BOP depresses the VALVE POSITION LIMITER pushbutton to raise the valve position limit to 95%.

18. INITIATE repairs on failed pump.

SRO When SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair packages for the 1A MFP and the auto start circuit for the Standby MFP.

SRO 19. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew brief is optional. The next event, Event 5, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior to SRO the next event.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4, 4.a Page 22 of 43 Event

Description:

4.) 1A MFP vibrations rise to 10 mils, requiring the 1A MFP to be tripped. Requires entry into 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Subsection 3.4 Loss of TDMFP Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load). AFD limits are exceeded, requiring a Tech Spec evaluation.

4.a.) Standby Main Feedwater Pump fails to auto start. Requires BOP to manually start the pump.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

EXAMINER: Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 5.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 23 of 43 Event

Description:

1B MFP trips due to a loss of lube oil pressure, resulting in a loss of feedwater and turbine trip Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring the RO to manually trip the reactor.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

50-B, MFPT 1B ABNORMAL 51-A, TRIPPED 52-A, BEARING OIL PRESS LO 1-PI-46-39. MFPT B BRG OIL PRESS LO indicating ZERO.

Feedwater flow dropping rapidly to all SGs.

Feedwater pressure dropping EXAMINER: Standby Main Feedwater Pump will be tripped by the Feedwater Isolation signal caused by the Turbine Trip. The Standby Main Feedwater pump remains operable, and available for start during the performance of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

BOP Diagnoses and announces the trip of the 1B-B MFP.

May dispatch personnel to the 1B-B MFP to investigate the cause of the trip.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to go to the turbine building to monitor the condition of the 1B BOP MFP.

Console Operator reports back that:

There is a lube oil leak.

Fire Ops and Environmental personnel are on the scene.

There is NO fire.

Determines that a reactor trip should have occurred due to a turbine trip RO (loss of both main feedwater pumps.) Actuates a manual reactor trip using 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP handswitch.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 1-E-0. Reactor Trip or Safety RO Injection.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety BOP Injection.

SRO Enters and directs actions of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

EXAMINER: The loss of secondary heat sink transient begins when the reactor is tripped.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 24 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink occurs, requiring performance of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Requires Standby Main Feedwater pump to be placed in service to restore the heat sink.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-E-0 The following actions are taken from 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

NOTE

Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS

Status Trees / SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR A RED light LIT on panel 1-M-4.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR B RED light LIT on panel 1-M-4 RO checks 1-52BYA, BYPASS BKR A lights DARK RO checks 1-52BYB, BYPASS BKR B lights DARK RO

RPIs at bottom of scale.

RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor 1 and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 and determines that the SHUTDOWN and CONTROL bank rods are NOT inserted.

Neutron flux DROPPING.

RO observes neutron flux on 1-NR-92-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER are not dropping.

Critical Task 1 Manually trip the reactor from the control room prior to entry into 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

Manually TRIP reactor.

RO locates 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the TRIP position.

RO determines that the reactor trip occurred by observing:

RO RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR A GREEN light LIT on panel 1-M-4.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR B GREEN light LIT on panel 1-M-4 RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor 1 and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 and determines that the SHUTDOWN and CONTROL bank rods ARE inserted.

RO observes neutron flux on 1-NR-92-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER ARE dropping.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

RO RO observes that indicating lights on 1-XX-47-1000 EHC CONTROL for individual throttle and governor valves are GREEN.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 25 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink occurs, requiring performance of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Requires Standby Main Feedwater pump to be placed in service to restore the heat sink.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

CSST (offsite),

D/G (blackout).

RO determines that the shutdown boards are energized from off-site power.

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

DETERMINE if SI required:

a. IF ANY of the following exists:

S/G press less than 675 psig, RO reports all SG pressures are greater than 675 psig.

RCS press less than 1870 psig, RO RO reports RCS pressure is greater than 1870 psig, and that pressures are above 1870 psig.

Cntmt press greater than 1.5 psig RO reports containment pressure is zero psig.

THEN ACTUATE SI manually.

IF SI NOT required, THEN ** GO TO 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 26 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink occurs, requiring performance of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Requires Standby Main Feedwater pump to be placed in service to restore the heat sink.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ES-0.1 The following actions are taken from ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

CAUTION Plant conditions, AFW pump start signals and flow requirements should be evaluated as time allows.

1. MONITOR SI actuation criteria:

IF SI actuation occurs during the performance of this Instruction, THEN **

GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

2. CHECK Generator PCBs OPEN.

BOP observes that 1-HS-57-26, PCB 5044 MAIN GENERATOR 500 KV BOP BUS red LIGHT IS DARK and GREEN LIGHT IS lit. BOP observes 1-HS-57-24, PCB 5088 MAIN GENERATOR 500 KV BUS red LIGHT IS DARK and GREEN LIGHT IS lit.

3. MONITOR RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F using:

RCS Loop T-avg with any RCP running.

RCS Loop T-cold with RCPs out-of-service.

RO reports Tavg is above 557°F.

4. ENSURE AFW operation:

a. AFW established:

Both MD AFW pumps RUNNING.

RO determines that there are NO MD AFW pumps running.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to determine the status of the 1A-A and 1B-B MD AFW pumps.

Console Operator reports that there is a rupture of the discharge piping of the 1A-A MD AFW pump. Reports the 1B-B MD AFW pump is BOP steam bound.

TD AFW pump RUNNING.

RO determines that that the TD AFW pump has tripped on overspeed.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to determine the status of the TD AFW pump. Console Operator reports the Trip & Throttle valve linkage is severely damaged and cannot be reset.

LCVs in AUTO or controlled in MANUAL.

4.a RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a. ESTABLISH feed flow from AFW or MFW as necessary.

BOP BOP determines that the AFW pumps are not available, and that due to the loss of condenser vacuum, the Main Feedwater pumps are not available.

BOP determines that the Standby Main Feedwater Pump is available.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 27 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink occurs, requiring performance of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Requires Standby Main Feedwater pump to be placed in service to restore the heat sink.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

b. Heat sink available:

Total feed flow greater than 410 gpm, OR BOP RO determines that minimum AFW flow does not exist.

At least one S/G NR level greater than 29%.

RO determines that NO S/G NR levels are greater than 29%.

4. b. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

b. IF heat sink can NOT be established, THEN ** GO TO 1-FR-H.1, Loss BOP Of Secondary Heat Sink.

SRO implements 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

1-FR-H.1 The following actions are taken from 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

CAUTION

If total feed flow CAPABILITY of 410 gpm is available, this Instruction should NOT be performed.

If an Intact S/G is available, feed flow should NOT be reestablished to any faulted S/G.

1. CHECK if secondary heat sink is required:

a. RCS pressure greater than any Intact S/G pressure.

b. RCS temperature greater than 375°F [360°F ADV].

RO determines that both of the conditions requiring a heat sink exist.

2. ENSURE at least one charging pump RUNNING.

RO RO reports that the 1A-A CCP is running.

CAUTION RCS bleed and feed criteria must be monitored for immediate response if the criteria is exceeded.

3. DETERMINE if RCS bleed and feed required:

a. CHECK RCS bleed and feed required:

Any THREE S/G WR levels less than or equal to 26% [36% ADV].

RO observes 1-LI-3-43A, SG 1 WR LEVEL, 1-LI-3-56A, SG 2 WR LEVEL, 1-LI-3-98A, SG 3 WR LEVEL, and 1-LI-3-111A, SG 4 WR LEVEL and determines that all levels are greater than 26%.

RCS pressure greater than or equal to 2335 psig.

RO observes 1-PI-68-340A, PZR PRESS, 1-PI-68-334, PZR PRESS, 1-PI-68-323, PZR PRESS and 1-PI-68-322 PZR PRESS and determines that all pressures are less than 2335 psig.

b. STOP all RCPs, AND ** GO TO Cautions prior to Step 18 to initiate RCS bleed and feed.

4. ENSURE S/G blowdown ISOLATED.

BOP BOP isolates blowdown.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 28 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink occurs, requiring performance of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Requires Standby Main Feedwater pump to be placed in service to restore the heat sink.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. MONITOR CST volume greater than 200,000 gal.

BOP BOP reports CST volume is approximately 320,000 gal in CST A and 370,000 gal in CST B.

NOTE If the use of condensate flow is anticipated, then a higher pzr level will better accommodate the level shrink from S/G cooldown and depressurization.

RO 6. CONTROL pzr level between 29% and 63% [47% and 58% ADV].

7. ESTABLISH MD AFW pump flow:

a. CHECK MD AFW pump AVAILABLE.

Reports from AUOs in the field indicate that the 1A-A MD AFW pump discharge piping has ruptured. The 1B-B MD AFW pump is steam BOP bound, and the vent valve is jammed closed.

If/when contacted as Work Control, repeat back the request to determine the cause of the MD AFW pump problems and to repair problems as soon as possible.

7. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a. ** GO TO Step 8.

8. ESTABLISH TD AFW pump flow:

a. CHECK TD AFW pump AVAILABLE.

Reports from the AUOs in the field indicate that the linkage for the Trip BOP & Throttle valve is severely damaged, and the valve cannot be reset.

If/when contacted as Work Control, repeat back the request to determine the cause of the TD AFW pump problems and to repair problems as soon as possible.

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a. ** GO TO Step 9

9. STOP all four RCPs.

RO RO stops all RCPs.

EXAMINER: For the convenience of the Examiner evaluating BOP, 1-FR-H.1, Appendix A, Establishing MFW following Reactor Trip, is contained on page 35 of 43.

10. IF Secondary pumps will be used to feed S/Gs, THEN REFER TO RO Appendix A (FR-H.1), Establishing MFW following Reactor Trip, while continuing this Instruction.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 29 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink occurs, requiring performance of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Requires Standby Main Feedwater pump to be placed in service to restore the heat sink.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION

If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action will be required to restart the SI pumps and RHR pumps due to loss of SI start signal.

If plant conditions degrade after automatic SI is blocked, manual actuation may be required.

NOTE After the low steamline pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

11. BLOCK SI signals:

a. INITIATE RCS depressurization to less than 1912 psig:

1) IF letdown in service, THEN ALIGN aux spray USING Appendix B (1-FR-H.1), ALIGN AUX SPRAY.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from 1-FR-H.1, Appendix B, ALIGN AUX SPRAY.

RO A. ENSURE at least one charging pump running.

B. IF charging is NOT aligned, THEN ALIGN charging:

RO RO determines that 1A-A charging pump is in service.

C. ENSURE BIT outlet valves 1-FCV-63-25 and 1-FCV-63-26 CLOSED.

RO RO locates 1-HS-63-25A, BIT OUTLET and 1-HS-63-26A, BIT OUTLET and observes that the valves are CLOSED by the GREEN lights LIT and the RED lights DARK.

NOTE Aux spray flow can be maximized by closing the normal pzr spray valve(s).

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 30 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink occurs, requiring performance of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Requires Standby Main Feedwater pump to be placed in service to restore the heat sink.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior D. CONTROL aux spray flow:

1. OPEN aux spray 1-FCV-62-84.

RO locates 1-HS-62-84A, AUX SPRAY TO PZR, and rotates the handswitch to the right from the CLOSE position to the OPEN position.

RO observes the RED light LIT and the GREEN light DARK.

2. CLOSE charging 1-FCV-62-85 and 1-FCV-62-86.

RO locates 1-HS-62-85, NORM CHARGING TO LOOP 1 and 1-HS-62-86, ALT CHARGING TO LOOP 4. And rotates 1-HS-62-86 to the left from the OPEN position to the CLOSE position.

RO 3. MODULATE Pzr Spray valves as needed to control Pzr pressure.

RO locates 1-PIC-68-340D, LOOP 1 SPRAY CONTROL, and 1-PIC 340B, LOOP 2 SPRAY CONTROL and places each controller in MANUAL by lifting the toggle switch from the AUTO position to the MAN position. The RO then holds each toggle to the left to the CLOSE position until each spray valve is fully closed.

4. ADJUST aux spray flow rate with 1-FCV-62-93 and 1-FCV-62-89 as needed.

RO locates and controls charging flow using 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL and 1-HIC-62-89, CHRG HDR-RCP SEALS FLOW CONTROL.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, at Step 11.b.

EXAMINER: During the process of restoring the feedwater flowpath, it is possible for the crew to encounter multiple feedwater isolation signals from the reactor trip coincident with lo Tavg isolation signal. For each isolation, multiple steps will have to be repeated to reestablish feedwater flow.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 31 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink occurs, requiring performance of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Requires Standby Main Feedwater pump to be placed in service to restore the heat sink.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

b. BLOCK auto SI actuation signals [68-B], and [69-B]:

1) NOTIFY IMs to block auto SI USING IMI-99.040, AUTO SI Block.

When contacted as the Instrument Shop, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to perform IMI-99.040. After 10 minutes, the Console Operator will report that IMI-99.040 is complete.

2) WHEN RCS pressure is less than 1962 psig (P-11), THEN

BLOCK low pzr pressure SI.

RO locates 1-HS-63-136A, LO PZR PRESS SI BLOCK P-11 and rotates the handswitch to the right to the BLOCK position.

RO locates 1-HS-63-136B, LO PZR PRESS SI BLOCK P-11 and rotates the handswitch to the right to the BLOCK position.

BLOCK low steam pressure SI.

RO locates 1-HS-63-135A, LO STEAM PRESS SI BLOCK and rotates the handswitch to the right to the BLOCK position.

RO locates 1-HS-63-135B, LO STEAM PRESS SI BLOCK and rotates the handswitch to the right to the BLOCK position.

RO c. ENSURE high cntmt pressure SI signal CLEARED [78-G].

RO determines that 78-G, SI CNTMT PRESS HI is DARK.

d. CHECK SI actuated.

RO determines that SI has not been actuated.

e. RESET SI, AND CHECK the following:

RO locates, then depresses 1-HS-63-134A, SI RESET TR A, and locates, then depresses 1-HS-63-134B SI RESET TR B.

SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.

RO observes window 70-A SI ACTUATED is DARK on Panel 1-XX-55-4A.

AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT.

RO observes window 70-B AUTO SI BLOCKED is LIT on Panel 1-XX-55-4A.

f. MAINTAIN RCS pressure less than 1912 psig.

RO operates 1-HS-62-84A, AUX SPRAY TO PZR, in conjunction with 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL and 1-HIC-62-89, CHRG HDR-RCP SEALS FLOW CONTROL.

NOTE

Cycling reactor trip breakers to allow MFW Isolation reset is required if SI, HI-HI S/G level, or Valve Vault Room Flooding has occurred.

If any valid SI signal has occurred since SI reset, cycling reactor trip breakers will initiate SI.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 32 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink occurs, requiring performance of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Requires Standby Main Feedwater pump to be placed in service to restore the heat sink.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. PREPARE for MFW startup:

a. PLACE MFW pump controllers in MANUAL, AND SET to zero.

BOP locates 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A&B MASTER SPEED CONTROL transfers the controller to manual by depressing the AUTO/MANUAL pushbutton and observing the YELLOW light for MAN LIT. The BOP depresses and holds the RAMP pushbutton and the << pushbutton simultaneously until the controller display indicates the output is zero.

BOP locates each of the individual Main Feed speed controllers and performs the actions for each pump.

b. PLACE MFW reg valve controllers in MANUAL, AND SET to zero.

BOP locates 1-FIC-3-35, SG 1-MFW REG VLV, transfers the controller to manual by depressing the AUTO/MANUAL pushbutton and observing the YELLOW light for MAN LIT. The BOP depresses and holds the RAMP pushbutton and the << pushbutton simultaneously until the controller display indicates the valve is closed.

BOP BOP locates each of the remaining Main Feed Reg valve controllers and performs the actions for each valve.

c. PLACE MFW reg bypass valve controllers in MANUAL, AND SET to zero.

BOP locates 1-FIC-3-35A, SG 1-MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL, transfers the controller to manual by depressing the AUTO/MANUAL pushbutton and observing the YELLOW light foe MAN LIT. The BOP depresses and holds the RAMP pushbutton and the << pushbutton simultaneously until the controller display indicates the valve is closed.

BOP locates each of the remaining MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL controllers and performs the actions for each valve.

d. CHECK FW bypass isolation valves OPEN.

BOP locates and observes the RED lights are LIT and the GREEN lights are DARK for 1-XI-3-SG 1 MFW BYP ISOL 1-FCV-3-238, 1-XI 239, SG 2 MFW BYP ISOL 1-FCV-3-239, 1-XI-3-242, SG 3 MFW BYP ISOL 1-FCV-3-242, and 1-XI-3-245, SG 4 MFW BYP ISOL 1-FCV-3-245.

NOTE If the standby feed pump will be used, only the hotwell pumps should be started to prevent an overpressure condition.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 33 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink occurs, requiring performance of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Requires Standby Main Feedwater pump to be placed in service to restore the heat sink.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 2 Perform actions of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, to place the Standby Main Feedwater Pump in service and establish flow into at least one SG before RCS bleed and feed is required.

13. ESTABLISH feedwater flow:

a. START secondary plant pumps as necessary:

1) Hotwell pumps.

All hotwell pumps may be running at this point. If not, the BOP starts the remaining pumps.

2) Condensate booster pumps.

BOP determines that the Condensate booster pumps are not required since the Standby Main Feedwater Pump is available.

3) Cond DI booster pumps.

BOP determines that the Cond DI booster pumps are not required since the Standby Main Feedwater Pump is available.

b. CHECK MSIVs OPEN.

BOP BOP observes the MSIVs are OPEN by RED lights LIT and GREEN lights DARK on 1-HS-1-4A, MSIV SG 1, 1-HS-1-11A, MSIV SG 2, 1-HS 22A, MSIV SG 3, 1-HS-1-29A, MSIV SG 4.

c. ESTABLISH MFW pump flow:

BOP determines that due to the previous failures of both MFW pumps that the MFW pumps cannot be returned to service.

1) START MFW pump turbine or standby feed pump.

BOP locates 1-HS-3-200A, STANDBY MFWP, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the START position. BOP observes 1-EI 200, STANDBY MFWP AMPS for normal amps. BOP observes 1-PI 203A, STANDBY MFWP DISCH PRESS for normal discharge pressure.

2.) CONTROL MFW pump and bypass reg valve(s) to restore S/G level(s).

BOP throttles open the bypass reg valves to establish flow to all SGs.

14. CHECK secondary heat sink restored:

BOP a. NR level in at least one S/G greater than 29% [39% ADV].

BOP reports that ALL SG narrow range levels are less than 29%.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 34 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink occurs, requiring performance of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Requires Standby Main Feedwater pump to be placed in service to restore the heat sink.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

14. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a. IF feed flow established to at least one S/G:

S/G Wide Range level rising, BOP reports that S/G Wide Range levels are rising.

OR SRO

Incore T/C dropping.

RO locates an RVLIS - ICCM PLASMA DISPLAY, and reports that Incore T/C temperatures are dropping.

THEN MAINTAIN flow to restore NR level to greater than 29% [39%

ADV].

IF feed flow NOT established to at least one S/G, THEN ** GO TO Step 15.

b. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

SRO SRO determines that the instruction in effect prior to entry into FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, is ES-0.1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

END OF SCENARIO 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 35 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink occurs, requiring performance of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Requires Standby Main Feedwater pump to be placed in service to restore the heat sink.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from 1-FR-H.1, Appendix A, Establishing MFW following Reactor Trip.

CAUTION

1) Rx trip breakers must be cycled to allow reset of MFW when isolated by SI or HI-HI S/G level or Valve Vault Room level switches.

2) If any valid SI signal has occurred since SI reset, cycling Rx trip breakers may initiate SI actuation, if signal has NOT yet been blocked by IMs.

A. ENSURE MFW reg valves controllers in MANUAL, AND SET to ZERO demand.

BOP locates 1-FIC-3-35, SG 1-MFW REG VLV, transfers the controller to manual by depressing the AUTO/MANUAL pushbutton and BOP observing the YELLOW light for MAN LIT. The BOP depresses and holds the RAMP pushbutton and the << pushbutton simultaneously until the controller display indicates the valve is closed.

BOP locates each of the remaining Main Feed Reg valve controllers and performs the actions for each valve.

B. ENSURE bypass reg valves controllers in MANUAL, AND SET to ZERO demand.

BOP locates 1-FIC-3-35A, SG 1-MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL, transfers the controller to manual by depressing the AUTO/MANUAL pushbutton and observing the YELLOW light foe MAN LIT. The BOP BOP depresses and holds the RAMP pushbutton and the << pushbutton simultaneously until the controller display indicates the valve is closed.

BOP locates each of the remaining MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL controllers and performs the actions for each valve.

C. WHEN SI signals blocked OR cleared, THEN CYCLE reactor trip breakers to allow MFW Isolation reset.

BOP SRO determines that since no SI has occurred, the reactor trip breakers DO NOT have to be cycled to allow the MFW isolation to be RESET.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 36 of 43 Event

Description:

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink occurs, requiring performance of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Requires Standby Main Feedwater pump to be placed in service to restore the heat sink.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior D. RESET MFW isolation:

1. PLACE both MFW isolation reset switches to RESET [M-3].

BOP locates 1-HS-3-99A1, MFW ISOL ACT RESET TR-A, then rotates the handle to the right to the ACTUATION RESET position.

