Text

301 Draft Simulator Scenarios
	ML13169A188
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	06/18/2013
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Duke Energy Carolinas
References
	50-369/12-301, 50-370/12-301
	Download: ML13169A188 (283)
	v • d • e

PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 28 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N12-1-1

REFERENCES:

1. AP/1/A/5500/01, Steam Leak. (Rev 18)

2. Control Room Crew Expectations Manual

3. Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves.

(Amendment 221/203)

4. Technical Specification 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits. (Amendment 219/201)

5. AP/1/A/5500/11, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. (Rev 11)

6. AP/1/A/5500/05, Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances. (Rev 9)

7. AP/1/A/5500/10, NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps. (Rev 22)

8. Technical Specification 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage. (Amendment 237/219)

9. SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System. (Rev 122)

10. AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower. (Rev 22)

11. EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (Rev 32)

12. EP/1/A/5000/E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. (Rev 23)

Validation Time: 125 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.

Facility Review: ________________________

Rev. 061412 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N12-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A MDCA Pump is OOS for motor replacement. However, it is expected back within the next two hours. 1NVP-6070, Boric Acid Tank B Level, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator AD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LVL, has failed (IAE is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 SM001C C-RO SG 1C PORV fails OPEN C-SRO 2 REM C-BOP Pzr Spray Valve (1NC-27) Controller fails OPEN NC0027C C(TS)-SRO 3 EA- C-RO Electrical Grid Disturbances PLP014 C-SRO 4 SG001C C-BOP Steam Generator Tube Leak C(TS)-SRO 5 NA R-RO Rapid Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 6 SG001C M-RO Steam Generator Tube Rupture M-BOP M-SRO 7 EP001 NA Loss of Off-Site Power 8 RN003A NA Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 McGuire 2012 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A MDCA Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

However, it is expected back within the next two hours. 1NVP-6070, Boric Acid Tank B Level, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator AD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LVL, has failed (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the 1C Steam Generator PORV will fail open. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/01, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE; and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Following this, the Pzr Spray Valve Controller, 1NC-27C A Spray, demand will fail to full output.

The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/11, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Next, electrical disturbances cause grid voltage to drop to 216 KV. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/05, Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances, and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage.

Subsequently, a 50 gpm Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur on the 1C Steam Generator.

The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/10, NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System.

The crew will be directed by AP/1/A/5500/10 to reduce plant power to Mode 3 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months .

The operator will perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower.

During the downpower, the leak will develop into a 300 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture and the operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Simultaneous with the Reactor Trip, a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) will occur, and both Emergency Diesel Generators will start and repower Busses 1ETA and 1ETB. Additionally, upon SI Actuation the 1A RN Pump will fail to start automatically, and the operator will need to manually start this pump.

Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the flow into and out of the 1C Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the NC System. Because of the LOOP the NCS cooldown will need to be accomplished using the Steam Generator PORVs on the intact Steam Generators.

The scenario will terminate at Step 22.c of E-3, after the crew has closed the Cold Leg Isolation Valves from the NV System.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Critical Tasks:

E-3A Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of P between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of P, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy. If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of RCS leakage into the SG.

E-3B Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because RCS temperature is either too high to maintain minimum required subcooling, or too low causing an Orange path on Subcriticality or Integrity.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure which constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy. If the RCS temperature is too high when RCS depressurization is started, a loss of subcooling will occur when the RCS depressurization is started. On the other hand, if RCS temperature is allowed to continue to decrease after the initial cooldown, the operator may be required to transition to the Subcriticality or Integrity response FRP, and delay the RCS depressurization.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Rod Step On T = 0 Malfunctions:

Reset to Temp I/C 39.

insert LOA-CA009 RACKED_OUT (CA Pump 1A Breaker Rackout) insert LOA-CA009A RACKED_OUT (CA Pump 1A Control Power) insert H_X05_031_1 10.000000 (Boric Acid Tank B Level) insert ANN 1AD_D04 = ON (1AD-9/D-4 failed ON) insert MAL-RN003A AUTO (1A RN Pump Auto Start Failure) insert MAL-EP001 ACTIVE cd='X01_099_2 EQ 1' (Blackout triggered off of Reactor Trip Breaker OPEN light)

Place Tagout/O-Stick on:

RUN 1A MDCA Pump (Tagout)

Reset all SLIMs LNV-6070 (O-stick)

MCB Annunciator AD-9, D-4 (O-stick)

NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.

Update Status Board, Setup OAC Freeze.

Update Fresh Tech.

Spec. Log.

Fill out the NEO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Prior to Crew Briefing RUN Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At examiner direction of Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N12-1-1.

At direction of examiner Event 1 SG 1C PORV fails OPEN insert MAL-SM001C 100 delay=0 ramp=10 At examiner direction of Event 2 Pzr Spray Valve (1NC-27) Controller fails OPEN insert REM-NC0027C 1 delay=0 ramp=0 delIA REM-NC0027C 2 delay=0 cd='X10_605_1 EQ 1' (Delete Remote function when Emergency Close switch taken to CLOSE)

At direction of examiner Event 3 Electrical Grid Disturbances insert (EA) PLP-014=500 delay=0 ramp=60 At direction of examiner Event 4 Steam Generator Tube Leak insert MAL-SG001C 50 delay=0 ramp=120 At direction of examiner Event 5 Rapid Downpower At examiner direction of Event 6 Steam Generator Tube Rupture insert MAL-SG001C 300 delay=0 ramp=120 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Loss of Off-Site Power This malfunction will occur on Reactor Trip.

Post-SI Act Event 8 Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start This malfunction will occur on Safety Injection actuation.

Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 8 of 53 Event

Description:

SG 1C PORV fails OPEN Shortly after taking the watch, the 1C Steam Generator PORV will fail open. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/01, Steam Leak, and isolate the PORV. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE; and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-SM001C 100 delay=0 ramp=10 (S/G PORV 1SV7 SGC fails OPEN)

Indications Available:

1SV-7ABC Red status light LIT 1SV-7ABC Black needle indication at 100%

OAC Alarm: TM FREEZE - MID3499-VLVSV13B SM PORV OAC Alarm: U1 SV-PORV/SAFETY VLV OPEN -T/D CAPMP ON OAC Alarm: 1SV-7ABC 1C SM PORV Core Ts rising Rx Power rising Steam flow on 1C steam line rising Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the operator will take actions to isolate the 1C SG PORV prior to being directed by the CRS.

(Step 13)

CONTROL ROOM CREW EXPECTATIONS MANUAL RO Transient load changes: Manual is preferred NOTE: The crew may

- immediately reduce 20MWe and then diagnose an overpower reduce as needed to maintain Rx power less condition and adjust turbine than pre-transient condition. After the initial load per the Crew Expectation 20 MWe load reduction, it is preferred that Manual.

the operators use multiple and diverse indications to determine how much more load should be reduced.

AP/1/A/5500/01, STEAM LEAK CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 9 of 53 Event

Description:

SG 1C PORV fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 2) Reduce turbine load to maintain the following:

Excore NIs - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%.

NC Loop D/Ts - LESS THAN 60°F D/T T-Avg - AT T-REF.

CRS (Step 3) Check containment entry - IN NOTE: A Containment Entry is PROGRESS. NOT in progress.

CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr pressure prior to event -

GREATER THAN P-11 (1955 PSIG).

BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr level - STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained Action. The CRS will make stable, THEN RETURN TO Step 6. both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 8) GO TO Step 12.

CRS (Step 12) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO system. to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 13) Identify and isolate leak on Unit 1 as follows:

(Step 13a) Check SM PORVs - NOTE: The 1C SG PORV is CLOSED. Open.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 10 of 53 Event

Description:

SG 1C PORV fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 13a RNO) IF S/G pressure is less than 1092 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

Close affected S/G SM PORV manual NOTE: Closing the Manual loader. Loader will have no effect.

IF SM PORV is still open, THEN perform NOTE: The 1C SG PORV the following: Isolation Valve will need to be closed.

Close SM PORV isolation valve.

IF SM PORV isolation valve still NOTE: The PORV Isolation open valve is closed.

RO (Step 13.b) Check condenser dump valves - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 13.c) Check containment conditions - NORMAL:

Containment temperature Containment pressure Containment humidity Containment floor and equipment sump level.

RO / (Step 13.d) Check TD CA pump - OFF.

BOP BOP (Step 13.e) Check valves on STEAM NOTE: One or more of these LINE DRAIN VALVES board (1MC-9) - valves may be cycling. The CLOSED. RNO will direct closing the valves.

CRS (Step 13.f) Check opposite Unit (Unit 2) NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO STEAM HEADER PRESSURE - for AS Header pressure.

GREATER THAN 200 PSIG.

If so, Floor Instructor report as U2 RO that U2 Steam Header pressure is 1000 psig.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 11 of 53 Event

Description:

SG 1C PORV fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 13.g) Dispatch operator to check NOTE: The CRS may dispatch for leaks. an NEO to look for leaks.

If so, Floor Instructor:

acknowledge.

Booth Instructor: Report back in 3-5 minutes that there are no leaks.

NOTE: The CRS may NOT dispatch NEOs to look for leaks because it is understood that the SM PORV opening was the reason that AP-1 was entered.

BOP (Step 14) Check UST level - STABLE OR GOING UP.

CRS (Step 15) Evaluate unit shutdown as follows:

Check unit status - IN MODE 1 OR 2.

Determine if unit shutdown or load NOTE: CRS may call reduction is warranted based on the WCC/Management to address following criteria: the startup.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Size of leak Location of leak Rate of depletion of secondary inventory IF steam is leaking from a secondary heater relief OR MSR relief valve IF turbine trip will isolate steam leak (such as feedwater heater leak or MSR leak Check unit shutdown or load reduction - NOTE: Shutdown/Load REQUIRED. Reduction will NOT be required.

CRS (Step 15.c RNO) Perform the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 12 of 53 Event

Description:

SG 1C PORV fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Maintain present plant conditions until leak can be isolated or repaired.

Exit this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.4, STEAM GENERATOR POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (SG PORVs)

CRS LCO 3.7.4 Three SG PORV lines shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE NOTE: After evaluation, the 4 when steam generator is relied upon for CRS will determine that 1SV-heat removal. 7ABC is OPERABLE and that LCO 3.7.4 is NOT entered.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for NOTE: If NC System Pressure pressurizer pressure, RCS average drops to < 2216 psig on the temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1. entered and exited during the transient.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 13 of 53 Event

Description:

SG 1C PORV fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. Pressurizer A.1 Restore DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months pressure or parameter(s)

RCS average to within limit.

temperature DNB parameters not within limits.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 14 of 53 Event

Description:

Pzr Spray Valve (1NC-27) Controller fails OPEN Following this, the Pzr Spray Valve Controller, 1NC-27C A Spray, demand will fail to full output. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/11, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert REM-NC0027C 1 delay=0 ramp=0 (1NC27 Fail OPEN) delIA REM-NC0027C 2 delay=0 cd='X10_605_1 EQ 1' (Delete Remote function when Emergency Close switch taken to CLOSE)

Indications Available:

NCS/Pzr pressure lowers OAC Alarm: U1 PZR PRESS I through IV 1NC-27C SLIMs LS indication 50 or 100%

MCB Annunciator 1AD6/C-6 PZR LO PRESS CONTROL Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The BOP may take all the necessary actions in the Immediate Actions, before CRS reads AOP.

AP/1/A/5500/11, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE ANOMALIES BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr pressure - HAS GONE Immediate Action DOWN.

BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr PORVs - CLOSED. Immediate Action BOP (Step 3) Check Pzr spray valves - CLOSED Immediate Action BOP (Step 3 RNO) CLOSE Pzr spray valve(s). NOTE: The BOP will recognize that the SLIMs is NOT effective at controlling the valve, and operate the EMERG SWITCH.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 15 of 53 Event

Description:

Pzr Spray Valve (1NC-27) Controller fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr spray valves - NOTE: IF the BOP has already CLOSED. used the EMERG SWITCH, the CRS may answer YES, and continue to Step 6.

If NOT, the Step 5 RNO will be performed (Scripted).

BOP (Step 5 RNO) IF NC pressure below desired pressure, THEN perform the following:

Ensure Pzr spray emergency close NOTE: When the BOP uses switch on 1MC-10 is in the CLOSE this switch the Spray Valve will position for failed spray valve. Close.

CRS IF Pzr spray valve closed, THEN GO TO Step 6.

CRS (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 7) Check 1NV-21A (NV Spray to PZR Iso) - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 8) Check the following Pzr heaters -

ON:

1A 1B 1D BOP (Step 9) Check 1C Pzr heaters - ON.

BOP (Step 10) Check PZR PRESS MASTER -

IN AUTO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 16 of 53 Event

Description:

Pzr Spray Valve (1NC-27) Controller fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 11) Check 1NC-27 PRESSURIZER NOTE: In order to close the SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch - malfunctioning Spray Valve, SELECTED TO NORMAL. the BOP had to take the EMERG SWITCH to CLOSE.

CRS (Step 11 RNO) Notify station management to NOTE: The CRS may call ensure switch restored to NORMAL once WCC/Station Management to spray valve is repaired. address the switch position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

BOP (Step 12) Check 1NC-29 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch -

SELECTED TO NORMAL.

BOP (Step 13) Check Pzr pressure - GOING UP TO DESIRED PRESSURE.

CRS (Step 14) Exit this procedure. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the valve failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for NOTE: If NC System Pressure pressurizer pressure, RCS average drops to < 2216 psig on the temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1. entered and exited during the transient.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 17 of 53 Event

Description:

Pzr Spray Valve (1NC-27) Controller fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. Pressurizer A.1 Restore DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months pressure or parameter(s)

RCS average to within limit.

temperature DNB parameters not within limits.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 18 of 53 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Disturbances Next, electrical disturbances cause grid voltage to drop to 216 KV. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/05, Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances, and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert (EA) PLP-014 500 delay=0 ramp=60 (Grid Disturbance)

Indications Available:

OAC Alarm: U1 GENERATOR X PHASE AMPS OAC Alarm: U1 GENERATOR Y PHASE AMPS OAC Alarm: U1 GENERATOR Z PHASE AMPS 230 KV Y BUS VOLTS 230 KV R BUS VOLTS Main Generator MVARs rise to outside of Generator Capability Curve Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/05, GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRICAL GRID DISTURBANCES CRS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS (Step 2) Ensure dispatcher is aware of NOTE: The CRS/BOP will problem. contact SOC.

Booth Instructor: as SOC, acknowledge.

As SOC, Booth Instructor report Electrical Grid voltage disturbances are occurring.

CRS (Step 3) Notify Unit 2 to evaluate Floor Instructor: As U2 RO, implementing AP/2/A/5500/05 (Generator acknowledge.

Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 19 of 53 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Disturbances Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 4) Check Unit 1 Generator - TIED TO GRID.

CRS (Step 5) IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is NOTE: This is a Continuous greater than 100%, THEN reduce turbine Action. The CRS will make load to maintain reactor power less than both board operators aware.

100%.

RO (Step 6) Check Unit 1 Generator frequency-GREATER THAN 58.5 Hz.

RO (Step 7) Monitor Generator Capability Curve NOTE: The RO or BOP will as follows: most likely place Curve on OAC Screen.

Check Generator voltage - LESS THAN NOTE: The Generator voltage 24 KV. will be 22.7 KV.

Check OAC - IN SERVICE.

Monitor Generator Capability Curve PER OAC turn on code GENCAP.

RO (Step 8) Check Generator MVARs - WITHIN NOTE: The MVARs will NOT LIMITS OF GENERATOR CAPABILITY be within the capability curve.

CURVE.

CRS (Step 8 RNO) GO TO Step 11.

RO (Step 11) Adjust MVARs to within the capability curve by performing one of the following:

Depress LOWER on the VOLTAGE NOTE: This adjustment will ADJUST to reduce Lagging MVARs. NOT be effective at controlling MVARs.

RO (Step 12) Check Generator MVARs - NOTE: The MVARs will NOT WITHIN LIMITS OF GENERATOR be within the capability curve.

CAPABILITY CURVE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 20 of 53 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Disturbances Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 12 RNO) IF actions in Step 11 do not restore MVARs, THEN perform the following:

IF voltage regulator in AUTO, THEN perform the following:

Place voltage regulator in MAN.

Adjust MVARs to within the capability curve.

IF unable to maintain MVARs within NOTE: The MVARs will be curve, able to be adjusted with the Voltage Regulator in MANUAL.

Booth Operator Instructions: After the adjustment, DELETE (EA)

PLP-014, wait 3-5 minutes, then re-insert (EA) PLP-014 = 538, Ramp = 300.

RO (Step 13) Monitor Generator frequency as follows:

Check generator frequency - BETWEEN 59.9 - 60.1 Hz.

IF AT ANY TIME generator frequency is NOTE: This is a Continuous abnormal OR TCC/SOC reports Action. The CRS will make abnormal grid frequency condition, both board operators aware.

THEN GO TO Step 13d.

CRS GO TO Step 16.

RO (Step 16) Check if voltage regulator malfunction has occurred:

Generator MVARs - FLUCTUATED WITHOUT A KNOWN GRID DISTURBANCE IN EFFECT OR OAC turn on code MAINGEN -

INDICATES PROBLEM WITH VOLTAGE REGULATOR.

OR

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 21 of 53 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Disturbances Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments VOLTAGE REGULATOR COMMON TROUBLE alarm (1AD-1, D-4) - LIT.

CRS (Step 16 RNO) GO TO Step 20.

CRS (Step 20) Check if TCC or SOC has reported any of the following:

Real Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA) indicated that switchyard voltage would not be adequate should the unit trip.

OR Real Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA) indicates that switchyard voltage would not be adequate if further grid degradation occurs.

OR Red grid condition exists or is predicted within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

OR Degraded 230 KV switchyard (grid) NOTE: if NOT already done, voltage or frequency condition exists. As SOC, Booth Instructor report Electrical Grid voltage disturbances are occurring.

CRS (Step 21) Notify Work Window Manager or NOTE: The CRS may call STA to perform the following in electronic risk WCC to address the Voltage assessment tool: regulator failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Enter PRA code OSSA_GRID for expected duration of event.

Evaluated results.

CRS (Step 22) Evaluate rescheduling work on the NOTE: The CRS will following equipment during degraded grid determine that there are no condition time frame: effects on this equipment.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 22 of 53 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Disturbances Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Emergency D/Gs Vital or Aux Control Power Systems SSF equipment CRS (Step 23) Evaluate the following:

Stopping any ongoing surveillance testing.

Stopping any ongoing maintenance activities.

Returning systems to normal/functional NOTE: The CRS will status. determine that there are no activities or tests that need to be stopped.

RO (Step 24) Check Unit 1 Generator - TIED TO GRID.

CRS/ (Step 25) IF AT ANY TIME TCC reports that NOTE: This is a Continuous RO Real Time Contingency Analysis (RTCA) Action. The CRS will make indicates 230 KV switchyard (grid) voltage both board operators aware.

would not be adequate should Unit 1 trip, THEN GO TO Enclosure 3 (RTCA Actions with Unit One On-line).

CRS (Step 26) IF AT ANY TIME offsite power is NOTE: This is a Continuous inoperable, THEN REFER TO the following Action. The CRS will make Tech Specs: both board operators aware.

Offsite power (TS 3.8.1).

The following shared systems:

RN (TS 3.7.7)

VC (TS 3.7.9)

YC (TS 3.7.10)

VA (TS 3.7.11)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 23 of 53 Event

Description:

Electrical Grid Disturbances Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 27) WHEN conditions return to normal, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN perform the following: Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Check Generator frequency - HAS REMAINED GREATER THAN 58.5 HZ.

Check Unit 1 Generator - TIED TO GRID.

Ensure Unit 1 Generator Bus Voltage is adjusted PER Data Book, Enclosure 4.3, Table 3.1.3, Generator Voltage Operating Schedule, including any operational restrictions.

CRS Exit this AP. NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 24 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Subsequently, a 50 gpm Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur on the 1C Steam Generator. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/10, NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, and SLC 16.9.7, Standby Shutdown System.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-SG001C 50 delay=0 ramp=120 (S/G 1C Tube Leak)

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1RAD/C-1 1EMF 71 S/G A LEAKAGE HI RAD MCB Annunciator 1RAD/D-1 1EMF 72 S/G B LEAKAGE HI RAD MCB Annunciator 1RAD/D-2 1EMF 73 S/G C LEAKAGE HI RAD MCB Annunciator 1RAD/D-3 1EMF 74 S/G B LEAKAGE HI RAD MCB Annunciator 1RAD/E-5 1EMF 24, 25, 26, 27 S/G A, B, C, D STEAM LINE HI RAD 1C S/G 1EMF26 in TRIP 2 1C S/G Narrow Range level is rising Pzr level is lowering Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE I, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr level - STABLE OR NOTE: Pzr Level will be slowly GOING UP. lowering.

BOP (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level:

Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent steps.

Ensure 1NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) - OPENING.

OPEN 1NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM.

Reduce or isolate letdown. NOTE: The BOP may reduce letdown flow to 45 gpm, or isolate it altogether.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 25 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Start additional NV pump. NOTE: The BOP will NOT need to start an additional NV Pump.

IF CLAs are isolated, . NOTE: The CLAs are NOT isolated.

IF Pzr level cannot be maintained greater NOTE: The Pzr level is NOT <

than 4% . 4%, or decreasing with maximum Charging flow.

RO/ (Step 2) IF AT ANY TIME Pzr level goes NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP down in an uncontrolled manner OR cannot Action. The CRS will make be maintained greater than 4%, THEN both board operators aware.

perform Step 1.

RO/ (Step 3) Identify affected S/G as follows:

BOP Any S/G N/R level - GOING UP IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

OR Check any of the following EMFs -

ABOVE NORMAL:

1EMF-24 (S/G A Steamline Hi Rad) NOTE: 1EMF 26, 1C SG Steamline Rad Monitor in TRIP 2.

1EMF-25 (S/G B Steamline Hi Rad) 1EMF-26 (S/G C Steamline Hi Rad) 1EMF-27 (S/G D Steamline Hi Rad) 1EMF-71 (S/G A Leakage Hi Rad) 1EMF-72 (S/G B Leakage Hi Rad) 1EMF-73 (S/G C Leakage Hi Rad) 1EMF-74 (S/G D Leakage Hi Rad)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 26 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 4) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS (Step 5) REFER TO RP/0/A/5700/000 NOTE: The CRS may ask (Classification of Emergency) OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

CRS (Step 6) IF AT ANY TIME NC leakage NOTE: The CRS will exceeds Tech Spec limits, THEN perform the determine that Leakage has following: exceeded the TS Limits.

Ensure Outside Air Pressure Filter train NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 in service PER OP/0/A/6450/011 BOP to take this action.

(Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water If so, Floor Instructor System), Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room acknowledge as U2 BOP, and Atmosphere Pressurization During perform actions.

Abnormal Conditions).

Have another SRO evaluate if leakage NOTE: The CRS may ask exceeds SLC 16.9.7 condition C limits OSM, STA, or Plant SRO to and immediately notify security if SSF is perform this action.

inoperable.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge accordingly.

BOP (Step 7) Check if unit shutdown or reactor trip required as follows:

Check VCT makeup - IN PROGRESS. NOTE: A VCT makeup is most likely NOT in progress.

Check VCT level - GOING UP.

BOP Check S/G tube leak size - LESS THAN NOTE: The CRS will 90 GPM. determine the SGTL to be about 30-40 gpm.

Leakage in one S/G - GREATER THAN 125 GPD (GALLON PER DAY).

CRS Observe the following limits while reducing load in Step 8:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 27 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Ensure reactor power is less than 50% within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of exceeding 125 GPD.

Be in Mode 3 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months of exceeding 125 GPD.

CRS (Step 8) Reduce load PER one of the following, while continuing with this AP as time allows beginning at Step 9.

CRS AP/1/A/5500/04 (Rapid Downpower) NOTE: The CRS will be implementing AP-4.

(Examiner Move forward to Event Termination Statement, pg 30)

RO (Step 9) Minimize secondary side NOTE: The following actions contamination as follows: are scripted because as the plant power is reduced, the CRS may continue to perform actions within AP-10.

Check affected S/G - IDENTIFIED.

CLOSE the blowdown throttle control valve for affected S/G.

1A: 1BB-123 (1A S/G Blowdown Throttle Control) 1B: 1BB-124 (1B S/G Blowdown Throttle Control) 1C: 1BB-125 (1C S/G Blowdown Throttle Control) 1D: 1BB-126 (1D S/G Blowdown Throttle Control)

Perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic NOTE: The CRS may ask the Enclosures), Enclosure 15 (Minimizing U2 BOP to perform this action.

Secondary Side Contamination).

If so, Floor Instructor:

acknowledge as U2 BOP.

RO (Step 10) Check reactor trip breakers -

OPEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 28 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 10 RNO) Do not continue in the procedure until the reactor is tripped PER Step 8.

Examiner NOTE: Based on the transient nature of evaluating this TS, the Examiner may need to question the CRS after the scenario.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE CRS LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

389 gallons per day total primary to secondary LEAKAGE through all steam generators (SGs): and 135 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG)

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 29 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME B. Required B.1 Be in MODE 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Action and 3.

associated Completion AND Time of B.2 Be in MODE Condition A 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months not met.

OR Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.

OR Primary to secondary LEAKAGE not within limits.

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.9.7, STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CRS COMMITMENT The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be operable.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

CRS REMEDIAL ACTIONS The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS inoperable. Immediately upon discovery of the SSS inoperability, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of discovery.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 30 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME C. Total C.1 Declare the Immediately Unidentified Standby LEAKAGE, Makeup Identified Pump LEAKAGE, inoperable.

and reactor coolant pump AND seal leakoff > C.2 Enter 20 gpm. Condition A.

OR Total reactor coolant pump seal leakoff

> 16.3 gpm.

OR Any reactor coolant pump No. 1 seal leakoff > 4.0 gpm.

When the Crew enters AP4 move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 31 of 53 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower The crew will be directed by AP/1/A/5500/10 to reduce plant power to Mode 3 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months . The operator will perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower.

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/04, RAPID DOWNPOWER RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 3) Check turbine control - IN AUTO.

RO (Step 4) Check MW LOOP - IN SERVICE.

RO (Step 4 RNO) Depress MW IN/MW OUT pushbutton.

CRS (Step 5) Check shutdown to Mode 3 -

DESIRED.

CRS (Step 6) Check if Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% Power appropriate:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 32 of 53 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% NOTE: It is normal practice to Power - DESIRED. shut down the reactor by driving rods, rather than tripping from 15%.

CRS (Step 6 RNO) Perform the following:

IF Mode 3 is time critical AND the reactor will be shutdown by manually inserting control rods, THEN allow an additional 45 minutes to reach Mode 3 once turbine load reduction is complete.

