ML13178A281

10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report Supplement

ML13178A281
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	06/26/2013
From:	James Shea Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML13178A281 (3)

Text

Tennessee Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 June 26, 2013 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 NRC Docket No. 50-390

Subject:

10 CFR 50.59 Summary Report Supplement

Reference:

Letter from Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "10 CFR 50.59(d)

SUMMARY

REPORT," dated November 21, 2011.

In the referenced letter, TVA provided a summary report of the changes, tests, and experiments implemented at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 1 from April 20, 2010 to November 21, 2011, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2). This letter provides an additional 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation omitted from the referenced Summary Report. This omission has been entered into the corrective action program for resolution.

The enclosed evaluation demonstrates that the described change does not meet the criteria for license amendments as defined by 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2).

There are no regulatory commitments in this letter. Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Donna Guinn, Site Licensing Manager, at (423) 365-1589.

Respectfully, Joseph W. Shea Vice President, Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure:

10 CFR 50.59 Cycle 10 Summary Report Supplement - WBN, Unit 1 cc: See Page 2 Printed on recycled paper

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 June 26, 2013 cc (Enclosure):

NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Enclosure 10 CFR 50.59 Cycle 10 Summary Report Supplement - WBN, Unit I EVALUATION NUMBER: EDC 54175 Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Equipment Coolers at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) serving the safety related Technical Specification (TS) equipment are arranged in some spaces containing both Train A and Train B equipment. In these spaces each cooler is sized at 100% capacity to support the design basis heat loads of the area containing both trains of TS equipment. When maintenance on one of the coolers is required, leaving one of the two coolers to serve the space, WBN current practice is to enter the most restrictive Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) of the safety system being served, usually 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Engineering Document Change (EDC) 54175 updates plant documentation (Calculation, System Description Document and Technical Specification Bases Section 3.0.6) to incorporate NRC guidance (Docket No. 50-440, Application of Generic Letter 80-30 Guidance to an Inoperable Non Technical Specification Support Subsystem) for ESF Room Coolers when one train is Out of Service. ESF Coolers in the following areas are affected by this EDC: Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump & Component Cooling System (CCS)

Pump Area, the Unit 2 AFW Pump & Boric Acid Transfer (BAT) Pump Area, the CCS Booster Pump & Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Pump Area, the Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) Filter Room, the Unit 1 Elevation 692' Penetration Room, Unit 1 Elevation 713' Penetration Room, Unit 1 & Unit 2 Elevation 737' Penetration Rooms and the Unit 2 Pipe Chase.

Incorporation of the NRC guidance for ESF Room Coolers when one train is Out of Service will allow the risk management strategies of the TS and 10 CFR50.65(a)(4) to determine the appropriate actions and time limits to return the non-TS subsystem to operable status. If the non-TS support function cannot be maintained, then the most limiting LCO of the TS supported system is entered.

The revision to TS Bases Section 3.0.6 to incorporate NRC guidance for the inoperability of ESF Room Cooler when one train is Out of Service does not require prior NRC approval.

These non-TS ESF Room Coolers support TS systems in their mitigation of design basis accidents. ESF Room Coolers do not initiate any accidents and changing the TS Bases does not create an accident of a different type. No new failure modes are created by the revision of the TS Bases Section 3.0.6 and the results of an ESF Room Cooler malfunction are no different than that currently evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The radiological consequences of an accident or a malfunction of an ESF Room Cooler is not affected by revision of TS Bases Section 3.0.6. The revision of TS Bases Section 3.0.6 does not exceed or alter a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as it is not described in the UFSAR nor does it cause a departure from a method of evaluation used in the UFSAR.