BOP locates 1-HS-3-99B1, MFW ISOL ACT RESET TR-B, then rotates the handle to the right to the ACTUATION RESET position.

2. ENSURE MFW isolation signal clears [M-6 Master Panel].

BOP observes 1-XX-55-6C, MASTER ISOL SIGNAL STATUS PNL BOP MFW (light 4) is DARK.

BOP observes 1-XX-55-6C, MASTER ISOL SIGNAL STATUS PNL MFW (light 4) is DARK.

3. PUSH MFW isolation reset push-buttons [M-3].

BOP locates 1-HS-3-99A2, RESET TR-A MFW ISOL, and depresses the pushbutton. The RED backlight on the pushbutton clear (be DARK) after depressing the pushbutton.

BOP locates 1-HS-3-99A2, RESET TR-B MFW ISOL, and depresses the pushbutton. The RED backlight on the pushbutton clear (be DARK) after depressing the pushbutton.

E. ENSURE MFW mode switch 1-HS-3-45 in LONG CYCLE RECIRC.

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-3-45, MFW - MODE SWITCH, and rotates the handswitch from the NORMAL position to the right to the LONG CYCLE RECIRC position.

F. ENSURE MFW bypass isolation valves OPEN.

BOP locates and observes the RED lights are LIT and the GREEN BOP lights are DARK for 1-XI-3-SG 1 MFW BYP ISOL 1-FCV-3-238, 1-XI 239, SG 2 MFW BYP ISOL 1-FCV-3-239, 1-XI-3-242, SG 3 MFW BYP ISOL 1-FCV-3-242, and 1-XI-3-245, SG 4 MFW BYP ISOL 1-FCV-3-245.

G. ENSURE standby MFW pump RUNNING, if available, AND CONTROL S/G levels with MFW bypass reg controllers.

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-3-200A, STANDBY MFWP, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the START position. BOP observes 1-EI 200, STANDBY MFWP AMPS for normal amps. BOP observes 1-PI 203A, STANDBY MFWP DISCH PRESS for normal discharge pressure.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 SM US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going - Name AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb = 757 ppm Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

1-FI-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW failed low during the last shift. Channel has been removed from DCS. 1A-A Containment Spray pump is out-of-service for motor winding inspection. LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray, was entered 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago. The 1A-A Containment Spray pump is expected to be returned to service within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

1A-MFP vibrations are elevated, and an AUO is monitoring the turbine and pump hourly. Operations Management is meeting to discuss the plan for the 1A MFP.

SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

US/SM review late SI report (SQN and WBN only)

Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

100% power, MOL conditions. RCS Boron Concentration is 757 ppm. Control Bank D rods are at 220 steps. Maintain current plant conditions. EOOS Risk matrix is GREEN.

Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only)

Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items)

Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs)

Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs)

Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs)

SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA)

Relief Time: _________________________________ Relief Date: ______________

Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties:

Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station)

Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week)

Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked)

Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs)

TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [01-14-2011]

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 SM US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going - Name AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb = 757 ppm Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

1-FI-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW failed low during the last shift. Channel has been removed from DCS. 1A-A Containment Spray pump is out-of-service for motor winding inspection. LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray, was entered 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago. The 1A-A Containment Spray pump is expected to be returned to service within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

1A-MFP vibrations are elevated, and an AUO is monitoring the turbine and pump hourly. Operations Management is meeting to discuss the plan for the 1A MFP.

SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

US/SM review late SI report (SQN and WBN only)

Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

100% power, MOL conditions. RCS Boron Concentration is 757 ppm. Control Bank D rods are at 220 steps. Maintain current plant conditions. EOOS Risk matrix is GREEN.

Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only)

Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items)

Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs)

Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs)

Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs)

SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA)

Relief Time: _________________________________ Relief Date: ______________

Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties:

Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station)

Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week)

Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked)

Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs)

TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [01-14-2011]

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-03 NRC Examination Scenario 3 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

1. ENSURE Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 333 by performing the following actions:

a. Select ICManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate IC #333.

c. Right click on IC#333.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC#333.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen:

Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value fw98 sby fw pump auto start inhibit M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active fw22b airbound afw pump 1b-b M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active hs-72-22a-1 05020 rwst spray hdr a fcv(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off fw18a feed water pump turbine vibration pump a M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 12 12 fw21a afw discharge line break afw pump 1a-a M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 100 rp01b automatic trip failure (atws) M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active rx09d main steam flow transmitter failure ft-1-28a M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 0 hs-72-27a-1 06020 cntmt spray pump a mtr sw(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off hs-72-34a-1 05060 cs pump a recirc fcv(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off Page 39 of 43

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-03 NRC Examination Scenario 3 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value hs-72-39a-1 05080 cs hdr a isol vlv sw.(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off hs-72-44a-1 05040 cntmt sump hdr a fcv(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off rx11a impulse pressure transmitter 1-73 fail to position M 1 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 90.0592 fwr27 overspeed trip linkage on turb afw pmp. R 10 00:00:00 00:00:00 tripped reset cc07c c-S ccs pump shaft break M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive rpr18 block train a auto si R 21 00:00:00 00:00:00 block normal rpr19 block train b auto si R 22 00:00:00 00:00:00 block normal hic-62-81a_ai O 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 fw18a feed water pump turbine vibration pump a M 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 72 12 fw05b turbine driven feed pump b trip M 5 00:00:04 00:00:00 Active InActive pi-46-39 02120 mfpt b brg oil press O 5 00:00:00 00:00:15 0 19 mux_11c035 52-a mfpt b bearing oil press lo (ps-46-39b) M 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 On None

5. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

6. ENSURE 1-FI-1-28A, SG 4 STEAM FLOW is failed low on 1-M-4, and tag with YELLOW ARROW. ENSURE 1-FI-1-28ASG 4 STEAM FLOW has been BYPASSED in DCS.

7. ENSURE 1-HS-72-27A, CNTMT SPRAY PMP A is in Stop, PULL-TO-LOCK, with a Hold Order Tag. ENSURE Hold Order Tags on 1-HS-72-22A, RWST TO CS PMP A SUCTION, 1-HS-72-39A CNTMT SPRAY HDR A TO CNTMT.

8. ENSURE the Train A Week - Channel 1 sign is placed on 1-M-30.

9. Place simulator in FREEZE.

10. ENSURE Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Reactivity Briefing Book MOL (Middle Of Life) is provided to the crew as part of the Turnover Package, and that the MOL placards are on 1-M-6, below the Boric Acid and Primary Water Integrators.

11. WHEN prompted by the Chief Examiner, place the Simulator in RUN.

Page 40 of 43

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-03 NRC Examination Scenario 3 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

1 1 1-PT-1-73, % HP TURBINE POWER TR A fails low.

When contacted as Work Control, repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1-PT-1-73.

2 C-S CCS Pump shaft shears. 1B-B CCS pump fails to auto start.

When contacted as the Aux Building AUO, repeat back request to investigate the problem with the C-S CCS pump. Report back that there is damage to the pump shaft, and it appears to be broken.

When the SRO contacts Work Control, repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for C-S CCS pump.

3 1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, closes due to a controller failure.

If contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, the Console Operator acknowledges the request to locally inspect 1-PCV-62-81. Report back that there are no obvious problems at the controller and that the valve appears to be responding to manual signals.

4 n/a Load reduction to 95%, using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction.

When contacted as the Shift Manager, repeat back request to evaluate EPIP-1.

When contacted as the Load Coordinator, repeat back the information provided.

When contacted as Chemistry, repeat back the request to perform 1-SI-68-28 (Power Change Sampling Requirements).

5 4 1A MFP vibrations rise to 10 mils, requiring the 1A MFP to be tripped.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to locally maintain SBMFP oil temperature between 110 and 130°F using 1-THV-24-948. Console Operator reports that oil temperature is currently 118°F.

When contacted as Chemistry, the Console Operator repeats back the request to perform power change samples.

When SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair packages for the 1A MFP and the auto start circuit for the Standby MFP.

Page 41 of 43

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-03 NRC Examination Scenario 3 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

5a 4 Standby Main Feedwater Pump fails to auto start.

When SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair packages for the 1A MFP and the auto start circuit for the Standby MFP.

6 5 1B MFP trip due to low oil pressure.

When contacted as an AUO, repeat back the request to go to the turbine building to the condition of the 1B MFP.

Report back that:

There is a lube oil leak.

Fire Ops and Environmental personnel are on the scene.

Request that the oil pumps be tripped.

After pumps are stopped, report that oil is being contained. There is NO fire.

7 6 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink If/when contacted as Work Control, repeat back the request to determine the cause of the MD AFW pump problems and to repair problems as soon as possible.

Report back that the 1A-A MD AFW pump discharge piping is ruptured.

Report back that the 1B-B MD AFW pump is steam bound.

If/when contacted as Work Control, repeat back the request to determine the cause of the TD AFW pump problems and to repair problems as soon as possible.

Report back that the trip and throttle valve linkage has failed and will take at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to repair.

When contacted as the Instrument Shop, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to perform IMI-99.040. After 10 minutes, the Console Operator will report that IMI-99.040 is complete.

Page 42 of 43

Scenario 3 Attachment 1 AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Attachment 1 Reactor Power VS T-avg/T-ref Temperature and PZR Level

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Watts Bar March 2013 Scenario No. 4 Op Test No.: 1 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Run Time:

Initial Conditions: 1 x10-2% power. RCS boron concentration is 1483 ppm. Control Bank D is at 100 steps. EOOS risk matrix is GREEN.

Turnover: Train A/Channel III Work Week. Continue with startup and raise power to 1-4% using GO-2, Reactor Startup. Currently 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, Reactor Startup, is in progress, ready for performance of Step 31.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description No.

1 n/a R-RO Continue with startup and raise power to 1-4% using 1-GO-2, N-SRO/BOP Reactor Startup.

2 cc02a 48 C-BOP Thermal barrier heat exchanger leak (RCS into CCS). Requires cc21a, cc21b performance of 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS).

3 fw103a C-BOP 1A Condenser Vacuum pump trips.

4 ni04a 0 TS-SRO Intermediate Range N35 fails low (internal circuit failure).

mux_14c003 Requires performance of 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation nin135ds209-1 Malfunctions. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

5 cv31a C-RO 1A-A Centrifugal Charging Pump shaft shears. Requires TS-SRO immediate start of the 1B-B CCP due to previous loss of thermal barrier flow and performance of AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

6 th04b C-RO 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails partially open.

Requires performance of AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak, or AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System.

7 th04b M-ALL 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails open when the plant is tripped.

8 si09l C-BOP The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically si09m occur on both trains. 1-FCV-62-61, RCP SEAL RETURN CIV-si10e, si10f, A, 1-FCV-62-63, RCP SEAL RETURN CIV-A, 1-FCV-77-9, si10k, si10l RCDT PMPS TO TDCT CIV-A IN CNTMT, and 1-FCV-77-10, RCDT PMPS TO TDCT CIV-A OUT CNTMT fail to auto close.

9 cs01a C-BOP 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically. 1A cs06g Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent ed06b when started. 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 4 - Summary Initial Condition 1 x10-2% power. RCS boron concentration is 1483 ppm. Control Bank D is at 100 steps. EOOS risk matrix is GREEN.

Turnover Train A/Channel III Work Week. Continue with startup and raise power to 1-4% using 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup. Currently 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, Reactor Startup, is in progress, ready for performance of Step 31.

Item Description 1 Raise power to 1-4% power, using 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, Reactor Startup, Step 31.

2 Thermal barrier heat exchanger leak (RCS into CCS) and automatic isolation fails to occur. Requires performance of 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). Requires manual isolation of the thermal barrier flow path.

3 1B Condenser Vacuum pump trips. Requires entry into ARI 14-E, M-1 THRU M-6 MOTOR TRIPOUT. Requires another condenser vacuum pump to be started.

4 Intermediate Range N35 fails low (internal circuit failure). Requires performance of 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires Tech Spec evaluation and entry into LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation.

5 1A-A Centrifugal Charging Pump shaft shears. Requires performance of ARI 108-A, Charging Flow HI/LO. Requires immediate start of the 1B-B CCP due to previous loss of thermal barrier flow. Requires performance of AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System.

Requires Tech Spec evaluation, and entry into LCO 3.5.2 and TR 3.1.4.

EVENT 6 - SUCCESS PATH 1 6 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails partially open. Requires entry into AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System. When Step 8 is addressed by the crew, the leak will worsen requiring a reactor trip to be initiated.

EVENT 6 - SUCCESS PATH 2 6 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails partially open. Requires entry into AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak. Following isolation of Charging and Letdown in AOI-6, PZR Safety Valve leak will worsen requiring reactor trip.

7 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails fully open when the plant is tripped. This causes the PRT to rupture, resulting in containment parameters degrading.

8 The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically occur on both trains. 1-FCV 61, RCP SEAL RETURN CIV-A, 1-FCV-62-63, RCP SEAL RETURN CIV-A, 1-FCV-77-9, RCDT PMPS TO TDCT CIV-A IN CNTMT, and 1-FCV-77-10, RCDT PMPS TO TDCT CIV-A OUT CNTMT fail to automatically close. Requires manual actions to actuate, then complete the Phase A isolation.

9 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically. 1A Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent when started. 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs. Requires entry into 1-FR-Z.1, High Containment Pressure.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 4 - Critical Task Summary Critical Task Description 1 Manually start the 1B-B Centrifugal Charging Pump prior to RCP seal damage due to coincidental loss of seal water injection and thermal barrier flows.

2 Manually initiate at least one train of Containment Phase A isolation prior to completion of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix A, Equipment Verification.

3 Trip the RCPs prior to completing 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 4 of 58 Event

Description:

Continue with startup and raise power to 1-4% using 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The applicants will begin to raise reactor power using 1-GO-2, 1-GO-2 Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, Reactor Startup, Step 31.

NOTE TAVG will vary as a function of reactor power until the unit is greater than 15% turbine load (C5) and the Tavg program is maintained by AUTO or manual rod control. The TAVG-TREF deviation alarm is expected as reactor power approaches 7% RTP.

[31] () ADJUST Control Rods or RCS CB to RAISE Reactor power, at a rate of less than 1 dpm, to between 1 and 4%.

RO RO withdraws Control Bank D rods and stabilizes reactor power between 1-4% power.

CAUTION IF AFW is controlling levels in one or more SGs, THEN Reactor power must be maintained within AFW capability (less than 4%).

[32] STABILIZE Reactor power between 1 and 4%:

[32.1] MAINTAIN RCS Steam Dumps in Pressure Mode, set at 84%

(1092 psig.), or SG PORVs set at 84%.

RO BOP may adjust 1-PIC-1-33, STM DUMP PRESS CONTROL to maintain power level.

[32.2] () FOLLOW Xenon by Rod movement or Boration to maintain control banks ABOVE the LO INSERTION LIMIT.

EXAMINER: When power is stabilized at 1-4%, cue Console Operator to insert Event 2.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 5 of 58 Event

Description:

Thermal barrier heat exchanger leak (RCS into CCS) and auto isolation failure.

Requires entry into 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS).

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

237-D RCP THRM BAR RET HDR TEMP HI Diagnoses and announces the leak in the thermal barrier heat exchanger BOP on RCP 3.

BOP May enter and take actions of ARI 237-D, TH BAR RET HDR TEMP.

May direct the RO to monitor RCP seal parameters on 1-M-4 and/or the SRO ICS computer.

Enters and directs actions of 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water SRO System, Section 3.2, Surge Tank level greater than 72% or rising uncontrolled, OR CCS Rad Monitor alarm.

ARI 237-D The following actions are taken from ARI 237-D, TH BAR RET HDR TEMP.

[1] CHECK 1-TI-70-88, TH BAR RET HDR TEMP [0-M-27B].

BOP BOP locates 1-TI-70-88, TH BAR RET HDR TEMP and determines that temperature is rising rapidly.

[2] ENSURE TB Booster Pump ON.

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-70-131A, THRM BAR BSTR PMP 1A (TBBP) and observes the RED light LIT and GREEN light DARK (pump running).

[3] CHECK the following for indication of TB leak:

1-LI-70-63A, UNIT 1 SURGE TANK A SIDE LEVEL [0-M-27B]

1-LI-70-99A, UNIT 1 SURGE TANK B SIDE LEVEL [0-M-27B]

1-RM-90-123, CCS HX A OUTLET LIQUID [0-M-12]

0-RM-90-123A, CCS HX C OUTLET LIQUID [0-M-12]

Due to the relative size of the leak, the CCS Surge Tank level will rise very slowly.

SRO may use ICS TSC display Liquid Release page to monitor 1-RM-90-123, CCS HX A OUTLET LIQUID and 0-RM-90-123A, CCS HX C OUTLET LIQUID.

[4] IF TB leak indicated, THEN GO TO AOI-15, LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCS).

BOP BOP determines that flow is high on RCP 3 Thermal Barrier and recommends implementing 1-AOI-15.

BOP [5] CHECK 1-FI-67-222, CCS HX A SUP FLOW [0-M-27A], AND BOP [6] ADJUST ERCW to CCS Hxs as necessary.

BOP [7] START additional CCS pumps OR REDUCE CCS loads as necessary.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 6 of 58 Event

Description:

Thermal barrier heat exchanger leak (RCS into CCS) and auto isolation failure.

Requires entry into 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS).

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling 1-AOI-15 Water (CCS), Section 3.4, CCS In-Leakage.

1. ENSURE 1-LCV-70-63, U1 SURGE TANK MAKEUP LCV [0-M-27],

CLOSED.

BOP BOP observes that 1-LCV-70-63, U1 SURGE TANK MAKEUP LCV is CLOSED with RED light DARK and GREEN light LIT.

NOTE CCS HX outlet Rad Monitor rising indicates possible RCS in-leakage.

2. CHECK CCS Rad Monitors NORMAL.

BOP RO may use ICS display to monitor liquid radiation monitors. If the ICS computer display is used, the RO will observe rising counts on 1-RM-90-123, CCS HX A OUTLET LIQUID.

2. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE U1 & U2 CCS Surge Tank Vents CLOSED.

BOP With radiation levels rising, the SRO may direct the BOP to close 1-HS-70-66A, U1 SURGE TANK VENT, and 2-HS-70-66A, U2 SURGE TANK VENT.

NOTE Thermal Barrier Booster pumps will trip on differential flow. This indicates in-leakage from RCS.

SRO 3. WHEN leak has been identified AND isolated, THEN GO TO Step 11.

4. CHECK Thermal Barrier Booster pump and flows NORMAL:

1 Thermal Barrier Booster pump running, BOP

Thermal Barrier flow 40 - 50 gpm BOP observes that 1-FI-70-94, TH BAR 3 FLOW is pegged high, and that 1-PDI-70-95, TH BAR 3 HX P is at a lower value than the other RCPs.

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE RCP seal injection flow NORMAL, THEN:

a. ENSURE Thermal Barrier Booster pumps STOPPED.

BOP BOP places 1B 1-HS-70-130A, THRM BAR BSTR PMP 1B (TBBP) in the STOP, PULL-TO-LOCK position. BOP places 1-HS-70-131A, THRM BAR BSTR PMP 1A (TBBP) in the STOP, PULL-TO-LOCK position.

(Continued on next page)

EXAMINER: When the Thermal Barrier Booster pumps are placed in STOP, PULL-TO-LOCK, an entry into OR14.10.1 is required.

14.10.1 With one or more required equipment in Table 14.10 inoperable (or not in its FSSD condition), restore to operable status (or its FSSD condition) within 30 days.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 7 of 58 Event

Description:

Thermal barrier heat exchanger leak (RCS into CCS) and auto isolation failure.

Requires entry into 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS).

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (Continued from previous page)

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

b. ENSURE the following isol valves CLOSED:

1-FCV-70-133 or 1-FCV-70-134, Thermal Barrier Supply CIV.

BOP rotates either 1-HS-70-133A, THERMAL BAR SUP CIV -B OR 1-HS-70-134A, THERMAL BAR SUP CIV -B, to the CLOSE position.

Closing BOTH valves is also acceptable.

1-FCV-70-87 or 1-FCV-70-90, Thermal Barrier Return CIV.

BOP rotates either 1-HS-70-87A, THERMAL BAR RET CIV -B OR 1-HS-70-90A, THERMAL BAR RET CIV -B, to the CLOSE position. Closing BOTH valves is also acceptable.

c. IF RCP lower bearing temp rising uncontrolled (180°F max), THEN REFER TO AOI-24, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Abnormalities.

RCP lower bearing temperature will rise on RCP 3. Isolating thermal barrier flow path will cause temperatures to drop.

EXAMINER: After performance of Step 4 RNO, the conditions of Step 3, WHEN leak has been identified AND isolated, THEN GO TO Step 11, have been met.

SRO 3. WHEN leak has been identified AND isolated, THEN GO TO Step 11.