Observe Note prior to Step 8 and GO TO Step 8.

CRS (Step 8) Determine the required power NOTE: The CRS will reduce reduction rate (MW/min). load at 10-15 MWe/minute.

RO (Step 9) Check control rods - IN AUTO.

BOP (Step 10) Notify SOC of load reduction (red Booth Instructor: as SOC, dispatcher phone). acknowledge.

RO (Step 11) Initiate turbine load reduction to desired load at desired rate.

BOP (Step 12) Borate NC System as follows:

Energize all backup Pzr heaters.

CRS Check unit to be shutdown - VIA NOTE: It is normal practice to REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% POWER. shut down the reactor by driving rods, rather than tripping from 15%.

CRS (Step 12b. RNO) GO TO Step 12.d. NOTE: The total power change is 85%.

BOP Determine boration amount based on the following:

Power Reduction Rate (MW/min)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 33 of 53 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Present NC System Boron Concentration (ppm)

Total Power change (%).

Record calculated boration amount: NOTE: The total boration is 1100 gallons.

RO Check auto or manual rod control -

AVAILABLE.

BOP Perform boration in 4 equal additions during load reduction PER OP/1/A/6150/009 (Boron Concentration Control), Enclosure 4.7 (Boration Using 1NV-265B (Boric Acid to NV Pumps)).

RO (Step 13) Check control rods - MOVING IN AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN T-AVG AT T-REF.

RO (Step 14) Display Rod Insertion Limits on OAC by entering turn on code RIL.

RO (Step 15) IF AT ANY TIME CONTROL ROD NOTE: This is a Continuous BANK LO LO LIMIT alarm (1AD-2, B-9) is lit Action. The CRS will make THEN comply with Tech Spec 3.1.6 (Control both board operators aware.

Bank Insertion Limits):

RO (Step 16) IF AT ANY TIME during procedure NOTE: This is a Continuous C-7A is received, THEN insure Transient Action. The CRS will make Monitor freeze is triggered. both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 17) REFER TO the following:

RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP/0/A/5700/010 (NRC Immediate NOTE: The CRS may ask Notification Requirements). OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 34 of 53 Event

Description:

Rapid Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 18) Notify Reactor Engineer on duty of NOTE: The CRS may call load reduction. WCC/RE to address the switch position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RE as appropriate.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-8.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 35 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start During the downpower, the leak will develop into a 300 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture and the operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Simultaneous with the Reactor Trip, a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) will occur, and both Emergency Diesel Generators will start and repower Busses 1ETA and 1ETB.

Additionally, upon SI Actuation the 1A RN Pump will fail to start automatically, and the operator will need to manually start this pump. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the flow into and out of the 1C Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the NC System.

Because of the LOOP the NCS cooldown will need to be accomplished using the Steam Generator PORVs on the intact Steam Generators. The scenario will terminate at Step 22.c of E-3, after the crew has closed the Cold Leg Isolation Valves from the NV System.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-SG001C 300 delay=0 ramp=120 (S/G 1C Tube Rupture)

Indications Available:

Pzr level lowers uncontrollably Pzr pressure lowers consistently with Pzr level Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: Upon changing plant conditions the crew will implement Continuous Action Step 2 of AP-10, and return to Step 1 of AP-10.

AP/1/A/5500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE I, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr level - STABLE OR NOTE: Pzr Level will be slowly GOING UP. lowering.

BOP (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level:

Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent steps.

Ensure 1NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) - OPENING.

BOP OPEN 1NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 36 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP Reduce or isolate letdown. NOTE: If not isolated already the BOP isolate letdown.

BOP Start additional NV pump. NOTE: The BOP will need to start an additional NV Pump.

IF CLAs are isolated, . NOTE: The CLAs are NOT isolated.

IF Pzr level cannot be maintained greater NOTE: The Pzr level is than 4% OR Pzr level going down with decreasing with maximum maximum charging flow, THEN perform Charging flow.

the following:

IF 1B OR 1C S/G identified as NOTE: The CRS will dispatch ruptured, THEN immediately two NEOs.

dispatch two operators to isolate TD Floor Instructor:

CA pump steam supply from Acknowledge as NEOs.

ruptured S/G PER Enclosure 3 (TD CA Pump Steam Supply Isolation) Booth Instructor:

insertREMSA0001 = 0 insertREMSA0077 = 0 Within 3 minutes, as NEO report that steam has been isolated to the TD CA Pump from the 1C SG.

RO Trip reactor.

RO/ WHEN reactor tripped OR auto S/I BOP setpoint reached, THEN ensure S/I initiated.

CRS GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

EP/1/A/5000/E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page. NOTE: Crew will carry out BOP Immediate Actions of E-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip: Immediate Action All rod bottom lights - LIT NOTE: The LOOP has caused DRPI to de-energize.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 37 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Reactor trip and bypass breakers -

OPEN I/R amps - GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Trip reactor.

IF reactor will not trip NOTE: The reactor will trip manually.

RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action All throttle valves - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 4) Check 1ETA and 1ETB - Immediate Action ENERGIZED.

RO/ (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action BOP SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (1SI-18) - LIT.

Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) - LIT.

CRS (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 7) Check all Feed water Isolation status lights (1SI-4) - LIT.

BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights -

DARK.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 38 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on Energized train(s):

Groups 1, 2, 5 - DARK.

Group 3 - LIT.

Group 4 - LIT AS REQUIRED.

BOP (Step 9c RNO) Align or start components as NOTE: The 1A RN Pump has required. failed to Auto Start.

Group 6 - LIT.

CRS GO TO Step 10.

RO (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status: NOTE: The 1A MDCA Pump is OOS.

MD CA pumps - ON.

RO (Step 10a RNO) Start pumps. NOTE: The RO will NOT attempt to start the 1A MDCA Pump.

N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs - GREATER THAN 17%.

BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps - ON.

BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps - ON. NOTE: The 1A RN Pump has failed to Auto Start. If it has NOT been started previously, it will be started here using the RNO.

CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the Floor Instructor: As U2 RO following: report 2A RN Pump is running.

Start 2A RN pump.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 39 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum Booth Instructor:

for existing plant condition. insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delay=0 ramp=10 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)

RO (Step 14) Check all S/G pressures -

GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure - NOTE: Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG. is normal.

BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:

Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge - INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressure - LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.

BOP (Step 16b RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) OPEN:

1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) 1ND-67B (1B ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).

CRS IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.

CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The CRS may ask perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic OSM to address.

Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions If so, Floor Instructor Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

acknowledge as OSM.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 40 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ (Step 18) Check CA flow:

BOP Total CA flow - GREATER THAN 450 NOTE: If crew started TD CA GPM. Pump previously, then flow will be greater than 450 gpm.

RO/ (Step 18a RNO) Perform the following:

BOP IF N/R level in all S/Gs is less than 11%...

IF N/R level in all S/Gs is less that 11%

(32% AC) AND feed flow greater than 450 GPM cannot be established BOP Check VI header pressure - GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

RO/ WHEN each S/G N/R level is greater NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA Action. The CRS will make flow to maintain that S/G N/R level both board operators aware.

between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.

RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:

IF any NC pumps on NOTE: NC Pumps are OFF due to the LOOP.

IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC NOTE: It is most likely that the T-Colds - STABLE OR TRENDING TO cooldown will be under control.

557°F. If NOT, the CRS will assign the RO (BOP) to perform Enclosure 3 (Not Scripted),

and continue the performance of E-0 with the BOP (RO).

BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray (RO) valves:

All Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

Normal Pzr spray valves - CLOSED.

At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve-OPEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 41 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on (RO) core exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 0°F.

BOP (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:

(RO)

All S/G pressures - STABLE OR GOING UP All S/Gs - PRESSURIZED.

BOP (Step 23) Check if S/G tubes intact: NOTE: 1EMF 26, 1C SG (RO) Steamline Rad Monitor in TRIP 2.

The following secondary EMFs -

NORMAL:

1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (Lo Range))

1EMF-24 (S/G A) 1EMF-25 (S/G B) 1EMF-26 (S/G C) 1EMF-27 (S/G D).

S/G levels - STABEL OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER.

CRS (Step 21 RNO) IF S/G levels going up in an NOTE: The 1C SG Level is uncontrolled manner OR any EMF abnormal, increasing in an uncontrolled THEN perform the following: manner.

Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to E-3.

EP/1/A/5000/E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 42 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP BOP (Step 2) Identify ruptured S/G(s):

Any S/G N/R level - GOING UP IN AN NOTE: The 1C SG Level is UNCONTROLLED MANNER increasing in an uncontrolled manner.

OR Chemistry or RP has determined NOTE: The CRS may contact ruptured S/G. Chemistry for sampling.

Booth Instructor:

Acknowledge as appropriate.

Any of the following EMFs - ABOVE NORMAL:

1EMF-24 (S/G A) 1EMF-25 (S/G B) 1EMF-26 (S/G C) 1EMF-27 (S/G D)

RO (Step 3) Check at least one S/G -

AVAILABLE FOR NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN.

RO (Step 4) Isolate flow from ruptured S/G(s) as follows:

Check ruptured S/G(s) PORV -

CLOSED.

Check S/Gs 1B and 1C - INTACT. NOTE: The 1C SG is NOT Intact.

CRS (Step 4b RNO) Isolate TD CA pump steam supply from ruptured S/G as follows:

IF TD CA pump is the only source of NOTE: The TD CA Pump is feedwater. NOT the ONLY CA Source.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 43 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Ensure operators dispatched in next step immediately notify Control Room Supervisor when valves are closed.

Immediately dispatch 2 operators to NOTE: This step was most concurrently verify (CV), unlock and likely accomplished in AP-10 If CLOSE valves on ruptured S/G(s): NOT, the CRS will dispatch two NEOs.

Floor Instructor:

Acknowledge as NEOs.

For 1C S/G:

1SA-77 (1C S/G SM Supply Booth Instructor:

to Unit 1 TD CA Pump Turb insertREMSA0001 = 0 Loop Seal Isol) (Unit 1 interior doghouse, 767+10, FF-53). insertREMSA0077 = 0 Within 3 minutes, as NEO report that steam has been isolated to the TD CA Pump from the 1C SG.

1SA-1 (1C S/G SM Supply to Unit 1 TD CA Pump Turb Maint Isol) (Unit 1 interior doghouse, 767+10, FF-53, above ladder).

CRS IF AT ANY TIME local closure of SA NOTE: Eight minutes will NOT valves takes over 8 minutes elapse before the valves are closed.

RO Check blowdown isolation valves on ruptured S/G/(s) - CLOSED.

For 1C S/G:

1BB-3B (1C S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) 1BB-7A (C S/G BB Cont Inside Isol).

BOP CLOSE steam drain on ruptured S/G(s) 1SM-95 (C SM Line Drain Isol)

RO CLOSE the following valves on ruptured S/G(s):

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 44 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments MSIV MSIV bypass valve.

RO (Step 5) Control ruptured S/G(s) level as follows:

Check ruptured S/G(s) N/R level -

GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

BOP Isolate feed flow to ruptured S/G(s):

For 1C S/G:

CLOSE 1CA-50B (U1 TD CA Pump Disch TO 1C S/G Isol).

CLOSE 1CA-46B (1B CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Isol).

CRITICAL TASK:

(E-3A) Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of P between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of P, the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy. If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of RCS leakage into the SG.

RO (Step 6) Check ruptured S/G(s) pressure -

GREATER THAN 280 PSIG.

BOP (Step 7) Check any NC pump - RUNNING. NOTE: NC Pumps are OFF due to the LOOP.

RO/ (Step 7 RNO) Disregard NC T-Cold BOP indication in the ruptured loop, until directed by this EP or until this EP is exited.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 45 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 8) Check Pzr pressure - GREATER THAN 1955 PSIG.

RO (Step 9) Initiate NC System cooldown as follows:

CRS Determine required core exit temperature based on lowest ruptured S/G pressure:

>1100 psig - 520°F NOTE: The CRS will determine the target temperature to be 520oF.

RO Check the following valves on ruptured S/G(s) - CLOSED:

MSIV MSIV bypass valve.

RO Check ruptured S/G(s) SM PORV -

CLOSED.

RO Check S/G(s) 1B and 1C - INTACT. NOTE: The 1C SG is ruptured.

RO (Step 9.d RNO) IF 1B OR 1C S/G is ruptured, THEN perform the following:

Ensure steam to TDCA pump is isolated from ruptured S/G per one of the following:

Local isolation of SA line (per Step 4.b)

OR Tripping TD CA pump stop valve (per Step 4.b)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 46 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Do not continue until affected TDCA NOTE: If NOT already done, pump steam supply is either: the CRS will direct two NEOs to CLOSE 1SA-1 and 77.

Booth Instructor:

insertREMSA0001 = 0 insertREMSA0077 = 0 Within 3 minutes, as NEO report that steam has been isolated to the TD CA Pump from the 1C SG.

Isolated OR Determined to be unisolable.

RO (Step 9e) Check condenser available: NOTE: Due to the LOOP, the Condenser is NOT available.

RO C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP status light (1SI-18)

- LIT CRS (Step 9e RNO) GO TO RNO for Step 9.h.

BOP (Step 9h RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure at least one Pzr PORV isolation valve is OPEN.

IF VI is lost, OR a Phase B Isolation has NOTE: Neither condition has occurred, THEN.. occurred.

IF Pzr pressure is greater than 1955 NOTE: Pzr Pressure may be <

PSIG, THEN depressurize to 1900 PSIG 1955 psig. If pressure > 1955 using Pzr PORV. psig, the crew will have to depressurize.

RO Depress BLOCK on Low Pressure Steamline Isolation block switches.

BOP Maintain NC pressure less than 1955 PSIG.

RO Ensure Main Steam Isolation reset.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 47 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO Ensure SM PORVs reset.

RO IF any intact S/G SM PORV isolation NOTE: All intact SG PORVs valves is closed AND associated SM are OPERABLE with isolation PORV is operable valves OPEN.

RO Dump steam using all intact S/G(s) SM PORVs at maximum rate as follows:

CLOSE SM PORV manual loader on ruptured S/G(s).

Place intact S/G SM PORV manual loaders at 50%.

Select MANUAL on SM PORV MODE SELECT.

Adjust manual loaders on intact S/G SM PORVs as required to control intact S/G depressurization rate at approximately 2 PSIG per second.

CRS IF any intact S/G SM PORV closed, NOTE: All intact SG PORVs THEN dump steam as follows, at will be OPEN.

maximum rate:

CRS IF no intact S/G available NOTE: The 1A, 1B and 1D SG are available.

RO (Step 9i) Check Low Pressure Steamline Isolation - BLOCKED.

RO (Step 9.j) Check Core exit T/Cs- LESS NOTE: It is likely that when the THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE. CRS arrives at this step, that the target temperature will NOT be reached.

RO (Step 9.j RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: This action will be taken after the target temperature has been achieved.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 48 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments WHEN Core exit T/Cs are less than required temperature, THEN perform the following:

Stop NC System cooldown.

Maintain core exit T/Cs less than required temperature.

CRS GO TO Step 10. NOTE: The CRS will proceed and return to this step when the target temperature has been achieved.

RO (Step 10) Control intact S/G levels:

Check N/R level in any intact S/G -

GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

Throttle feed flow to maintain all intact S/G N/R levels between 22% (32% ACC) and 50%.

BOP (Step 11) Check Pzr PORVs and isolation valves:

Power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves -

AVAILABLE.

All Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve -

OPEN.

BOP (Step 12) Reset the following:

S/I Sequencers Phase A Isolation Phase B Isolation BOP (Step 13) Establish VI to containment as follows:

Open the following valves:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 49 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1VI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess Vl Hdr Outside Isol))

1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol))

1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non Ess Cont Outside Isol).

Check VI header pressure - GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.

RO (Step 14) Check if NC System cooldown should be stopped as follows:

Check cooldown - INITIATED PER STEP 9.

Check Core exit T/Cs - LESS THAN NOTE: It is likely that when the REQUIRED TEMPERATURE. CRS arrives at this step, that the target temperature will NOT be reached.

CRS (Step 14b RNO) Perform the following:

IF AT ANY TIME while in this step NOTE: This is a Continuous ruptured S/G pressure changes by over Action. The CRS will make 100 PSIG, AND ruptured S/G pressure is both board operators aware, greater than 400 PSIG, THEN select a and HOLD.

new target temperature from table in Step 9.a.

Do not continue until core exit T/Cs are less than target temperature.

RO (Step 14c) Stop NC System cooldown.

Maintain Core exit T/Cs - LESS THAN REQURIED TEMPERATURE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 50 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRITICAL TASK:

(E-3B) Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because RCS temperature is either too high to maintain minimum required subcooling, or too low causing an Orange Path on Subcriticality or Integrity.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure which constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy. If the RCS temperature is too high when RCS depressurization is started, a loss of subcooling will occur when the RCS depressurization is started. On the other hand, if RCS temperature is allowed to continue to decrease after the initial cooldown, the operator may be required to transition to the Subcriticality or Integrity response FRP, and delay the RCS depressurization.

RO (Step 15) Check ruptured S/G(s) pressure -

STABLE OR GOING UP.

RO (Step 16) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 20°F.

BOP (Step 17) Depressurize NC System using Pr spray as follows:

Check normal Pzr spray flow - NOTE: All NC Pumps are AVAILABLE. OFF, Pzr Spray is NOT available.

CRS (Step 17a RNO) GO TO Step 18.

BOP (Step 18) Depressurize NC System using Pzr PORV as follows:

Check at least one Pzr PORV -

AVAILABLE.

Open one Pzr PORV.

Do not continue until any of the following conditions satisfied:

NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs - LESS THAN 0°F OR

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 51 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Pzr level - GREATER THAN 76%

OR Both of the following:

NC pressure - LESS THAN RUPTURED S/G(s)

PRESSURE.

Pzr level - GREATER THAN 11%

Close Pzr PORV.

Close Pzr spray valves.

BOP (Step 19) Check NC pressure - GOING UP.

RO/ (Step 20) Check S/I termination criteria:

BOP NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs -

GREATER THAN 0°F.

Secondary heat sink:

N/R level in at least one intact S/G -

GREATER THAN 11%

OR Total feed flow available to S/G(s) -

GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

NC pressure - STABLE OR GOING UP.

Pzr level - GREATER THAN 11%

BOP (Step 21) Stop S/I pumps as follows:

NI pumps.

All but one NV pump.

BOP (Step 22) Isolate NV S/I flowpath as follows:

Check the following valves - OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 52 of 53 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture/ Loss of Off-Site Power/ Failure of 1A RN Pump to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1NV-221A (U1 NV Pumps Suct From FWST Isol) 1NV-222B (U1 NV Pumps Suct From FWST Isol).

Check the following valves - OPEN 1NV-150B (U1 NV Pump Recirc NOTE: Both valves are Isol). CLOSED.

1NV-151A (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol).

BOP (Step 22.b RNO) Perform the following:

OPEN valves.

IF both valves open, THEN GO TO Step 22.c.

BOP Close the following valves:

1NI-9A (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV) 1NI-10B (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV).

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power Level: 100% NCS [B] 912 ppm Pzr [B]: 914 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History: At this power level for 178 days Core Burnup: 251 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/1/A/6100/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A MDCA Pump is OOS for motor replacement. However, it is expected back within the next two hours.

1NVP-6070, Boric Acid Tank B Level, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator AD-9, D-4, D COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL LVL, has failed (IAE is investigating).

Crew Directions:

Maintain present plant conditions.

Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLO's AVAILABLE Unit 1 Unit 2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill Ed Wayne Tanya

PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 28 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N12-1-2

REFERENCES:

1. AP/1/A/5500/11, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. (Rev 11)

2. Technical Specification 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits. (Amendment 219/201)

3. Technical Specification 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS).

(Amendment 221/203)

4. AP/1/A/5500/01, Steam Leak. (Rev 18)

5. AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower. (Rev 22)

6. OP/1/A/6100/010 B, Annunciator Response For Panel 1AD-1. (Rev 44)

7. OP/1/A/6300/001A, Turbine Generator Load Change. (Rev 91)

8. AP/1/A/5500/14, Rod Control Malfunctions. (Rev 14)

9. Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trips System Instrumentation. (Amendment 184/166)

10. AP/1/A/5500/06, S/G Feedwater Malfunction. (Rev 15)

11. EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (Rev 32)

12. EP/1/A/5000/E-1, Loss of reactor or Secondary Coolant. (Rev 15)

Validation Time: 86 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.

Facility Review: ________________________

Rev. 061412 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 136 days.

The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A EDG is OOS for Fuel Injector replacement. However, it is expected back within the next two hours. 1A MDCA Pump is OOS for motor replacement. However, it is also expected back within the next two hours. 1NCP-5350, PRT Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, E-7, Turbine Stop Valve Closed, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description REM 1 C-BOP PORV Leakage NC0034A C(TS)-SRO 2

REM R-RO MSR Relief Valve fails OPEN/Downpower HS0179 N-BOP N-SRO MAL 3 C-RO Turbine Control Unit failure DEH008B C-SRO 4 VARIOUS I-RO Reactor Control Unit failure I(TS)-SRO MAL 5 DCS1418 C-BOP 1A CF Pump Rollback C-SRO MAL 6 M-RO Pzr Steam Space Break NC014A M-BOP M-SRO MAL 7 NA Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close ISE003A REM KC0332B

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 McGuire 2012 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 100% power (MOL), and has been at this power level for 136 days. The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A EDG is OOS for Fuel Injector replacement.

However, it is expected back within the next two hours. 1A MDCA Pump is OOS for motor replacement. However, it is also expected back within the next two hours. 1NCP-5350, PRT Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, E-7, Turbine Stop Valve Closed, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, Pzr PORV 1NC34A will fail open (i.e. leakage), and NC Pressure will start to drop. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/11, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will ultimately close the Block Valve for Pressurizer PORV 1NC34A when it is determined that the PORV cannot be closed. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, and 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS).

Following this, MSR Relief Valve 1HS179 will fail open causing a loss of turbine efficiency and an increase in reactor power. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/01, Steam Leak. The operator will recognize the failure, and perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower, in an attempt to shut the valve.

During the downpower, a failure will occur in the Turbine Control Unit causing the unit to shift from Operator Auto to Manual control. The operator will address 1AD-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL, and control the Turbine manually during the downpower in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001A, Enclosure 4.1, Turbine Generator Load Change. The MSR Relief Valve will re-close after power has been reduced by about 30 MWe in MANUAL.

After the plant has stabilized, a Reactor Control Unit failure will occur, causing Tref to fail, and unwarranted inward control rod motion. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/14, Rod Control Malfunctions, and restore Tavg-Tref to normal. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.

Next, the 1A CF will rollback to minimum speed requiring manual speed control of the Main Feed Pumps. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/06, S/G Feedwater Malfunction. If the operator does not regain control of the 1A CF Pump, the operator will trip 1A CF and allow the plant to run back to 56%. In this case, the operator will need to respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/03, Load Rejection.

Shortly afterwards, a LOCA will occur in the Pressurizer Steam Space, requiring a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection; and the crew will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Upon the trip, Train A of Phase A CIS will fail to auto actuate. Train B of Phase A CIS will actuate, however, one valve will fail to close. The operator will be required to manually actuate Train A of Phase A CIS. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and the Reactor Coolant Pumps (NCPs) will be required to be manually tripped upon reaching the established NCP trip criteria.

The scenario will terminate at Step 14 of E-1, after the crew has determined to transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Critical Tasks:

SS (E1C)

Trip NC Pumps within 5 minutes of loss of SCM (4600/113/E13.1)

Safety Significance: Failure to trip all NCPs on a loss of subcooled margin can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200oF. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.1 states that McGuire is committed to having NC Pumps tripped within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. The Safety Analysis recommends that the NC Pumps be tripped within 2 minutes to limit the depth and duration of core uncovery. It is a management expectation that the NC Pumps be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.

E-0 O Actuate Phase A Containment Isolation before transition out of E-0.

Safety Significance: Failure to close at least one Containment Isolation Valve on each critical penetration under the postulated conditions when it is possible to do so, constitutes mis-operation leading to degradation of the Containment Barrier. Failure to take this action leads to an unnecessary release of fission products to the auxiliary building, increasing the potential for release to the environment, and reducing accessibility to vital equipment within the Auxiliary Building. Higher radiation levels within the Auxiliary Building will result in a degradation of ALARA principles.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Rod Step On T = 0 Malfunctions:

Reset to Temp I/C 39.

insert MAL-EPQ001A ACTIVE (Loss of D/G A Control Power) insert LOA-DG020 RACKED_OUT (1A D/G Output Breaker Control Power Fuses) insert LOA-DG011 RACKED_OUT (1A D/G Output Breaker Racked Out) insert H_X10_119_1 50 (PRT Temp failed low) insert REM-KC0332B = 1.0 (Failure of 1KC-332B (NCDT HX Rtn Hdr Cont INSD Isol) to close) insert MAL-ISE003A BLK_AUTO (Failure of Phase A Train A Auto actuation) insert MAL-DEH008B TRUE cd='h_x10_280_4 eq 1' (DEH Switch to Manual - triggered from 1NV-265B open light ON)

Place Tagout/O-Stick on:

RUN 1A EDG (Tagout)

Reset all SLIMs 1A MDCA Pump (Tagout) 1NCP-5350 (O-stick)

MCB Annunciator AD-1, E-7 (O-stick)

NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.

Update Status Board, Setup OAC Freeze.

Update Fresh Tech.

Spec. Log.

Fill out the NEO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Prior to Crew Briefing RUN Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At examiner direction of Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N12-1-2.