11. IF leak is on individual component HX, THEN:

a. REMOVE affected equipment from service.

b. ISOLATE associated equipment HX.

SRO determines that the leaking component has been isolated.

11. NOTIFY Work Control to initiate repairs.

RO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will acknowledge the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for the thermal barrier piping.

12. REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

3.5.2, ECCS - Operating

3.5.3, ECCS - Shutdown RO

3.7.7, - Component Cooling Water System (CCS)

SRO determines that isolating the leaking thermal barrier flowpath does not render the CCS system inoperable.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 8 of 58 Event

Description:

Thermal barrier heat exchanger leak (RCS into CCS) and auto isolation failure.

Requires entry into 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS).

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

13. WHEN repairs are complete, THEN:

a. ENSURE Surge Tank Vents are OPEN:

1-FCV-70-66

2-FCV-70-66

b. ENSURE 1-HS-70-63A, U1 SURGE TANK MAKEUP LCV in P-AUTO.

c. ENSURE CCS, CVCS, and Locked Valves and Breakers are returned RO to normal alignment USING the following Instructions:

SOI-70.01, Component Cooling Water (CCS).

SOI-62.01, CVCS - Charging and Letdown.

0-PI-OPS-17.0, 18 Month Locked Valve Verification.

0-PI-OPS-17.1, 18 Month Locked Breaker Verification.

SRO determines that the conditions of the step have not been satisfied and that the actions cannot be completed.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 3, may be entered prior to the brief at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

14. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 3.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 9 of 58 Event

Description:

1A Condenser Vacuum pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent. Requires BOP to start another Condenser Vacuum Pump.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

14-E, M-1 THRU M-6 MOTOR TRIPOUT 175-E, VAC PMP EXH 1-RM-119 INSTR MALF BOP Diagnoses and announces the trip of the A Condenser Vacuum pump.

May enter and take actions of ARI 14-E, M-1 THRU M-6 MOTOR BOP TRIPOUT.

May enter and take actions of ARI 175-E, VAC PMP EXH 1-RM-119 INSTR BOP MALF.

SRO May enter and direct actions of AOI-11, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.

Enters and directs actions of 1-SOI-2&3.01, Condensate and Feedwater SRO System, Section 8.12, Starting CVPs With Vacuum Established.

The following actions are taken from ARI 14-E, M-1 THRU M-6 MOTOR ARI 14-E TRIPOUT BOP [1] DETERMINE what equipment tripped.

BOP [2] PLACE control switch for tripped equipment in OFF.

[3] START spare equipment, as needed.

BOP If dispatched to check another Condenser Vacuum Pump ready for start, Console operator will acknowledge request and report pump is available for start.

[4] ADJUST plant conditions to compensate for affected equipment, as BOP necessary.

[5] REFER TO Tech Specs for operability requirements of affected BOP equipment.

The following actions are taken from ARI 175-E, VAC PMP EXH 1-RM-119 ARI 175-E INSTR MALF.

[1] CHECK 1-RM-90-119 Operate green light lit, IF NOT, THEN perform BOP source check on affected channel and reset the monitor.

[2] IF alarm NOT reset above, THEN DISPATCH Operator with Radiation BOP Protection coverage to investigate alarm and initiate corrective action.

3] IF monitor declared inoperable, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to perform BOP CM-9.09 Effluent Radiation Monitor Alarm Guidelines.

BOP [4] NOTIFY Instrument Maintenance to investigate alarm.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 10 of 58 Event

Description:

1A Condenser Vacuum pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent. Requires BOP to start another Condenser Vacuum Pump.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Determines that 1-RM-90-119 Vacuum Pump Exhaust radiation monitor alarm requires an ODCM entry. ODCM will be exited when one of the remaining condenser vacuum pumps is started and flow is reestablished through 1-RM-90-119.

1/2.1.2 RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

a. With a radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channel alarm/trip setpoint less conservative than required by the above Control, immediately suspend the release of radioactive gaseous effluents monitored by the affected channel, or declare the channel inoperable, or change the setpoint so it is acceptably conservative.

b. With less than the minimum number of radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channels OPERABLE, take the ACTION shown in Table 1.1-2. Restore the inoperable instruments to SRO OPERABLE status within 30 days and, if unsuccessful, explain in the next Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, per ODCM Administrative Control 5.2, why the inoperability was not corrected within 30 days.

c. The provisions of SR 2.0.4 are not applicable. Report all deviations in the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report.

Applicable in MODES 1 through 6 when Condenser Vacuum Exhaust System is in operation.

Requires Compensatory Action C - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided grab samples are taken at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and these samples are analyzed for noble gases (gamma emitters) in accordance with plant procedures. Grab samples are required only during those periods when releases are being made.

EXAMINER: When dispatched to check pump breaker locally console operator will report that the overcurrent relay appears to have failed.

If work control is contacted to troubleshoot and repair console operator will acknowledge request and initiate work package.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 11 of 58 Event

Description:

1A Condenser Vacuum pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent. Requires BOP to start another Condenser Vacuum Pump.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from 1-SOI-2&3.01, Condensate and 1-SOI-2&3.01 Feedwater System, Sub section 8.12, Starting CVPs With Vacuum Established.

NOTE

1) This section allows for starting additional condenser vacuum pumps or swapping of vacuum pumps

2) Venting seal water pump is necessary if the pump and/or seal water tank has been drained.

3) N/A the substeps of step 8.12[2] if venting is not required.

[1] IF necessary, THEN VENT CVP's seal water pump(s) by performing the following: (N/A substeps if venting NOT performed)

[1.1] REMOVE cap from the following valve(s):

1-VTV-2-1045, COND VACUUM WATER PMP A VENT.

1-VTV-2-1047, COND VACUUM WATER PMP C VENT.

[1.2] ENSURE water level in seal water tank is above level of vent valve.

[1.3] OPEN to vent trapped air from pump, then CLOSE the following BOP valve(s):

1-VTV-2-1045.

1-VTV-2-1047.

[1.4] REINSTALL cap on the following valve(s)

1-VTV-2-1045.

1-VTV-2-1047.

N/As this step.

[2] START CVP(s) as necessary [1-M-3]: (pumps NOT selected may be N/Ad)

A. 1-HS-2-171A, COND VACUUM PMP A.

BOP B. 1-HS-2-176A, COND VACUUM PMP B.

C. 1-HS-2-181A, COND VACUUM PMP C.

Will start at least one operable Condenser Vacuum Pump.

[3] ESTABLISH continuous drain for the in-service pump(s) to reduce ammonia concentration by throttling the drain valve to a position which maximizes drain flow within the capabilities of the drain system and the auto makeup:

BOP A. 1-DRV-37-572, GLAND SEAL WATER DRAIN - PUMP 1A.

B. 1-DRV-37-571, GLAND SEAL WATER DRAIN - PUMP 1B.

C. 1-DRV-37-565, GLAND SEAL WATER DRAIN - PUMP 1C.

May dispatch AUO to establish drain. AUO will acknowledge request.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 12 of 58 Event

Description:

1A Condenser Vacuum pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent. Requires BOP to start another Condenser Vacuum Pump.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[4] STOP selected pump and place in P-AUTO: (pumps NOT selected may be N/Ad)

A. 1-HS-2-171A, COND VACUUM PMP A.

BOP B. 1-HS-2-176A, COND VACUUM PMP B.

C. 1-HS-2-181A, COND VACUUM PMP C.

Pump previously tripped.

[5] ISOLATE continuous drain for any pumps STOPPED:

A. 1-DRV-37-572, GLAND SEAL WATER DRAIN - PUMP 1A.

B. 1-DRV-37-571, GLAND SEAL WATER DRAIN - PUMP 1B.

BOP C. 1-DRV-37-565, GLAND SEAL WATER DRAIN - PUMP 1C.

May dispatch AUO to isolate drain for tripped pump. AUO will acknowledge request.

EXAMINER: AOI-11 may not be entered if a Condenser Vacuum pump has been placed in service and vacuum is being maintained.

If AOI-11 not entered, Cue console operator to insert Event 4 and continue to the next event actions. Otherwise, continue with AOI-11 steps below.

AOI-11 The following actions are taken from AOI-11, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.

CAUTION If steam dumps are lost due to condenser backpressure a turbine/reactor trip from high power may result in secondary and primary safety valve actuation.

NOTE Reference Appendix A as required for Condenser Vacuum LO-LO and LO Alarm setpoints if ICS graph from Turn On code AOI11 is NOT available.

1. MONITOR condenser backpressure is, and will remain, less than 0.1 in.

below the Lo-Lo Alarm using ICS Turn On code AOI11.

Other evaluation points available:

a. ICS Pt. - P2265A (C-Zone)

BOP b. ICS Pt. - P1133A (C-Zone)

c. ICS Pt. - P2264A (B-Zone)

d. ICS Pt. - P2263A (A-Zone)

e. Cond Back Press Rate of Rise

f. Environmental Conditions BOP 2. ENSURE condenser vacuum breaker CLOSED.

CAUTION If loss of vacuum is due to undesirable atmospheric conditions for cooling tower operation, then use of Supplemental Condenser Circulating Water (SCCW) or operating unit at reduced load may be required.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 13 of 58 Event

Description:

1A Condenser Vacuum pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent. Requires BOP to start another Condenser Vacuum Pump.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP 3. ENSURE adequate number of CCW pumps in service.

4. ENSURE condenser vacuum pump in service.

BOP Operator will start condenser vacuum pump if not previously performed.

BOP 5. EVALUATE use of SCCW, if time permits.

6. CHECK gland seal steam pressure approximately 115 psig, 1-PI-47-187, BOP STEAM SEAL SUP PRESS [1-M-2].

BOP 7. CHECK cooling tower basin level NORMAL (164-E DARK [1-M- 5]).

8. CHECK condenser air in-leakage less than 30 SCFM [computer point BOP F2700A].

NOTE Condenser water box T below normal indicates tube fouling or Amertap system failure. T and tube P above normal indicates tube sheet fouling.

9. CHECK the condenser tube and water box parameters NORMAL:

BOP a. T (~38°F at 100% load) 1-TI-27-58, -68, -74, -84 [1-M-15]

b. P (less than 17 psid) 162-C and 163-C DARK [1-M-15]

NOTE If low vacuum is due to high outside air temperature, DG operability should be evaluated. 1-SI-0-2-00, Shift and Daily Surveillance Log Master, may be referenced to determine DG ventilation limitations with respect to outside air temperature.

10. NOTIFY Unit SRO to EVALUATE the combination of high outside air BOP temperature vs. any inoperable DG ventilation fans.

BOP 11. INITIATE repairs as required.

BOP 12. CHECK condenser backpressure less than Lo Alarm.

NOTE The following step is to avoid cycling turbine load by limiting load increases based upon plant and environmental conditions (e.g.; the weather forecast). Operations Manager approval indicates that this has been evaluated for the load increase.

13. IF turbine load is to be increased, THEN OBTAIN Operations Manager BOP approval prior to increasing Turbine Load.

SRO 14. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 4, may be entered prior to the brief at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 14 of 58 Event

Description:

1A Condenser Vacuum pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent. Requires BOP to start another Condenser Vacuum Pump.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 4.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 15 of 58 Event

Description:

Intermediate Range N35 fails low (internal circuit failure). Requires entry into 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

1-NI-92-135A Intermediate Range Channel I indicator fails low.

81-A CHANNEL I SOURCE/INTERM RANGE TROUBLE Diagnoses and announces the failure of 1-NI-92-135A, Intermediate Range RO CH-I Neutron Monitor.

Enters and directs actions of 1-AOI-4, "Nuclear Instrumentation SRO Malfunctions," Section 3.3, "Intermediate Range Monitor Malfunction."

The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-4, "Nuclear Instrumentation 1-AOI-4 Malfunctions," Section 3.3, "Intermediate Range Monitor Malfunction."

1. IF greater than P-6 and less then P-10 with BOTH IRM channels failed, SRO THEN STOP positive reactivity changes.

Step is not applicable since only one IRM channel is failed.

NOTE Placing the affected channel in bypass will cause either window 64B or 65B to alarm.

2. PLACE failed channel LEVEL TRIP switch to BYPASS [1-M-13].

RO Level Trip Switch on CH I Intermediate Range Drawer on 1-M-13 is placed in BYPASS position. Alarm 64B on 1-M-4 is acknowledged.

3. ENSURE 1-NR-92-145 recording an operable IRM.

RO Neutron Flux Level Recorder [1-M-4] is selected to IR CH II if not already selected.

EXAMINER: The SRO must determine a plan based on the Intermediate Range Failure to comply with Tech Specs. If the SRO contacts Operations Supervision, the Console Operator will ask for the SROs recommendation and agree with the plan presented.

4. REFER TO Tech Spec 3.3.1, Rx Trip System Instrumentation and 3.3.3, PAM Instruments.

3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.

Function 4, Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, Condition F, THERMAL POWER > P-6 and < P-10, one Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable. Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months SRO OR Increase THERMAL POWER to > P-10 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Function 16.a, Reactor Trip System Interlock P Not Applicable (Power is above P-6 interlock in accordance with Note (d) Table 3.3.1-1.)

3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.

Function 1, Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, Condition A, With one or more Functions with one required channel inoperable, restore required channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 16 of 58 Event

Description:

Intermediate Range N35 fails low (internal circuit failure). Requires entry into 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. NOTIFY Operations Duty Manager and Rx Engineering of any failed channel.

SRO When contacted as Operations Duty and Rx Engineering, the Console operator will acknowledge and repeat back the report.

6. INITIATE repair of IRM.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back request to prepare a package to troubleshoot and repair Intermediate Range Channel N35.

SRO 7. DO NOT CONTINUE UNTIL repairs are complete.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 5, may be entered prior to the brief at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 5.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 17 of 58 Event

Description:

1A-A Centrifugal Charging Pump shaft shears. Requires immediate start of the 1B-B CCP due to previous loss of thermal barrier flow. SRO may enter into AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

101-E RCP SEAL SUPPLY FLOW LO 108-A CHARGING FLOW HI/LO 110-A REGEN HX LTDN TEMP HI 237-D RCP THRM BAR RET HDR TEMP HI Seal injection flow dropping on all RCPs (1-FI-62-1A, 1-FI-62-14A, 1-FI-62-27A, and 1-FI-62-40A.)

Charging flow dropping on 1-FI-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW.

PZR level dropping.

Diagnoses and announces loss of charging flow, with the 1A-A CCP in RO service.

Will perform IMMEDIATE ACTION step of AOI-20, Malfunction Of RO Pressurizer Level Control System to isolate letdown due to the loss of charging flow.

May dispatch an Assistant Unit Operator to determine the cause of the loss RO of charging flow.

May dispatch an Assistant Unit Operator to determine that 1B-B CCP is RO ready to be started.

SRO May enter and direct actions of ARI 108-A, CHARGING FLOW HI/LO.

May enter and direct actions of AOI-20, "Malfunction of Pressurizer Level SRO Control System.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 18 of 58 Event

Description:

1A-A Centrifugal Charging Pump shaft shears. Requires immediate start of the 1B-B CCP due to previous loss of thermal barrier flow. SRO may enter into AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ARI 108-A The following actions are taken from ARI 108-A, CHARGING FLOW HI/LO.

Critical Task 1 Manually start the 1B-B Centrifugal Charging Pump prior to RCP seal damage due to coincidental loss of seal water injection and thermal barrier flows.

Critical [1] IF ALL the following conditions exist:

Task 1 Any RCP Thermal Barrier Out-Of-Service, In-Service Charging pump trips, RCP seal injection flow required, THEN IMMEDIATELY START available charging pump to restore seal flow.

When contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, the Console Operator will acknowledge the request to investigate the cause of the loss of charging flow. After 1 minute, the Console Operator will report back that the 1A-A CCP shaft is broken and there is extensive damage to RO the pump.

If contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO to determine that 1B-B CCP is ready to be started, the Console Operator will repeat back the request, and then inform the RO that the 1B-B CCP is ready for a start.

RO starts 1B-B CCP by rotating 1-HS-62-104A, CCP B-B (ECCS) to the START position. After the starting logic time delay is satisfied, the RED light on 1-HS-62-104A, CCP B-B (ECCS) will be LIT. RO will observe 1-EI-62-104A, CCP B-B AMPS and/or 1-PI-62-92A, CHARGING HDR PRESS to ensure charging is in service.

If contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to check out the 1B-B CCP after start, and then inform the RO that 1B-B CCP local checks are normal.

[2] CHECK 1-FI-62-93A [1-M-5] to determine if flow is high or low.

RO RO determines that 1-FI-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW indicates zero flow.

[3] CHECK 1-LI-68-320, -335A, and -339A, PZR LEVEL [1-M-4].

RO RO determines that 1-LI-68-339A, PZR LEVEL, 1-LI-68-335A, PZR LEVEL, AND 1-LI-68-320, PZR LEVEL are trending down.

[4] IF PZR level control system malfunction, THEN GO TO AOI-20, MALFUNCTION OF PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL.

SRO SRO determines that AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System, entry is NOT required.

SRO MAY enter AOI-20 to ensure no additional actions are required.

[5] IF charging flow is low, THEN CHECK letdown temperature and RO CONSIDER increasing charging flow, or ISOLATE letdown.

RO [6] IF charging is lost, THEN IMMEDIATELY ISOLATE letdown.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 19 of 58 Event

Description:

1A-A Centrifugal Charging Pump shaft shears. Requires immediate start of the 1B-B CCP due to previous loss of thermal barrier flow. SRO may enter into AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO [7] DETERMINE cause of problem and INITIATE corrective action.

SRO [8] REFER TO SOI-62.01, CVCS - CHARGING AND LETDOWN.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 20 of 58 Event

Description:

1A-A Centrifugal Charging Pump shaft shears. Requires immediate start of the 1B-B CCP due to previous loss of thermal barrier flow. SRO may enter into AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from AOI-20, Malfunction Of Pressurizer AOI-20 Level Control System.

NOTE Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step.

1. CHECK charging in service.

RO RO states charging pump is not in service.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IF charging flow ABNORMAL

Flow low or isolated

Window 110A LIT THEN, RO ISOLATE letdown:

1) CLOSE letdown orifice(s)

2) CLOSE 1-FCV-62-69

3) CLOSE 1-FCV-62-70 RO Ensures Letdown Isolated (may have previously been isolated).

2. CHECK pzr level program signal NORMAL:

1-LR-68-339 (green pen).

RO Reference level 1-LR-68-339 green pen (program) indicates approximately 25%, which is correct for 1% power.

3. Ensure 1-XS-68-339E is selected to OPERABLE channel for control and backup:

LT-68-339 & 335, OR LT-68-335 & 320, RO OR LT-68-335.

RO determines that 1-LI-68-339A, PZR LEVEL, 1-LI-68-335A, PZR LEVEL, AND 1-LI-68-320, PZR LEVEL are trending down, and all instruments indicating properly.

4. CHECK letdown IN SERVICE:

1-FCV-62-69 OPEN.

1-FCV-62-70 OPEN.

1-FCV-62-77 OPEN.

RO Letdown orifice OPEN Letdown flow NORMAL RO observes that 1-FCV-62-69, 1-FCV-62-70 and all of the letdown orifice isolation valves are CLOSED. Also observes that letdown flow is zero.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 21 of 58 Event

Description:

1A-A Centrifugal Charging Pump shaft shears. Requires immediate start of the 1B-B CCP due to previous loss of thermal barrier flow. SRO may enter into AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE pzr heater banks D and C ON.

RO ensures pzr heater banks D and C on using 1-HS-68-341H and 1-HS-68-341F (1-M-4) as needed.

ESTABLISH charging and letdown:

REFER TO Attachment 1 IF pzr level rising uncontrolled due to 1-PCV-62-81 failed closed, THEN.....

SRO N/As the rest of the RNO since 1-PCV-62-81 is not failed and Letdown can be established.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 22 of 58 Event

Description:

1A-A Centrifugal Charging Pump shaft shears. Requires immediate start of the 1B-B CCP due to previous loss of thermal barrier flow. SRO may enter into AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System, Attachment 1, Alignment of Charging And Letdown.

NOTE This section can be used in conjunction with SOI-62.01 for local control of 1-FCV-62-89, 1-PCV-62-81 or 1-FCV-62-93. Substitute local actions as appropriate for Steps 1.1A.1, 1.1A.2, 1.1A.6, 1.1D, 1.1G and 1.1E.

RO 1.1 Establish Charging and Letdown A. IF charging NOT established, THEN PERFORM the following:

1. CLOSE 1-FCV-62-89, CHRG HDR-RCP SEALS FLOW CONTROL.

1-HIC-62-89A, CHG HDR - RCP SEALS FLOW CONTROL was CLOSED in a previous step. RO may rotate the knob to the left to confirm valve is closed.

2. ENSURE Charging Pump running.

When contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, the Console Operator will acknowledge the request to investigate the cause of the loss of charging flow. After 1 minute, the Console Operator will report back that the 1A-A CCP shaft is broken and there is extensive damage to the pump.

If contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO to determine that 1B-B CCP is ready to be started, the Console Operator will repeat back the request, and then inform the RO that the 1B-B CCP is ready for a start.

RO starts 1B-B CCP by rotating 1-HS-62-104A, CCP B-B (ECCS) to the RO START position. After the starting logic time delay is satisfied, the RED light on 1-HS-62-104A, CCP B-B (ECCS) will be LIT. RO will observe 1-EI-62-104A, CCP B-B AMPS and/or 1-PI-62-92A, CHARGING HDR PRESS to ensure charging is in service.

If contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to check out the 1B-B CCP after start, and then inform the RO that 1B-B CCP local checks are normal.

3. OPEN 1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV-62-91, CHARGING LINE ISOL.

RO restores charging by rotating 1-HS-62-90A, CHARGING LINE ISOL and 1-HS-62-91, CHARGING LINE ISOL to the OPEN position.

4. ENSURE 1-FCV-62-85, NORM CHARGING TO LOOP 1, or 1-FCV 86, ALT CHARGING TO LOOP 4, OPEN.

RO observes 1-FCV-62-86, ALT CHARGING TO LOOP 4 is open by RED light LIT.

5. ADJUST 1-FCV-62-93 to maintain seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm for each RCP.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 23 of 58 Event

Description:

1A-A Centrifugal Charging Pump shaft shears. Requires immediate start of the 1B-B CCP due to previous loss of thermal barrier flow. SRO may enter into AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior B. ENSURE letdown isol valves OPEN:

1. 1-FCV-62-69, CVCS LETDOWN ISOLATION.

1-HS-62-69, RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT is rotated to the right to the OPEN position and held until the RED light is LIT and the GREEN light is DARK.

2. 1-FCV-62-70, CVCS LETDOWN ISOLATION.

1-HS-62-70, RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT is rotated to the right to the OPEN position and held until the RED light is LIT and the GREEN light is DARK.

3. 1-FCV-62-77, CVCS LP LETDOWN ISOLATION.

C. PLACE 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL, in MANUAL at 25% OPEN.

RO 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL is placed in MANUAL by lifting the toggle switch from the AUTO position, the toggle is pushed to the right to open the valve to 25% (as read on the controller.)

D. PLACE 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, in MANUAL at 40-50% OPEN if using 75 gpm orifice (20-30% OPEN if using 45 gpm orifice).

RO 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL is placed in MANUAL by lifting the toggle switch from the AUTO position, the toggle is pushed to the right to open the valve to 40-50% (as read on the controller).

E. ESTABLISH 75 gpm or greater charging flow while maintaining seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm for each RCP using 1-FCV-62-93.

and 1-FCV-62-89.

RO RO establishes 75 gpm charging flow on 1-FI-62-93A, and 8 to 13 gpm on 1-FI-62-1A, RCP 1 SEAL SUP FLOW, 1-FI-62-14A, , RCP 2 SEAL SUP FLOW, 1-FI-62-27A, RCP 3 SEAL SUP FLOW, and 1-FI-62-40A, RCP 4 SEAL SUP FLOW.

F. OPEN letdown orifices as needed:

1-FCV-62-72 (45 gpm).

1-FCV-62-73 (75 gpm).

1-FCV-62-74 (75 gpm).

RO 1-FCV-62-76 (5 gpm).

RO selects either 1-HS-62-73A. LETDOWN ORIFICE B 75 GPM - CIV-A, or 1-FCV-62-74, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM - CIV-A and rotates the selected handswitch to the right to the OPEN position.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 24 of 58 Event

Description:

1A-A Centrifugal Charging Pump shaft shears. Requires immediate start of the 1B-B CCP due to previous loss of thermal barrier flow. SRO may enter into AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior G. ADJUST 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, for desired press, (320 psig at normal letdown temp), and PLACE in AUTO.

RO 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL toggle switch is moved to the right to close the valve and raise pressure to 320 psig. 1-HIC 81A is placed in AUTO by pushing the toggle switch down to the AUTO position.

H. PLACE 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL, in AUTO.

RO 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL, is placed in AUTO by pushing the toggle switch down to the AUTO position.

I. RETURN pzr level to program.

RO RO makes periodic adjustments to 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL and 1-HIC-62-89A, CHG HDR - RCP SEALS FLOW CONTROL to return PZR level to program level.

J. WHEN ready to return 1-FCV-62-93 to AUTO control, THEN PERFORM Section 1.2 RO 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL, is placed in AUTO using Section 1.2 once PZR level is on program.

RO 1.2 Establish AUTO Control of 1-FCV-62-93 A. RETURN 1-FCV-62-93 to AUTO.

RO 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL, is placed in AUTO.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-20, Malfunction Of Pressurizer Level Control System, beginning at Step 5.

5. ENSURE pzr level returning to program:

CONTROL 1-HIC-62-93A in MAN as necessary RO (Addressed previously)

MAINTAIN regen hx letdown temp < 380 °F.

6. CHECK pzr heaters ENERGIZED:

a. Control Heaters D red light LIT.

RO observes handswitch 1-HS-68-341F, CONTROL HEATERS D RED RO light LIT.

b. Backup Heaters C red light LIT.

RO observes handswitch 1-HS-68-341H, CONTROL HEATERS C RED light LIT.

7. ENSURE operable channel selected for recording with 1-XS-68-339B [1-RO M-5]:

RO determines operable channel is selected.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 25 of 58 Event

Description:

1A-A Centrifugal Charging Pump shaft shears. Requires immediate start of the 1B-B CCP due to previous loss of thermal barrier flow. SRO may enter into AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. CHECK 1-HIC-62-93A in AUTO.

RO (Addressed previously)

9. REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation Not Applicable 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation. Not Applicable 3.4.9, Pressurizer. Not applicable.

3.5.2, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS)

LCO 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating Action A. One or more trains inoperable.

AND At least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE SRO ECCS train available, restore train(s) to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

TR 3.1.4 Charging Pump Operating TR 3.1.4 Charging Pumps, Operating Condition A. One required charging pump inoperable, A.1 Restore required charging pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR A.2.1 Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months AND A.2.2 Borate to a SDM equivalent to > 1% k/k at 200°F within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months . AND A.2.3 Restore required charging pump to OPERABLE status within 246 hours0.00285 days 0.0683 hours 4.06746e-4 weeks 9.3603e-5 months .

10. NOTIFY Work Control to remove failed channel from service.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will acknowledge the request for a troubleshooting and repair package 1A-A CCP.

SRO 11. INITIATE repairs to failed instrument/circuitry.

SRO 12. RETURN TO instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 6, may be entered prior to the brief at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 6.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 26 of 58 Event

Description:

1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails partially open.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

Alarm [89-B] PZR SAFETY LINE TEMP HI Temp Indicator 1-TI-68-329 "Safety 68-564 Tailpipe Temp" shows elevated temperature.

PZR Valves Acoustic Monitor 1-XI-68-364 (68-564) indicates flow.

RO Respond to Alarm and evaluate RCS parameters.

RO Diagnose open Pressurizer Safety valve.

SRO Enter and direct actions of AOI-18 or AOI-6.

EXAMINER: Crew may respond to this failure using either AOI-18, Malfunction Of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Section 3.2, PZR pressure drop due to failed PORV/Safety or spray valve, or AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak. Event guides for each procedure are included.

ARI 89-B The following actions are taken from ARI 89-B PZR SAFETY LINE TEMP HI.

[1] DETERMINE which valve is lifting/leaking through by monitoring 1-TI RO 330 -329, and -328 [1-M-4], and Acoustic Monitors [0-M-25].

RO should identify leaking Safety valve 1-SV-68-564.

RO [2] MONITOR RCS pressure.

[3] MONITOR the following for indication of leakage:

1-LI-68-300, PRT LEVEL RO

1-PI-68-301, PRT PRESS

1-TI-68-309, PRT TEMP SRO [4] REFER TO AOI-6.

[5] REFER TO Tech Specs.

SRO SRO may defer Tech Specs evaluation at this time.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 27 of 58 Event

Description:

1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails partially open.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SUCCESS PATH 1 The following actions are taken from AOI-18, Malfunction Of Pressurizer AOI-18 Pressure Control System, Section 3.2, PZR pressure drop due to failed PORV/Safety or spray valve.

NOTE Step 1 and 2 are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps

1. CHECK PZR spray valves CLOSED:

Green indicating lights IT RO determines 1-XI-68-340B, PZR Spray Loop 2 and 1-XI-68-340D, PZR Spray Loop 1 not lit [1-M-4].

Pzr spray demand meters, 1-PIC-68-340B and 1-PIC-68-340D indicating ZERO [1-M-4]

RO determines listed PZR Spray controller demands are Zero.

2. CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

PORV indicating lights RO observes 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV 340A, CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

RO observes 1-HS-68-334A, PZR PORV 334, CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

tailpipe temperature RO determines 1-TI-68-331, PORV 340A & 334 TAILPIPE TEMP temperature is not elevated.

acoustic monitoring BOP may observe 1-XI-68-363, PZR VALVES ACOUSTIC MONITOR indicating lights are NOT LIT for 1-XI-68-340 1-XI-68-334.

3. VERIFY actions taken in Steps 1 and 2 have STOPPED press drop.

RO RO determines pressurizer pressure still dropping slowly.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 28 of 58 Event

Description:

1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails partially open.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENERGIZE all PZR heaters.

RO may take PZR Press Master Control 1-PIC-68-340A to manual and decrease output to zero to energize all heaters.

IF low pressure reactor trip (1970) is IMMINENT, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. TRIP Rx

b. ENSURE RCP alternate bkr in MAN for the affected loop, and STOP RCP(s) supplying any stuck open spray valve.

c. **GO TO 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

EVALUATE continued plant operation.

SRO determines plant operation may continue at this time.

4. CHECK PZR Safeties CLOSED:

tailpipe temperatures RO observes 1-TI-68-329, SAFETY 68-564 TAILPIPE TEMP, temperature elevated and determines that 1-SV-68-564 is not closed.

acoustic monitor BOP may also observe 1-XI-68-363, PZR VALVES ACOUSTIC MONITOR indicating lights are LIT for 1-XI-68-364 (68-564) and determine that 1-SV-68-564 is not closed [0-M-25].

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF PZR press can NOT be maintained above 1970 psig, THEN:

SRO a. TRIP Rx and INITIATE SI.

b. **GO TO 1-E-0, Rx Trip or Safety Injection.

EVALUATE continued plant operation.

SRO determines plant operation may continue at this time.

5. ENSURE PZR heaters on as required:

Control Group on at 2220 psig RO

Backup Groups on at 2210 psig RO turns heaters off and on manually or with master pressure controller as required.

6. CHECK aux spray, 1-FCV-62-84, CLOSED.

RO observes 1-HS-62-84A [1-M-6] and determines aux spray valve is closed.

7. CHECK PZR press STABLE or RISING.

RO RO determines pressure has stabilized.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 29 of 58 Event

Description:

1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails partially open.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. WHEN pressurizer pressure stable and equipment status supports returned to normal, THEN ENSURE the following in AUTO:

PZR Master controller RO

PZR spray controllers

All heater groups RO evaluates pressurizer pressure and may continue in auto or manual control at this time.

EXAMINER: At this point, the safety valve failure worsens (severity increases from 1% to 6%),

and the crew is expected to initiate a manual reactor trip and Safety injection based on deceasing RCS pressure approaching Reactor Trip Setpoint and Enter 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 30 of 58 Event

Description:

1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails partially open.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SUCCESS PATH 2 The following actions are taken from AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System AOI-6 Leak.

NOTE During performance of this instruction the need for rapid load reduction or Unit trip should be continuously evaluated.

RO 1. CHECK CCP in service.

2. ADJUST 1-FCV-62-89 AND 1-FCV-62-93 as necessary to maintain pzr level on program.

RO RO may manual control of 1-FCV-62-89 and 93 to control pzr level on program.

RO 3. CHECK letdown flow in service for 75 gpm.

4. INCREASE VCT Auto makeup:

a. DOUBLE setting on Boric Acid and PW water flow controllers

1-FC-62-142 RO doubles the PW setting from 35% to 70% on 1-FC-62-142.

1-FC-62-139 RO doubles the BA setting on 1-FC-62-139.

b. ENSURE RED light lit on 1-HS-62-140A.

RO observes 1-HS-62-140A, MAKEUP CONTROL RED light is LIT and GREEN light is DARK.

SRO 5. CHECK in Modes 1 through 3 NOTE Pzr level must be allowed time to change following changes in charging flow.

6. MONITOR the following parameters:

Pzr level STABLE or RISING.

Containment pressure STABLE or DROPPING.

RCS pressure STABLE or RISING.

6. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF any of the following occur:

Loss of pzr level is IMMINENT,

Containment pressure is approaching 1.5 psig.

RCS pressure is approaching 1970 psig (dropping), THEN

1) ()TRIP Rx.

2) INITIATE SI.

3) ** GO TO 1-E-0, Rx Trip or Safety Injection.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 31 of 58 Event

Description:

1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails partially open.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. CHECK secondary plant radiation NORMAL:

Condenser exhaust monitors.

S/G blowdown monitors.

Main steam line monitors.

8. MAKE plant announcement via PA:

RO "Attention plant personnel. A primary system leak has developed. Any personnel located either inside containment or in the Auxiliary Building should exit the area immediately." (Repeat)

CAUTION Attempts to quantify leak rate should not delay performance of the remaining steps.

NOTE Appendix B may be used to estimate RCS leak rate.

9. INITIATE leak rate estimate:

a. STOP any heatup/cooldown in progress.

b. ADJUST charging flow to STABALIZE pzr level.

c. CHECK Net Charging on ICS (UF1016)

10. CHECK safety valves CLOSED:

EVALUATE tailpipe temp and acoustic monitors.

RO determines that a 1-SV-68-564 is not closed.

10. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO EVALUATE need for shutdown.

REFER TO Tech Spec 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves.

11. CHECK PORVs CLOSED:

EVALUATE tailpipe temp and acoustic monitors.

NOTE Relief valves (pzr PORVs, pzr safeties, CVCS letdown, RHR suction, and SI lines), and Rx head vent isolation valves could be leaking to the PRT. Further investigation will have to be made if PRT conditions become abnormal and leakage path is not readily identifiable.

12. MONITOR PRT conditions NORMAL:

Level.

Temperature.

Press.

RO determines that PRT conditions are not normal due to leaking pzr safety valve.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 32 of 58 Event

Description:

1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails partially open.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF PRT diaphragm rupture is IMMINENT (85 psig), THEN:

a. ()TRIP Rx.

RO b. GO TO 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RESTORE PRT to normal:

a. REFER TO SOI-68.01 WHILE attempting to determine leak path into PRT.

NOTE If leak is on CVCS, pzr level should begin rising with charging and letdown isolated. Appendix B can be used to verify small leaks are isolated.

13. ISOLATE letdown:

CLOSE 1-FCV-62-72, (45 gpm).

CLOSE 1-FCV-62-73, (75 gpm).

CLOSE 1-FCV-62-74, (75 gpm).

CLOSE 1-FCV-62-76, (5 gpm).

CLOSE 1-FCV-62-69.

CLOSE 1-FCV-62-70.

EXAMINER: After Letdown is isolated in the next step, the safety valve failure worsens (severity increases from 1% to 6%), and the crew is expected to initiate a manual reactor trip based on Step 6 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED conditions OR Step 12 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED conditions.

14. ISOLATE charging:

CLOSE 1-FCV-62-85.

CLOSE 1-FCV-62-86.

CLOSE 1-FCV-62-90.

CLOSE 1-FCV-62-91.

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to increasing PZR safety valve leak severity from 1% to 6%.

NOTE Normal range of seal injection flow is between 8 and 13 gpm per RCP with a minimum allowed flow of 6 gpm.

15. MINIMIZE RCP seal injection flow (greater than 6 gpm per pump), and RO EVALUATE pzr level trend.

NOTE Pzr level must be allowed time to change following changes in charging flow.

RO 16. CHECK pzr level DROPPING or STABLE.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, & 9 Page 33 of 58 Event

Description:

7.) 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails open when the plant is tripped.

8.) The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically occur on both trains 9.) 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically. 1A Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent when started. 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: When the reactor is tripped, the leaking PZR safety valve fails fully open.

1-E-0 The following actions are taken from 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

NOTE Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS.

Status Trees / SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR A GREEN light LIT on panel 1-M-4.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RC TRIP BKR B GREEN light LIT on panel 1-M-4 RO checks 1-52BYA, BYPASS BKR A lights DARK RO checks 1-52BYB, BYPASS BKR B lights dark

RPIs at bottom of scale.

RO RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor 1 and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 for indication that all SHUTDOWN and CONTROL bank rods are inserted.

Neutron flux DROPPING.

RO observes neutron flux trending down on 1-NR-92-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER. May also observe levels decreasing on 1-NI-92-135A, CH I NEUTRON MON % PWR, and 1-NI-92-136A, CH II NEUTRON MON % PWR.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

RO RO observes that indicating lights on 1-XX-47-1000 EHC CONTROL for individual throttle and governor valves are GREEN.

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

RO CSST (offsite),

OR D/G (blackout).

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, & 9 Page 34 of 58 Event

Description:

7.) 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails open when the plant is tripped.

8.) The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically occur on both trains 9.) 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically. 1A Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent when started. 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RO will announce that the window 70-A, SI ACTUATED is LIT.

b. Both trains SI ACTUATED.

1-XX-55-6C

1-XX-55-6D EXAMINER: 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendices A and B are included as .

EXAMINER: Critical Task 2 is identified in Attachment 1 (1-E-0 Appendix A Step 5). If not previously performed, the BOP will complete Critical Task 2 during the performance of 1-E-0 Appendix A.BOP may manually initiate at least one train of Containment Phase A isolation prior to 1-E-0 Appendix A, Step 5.

Critical Task 2 Manually initiate and complete a Containment Phase A isolation on at least one train prior to completion of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix A, Equipment Verification.

Critical Task is accomplished by:

1. MANUALLY actuating Phase A isolation by rotating1-HS-30-63A, Phase A & CNTMT VENT ISOL and 1-HS-30-63B, Phase A & CNTMT VENT ISOL to the right to the ACTUATE position.

2. MANUALLY rotating 1-FCV-62-61, RCP SEAL RETURN CIV-PHASE A and/or 1-FCV-62-63A, RCP SEAL RETURN CIV-PHASE A handswitches to the left to the CLOSE position.

3. MANUALLY rotating 1-HS-77-9A, RCDT PMPS TO TDCT CIV-PHASE A IN CNTMT and/or 1-HS-77-10A, RCDT TO TDCT CIV-PHASE A OUT CNTMT handswitches to the left to the CLOSE position.

Critical 5. PERFORM Appendixes A and B, 1-E-0, pages 16-30.

Task 2 BOP is assigned to perform actions contained in the Appendices. A BOP separate copy of the Appendices is contained in this package for Examiner use.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, & 9 Page 35 of 58 Event

Description:

7.) 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails open when the plant is tripped.

8.) The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically occur on both trains 9.) 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically. 1A Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent when started. 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO 6. ANNOUNCE reactor trip and safety injection over PA system.

7. ENSURE secondary heat sink available with either:

Total AFW flow greater than 410 gpm, RO OR

At least one S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

8. MONITOR RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F using:

RCS Loop T-avg with any RCP running, RO OR

RCS Loop T-cold with RCPs out-of-service.

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IF temp less than 557°F, THEN ENSURE steam dumps and S/G PORVs CLOSED.

IF cooldown continues, THEN CONTROL total AFW flow to maintain greater than 410 gpm UNTIL NR level in at least one S/G greater than 29% [39% ADV].

BOP BOP takes manual control of AFW LCVs and reduces AFW flow.

IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN

PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

CLOSE MSIVs.

ENSURE MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

IF RCS temp greater than 564°F, THEN ENSURE either steam dumps or S/G PORVs OPEN.

9. ENSURE excess letdown valves CLOSED:

1-FCV-62-54 RO

1-FCV-62-55 RO observes GREEN lights LIT on handswitches 1-HS-62-54A, EXCESS LTDN ISOL, and 1-HS-62-55A, EXCESS LTDN.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, & 9 Page 36 of 58 Event

Description:

7.) 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails open when the plant is tripped.

8.) The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically occur on both trains 9.) 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically. 1A Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent when started. 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. CHECK pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

RO observes 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV 340A, in P-AUTO position and valve CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

RO observes 1-HS-68-334A, PZR PORV 334, in P-AUTO position and RO valve CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

RO observes 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A, OPEN, GREEN light is DARK, RED light is LIT.

RO observes 1-HS-68-332A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 334, OPEN, GREEN light is DARK, RED light is LIT.

11. CHECK pzr safety valves CLOSED:

EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitors.

RO observes response of 1-TI-68-330, SAFETY 68-563 TAILPIPE TEMP, RO 1-TI-68-329, SAFETY 68-564 TAILPIPE TEMP, and 1-TI-68-328, SAFETY 68-565. All are elevated, with 1-TI-68-329, SAFETY 68-564 TAILPIPE TEMP, indicating the highest temperature.