At direction of examiner Event 1 PORV Leakage insert REM-NC0034A 0.300000 (PZR PORV 1NC-34A Fails OPEN)

At examiner direction of Event 2 MSR Relief Valve fails OPEN/Downpower insert REM-HS0179 1 (MSR 1HS179 Relief Failure)

At direction of examiner Event 3 Turbine Control Unit failure (Turbine Control Fails NOTE: After 20-30MWe in Manual: Set REM-to MANUAL) Set in HS0179 = 0, THEN delIA REM-HS0179 2 initial conditions. delay=0 cd= (Remove 1HS179 Relief Valve Triggered from 1NV- Failure - after crew has moved turbine in 265B open light ON. MANUAL approximately 20-30 MWe)

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of examiner Event 4 Reactor Control Unit failure insert XMT-SM_1SMPT5220 0 (U1 HP Turbine Impulse Press M1A0969) insert MAL-DCS1132 0.0 (Turb Imp Press Ch 3 Override) insert MAL-DCS1131 FAIL_VALUE (Turb Imp Press Ch 3) insert MAL-DCS1176 0.0 (Turb Imp Press Ch 2 Override) insert MAL-DCS1175 FAIL_VALUE (Turb Imp Press Ch 2)

At direction of examiner Event 5 1A CF Pump Rollback insert MAL-DCS1418 TRUE (Reactor Trip to CF Pump A) Turbine rolls back to 2800 RPM At examiner direction of Event 6 Pzr Steam Space Break insert MAL-NC014A 1.5 delay=0 ramp=45 (PZR Steam Space Leak)

Post-Reactor Trip Event 7 Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close This malfunction will occur on Reactor Trip.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION E-0 Actions Start 2A RN Pump and Throttle Flow insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delay=0 ramp=10 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)

Stop All NF AHUs insert LOA-NF016 STOP (Ice Condenser AHU Start/Stop)

E-1 Actions Locally Stop 1B EDG insert LOA-DG004 STOP_DSG (Start/Stop 1B Diesel Generator)

Place the H2 Analyzers In Service insert LOA-VX009 enabled delay=300 (H2 Analyzer 1A) insert LOA-VX010 ENABLED delay=600 (H2 Analyzer 1B)

Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 9 of 48 Event

Description:

PORV Leakage Shortly after taking the watch, Pzr PORV 1NC34A will fail open (i.e. leakage), and NC Pressure will start to drop. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/11, Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies. The operator will ultimately close the Block Valve for Pressurizer PORV 1NC34A when it is determined that the PORV cannot be closed. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, and 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS).

Booth Operator Instructions: insert REM-NC0034A 0.300000 (PZR PORV 1NC-34A Fails OPEN)

Indications Available:

OAC Alarm: U1 PZR PRESS I through IV 1NC-34A dual status light indication (Red and Green status lights LIT)

MCB Annunciator 1AD-6/B-9 PZR PORV DISCH TEMP HI MCB Annunciator 1AD-6/C-6 PZR LO PRESS CONTROL Pzr Pressure is lowering Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the operator will take actions to isolate the Pzr PORV prior to being directed by the CRS.

AP/1/A/5500/11, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE ANOMALIES BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr pressure - HAS GONE Immediate Action DOWN.

BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr PORVs - CLOSED. Immediate Action BOP (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following: Immediate Action CLOSE PORVs. NOTE: 1NC-34A will display dual indication, even after closing the PORV.

IF PORV will not close, THEN CLOSE PORV isolation valve.

BOP (Step 3) Check Pzr spray valves - CLOSED. Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 10 of 48 Event

Description:

PORV Leakage Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

CLOSE associated PORV inlet drain valve as follows:

IF 1NC-32B (PZR PORV) failed, IF 1 NC-34A (PZR PORV) failed, NOTE: 1NC-34A has failed THEN CLOSE 1NC-270 (PZR PORV OPEN.

Drn Isol For 1NC-34A).

IF 1NC-36B (PZR PORV) failed CRS IF Pzr PORV isolation valve is closed for failed Pzr PORV, THEN GO TO Step 5.

BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr spray valves - CLOSED.

CRS (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 7) Check 1NV-21A (NV Spray To PZR Isol) - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 8) Check the following Pzr heaters - NOTE: Backup Heaters are ON: OFF.

1A 1B 1D BOP (Step 8 RNO) If NC pressure below desired NOTE: It is expected that the pressure, THEN.. 1C Pzr heaters will adequately be controlling Pzr pressure.

BOP (Step 9) Check 1C Pzr heaters - ON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 11 of 48 Event

Description:

PORV Leakage Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 10) Check PZR PRESS MASTER -

IN AUTO.

BOP (Step 11) Check 1NC-27 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch -

SELECTED TO NORMAL.

BOP (Step 12) Check 1NC-29 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE switch -

SELECTED TO NORMAL.

BOP (Step 13) Check Pzr pressure - GOING UP TO DESIRED PRESSURE.

CRS (Step 14) Exit this procedure. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the valve position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Booth Instructor: insert LOANC034 = Racked Out, delay = 10 minutes.

As NEO call and report.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.11, PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (PORVs)

CRS LCO 3.4.11 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 AND 3.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 12 of 48 Event

Description:

PORV Leakage Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME B. One or two B.1 Close 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months PORVs associated inoperable block valves.

and not capable of AND being B.2 Remove 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months manually power from cycled. associated block valves.

AND B.3 Restore one 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months PORV to OPERABLE status if two PORVs are inoperable.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for NOTE: If NC System Pressure pressurizer pressure, RCS average drops to < 2216 psig on the temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1. entered and exited during the transient.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. Pressurizer A.1 Restore DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months pressure or parameter(s)

RCS average to within limit.

temperature DNB parameters not within limits.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 13 of 48 Event

Description:

MSR Relief Valve fails OPEN/Downpower Following this, MSR Relief Valve 1HS179 will fail open causing a loss of turbine efficiency and an increase in reactor power. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/01, Steam Leak. The operator will recognize the failure, and perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower, in an attempt to shut the valve.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert REM-HS0179 1 (MSR 1HS179 Relief Failure)

Indications Available:

Turbine MWe lowers rapidly Core Ts start to rise OAC Alarm: 1C1 L/P TURBINE CROSSOVER STEAM TEMP RATE OAC Alarm: 1C2 L/P TURBINE CROSSOVER STEAM TEMP RATE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The crew may diagnose an overpower condition and adjust turbine load per the Crew Expectations Manual.

CONTROL ROOM CREW EXPECTATIONS MANUAL RO Transient load changes: Manual is preferred-immediately reduce 20MWe and then reduce as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition. After the intial 20 MWe load reduction, it is preferred that the operators use multiple and diverse indications to determine how much more load should be reduced.

AP/1/A/5500/01, STEAM LEAK

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 14 of 48 Event

Description:

MSR Relief Valve fails OPEN/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may dispatch NEOs to look for steam leaks.

If so, Booth Instructor as NEO, respond back in 3-5 minutes per script (See Page 15).

After 3-5 minutes of Non-investigatory Action, Call as Security and report Steam Release to atmosphere on U1 TB Roof.

RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP RO (Step 2) Reduce turbine load to maintain the NOTE: The RO may take the following: Turbine Control to MANUAL.

Excore NIs - LESS THAN OR EQUAL NOTE: The power level was TO 100% originally at 100%. Per the Control Room Expectations Manual, the RO has the authority to remove 20 Mwe initially, and then additional load as needed to stabilize temperature.

NC Loop D/Ts - LESS THAN 60ºF D/T T-Avg - AT T-REF.

CRS (Step 3) Check containment entry - IN NOTE: There is no PROGRESS. Containment Entry in progress.

CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr pressure prior to event -

GREATER THAN P-11 (1955 PSIG)

BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr level - STABLE OR GOING UP

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 15 of 48 Event

Description:

MSR Relief Valve fails OPEN/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained Action. The CRS will make stable, THEN RETURN TO Step 6. both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 8) GO TO Step 12.

CRS (Step 12) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 system. RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 13) Identify and isolate leak on Unit 1 as follows:

Check SM PORVs - CLOSED.

Check condenser dump valves -

CLOSED.

BOP Check containment conditions -

NORMAL:

Containment temperature Containment pressure Containment humidity Containment floor and equipment sump level.

Check TD CA pump - OFF.

Check valves STEAM LINE DRAIN VALVES board (1MC-9) - CLOSED RO/ Check opposite Unit (Unit 2) STEAM NOTE: The CRS will ask U2 HEADER PRESSURE - GREATER RO.

BOP THAN 200 PSIG.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO, and report U2 Steam Header Pressure is 1000 psig.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 16 of 48 Event

Description:

MSR Relief Valve fails OPEN/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS Dispatch operator to check for leaks. NOTE: If not already done, the CRS will dispatch NEOs to look for steam leaks.

After 2-3 minutes, Booth Instructor, as NEO, report that MSR 1C1 Shell Side Relief Valve (1HS179) is lifting.

BOP (Step 14) Check UST level - STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 14 RNO) Makeup to UST as required to maintain level.

CRS (Step 15) Evaluate unit shutdown as follows:

Check unit status - IN MODE 1 OR 2.

Determine if unit shutdown or load reduction is warranted based on the following criteria:

Size of leak Location of leak Rate of depletion of secondary inventory IF steam is leaking from a secondary NOTE: Steam is leaking from heater relief OR MSR relief valve, an MSR relief valve.

THEN reducing turbine load may reduce pressure enough to close relief valve.

IF turbine trip will isolate steam leak NOTE: It is NOT necessary to (such as feedwater heater leak or trip the Turbine.

MSR leak), THEN it may be desirable to perform an orderly shutdown of the turbine and maintain reactor power in Mode 1.

CRS Check unit shutdown or load reduction - NOTE: It is necessary to REQUIRED. reduce load in an attempt to close the lifting relief valve.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 17 of 48 Event

Description:

MSR Relief Valve fails OPEN/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS Check reactor trip - REQUIRED. NOTE: A reactor trip is NOT required.

CRS (Step 15.d RNO) GO TO Step 15.h.

CRS (Step 15.h) Determine if turbine trip is desired to isolate steam leak:

Check steam leak location -

KNOWN TO BE ISOLABLE BY TURBINE TRIP Turbine trip - DESIRED. NOTE: A turbine trip is NOT desired.

CRS (Step 15.h RNO) Perform the following:

Reduce load as necessary PER one of the following:

OP/1/A/6100/003 OR AP/1/A/5500/04 (Rapid Downpower). NOTE: The CRS will transition to AP-4.

Floor Instructor: If it appears likely that the crew will use the OP rather than the AP, state as the OSM that it is desired to use AP-4.

AP/1/A/5500/04, RAPID DOWNPOWER RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 18 of 48 Event

Description:

MSR Relief Valve fails OPEN/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3) Check turbine control - IN AUTO. NOTE: The Turbine may be in MANUAL. If so, the RO will place the Turbine in AUTO.

RO (Step 4) Check MW LOOP - IN SERVICE.

RO (Step 4 RNO) Depress MW IN/MW OUT pushbutton.

CRS (Step 5) Check shutdown to Mode 3 -

DESIRED.

CRS (Step 5 RNO) Observe Note prior to Step 8 and GO TO Step 8.

CRS (Step 8) Determine the required power NOTE: The CRS will reduce reduction rate (MW/min). load at 10-20 MWe/minute.

RO (Step 9) Check control rods - IN AUTO.

BOP (Step 10) Notify SOC of load reduction (red Booth Instructor: as SOC, dispatcher phone). acknowledge.

RO (Step 11) Initiate turbine load reduction to desired load at desired rate.

BOP (Step 12) Borate NC System as follows:

Energize all backup Pzr heaters.

Check unit to be shutdown - VIA NOTE: It is normal practice to REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% POWER. shut down the reactor by driving rods, rather than tripping from 15%.

CRS (Step 12.b RNO) GO TO Step 12.d.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 19 of 48 Event

Description:

MSR Relief Valve fails OPEN/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Determine boration amount based on the following:

Power Reduction Rate (MW/min)

Present NC System Boron Concentration (ppm)

Total Power change (%). NOTE: The total power change will be determined by the CRS, and will affect the amount of boron inserted by the BOP.

Record calculated boration amount:

RO Check auto or manual rod control -

AVAILABLE.

BOP Perform boration in 4 equal additions Examiner NOTE: When 1NV-during load reduction PER 265B is OPEN, Event 3 will be OP/1/A/6150/009 (Boron Concentration in progress.

Control), Enclosure 4.7 (Boration Using 1NV-265B (Boric Acid to NV Pumps)).

(Step 13) Check control rods - MOVING IN AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN T-AVG AT T-REF.

When 1NV-265B is OPEN, move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 20 of 48 Event

Description:

Turbine Control Unit failure During the downpower, a failure will occur in the Turbine Control Unit causing the unit to shift from Operator Auto to Manual control. The operator will address 1AD-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL, and control the Turbine manually during the downpower in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001A, Enclosure 4.1, Turbine Generator Load Change.

The MSR Relief Valve will re-close after power has been reduced by about 30 MWe in MANUAL.

Booth Operator Instructions: (Turbine Control Fails to MANUAL) Set in initial conditions. Triggered from 1NV-265B open light ON.

Set REM-HS0179 = 0, THEN delIA REM-HS0179 2 delay=0 cd= (Remove 1HS179 Relief Valve Failure - after crew has moved turbine in MANUAL approximately 20-30 MWe)

Indications Available:

Turbine MWe indication stabilizes MCB Annunciator 1AD-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will continue in AP-4 while the ARP/OP are addressed.

MCB ANNUNCIATOR 1AD-1/F4, TURBINE IN MANUAL RO Immediate Action: Ensure Turbine/Generator NOTE: The Turbine will operation stabilizes in either Load or Speed stabilize in LOAD Mode.

Modes of operation.

CRS (Step 1) Determine cause and effect, then NOTE: The CRS may call notify IAE of any malfunction. WCC/IAE to address the Turbine Control failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

RO (Step 2) Refer to OP/1/A/6300/001 A NOTE: The RO will continue (Turbine-Generator Load Change) for the load reduction in MANUAL.

manual operation of Turbine Generator.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 21 of 48 Event

Description:

Turbine Control Unit failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 3) WHEN available and desired, return DEH to OPER AUTO.

OP/1/A/6300/001 A, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE RO (Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load RO (Step 3.5.1) IF Turbine in OPERATOR AUTO RO (Step 3.5.2) IF Turbine in MANUAL perform the following:

Ensure desired change within Calculated Capability Curve.

If turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.

IF raising load, IF decreasing load, depress GV LOWER.

Booth Operator Instructions: delIA REM-HS0179 2 delay=0 cd=

(Remove 1HS179 Relief Valve Failure -

after crew has moved turbine in MANUAL approximately 20-30 MWe)

Booth Instructor: as NEO, report that 1HS179 Relief Valve has reseated.

Examiner NOTE: It may be necessary to allow the crew to stabilize the plant prior to moving to Event 4.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 22 of 48 Event

Description:

Reactor Control Unit failure After the plant has stabilized, a Reactor Control Unit failure will occur, causing Tref to fail, and unwarranted inward control rod motion. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/14, Rod Control Malfunctions, and restore Tavg-Tref to normal. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert XMT-SM_1SMPT5220 0 (U1 HP Turbine Impulse Press M1A0969) insert MAL-DCS1132 0.0 (Turb Imp Press Ch 3 Override) insert MAL-DCS1131 FAIL_VALUE (Turb Imp Press Ch 3) insert MAL-DCS1176 0.0 (Turb Imp Press Ch 2 Override) insert MAL-DCS1175 FAIL_VALUE (Turb Imp Press Ch 2)

Indications Available:

Control Rods stepping inward Turbine MWe stable Turbine Impulse Channel 2 indicating LOW scale MCB Annunciator 1AD-2/E-8, DCS TROUBLE ALARM OAC Alarm: U1 Tavg-Tref MCB Annunciator 1AD-6/B-10, T-REF/T-AUCT ABNORMAL Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF more than one rod dropped, OR Immediate Action misaligned by greater than 24 steps, NOTE: No Rods have dropped.

RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual. Immediate Action RO (Step 3) Check rod movement - STOPPED. Immediate Action RO (Step 4) Check all rods - ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 23 of 48 Event

Description:

Reactor Control Unit failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5) Check ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE alarm (1AD-2, A-10) - DARK.

RO (Step 6) Check T-AVG/T-REF FAILURE ROD STOP alarm (1AD-2, B-7) - DARK CRS (Step 7) IF this AP entered due to unwarranted rod insertion or withdrawal, THEN GO TO Enclosure 3 (Response to Continuous Rod Movement).

NOTE: The CRS will go to Enclosure 3.

AP/1/A/5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION, ENCLOSURE 3, RESPONSE TO CONTINUOUS ROD MOVEMENT CRS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 system. RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS (Step 2) Notify IAE to investigate problem. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/IAE.

RO (Step 3) Evaluate the following prior to any control rod withdrawal:

Ensure no inadvertent mode change will occur.

Ensure the control rods are withdrawn in a deliberate manner, while closely monitoring the reactors response.

RO (Step 4) Check T-Ref indication - NORMAL: NOTE: T-Ref is lower than normal (557°F).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 24 of 48 Event

Description:

Reactor Control Unit failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

IF TURB IMP PRESS CH 2 failed, NOTE: Channel 2 has failed.

THEN ensure P-7 and P-13 interlocks are in required state for existing unit conditions (Tech Spec 3.3.1.16).

IF unit coastdown in progress, NOTE: Coastdown is NOT in progress.

RO Perform any of the following as necessary to maintain T-Colds 555°F to 557°F:

Position control rods in manual. NOTE: The RO will need to withdrawal control rods to restore Tave-Tref.

OR Borate/dilute NC System OR Adjust turbine load.

CRS GO TO Step 9.

RO (Step 9) WHEN problem is repaired, THEN NOTE: This is a Continuous perform the following: Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Ensure T-Avg at T-Ref +/- 1°F.

IF auto rod control desired, THEN place rods in auto.

CRS (Step 10) Exit this procedure. NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS)

INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 25 of 48 Event

Description:

Reactor Control Unit failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS APPLICABILITY: According to 3.3.1-1.

CRS Functions 16.b and 16.e are affected by this failure.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One or more A.1 Enter the Immediately Functions Condition with one or referenced in more Table 3.3.1-1 required for the channels channel(s).

inoperable.

CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME T. One or more T.1 Verify 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months channel(s) interlock is in inoperable. required state for existing unit conditions.

OR T.2 Be in MODE 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 2.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 26 of 48 Event

Description:

1A CF Pump Rollback Next, the 1A CF will rollback to minimum speed requiring manual speed control of the Main Feed Pumps. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/06, S/G Feedwater Malfunction. If the operator does not regain control of the 1A CF Pump, the operator will trip 1A CF and allow the plant to run back to 56%. In this case, the operator will need to respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/03, Load Rejection.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-DCS1418 TRUE (Reactor Trip to CF Pump A) Turbine rolls back to 2800 RPM Indications Available:

1A CF Pump Turbine RPM lowers to 3200 RPM 1A CF Pump Turbine LP Gove Control indicates 2800 RPM MCB Annunciator 1AD-4/C-1, S/G A FLOW MISMATCH LO CF FLOW MCB Annunciator 1AD-4/C-2, S/G B FLOW MISMATCH LO CF FLOW MCB Annunciator 1AD-4/C-3, S/G C FLOW MISMATCH LO CF FLOW MCB Annunciator 1AD-4/C-4, S/G D FLOW MISMATCH LO CF FLOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/06, S/G FEEDWATER MALFUNCTIONS RO (Step 1) Check all CF control and bypass valves - OPERATING PROPERLY.

BOP (Step 2) Check both CF pumps -

OPERATING PROPERLY.

BOP (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

IF malfunctioning CF pump has tripped NOTE: The 1A CF Pump has OR pump is in rollback hold in Mode 3. not tripped.

IF CF pump is not controlling properly in auto, THEN place affected CF pump in speed set mode as follows:

On DCS workstation, Feedpump Overview graphic, place CF pump in speed set mode as follows:

Select AUTO/SPD on affected CF pump.

Select SPD SET in the AUTO/SPD SETTER SEL box.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 27 of 48 Event

Description:

1A CF Pump Rollback Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Adjust affected CF pump speed setpoint using controls on LP governor as required to maintain desired CF pump discharge pressure and S/G levels.

BOP IF CF pump is not controlling properly in NOTE: The operator may speed set mode, THEN control affected place the 1A CF Pump in CF pump in manual as follows: MANUAL and control speed as needed.

Place low pressure governor control in manual.

Place high pressure governor control in manual.

Adjust CF pump speed to maintain desired CF pump discharge pressure and S/G levels.

IF both of the following conditions are met:

Flow from malfunctioning CF NOTE: The flow from the 1A pump- COMPLETELY LOST CF Pump is NOT completely lost.

Turbine Impulse pressure - NOTE: The Turbine Impulse GREATER THAN 400 PSIG, pressure is < 400 psig.

THEN Examiner NOTE: If the BOP does not regain control of the 1A CF Pump, the CRS will direct that the 1A CF be tripped, and the plant will run back to 56% power. In this case, the crew will address AP-3. If not, move forward to next event.

AP/1/A/5500/03, LOAD REJECTION RO (Step 1) Ensure rods are in auto. NOTE: Rods are in MANUAL do to a previous Tref malfunction.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 28 of 48 Event

Description:

1A CF Pump Rollback Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 2) Check Turbine Generator response as follows:

Check Generator - TIED TO GRID.

Check Generator output - GOING DOWN AS REQUIRED.

RO (Step 3) Check control rod response as follows:

Check control banks - MOVING IN AS REQUIRED.

RO (Step 3.a RNO) If no rods will move in auto, THEN perform the following:

Place control rods in manual.

Insert rods to reduce T-Avg equal to T-Ref.

If no rods will move,. NOTE: Rods are moving in MANUAL.

RO (Step 3.b) Check all rods - ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

BOP (Step 4) Check CM System response as follows:

Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster pumps - RUNNING.

1CM-420 (Unit 1 Generator Load Rejection Bypass Control) - OPEN.

BOP (Step 5) IF 50% runback, THEN ensure turbine impulse pressure going down to less than 410 psig.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 29 of 48 Event

Description:

1A CF Pump Rollback Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 6) Announce: Unit 1 load rejection, NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 non-essential personnel stay out of Unit 1 RO to make Plant turbine bldg. Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 7) Check P/R meters - LESS THAN 20%.

RO (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

Designate an operator to continuously monitor reactor power.

IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is less than 20%, THEN perform Step 8 to stabilize reactor power.

CRS GO TO Step 9.

BOP (Step 9) Check condenser dump valves -

MODULATING OPEN.

BOP (Step 10) Check IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE alarm (1AD-11, J-5). - DARK BOP (Step 11) Check Pzr pressure control response as follows:

Ensure Pzr heaters are in AUTO.

Ensure Pzr spray control valves are in auto.

Check Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 11.c RNO) WHEN Pzr pressure is less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

Ensure Pzr PORVs are CLOSED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 30 of 48 Event

Description:

1A CF Pump Rollback Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP IF any PORV cannot be closed, THEN CLOSE its isolation and inlet drain valve as follows:

IF 1NC-32B (PZR PORV) failed, IF 1 NC-34A (U1 Pzr PORV) failed, NOTE: 1NC-34A has failed THEN CLOSE the following valves: OPEN.

1NC-33A (U1 Pzr PORV Isol). NOTE: 1NC-33A has previously been CLOSED.

1NC-270 (PZR PORV Drn Isol NOTE: 1NC-270 has For 1NC-34A). previously been CLOSED.

IF 1NC-36B (PZR PORV) failed BOP Check Pzr spray control valves -

CLOSED.

RO/ (Step 12) Check load rejection - DUE TO NOTE: The runback occurred BOP LOSS OF CF PUMP. due to a loss of the 1A CF Pump.

CRS (Step 13) Dispatch operator as necessary to NOTE: The CRS may dispatch determine cause of CF pump trip. an NEO.

Floor Instructor:

Acknowledge.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-7.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 31 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Shortly afterwards, a LOCA will occur in the Pressurizer Steam Space, requiring a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection; and the crew will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Upon the trip, Train A of Phase A CIS will fail to auto actuate. Train B of Phase A CIS will actuate, however, one valve will fail to close. The operator will be required to manually actuate Train A of Phase A CIS. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and the Reactor Coolant Pumps (NCPs) will be required to be manually tripped upon reaching the established NCP trip criteria. The scenario will terminate at Step 14 of E-1, after the crew has determined to transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-NC014A 1.5 delay=0 ramp=45 (PZR Steam Space Leak)

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1AD-13/B-3, CONT PRESSURE ALERT HI Pzr level lowers Containment pressure starts to rise MCB Annunciator 1AD-6/A-6, PZR LO PRESSPORV NC34 BLOCKED MCB Annunciator 1AD-6/B-6, PZR LO PRESSPORV NC32 & 36 BLOCKED Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: NC Subcooling will be lost on this LOCA.

The five minute Clock to stop the NC Pumps should start WHEN subcooling is 0°F/NEGATIVE.

Record Time: __________

NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

EP/1/A/5000/E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip: Immediate Action All rod bottom lights - LIT

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 32 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Reactor trip and bypass breakers -

OPEN I/R amps - GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action All throttle valves - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 4) Check 1ETA and 1ETB - Immediate Action ENERGIZED.

RO/ (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action BOP SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (1SI-18) - LIT.

Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) - LIT.

CRS (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection. NOTE: The CRS may ask the U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4) - LIT.

BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights - NOTE: Train A Phase A CIS DARK. has failed to automatically actuate.

BOP (Step 8 RNO) Initiate Phase A Isolation.

BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 33 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Groups 1, 2, 5 - DARK.

Group 3 - LIT.

Group 4 - LIT AS REQUIRED.

Group 6 - LIT. NOTE: 1KC-332B is/may be OPEN.

BOP (Step 9.d RNO) GO TO Step 9.f.

BOP (Step 9.f) Check the following:

OAC - IN SERVICE.

LOCA Sequencer Actuated status light (1SI-14) on energized train(s) - LIT.

BOP (Step 9.g) Perform the following on energized train(s):

Check OAC Monitor Light Program (MONL) for Group 6 windows that are dark.

Align valves as required, while continuing NOTE: If 1KC-332B is still in the EP. OPEN, it is expected to be closed here.

CRITICAL TASK:

(E-0 O) Actuate Phase A Containment Isolation before transition out of E-0.

Safety Significance: Failure to close at least one Containment Isolation Valve on each critical penetration under the postulated conditions when it is possible to do so, constitutes mis-operation leading to degradation of the Containment Barrier. Failure to take this action leads to an unnecessary release of fission products to the auxiliary building, increasing the potential for release to the environment, and reducing accessibility to vital equipment within the Auxiliary Building. Higher radiation levels within the Auxiliary Building will result in a degradation of ALARA principles.

RO/ (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

BOP MD CA pumps - ON

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 34 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs - GREATER THAN 17%.

BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps - ON BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps - ON.

CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the Floor Instructor: As U2 RO following: report 2A RN Pump is running.

Start 2A RN pump.

THROTTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum Booth Instructor:

for existing plant conditions. insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delay=0 ramp=10 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)

RO (Step 14) Check all S/G pressures -

GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure - NOTE: Containment pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG. is 2.0 psig, and slowly rising due to the LOCA.

BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:

BOP Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge - INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressure - LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.

Check NI pumps - INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressure - LESS THAN 275 PSIG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 35 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 16.d RNO) Perform the following:

BOP Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) OPEN:

1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) 1ND-67B (1B ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).

CRS IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.

CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The CRS may ask perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic OSM to address.

Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions If so, Floor Instructor Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

acknowledge as OSM.

RO/ (Step 18) Check CA flow:

BOP Total CA flow - GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

Check VI header pressure - GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

WHEN each S/G N/R level is greater NOTE: This is a Continuous than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA Action. The CRS will make flow to maintain that S/G N/R level both board operators aware.

between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.

NOTE: The use of adverse Containment numbers is required if Containment Pressure is > 3 psig.

RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:

IF all NC pumps on, THEN check NC T- NOTE: The NC Pumps are Avg - STABLE OR TRENDING TO most likely OFF.

557ºF.

OR

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 36 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T- NOTE: Tavg and/Tcolds will Colds - STABLE OR TRENDING TO be < 557°F.

557°F.

RO (Step 19 RNO) Perform the following based on plant conditions:

IF temperature less than 557°F AND NOTE: The cooldown may be going down, THEN attempt to stop under control, and Enclosure 3 cooldown PER Enclosure 3 may NOT be needed.

(Uncontrolled NC System Cooldown).

NOTE: If needed, the CRS may assign the RO to perform this action.

If so, RO Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3.

Other Examiners follow E-0 Actions, Step 20, on Page 38.

E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 3, UNCONTROLLED NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN RO (Step 1) Check steam dump valves - Examiner NOTE: Follow the CLOSED. actions associated with Enclosure 3 if RO is assigned by CRS to perform.

RO (Step 1 RNO) CLOSE steam dump valves as follows:

Place STM PRESS CONTROLLER in manual.

Adjust STM PRESS CONTROLLER output to 0%.

Place STEAM DUMP SELECT in steam pressure mode.

IF steam dumps still open NOTE: The Steam Dump Valves will be CLOSED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 37 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 2) Check all SM PORVs - CLOSED.

RO (Step 3) Check MSR RESET light - LIT.

RO (Step 4) Check any NC pump - ON. NOTE: It is likely that the NCPs will be OFF at this time.

RO (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

IF any NC T-Cold is still going down, THEN GO TO Step 6.

RO (Step 6) Control feed flow as follows:

IF S/G N/R level is less than 11% (32%

ACC) in all S/Gs WHEN N/R level is greater than 11%

(32% ACC) in at least one S/G, THEN THROTTLE feed flow further to:

Minimize cooldown Maintain at least one S/G N/R level greater than 11% (32% ACC).

RO (Step 7) Check MSIVs - ANY OPEN. NOTE: All MSIVs are CLOSED.

RO (Step 8) CLOSE 1SM-15 (U1 SM TO MSR 2nd Stg Tube Bundles Isol).

RO (Step 9) Check any NC pump - ON RO (Step 9 RNO) Perform the following:

IF any NC T-Cold is still going down, NOTE: It is expected that NC Tcolds will be stabilized.

IF cooldown stopped, THEN exit this enclosure.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 38 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE.

BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:

All Pzr PORVs - CLOSED. NOTE: 1NC-34A previously failed OPEN.

BOP (Step 20a RNO) IF Pzr pressure less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

CLOSE Pzr PORV(s).

IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN perform the following:

CLOSE its isolation valve.

CLOSE the following valve(s).

IF 1NC-32B (U1 Pzr PORV) failed IF 1NC-34A (U1 Pzr PORV) NOTE: 1NC-270 is CLOSED.

failed, THEN CLOSE 1NC-270 (PZR PORV Drn Isol For 1 NC-34A)

IF 1NC-36B (U1 Pzr PORV) failed IF PORV isolation valve cannot be NOTE: 1NC-34A isolation closed valve is CLOSED.

IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed or NOTE: 1NC-34A isolation isolated, valve is CLOSED.

BOP (Step 20.b) Normal Pzr spray valves -

CLOSED BOP (Step 20.c) At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve - OPEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 39 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on NOTE: NCS Subcooling is core exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 0ºF. NEGATIVE 15°F.

BOP (Step 21 RNO) IF at least one NV or NI NOTE: If not already pump on, THEN stop all NC pumps while accomplished the NC Pumps maintaining seal injection flow. should be stopped here.

CRITICAL TASK:

(SS (E1C)) Trip NC Pumps within 5 minutes of loss of SCM (4600/113/E13.1)

Safety Significance: Failure to trip all NCPs on a loss of subcooled margin can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200oF. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.1 states that McGuire is committed to having NC Pumps tripped within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling.

The Safety Analysis recommends that the NC Pumps be tripped within 2 minutes to limit the depth and duration of core uncovery. It is a management expectation that the NC Pumps be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.

Record Pump Stop Time: __________

subtract time recorded at time of the loss SCM on page 31 _____ = _____ minutes.

RO (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:

All S/G pressures - STABLE OR GOING UP All S/Gs - PRESSURIZED.

RO/ (Step 23) Check if S/G tubes intact:

BOP The following secondary EMFs -

NORMAL:

1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (Lo Range))

1EMF-24 (S/G A)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 40 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1EMF-25 (S/G B) 1EMF-26 (S/G C) 1EMF-27 (S/G D)

S/G levels - STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER.

BOP (Step 24) Check if NC System intact as follows:

1EMF-38(L) (Containment Particulate NOTE: 1EMF-38L is in TRIP (LR)) - NORMAL 2.

BOP (Step 24 RNO) Perform the following:

IF H2 Igniters are off, THEN perform the NOTE: The H2 Igniters are following: OFF.

Energize H2 Igniters by depressing ON and OVERRIDE.

Dispatch operator to stop all Unit 1 NOTE: The CRS will dispatch NF AHUs PER EP/1/A/5000/G-1 an NEO.

(Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 28 Booth Instructor: as NEO, (De-energizing Ice Condenser acknowledge AHUs).

insert LOA-NF016 STOP (Ice Condenser AHU Start/Stop)

CRS IF AT ANY TIME both of the following conditions exist, THEN perform Enclosure 4 (VX Manual Start And Isolating RV Cooling):

Containment pressure has remained less than 3 PSIG Containment pressure is between 1 NOTE: These conditions may PSIG and 3 PSIG. exist.

If so, the BOP may perform Enclosure 4.

Or, the CRS may ask U2 BOP to perform Enclosure 4.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP, and report upon completion.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 41 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-1 (Loss OF Reactor Or Secondary Coolant).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to E-1.

EP/1/A/5000/E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP RO (Step 2) Check NC subcooling based on core NOTE: NCS subcooling will exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 0°F. most likely be less than 0°F.

BOP (Step 2 RNO) IF any NV OR NI pump is on, THEN perform the following:

Ensure all NC pumps are off.

Maintain seal injection flow.

RO (Step 3) Check main steamlines intact as follows:

All S/G pressures - STABLE OR GOING UP All S/Gs - PRESSURIZED.

RO (Step 4) Control intact S/G levels as follows:

Check N/R level in any intact S/G - NOTE: Adverse Containment GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC). Numbers may be used if pressure has risen > 3 psig.

BOP Check VI header pressure - GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

RO THROTTLE feed flow to maintain all NOTE: Adverse Containment intact S/G N/R levels between 11% (32% Numbers may be used if ACC) and 50%. pressure has risen > 3 psig.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 42 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 5) Check secondary radiation normal as follows:

Check all S/Gs - INTACT.

Notify RP to perform the following: NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/RP to address the need for local surveys.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RP.

Frisk all Unit 1 S/G cation columns to determine if activity level is significantly higher for any S/G.

Notify Control Room of survey results.

WHEN all survey results reported, THEN NOTE: This is a Continuous perform the following: Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Check all S/G(s) activity levels -

NORMAL.

BOP Check secondary EMFs - NORMAL:

1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (Lo Range))

1EMF-24 (S/G A) 1EMF-25 (S/G B) 1EMF-26 (S/G C) 1EMF-27 (S/G D).

BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr PORVs and isolation valves:

Power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves -

AVAILABLE.

All Pzr PORVs - CLOSED. NOTE: 1NC-34A previously failed OPEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 43 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6.b RNO) IF Pzr pressure less that 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

CLOSE Pzr PORV(s).

IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN perform the following:

CLOSE its isolation valve.

CLOSE the following valve(s):

IF 1NC-32B failed, IF 1NC-34A failed, THEN NOTE: 1NC-270 is CLOSED.

CLOSE 1NC-270 (PZR PORV Drn Isol For 1NC-34A)

IF 1NC-36B failed, If Pzr PORV isolation valve cannot NOTE: 1NC-34A isolation be closed valve is CLOSED.

BOP (Step 6c) At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve - OPEN.

BOP (Step 6d) IF AT ANY TIME any Pzr PORV NOTE: This is a Continuous opens due to high pressure, THEN after Action. The CRS will make pressure goes below 2315 PSIG, ensure both board operators aware.

PORV CLOSES or is isolated.

RO (Step 7) Check S/I termination criteria:

NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs - NOTE: NCS subcooling will GREATER THAN 0°F. most likely be less than 0°F.

CRS (Step 7.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.f.

RO/ (Step 7.f) Monitor S/I termination criteria PER BOP Enclosure 2 (S/I Termination Criteria) while in the procedure.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 44 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 7.g) IF AT ANY TIME while in this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure S/I termination criteria is met, Action. The CRS will make THEN RETURN TO Step 7. both board operators aware.

BOP (Step 8) Check if ND pumps should be stopped:

NC pressure - GREATER THAN 275 PSIG.

NC Pressure - STABLE OR GOING UP. NOTE: With the NC pressure in stable, the ND Pumps will be stopped.

Any ND pump - ON.

Running ND pumps suction - ALIGNED TO FWST.

Reset the following:

S/I.

Sequencers.

Stop the ND pumps.

IF AT ANY TIME, a B/O signal occurs THEN restart S/I equipment previously started.

IF AT ANY TIME, NC pressure goes below 275 PSIG in an uncontrolled manner, THEN restart ND pumps RO (Step 9) Check NC and S/G pressures:

All S/G pressures - STABLE OR GOING UP.

NC pressure - STABLE OR GOING DOWN.

BOP (Step 10) Check if D/Gs should be stopped.

BOP Any D/G - ON. NOTE: The 1B DG is running.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 45 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Check 1ETA energized by offsite power as follows:

1ETA Emergency Breaker - OPEN.

1ETA - ENERGIZED.

Check 1ETB energized of offsite power as follows:

1ETB Emergency Breaker - OPEN.

1ETB - ENERGIZED.

Reset the following:

S/I.

Sequencers.

IF AT ANY TIME a B/O signal occurs, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN restart S/I equipment previously Action. The CRS will make on. both board operators aware.

Dispatch operator to stop unloaded NOTE: The CRS will dispatch D/G(s) and place in standby readiness an NEO.

PER OP/1/A/6350/002 (Diesel Generator): Floor Instructor acknowledge as NEO.

Booth Instructor:

insert LOA-DG004 STOP_DSG (Start/Stop 1B Diesel Generator), and report upon completion Enclosure 4.4 (1B D/G Shutdown).

BOP (Step 11) Check containment H2 concentration:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 46 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Ensure operator dispatched to stop Unit NOTE: This action was likely 1 NF Ahs PER EP/1/A/5000/G-1 taken previously.

(Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 28 (De-If NOT, the CRS will dispatch energizing Ice Condenser AHUs).

an NEO.

Booth Instructor: as NEO, acknowledge insert LOA-NF016 STOP (Ice Condenser AHU Start/Stop)

Check H2 analyzers - IN SERVICE. NOTE: The H2 Analyzers have NOT been placed in service.

BOP (Step 11b RNO) Perform the following:

Dispatch operator to place H2 analyzers NOTE: The CRS will dispatch in service PER EP/1/A/5000/G-1 an NEO.

(Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 5 Floor Instructor: as NEO, (Placing H2 Analyzers In Service).

acknowledge.

Booth Instructor:

insert LOA-VX009 enabled delay=300 (H2 Analyzer 1A) insert LOA-VX010 ENABLED delay=600 (H2 Analyzer 1B)

WHEN H2 analyzers in service, THEN complete Steps 11.c and 11.d.

CRS GO TO Step 12.

RO/ (Step 12) Initiate evaluation of plant status as follows:

BOP Check Cold Leg Recirc capability from at least on train as follows:

RO/ Train A:

BOP 1A ND pump - AVAILABLE 1NI-185A (1A ND Pump Suction From Cont Sump Isol) - POWER AVAILABLE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6&7 Page 47 of 48 Event

Description:

Pzr Steam Space Break/ Phase A CIS Auto Signal failure/CIV fails to Close Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OR Train B:

1B ND pump - AVAILABLE 1NI-184B (1B ND Pump Suction From Cont Sump Isol) - POWER AVAILABLE.

BOP (Step 12.b) Check for potential leak in aux bldg as follows:

Check aux bldg radiation:

All area monitor EMFs -

NORMAL CRS (Step 12.c) WHEN TSC staffed, THEN have NOTE: This is a Continuous TSC perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Action. The CRS will make Enclosures), Enclosure 30 (Evaluation of both board operators aware.

Plant Status During LOCAs by TSC).

NOTE: The TSC is NOT staffed.

CRS (Step 13) Check if NC System cooldown and depressurization is required:

NC pressure - GREATER THAN 275 PSIG.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.2 (Post LOCA Cooldown And Depressurization).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to ES-1.2.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power Level: 100% NCS [B] 912 ppm Pzr [B]: 914 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History: At this power level for 136 days Core Burnup: 251 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/1/A/6100/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A EDG is OOS for Fuel Injector replacement. However, it is expected back within the next two hours.

1A MDCA Pump is OOS for motor replacement. However, it is expected back within the next two hours.

1NCP-5350, PRT Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, E-7, Turbine Stop Valve Closed, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Crew Directions:

Maintain present plant conditions.

Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLO's AVAILABLE Unit 1 Unit 2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill Ed Wayne Tanya

PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 28 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N12-1-3

REFERENCES:

1. OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. (Rev 174)

2. OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control. (Rev 116)

3. OP/1/A/6300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change. (Rev 10)

4. AP/1/A/5500/14, Rod Control Malfunctions. (Rev 14)

5. AP/1/A/5500/20, Loss of RN. (Rev 31)

6. Technical Specification 3.7.7, Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS). (Amendment 184/166)

7. Technical Specification 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating. (Amendment 184/166)

8. Technical Specification 3.6.6, Containment Spray System. (Amendment 265/245)

9. Technical Specification 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System. (Amendment 221/203)

10. Technical Specification 3.7.6 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System. (Amendment 184/166)

11. Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating. (Amendment 221/203)

12. Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.9, Boration Systems - Flow Path (Operating).

(Revision 101)

13. OP/1/A/6200/001 B, Chemical and Volume Control System - Charging. (Rev 51)

14. AP/1/A/5500/03, Load Rejection. (Rev 27)

15. EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (Rev 32)

16. EP/1/A/5000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. (Rev 10)

17. EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1, SI Termination. (Rev 25)

18. EP/1/A/5000/FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition. (Rev 13)

Validation Time: 110 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.

Facility Review: ________________________

Rev. 062112 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: N12-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 73% power (MOL), and has been stabilized at this power level for four hours while repairs are completed on the 1A EDG and the 1A MDCA Pump.

Repairs are nearing completion and management has approved a power increase to 100% for this shift. The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A EDG is OOS due to a Voltage Regulator failure. However, it is expected back within the next two hours. 1A MDCA Pump is OOS for motor replacement. However, it is also expected back within the next two hours. 1EMF 33, Air Ejector Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-6, D-13, RMWST Hi Level, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO 2

MAL I-RO Reactor Control DCS failure (Outward Rod Motion)

DCS1214 I-SRO 3 MAL C-BOP 1B RN Pump Trip RN007B C(TS)-SRO XMT 4 C-BOP 1B NV Pump Hi Bearing Temperature NVTE C(TS)-SRO 7540 5

MAL C-RO Turbine Runback/Manual Rod Control DEH002A C-SRO MAL 6 M-RO Steam Line Break Inside Containment SM007D M-BOP M-SRO MAL 7 NA SI fails to actuate automatically ISE002A ISE002B

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 McGuire 2012 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 73% power (MOL), and has been stabilized at this power level for four hours while repairs are completed on the 1A EDG and the 1A MDCA Pump. Repairs are nearing completion and management has approved a power increase to 100% for this shift. The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A EDG is OOS due to a Voltage Regulator failure.

However, it is expected back within the next two hours. 1A MDCA Pump is OOS for motor replacement. However, it is also expected back within the next two hours. 1EMF 33, Air Ejector Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-6, D-13, RMWST Hi Level, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.34 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with .4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.

Then, a Reactor Control DCS failure will occur causing continuous rod withdrawal. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/14, Rod Control Malfunction. After the implementation of the AP, the control rods will remain in MANUAL.

Shortly after this, the 1B RN Pump will trip on overcurrent. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/20, Loss of RN. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.7, Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS). Additionally, the operator will address Technical Specification 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, 3.6.6, Containment Spray System, 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, 3.7.6 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, and Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.9, Boration Systems - Flow Path (Operating).

Subsequently, the 1B NV Pump motor will develop a hot bearing. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm M1A0495, 1B NV PUMP MOTOR OUTBOARD BEARING TEMP, and swap Charging Pumps in accordance with OP/1/A/6200/001 B, Chemical and Volume Control System - Charging, Enclosure 4.2, NV Pump Operation. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, and Selected License Commitment 16.9.9, Boration Systems - Flow Path (Operating).

Subsequently, the Main Turbine will automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, Load Rejection. The operator will be required to manually adjust control rods during the runback.

Following this, a large Steam Rupture will occur inside Containment. SI will fail to actuate automatically. The operator will trip the Reactor and manually actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Upon completion of E-0, the operator is expected to transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. If the operator transitions to E-2, upon completion of this procedure, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1, SI Termination. The scenario will terminate at Step 7.c of ES-1.1, after the crew has closed 1NI-9A and 1NI-10B.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 However, due to the immense cooldown of the NCS, and the need to stop the NCPs upon high Containment pressure, an Orange or Red Path condition on INTEGRITY may occur at any time when the crew is operating within the EOP Network. If so, the crew will transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-P-1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, once the transition out of E-0 has been made. In this case, the operator will isolate the Faulted Steam Generator and terminate Safety Injection within FR-P.1. If a transition is made to this procedure, the scenario will terminate at Step 11.c of FR-P.1, after the crew has closed 1NI-9A and 1NI-10B.

Critical Tasks:

E-2 A Isolate CA flow to the Faulted Steam Generator.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).

E-0 D Manually actuate at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards prior to transition to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Safety Significance: Failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded ECCS capacity. Since SI can be initiated manually from the Control Room, failure to do so demonstrates an inability by the crew to recognize a failed auto actuation of an ESF and take appropriate action, and to take action that would unnecessarily challenge a CSF. In the specified scenario, if ECCS systems are not actuated, all assumptions made in the FSAR analysis for the Steam Line break analysis are invalid.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Rod Step On T = 0 Malfunctions:

Reset to I/C 262 (Base I/C 37).

insert MAL-EPQ001A ACTIVE (Loss of D/G A Control Power) insert LOA-DG020 RACKED_OUT (1A D/G Output Breaker Control Power Fuses) insert LOA-DG011 RACKED_OUT (1A D/G Output Breaker Racked Out) insert LOA-CA009 RACKED_OUT (CA Pump 1A Breaker Rackout) insert LOA-CA009A RACKED_OUT (CA Pump 1A Control Power) insert MAL-EMF-33 10 (EMF-33 Fails Low) insert MAL-ISE002A AUTO (SI Train A Fails to Actuate in AUTO) insert MAL-ISE002B AUTO (SI Train B Fails to Actuate in AUTO)

Place Tagout/O-Stick on:

RUN 1A EDG (Tagout)

Reset all SLIMs 1A MDCA Pump (Tagout) 1EMF-33 (O-stick)

MCB Annunciator AD-6, D-13 (O-stick)

NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.

Update Status Board, Setup OAC Freeze.

Update Fresh Tech.

Spec. Log.

Fill out the NEO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Prior to Crew Briefing RUN Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide crew with Reactivity Plan associated with power increase.

4. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/A/6100/003 marked up as follows:

Step 3.34.1 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.34.2 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.34.3 is initialed/person notified is identified w/Date & Time.

Step 3.34.4 is circled.

Step 3.34.5 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.34.6.1 is initialed/person notified is identified w/Date & Time.

Step 3.34.6.2 is NA/initialed.

Step 3.34.6.3 is NA/initialed.

Step 3.34.7 is initialed.

Step 3.34.7.1 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.34.7.2 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.34.7.3 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.34.7.4 is initialed.

Step 3.34.8 is initialed.

Step 3.34.8.1 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.34.8.2 is initialed.

Step 3.34.10 is NA/initialed.

Step 3.34.11 is NA/initialed.

5. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At examiner direction of Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N12-1-3.

At direction of examiner Event 1 Power Increase Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At examiner direction of Event 2 Reactor Control DCS failure (Outward Rod insert MAL-DCS1214 Motion)

TRUE (Reactor Control DCS Failure Rods Out Demand) delIA MAL-DCS1214 2 delay=0 cd='x01_176_2 eq 1' (DCS Malfunction Removed when CRD Bank Select to MANUAL)

At direction of examiner Event 3 1B RN Pump Trip insertMAL-RN007B =

TRUE (1B RN Pump trips)

At direction of examiner Event 4 1B NV Pump Hi Bearing Temperature insert XMT- NOTE: Initiate this malfunction from Browser, NV_1NVTE7540 231 NOT Lesson Plan.

delay=0 ramp=120 (NV Pump 1B Motor Outboard Bearing High NOTE: When Pump is stopped NV_1NVTE7540 Temperature) 97 ramp=300 seconds At direction of examiner Event 5 Turbine Runback/Manual Rod Control insert MAL-DEH002A4 TRUE (Turbine Runback)

At examiner direction of Event 6 Steam Line Break Inside Containment insert MAL-SM007D 2021250.000000 delay=0 ramp=60 (Steam Line Break on S/G 1D)

Post-Reactor Trip Event 7 SI fails to actuate automatically Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION E-0 Actions Start 2A RN Pump and Throttle Flow insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delay=0 ramp=10 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)

Stop All NF AHUs insert LOA-NF016 STOP (Ice Condenser AHU Start/Stop)

Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 9 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Increase Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100%

starting with Step 3.34 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/1/A/6100/003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.34) Increase power to 95% RTP. NOTE: The power increase will be at 2 MWe/minute.

RO/ (Step 3.34.9) WHEN 77-80% RTP, enable, NOTE: Based on the extent of OTDT DCS alarming as follows: the power increase, this action BOP may or may not be taken.

On DCS graphics, select MAINTENANCE MENU.

Select TAVG, DELTA T INPUTS &

ALARM CHECKING graphic.

Select ON for the following:

NCAA 5422 NCAA 5462 NCAA 5502 NCAA 5542 OTDELTAT-FAIL CRS (Step 3.34.12) Continue power increase to NOTE: The power increase 95% RTP. will be at 2 MWe/minute.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 10 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/1/A/6150/009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DILUTE NOTE: The BOP may repeat this task as needed during the power increase.

BOP (Step 3.6) Determine amount of reactor makeup water needed to obtain desired boron concentration using McGuire Data Book, OAC, Reactor Group Guidance, or plant parameters (T-Ave, Steam Pressure, Xenon worth, etc.). (R.M.)

Total Reactor Makeup Water:

BOP (Step 3.7) Ensure the following reset to zero:

(R.M.)

Total Make Up Flow Counter Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.8) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.6. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.9) Select ALTERNATE DILUTE on NC Sys M/U Controller.

BOP (Step 3.10) IF desired to makeup only through 1NV-175A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control), select CLOSED on 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control).

BOP (Step 3.11) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to NOTE: It is NOT desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow, adjust Rx adjust reactor makeup water M/U Water Flow Control setpoint to achieve flow.

desired flowrate.

BOP (Step 3.12) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 11 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.12.1) Place Rx M/U Water Flow Control in manual.

(Step 3.12.2) Adjust Rx M/U Water Flow Control output to control reactor makeup water flowrate.

BOP (Step 3.13) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to lower VCT level, perform the following:

(Step 3.13.1) Monitor Letdown Pressure.

(Step 3.13.2) Select HUT on 1NV-137A (U1 NOTE: The BOP may do this NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion at any time to lower VCT level.

Contrl).

(Step 3.13.3) IF Letdown Pressure increases greater than 20 psig, notify CRS.

(Step 3.13.4) AFTER desired level achieved, select AUTO on 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl).

BOP (Step 3.14) IF AT ANY TIME plant parameters require termination of dilution, perform the following:

(Step 3.14.1) Place NC System Make Up to STOP. (R.M.)

(Step 3.14.2) IF 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) was placed to HUT, place to AUTO.

BOP (Step 3.15) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.16) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.

BOP (Step 3.17) Check 1NV-175A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) open.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 12 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.18) Check 1NV-252A (Rx M/U Water Supply To U1 BA Blender Cntrl) open or throttled as required.

BOP (Step 3.19) IF 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid NOTE: 1NV-171A is NOT in Blender To VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO, AUTO.

check 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) open.

BOP (Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts.

BOP (Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.22) HOLD until one of the following occurs:

Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.6 added OR Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated BOP (Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows: (R.M.)

(Step 3.23.1) IF in AUTO, ensure the following off:

1A Rx M/U Water Pump 1B Rx M/U Water Pump BOP (Step 3.23.2) Ensure the following closed:

1NV-175A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) 1NV-252A (RX M/U Water Supply To U1 BA Blender Cntrl) 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Inlet Control)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 13 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.24) Ensure 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO.

BOP (Step 3.25) Ensure Rx M/U Water Flow Control in AUTO. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.26) IF Rx M.U Water Flow Control NOTE: The Rx M.U Water adjusted per Step 3.11 Flow Control was NOT adjusted.

BOP (Step 3.27) Ensure 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) in AUTO.

BOP (Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender. NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender.

BOP (Step 3.29) Select AUTO for NC Sys M/U Controller.

BOP (Step 3.30) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up.

BOP (Step 3.31) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.

BOP (Step 3.32) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.)

Total Make Up Flow Counter Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 14 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/1/A/6300/001A, TURBINE-GENERATOR STARTUP/SHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE RO (Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load (Step 3.5.1) IF Turbine in OPERATOR AUTO, perform the following:

(Step 3.5.1.1) Ensure desired change within Calculated Capability Curve.

(Step 3.5.1.2) IF turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.

(Step 3.5.1.3) Depress LOAD RATE.

(Step 3.5.1.4) Enter desired load rate in NOTE: the RO will select 2 VARIABLE DISPLAY. MWe/Min loading rate.

(Step 3.5.1.5) Depress ENTER.

(Step 3.5.1.6) Depress REFERENCE.

(Step 3.5.1.7) Enter desired load in VARIABLE DISPLAY.