BOP may observe 1-XI-68-363, PZR VALVES ACOUSTIC MONITOR indicating lights are LIT for 1-XI-68-364 (68-564).

11. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RO IF RCS pressure less than 2485 psig, AND Pzr safety valve open, THEN ** GO TO 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, & 9 Page 37 of 58 Event

Description:

7.) 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails open when the plant is tripped.

8.) The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically occur on both trains 9.) 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically. 1A Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent when started. 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: Status tree monitoring is in effect when transition to 1-E-1 occurs. 4 minutes after Phase B occurs a transition to 1-FR-Z.1 will be indicated. Refer to page 44 for applicable steps from 1-FR-Z.1.

The following actions are taken from 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary 1-E-1 Coolant.

EXAMINER: As the RCS leak becomes larger, containment temperature and pressure will rise sharply. 265-A UPPER CNTMT RE-271/272 RAD HI and 265-B LOWER CNTMT RE-273/274 are expected to alarm, since testing has shown rad monitor to give unreliable indication for up to 2 minutes following a rapid increase or decrease in containment temperature. The alarms will clear after the initial temperature transient.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

1. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

RO a. Phase B DARK [MISSP].

b. RCS pressure greater than 1500 psig.

Critical Task 3 Trip the RCPs prior to completing 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Critical 1. b. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Task 3 RO ENSURE at least one Charging pump or SI pump injecting. WHEN injection flow established, THEN STOP all RCPs.

SRO 2. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart.

NOTE Time since initiation of event is defined by performance of Step 3.

3. RECORD current time to mark initiation of LOCA and determination of SRO time for hot leg recirc.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, & 9 Page 38 of 58 Event

Description:

7.) 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails open when the plant is tripped.

8.) The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically occur on both trains 9.) 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically. 1A Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent when started. 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. CHECK S/G pressures:

All S/G pressures controlled or rising.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressures are controlled. May also RO observe trends on 1-PR-1-2, SG 1 & 2 PRESS PSIG, and 1-PR-1-23, SG 3 & 4 PRESS PSIG to assess this step.

All S/G pressures greater than 140 psig.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressures are greater than 140 psig.

5. MAINTAIN Intact S/G NR levels:

a. MONITOR levels greater than 29% [39% ADV].

RO informs the SRO that S/G narrow range levels are controlled after BOP observing PAM narrow range level instruments (black labels).

b. CONTROL intact S/G levels between 29% and 50% [39% and 50%

ADV].

RO acknowledges the need to control SG levels between 39 and 50%.

EXAMINER: The status of secondary radiation may have already been reported as normal by the BOP during performance of 1-E-0 Appendix A.

6. CHECK secondary radiation:

S/G discharge monitors NORMAL.

Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitors NORMAL.

S/G blowdown rad monitor recorders NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, & 9 Page 39 of 58 Event

Description:

7.) 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails open when the plant is tripped.

8.) The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically occur on both trains 9.) 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically. 1A Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent when started. 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. ENSURE cntmt hydrogen analyzers in service:

PLACE 1-HS-43-200A in ANALYZE [M-10].

BOP places 1-HS-43-200A, H2 ANALYZER A FAN to the ANALYZE position on panel 1-M-10.

PLACE 1-HS-43-210A in ANALYZE [M-10].

BOP places 1-HS-43-200A, H2 ANALYZER A FAN to the ANALYZE position on panel 1-M-10.

CHECK low flow lights NOT lit [M-10].

BOP checks 1-XI-43-200, LO FLOW - ANAL A, WHITE light is DARK.

BOP checks 1-XI-43-210, LO FLOW - ANAL B, WHITE light is DARK.

LOCALLY CHECK low analyzer temp lights NOT lit AND RESET local alarm panel. [North wall of Train A 480V SD Bd rm].

When contacted as the Control Building AUO the Console Operator repeat back request to check low analyzer temp lights, and reports that the lights are NOT LIT.

8. MONITOR pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

RO observes 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV 340A, in P-AUTO position and valve CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

RO observes 1-HS-68-334A, PZR PORV 334, in P-AUTO position and RO valve CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

RO observes 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A, OPEN, GREEN light is DARK, RED light is LIT.

RO observes 1-HS-68-332A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 334, OPEN, GREEN light is DARK, RED light is LIT.

9. DETERMINE if cntmt spray should be stopped:

SRO a. MONITOR cntmt pressure less than 2.0 psig.

b. CHECK at least one cntmt spray pump RUNNING.

9. b. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO IF both spray pumps stopped, THEN ** GO TO Step 10.

10. ENSURE both pocket sump pumps STOPPED [M-15]:

1-HS-77-410.

1-HS-77-411.

BOP observes handswitch 1-HS-77-410, POCKET SUMP PMP A GREEN light is LIT, and 1-HS-77-411, POCKET SUMP PMP B GREEN light is LIT.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, & 9 Page 40 of 58 Event

Description:

7.) 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails open when the plant is tripped.

8.) The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically occur on both trains 9.) 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically. 1A Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent when started. 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

11. CHECK SI termination criteria:

a. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65ºF [85ºF ADV].

RO RO determines that subcooling is less than 85ºF by observing 1-TI-68-105, RCS SUBCOOLING and 1-XI-68-115 RCS SUBCOOLING indicators.

a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

- GO TO Caution prior to Step 12.

CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action will be required to restart the SI pumps and RHR pumps due to loss of SI start signal.

12. RESET SI and CHECK the following:

RO resets SI signal by depressing 1-HS-63-134A, SI RESET TR A and 1-HS-63-134B, SI RESET TR B one at a time.

SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.

RO RO observes and reports that Window 70-A, SI ACTUATED is DARK.

AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT.

RO observes and reports that Window 70-B, AUTO SI BLOCKED is DARK.

13. DETERMINE if RHR pumps should be stopped:

a. CHECK RCS pressure greater than 150 psig.

b. CHECK RHR suction aligned from RWST.

c. CHECK RCS pressure stable or rising.

c. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE CCS from RHR heat exchanger 1-FCV-70-153 and 1-FCV-70-156 OPEN.

BOP rotates 1-FCV-70-156 RHR HX 1A OUTLET to the right to the BOP OPEN position. Ensures RED light is LIT and GREEN light is DARK.

CLOSE SFP heat exchanger A CCS supply 0-FCV-70-197.

BOP rotates 0-FCV-70-197, SFP HX A SUPPLY to the left to the CLOSE position. Ensures RED light is DARK and GREEN light is LIT.

GO TO Step 14.

14. CHECK pressure in all S/Gs controlled or rising.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black RO labels) and determines that pressures are controlled. May also observe trends on 1-PR-1-2, SG 1 & 2 PRESS PSIG, and 1-PR-1-23, SG 3 & 4 PRESS PSIG to assess this step.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, & 9 Page 41 of 58 Event

Description:

7.) 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails open when the plant is tripped.

8.) The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically occur on both trains 9.) 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically. 1A Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent when started. 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

15. CHECK RCS pressure stable or dropping.

RO RO observes RCS pressure on 1-XI-68-100, RVLIS - ICCM PLASMA DISPLAY and/or 1-XI-68-110, RVLIS - ICCM PLASMA DISPLAY and determines that pressure is dropping.

16. MONITOR electrical board status:

a. CHECK offsite power available.

BOP b. CHECK all shutdown boards ENERGIZED by offsite power.

c. PLACE any unloaded D/G in standby USING SOI-82 Diesel Generators.

EXAMINER: 4 Minutes after Phase B occurs, 1B-B 6.9 KV shutdown board trips on differential relay therefore AOI-43 may be implemented at that time. Applicable sections from AOI-43.02, Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown Boards, are included as Attachment 2.

May transfer Instrument Power B Rack [1-M-7] to ENERGIZED feeder prior BOP to entry into AOI-43.02.

EXAMINER: When Dispatched to check 1B-B 6.9 KV shutdown board, console operator will report that the differential lockout relay has operated, and that there is extensive damage to the board. There is no fire.

16.b. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENERGIZE shutdown boards USING:

SOI-211 Shutdown Boards OR

AOI-43 Loss of Shutdown Boards OR

SOI-82 Diesel Generators EXAMINER: AOI-17, Turbine Trip, Section 3.3, BOP Realignment is contained as .

17. INITIATE BOP realignment:

REFER TO AOI-17, Turbine Trip.

BOP SRO assigns AOI-17, Turbine Trip to the BOP for performance on a not to interfere basis.

EXAMINER: 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Appendices A, B, C, and D are contained as Attachment 4.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, & 9 Page 42 of 58 Event

Description:

7.) 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails open when the plant is tripped.

8.) The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically occur on both trains 9.) 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically. 1A Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent when started. 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

18. INITIATE 480V board room breaker alignments USING the following:

Appendix A (1-E-1), CLA Breaker Operation.

Appendix B (1-E-1), 1-FCV-63-1 Breaker Operation.

Appendix C (1-E-1), 1-FCV-63-22 Breaker Operation.

When contacted as the Control Building AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request, and then report that Appendix A through C have been performed. Console Operator enters remote functions sir01, sir14 and sir06 to perform actions.

19. ENSURE RHR available for cntmt sump recirculation:

Power to at least one operable RHR pump AVAILABLE.

Cntmt sump valve 1-FCV-63-72 or 1-FCV-63-73 to operable RHR pump AVAILABLE.

20. EVALUATE plant equipment status:

REFER TO Appendix D (1-E-1), Equipment Evaluation.

21. CHECK Aux Bldg radiation for loss of RCS inventory outside cntmt:

a. Area monitor recorders 1-RR-90-1 and 0-RR-90-12A Aux Bldg points BOP NORMAL.

b. Vent monitor recorder 0-RR-90-101 NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

SRO 22. NOTIFY Chemistry of event status and plant conditions.

23. DETERMINE if RCS cooldown and depressurization is required:

a. CHECK RCS pressure greater than 150 psig.

b. ** GO TO ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

SRO will transition to ES-1.2.

EXAMINER: When SRO transitions to ES-1.2 scenario may be terminated if crew has completed 1-FR-Z.1 (Next Page).

If 1-FR-Z.1 has not been completed at this point, delay scenario termination until 1-FR-Z.1 is complete.

END OF SCENARIO 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, & 9 Page 43 of 58 Event

Description:

7.) 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails open when the plant is tripped.

8.) The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically occur on both trains 9.) 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically. 1A Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent when started. 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-FR-Z.1 The following actions are taken from 1-FR-Z.1, High Containment Pressure.

CAUTION If ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation, is in effect, the number of cntmt spray pumps to be operated is directed in ECA-1.1 rather than in this Instruction.

NOTE Adverse containment setpoints [ADV] should be used where provided due to Phase B actuation.

1. ENSURE cntmt spray operation:

a. Cntmt spray signal ACTUATED.

b. Cntmt spray pumps RUNNING.

RO determines that both Containment spray pumps are NOT RUNNING due to previous failures.

c. Cntmt spray valves 1-FCV-72-2 and 1-FCV-72-39 OPEN.

d. Cntmt spray pump suction valves OPEN:

Valves from RWST:

1-FCV-72-21and 1-FCV-72-22 OR

Valves from cntmt sump:

1-FCV-72-44 and 1-FCV-72-45

e. Cntmt spray flow:

1-FI-72-34

1-FI-72-131 1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ESTABLISH at least one train of cntmt spray flow.

RO RO Determines that no train of containment spray flow can be established due to 1A-A Spray pump trip and 1B-B Spray Pump Power not available.

EXAMINER: If Dispatched to check 1A-A Containment spray pump breaker locally, console operator will report 1A-A Containment Spray Pump tripped due to instantaneous overcurrent.

If Dispatched to check 1A-A Containment spray pump locally, console operator will report that the pump is severely damaged, and the shaft appears to be broken.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, & 9 Page 44 of 58 Event

Description:

7.) 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails open when the plant is tripped.

8.) The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically occur on both trains 9.) 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically. 1A Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent when started. 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. ENSURE cntmt isolation:

a. Phase A isolation:

Train A GREEN.

Train B GREEN.

If TSC or AUO contacted to manually close valves Containment Isolation Valves without power (1-FCV-62-61 and 1-FCV-31-67),

RO Console Operator will acknowledge the request.

b. Cntmt vent isolation:

Train A GREEN.

Train B GREEN.

c. Phase B isolation:

Train A GREEN.

Train B GREEN.

3. ENSURE MSIVs and bypasses CLOSED.

SRO RO locates 1-HS-1-4A, MSIV SG 1, 1-HS-1-11A, MSIV SG 2, 1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3, 1-HS-1-29A, MSIV SG 4 and observes GREEN and BLUE lights LIT on ALL handswitches.

4. PLACE steam dump controls OFF:

1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A RO

1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B RO determines that action has already been taken.

5. ENSURE all four RCPs STOPPED.

RO RO determines that action has already been taken.

6. MONITOR EGTS operation:

a. EGTS fans RUNNING.

SRO b. Filter bank dp between 5 and 9 inches of water.

BOP reports that 1-E-0, Appendix A, addressed EGTS fans, and reports filter P was 7 inches of water.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, & 9 Page 45 of 58 Event

Description:

7.) 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails open when the plant is tripped.

8.) The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically occur on both trains 9.) 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically. 1A Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent when started. 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. ENSURE ABGTS operation:

a. ABGTS fans RUNNING.

BOP reports that 1-E-0, Appendix A, addressed ABGTS fans and dampers.

RO b. ABGTS dampers OPEN:

FCO-30-146A.

FCO-30-146B.

FCO-30-157A.

FCO-30-157B.

8. WHEN 10 minutes has elapsed since Phase B actuation, THEN ENSURE Cntmt air return fans start.

BOP determines time since the Phase B actuation and then locates BOP 1-HS-30-38A, AIR RETURN FAN A-A and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the START position. BOP locates 1-HS-30-39A, AIR RETURN FAN B-B and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the START position.

CAUTION

RCS cooldown requires the availability of at least one S/G.

If ALL S/Gs are Faulted, at least a minimum detectable feed flow to each S/G is required to limit thermal stress during subsequent S/G feed operations.

9. CHECK S/G pressures:

All S/G pressures controlled or rising.

All S/G pressures greater than 140 psig.

RO reports that SG pressures are controlled, and are greater than 140 psig.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8, & 9 Page 46 of 58 Event

Description:

7.) 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails open when the plant is tripped.

8.) The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically occur on both trains 9.) 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically. 1A Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent when started. 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. DETERMINE if RHR spray should be placed in service:

a. CHECK the following conditions:

At least one hour has elapsed since the beginning of the accident.

SRO determines that one hour has NOT elapsed since the beginning of the accident.

Cntmt pressure is greater than 9.5 psig.

SRO determines that containment pressure is less than 9.5 psig.

RHR suction is aligned to cntmt sump.

At least one charging pump and one SI pump running.

b. ALIGN Train B RHR spray:

1) ENSURE Train B RHR pump RUNNING.

2) CLOSE RHR crosstie 1-FCV-74-35.

3) CLOSE RHR injection 1-FCV-63-94.

4) OPEN RHR spray 1-FCV-72-41.

SRO determines that the conditions for placing RHR spray in service are NOT met and continues to the next step.

RO 11. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: If crew has previously transitioned to ES-1.2 Scenario may be terminated when 1-FR-Z.1 is complete.

END OF SCENARIO 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 SM US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going - Name AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift:

Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

US/SM review late SI report (SQN and WBN only)

Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Continue with startup and raise power to 1-4% using GO-2, Reactor Startup. Currently GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, Reactor Startup, is in progress, ready for performance of Step 31. EOOS risk Matrix is GREEN.

Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only)

Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items)

Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs)

Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs)

Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs)

SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA)

Relief Time: _________________________________ Relief Date: ______________

Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties:

Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station)

Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week)

Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked)

Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs)

TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [01-14-2011]

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 SM US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going - Name AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb =

Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

US/SM review late SI report (SQN and WBN only)

Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Continue with startup and raise power to 1-4% using GO-2, Reactor Startup. Currently GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, Reactor Startup, is in progress, ready for performance of Step 31. EOOS risk Matrix is GREEN.

Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only)

Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items)

Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs)

Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs)

Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs)

SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA)

Relief Time: _________________________________ Relief Date: ______________

Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties:

Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station)

Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week)

Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked)

Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs)

TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [01-14-2011]

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-03 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

1. ENSURE Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 334 by performing the following actions:

a. Select ICManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate IC# 334.

c. Right click on IC# 334.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC# 334.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen:

Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value fw27c lcv-6-105a fail position M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 100 fw27d lcv-6-105a fail position M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 100 fw28b lcv-6-190b fail M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 100 cs06g air return fan a-a fail to start on phase b M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active cs01a containment spray system pump a trip M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active si09l failure of auto si for phase a train a isolation M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active si09m failure of auto si for phase a train b isolation M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active si10e failure of phase a signal for fcv-62-63 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active si10f failure of phase a signal for fcv-62-61 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active Page 49 of 58

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-03 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value si10k failure of phase a signal for fcv-77-9 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active si10l failure of phase a signal for fcv-77-10 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active cc02c rcp-3 thermal barrier heat exchanger tube leak M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 48 0 cc21a failure of fds-70-81e to operate M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 block norm cc21b failure of fds-70-81b to operate M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 block norm fw103a oc trip vacuum pump a M 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive ni04a ir channel failure chnl 1 M 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 0.0098462 mux_14c003 81-a 1-ni-92-135-d intermediate range channel i trouble M 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 On 00:00:00 nin135ds209-1 02050 n135 non-operational lo O 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 On Off cv31a charging pump a sheared shaft M 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive th04b pzr safety failure sv-68-564 M 6 00:00:00 00:00:00 1 0 th04b pzr safety failure sv-68-564 M 7 00:00:00 00:00:00 6 0 th04b pzr safety failure sv-68-564 M 19 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 0 ed06b loss of 6.9 kv shutdown board bus 1b-b M 13 00:04:00 00:00:00 Active InActive

5. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

6. ENSURE the Channel III Work Week sign is placed on 1-M-30.

7. Place simulator in FREEZE.

8. ENSURE Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Reactivity Briefing Book BOL (Beginning Of Life) is provided to the crew as part of the Turnover Package, and that the BOL placards are on 1-M-6, below the Boric Acid and Primary Water Integrators.

ENSURE that the Reactivity Plan for the startup is included in the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Reactivity Briefing Book BOL.

9. WHEN prompted by the Chief Examiner, place the Simulator in RUN.

Page 50 of 58

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-03 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

1 n/a Continue with startup and raise power to 1-4% using 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup.

ROLE PLAY: N/A 2 2 Thermal barrier heat exchanger leak (RCS into CCS).

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, repeat back request to perform inspections of CCS piping, ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, acknowledge the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for the thermal barrier piping.

3 3 1A Condenser Vacuum pump trips.

ROLE PLAY: If dispatched to check another Condenser Vacuum Pump ready for start, Console Operator will acknowledge request and report pump is available for start.

ROLE PLAY: When Dispatched to check pump breaker locally report the amptector is picked up at the breaker.

ROLE PLAY: When dispatched to check pump locally, report odor of overheated insulation.

ROLE PLAY: If work control is contacted to troubleshoot and repair, acknowledge request and initiate work package.

ROLE PLAY: If AUO dispatched to establish drain to running Condenser Vacuum Pump acknowledge request.

ROLE PLAY: If AUO dispatched to isolate drain for tripped Condenser Vacuum Pump acknowledge request.

4 4 Intermediate Range N35 fails low.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Operations Duty and Rx Engineering, acknowledge and repeat back the report.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, repeat back request to prepare a package to troubleshoot and repair Intermediate Range Channel N35.

Page 51 of 58

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-03 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

5 5 1A-A Centrifugal Charging Pump shaft shears.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, acknowledge the request to investigate the cause of the loss of charging flow. After 1 minute, report back that the 1A-A CCP shaft is broken and there is extensive damage to the pump.

ROLE PLAY: If contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO to determine that 1B-B CCP is ready to be started, repeat back the request, and then inform the RO that the 1B-B CCP is ready for a start.

ROLE PLAY: If contacted as the Control Building AUO, acknowledge request to check 1B-B CCP closing spring charged.

ROLE PLAY: If contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, repeat back the request to check out the 1B-B CCP after start, and then inform the RO that 1B-B CCP local checks are normal.

ROLE PLAY: ROLE PLAY: If contacted as Work Control, acknowledge request to prepare a troubleshooting and repair package for the 1A-A CCP.

6 6 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails partially open.

ROLE PLAY: N/A Page 52 of 58

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-03 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

7 n/a 1-SV-68-564, PZR SAFETY VALVE fails open when the plant is tripped.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted, acknowledge the request to shutdown the Upper and Lower Containment Radiation monitors sampling pumps, and inform the requestor that the sample pumps are off.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted, acknowledge the request to open the Ice Condenser AHU breakers, and inform the requestor that the breakers are open.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted, acknowledge the need to perform 1-E-1 Appendix A, B, and C.