(Step 3.5.1.8) Depress ENTER.

(Step 3.5.1.9) Depress GO (Step 3.5.1.10) Check load changes at selected rate.

OP/1/A/6100/003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE RO/ (Step 3.34.13) At greater than 85% steam flow from each S/G, ensure the following BOP valves in auto and open:

1CF104AB (1A S/G CF Cntrl Vlv Bypass) 1CF105AB (1B S/G CF Cntrl Vlv Bypass) 1CF106AB (1C S/G CF Cntrl Vlv Bypass) 1CF107AB (1D S/G CF Cntrl Vlv Bypass)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 15 of 62 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 16 of 62 Event

Description:

Reactor Control DCS failure (Outward Rod Motion)

Then, a Reactor Control DCS failure will occur causing continuous rod withdrawal. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/14, Rod Control Malfunction. After the implementation of the AP, the control rods will remain in MANUAL.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-DCS1214 TRUE (Reactor Control DCS Failure Rods Out Demand) delIA MAL-DCS1214 2 delay=0 cd='x01_176_2 eq 1' (DCS Malfunction Removed when CRD Bank Select to MANUAL)

Indications Available:

Control Rods stepping outward Tavg-Tref within band Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS/RO may go to hold on the Turbine.

AP/1/A/5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF two or more rods are either Immediate Action dropped OR misaligned by greater than 24 NOTE: No Rods have steps, THEN perform the following:

dropped.

Trip reactor.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual. Immediate Action RO (Step 3) Check rod movement - STOPPED. Immediate Action RO (Step 4) Check all rods - ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

RO (Step 5) Check ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE alarm (1AD-2, A-10) - DARK.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 17 of 62 Event

Description:

Reactor Control DCS failure (Outward Rod Motion)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 6) Check T-AVG/T-REF FAILURE ROD STOP alarm (1AD-2, B-7) - DARK CRS (Step 7) IF this AP entered due to unwarranted rod insertion or withdrawal, THEN GO TO Enclosure 3 (Response to Continuous Rod Movement).

NOTE: The CRS will go to Enclosure 3.

AP/1/A/5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION, ENCLOSURE 3, RESPONSE TO CONTINUOUS ROD MOVEMENT CRS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 system. RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS (Step 2) Notify IAE to investigate problem. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/IAE.

RO (Step 3) Evaluate the following prior to any control rod withdrawal:

Ensure no inadvertent mode change will occur.

Ensure the control rods are withdrawn in a deliberate manner, while closely monitoring the reactors response.

RO (Step 4) Check T-Ref indication - NORMAL:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 18 of 62 Event

Description:

Reactor Control DCS failure (Outward Rod Motion)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5) Do not move rods until IAE Booth Instructor: As IAE, determines rod motion is permissible. report the following:

The problem with the automatic rod control circuit has been identified. It does not affect the manual rod control circuit. Manual rod motion is permissible.

RO (Step 6) Maintain T-Avg within 1°F of T-Ref as follows:

Adjust Turbine load OR Borate/dilute NC System.

RO (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME a runback occurs NOTE: This is a Continuous while in this procedure, THEN observe the Action. The CRS will make following guidance: both board operators aware.

IF IAE has determined that it is permissible to move rods, THEN respond to the runback PER AP/1/A/5500/03 (Load Rejection).

For all other circumstances, assume rod control is not available and respond to the runback as follows:

Trip Reactor.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

CRS (Step 8) IF AT ANY TIME while in this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure a unit shutdown is required AND Action. The CRS will make rods cannot be moved, both board operators aware.

RO (Step 9) WHEN problem is repaired, THEN NOTE: This is a Continuous perform the following: Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Ensure T-Avg at T-Ref +/- 1°F.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 19 of 62 Event

Description:

Reactor Control DCS failure (Outward Rod Motion)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF auto rod control desired, THEN place rods in auto.

CRS (Step 10) Exit this procedure. NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

NOTE: The crew may restart the power increase.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 20 of 62 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Trip Shortly after this, the 1B RN Pump will trip on overcurrent. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/20, Loss of RN. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.7, Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS). Additionally, the operator will address Technical Specification 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, 3.6.6, Containment Spray System, 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, 3.7.6 Component Cooling Water (CCW)

System, 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, and Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.9, Boration Systems - Flow Path (Operating).

Booth Operator Instructions: insertMAL-RN007B = TRUE (1B RN Pump trips)

Indications Available:

1B RN Pump Motor breaker Green status light is LIT 1B RN Pump Motor amps indicating 0 MCB Annunciator 1AD-12/A-3 A RN PMP DISCHARGE LO PRESS MCB Annunciator 1AD-12/A-4 B RN PMP DISCHARGE LO PRESS Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/20, LOSS OF RN CASE I, LOSS OF OPERATING RN TRAIN BOP (Step 1) Check for potential loss of LLI as follows:

Check Unit 2 RN pump(s) that are Floor Instructor: If asked, As aligned to LLI - OPERATING U2 RO report 2B RN Pump is PROPERLY. running properly.

Check suction flowpath -

AVAILABLE.

CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 3) Check if adequate NPSH exists to running RN Pumps as follows:

Any RN pump - ON. NOTE: Both RN Pumps are OFF.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 21 of 62 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 6.

BOP (Step 6) Place idle RN train in service as follows:

BOP Check idle RN train - AVAILABLE TO START.

Start one train of RN as follows:

To start 1A RN pump perform the following:

Place manual loader for 1RN-89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to 10% OPEN.

Start 1A RN pump.

Ensure the following valve for train being started - OPEN.

1RN-86A (A KC Hx Inlet Isol).

Check the following cross-tie valves

- OPEN:

1RN-40A (Train A To Non Ess Hdr Isol) 1RN-41B (Train B TO Non Ess Hdr Isol) 1RN-43A (Train B To Non Ess Hdr Isol).

Ensure malfunctioning RN pump is off.

BOP Check if local venting of RN pump NOTE: Local venting of RN has been performed PER one of the pump has NOT been following: performed.

Enclosure 6 (1A RN Pump Venting)

OR Enclosure 7 (1B RN Pump Venting).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 22 of 62 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 6.f RNO) GO TO Step 6.h.

BOP Check Enclosure 8 (NV Pump NOTE: Enclosure 8 has NOT Cooling Via Gravity Drain To Sump) been performed.

- HAS BEEN PERFORMED.

CRS (Step 6.h RNO) GO TO Sep 6.j.

BOP Check Case II (Loss of Low Level or NOTE: Case II has NOT been RC Supply Crossover) - HAS BEEN performed.

IMPLEMENTED.

CRS (Step 6.j RNO) GO TO Step 7.

BOP (Step 7) Ensure cooling to KC as follows:

BOP Check 1A KC pump(s) - RUNNING. NOTE: The B Train of KC is operating.

CRS (Step 7.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.f.

BOP Check 1B KC pump(s) - RUNNING.

BOP Ensure 1B KC pumps aligned to reactor bldg non essential header as follows:

OPEN the following valves:

1KC-18B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1KC-228B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

CLOSE the following valves:

1KC-230A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

1KC-3A (Trn A Rx bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 23 of 62 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP Check 1B RN pump - OFF.

BOP Check 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet NOTE: 1RN-187B has NOT Isol) - LOCALLY THROTTLED been locally throttled.

DURING THIS PROCEDURE.

BOP (Step 7.i RNO) Perform the following:

Place 1RN-187B MODE SELECT switch to manual.

OPEN 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol).

BOP (Step 8) Perform the following on operating train:

A Train:

IF 1A RN pump is aligned to LLI, THEN THROTTLE 1 RN-89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to establish desired flow while attempting to maintain 1A RN pump flow less than 16,000 GPM.

BOP/ (Step 9) Investigate reason for loss of RN CRS train as follows:

Dispatch operator to check RN pump. NOTE: The BOP/CRS will dispatch an NEO.

Booth Instructor: After 5 minutes, as NEO, report that the 51 Overcurrent Relay on the 1B RN Pump breaker has operated.

Dispatch operator to check RN pump breaker.

Check suction flowpath alignment.

Check discharge flowpath alignment. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the Pump malfunction.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 24 of 62 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 10) Ensure Control Room Area Chiller NOTE: CRS may ask U2 BOP in service PER Enclosure 4 (VC/YC to perform this Enclosure.

Operation).

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 11) Align operating train of equipment with running RN pump as follows:

Check 1A RN pump - ON.

Check the following equipment - ON:

1A1 and 1A2 KC pumps - ON CRS (Step 11.b RNO) GO TO Step 11.i BOP (Step 11.i) Perform one of the following as necessary to align operating RN train with train of equipment cooled by RN:

Swap operating equipment to opposite train as follows:

IF desired to swap KC trains, THEN perform Enclosure 2 (Shifting KC Trains).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to Enclosure 2.

AP/1/A/5500/20, LOSS OF RN ENCLOSURE 2, SHIFTING KC TRAINS BOP (Step 1) Limit KC flow to 4000 GPM per operating KC pump in subsequent steps.

BOP (Step 2) Check the following:

1RN-40A (Train A To Non Ess Hdr Isol) -

OPEN 1RN-41B (Train B To Non Ess Hdr Isol) -

OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 25 of 62 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1RN-43A (Train B To Non Ess Hdr Isol) -

OPEN Any KC pump - RUNNING. NOTE: The B Train KC Pumps are operating.

BOP (Step 3) Check both ND pumps - OFF.

CRS (Step 4) Perform the following:

IF shifting from 1A KC Train to 1B KC NOTE: The crew will be Train, shifting from 1B KC Train to 1A KC Train.

OR IF shifting from 1B KC Train to 1A KC Train, THEN GO TO Step 20.

BOP (Step 20) Maintain the following limits in next steps:

IF 1A RN pump is aligned to LLI, THEN maintain 1A pump flow less than 16,000 GPM.

BOP (Step 21) Perform the following to establish RN flow to 1A KC Hx:

Ensure 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol)

Mode Select switch is in manual.

IF required to reduce RN flow to 1B KC NOTE: It is NOT required to Hx, reduce RN flow to 1B KC Hx.

THROTTLE OPEN 1RN-89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to establish desired flow to 1A KC Hx, while maintaining 1A RN pump within flow limit of Step 20.

BOP (Step 22) Perform the following:

Place control switch for 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) in the AUTO position.

Ensure 1KC-51A OPENS.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 26 of 62 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 23) Start 1A1 KC pump.

BOP (Step 24) Start 1A2 pump.

BOP (Step 25) Align Reactor Bldg header to 1A Train as follows:

OPEN the following valves:

1KC-3A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol) 1KC-230A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

CLOSE the following valves:

1KC-228B (Trn B Rx Bldg non Ess Sup Isol) 1KC-18B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

BOP (Step 26) Check both ND pumps - OFF.

BOP (Step 27) Place 1RN-187B MODE SELECT switch to auto.

BOP (Step 28) Check 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol) - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 29) WHEN RN flow through the 1B KC Hx begins to go down, THEN THROTTLE OPEN 1RN-89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to achieve desired flow rate while maintaining 1A RN pump within the following flow limit:

IF 1A Rn pump is aligned to LLI, THEN maintain 1A RN pump flow less than 16,000 GPM.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 27 of 62 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 30) Place 1KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) in CLOSE.

BOP (Step 31) Ensure 1KC-54B is CLOSED.

BOP (Step 32) Stop the following pumps:

1B1 KC pump 1B2 KC pump.

BOP (Step 33) Ensure NC pump thermal barrier isolation valves are OPEN.

BOP (Step 34) RETURN TO step in effect in body of this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS will return to the main body of AP-21.

Examiner NOTE: Because there are still AP-related actions to take with this procedure, the CRS may NOT address the TS at the time.

Consequently, it may be necessary to move to next event, and address the TS after the scenario.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.7, NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CRS 3.7.7 Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS)

CRS LCO 3.7.7 Two NSWS trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 28 of 62 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One NSWS A.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months train NSWS train inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.5.2, ECCS - OPERATING CRS LCO 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One or more A.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months trains trains to inoperable. OPERABLE status.

AND At least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.6, CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM CRS 3.6.6 Containment Spray System CRS LCO 3.6.6 Two containment spray trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 29 of 62 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. one A.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months containment containment spray train spray train inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.5, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) SYSTEM CRS 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System CRS LCO 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME B. One AFW B.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months train AFW train to inoperable in OPERABLE AND MODE 1, 2, status. 10 days from or 3 for discovery of reasons failure to meet other than the LCO.

Condition A.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW)

SYSTEM CRS 3.7.6 Component Cooling Water (CCW)

System

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 30 of 62 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One CCW A.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months train CCW train inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, AC SOURCES - OPERATING CRS 3.8.1 AC Source - Operating CRS LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System AND Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power Systems AND The automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 31 of 62 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME E. Two DGs E1 Restore one 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months inoperable. DG to OPERABLE status.

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.9.9, BORATION SYSTEMS - FLOW PATH (OPERATING)

CRS 16.9.9 Boration Systems - Flow Path (Operating)

CRS LCO 16.9.9 Two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

The flow path from a boric acid tank via a boric acid transfer pump and a charging pump to the reactor coolant system, AND Two flow paths from the refueling water storage tank via charging pumps to the reactor coolant system.

Note: An OPERABLE charging pump used to satisfy OPERABLITY requirements of one boration flow path may not be used to satisfy OPERABILITY requirements for a second boration flow path.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 32 of 62 Event

Description:

1B RN Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments A. One required A.1 Restore the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months boron required injection flow boron path injection inoperable. flow path to OPERABLE status.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 33 of 62 Event

Description:

1B NV Pump Hi Bearing Temperature Subsequently, the 1B NV Pump motor will develop a hot bearing. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm M1A0495, 1B NV PUMP MOTOR OUTBOARD BEARING TEMP, and swap Charging Pumps in accordance with OP/1/A/6200/001 B, Chemical and Volume Control System - Charging, Enclosure 4.2, NV Pump Operation. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.5.2, ECCS -

Operating, and Selected License Commitment 16.9.9, Boration Systems - Flow Path (Operating).

Booth Operator Instructions: NOTE: Initiate from Browser, NOT Lesson Plan:

insert XMT-NV_1NVTE7540=231 delay=0 ramp=120 (NV Pump 1B Motor Outboard Bearing High Temperature)

NOTE: When Pump is stopped NV_1NVTE7540=97 ramp=300 seconds Indications Available:

OAC Alarm M1A0495, 1B NV PUMP MOTOR OUTBOARD BEARING TEMP.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OAC ALARM M1A0495, 1B NV PUMP MOTOR OUTBOARD BEARING TEMP BOP (Step 1) Check oil levels on affected Pump NOTE: The CRS will dispatch and Motor. an NEO to evaluate the pump.

If so, Booth Instructor wait 4 minutes and report back that the 1B NV Pump motor casing is very hot.

BOP (Step 2) If either oil level is low (Below red tape)..

BOP (Step 3) If motor oil ring is NOT rotating BOP (Step 4) If motor bearing temperature is NOTE: The CRS will obtain a increasing greater than 2oF/minute, copy of OP/1/A/6200/001 B.

Shutdown Affected Pump per Floor Instructor: When the OP/1/A/6200/001 B (Chemical and Volume CRS seeks to obtain copy, Control System - Charging) provide a pre-printed copy.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 34 of 62 Event

Description:

1B NV Pump Hi Bearing Temperature Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 5) Monitor affected NV bearing Temperature on point trend.

BOP (Step 6) Verify thrust bearing oil temp gauge is less than 150oF.

BOP (Step 7) Notify Engineering of the high NV NOTE: The CRS may call Bearing temperature. WCC/Maintenance to address the Pump Motor.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

OP/1/A/6200/001 B, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM - CHARGING ENCLOSURE 4.2, NV PUMP OPERATION CRS (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs NOTE: The CRS may call that may impact performance of this WCC/Maintenance to address procedure. the 1A NV Pump.

If so, Booth Instructor report as WCCS that there are no outstanding R&Rs that could affect the performance of the 1A NV Pump.

CRS (Step 3.2) Perform the following section, as applicable.

Section 3.4, Shifting from 1B NV Pump to NOTE: The CRS will go to 1A NV Pump with All Reactor Coolant Section 3.4.

Cold Leg Temperatures Greater Than 300°F.

BOP (Step 3.4) Shifting from 1B NV Pump to 1A NV Pump with All Reactor Coolant Cold Leg Temperatures Greater Than 300°F.

If NC System is less than 400 psig.. NOTE: The NC System is >

400 psig.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 35 of 62 Event

Description:

1B NV Pump Hi Bearing Temperature Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF immediate pump swap is required, go NOTE: Immediate pump swap to Step 3.4.6 IS required.

BOP Start 1A NV Lube Oil Pump.

IF this is a routine start of the 1A NV NOTE: This is NOT a routine Pump.. Start of the Pump.

BOP Start the 1A NV Pump.

BOP Place in AUTO 1A NV Lube Oil Pump.

BOP Depress STP for 1A NV Lube Oil Pump.

Check START pushbutton released AND OFF lit for 1A NV Lube Oil Pump.

BOP Stop the 1B NV Pump.

Adjust charging flow and seal flow as needed.

Calculate DP between Seal Balance Line NOTE: The BOP will contact Pressure and Suction Pressure for 1A the NEO to obtain the local NV Pump. pressures necessary for this calculation.

Booth Instructor: as NEO, report the following:

1NVPG-5810 (1A NV Pump Seal Balance Line Pressure) =

51.2 psig 1NVPG-5790 (1A NV Pump Suction Pressure) = 31.2 psig If DP between Seal Balance Line NOTE: The DP is < 50 psid.

Pressure and Suction Pressure greater than 50 psid..

Evaluate back leakage through 1B NV Pump as follows:

HOLD until Pzr level stable at setpoint, THEN check 1NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) output.

If charging flow less than or equal to NOTE: No back leakage will 75 gpm AND 1NV-238 output greater be indicated.

than 74%,.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 36 of 62 Event

Description:

1B NV Pump Hi Bearing Temperature Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/Maintenance to address the 1B NV Pump.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.5.2, ECCS-OPERATING CRS LCO 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One or more A.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months trains train(s) to inoperable OPERABLE status.

AND At least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERALBE ECCS train available.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, AC SOURCES - OPERATING CRS LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 37 of 62 Event

Description:

1B NV Pump Hi Bearing Temperature Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Auxiliary Power System, and Two Diesel Generators (DGs) capable of supplying the Onsite Auxiliary Power Systems.

AND The automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME B.2 B.2 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from discovery of One DG Declare required condition B inoperable features concurrent with supported by the inoperability of inoperable DG redundant inoperable when required its required features.

redundant features is inoperable.

NOTE: With the 1A DG OOS, and the 1B NV Pump inoperable, the 1A NV Pump must be declared inoperable within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.9.9, BORATION SYSTEMS - FLOW PATH (OPERATING)

CRS 16.9.9 Boration Systems - Flow Path (Operating)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 38 of 62 Event

Description:

1B NV Pump Hi Bearing Temperature Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS COMMITMENT: Two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

CRS The flow path from a boric acid tank via a boric acid transfer pump and a charging pump to the reactor coolant system AND CRS Two flow paths from the refueling water storage tank via charging pumps to the reactor coolant system.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One required A.1 Restore the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months boron required injection flow boron path injection inoperable. flow path to OPERABLE status.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 39 of 62 Event

Description:

Turbine Runback/Manual Rod Control Subsequently, the Main Turbine will automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, Load Rejection. The operator will be required to manually adjust control rods during the runback.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-DEH002A4 TRUE (Turbine Runback)

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1AD-1/D-6 DEH TURBINE RUNBACK Turbine MWe is lowering Rod motion demand signal indicates > 1.5°F Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/03, LOAD REJECTION RO (Step 1) Ensure control rods in auto. Immediate Action NOTE: The RO will need to insert control rods manually.

RO (Step 2) Check Turbine Generator response as follows:

Check Generator - TIED TO GRID.

Check Generator output - GOING DOWN AS REQUIRED.

RO (Step 3) Check control rod response as follows:

Check control banks - MOVING IN AS NOTE: The Control Rods will REQUIRED. NOT be moving in AUTO as required.

RO (Step 3 RNO) IF no rods will move in auto; THEN perform the following:

Place Control Rods in manual.

Insert rods to reduce T-avg equal to programmed T-Ref.

If no rods will move, THEN.. NOTE: The Control Rods will move in MANUAL.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 40 of 62 Event

Description:

Turbine Runback/Manual Rod Control Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO Check all rods - ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

BOP (Step 4) Check CM system response as follows:

Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster pumps - RUNNING.

1CM-420 (Unit 1 Generator Load Rejection Bypass Control) - OPEN.

RO (Step 5) IF 50% runback, THEN ensure turbine impulse pressure going down to less than 410 PSIG.

CRS (Step 6) Announce: UNIT 1 LOAD NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO REJECTION, NON-ESSENTIAL to make Plant Announcement.

PERSONNEL STAY OUT OF UNIT 1 If so, Floor Instructor TURBINE BLDG.

acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 7) Check P/R meters - LESS THAN 20%.

CRS / (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

RO Designate an operator to continuously monitor reactor power.

IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is less NOTE: This is a Continuous than 20%, THEN perform Step 8 to Action. The CRS will stabilize reactor power. designate the RO to observe this action.

CRS GO TO Step 9.

RO (Step 9) Check condenser dump valves -

MODULATING OPEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 41 of 62 Event

Description:

Turbine Runback/Manual Rod Control Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 10) Check IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE alarm (1AD-11, J-5) - DARK.

BOP (Step 11) Check Pzr pressure control response as follows:

Ensure Pzr heaters are in auto.

Ensure Pzr spray control valves are in auto.

Check Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

Check Pzr spray control valves -

CLOSED.

RO/ (Step 12) Check load rejection - DUE TO LOSS OF CF PUMP.

BOP CRS (Step 12 RNO) GO TO Step 15.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-7.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 42 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Following this, a large Steam Rupture will occur inside Containment. SI will fail to actuate automatically. The operator will trip the Reactor and manually actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Upon completion of E-0, the operator is expected to transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. If the operator transitions to E-2, upon completion of this procedure, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1, SI Termination. The scenario will terminate at Step 7.c of ES-1.1, after the crew has closed 1NI-9A and 1NI-10B. However, due to the immense cooldown of the NCS, and the need to stop the NCPs upon high Containment pressure, an Orange or Red Path condition on INTEGRITY may occur at any time when the crew is operating within the EOP Network.

If so, the crew will transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-P-1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, once the transition out of E-0 has been made. In this case, the operator will isolate the Faulted Steam Generator and terminate Safety Injection within FR-P.1. If a transition is made to this procedure, the scenario will terminate at Step 11.c of FR-P.1, after the crew has closed 1NI-9A and 1NI-10B.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-SM007D 2021250.000000 delay=0 ramp=60 (Steam Line Break on S/G 1D)

Indications Available:

Containment pressure rises to > 1 psig Reactor Trip on Hi Containment Pressure (1FO-1/D-5)

Reactor Trip Breakers Open Rod Bottom lights LIT Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

EP/1/A/5000/E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP RO (Step 2) Check Reactor trip: Immediate Action All rod bottom lights - LIT

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 43 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Reactor trip and bypass breakers -

OPEN I/R amps - GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action All throttle valves - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 4) Check 1ETA and 1ETB - Immediate Action ENERGIZED.

RO/ (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action BOP NOTE: SI will fail to auto actuate, but may have been manually actuated by the time that the crew arrives at this Step.

If NOT, the RO/BOP will manually actuate SI.

A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (1SI-18) - LIT.

Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) - LIT.

Manually actuate at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards prior to transition to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Safety Significance: Failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance that leads to degraded ECCS capacity. Since SI can be initiated manually from the Control Room, failure to do so demonstrates an inability by the crew to recognize a failed auto actuation of an ESF and take appropriate action, and to take action that would unnecessarily challenge a CSF. In the specified scenario, if ECCS systems are not actuated, all assumptions made in the FSAR analysis for the Steam Line break analysis are invalid.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 44 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4) - LIT.

BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights -

DARK.

BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Groups 1, 2, 5 - DARK.

Group 3 - LIT.

Group 4 - LIT AS REQUIRED. NOTE: The 1B NV Pump is OOS.

Group 6 - LIT (Step 9.d RNO) GO TO Step 9.f.

BOP (Step 9.f) Check the following:

OAC - IN SERVICE LOCA Sequencer Actuated status light (1SI-14) on energized train(s) - LIT.

BOP (Step 9.g) Perform the following on energized train(s):

Check OAC Monitor Light Program (MONL) for Group 6 windows that are dark.

Align valves as required, while continuing in the EP.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 45 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

BOP MD CA pumps - ON NOTE: The 1A MDCA Pump is OOS.

RO/ (Step 10.a RNO) Start pumps. NOTE: No attempt will be made to start the 1A MDCA BOP Pump.

N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs - GREATER THAN 17%.

BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps - ON.

BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps - ON. NOTE: 1B RN pump is NOT running.

BOP (Step 12 RNO) Perform the following:

Start pump(s)

If any RN pump off, THEN perform the following....

IF 1A RN pump is off..... NOTE: 1A RN pump is running.

IF affected train is deenergized.... NOTE: 1ETB is energized Reset the following on affected train:

a) S/I b) Sequencer

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 46 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Dispatch operator to stop affected D/G NOTE: The CRS will dispatch using emergency stop pushbutton NEO.

Booth instructor:

Insert LOA-DG018 = Stop PB Insert LOA-DG018 =

Released Wait one minute then report to Control Room that 1B D/G has been stopped.

Monitor affected RN cooled components NOTE: The CRS will make and shut down as necessary. the crew aware.

CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the following:

Start 2A RN pump.

RO THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum Booth Instructor:

for existing plant conditions. insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delay=0 ramp=10 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)

RO (Step 14 RNO) Check all S/G pressures -

GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

RO (Step 14) Perform the following: NOTE: 1D SG Pressure is decreasing uncontrollably.

Check the following valves closed:

All MSIVs All MSIV Bypass Valves All SM PORVs If any valve open,..

RO/ (Step 15) Check containment pressure - NOTE: Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG. is > 3 psig.

BOP

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 47 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 15 RNO) Perform the following:

Check Monitor Light Panel Group 7 lit.

IF Group 7 window is dark on energized NOTE: Group 7 status lights train(s) are LIT.

Stop all NC pumps while maintaining seal injection flow.

Ensure all RV pumps are in manual and off.

BOP Energize H2 Igniters by depressing ON and OVERRIDE.

CRS Dispatch operator to stop all Unit 1 NF NOTE: The CRS will dispatch AHUs PER EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic NEO.

Enclosures) Enclosure 28 (De-energizing Floor/Booth Instructor:

Ice Condenser AHUs).

Acknowledge as appropriate.

Booth Instructor:

insert LOA-NF016 STOP (Ice Condenser AHU Start/Stop)

And then, report as NEO that breakers are closed.

BOP WHEN time allows, THEN check Phase NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 B HVAC equipment PER Enclosure 2 BOP to perform this (Phase B HVAC Equipment). Enclosure.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP.

BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:

Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge - INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressure - LESS THAN 1600 NOTE: NC Pressure is 1400 PSIG. psig.

Check NI pumps - INDICATING FLOW.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 48 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Check NC pressure - LESS THAN 275 PSIG.

BOP (Step 16.d RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) open:

1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) 1ND-67B (1B ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).

CRS IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.

CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The CRS may ask perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic OSM to address.

Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions If so, Floor Instructor Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

acknowledge as OSM.

RO/ (Step 18) Check CA flow:

BOP Total CA flow - GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

BOP Check VI header pressure - GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

RO WHEN each S/G N/R level is greater NOTE: Adverse Containment than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA numbers will need to be used flow to maintain that S/G N/R level until Containment Pressure is between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%. < 3 pisg.

RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:

IF all NC pumps on, NOTE: All NC Pumps will be OFF.

IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T-Colds - STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 49 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 19 RNO) Perform the following based NOTE: The CRS may assign on plant conditions: the RO to perform this action.

If so, RO Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3.

Others should move ahead to Step 20 on Page 49 to continue in E-0.

E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 3, UNCONTROLLED NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN RO (Step 1) Check steam dump valves - Examiner NOTE: Follow the CLOSED. actions associated with Enclosure 3 if RO is assigned by CRS to perform.

RO (Step 2) Check all SM PORVs - CLOSED.

RO (Step 3) Check MSR RESET light - LIT.

RO (Step 4) Check any NC pump - ON.

RO (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

IF any NC T-Cold is still going down, THEN GO TO Step 6.

RO (Step 6) Control feed flow as follows:

IF S/G N/R level is less than 11% (32% NOTE: Adverse Containment ACC) in all S/Gs, numbers will need to be used until Containment Pressure is

< 3 pisg.

WHEN N/R level is greater than 11% NOTE: Adverse Containment (32% ACC) in at least one S/G, THEN numbers will need to be used THROTTLE feed flow further to: until Containment Pressure is

< 3 pisg.

Minimize cooldown

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 50 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Maintain at least one S/G N/R level NOTE: The RO may stop feed greater than 11% (32% ACC). flow to 1D SG.

RO (Step 7) Check MSIVs - ANY OPEN. NOTE: All MSIVs will be closed.

RO (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

Close MSIV bypass valves.

Exit this enclosure.

E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners NOT following RO actions in Enclosure 3, continue HERE.

BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:

All Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

BOP Normal Pzr spray valves - CLOSED.

At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve -

OPEN.

BOP (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 0°F.

BOP (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:

All S/G pressures - STABLE OR GOING NOTE: The 1D SG is Faulted.

UP All S/Gs - PRESSURIZED.

BOP (Step 22 RNO) IF any S/G is faulted, THEN perform the following:

CRS Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

CRS GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-2 (Faulted Steam NOTE: The CRS will transition Generator Isolation). to E-2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 51 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: If at any time, a RED Path on INTEGRITY occurs, proceed to the Actions of FR-P.1 on Page 55.

EP/1/A/5000/E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP CRS (Step 2) Maintain any faulted S/G or secondary break isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for NC System cooldown.

RO (Step 3) Check the following - CLOSED:

All MSIVs All MSIV bypass valves.

RO (Step 4) Check at least one S/G pressure - NOTE: Although all SG STABLE OR GOING UP. pressures may be decreasing slowly, the operator will report stable based on plant conditions (i.e. faulted SG).

Otherwise a transition to ECA-2.1 will be made.

RO/ (Step 5) Identify faulted S/G(s): NOTE: The 1D SG is Faulted.

BOP Any S/G pressure - GOING DOWN IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR Any S/G - DEPRESSURIZED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 52 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 6) Maintain at least one S/G available for NC System cooldown in subsequent steps.

RO (Step 7) Check faulted S/G(s) SM PORV -

CLOSED.

BOP (Step 8) Reset CA modulating valves.

RO/ (Step 9) Isolate faulted S/G(s) as follows:

BOP RO/ For 1D S/G:

BOP Check S/G C FDW ISOLATED status light (1SI-4) - LIT.

Close 1CA-38B (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1D S/G Isol).

Close 1CA-42B (1B CA Pump Disch To 1D S/G Isol).

Check BB valves - CLOSED:

1BB-4B (1D S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control).

1BB-8A (D S/G BB Cont Inside Isol).

Close 1SM-101 (D SM Line Drain Isol).

CRITICAL TASK:

(E-2 A) Isolate CA flow to the Faulted Steam Generator.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 53 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 10) Close 1AS-12 (U1 SM To AS Hdr Control Inlet Isol).

RO/ (Step 11) Check S/G tubes intact as follows:

BOP Check the following EMFs - NORMAL:

1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector NOTE: 1EMF-33 is OOS.

Exhaust) 1EMF-24 (S/G A) 1EMF-25 (S/G B) 1EMF-26 (S/G C) 1EMF-27 (S/G D).

IF any S/G has previously been identified NOTE: There have been no as ruptured.. SGTRs identified.

Notify RP to perform the following:

IF S/G(s) fault known to be outside containment, THEN monitor area of steam fault for radiation.

Frisk all Unit 1 S/G cation columns to determine if activity level is significantly higher for any S/G.

Notify Control Room of any abnormal radiation conditions.

WHEN activity results reported, THEN notify station management to evaluate S/G activity.

RO/ (Step 12) Check S/I termination criteria:

BOP NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs -

GREATER THAN 0°F.

Secondary heat sink:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 54 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments N/R level in at least one intact S/G - NOTE: Adverse Containment GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC) numbers will need to be used until Containment Pressure is

< 3 pisg.

OR Total feed flow to intact S/Gs -

GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

NC pressure - STABLE OR GOING UP.

Pzr level - GREATER THAN 11% (29% NOTE: Adverse Containment ACC). numbers will need to be used until Containment Pressure is

< 3 pisg.

CRS GO TO EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 (Safety NOTE: The CRS will transition Injection Termination). to ES-1.1 EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1, SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP BOP (Step 2) Reset the following:

S/I.

Sequencers.

Phase A Isolation.

Phase B Isolation.

IF AT ANY TIME a B/O signal occurs, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN restart S/I equipment previously Action. The CRS will make on. both board operators aware.

BOP (Step 3) Establish VI to containment as follows:

Open the following valves:

1VI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 55 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess Hdr Outside Isol) 1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non-Ess Cont Outside Isol).

Check VI header pressure - GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.

BOP (Step 4) Stop all but one NV pump.

RO (Step 5 Check NC pressure - STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 6) Isolate NV S/I flowpath as follows:

Check the following valves - OPEN:

1NV-221A (U1 NV Pumps Suct From FWST Isol) 1NV-222B (U1 NV Pumps Suct From FWST Isol)

Check the following valves - OPEN NOTE: Both valves are CLOSED.

1NV-150B (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol) 1NV-151A (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol).

BOP (Step 6.b RNO) Perform the following:

OPEN valves.

IF both valves open, THEN GO TO Step 6.c.

(Step 6.c) CLOSE the following valves:

1NI-9A (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 56 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1NI-10B (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV). Examiner NOTE: If the crew arrives here without having received a RED Path on INTEGRITY, Terminate the exam here.

EP/1/A/5000/FR-P.1, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION Examiner NOTE: The crew may enter this procedure at any time after exiting E-0, based on a RED Path on INTEGRITY.

RO (Step 1) Check NC pressure - GREATER THAN 275 PSIG.

RO/ (Step 2) Monitor Foldout Page.

BOP RO (Step 3) Check NC T-Colds - STABLE OR GOING UP.

RO (Step 3 RNO) Try to stop NC System cooldown as follows:

Ensure SM PORVs CLOSED.

IF any SM PORV cannot be closed, THEN perform the following:

Ensure condenser dump valves CLOSED.

IF ND in RHR mode, THEN stop any cooldown from ND System.

Identify faulted S/G(s) as follows:

Any S/G pressure going dwon in an uncontrolled manner.

OR Any S/G depressurized.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 57 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF VI is not available for CA flow control in subsequent steps, Control feed flow to non-faulted S/G(s) to stop NC System cooldown asfollows:

RO WHEN N/R level is greater than 11%

(32% ACC) in at least one non-faulted S/G, THEN THROTTLE feed flow further to:

Minimize cooldown.

Maintain at least one non-faulted S/G N/R level greater than 11%

(32% ACC).

Minimize cooldown from faulted S/G(s) as follows:

Ensure the following valves CLOSED for each faulted S/G:

MSIV MSIV bypass valve.

IF TD CA pump is the only source of feedwater, THEN maintain steam flow to it from at least one S/G.

IF S/G B or C faulted, CLOSE 1AS-12 (U1 SM TO AS Hdr Control Inlet Isol).

IF 1AS-12 will not close AND IF 1AS-12 will not close AND IF all S/gs faulted, THEN (Step 3 RNO h.8) IF feed flow to faulted NOTE: If the 1D SG is NOT S/G(s) is not required for NC temperature isolated the CRS may read control, THEN isolate faulted S/G(s) PER these steps to the RO. If the Enclosure 2 (Faulted S/G Isolation). 1D SG is isolated the CRS may direct the RO to check the 1D SG isolated per Enclosure 2, and continue on in FR-P.1 with the BOP.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 58 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EP/1/A/5000/FR-P.1, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION ENCLOSURE 2, FAULTED S/G ISOLATION RO (Step 1) Reset CA modulating valves.

RO (Step 2) Isolate faulted S/G(s) as follows:

RO For 1D S/G:

Check S/G D FDW ISOLATED status light (1SI-4) - LIT.

CLOSE 1CA-38B (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1D S/G Isol).

CLOSE 1CA-42B (1B CA Pump Disch To 1D S/G Isol)/

CLOSE 1SM-101 (D SM Line Drain Isol).

CRITICAL TASK:

(E-2 A) Isolate CA flow to the Faulted Steam Generator.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).

EP/1/A/5000/FR-P.1, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION BOP (Step 3 RNO H.9) IF a faulted S/G is necessary for NC temperature control.

BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr PORV isolation valves:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 59 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves -

AVAILABLE.

At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve -

OPEN.

BOP (Step 5) Check if Pzr should be closed:

Check LOW PRESS mode -

SELECTED.

CRS (Step 5.a RNO) GO TO Step 5.d.

BOP Check Pzr pressure - LESS THSN 2335 PSIG.

Check all Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

IF AT ANY TIME any Pzr PORV opens due to high pressure, THEN after pressure goes below reseat pressure, ensure PORV CLOSES or is isolated.

BOP (Step 6) Check if S/I in service using any of the following:

Any NI Pump - ON.

OR 1NI-9A (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV) -

OPEN.

OR 1NI-10B (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV) -

OPEN.

RO/ (Step 7) Check if S/I can be terminated:

BOP NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs -

GREATER THAN 50°F.

Check RVLIS indication:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 60 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF all NC pumps off, THEN check REACTOR VESSEL LR LEVEL -

GREATER THAN 60%.

BOP (Step 8) Reset the following:

S/I.

Sequencers.

Phase A Isolation.

Phase B Isolation.

IF AT ANY TIME a B/O signal occurs, THEN restart S/I equipment previously on.

BOP (Step 9) Establish VI to containment as follows:

OPEN the following valves:

1VI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol).

BOP 1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol).

1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non-Ess Cont Outside Isol).

Check VI header pressure - GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.

BOP (Step 10) Stop S/I pumps as follows:

All but one NV pump.

Both NI pumps.

Check running ND pumps suction -

ALIGNED TO FWST.

Stop both ND pumps.

BOP (Step 11) Isolate NV S/I flowpath as follows:

Check the following valves - OPEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6&7 Page 61 of 62 Event

Description:

Steam Line Break Inside Containment/SI fails to actuate automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1NV-221A (U1 NV Pump Suct From FWST Isol).

1NV-222B (U1 NV Pump Suct From FWST Isol).

Check the following valves - OPEN.

1NV-150B (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol) 1NV-151A (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol)

CLOSE the following valves:

1NI-9A (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV).

1NI-10B (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV).

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power Level: 74% NCS [B] 1015 ppm Pzr [B]: 1016 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History: At this power level for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Core Burnup: 251 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/1/A/6100/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

The plant is at 74% power (MOL), and has been stabilized at this power level to address DEH screen display problems.

The DEH display has been repaired.

The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A EDG is OOS due to a voltage regulator failure. However, it is expected back within the next two hours.

1A MDCA Pump is OOS for motor replacement. However, it is also expected back within the next two hours.

1EMF 33, Air Ejector Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD-6, D-13, RMWST Hi Level, has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Crew Directions:

Raise power to 100% per OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation",

Enclosure 4.1, "Power Increase", starting at step 3.34.9. Conditioned power level is 100%.

Raise load at 2MWe/minute Use of Alternate Dilute during power ascension in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control, has been approved.

The Reactor Group has recommended that a Dilution of 400 gallons be made during initial power increase.

RMWST oxygen is less than 1000 ppb.

Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLO's AVAILABLE Unit 1 Unit 2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill Ed Wayne Tanya

PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 28 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N12-1-4

REFERENCES:

1. OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. (Rev 174)

2. OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control. (Rev 116)

3. OP/1/A/6300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change. (Rev 10)

4. AP/1/A/5500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. (Rev 9)

5. Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System. (Amendment 184/166)

6. Technical Specification 3.6.6, Containment Spray System. (Amendment 265/245)

7. Technical Specification 3.5.2 ECCS - Operating. (Amendment 184/166)

8. AP/1/A/5500/14, Rod Control Malfunction. (Rev 14)

9. AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower. (Rev 22)

10. OP/1/A/6100/010 E, Annunciator Response for Panel 1AD-4 (Rev 21)

11. AP/1/A/5500/06, S/G Feedwater Malfunction. (Rev 15)

12. Technical Specification 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits. (Amendment 184/166)

13. Technical Specification 3.2.4 QPTR. (Amendment 184/166)

14. EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (Rev 32)

15. EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. (Rev 34)

16. EP/1/A/5000/E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. (Rev 10)

17. EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1, SI Termination. (Rev 25)

Validation Time: _136_ minutes Author: David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.

Facility Review: ________________________

Rev. 062112 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: N12-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is stabilized at 59% power (MOL), for shift turnover. Management has approved a power increase to 100% for this shift. The 1B CF has just been started and both CF Pumps are in operation. The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A MDCA Pump is OOS for motor replacement. However, it is expected back within the next two hours.

1KCP-5490, KC Pump 1A Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-13, F-7, WE TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Power Increase N-BOP N-SRO MAL 2 C-BOP 1B2 KC Pump Trips KC010B C(TS)-SRO MAL 3 C-RO Dropped Rod/Downpower IRE006K2 C(TS)-SRO REM 4 C-BOP Boration Valve fails OPEN NV265B C-SRO REM 5 CF0026AB C-RO Feedwater Containment Isol valve fails CLOSED/Failure of MAL IPE001 C-SRO Auto Rx trip A/B 6

MAL M-RO Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO ISE007 M-BOP A/B M-SRO REM 7 NA Steam Dump valves stick OPEN SB0003 SB0006 MAL 8 NA Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump CA005 MAL 9 NA 1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start CA009B

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 McGuire 2012 NRC Scenario #4 The plant is stabilized at 59% power (MOL), for shift turnover. Management has approved a power increase to 100% for this shift. The 1B CF has just been started and both CF Pumps are in operation. The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A MDCA Pump is OOS for motor replacement.

However, it is expected back within the next two hours. 1KCP-5490, KC Pump 1A Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-13, F-7, WE TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.34 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with .4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.

Next, the 1B2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, 3.6.6, Containment Spray System, and 3.5.2 ECCS -

Operating.

Subsequently, one Control Bank B Control Rod will drop into the core. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-2/D-9, RPI at Bottom Rod Drop and will implement AP/1/A/5500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, and ultimately reduce power to less than 50% using AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits and 3.2.4 QPTR.

During the downpower 1NV-265B will be opened to initiate an immediate boration per AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower. When the BOP attempts to stop the boration, 1NV-265B will fail to close. The operator will be required to stop the BA Transfer pump in accordance with OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control.

Following this, the Feedwater Containment Isol valve (1CF-26AB) on the 1D Steam Generator will fail closed. The operator may attempt to take manual control of the valve IN ACCORDANCE WITH AP/1/A/5500/06, S/G Feedwater Malfunction, but will recognize that manual control from the Control Room is not available. Upon recognizing this, the operator will manually trip the reactor. Note that the automatic reactor trip signal will fail to actuate. The crew will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

On the reactor trip a FWIS will occur at a higher Tavg then normal. Simultaneously, the 1B MDCA Pump will trip upon start, and the TDCA Pump will trip on overspeed, causing the reactor to be left without a source of feedwater. Additionally, when the Steam Dumps open, two valves will stick fully open. The crew will exit E-0, and enter EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

Eventually, while in ES-0.1, the operator will determine that Safety Injection must be actuated and manually actuate SI. Upon SI actuation, the operator will return to E-0. While responding per E-0, a Red Path on Heat Sink will occur and the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 The operator will eventually restore feed flow using a CF Pump in accordance with Enclosure 8 (Re-establishing CF Flow) of FR-H.1. Upon restoration of feed flow to the Steam Generators, the crew will transition back to E-0.

The scenario will terminate upon the operator returning to E-0 after the secondary heat sink has been restored.

Critical Tasks:

E-0 A Manually trip the reactor prior to transition to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Generation/ATWS.

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the reactor when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not exist. This mis-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.

FR-H.1 Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before transition out of FR-H.1.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator results in the crew having to rely upon the lower-priority action of having to initiate RCS Bleed and Feed to minimize the possibility of core uncovery. Failure to perform this task, when able to do so, constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Rod Step On T = 0 Malfunctions:

Reset to I/C 263 (parent I/C-29).

insert LOA-CA009 RACKED_OUT (CA Pump 1A Breaker Rackout) insert LOA-CA009A RACKED_OUT (CA Pump 1A Control Power) insert XMT-KC_1KCPT5490 0.000000 (KC Header Pressure Transmitter Failed Low) insert (ANN) 1AD13_F07=ON (1AD13 F-7 in constant alarm) insert MAL-IPE001A = True (Failure of Auto Rx Trip Signal Train A) insert MAL-IPE001B = True (Failure of Auto Rx Trip Signal Train B) insert MAL-ISE007A ACT_AUTO cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (Automatic FWI Train A occurs on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light) insert MAL-ISE007B ACT_AUTO cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (Automatic FWI Train B occurs on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light) insert MAL-CA009B TRUE cd='H_X10_102_4 EQ 1' delay=0 (MD CA Pump 1B trips on overcurrent after pump ON light actuates) insert MAL-CA005 TRIP cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (TDCA Overspeed Trip occurs on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light) insertMAL-DEH003A TRUE (Failure of the Main Turbine to Auto trip) insertREM-SB0003 = 1 cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (Steam Dump Valve fails OPEN on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light) insertREM-SB0006 = 1 cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (Steam Dump Valve fails OPEN on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light)

Place Tagout/O-Stick on:

RUN 1A MDCA Pump (Tagout)

Reset all SLIMs 1KCPT5490 (O-stick)

MCB Annunciator AD-13, F-7 (O-stick)

NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.

Update Status Board, Setup OAC Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Freeze.

Update Fresh Tech.

Spec. Log.

Fill out the NEO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Prior to Crew Briefing RUN Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide crew with Reactivity Plan and procedures associated with power increase.

Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/A/6100/003 shall be marked up as follows:

Step 3.34.1 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.34.2 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.34.3 is initialed and Person Notified is listed with Date/Time.

Step 3.34.4 is circled.

Step 3.34.5 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.34.6.1 is initialed and Person Notified is listed with Date/Time.

Step 3.34.6.2 is NAd and initialed.

Step 3.34.6.3 is NAd and initialed.

Step 3.34.7 is initialed.

Step 3.34.7.1 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.34.7.2 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.34.7.3 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.34.7.4 is initialed.

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At examiner direction of Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N12-1-4.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of examiner Event 1 Power Increase At examiner direction of Event 2 1B2 KC Pump Trips insert MAL-KC010D TRUE (1B2 KC Pump Trips)

At direction of examiner Event 3 Dropped Rod/Downpower insert MAL-IRE006K2 STATIONARY_GRPPR (Control Rod K2 drops)

On Attempt to Close 1NV-Event 4 Boration Valve fails OPEN REM-NV265B = 1.0 cd (Conditional trigger set to fail valve open when 265B x10_280_3 = 0 the closed light goes dark)

At examiner direction of Event 5 CF Cont Isol valve fails CLOSED/Failure of Insert REM-CF0026AB Auto Rx trip

= 0, Ramp = 3 Minutes NOTE: Auto Rx Trip Failure at T = 0.

Post-Reactor Trip Event 6 Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO NOTE: This event will occur on Rx Trip.

Post-Reactor Trip Event 7 Steam Dump valves stick OPEN NOTE: This event will occur on Rx Trip.

Post-Reactor Trip Event 8 Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump NOTE: This event will occur on Rx Trip.

Post-Reactor Trip Event 9 1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start NOTE: This event will occur on Rx Trip.

Actions for FR-H.1 delIA MAL-ISE007A = 2 (Upon Demand to Reset FWIS) delIA MAL-ISE007B = 2 (Upon Demand to Reset FWIS) insert MAL-ISE007A = BLK_BOTH (Upon Demand to Reset FWIS) insert MAL-ISE007B = BLK_BOTH (Upon Demand to Reset FWIS)

Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 8 of 61 Event

Description:

Power Increase Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100%

starting with Step 3.34 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control, and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001 A, Turbine-Generator Load Change.

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/1/A/6100/003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE CRS (Step 3.34) Increase power to 95% RTP. NOTE: The power increase will be at 2 MWe/minute.

RO/ (Step 3.34.8) WHEN 70% RTP or as directed by Secondary Chemistry, perform the BOP following:

Begin placing C HDT Pumps in service per OP/1/B/6250/004 (Feedwater Heater Vents, Drains, and Bleed System).

WHEN C HDT Pumps are in service, ensure one Hotwell Pump secured per OP/1/B/6250/004 (Feedwater Heater Vents, Drains, and Bleed System).

OP/1/A/6150/009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DILUTE BOP (Step 3.6) Determine amount of reactor NOTE: The BOP may repeat makeup water needed to obtain desired this task as needed during the boron concentration using McGuire Data power increase.

Book, OAC, Reactor Group Guidance, or plant parameters (T-Ave, Steam Pressure, Xenon worth, etc.). (R.M.)

Total Reactor Makeup Water:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 9 of 61 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.7) Ensure the following reset to zero:

(R.M.)

Total Make Up Flow Counter Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.8) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.6. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.9) Select ALTERNATE DILUTE on NC Sys M/U Controller.

BOP (Step 3.10) IF desired to makeup only through 1NV-175A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control), select CLOSED on 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control).

BOP (Step 3.11) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to NOTE: It is NOT desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow, adjust Rx adjust reactor makeup water M/U Water Flow Control setpoint to achieve flow.

desired flowrate.

BOP (Step 3.12) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following:

(Step 3.12.1) Place Rx M/U Water Flow Control in manual.

(Step 3.12.2) Adjust Rx M/U Water Flow Control output to control reactor makeup water flowrate.

BOP (Step 3.13) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to lower VCT level, perform the following:

(Step 3.13.1) Monitor Letdown Pressure.

(Step 3.13.2) Select HUT on 1NV-137A (U1 NOTE: The BOP may do this NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion at any time to lower VCT level.

Contrl).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 10 of 61 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.13.3) IF Letdown Pressure increases greater than 20 psig, notify CRS.

(Step 3.13.4) AFTER desired level achieved, select AUTO on 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl).

BOP (Step 3.14) IF AT ANY TIME plant parameters require termination of dilution, perform the following:

(Step 3.14.1) Place NC System Make Up to STOP. (R.M.)

(Step 3.14.2) IF 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) was placed to HUT, place to AUTO.

BOP (Step 3.15) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.16) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.

BOP (Step 3.17) Check 1NV-175A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) open.

BOP (Step 3.18) Check 1NV-252A (Rx M/U Water Supply To U1 BA Blender Cntrl) open or throttled as required.

BOP (Step 3.19) IF 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid NOTE: 1NV-171A is NOT in Blender To VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO, AUTO.

check 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) open.

BOP (Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 11 of 61 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.22) HOLD until one of the following occurs:

Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.6 added OR Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated BOP (Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows: (R.M.)

(Step 3.23.1) IF in AUTO, ensure the following off:

1A Rx M/U Water Pump 1B Rx M/U Water Pump BOP (Step 3.23.2) Ensure the following closed:

1NV-175A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) 1NV-252A (RX M/U Water Supply To U1 BA Blender Cntrl) 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Inlet Control)

BOP (Step 3.24) Ensure 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) in AUTO.

BOP (Step 3.25) Ensure Rx M/U Water Flow Control in AUTO. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.26) IF Rx M.U Water Flow Control NOTE: The Rx M.U Water adjusted per Step 3.11 Flow Control was NOT adjusted.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 12 of 61 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.27) Ensure 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) in AUTO.

BOP (Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender. NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender.

BOP (Step 3.29) Select AUTO for NC Sys M/U Controller.

BOP (Step 3.30) Momentarily select START on NC System Make Up.

BOP (Step 3.31) Check NC System Make Up red light lit.

BOP (Step 3.32) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.)

Total Make Up Flow Counter Boric Acid Flow Counter BOP (Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water.

OP/1/A/6300/001A, TURBINE-GENERATOR STARTUP/SHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE RO (Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load (Step 3.5.1) IF Turbine in OPERATOR AUTO, perform the following:

(Step 3.5.1.1) Ensure desired change within Calculated Capability Curve.

(Step 3.5.1.2) IF turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 13 of 61 Event

Description:

Power Increase Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.5.1.3) Depress LOAD RATE.

(Step 3.5.1.4) Enter desired load rate in NOTE: the RO will select 2 VARIABLE DISPLAY. MWe/Min loading rate.

(Step 3.5.1.5) Depress ENTER.

(Step 3.5.1.6) Depress REFERENCE.

(Step 3.5.1.7) Enter desired load in VARIABLE DISPLAY.

(Step 3.5.1.8) Depress ENTER.

(Step 3.5.1.9) Depress GO (Step 3.5.1.10) Check load changes at selected rate.