Use remote function sir01 to complete 1-E-1 Appendix A (place power on CLA outlet valves).

Use remote sir14 to complete 1-E-1 Appendix B (place power on 1-FCV-63-1.

Use remote function sir06 to complete 1-E-1 Appendix C (place power on 1-FCV-63-22).

After remote functions are entered, report that the Appendices are complete.

ROLE PLAY: If Shift Manager contacted to Refer to EPIP-1, acknowledge the request.

ROLE PLAY: If Chemistry or Rad Protection contacted to survey or sample secondary lines, acknowledge the request.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Control Building AUO the Console Operator repeat back request to check low analyzer temp lights, and reports that the lights are NOT LIT.

8 n/a The Containment Phase A isolation signal fails to automatically occur on both trains.

ROLE PLAY: N/A Page 53 of 58

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-03 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

9 n/a 1A Air Return Fan fails to start automatically.

ROLE PLAY: N/A 1A Containment Spray Pump trips on instantaneous overcurrent when started.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Control Building AUO, state that the breaker for the 1A Containment Spray Pump tripped due to instantaneous overcurrent.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, state that the 1A Containment Spray pump is severely damaged, and the shaft appears to be broken.

1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation 4 minutes after the Phase B occurs.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Control Building AUO, repeat back request to investigate the 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board, report that the differential lockout relay has operated, and that there is extensive damage to the board. There is no fire.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, acknowledge the request to have a maintenance team go to the 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board to assess the damage, and to plan repairs.

ROLE PLAY: If TSC or AUO contacted to manually close valves Containment Isolation Valves without power (1-FCV-62-61 and 1-FCV-31-67) acknowledge the request.

Page 54 of 58

Scenario 4 Attachment 1 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix A and B Attachments 1 through 5

Scenario 4 Attachment 2 AOI-43.02, Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown Boards.

Section 3.1, Initial Actions.

Section 3.4, Compensatory Actions for Loss of 6.9kVSD BD 1B-B.

Scenario 4 Attachment 3 AOI-17, Turbine Trip.

Section 3.3, BOP Realignment.

Scenario 4 Attachment 4 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Appendix A through D

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Watts Bar March 2013 Scenario No. 5 Op Test No.: 1 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Run Time:

Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOL. RCS boron is 759 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. EOOS matrix is GREEN Turnover: Train A/Channel III. 1-LT-68-320, PZR LEVEL is out of service for maintenance and calibration. IMI-160.3 has been performed to trip the bistable associated with 1-LT-68-320.

LCO 3.3.1 and LCO 3.3.3 were entered 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ago. Expected return to service is 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description No.

1 rx02h I-RO Loop 4 Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires performance of AOI-2, TS-SRO Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires RO to defeat the failed Loop 4 input to Tavg Auctioneering Circuit. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

2 rw14a C-BOP Train B ERCW intake pumping station header ruptures at the TS-SRO common discharge of the B pumps. Requires performance of AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

3 tic-24-69 C-BOP 1-TIC-24-69, MTOT TEMP CONTROL fails, causing raw cooling water flow to be lost. Causes Main Turbine coupling vibration to rise. Requires the BOP to take manual control to reestablish flow and reduce oil temperature.

4 th05d C-RO Steam generator tube leak of approximately 35 gpm develops on SG 4. Requires entry into AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

5 n/a R-RO AOI-39, Rapid Plant Shutdown, is entered as required by AOI-N-BOP/SRO 33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

6 th05d M-ALL Steam generator tube leak progresses to a tube rupture, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection to be actuated.

7 ms13d 5 M- ALL When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8 si09a, C-BOP 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET si09b valves fail to automatically open when the SI occurs. Requires the BOP to manually open each valve.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 5 - Summary Initial Condition 100% power, MOL. RCS boron is 759 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. EOOS matrix is GREEN.

Turnover Train A/Channel III. 1-LT-68-320, PZR LEVEL is out of service for maintenance and calibration. IMI-160.3 has been performed to trip the bistable associated with 1-LT-68-320.

LCO 3.3.1 and LCO 3.3.3 were entered 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ago. Expected return to service is 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Event Description 1 Loop 4 Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires performance of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires RO to defeat the failed Loop 4 input to Tavg Auctioneering Circuit.

Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and multiple entries into LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.

2 Train B ERCW intake pumping station header ruptures at the common discharge of the B pumps. Requires performance of AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into LCO 3.0.3.

3 1-TIC-24-69, MTOT TEMP CONTROL fails, causing raw cooling water flow to be lost and main turbine coupling vibrations to rise. Requires the BOP to take manual control to reestablish flow and reduce temperatures.

4 Steam generator tube leak of approximately 25 gpm develops on SG 4. Requires performance of AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage.

5 AOI-39, Rapid Plant Shutdown, is entered as required by AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

6 Steam generator tube leak progresses to a tube rupture, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection to be actuated. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

7 When the reactor is tripped, a steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

Requires transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then a transition to 1-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then 1-ECA-3.1, SGTR and LOCA - Subcooled Recovery.

8 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET valves fail to automatically open when the SI occurs. Requires the BOP to manually open each valve.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 5 - Critical Task Summary Critical Task Description 1 Manually open 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET valves prior to exiting 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

2 Isolate feedwater to the faulted and ruptured steam generator prior to transitioning to 1-ECA-3.1, SGTR and LOCA - Subcooled Recovery.

Appendix D 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 4 of 54 Event

Description:

Loop 4 Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires performance of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires RO to defeat the failed Loop 4 input to Tavg Auctioneering Circuit. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

Loop 4 Tavg Indicator 1-TI-68-67E [M-5] indicates high.

92-A, PZR LEVEL HI/LO 93-A RCS LOOP T DEVIATION 93-F EAGLE PROC PROT CHANNEL I RTD FAILURE 94-A TAVG-TREF DEVIATION 94-B TAVG-T AUCT DEVIATION 110-F PROT SET TROUBLE 123-C OVERTEMP T TRIP ALERT 123-D OVERTEMP T TURB RUNBACK & C-3 ROD BLOCK Performs IMMEDIATE ACTION step of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor RO Control System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod Bank Movement.

May enter and perform initial actions of ARI-94-A, TAVG-TREF RO DEVIATION, and refer to AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System.

May place 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL in RO MANUAL, due to impact of Auct T-avg failure on PZR level program signal.

Enters and directs actions of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control SRO System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod Bank Movement.

The following steps are the first 4 steps from ARI 94-A, TAVG-TREF ARI 94-A DEVIATION.

RO [1] CHECK Loop Tavg on 1-TI-68-2E, -25E, -44E, and -67E [1-M-5].

[2] IF Tavg is less than or equal to 561°F, THEN PERFORM 1-SI-68-34 RO within 30 minutes.

RO [3] CHECK Tref & Auct Tavg recorder 1-TR-68-2B [1-M-5].

[4] IF control rods are in AUTO, THEN:

[4.1] PLACE control rods in MANUAL AND RESTORE Tavg to Tref RO using rods OR ADJUST turbine load to match Tavg with Tref.

[4.2] REFER TO AOI-2.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 5 of 54 Event

Description:

Loop 4 Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires performance of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires RO to defeat the failed Loop 4 input to Tavg Auctioneering Circuit. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor AOI-2 Control System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod Bank Movement.

NOTE Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step

1. STOP uncontrolled rod motion:

a. PLACE control rods in MAN.

RO b. CHECK control rod movement STOPPED.

RO rotates 1-RBSS from the AUTO position to the left to the MANUAL position.

EXAMINER: AOI-2, Attachment 1 is included in the scenario as Attachment 1.

2. MAINTAIN T-ave on PROGRAM. (Reference Attachment 1)

() USE control rods.

() ADJUST turbine load.

RO 3. CHECK loop T-ave channels NORMAL.

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

DEFEAT failed channels:

RO a. PLACE 1-XS-68-2D, T CHANNEL DEFEAT, to failed channel position, AND PULL.

RO will rotate 1-XS-68-2D to the LOOP 4 position and then pull out the selector switch.

EXAMINER: The next switch manipulation will result in the following alarm sequence:

94-A TAVG-TREF DEVIATION - Alarm clears 94-B TAVG-T AUCT DEVIATION - Alarm clears and then reflashes

b. PLACE 1-XS-68-2M, TAVG CHANNEL DEFEAT, in failed channel position AND PULL.

RO will rotate 1-XS-68-2M to the LOOP 4 position and then pull out the selector switch.

ENSURE TR-68-2A placed to a Loop with operable T/OTT/OPT RO channels using 1-XS-68-2B.

RO determines that Loop 4 is not selected.

NOTIFY Maintenance to implement IMI-160 for failed channel.

SRO will contact Maintenance/Work Control and request performance of IMI-160. Console Operator will repeat back request.

(Continued Next Page) 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 6 of 54 Event

Description:

Loop 4 Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires performance of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires RO to defeat the failed Loop 4 input to Tavg Auctioneering Circuit. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED: (Cont'd)

WHEN at least 5 minutes have elapsed since failed T-ave channel is defeated AND auto rod control desired, THEN

a. ENSURE T-ave and T-ref within 1°F.

RO observes T-avg and T-ref within 1F on 1-TR-68-2B, TREF & AUCT TAVG - °F.

b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication [1-M-4].

RO observes that there is a zero demand indicated on the PASSIVE SUMMER ROD DEMAND on both CERPI displays.

c. PLACE rods in AUTO.

RO rotates 1-RBSS from the MANUAL position to the right to the AUTO position.

4. CHECK Auct T-avg NORMAL on 1-TR-68-2B.

RO After Step 3 is performed and the failed channel is defeated, Auct Tavg will indicate NORMAL on 1-TR-68-2B.

5. CHECK NIS power range channels NORMAL.

RO RO observes all NIS channels are indicating the same values and are NORMAL.

6. CHECK the following:

Turbine impulse pressure channel 1-PI-1-73, NORMAL.

BOP observes that 1-PI-1-73, % HP TURBINE POWER TR A is matched with 1-PI-1-72, % HP TURBINE POWER TR B and both are NORMAL.

T-ref and Auct T-avg NORMAL on 1-TR-68-2B (Reference Attachment 1).

After failed loop T and loop T-avg channels have been defeated in Step 3 RNO, Tref and Auct Tavg are NORMAL.

7. MONITOR core power distribution parameters:

Power range channels

Flux Indicators SRO

T-ave

Loop T

Incore TCs

Feed flow/Steam flow

8. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back request to have a troubleshooting and repair package made up for Loop 4 RCS Temperature instrument.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 7 of 54 Event

Description:

Loop 4 Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires performance of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires RO to defeat the failed Loop 4 input to Tavg Auctioneering Circuit. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. REFER TO Tech Specs:

3.1.1, Shutdown Margin - Not applicable.

3.1.5, Rod Group Alignment Limits - Not applicable.

3.1.6, Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits - Not applicable.

3.1.7, Control Bank Insertion Limits - Not applicable.

3.2.1, Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor - Not applicable.

3.2.2, Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor - Not applicable.

3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio - Not applicable.

3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference - Not applicable.

3.3.1-1, Rx Trip System (RTS)

Function 6. Overtemperature T Condition W. Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months .

Function 7. Overpower T Condition W. Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR reduce THERMAL POWER to <P-7.

Function 13.a), SG Water Level Lo-Lo Coincident with Vessel T Equivalent to 50% RTP with a time delay (Ts) if one steam generator is affected or A time delay (Tm) if two or more steam generators are SRO affected Condition V, One Vessel T channel inoperable, Set the Trip Time Delay threshold power level for (TS) and (TM) to 0% power within 72 OR Be in MODE 3 in 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months .

Function 13.b), SG Water Level Lo-Lo Coincident with Vessel T Equivalent to>50% RTP with no time delay Condition V, One Vessel T channel inoperable, Set the Trip Time Delay threshold power level for (TS) and (TM) to 0% power within 72 OR Be in MODE 3 in 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months .

3.3.2-1, ESFAS Instrumentation.

Function 6.b.1) SG Water Level Lo-Lo Coincident with Vessel T Equivalent to 50% RTP with a time delay (Ts) if one steam generator is affected or A time delay (Tm) if two or more steam generators are affected, Condition N, One Vessel T channel inoperable, Set the Trip Time Delay threshold power level for (TS) and (TM) to 0% power within 72 OR Be in MODE 3 in 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months .

Function 6.b.2) SG Water Level Lo-Lo Coincident with Vessel T Equivalent to>50% RTP with no time delay Condition N, One Vessel T channel inoperable, Set the Trip Time Delay threshold power level for (TS) and (TM) to 0% power within 72 OR Be in MODE 3 in 78 hours9.027778e-4 days 0.0217 hours 1.289683e-4 weeks 2.9679e-5 months .

10. NOTIFY Chemistry of any reactor power changes greater than 15% in SRO one hour.

Power change has not exceeded 15%, so this step is not applicable.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 8 of 54 Event

Description:

Loop 4 Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires performance of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires RO to defeat the failed Loop 4 input to Tavg Auctioneering Circuit. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

11. WHEN ready to restore repaired T and loop T-avg channels, THEN:

PUSH IN 1-XS-68-2D, T CHANNEL DEFEAT and SELECT AWAY from all channels.

PUSH IN 1-XS-68-2M, TAVG CHANNEL DEFEAT, and SELECT AWAY from all channels.

SRO determines that the conditions of this step are not met and continues to the next step.

CAUTION Allowing at least 5 minutes between any rod control input change (i.e., T-ave, T-ref, or NIS) and placing rods in AUTO, will help prevent undesired control rod movement.

EXAMINER: Step 12 actions are provided if the applicants did NOT return rods to automatic during the performance of Step 3 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED actions.

12. WHEN auto rod control desired, THEN:

a. ENSURE T-ave and T-ref within 1°F.

RO withdraws control rods in MANUAL to match T-avg and T-ref within 1F.

b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication [1-M-SRO 4].

RO observes that there is a zero demand indicated on the PASSIVE SUMMER ROD DEMAND on both CERPI displays.

c. PLACE rods in AUTO.

RO rotates 1-RBSS from the MANUAL position to the right to the AUTO position.

13. WHEN conditions allow auto PZR level control, THEN ENSURE PZR level returned to normal program, AND PLACE 1-FCV-62-93 in AUTO.

SRO If action was taken earlier to take manual control of PZR level, the RO will place 1-HIC-62-93A in AUTO after verifying level has been returned to program.

SRO 14. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 2, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 9 of 54 Event

Description:

Loop 4 Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires performance of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires RO to defeat the failed Loop 4 input to Tavg Auctioneering Circuit. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 2.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 10 of 54 Event

Description:

Train B ERCW intake pumping station header ruptures at the common discharge of the B pumps.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

170-F, IPS VLV & STRNR ROOM B SUMP LEVEL HI 227-A, ERCW PMP E-B DISCH PRESS LO 229-A, ERCW HDR B SUP PRESS LO 229-B, ERCW PMP H-B DISCH PRESS LO 225-E, TR-A/B ERCW TO C&SS COMPR FLOW HI BOP Diagnoses and announces the ERCW pipe break on 1B header in the IPS.

May dispatch the Outside AUO to the Intake Pumping Station (IPS) to assess the flooding.

BOP When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back request to go to the IPS to determine the location of the rupture.

Console Operator reports back that the IPS is flooding rapidly.

Enters and directs actions of AOI-13, Loss of ERCW, Section 3.5, Supply SRO Header Rupture in IPS.

The following actions are taken from AOI-13, Loss of ERCW, Section 3.5, AOI-13 Supply Header Rupture in IPS.

NOTE This Section applies to a header break prior to the ERCW Strainer inlet valves or as directed by another section in this procedure.

1. DISPATCH personnel to determine location of rupture.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back BOP request to go to the IPS to determine the location of the rupture.

Console Operator reports back that the IPS is flooding rapidly.

2. DISPATCH AUO, with a radio, to the Rx MOV Bds BOP When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back request to go the Rx MOV Bds. The Console Operator will report back that he is at the Rx MOV Bds.

CAUTION MOVs with power normally removed may not travel to full closed position under high flow conditions, local verification of isolation may be required.

3. CHECK Train A Supply Header pressure at expected values for existing plant conditions.

BOP BOP observes Train A Supply Header pressure is NORMAL at approximately 130 psig.

4. CHECK Train B Supply Header pressure at expected values for existing plant conditions.

BOP BOP observes Train B Supply Header pressure is low.

SRO enters RNO for contingency actions.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 11 of 54 Event

Description:

Train B ERCW intake pumping station header ruptures at the common discharge of the B pumps.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PERFORM the following:

a. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/11B, 1-FCV-67-147.

When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/11B. The Console Operator reports the breaker closed after entering rwr12.

b. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/15E, 1-FCV-67-458.

When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/15E. The Console Operator reports the breaker closed after entering rwr22

c. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1B2-B c/8A, 1-FCV 24.

When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1B2-B c/8A. The Console Operator reports the breaker closed after entering rwr06 BOP

d. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 2B2-B c/8A, 2-FCV 24.

When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to unlock, and bkr on Rx MOV Bd 2B2-B c/8A. The Console Operator reports the breaker closed after entering rwr31.

e. ENSURE 2-FCV-67-147, CCS Hx C Sup From Hdr 2B, OPEN.

BOP checks 2-FCV-67-147 placard indicates the valve is OPEN with POWER DISCONNECTED.

f. OPEN 1-FCV-67-147, CCS Hx C Sup From Hdr 1A.

BOP locates 1-HS-67-147A, CCS HX C SUP FROM HDR 1A, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the OPEN position. BOP observes the RED light LIT and GREEN light DARK.

g. STOP, and PULL TO LOCK all Tr B ERCW Pumps.

h. CLOSE 1-FCV-67-24, Strainer 1B-B Inlet.

BOP locates handswitch 1-HS-67-24, STRAINER 1B-B INLET, and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position. BOP observes the RED light DARK and GREEN light LIT.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 12 of 54 Event

Description:

Train B ERCW intake pumping station header ruptures at the common discharge of the B pumps.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED: (continued)

i. CLOSE 2-FCV-67-24, Strainer 2B-B Inlet.

BOP locates handswitch 2-HS-67-24A, STRAINER 2B-B INLET, and rotates the handswitch to the left to the CLOSE position. BOP observes the RED light DARK and GREEN light LIT.

j. START additional Tr A ERCW Pumps as required.

k. ENSURE 1-FCV-67-223, ERCW Hdr 1B to 2A Xtie, OPEN.

BOP checks 2-HS-67-223A placard indicates the valve is OPEN with POWER DISCONNECTED.

l. ENSURE 2-FCV-67-223, ERCW Hdr 2A To 1B Xtie, OPEN.

BOP checks 2-HS-67-147A placard indicates the valve is OPEN with POWER DISCONNECTED.

m. OPEN 1-FCV-67-458, CCS Hx A Sup From Hdr 1B.

BOP BOP locates handswitch 1-HS-67-458, CCS Hx A Sup From Hdr 1B, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the OPEN position.

BOP observes the RED light LIT and GREEN light DARK.

Strainer isolation valves have been closed, this step is not applicable.

n. IF strainer inlet isolation(s) failed to close, THEN PERFORM the following:

UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 2A2-A c/8A, 2-FCV 81

UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/8A, 1-FCV 81.

CLOSE 1-FCV-67-81, AB Supply Hdr 1A.

CLOSE 2-FCV-67-81, AB Supply Hdr 2A.

o. **GO TO Step 5.

NOTES

With ruptured header strainer inlet valves closed, the flow indicators on the isolated supply headers will be off-scale low

With ERCW headers cross-tied, evaluate LCO 3.0.3 applicability.

5. CHECK in-service header(s) flow(s) and pressure(s) return to expected BOP values for existing plant conditions.

BOP 6. CHECK pump amps within limits.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 13 of 54 Event

Description:

Train B ERCW intake pumping station header ruptures at the common discharge of the B pumps.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. ALIGN backup ERCW supply to DGs without normal supply:

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-67-65A, DG 1B-B BACKUP SUP (FCV-67-72 for C-S) and rotates the handswitch to the right to the OPEN position. BOP observes RED light LIT and GREEN light DARK.

BOP locates 2-HS-67-65A, DG 2B-B BACKUP SUP (FCV-67-72 for C-S) and rotates the handswitch to the right to the OPEN position. BOP observes RED light LIT and GREEN light DARK.

8. REFER TO Tech Specs:

3.0.3, Applicability With the ERCW headers cross-connected, entry into LCO 3.0.3 is required. When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to place the unit, as applicable, in:

a. MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months ;

b. MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months ; and

c. MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days 0.0103 hours 6.117725e-5 weeks 1.40785e-5 months .

3.4.6, RCS Loops-Mode 4.

SRO Not applicable, since the plant is in Mode 1.

3.7.8, Essential Raw Cooling Water System.

With trains cross-connected, LCO 3.0.3 is most limiting.

3.8.1, AC Sources-Operating.

Condition C. Two required DGs in Train B inoperable may be entered.

However, LCO 3.0.3 is the most limiting and a Safety Function Determination would be required in this situation.

OR 14.10 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment 14.10 With one or more of the breakers and/or valves specified in design output documents not in the noted position or condition, return the breakers and/or valve to the required position within 30 days.

9. EVALUATE ERCW availability to DGs.

SRO SRO determines that the backup supply valves are open to the affected DGs.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 14 of 54 Event

Description:

Train B ERCW intake pumping station header ruptures at the common discharge of the B pumps.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. INITIATE repair.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator repeats back the request for a work package to troubleshoot and repair B ERCW Header at the IPS.

11. IF ERCW to in-service CCS heat exchanger was interrupted, THEN SRO NOTIFY Duty System Engineer to initiate evaluation for effect on CCS equipment and piping.

12. REFER TO SOI-67.01, Essential Raw Cooling Water System for SRO system realignment.

SRO 13. RETURN TO instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 3, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 3.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 15 of 54 Event

Description:

1-TIC-24-69, MTOT TEMP TEMP CONTROL fails, causing raw cooling water flow to be lost. Requires the BOP to take manual control to reestablish flow.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

23-A TURB/GEN VIBRATION HI/HI-HI MTOT Oil Temperatures rising on ICS display.

Turbine coupling vibrations rising on ICS display.

May diagnose and announce rising trend on Main Turbine drain oil temperatures.

BOP When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back request to check Main Turbine oil system locally.

May diagnose and announce rising trend on Main Turbine vibrations on ICS BOP display.

BOP Announces 23-A TURB/GEN VIBRATION HI/HI-HI alarm.

SRO Enters and directs actions of ARI 23-A TURB/GEN VIBRATION HI/HI-HI ARI 23-A The following actions are taken from ARI 23-A TURB/GEN VIBRATION HI/HI-HI.

[1] IF the cause of this alarm is COUPLING vibration, THEN notify the Sys Eng. No Operator action is required.

BOP BOP determines from 1-CRT-47-121 ICS display, TURBINE BEARINGS, that oil temperatures are rising. BOP reports that the high vibration condition is limited to main turbine coupling bearing 7.

[2] MONITOR 1-CRT-47-121 [1-M-2] to determine which bearing has possible vibration problems.

BOP BOP determines from 1-CRT-47-121 ICS display, TURBINE VIBRATION, that vibrations are rising on multiple bearings.

[3] DISPATCH Operator to perform the following:

CHECK local indications on 1-L-792

SOUND Turbine bearings

CHECK Turbine lube oil temperature.

CHECK Seal Oil temperature.

BOP When contacted by the BOP as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to perform the following:

CHECK local indications on 1-L-792

SOUND Turbine bearings

CHECK Turbine lube oil temperature.

CHECK Seal Oil temperature.

[4] IF a catastrophic Turbine/ Generator failure has occurred, THEN EVALUATE performing Generator Hydrogen Emergency BOP Depressurization IAW SOI-35.01 Section 8.15.

BOP determines that there are no indications of a catastrophic Turbine/Generator failure.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 16 of 54 Event

Description:

1-TIC-24-69, MTOT TEMP TEMP CONTROL fails, causing raw cooling water flow to be lost. Requires the BOP to take manual control to reestablish flow.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[5] ATTEMPT to stabilize or reduce bearing vibration by varying one or more of the following parameters within normal operation limits:

Turbine bearing lube oil supply temperature.

BOP will determine that 1-TIC-24-69 is indicating full closed, and BOP transfer the controller to MANUAL. After transferring the controller to MANUAL, the BOP will open 1-TIC-24-69 to reduce MTOT temperature.

Generator Megawatts and/or VARS

Seal Oil temperature.

EXAMINER: Bearing vibrations are expected to lower as the BOP takes manual control of 1-HIC-24-69, MTOT TEMP TEMP CONTROL.

[6] IF bearing vibration is above 7 mils, THEN NOTIFY Engineering AND EVALUATE if load reduction or unit shutdown warranted.

When contacted as System Engineering, the Console Operator will SRO repeat back the request for support in evaluating if a turbine load reduction or shutdown is required. As System Engineering, report back that the turbine is being evaluated, but no actions are required at this time.

[7] IF bearing vibration continues to rise above evaluated limits, THEN EVALUATE rapid load reduction per AOI-39, or tripping the turbine prior SRO to exceeding 14 mils vibration.

When contacted as an AUO, Console Operator repeats back request to reset high vibration alarm locally.

EXAMINER: SOI-47.02, Turbo-Generator Startup Operation, Appendix F, Turbine Instrument Limits, is provided as Attachment 2.

[8] ENSURE Turbine is operated within startup and loading limitations of BOP SOI-47.02, Turbo-generator Startup Operation.

[9] ENSURE lube oil temperature, condenser vacuum, sealing steam BOP pressure, and exhaust hood temperature are normal.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 4, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior to SRO the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 17 of 54 Event

Description:

1-TIC-24-69, MTOT TEMP TEMP CONTROL fails, causing raw cooling water flow to be lost. Requires the BOP to take manual control to reestablish flow.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 4.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 18 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam generator tube leak of approximately 35 gpm develops on SG 4. Requires entry into AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

175-B, VAC PMP EXH 1-RM-119 RAD HI Possible indication of feedwater reduction to SG 4 on the ICS STEAM GENERATORS display page.

Announces 175-B, ARI-175-B, VAC PMP EXH 1-RM-119 RAD HI, then BOP uses the ICS computer to diagnose the SG tube leak on SG 4.

May call Chemistry and request sampling of SGs for activity, BOP recommending that SG 4 be sampled first.

May call Rad Prot and request surveys of the secondary plant due to a BOP suspected SG tube leak.

RO Informs the SRO of changing level in the PZR and VCT.

SRO Enters and directs actions of AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

EXAMINER: Ten minutes after Chemistry and/or Radiation Protection are contacted to evaluate the SGs, Chemistry and/or Radiation Protection will call and provide preliminary data to the crew.

The following actions are taken from ARI-175-B, VAC PMP EXH 1-RM-119 RAD ARI 175-B HI.

[1] REFER TO AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

BOP BOP informs the SRO of the need to go to AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

BOP [2] CHECK 1-RM-90-120 (R1020A) and 1-RM-90-121 (R1021A).

[3] CHECK Post Accident monitors 1-RM-90-421 (R9055A), 1-RM-90-422 BOP (R9056A), 1-RM-90-423 (R9057A), and 1-RM-90-424 (R9058A).

[4] IF Alarm is valid, THEN REQUEST Chemistry to evaluate appropriate SRO SG Blowdown routing when monitor alarms (i.e., CTBD or hotwell),

based on ODCM limitations.

NOTE 1-HS-15-44 is key-operated. Obtain key from Unit SRO.

[5] IF Step [4] Chemistry evaluation determines that SG Blowdown routing should divert to the hotwell on alarm, THEN DISPATCH AUO to VERIFY BOP 1-HS-15-44, SG BLOWDOWN DISCH TO CTBD [T5I/708] NOT in OPEN.

NOTE ICS screen CHEM7 provides calculated instantaneous primary to secondary leak rate value.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 19 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam generator tube leak of approximately 35 gpm develops on SG 4. Requires entry into AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[6] NOTIFY Chemistry to perform CM-9.09 Effluent Radiation Monitor Alarm Guidelines.

BOP If contacted as Chemistry, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for performance of CM-9.09 Effluent Radiation Monitor Alarm Guidelines.

[7] NOTIFY Radiation Protection to investigate alarm.

SRO When contacted as Radiation Protection, the Console Operator repeats back request to survey the secondary plant.

[8] IF monitor declared inoperable, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry Countroom to SRO initiate compensatory sampling.

SRO [9] REFER TO AOI-31, Abnormal Release Of Radioactive Material.

AOI-33 The following actions are taken from AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

NOTE Sufficient time must be allowed for level to respond following changes in charging flow, in order to determine if Pzr level can be maintained.

1. MAINTAIN PZR Level:

1. MAINTAIN pzr Level:

a. CONTROL charging flow using 1-FCV-62-93 and 1-FCV-62-89 as necessary to maintain pzr level.

RO RO may place 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL in MANUAL and raise charging flow. RO may also adjust 1-HIC-62-89 to establish proper seal flows as charging flow is raised.

b. CHECK letdown flow is 75 gpm.

RO checks 1-FI-62-82, LETDOWN FLOW indicates 75 gpm.

NOTE Sufficient time must be allowed for level to respond following changes in charging flow, in order to determine if Pzr level can be maintained.

c. MONITOR pzr level STABLE or INCREASING.

RO RO determines that PZR level is stable, with increased charging flow.

NOTE Condenser Vacuum Exhaust and SG blowdown Radiation Monitors should be monitored at approximately 15 minute intervals for indications of rising leak rate.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 20 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam generator tube leak of approximately 35 gpm develops on SG 4. Requires entry into AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. IDENTIFY Leaking SG(s);

a. EVALUATE the following:

Unexpected rise in any SG narrow range level,

Feedwater flow mismatches,

High radiation from any Chemistry SG sample results, RO

High radiation on any SG main steamline radiation monitor,

RAD PROT survey of main steamlines and SG blowdown lines.

b. MONITOR Condenser Vacuum Exhaust and SG Blowdown Radiation Monitors BOP utilizes the ICS computer to evaluate steam and feed flow mismatch to each SG and determines that SG 4 has the tube leak.

3. INCREASE VCT Auto Makeup:

a. DOUBLE setting on Boric Acid and PW flow controllers RO changes value on 1-FC-62-142, PW TO BLENDER FCV 62-143 CONTROL from approximately 35 to 70%.

1-FC-62-142 RO RO changes value on 1-FC-62-139, BA TO BLENDER FCV-62-140 CONTROL from approximately 21 to 42%.

1-FC-62-139

b. ENSURE RED light lit on 1-HS-62-140A RO observes 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL handswitch RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

NOTE Sufficient time must be allowed for level to respond following changes in charging flow, in order to determine if Pzr level can be maintained.

RO 4. MAINTAIN VCT level greater than 13%.

NOTE Sufficient time must be allowed for level to respond following changes in charging flow, in order to determine if Pzr level can be maintained.

EXAMINER: The applicants have enough evidence to determine SG 4 is leaking, and the leakage rate is approximately 35 gpm.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 21 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam generator tube leak of approximately 35 gpm develops on SG 4. Requires entry into AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. DETERMINE if Plant Shutdown Is Required:

High Secondary Radiation, AND

pzr level continues to decrease, OR SRO Charging flow continues to rise.

Primary to secondary leakage in EXCESS of TS LCO 3.4.13 limits.

SRO determines from the net charging that the leakage rate is approximately 35 gpm, which is in excess of the TS LCO 3.4.13 limit of 150 gpd primary-to-secondary leakage and orders a plant shutdown.

6. NOTIFY The Following:

a. Plant personnel via PA system.

Attention plant personnel. The Unit has developed a S/G tube leak and Unit shutdown is in progress. Treat all leaks as radioactive.

b. Operations Manager.

When contacted as Operations Manager, the Console Operator will repeat back information provided.

c. RADPRO to survey secondary plant and site environment.

When contacted as RADPRO to perform surveys, the Console Operator will repeat the request. If 10 minutes have elapsed since the first call was made to RADPRO, the Console Operator will provide SRO information confirming higher radiation levels near SG 4 steam line.

d. Chemistry to initiate the following:

Hourly RCS Cb sampling.

CM-5.01, Primary to Secondary Leak Rate Methods.

CM-9.93, Abnormal Release Assessment (for unmonitored steam releases such as SG PORVs and TD AFWP).

1-ODI-90-2, Steam Generator Blowdown Release.

When contacted as Chemistry to perform samples, the Console Operator will repeat the request. If 10 minutes have elapsed since the first call was made to Chemistry, the Console Operator will provide information confirming higher activity levels in SG 4.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 22 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam generator tube leak of approximately 35 gpm develops on SG 4. Requires entry into AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. PERFORM The Following Evaluations:

a. EVALUATE Tech Specs for applicability:

3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, Condition B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met, OR Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists OR Primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE not within limit then Be in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and be in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, RO

3.7.6, Condensate Storage Tank (CST),

3.7.14, Secondary Specific Activity,

b. EVALUATE EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Matrix.

SRO contacts the Shift Manager and Console Operator repeats back request that EPIP-1 be evaluated.

c. EVALUATE NPG-SPP-03.5 reportability.

SRO contacts the Shift Manager and Console Operator repeats back request for an evaluation of NPG-SPP-3.05.

RO 8. CHECK Unit Load - GREATER THAN 30%.

9. INITIATE unit shutdown USING AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction while RO continuing with this procedure.

RO 10. MONITOR CST Level - GREATER THAN 200,000 GAL.

11. MINIMIZE Secondary System Contamination:

a. CONTROL Condensate return to CST:

1) PLACE 1-LIC-2-3, in MANUAL, and CLOSE.

RO 2) MAINTAIN condenser level 1-LR-2-12 on- scale [1-M-3].

b. CHECK Cond DI - BYPASSED.

c. INITIATE Attachment 1, Minimize Secondary Contamination, to realign turbine bldg sump to unlined pond.

RO 12. CHECK Reactor Trip Breakers - OPEN.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 23 of 54 Event

Description:

AOI-39, Rapid Plant Shutdown, is entered as required by AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, Section AOI-39 3.2, Reactor power is greater than 50%.

CAUTION Over boration may result in excessive rod withdrawal, T-avg lower than desired, and AFD oscillations.

NOTE

Rod Control should remain in automatic for T-avg Control

Reactivity Briefing Sheet, Thumb Rules (page 3), lists boration flows and volumes for different reduction rates.

Effect of boration will lag behind turbine load reduction and can be compensated for by temporarily increasing boric acid flow rate above recommended rate.

1. INITIATE a manual boration:

a. DETERMINE recommended boration flow rate and volume from Reactivity Briefing Sheet:

RO determines the recommended boration flow rate between 27 to 40 gpm and the volume to add to be approximately 1000 gallons of boron.

b. INITIATE normal boration:

1) ADJUST BA flow controller, 1-FC-62-139, to desired flow rate.

RO adjusts 1-FC-62-139 to the value corresponding to the flow rate for the selected load reduction rate.

2) ADJUST BA batch counter 1-FQ-62-139 to required quantity.

RO adjusts 1-FQ-62-139 BA BATCH COUNTER as follows:

1. Depresses and holds the black pushbutton.

RO 2. While holding the pushbutton, the applicant raises the red translucent cover.

3. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant enters 001000 in the display.

4. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant lowers the red translucent cover, and then releases the pushbutton.

3) PLACE mode selector 1-HS-62-140B to BOR.

RO rotates 1-HS-62-140B VCT MAKEUP MODE from AUTO to the right to BOR position.

4) () PLACE VCT makeup control 1-HS-62-140A, to START.

RO rotates 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL to the right to the START position.

5) VERIFY desired boric acid flow indicated on 1-FI-62-139.

RO observes the desired flow on 1-FI-62-139, BA TO BLENDER FLOW 2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 24 of 54 Event

Description:

AOI-39, Rapid Plant Shutdown, is entered as required by AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION

Condenser Backpressure limits are on page 5.

TURBINE MANUAL Operation requires continuous operator monitoring and control.

LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM may be made worse if steam dumps are actuated. AOI-11 requires T-ave and T-ref be maintained within 3°F.

NOTE If the initiating condition is corrected, the power reduction may be terminated

2. ESTABLISH a turbine load reduction rate less than or equal to 5%/min:

a. PLACE turbine in IMP IN BOP depressed the IMP IN pushbutton and observes the transfer from IMP OUT to IMP IN control complete.

b. SET a desired load in the SETTER with the REFERENCE CONTROL.

BOP depresses the reference control (down) button to reduce the BOP setter display to approximately 30% load or as directed by the SRO.

c. SET the LOAD RATE at less than or equal to 5%/min.

BOP selects the load reduction rate directed by the SRO using the LOAD RATE % PER MIN thumbwheel selector. It is expected that a load reduction rate of 2-4%/minute will be used

d. () DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

BOP depresses the REFERENCE CONTROL GO button.

NOTE AFD green target band can be monitored using ICS Turn On code DOGHOUSE.

3. MONITOR rod position:

Rods above Lo-Lo insertion limit

AFD within Target Band

4. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart SRO SRO contacts the Shift Manager and Console Operator repeats back request that EPIP-1 be evaluated

5. NOTIFY the Load Coordinator of the required load reduction and expected ramp rate SRO When the SRO contacts Load Coordinator, the Console Operator will repeat back the information provided.

6. MONITOR T-avg and T-ref:

T-ave trending to T-ref.

Mismatch less than 5°F.

7. CHECK rate of power reduction is rapid enough for existing plant SRO conditions.

SRO 8. NOTIFY Cnds Demin AUO of impending pmp shutdowns.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 25 of 54 Event

Description:

AOI-39, Rapid Plant Shutdown, is entered as required by AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. WHEN rated thermal power change exceeds 15% in one hour, THEN SRO NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate 1-SI-68-28.

EXAMINER: When load has been reduced to 94%, the Console Operator will increase the severity of the leak from 1.75 to 8% by entering Event 6.

The change in flowrate will require the crew to initiate a reactor trip due to the loss of VCT level, verify the trip. These actions are based on AOI-33, Step 4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 Page 26 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam generator tube leak progresses to a tube rupture, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection to be actuated.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior AOI-33 The following actions are taken from AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

RO 4. MAINTAIN VCT level greater than 13%.

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF VCT level CANNOT be maintained, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) () ENSURE CCP suction aligned to RWST.

2) () TRIP the reactor.

3) PERFORM the following:

GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. AND

CONTINUE performance of this procedure at Step 11 in parallel with E-0.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7 and 8 Page 27 of 54 Event

Description:

7.) When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8.) 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET VALVE, and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET VALVE, fail to automatically open on the SI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-E-0 The following actions are taken from 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

NOTE Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS.

Status Trees / SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR A GREEN light LIT on panel 1-M-4.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RC TRIP BKR B GREEN light LIT on panel 1-M-4 RO checks 1-52BYA, BYPASS BKR A lights DARK RO checks 1-52BYB, BYPASS BKR B lights DARK

RPIs at bottom of scale.

RO RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor 1 and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 for indication that all SHUTDOWN and CONTROL bank rods are inserted.

Neutron flux DROPPING.

RO observes neutron flux trending down on 1-NR-92-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER. May also observe levels decreasing on 1-NI-92-135A, CH I NEUTRON MON % PWR, and 1-NI-92-136A, CH II NEUTRON MON % PWR.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

RO RO observes that lights on 1-XX-47-1000 EHC CONTROL for individual throttle and governor valves are GREEN.

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

CSST (offsite),

OR D/G (blackout)

RO RO observes that 1-HS-57-41A, 1716 NORMAL - 6.9 SD BD 1A-A FROM CSST C RED light is LIT, GREEN light is DARK (breaker closed) and 1-EI-57-39, 6.9 SDB 1A-A VOLTS indicates approximately 7000 volts.

RO observes that 1-HS-57-71A, 1728 NORMAL - 6.9 SD BD 1B-B FROM CSST D RED light is LIT, GREEN light is DARK (breaker closed) and 1-EI-57-66, 6.9 SDB 1B-B VOLTS indicates approximately 7000 volts.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7 and 8 Page 28 of 54 Event

Description:

7.) When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8.) 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET VALVE, and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET VALVE, fail to automatically open on the SI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RO will announce that the window 70-A, SI ACTUATED is LIT. May also RO announce that FIRST OUT 76-G SI MANUAL is LIT.

b. Both trains SI ACTUATED.

1-XX-55-6C

1-XX-55-6D

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

DETERMINE if SI required:

a. IF ANY of the following exists:

S/G press less than 675 psig, OR

RCS press less than 1870 psig, OR RO

Cntmt press greater than 1.5 psig THEN ACTUATE SI manually.

RO reports that RCS pressure has dropped, and actuates a manual SI.

RO locates 1-HS-63-133B SI ACTUATE TR A& B on 1-M-4, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the ACTUATE position.

As an alternative, the RO may locate 1-HS-63-133A SI ACTUATE TR A&

B on 1-M-6, and rotate the handswitch to the RIGHT to the ACTUATE position.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7 and 8 Page 29 of 54 Event

Description:

7.) When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8.) 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET VALVE, and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET VALVE, fail to automatically open on the SI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendices A and B are included as .

Critical Task 1 Manually open 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET valves prior to exiting 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

5. PERFORM Appendixes A and B, E-0, pages 16-30.

BOP determines that 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET valves failed to open when the SI occurred.

BOP BOP rotates 1-HS-63-25A, BIT OUTLET to the RIGHT to the OPEN position. BOP observes RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

BOP rotates 1-HS-63-26A, BIT OUTLET to the RIGHT to the OPEN position. BOP observes RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

EXAMINER: When the SRO pages the STA, the Console Operator will start a 10 minute countdown. When 10 minutes have elapsed, the Surrogate STA will report to the Control Room.

SRO 6. ANNOUNCE reactor trip and safety injection over PA system.

7. ENSURE secondary heat sink available with either:

Total AFW flow greater than 410 gpm, OR RO

At least one S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

RO determines that secondary heat sink is available, based on both AFW flow and intact SG level.