OP/1/A/6100/003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE RO/ (Step 3.34.9) WHEN 77-80% RTP, enable, NOTE: Based on the extent of OTDT DCS alarming as follows: the power increase, this action BOP may or may not be taken.

On DCS graphics, select MAINTENANCE MENU.

Select TAVG, DELTA T INPUTS &

ALARM CHECKING graphic.

Select ON for the following:

NCAA 5422 NCAA 5462 NCAA 5502 NCAA 5542 OTDELTAT-FAIL At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 14 of 61 Event

Description:

1B2 KC Pump Trips Next, the 1B2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/21, Loss of KC or KC System Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, 3.6.6, Containment Spray System, and 3.5.2 ECCS - Operating.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-KC010D TRUE (1B2 KC Pump Trips)

Indications Available:

1B2 KC Pump Green status light is LIT 1B2 KC Pump motor amps indicates 0 1SI-13 KC B2 PUMP RUNNING light is DARK MCB Annunciator 1AD-6/B-1, A NC PUMP UPPER MOTOR BRG LO KC FLOW MCB Annunciator 1AD-6/B-2, B NC PUMP UPPER MOTOR BRG LO KC FLOW MCB Annunciator 1AD-6/B-3, C NC PUMP UPPER MOTOR BRG LO KC FLOW MCB Annunciator 1AD-6/B-4, D NC PUMP UPPER MOTOR BRG LO KC FLOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS/RO may go to hold on the Turbine.

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an NEO to check out the 1B2 KC Pump.

If so, Booth Instructor, wait 3 minutes, and then report that the 1B2 KC Pump Breaker shows a 51/50 Overcurrent Relay has operated, and the pump is NOT running.

NOTE: The CRS will enter AP-21.

AP/1/A/5500/21, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE BOP (Step 1) Check any KC pump - ON. NOTE: The 1B1 KC Pump is ON, and running properly.

RO/ (Step 2) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 15 of 61 Event

Description:

1B2 KC Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3) Secure any dilution in progress. NOTE: There may be a dilution in progress in support of the power increase.

BOP (Step 4) Check ND - IN RHR MODE. NOTE: ND is NOT in the RHR Mode.

CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 7.

CRS (Step 7) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 system. RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 8) Check both trains KC Surge Tank level - STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 9) Start standby KC train as follows:

Check standby KC train - AVAILABLE TO START.

Check standby KC Surge Tank Level -

GREATER THAN 2 FT.

Start standby KC train PER one of the following:

To start A Train, GO TO Enclosure 4 (Startup of 1A KC Train).

AP/1/A/5500/21, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE ENCLOSURE 4, STARTUP OF 1A KC TRAIN BOP (Step 1) Check 1KC-56A (KC To A ND HX) -

CLOSED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 16 of 61 Event

Description:

1B2 KC Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 2) Check 1KC-81B (KC To B ND HX) -

CLOSED.

BOP (Step 3) Check 1B Train KC pumps - OFF. NOTE: The 1B1 KC Pump is ON, and running properly.

CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

BOP (Step 5) Check 1A Train KC pumps - OFF.

BOP (Step 6) IF voiding of 1A train KC is NOTE: Voiding is NOT suspected. suspected.

BOP (Step 7) Close the following:

1KC-50A (Trn A Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

1KC-1A (Trn A Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1KC-230A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

1KC-3A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

BOP (Step 8) Start 1A RN pump.

BOP (Step 9) Ensure 1RN-86A (A KC Hx Inlet Isol) opens.

BOP (Step 10) Place control switch for 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) in the AUTO.

BOP (Step 11) Ensure 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) opens.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 17 of 61 Event

Description:

1B2 KC Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 12) Start 1A1 KC pump.

BOP (Step 13) Check 1KC-6 (1A1 KC Pump NOTE: 1KC-6 was NOT locally Discharge) - LOCALLY THROTTLED IN throttled in Step 6.

STEP 6.

BOP (Step 13 RNO) Perform the following:

Start 1A2 KC pump.

CRS GO TO Step 17. NOTE: The CRS/BOP may dispatch an NEO to check out the A Train KC Pumps.

If so, Booth Instructor, as NEO report that both pumps are operating normally.

BOP (Step 17) Check ND pumps - ANY ON NOTE: BOTH ND Pumps are PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE. and have been OFF.

CRS (Step 17 RNO) GO TO Step 20.

BOP (Step 20) Check KC leak - HAS NOTE: A KC System Leak has OCCURRED. NOT occurred.

BOP (Step 20 RNO) Perform the following:

Limit KC pump flow to 4000 GPM per operating KC pump in next step.

Open the following valves:

1KC-3A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1KC-230A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

Close the following valves:

1KC-228B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 18 of 61 Event

Description:

1B2 KC Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1KC-18B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

Open the following valves:

1KC-1A (Trn A Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

1KC-50A (Trn A Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

CRS GO TO Step 25.

BOP (Step 25) Check 1B ND pump - OFF.

BOP (Step 26) Check 1KC-81B (KC To B ND HX)

- CLOSED.

BOP (Step 27) Place control switch for 1KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) in the CLOSE position.

BOP (Step 28) Ensure 1KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) closes.

BOP (Step 29) Stop 1B1 and 1B2 KC pumps. NOTE: The BOP will stop the 1B1 KC Pump.

NOTE: The 1A KC Header pressure gage has failed in the Control Room. The BOP may call the NEO to report local 1A KC header pressure.

If so, Booth Instructor report 1A KC Header Pressure is 104 psig.

BOP (Step 30) Check KC flow - LESS THAN 4000 GPM PER OPERATING KC PUMP.

BOP (Step 31) Check ND pumps - ANY ON NOTE: BOTH ND Pumps are PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE. and have been OFF.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 19 of 61 Event

Description:

1B2 KC Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 31 RNO) GO TO Step 37.

BOP (Step 37) Check KC System leak - HAS NOTE: A KC System Leak has OCCURRED. NOT occurred.

CRS (Step 37 RNO) GO TO Step 41 in body of this procedure.

AP/1/A/5500/21, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE BOP (Step 41) Check any letdown path - IN NOTE: Normal Letdown is in SERVICE. service.

BOP (Step 42) Check NC pump thermal barrier valves - OPEN:

1KC-394A (A NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt) 1KC-345A (C NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt) 1KC-364B (B NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt) 1KC-413B (D NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt).

BOP (Step 43) Check KC to Aux Bldg Non-essential header - ESTABLISHED.

BOP (Step 44) Check NM valves (on 1MC-8) - NOTE: NM Valves have NOT PREVIOUSLY CLOSED BY THIS been previously Closed by this PROCEDURE. procedure.

CRS (Step 44 RNO) GO TO Step 46.

CRS (Step 46) Evaluate KC chemistry requirements as follows:

Notify Primary Chemistry of KC NOTE: KC System makeup makeup that has occurred or is in has NOT occurred.

progress.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 20 of 61 Event

Description:

1B2 KC Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Evaluate recirculating the KC Surge NOTE: There is NO NEED for Tank volume and feed and bleed of KC System Feed and Bleed.

KC System PER OP/1/A/6400/005 (Component Cooling Water System).

BOP (Step 47) Check both trains RN suction -

ALIGNED TO LLI.

CRS (Step 48) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CRS LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will declare ACTION TIME the B KC Train inoperable.

A. One CCW A.1 Restore CCW 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months train train to inoperable. OPERABLE status.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.6, CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM CRS LCO 3.6.6 Two containment spray trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 21 of 61 Event

Description:

1B2 KC Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will declare ACTION TIME the B NS Train inoperable.

A. One A.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months containment containment spray train spray train to inoperable. OPERABLE status.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.5.2, EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS CRS LCO 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE>

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will declare ACTION TIME the ECCS Train Train A. One or more A.1 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable.

trains train(s) to inoperable. OPERABLE status.

AND At least 100%

of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 22 of 61 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod/Downpower Subsequently, one Control Bank B Control Rod will drop into the core. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-2/D-9, RPI at Bottom Rod Drop and will implement AP/1/A/5500/14, Rod Control Malfunction, and ultimately reduce power to less than 50% using AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits and 3.2.4 QPTR.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-IRE006K2 STATIONARY_GRPPR (Control Rod K2 drops)

Indications Available:

DRPI for Control Rod K-2 indicates Rod on Bottom MCB Annunciator 1AD-2/B-3, P/R CHANNEL DEVIATION MCB Annunciator 1AD-2/B-10, ROD CONTROL NON URGENT FAILURE MCB Annunciator 1AD-2/D-9, RPI AT BOTTOM ROD DROP Tref > Tavg Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) IF two or more rods are either Immediate Action dropped OR misaligned by great than 24 NOTE: Only one Rod Dropped steps, during this event.

RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual. Immediate Action NOTE: The will RO place the rods in Manual.

RO (Step 3) Check rod movement - STOPPED. Immediate Action RO (Step 4) Check all rods - ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

RO (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following.

IF misaligned rod(s) due to DRPI NOTE: The misaligned rod is indication failure only, NOT a DRPI indication failure.

IF T-Avg has gone down, THEN lower NOTE: The RO may adjust Turbine load as necessary to restore T- load on the Turbine to Avg to T-Ref. maintain Tavg-Tref = 1oF.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 23 of 61 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments GO TO Enclosure 1 (Response To Dropped or Misaligned Rod)

NOTE: The CRS will transition to Enclosure 1.

AP/1/A/5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION ENCLOSURE 1, RESPONSE TO DROPPED OR MISALIGNED ROD CRS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 system. RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS (Step 2) Dispatch rod control system NOTE: The CRS may call qualified IAE to perform the following: WCC/IAE to address.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/IAE as appropriate.

Correct cause of misaligned rod.

Notify Control Room operators when auto or manual rod motion is available for reactivity control.

RO (Step 3) Do not move rods until IAE determines rod movement is available.

RO (Step 4) IF AT ANY TIME a runback occurs NOTE: This is a Continuous while in this procedure, THEN observe the Action. The CRS will make following guidance: both board operators aware.

IF IAE has determined that it is permissible to move rods, THEN respond to the runback PER AP/1/A/5500/03 (Load Rejection).

For all other circumstances, assume rod control is not available and respond to the runback as follows:

Trip Reactor.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 24 of 61 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO (Step 5) Check ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE alarm (1AD-2, A-10) - DARK.

RO (Step 6) Use OAC point M1P1385 (Reactor Thermal Power, Best Estimate) to determine reactor power in subsequent steps.

RO (Step 7) Check AFD (Tech Spec 3.2.3) -

WITHIN TECH SPEC LIMITS.

CRS (Step 8) REFER TO the following Tech Specs while continuing in the enclosure:

Tech Spec 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment NOTE: The CRS may check Limits). the TS now and conclude that LCO 3.1.4 must be entered.

Tech Spec 3.1.5 (Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits).

Tech Spec 3.1.6 (Control Bank Insertion NOTE: The CRS may check Limits). the TS now and conclude that LCO 3.1.6 NOT required to be entered.

Tech Spec 3.2.4 (QPTR) NOTE: The CRS may check the TS now and conclude that LCO 3.2.4 must be entered.

Ensure shutdown margin calculation is IF asked U2/WCC will perform performed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . SDM calculation CRS (Step 9) Contact Reactor Engineering for NOTE: The CRS may call instructions. WCC/RE to address the switch position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RE.

RO (Step 10) Check reactor power - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 25 of 61 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 11) Maintain T-Avg within 1°F of T-Ref as follows:

Adjust Turbine load. NOTE: The RO may adjust load on the Turbine as needed.

OR Borate/Dilute NC System.

CRS (Step 12) Determine if power reduction is required as follows:

Check any misaligned rod - GREATER THAN 12 STEPS MISALIGNED.

RO Check only one rod - MISALIGNED.

Check reactor power - GREATER than NOTE: Power is > 50%.

50%

CRS (Step 13) Reduce reactor power below 50%

prior to rod realignment as follows:

Ensure reactor power is less than 75% NOTE: The CRS may check within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months of rod misalignment to the TS now and conclude that comply with Tech Spec 3.1.4. LCO 3.1.4 must be entered.

Check QPTR (Tech Spec 3.2.4) - NOTE: The CRS may check WITHIN TECH SPEC LIMITS. the TS now and conclude that LCO 3.2.4 must be entered.

(Step 13.b RNO) Ensure reactor power is also reduced in subsequent steps as required PER Tech Spec 3.2.4 (QPTR).

Continue reducing load as directed in subsequent steps until reactor power is less than 50% to comply with Reactor Engineering requirements.

RO/ Observe the following limitations during BOP power reduction:

Do not move rods until IAE determines rod movement is available.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 26 of 61 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Borate as required during power reduction to maintain T-Avg at T-Ref.

Monitor AFD during load reduction.

IF AT ANY TIME AFD reaches Tech NOTE: This is a Continuous Spec limit AND reactor power is Action. The CRS will make greater than 50%, THEN perform the both board operators aware.

following:

Trip Reactor GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

Reduce reactor power to less than 50% PER one of the following procedures:

OP/1/A/6100/003 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Operation).

Enclosure 4.2 (Power Reduction)

OR AP/1/A/5500/04 (Rapid Floor Instructor: If the CRS Downpower). elects to use the OP rather than AP-4, as the OSM direct that AP-4 be used; and lower power to 40% at 10MWe/min within 30 minutes.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

AP/1/A/5500/04, RAPID DOWNPOWER RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 27 of 61 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3) Check turbine control - IN AUTO. NOTE: Turbine may be in manual at this time due to actions in AP-14.

RO (Step 4) Check MW LOOP - IN SERVICE. NOTE: MW Loop may be in service RO (Step 4 RNO) Depress MW IN/MW OUT pushbutton.

CRS (Step 5) Check shutdown to Mode 3 -

DESIRED.

CRS (Step 5 RNO) Observe Note prior to Step 8 and GO TO Step 8.

CRS (Step 8) Determine the required power NOTE: The CRS will reduce reduction rate (MW/min). load at 10 MWe/minute.

RO (Step 9) Check control rods - IN AUTO. NOTE: The control rods are in MANUAL for the dropped Rod event.

RO (Step 9 RNO) Perform the following:

IF auto control available, NOTE: AUTO rod control is NOT available.

IF manual control available, THEN NOTE: MANUAL rod control is NOT available.

BOP IF rods cannot be moved in auto or manual, THEN perform the following:

Borate as required to maintain T-Avg at T-Ref.

Monitor AFD during load reduction.

RO/ IF AT ANY TIME AFD reaches Tech NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP Spec limit AND reactor power is Action. The CRS will make greater than 50%, THEN perform the both board operators aware.

following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 28 of 61 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Trip Reactor.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

BOP (Step 10) Notify SOC of load reduction (red Booth Instructor: as SOC, dispatcher phone). acknowledge.

RO (Step 11) Initiate turbine load reduction to NOTE: The RO will select desired load at desired rate. 10MWe/minute.

BOP (Step 12) Borate NC System as follows:

Energize all backup Pzr heaters.

CRS Check unit to be shutdown - VIA NOTE: The direction has been REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% POWER. given to reduce power to 40%.

CRS (Step 12b. RNO) GO TO Step 12.d. NOTE: The total power change is 15%.

BOP Determine boration amount based on the following:

Power Reduction Rate (MW/min)

Present NC System Boron Concentration (ppm)

Total Power change (%).

Record calculated boration amount: 160 NOTE: The total boration is gallons. 160 gallons.

RO Check auto or manual rod control -

AVAILABLE.

BOP (Step 12.f RNO) Adjust boration amount as NOTE: Neither AUTO or follows: MANUAL rod control is available.

To estimate boration amount without the use of control rods, multiply boron calculated in Step 12.e by 3:

160 x 3 = 480 adjusted gallons

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 29 of 61 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP Perform boration in 4 equal additions Examiner NOTE: After the during load reduction PER first opening of 1NV-265B, the OP/1/A/6150/009 (Boron Concentration valve will stick OPEN, proceed Control), Enclosure 4.7 (Boration Using to Event 5.

1NV-265B (Boric Acid to NV Pumps)).

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.4, ROD GROUP ALIGNMENT LIMITS CRS LCO 3.1.4 All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE, with all individual indicated rod positions within 12 steps of their group step counter demand position.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 30 of 61 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments B. One rod not B.1Restore rod 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months within to within alignment alignment limits. limits.

OR B.2.1.1 Verify SDM is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months within the limit specified in the COLR.

OR B.2.1.2 Initiate boration to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months restore SDM to within limit.

AND B.2.2 Reduce 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months THERMAL POWER to

< 75% RTP.

AND B.2.3 Verify SDM is within the Once per limit specified 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months in the COLR.

AND B.2.4 Perform SR 3.2.1.1. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months AND B.2.5 Perform SR 3.2.2.1. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months AND B.2.6 Re-evaluate safety 5 days analyses and confirm results remain valid for duration of operation under these conditions.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.2.4, QPTR CRS LCO 3.2.4 The QPTR shall be 1.02.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 31 of 61 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER > 50% RTP.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. QPTR not A.1.1Reduce 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months within limit THERMAL POWER 3% from RTP for each 1%

of QPTR >

1.02.

AND A.2.2 Perform Once per 12 SR 3.2.4.1 hours and reduce THERMAL POWER 3% from RTP for each 1%

of QPTR >

1.02.

AND 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months A.3 Perform SR 3.2.2.1 and AND SR 3.2.2.1.

Once per 7 days thereafter AND A.4 Reduce Power 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Range Neutron Flux

- High Trip Setpoint 3% for each 1% of QPTR

> 1.02.

AND A.5 Reevaluate Prior to safety increasing analyses and THERMAL confirm POWER above results the more remain valid restrictive limit for duration of Required of operation Action A.1 or under this A.2.

condition.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 32 of 61 Event

Description:

Dropped Rod/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Prior to AND increasing THERMAL A.6 Calibrate POWER above excore the more detectors to restrictive limit show zero of Required QPT. Action A.1 or A.2.

AND Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months A.7 Perform SR after reaching 3.2.1.1 and RTP.

SR 3.2.21 OR Within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months after increasing THERMAL POWER above the more restrictive limit of Required Action A1 or A.2.

When the operator diagnoses that 1NV-265B has failed OPEN, move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 33 of 61 Event

Description:

Boration Valve fails OPEN During the downpower 1NV-265B will be opened to initiate an immediate boration per AP/1/A/5500/04, Rapid Downpower. When the BOP attempts to stop the boration, 1NV-265B will fail to close. The operator will be required to stop the BA Transfer pump in accordance with OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control.

Booth Operator Instructions: REM-NV265B = 1.0 cd x10_280_3 = 0 (Conditional trigger set to fail valve open when the closed light goes dark)

Indications Available:

Red status light for 1NV-265B LIT.

Green status light for 1NV-265B is DARK.

Emergency Boration flow 90 gpm.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/1/A/6150/009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.7, BORATION USING 1NV-265B (BORIC ACID TO NV PUMPS)

BOP (Step 3.6.4) HOLD until 1NV-265B (Boric NOTE: This action is in Acid To NV Pumps) full open time progress per AP-4.

elapsed, THEN close 1NV-265B (Boric Acid To NV Pumps). (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.6.5.1) IF 1NV-265B (Boric Acid To NV Pumps) will NOT close, perform the following:

Select "STOP" on the following:

(R.M.)

o 1A BA Trans Pump NOTE: The BOP will stop the 1A BA Trans Pump and observe Emergency Boration flow to be 0.

o 1B BA Trans Pump BOP Notify CRS. NOTE: The CRS will direct that the plant power level be stabilized.

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch a NEO to investigate.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 34 of 61 Event

Description:

Boration Valve fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a focus brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 35 of 61 Event

Description:

CF Cont Isol valve fails CLOSED/Failure of Auto Rx trip Following this, the Feedwater Containment Isol Valve (1CF-26AB) on the 1D Steam Generator will fail closed. The operator may attempt to take manual control of the valve IN ACCORDANCE WITH AP/1/A/5500/06, S/G Feedwater Malfunction, but will recognize that manual control from the Control Room is not available. Upon recognizing this, the operator will manually trip the reactor. Note that the automatic reactor trip signal will fail to actuate. The crew will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Booth Operator Instructions: Insert REM-CF0026AB = 0, Ramp = 30 seconds Indications Available:

CF Flow to 1D S/G lowering MCB Annunciator 1AD-4/B-4, S/G D LEVEL DEVIATION MCB Annunciator 1AD-4/C-4, S/G D FLOW MISMATCH LO CF FLOW MCB Annunciator 1AD-4/CE-4, S/G D LO LEVEL ALERT Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/1/A/6100/010 E, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL 1AD-4 C-4, S/G D FLOW MISMATCH LO CF FLOW RO (Step 1) IF loss of feedwater, go to Immediate Action AP/1/A/5500/006 (S/G Feedwater NOTE: The CRS may enter Malfunction).

AP-6 directly.

NOTE: The crew may trip the reactor and go straight to E-0 on decreasing SG levels before diagnosing which valve has failed. If so, skip to page 38 to evaluate E-0 actions.

AP/1/A/5500/06, S/G/ FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) Check all CF control and bypass NOTE: The 1D Feed valves - OPERATING PROPERLY. Control Valve is failing closed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 36 of 61 Event

Description:

CF Cont Isol valve fails CLOSED/Failure of Auto Rx trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 1 RNO) IF valve has failed, THEN perform the following:

Place affected valve(s) in manual. NOTE: The RO will place the 1D Feed Control Valve in MANUAL.

Restore S/G level to program. NOTE: The RO will be unable to control feed flow with the 1D Feed Control Valve in MANUAL.

RO (Step 2) Check both CF pumps -

OPERATING PROPERLY.

RO (Step 3) Check unit status as follows:

Reactor trip breakers - CLOSED Pzr pressure - GREATER THAN P-11 (1955 PSIG).

RO (Step 4) IF AT ANY TIME S/G N/R level NOTE: The RO will approaches 17% OR 83%, THEN determine that the 1D S/G perform the following: Level is approaching 17%

and trip the Reactor Manually.

Trip reactor.

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 37 of 61 Event

Description:

CF Cont Isol valve fails CLOSED/Failure of Auto Rx trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRITICAL TASK:

E-0 A: Manually trip the reactor prior to transition to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Generation/ATWS.

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the reactor when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not exist. This mis-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.

When the RO manually trips the reactor, move to Events #6-9.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 38 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start On the reactor trip a FWIS will occur at a higher Tavg then normal. Simultaneously, the 1B MDCA Pump will trip upon start, and the TDCA Pump will trip on overspeed, causing the reactor to be left without a source of feedwater. Additionally, when the Steam Dumps open, two valves will stick fully open. The crew will exit E-0, and enter EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. Eventually, while in ES-0.1, the operator will determine that Safety Injection must be actuated and manually actuate SI. Upon SI actuation, the operator will return to E-0. While responding per E-0, a Red Path on Heat Sink will occur and the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The operator will eventually restore feed flow using a CF Pump in accordance with Enclosure 8 (Re-establishing CF Flow) of FR-H.1. Upon restoration of feed flow to the Steam Generators, the crew will transition back to E-0.

The scenario will terminate upon the operator returning to E-0 after the secondary heat sink has been restored.

Booth Operator Instructions: The following will occur on the Rx trip:

insert MAL-ISE007A ACT_AUTO cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' (FWIS Train A) insert MAL-ISE007B ACT_AUTO cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' (FWIS Train B) insert MAL-CA009B TRUE cd='H_X10_102_4 EQ 1' (MD CA Pump 1B trips on startup) insertMAL-DEH003A TRUE (Failure of the Main Turbine to Auto trip) insertREM-SV0003 = 1 cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' (SDV fails OPEN) insertREM-SV0006 = 1 cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' (SDV fails OPEN)

Indications Available:

DRPI indicates all Control Rods on the Bottom Both Reactor Trip Breakers are OPEN All Turbine Throttle Valves are OPEN Feedwater Isolation Valves are CLOSED All Steam Dump Valves are OPEN initially and two stick OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 39 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

EP/1/A/5000/E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP RO (Step 2) Check Reactor trip: Immediate Action All rod bottom lights - LIT Reactor trip and bypass breakers -

OPEN I/R amps - GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action All throttle valves - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 4) Check 1ETA and 1ETB - Immediate Action ENERGIZED.

RO/ (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action BOP A SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (1SI-18) - LIT.

BOP (Step 5.a RNO) Perform the following:

Check if S/I is required:

Pzr pressure less than 1845 PSIG OR Containment pressure greater than 1 PSIG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 40 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF S/I is required, NOTE: SI is NOT required.

CRS IF S/I is not required, THEN perform the following:

CRS Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Tress).

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1 (Reactor Trip Response).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to ES-0.1.

At the brief the RO may report that two Steam Dump Valves are OPEN, and attempt to close them using the RESET Switch. This will be unsuccessful, and the CRS may dispatch an NEO to close the isolation valves.

If so, Floor Instructor:

acknowledge.

Booth Instructor:

insertREM-SB0002=0, ramp

=2 minutes, delay = 20 minutes insertREM-SB0005=0, ramp

=2 minutes, delay = 20 minutes As NEO, report when action complete.

EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Examiner NOTE: The plant is cooling down and will require SI actuation momentarily.

Move forward to Page 42 when SI is actuated.

RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP BOP (Step 2) Check the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 41 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments VI pressure - GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.

Any Unit 1 6900V bus - ENERGIZED.

CRS (Step 3) Announce: Unit 1 Reactor trip, non- NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO essential personnel stay out of Unit 1 turbine to make Plant Announcement.

bldg.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS (Step 4) REFER TO the following: NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP/0/A/5700/010 (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

RO (Step 5) Check NC temperatures: NOTE: The Steam Dumps have failed OPEN causing the plant to cooldown.

IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC T-AVG - STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F.

RO (Step 5 RNO) Perform the following based on plant conditions:

IF temperature less than 557°F AND going down, THEN perform the following:

RO Ensure all steam dump valves CLOSED.

IF MSR RESET light is dark NOTE: The MSR Reset light is LIT.

Ensure all SM PORVs CLOSED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 42 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF any SM PORV cannot be closed, Ensure S/G blowdown is isolated.

IF cooldown continues, THEN control feed flow as follows:

IF S/G N/R level is less than NOTE: At least one S/G level 11% in all S/Gs, may be > 11%, but trending downward.

WHEN N/R level is greater than NOTE: There is no feedwater 11% in at least on S/G, THEN flow.

THROTTLE feed flow further to:

Minimize cooldown Maintain at least one S/G N/R level greater than 11%.

RO IF cooldown continues, THEN NOTE: The operator will likely perform the following: close the MSIVs, and the S/G shrink will drive the plant into a Red path on Heat Sink.

CLOSE all MSIVs.

CLOSE all MSIV Bypass Valves.

Examiner NOTE: The operator will go FR-H.1 if a Red Path on heat Sink exists.