8. MONITOR RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F using:

RCS Loop T-avg with any RCP running, RO OR

RCS Loop T-cold with RCPs out-of-service.

RO reports RCS T-avg is less than 557°F.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7 and 8 Page 30 of 54 Event

Description:

7.) When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8.) 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET VALVE, and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET VALVE, fail to automatically open on the SI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IF temp less than 557°F, THEN ENSURE steam dumps and S/G PORVs CLOSED.

RO reports that the steam dumps and S/G PORVs are closed.

IF cooldown continues, THEN CONTROL total AFW flow to maintain greater than 410 gpm UNTIL NR level in at least one S/G greater than 29% [39% ADV].

RO takes manual control of AFW LCVs and reduces AFW flow.

IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN

PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

RO RO rotates 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A, and 1-HS-103B STEAM DUMP FSV B to the left to the OFF RESET position.

CLOSE MSIVs.

RO rotates handswitches 1-HS-1-4A, 1-HS-1-11A, 1-HS-1-22A, and 1-HS-1-29A to the CLOSE position and verifies GREEN and BLUE lights LIT for each MSIV.

ENSURE MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

RO observes bypass valves are closed with label plate PD/C (Power Disconnected Closed)

IF RCS temp greater than 564°F, THEN ENSURE either steam dumps or S/G PORVs OPEN.

9. ENSURE excess letdown valves CLOSED:

1-FCV-62-54 RO

1-FCV-62-55 RO observes GREEN lights LIT on handswitches 1-HS-62-54A, EXCESS LTDN ISOL, and 1-HS-62-55A, EXCESS LTDN.

10. CHECK pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

RO observes 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV 340A, in P-AUTO position and valve CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

RO observes 1-HS-68-334A, PZR PORV 334, in P-AUTO position and RO valve CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

RO observes 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A, OPEN, GREEN light is DARK, RED light is LIT.

RO observes 1-HS-68-332A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 334, OPEN, GREEN light is DARK, RED light is LIT.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7 and 8 Page 31 of 54 Event

Description:

7.) When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8.) 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET VALVE, and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET VALVE, fail to automatically open on the SI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

11. CHECK pzr safety valves CLOSED:

EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitors.

RO observes response of 1-TI-68-330, SAFETY 68-563 TAILPIPE TEMP, RO 1-TI-68-329, SAFETY 68-564 TAILPIPE TEMP, and 1-TI-68-328, SAFETY 68-565, stable at approximately 110F.

BOP may observe 1-XI-68-363, PZR VALVES ACOUSTIC MONITOR lights are DARK for 1-XI-68-363 (68-563), 1-XI-68-364 (68-564) and 1-XI-68-365 (68-565

12. CHECK pzr sprays CLOSED.

RO RO observes the pzr spray valves closed by GREEN lights LIT for 1-XI-68-340B, PZR SPRAY LOOP 2 and 1-XI-68-340D, PZR SPRAY LOOP 1.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

13. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

a. Phase B signals DARK [MISSP].

RO b. RCS pressure greater than 1500 psig.

RO determines that RCS pressure is greater than 1500 psig, and that there is NO Phase B isolation. RCPs remain in service.

14. CHECK S/G pressures:

All S/G pressures controlled or rising.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that SG 4 pressure is dropping. May also RO observe trends on 1-PR-1-2, SG 1 & 2 PRESS PSIG, and 1-PR-1-23, SG 3 & 4 PRESS PSIG to assess this step.

All S/G pressures greater than 140 psig.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressures are greater than 140 psig.

14. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF S/G pressure low OR dropping uncontrolled, THEN GO TO 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7 and 8 Page 32 of 54 Event

Description:

7.) When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8.) 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET VALVE, and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET VALVE, fail to automatically open on the SI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-E-2 The following steps are taken from 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

CAUTION If a faulted S/G is NOT needed for RCS cooldown, it should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions.

BOP 1. ENSURE all MSIVs and MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

NOTE If it is known that a steam leak exists in the Turbine building, the following step should not be performed until the affected steam header is depressurized.

2. PLACE steam dump controls OFF:

1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A.

1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B.

Step already performed as part of 1-E-0.

3. CHECK for at least one Intact S/G:

Any S/G pressure controlled or rising, OR RO

Any S/G pressure greater than P-sat for RCS incore temperature.

BOP determines that SG 1, 2 and 3 are intact.

4. IDENTIFY Faulted S/G based on ANY of the following:

Any S/G pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner, OR

Any S/G pressure less than 120 psig, OR

S/G enclosure temps high:

1) T1002A for 2 and 3, BOP 2) T1003A for 1 and 4.

Local indication of break in any of the following:

Main steam lines,

Main feedwater lines,

Other secondary piping.

BOP determines from SG 4 pressure responses that it is the faulted SG.

CAUTION

If the turbine-driven AFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, steam supply to the turbine-driven AFW pump must be maintained from one S/G.

RCS cooldown requires the availability of at least one S/G.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7 and 8 Page 33 of 54 Event

Description:

7.) When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8.) 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET VALVE, and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET VALVE, fail to automatically open on the SI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 2 Isolate feedwater to the faulted and ruptured steam generator prior to transitioning to 1-ECA-3.1, SGTR and LOCA - Subcooled Recovery.

5. ISOLATE Faulted S/G:

a. ISOLATE AFW flow to Faulted S/G.

BOP rotates 1-HS-3-171 SG 4 SUPPLY LCV-3-171 CNTL to the ACC RESET MODULATE position, then rotates the handswitch to the CLOSE position and Pulls the switch to lock.

BOP may depress 1-LIC-3-171A, SG 4 SUPPLY FRM PMP B-B M pushbutton and lock the slider in the CLOSED position.

BOP rotates 1-HS-3-174 SG 4 SUPPLY LCV-3-175 CNTL to the ACC RESET MODULATE position, then rotates the handswitch to the CLOSE position and Pulls the switch to lock.

BOP BOP may depress 1-LIC-3-175A, SG 4 SUPPLY FRM TD PMP M pushbutton and lock the slider in the CLOSED position.

b. ENSURE MFW ISOLATED to Faulted S/G:

MFW isolation and bypass isolation valves CLOSED.

MFW reg and bypass reg valves CLOSED.

MFPs TRIPPED.

c. ENSURE Faulted S/G PORV CLOSED.

BOP places 1-HS-1-31, SG 4 PORV PCV-1-30 in the CLOSE position.

d. ENSURE Faulted S/G blowdown ISOLATED.

BOP observes 1-HS-1-32/184, SG 4 BLOWDOWN VLVE is CLOSED by RED light DARK and GREEN light LIT.

NOTE TD AFW pump steam supply should NOT be aligned from a S/G with a known primary to secondary leak if other AFW sources are available.

6. ENSURE TD AFW pump being supplied from Intact S/G.

BOP BOP determines that the TD AFW pump is being supplied from SG 1.

7. MONITOR CST volume greater than 200,000 gal.

BOP BOP reports CST level greater than 300,000 gallons.

8. WHEN RCS temperature is stable or rising following Faulted S/G blowdown, THEN ADJUST Intact S/G PORV controllers in AUTO to:

P-sat for the highest RCS temp (one or more RCPs running)

P-sat for the highest T-cold temp (no RCPs running)

Conditions of the step are not expected to be met at this time.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7 and 8 Page 34 of 54 Event

Description:

7.) When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8.) 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET VALVE, and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET VALVE, fail to automatically open on the SI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. CHECK secondary side radiation:

S/G discharge monitors NORMAL.

Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitors NORMAL.

BOP SRO recalls that a tube leak event was in progress prior to the trip and enters the RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED column for actions.

S/G blowdown rad monitor recorders NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

S/G sample results by Chemistry.

9. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF rad monitors NOT available, THEN:

a. NOTIFY Radiation Protection to survey main steam lines and S/G blowdown lines.

SRO b. NOTIFY Chemistry to sample S/G activity.

IF radiation is high, THEN ** GO TO 1-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

SRO determines that Rad Protection and Chemistry have been notified, and transitions to 1-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7 and 8 Page 35 of 54 Event

Description:

7.) When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8.) 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET VALVE, and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET VALVE, fail to automatically open on the SI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-E-3 The following steps are taken from 1-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

NOTE Early notification of Radiation Protection and Chemistry could expedite subsequent sampling efforts if needed.

1. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart.

SRO When contacted as the Shift Manager, Console Operator repeats back request to perform EPIP-1, Emergency plan Classification Flowchart.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

2. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

RO a. Phase B DARK [MISSP].

b. RCS pressure greater than 1500 psig.

3. IDENTIFY Ruptured S/G based on ANY of the following:

Unexpected rise in S/G NR level.

S/G discharge monitor high radiation.

SRO OR

RP Survey.

Chemistry sample.

Previous diagnosis had indicated that SG 4 was the Ruptured SG.

4. ENSURE Ruptured S/G PORV aligned:

a. ENSURE controller in AUTO set at 90%.

b. ENSURE HS in P-AUTO.

During performance of 1-E-2 actions, SG 4 PORV may have been placed in the CLOSED position.

c. WHEN Ruptured S/G pressure less than 1130 psig. THEN

1) ENSURE Ruptured S/G PORV CLOSED, SRO OR

2) OBTAIN Radiation Protection support AND Locally CLOSE Ruptured S/G isolation valve:

Loop 1, 1-ISV-1-619 [South Valve Room].

Loop 2, 1-ISV-1-620 [North Valve Room].

Loop 3, 1-ISV-1-621 [North Valve Room].

Loop 4, 1-ISV-1-622 [South Valve Room].

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7 and 8 Page 36 of 54 Event

Description:

7.) When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8.) 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET VALVE, and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET VALVE, fail to automatically open on the SI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION If turbine-driven AFW pump is only available source of feed flow, then steam supply to the turbine-driven AFW pump must be maintained.

5. ENSURE TD AFW pump being supplied from Intact S/G.

SRO BOP determines that the TD AFW pump is being supplied from SG 1.

EXAMINER: Since SG 1 is supplying steam to the TD AFW pump, the RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED actions may not be immediately required. However, the action is provided for evaluation WHEN SG 1 pressure drops to a point where it can no longer provide required steam flow.

5. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE at least one MD AFW pump aligned to an Intact S/G, AND ISOLATE steam to TD AFW pump:

a. INITIATE electrical overspeed trip USING 1-HS-46-55A-S.

b. CLOSE 1-FCV-1-17.

c. CLOSE 1-FCV-1-18.

6. ENSURE Ruptured S/G blowdown isolated.

SRO BOP observes 1-HS-1-32/184, SG 4 BLOWDOWN VLVE is CLOSED by RED light DARK and GREEN light LIT.

CAUTION At least one S/G must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

7. CLOSE Ruptured S/G MSIV and bypass valve.

RO rotates 1-HS-1-29A, MSIV SG 4 to the left to the CLOSE position.

RO RO determines that 1-HS-1-150, SG 4 MSIV BYPASS WARMING LINE has power disconnected and is closed, based on the PDlC label.

CAUTION If any Ruptured S/G is also faulted, feed flow should remain isolated in subsequent steps UNLESS needed for RCS cooldown.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7 and 8 Page 37 of 54 Event

Description:

7.) When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8.) 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET VALVE, and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET VALVE, fail to automatically open on the SI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. CONTROL Ruptured S/G level:

a. CHECK Ruptured S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

b. ISOLATE AFW flow to Ruptured S/G.

c. ENSURE MFW ISOLATED to Ruptured S/G:

MFW isolation valves CLOSED.

MFW bypass isolations CLOSED.

MFW reg and bypass reg valves CLOSED.

MFW pumps TRIPPED.

d. CONTROL Ruptured S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

BOP abides by the CAUTION and does not feed SG 4.

9. PLACE dumpback valve to CST, 1-LIC-2-3, in MANUAL AND CLOSE valve.

BOP places 1-LIC-2-3, DUMPBACK TO CST FROM HW PMP DISCH RO slider in the M position to take manual control of the controller.

BOP depresses the CLOSE pushbutton and verifies that the position indicator indicates CLOSE.

BOP 10. MAINTAIN condenser level 1-LR-2-12 on-scale [M-3]

10. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

NOTIFY TSC to evaluate options:

Dumpback to CST A or B, OR

Drain hotwell to TB Sump.

11. DISPATCH operator to OPEN 1-FCV-14-3 to bypass condensate DI.

BOP observes 1-ZI-14-3 CNDS DEMIN BYPASS FCV-14-2 RED light LIT BOP and GREEN light DARK. If/When the BOP dispatches the Cond DI AUO to ensure 1-FCV-14-3 is OPEN locally, report back that the valve is OPEN.

12. ENSURE Radiation Protection dispatched to survey secondary plant.

SRO BOP contacts Radiation Protection and the Console Operator repeats back request survey the secondary plant.

13. NOTIFY Chemistry to obtain samples as necessary for confirming Ruptured S/G.

SRO SRO contacts Chemistry and Console Operator repeats back request to continue sampling of SGs.

14. NOTIFY plant personnel of potential contaminated release.

SRO SRO may repeat PA announcement warning personnel of the faulted and ruptured SG 4.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7 and 8 Page 38 of 54 Event

Description:

7.) When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8.) 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET VALVE, and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET VALVE, fail to automatically open on the SI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

15. ENSURE major steam flowpaths from the ruptured S/G isolated:

a. TD AFW pump steam supply from Ruptured S/G CLOSED (if applicable).

Since pressure still exists in SG 1, this step is NOT APPLICABLE.

b. Ruptured S/G MSIV and bypass valve CLOSED, OR Intact S/G MSIVs and bypass valves CLOSED.

SRO observes that flowpaths have been isolated.

16. CHECK Ruptured S/G pressure greater than 710 psig.

BOP BOP reports that SG pressure in SG 4 is less than 710 psig.

16. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO GO TO 1-ECA-3.1, SGTR and LOCA - Subcooled Recovery.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7 and 8 Page 39 of 54 Event

Description:

7.) When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8.) 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET VALVE, and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET VALVE, fail to automatically open on the SI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following steps are taken from 1-ECA-3.1, SGTR and LOCA - Subcooled 1-ECA-3.1 Recovery.

1. PREPARE for switchover to RHR cntmt sump:

a. RESTORE power to 1-FCV-63-1 USING Appendix A (1-ECA-3.1), 1-FCV-63-1 Breaker Operation.

SRO b. WHEN RWST level is less than 34%, THEN GO TO 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to RHR Containment Sump.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back request to perform Appendix A of 1-ECA-3.1 to restore power to 1-FCV-63-1. Console Operator inserts remote function sir14 to on.

CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action will be required to restart the SI pumps and RHR pumps due to loss of SI start signal.

2. RESET SI, AND CHECK the following:

SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.

AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT.

RO depresses SI RESET pushbuttons and verifies SI ACTUATED (70-A) is DARK and AUTO SI BLOCKED (70-B) is LIT.

3. RESET Phase A and Phase B.

RO depresses each PHASE A RESET pushbuttons and verifies A RO indicators on 1-XX-55-6C and 1-XX-55-6D are DARK.

RO determines that the Phase B signal was NOT generated and verifies B indicators on 1-XX-55-6C and 1-XX-55-6D are DARK.

4. ENSURE cntmt air in service:

a. Aux air press greater than 75 psig [M-15].

b. Cntmt air supply valves OPEN [M-15]:

1-FCV-32-80.

1-FCV-32-102.

1-FCV-32-110.

BOP verifies air pressure on 0-PI-32-104A and 0-PI-32-105A is greater than 75 psig (approximately 100 psig). BOP verifies RED light is LIT for handswitches 1-HS-32-80A, 1-HS-32-102A, and 1-HS-32-110A.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7 and 8 Page 40 of 54 Event

Description:

7.) When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8.) 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET VALVE, and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET VALVE, fail to automatically open on the SI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. MONITOR electrical board status:

a. CHECK offsite power available.

b. CHECK all shutdown boards ENERGIZED by offsite power.

c. CHECK all unit boards ENERGIZED.

d. PLACE any unloaded D/G in standby USING SOI-82 Diesel BOP Generators.

RO observes that 1-HS-57-41A, 1716 NORMAL - 6.9 SD BD 1A-A FROM CSST C RED light is LIT, GREEN light is DARK (breaker closed) and 1-EI-57-39, 6.9 SDB 1A-A VOLTS indicates approximately 7000 volts.

RO observes that 1-HS-57-71A, 1728 NORMAL - 6.9 SD BD 1B-B FROM CSST D RED light is LIT, GREEN light is DARK (breaker closed) and 1-EI-57-66, 6.9 SDB 1B-B VOLTS indicates approximately 7000 volts.

NOTE Backup heater C bank may need to be placed in AUX at the breaker compt to ensure it is turned OFF.

6. ENSURE pzr heaters off:

PLACE Backup heaters A-A OFF.

PLACE Backup heaters B-B OFF.

PLACE Backup heaters C OFF.

PLACE Control heaters D OFF.

RO will place handswitches 1-HS-68-341A and 1-HS-68-341D to OFF for A-A and B-B heaters. RO will rotate handswitches 1-HS-68-341H and 1-HS-68-341F to OFF for C and D heaters. RO may dispatch and AUO to place C bank Normal/Aux switch in AUX.

CAUTION If any Ruptured S/G is also faulted, feed flow should remain isolated in subsequent steps UNLESS needed for RCS cooldown.

7. CONTROL Ruptured S/G level:

a. CHECK Ruptured S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

b. ISOLATE feed flow to Ruptured S/G.

c. CONTROL Ruptured S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

BOP recognizes that S/G 4 is also faulted and takes no actions to feed S/G 4. BOP verifies that AFW is isolated to S/G 4.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7 and 8 Page 41 of 54 Event

Description:

7.) When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8.) 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET VALVE, and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET VALVE, fail to automatically open on the SI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. DETERMINE if RHR pumps should be stopped:

a. CHECK RHR suction aligned from RWST.

RO verifies RED lights are LIT for handswitches 1-HS-74-3A and 1-HS-74-21A.

b. CHECK RCS pressure:

RCS pressure greater than 150 psig.

RCS pressure stable or rising.

RO verifies RCS pressure IS greater than 150 psig and stable.

c. STOP RHR pumps, AND PLACE in A-AUTO.

RO places handswitches 1-HS-74-10A for 1A RHR pump and 1-HS 20A for 1B RHR pump to STOP, verifies the GREEN light is LIT, and allows them to spring return to A-AUTO.

d. MONITOR RCS pressure greater than 150 psig.

9. DETERMINE if cntmt spray should be stopped:

a. MONITOR cntmt pressure less than 2.0 psig.

b. CHECK at least one cntmt spray pump RUNNING.

c. RESET cntmt spray signal.

d. STOP cntmt spray pumps, AND PLACE in A-AUTO.

e. CLOSE cntmt spray discharge valves 1-FCV-72-2 and 1-FCV-72-39.

RO determines that no Containment Spray pumps are running and are not required.

9. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

b. IF both spray pumps stopped, THEN GO TO Step 10.

10. NOTIFY Chemistry of event status and plant conditions.

SRO When the SRO contacts Chemistry, the Console Operator repeats back the information provided.

11. NOTIFY Radiation Protection of event status and plant conditions.

SRO When the SRO contacts Radiation Protection, Console Operator repeats back the information provided.

EXAMINER: 1-ECA-3.1, Appendix D, Equipment Evaluation, is contained in this scenario as Attachment 2.

12. EVALUATE plant equipment status:

REFER TO Appendix D (1-ECA-3.1), Equipment Evaluation.

SRO When contacted as the Shift Manager, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to perform 1-ECA-3.1, Appendix D, Equipment Evaluation.

2013-03 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7 and 8 Page 42 of 54 Event

Description:

7.) When the reactor is tripped, steam line break occurs outside containment on #4 SG.

8.) 1-FCV-63-25, BIT OUTLET VALVE, and 1-FCV-63-26, BIT OUTLET VALVE, fail to automatically open on the SI.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

13. CHECK S/G pressure:

All S/G pressures controlled or rising.

All S/Gs pressures greater than 140 psig.

RO determines that S/G 4 pressure is NOT controlled or rising.

13. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF steamline AND feedline isolation has been performed or attempted for the Faulted S/G, THEN SRO GO TO Step 14.

SRO determines that steamline and feedline isolation has been performed for S/G 4.

14. MAINTAIN Intact S/G NR levels:

a. MONITOR levels greater than 29% [39% ADV].

BOP b. CONTROL intact S/G levels between 29% and 50% [39% and 50%

ADV].

BOP determines that S/Gs 1, 2, and 3 are intact and greater than 29%

level being maintained by automatic control of AFW LCVs.

CAUTION If on natural circulation, the following boration will result in a CB in the ACTIVE portion of the RCS which will be higher than the calculated CB.

15. MONITOR shutdown margin during cooldown:

a. NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate sampling for boron concentration:

Ruptured S/G.

RCS.

When the SRO contacts Chemistry, the Console Operator repeats back the request.