The operator will go to E-0 if SI actuates, and a red Path on Heat Sink does NOT exist.

EP/1/A/5000/E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: When the Red Path on Heat Sink occurs, the operator will go FR-H.1.

If so, move forward to Page 45.

RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 43 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments All rod bottom lights - LIT Reactor trip and bypass breakers -

OPEN I/R amps - GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action All throttle valves - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 4) Check 1ETA and 1ETB - Immediate Action ENERGIZED.

RO/ (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action BOP SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED status light (1SI-18) - LIT.

Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) - LIT.

CRS (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection. NOTE: The CRS may ask the U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4) - LIT.

BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights -

DARK.

BOP (Step 8 RNO) Initiate Phase A Isolation.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 44 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Groups 1, 2, 5 - DARK.

Group 3 - LIT.

Group 4 - LIT AS REQUIRED.

Group 6 - LIT.

CRS GO TO Step 10.

RO/ (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

BOP MD CA pumps - ON N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs - GREATER THAN 17%.

BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps - ON BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps - ON.

CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the Floor Instructor: As U2 RO following: report 2A RN Pump is running.

Start 2A RN pump.

THROTTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum Booth Instructor:

for existing plant conditions. insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delay=0 ramp=10 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)

RO (Step 14) Check all S/G pressures -

GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 45 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure - NOTE: Containment pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG. is normal.

BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:

BOP Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge - INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressure - LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.

BOP (Step 16.b RNO) Perform the following:

BOP Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) OPEN:

1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol) 1ND-67B (1B ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).

CRS IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.

CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The CRS may ask perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic OSM to address.

Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions If so, Floor Instructor Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

acknowledge as OSM.

Examiner NOTE: It is expected that the Red Path on Heat Sink will exist by this time.

The CRS will transition to FR-H.1.

EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 46 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 1) IF total feed flow is less than 450 NOTE: This condition is NOT GPM due to operator action, THEN RETURN met, and the crew will remain TO procedure and step in effect. in FR-H.1.

RO/ (Step 2) Check if secondary heat sink is BOP required:

NC pressure - GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE.

Any NC T-Hot - GREATER THAN 350°F NOTE: A Secondary Heat Sink (347°F ACC). is required.

RO/ (Step 3) Monitor Foldout Page.

BOP BOP (Step 4) Check at least one of the following NV pumps - AVAILABLE:

1A NV pump OR 1B NV pump.

RO (Step 5) Check if NC System feed and bleed should be initiated:

Check W/R level in at least 3 S/Gs -

LESS THAN 24% (36% ACC).

RO/ (Step 5.a RNO) Perform the following:

BOP Monitor feed and bleed initiation criteria.

WHEN criteria satisfied, THEN GO TO NOTE: This is a Continuous Step 22. Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS GO TO Step 6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 47 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6) Ensure S/G BB and NM valves NOTE: The CRS may assign CLOSED PER Enclosure 3 (S/G BB and the BOP to perform this action.

Sampling Valve Checklist).

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3.

Others should move ahead to Step 7 on Page 47 to continue in FR-H.1.

EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ENCLOSURE 3, S/G BB AND SAMPLING VALVE CHECKLIST BOP (Step 1) Check the following valves - Examiner NOTE: Follow the CLOSED. actions associated with Enclosure 3 if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform.

1BB-1B (1A S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) - CLOSED 1BB-2B (1B S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) - CLOSED 1BB-3B (1C S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) - CLOSED 1BB-4B (1D S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) - CLOSED 1BB-5A (A S/G BB Cont Inside Isol) -

CLOSED 1BB-6A (B S/G BB Cont Inside Isol) -

CLOSED 1BB-7A (C S/G BB Cont Inside Isol) -

CLOSED 1BB-8A (D S/G BB Cont Inside Isol) -

CLOSED 1NM-187A (1A S/G Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED BOP 1NM-190A (1A S/G Blowdown Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 48 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1NM-201A (1B S/G Blowdown Sample Hdr Cont Outside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-207A (1C S/G Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-210A (1C S/G Blowdown Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-221A (1D S/G Blowdown Sample Hdr Cont Outside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-191B (1A S/G Blowdown Sample Hdr Cont Outside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-197B (1B S/G Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED RO 1NM-200B (1B S/G Blowdown Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-211B (1C S/G Blowdown Sample Hdr Cont Outside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-217B (1D S/G Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED 1NM-220B (1D S/G Blowdown Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK RO (Step 7) Attempt to establish CA flow to at Examiner NOTE: Examiners least one S/G as follows: NOT following BOP actions in Enclosure 3, continue HERE.

Check power to both MD CA pumps - NOTE: The 1A MDCA Pump is AVAILABLE. OOS, and the 1B MDCA Pump has failed upon Auto Start.

RO (Step 7.a RNO) Perform the following:

RO IF 1ETA or 1ETB deenergized,.. NOTE: 1ETA and 1ETB are both energized.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 49 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF the essential bus is energized, THEN NOTE: The CRS will dispatch dispatch operator to determine cause of an NEO.

breaker failure.

Floor Instructor:

Acknowledge as NEO. Report back that the breaker has an overcurrent lockout relay showing, and the motor smells of burnt insulation.

RO (Step 7.b) Ensure control room CA valves NOTE: The CRS may assign aligned PER Enclosure 4 (CA Valve the BOP to perform this action.

Alignment).

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 4.

Others should move ahead to Step 7.c on Page 51 to continue in FR-H.1.

EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ENCLOSURE 4, CA VALVE ALIGNMENT Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with Enclosure 4 if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform.

BOP (Step 1) Check the following valves - OPEN 1CA-66AC (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Isol) - OPEN 1CA-62A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Isol) - OPEN 1CA-54AC (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1B S/G Isol) - OPEN 1CA-58A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1B S/G Isol) - OPEN 1CA-50B (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Isol) - OPEN 1CA-46B (1B CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Isol) - OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 50 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1CA-38B (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1D S/G Isol) - OPEN 1CA-42B (1B CA Pump Disch To 1D S/G Isol) - OPEN BOP (Step 2) Check the following valves - OPEN 1CA-64B (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-60A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-52AB (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1B S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-56A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1B S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-48AB (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-44B (1B CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-36AB (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1D S/G Control) - OPEN 1CA-40B (1B CA Pump Disch To 1D S/G Control) - OPEN BOP (Step 3) Check CA Storage Tank (water tower) level - GREATER THAN 1.5 FT.

BOP (Step 4) Check the following valves -

CLOSED 1RN-69A (1A RN Assured Supply TO U1 CA Isol) - CLOSED 1CA-86A (U1 TD CA Pump Suction From 1A RN Isol) - CLOSED 1CA-15A (1A CA Pump Suction From 1A RN Isol) - CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 51 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1RN-162B (1B RN Assured Supply To U1 CA Isol) - CLOSED 1CA-116B (U1 TD CA Pump Suction From 1B RN Isol) - CLOSED 1CA-18B (1B CA Pump Suction From 1B RN Isol) - CLOSED BOP (Step 5) Check the following valves - OPEN:

1CA-11A (1A CA Pump Suction Isol) -

OPEN 1CA-7AC (U1 TD CA Pump Suction Isol)

- OPEN 1CA-9B (1B CA Pump Suction Isol) -

OPEN BOP (Step 6) GO TO Step 8.

BOP (Step 8) Check 1CA-2 (U1 CA Pump Suct From CA Storage Tank Isol) - OPEN.

BOP (Step 9) Check CA pump suction from UST and CA Condensate Storage Tank (service bldg roof tank) valves - CLOSED:

1CS-18 (U1 UST To CA Pump Suct Hdr Isol) - CLOSED 1CA-4 (U1 CA Pumps Suct From SUT Isol) - CLOSED 1CA-6 (U1 CA Pumps Suct From CA CST Isol) - CLOSED.

EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK Examiner NOTE: Examiners NOT following BOP actions in Enclosure 4, continue HERE.

RO (Step 7.c) Start all available CA pumps.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 52 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 7.d) Check TD CA pump - RUNNING. NOTE: The TDCA Pump is NOT running.

RO (Step 7.d RNO) Perform the following as necessary:

IF 1SA-48BC (SM From S/G C To TD CA NOTE: 1SA-48BC indicates Pump Isol) is closed, THEN OPEN.

IF 1SA-49AB (SM From S/G B to TD CA NOTE: 1SA-49AB indicates Pump Isol) is closed, OPEN.

CRS IF TD CA PUMP STOP VLV NOT NOTE: The CRS will dispatch OPEN alarm (1AD-5, F-3) is lit, THEN an NEO.

dispatch operator to reset 1SA-3 (Unit 1 Floor Instructor:

TD CA Pump Turb Stop Valve) PER Acknowledge as NEO. Report EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures),

back that the TDCA Turbine Enclosure 24 (Resetting TD CA Stop has oversped and will NOT Valve).

reset.

CRS IF reason for loss of steam supply to TD NOTE: The CRS will CA pump not determined, determine from the NEO report that the TDCA Pump is unavailable.

RO/ (Step 7.e) Check total flow to S/G(s) - NOTE: There is no feedwater BOP GREATER THAN 450 GPM. flow.

RO/ (Step 7.e RNO) Perform the following:

BOP IF only one MD CA pump is on, NOTE: There are no MDCA Pumps running.

IF any CA pump is started, NOTE: There are no CA Pumps running.

IF any feed flow to at least on S/G is NOTE: There is no feedwater indicated, flow.

CRS IF no feed flow indicated, THEN perform the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 53 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF no CA pump can be started, NOTE: The CRS may call THEN dispatch operator and WCC/IAE to address the CA maintenance to CA pumps to try to Pump situation.

restore one CA pump to service.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Dispatch operator to ensure CA NOTE: The CRS will dispatch valves aligned PER Enclosure 6 an NEO.

(Local CA Valve Alignment).

Floor Instructor:

Acknowledge as NEO.

Booth Instructor: After 5 minutes report completion.

CRS GO TO Step 8.

RO (Step 8) Check steam dumps as follows:

Check condenser available as follows:

C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP status light (1SI-18) -

LIT Any MSIV - OPEN. NOTE: The MSIVs are CLOSED.

CRS (Step 8.a RNO) GO TO Step 9.

BOP (Step 9) Stop all NC pumps.

BOP (Step 10) Reset Feedwater Isolation as follows:

Check any Condensate Booster pump -

ON.

Check the following alarms - DARK.

1AD-5, G-6 (Inner Doghouse Level Hi) 1AD-5, H-6 (Outer Doghouse Level Hi).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 54 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS Dispatch operator to block Feedwater NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Isolation signal PER Enclosure 7 an NEO.

(Feedwater Isolation Override).

Floor Instructor:

Acknowledge as NEO.

Booth Instructor: delIA MAL-ISE007A = 2 (Upon Demand to Reset FWIS) delIA MAL-ISE007B = 2 (Upon Demand to Reset FWIS) insert MAL-ISE007A =

BLK_BOTH (Upon Demand to Reset FWIS) insert MAL-ISE007B =

BLK_BOTH (Upon Demand to Reset FWIS)

As NEO, report completion.

BOP Check S/I - HAS BEEN ACTUATED. NOTE: SI has been actuated.

BOP Reset the following:

S/I Sequencers BOP IF AT ANY TIME a B/O signal occurs, THEN restart S/I equipment previously on.

BOP Do not continue until Enclosure 7 (Feedwater Isolation Override) is completed.

BOP (Step 11) Check CM System in service:

Hotwell pump(s) - ON Condensate Booster pump(s) - ON.

RO/ (Step 12) Check CF pumps - AT LEAST NOTE: Both CF Pumps are BOP ONE AVAILABLE TO START. available to start.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 55 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 13) Establish CF flow PER Enclosure 8 (Reestablishing CF Flow).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to Enclosure 8.

EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ENCLOSURE 8, RE-ESTABLISHING CF FLOW RO (Step 1) Place the following valves in manual and CLOSE:

S/G CF control valves S/G CF control bypass valves.

RO (Step 2) CLOSE the following CF control isolation valves:

CLOSE 1CF-31 (1A S/G CF Control Inlet Isol).

CLOSE 1CF-33 (1A S/G CF Control Outlet Isol).

CLOSE 1CF-22 (1B S/G CF Control Inlet Isol).

CLOSE 1CF-24 (1B S/G CF Control Outlet Isol).

CLOSE 1CF-19 (1C S/G CF Control Inlet Isol).

CLOSE 1CF-21 (1C S/G CF Control Outlet Isol).

CLOSE 1CF-16 (1D S/G CF Control Inlet Isol).

CLOSE 1CF-18 (1D S/G CF Control Outlet Isol).

BOP (Step 3) Depress and release the Feedwater Isolation reset pushbuttons.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 56 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ (Step 4) Check any CF pump - RESET.

BOP CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 13.

RO/ (Step 13) Depress RESET on 1A OR 1B BOP CF PUMP RECIRC VALVE CLOSURE CIRCUIT and check RESET light lit.

RO/ (Step 14) Reset CF pump turbine that will be BOP placed in service as follows:

Depress RESET and hold RESET 2-3 seconds after the RST light is lit on pump to be started.

Check CF pump turbine to be started RESET.

RO (Step 15) Align AS header as follows:

CLOSE 1AS-9 (U1 C Htr Bleed To AS Hdr Isol).

CRS Check Unit 2 as follows:

Unit 2 Reactor power - GREATER NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RO to THAN 15% report power level.

If so, Floor Instructor report 100% as U2 RO.

Unit 2 2AS-12 (U2 SM to AS Hdr NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RO to Control Inlet Isol) - OPEN report valve position.

If so, Floor Instructor report 2AS-12 is OPEN.

CRS Unit 2 - AVAILABLE TO SUPPLY AS HEADER.

RO/ Isolate Unit 1 SM to AS header as BOP follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 57 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF AT ANY TIME AS header NOTE: This is a Continuous pressure cannot be maintained Action. The CRS will make greater than 140 PSIG while both board operators aware.

performing the following step, THEN GO TO Step 15.e.

RO/ Slowly CLOSE 1AS-12 (U1 SM To BOP AS Hdr Control Inlet Isol) while monitoring AS header pressure.

CRS (Step 15.d) GO TO Step 16.

RO/ (Step 16) Check 1HM-95 (U1 Aux Steam NOTE: 1HM-95 is CLOSED.

BOP Supply to CF Pumps Turbine Isol) - OPEN.

RO/ Step 16 RNO) Open 1HM-95.

BOP RO/ (Step 17) CLOSE the following valves:

BOP CLOSE 1CF-35AB (1A S/G CF Cont Outside Isol).

CLOSE 1CF-30AB (1B S/G CF Cont Outside Isol).

CLOSE 1CF-28AB (1C S/G CF Cont Outside Isol).

CLOSE 1CF-26AB (1D S/G CF Cont Outside Isol).

RO/ (Step 18) Check 1A CF pump - TO BE BOP PLACED IN SERVICE.

RO/ (Step 19) Place 1A CF pump in service as BOP follows:

Place the following in auto:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 58 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1A CF pump turbine low pressure governor control.

1A CF pump turbine high pressure governor control.

OPEN stop valves by depressing RAISE on 1A CF PUMP TURBINE HP-LP SV until MAX light is lit on the following:

1SP-15 (1A CFPT Turb Hi Press Step valve) 1HM-157 (1A CFPT Turb Lo Press Step valve)

Adjust 1A CF pump turbine speed using NOTE: S/G pressures are control located on low pressure governor 1100 psig.

controller to establish CF HEADRE PRESSURE 50-100 PSIG above S/G pressure.

CRS (Step 19.d) GO TO Step 21.

RO/ (Step 21) Check feed and bleed - NOTE: Feed and Bleed has BOP ESTABLISHED IN BODYOF THIS NOT been established.

PROCEDURE.

RO/ (Step 21 RNO) Perform the following:

BOP WHEN restoring feed flow in next steps, THEN control feed flow as required to raise S/G levels while preventing an uncontrolled NC system cooldown.

CRS GO TO Step 25.

RO (Step 25) OPEN the following valve(s) for the S/Gs to be fed:

1CF-126B (1A S/G CF To CA Nozzle Isol)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 59 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1CF-127B (1B S/G CF To CA Nozzle Isol) 1CF-128B (1C S/G CF TO CA Nozzle Isol) 1CF-129B (1D S/G CF To CA Nozzle Isol).

RO (Step 26) Establish feed flow to desired S/G(s) as follows:

THROTTLE OPEN S/G CF control bypass valve for S/G(s) to be fed.

Monitor CF pump discharge pressure NOTE: This is a Continuous and adjust CF pump speed as needed to Action. The CRS will make maintain CF HEADER PRESSURE 50- both board operators aware.

100 PSIG above S/G pressure.

IF AT ANY TIME S/G CF control bypass NOTE: This is a Continuous valves are throttled closed, THEN ensure Action. The CRS will make pump speed is controlled at same time to both board operators aware.

avoid a CF pump trip on high discharge pressure (1435 PSIG).

CRS (Step 27) Check Step 23 or 24 in this NOTE: Step 23 or 24 have enclosure - IMPLEMENTED. NOT been implemented.

RO (Step 27 RNO) Perform the following:

WHEN S/G N/R level is greater than 11%

(32% ACC), THEN control CF flow to maintain N/R level between 11% (32%

ACC) and 50%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 60 of 61 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/Failure of Turbine to Trip in AUTO/ Steam Dump valves stick OPEN/ Overspeed Trip of TDCA Pump/1B MDCA Pump trips upon Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRITICAL TASK Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before transition out of FR-H.1.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator results in the crew having to rely upon the lower-priority action of having to initiate RCS Bleed and Feed to minimize the possibility of core uncovery. Failure to perform this task, when able to do so, constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers.

CRS (Step 27 RNO b) RETURN TO step in effect in body of this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to Step 14 of FR-H.1.

EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK RO/ (Step 14) Check S/G levels:

BOP N/R level in at least on S/G - GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

RO/ (Step 14 RNO a) Perform the following:

BOP IF feed flow to at least on S/G is indicated, THEN maintain flow to restore N/R level to between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.

IF feed flow not indicated, THEN .. NOTE: Feed flow is indicated.

CRS (Step 14 RNO b) Return to procedure and NOTE: The CRS will transition step in effect. to E-0 or ES-0.1 if the transition into FR-H.1 came from ES-0.1.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power Level: 59% NCS [B] 965 ppm Pzr [B]: 968 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History: At this power level for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Core Burnup: 251 EFPD CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/1/A/6100/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

The plant was shutdown two days ago for a corrective maintenance outage, and restarted on the previous shift.

The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The plant is stabilized at 59% power (MOL), per Chemistry request.

Management has approved a power increase to 100% for this shift.

The 1B CF pump has just been started and both CF Pumps are in operation.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1A MDCA Pump is OOS for motor replacement. However, it is expected back within the next two hours.

1KCP-5490, KC Pump 1A Header Pressure, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD-13, F-7, WE TANK LO LEVEL, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Crew Directions:

Continue power increase beginning with Step 3.34.8 of OP/1/A/6100/03 Raise load at 2MWe/minute Use of Alternate Dilute during power ascension in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, Alternate Dilute, of OP/1/A/6150/009, Boron Concentration Control, has been approved.

The Reactor Group has recommended that a Dilution of 600 gallons be made during initial power increase.

RMWST oxygen is less than 1000 ppb.

Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLO's AVAILABLE Unit 1 Unit 2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill Ed Wayne Tanya

PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 28 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N12-1-5

REFERENCES:

1. OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation. (Rev 174)

2. OP/1/A6200/001A, Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown. (Rev 46)

3. AP/1/A/5500/01, Steam Leak. (Rev 18)

4. Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs). (Amendment 221/201)

5. Specification 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits. (Amendment 219/201)

6. AP/1/A/5500/16, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation. (Rev 12)

7. Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation. (Amendment 184/166)

8. AP/1/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power. (Rev 31)

9. AP/1/A/5500/08, Malfunction of NC Pump. (Rev 12)

10. Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating. (Amendment 221/203)

11. Technical Specification 3.8.4, DC Sources - Operating. (Amendment 184/166)

12. Technical Specification 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Operating. (Amendment 184/166)

13. EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (Rev 32)

14. EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. (Rev 30)

15. EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. (Rev 34)

Validation Time: 116 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Western Technical Services, Inc.

Facility Review: ________________________

Rev. 062112 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: N12-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 1x10-8 amps in accordance with OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, following a severe weather induced plant shutdown two days ago. Maximum Letdown is in service.

The crew is expected to raise power to 30% on this shift. The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1D RC Pump is OOS due to motor replacement. 1NIP-5270, Containment Sump Level, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-13, B-3, Cont Press Alert Hi, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Raise power to 4%

N-SRO 2 NA N-BOP Swap Letdown Orifices N-SRO 3 XMT C-RO 1A SG PORV Controller failure SM-1SMPT55 C-SRO 20 4 MAL I(TS)-SRO IR Channel Compensating Voltage failure ENB007A 5 MAL C-BOP Ground Fault on 1ETA EP008A C(TS)-SRO 6 MAL C-RO High Vibration on 1A NCP NCP003A C-BOP C-SRO 7 MAL M-RO LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG EP001 automatically M-BOP EQB003B M-SRO 8 MAL NA PORV Fails Open NC003B

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 McGuire 2012 NRC Scenario #5 Unit 1 is at 1x10-8 amps in accordance with OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, following a severe weather induced plant shutdown two days ago. Maximum Letdown is in service. The crew is expected to raise power to 30% on this shift. The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1D RC Pump is OOS due to motor replacement.

1NIP-5270, Containment Sump Level, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-13, B-3, Cont Press Alert Hi, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power in accordance with Step 3.14.15 of .1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.

Following this, the operator will be directed to swap Letdown from 1NV-457A to 1NV-35A (1NV-459). The operator will perform Enclosure 4.3, Swapping Letdown Orifices, of OP/1/A6200/001A, Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown.

After this, the 1A SG PORV Controller will fail such that the PORV fails fully open due to a pressure transmitter failure. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/01, Steam Leak. and close the PORV using the manual loader. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE; and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

After this, the Compensating Voltage for Intermediate Range Channel N35 will fail. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/16, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation, and perform Case II, Intermediate Range Malfunction The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation. This malfunction will require that the operator manually re-energize the Source Range channels after a reactor trip has occurred.

Next, a ground fault will occur on 1ETA causing the bus to de-energize. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power, and start the equipment on the B Train. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, 3.8.4, DC Sources

- Operating, and 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Operating.

Shortly afterwards, a high vibration condition will develop on the 1A NCP. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm M1D3041, 1A NC PUMP VIBRATION (HALM), and enter AP/1/A/5500/08, Malfunction of NC Pump, ultimately tripping the reactor and stopping the NCP. The operator will manually trip the reactor and enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Upon reactor trip, a Total Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP) will occur. The 1A EDG will not start due to a Ground Fault on 1ETA, and the 1B DG will not auto start due to a Sequencer failure.

The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, however the operator will immediately recognize that all Essential AC Busses are de-energized and enter EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. Additionally, PORV 1NC-34A will fail open.

Within ECA-0.0, the operator will need to recognize and close the failed PORV and take action to manually start the 1B DG.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Safety Injection may actuate on low pressurizer pressure due to the failed PORV. If so, the SI pumps will need to be started manually.

Upon restoration of power to 1ETB, the operator will transition to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and either terminate SI at Step 27.b of E-0, when the crew has closed 1NI-9A/10B; or determine that SI is not needed and transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, at Step 5 RNO.

Critical Tasks:

E-0 C Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus before proceeding past Step 18 in ECA-0.0.

Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the Critical Task results in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the RCP Seals. Additionally, failure to perform the Critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which NCS inventory is being lost and cannot be replaced. This situation could potentially be equivalent to a situation in which a Small Break LOCA were to exist without the ability to add inventory through the ECCS.

ECA-0.0 A Isolate the NCS by closing the failed PORV before transition out of ECA-0.0.

Safety Significance: Failure to close the PORV under the existing plant conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance which leads to degradation of any fission product barrier. In this situation, the NCS Barrier can be restored to full integrity by manually closing the PORV. Therefore, a failure to close the PORV represents a demonstrated inability to take action that would present a challenge to a safety barrier.

NOTE: This scenario will require the assignment of a Surrogate Licensed Operator to monitor/control Steam Generator level, Steam Dumps, Tavg, Tcold and the operating CF Pump during this scenario. This is based on Step 3.1.2 of Enclosure 4.8 of OP/1/A/6100/003 which requires the assignment of this operator during reactor startup. The surrogate may be released after event 2.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Rod Step On T = 0 Malfunctions:

Reset to I/C 13.

insert XMT-NI_1NILT5270=0.0 (Containment Sump Level 1NIP-5270 Failed) insert H_X09_002B03_1 1 (1AD-13, B-3 in constant alarm) insertLOA-RC017A RACKED_OUT (1D RC Pump Control Power) insertLOA-RC017 RACKED_OUT (1D RC Pump Breaker) insert MAL-NC003B 50.000000 cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' (PORV 1NC34A Fails OPEN on Reactor Trip Breaker Open)

Place Tagout/O-Stick on:

RUN 1D RC Pump (Tagout)

Reset all SLIMs 1NIP-5270 (O-stick)

MCB Annunciator AD-13, B-3 (O-stick)

NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.

Update Status Board, Setup OAC Freeze.

Update Fresh Tech.

Spec. Log.

Fill out the NEO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Prior to Crew Briefing RUN Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide crew with Enclosure 4.3 of OP/1/A/6200/001 A marked up as follows:

Step 2.1 is initialed.

Step 3.1 Checkbox is checked.

Step 3.2 is initialed/Person Notified/Date and Time recorded.

4. Provide crew with Enclosure 4.8 of OP/1/A/6100/003 (Blank).

5. Provide crew with Enclosure 4.14 of OP/1/A/6100/003.

6. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/A/6100/003, marked up as follows:

Step 2.1 - Initialed.

Step 3.1 - Checkbox checked.

Step 3.2 - Initialed.

Step 3.3 - NA/Initialed.

Step 3.4 - NA/Initialed.

Step 3.5 - Initialed.

Step 3.6 - Checkbox checked.

Step 3.7 - Initialed.

Step 3.8 - Initialed. (Four Sub-Bullets)

Step 3.9.1 - Initialed.

Step 3.9.2 - Initialed.

Step 3.9.3 - Checkbox checked.

Step 3.9.4 - Initialed.

Step 3.9.5 - Initialed.

Step 3.10.1 - Checkbox checked.

Step 3.10.2 - Checkbox checked.

Step 3.10.3 - Checkbox checked.

Step 3.11 - NA/Initialed.

Step 3.12 - Initialed. (Management Designee: John Williams, Evolution Coordinator: Pam Smith)

Step 3.13 - Checkbox Checked Step 3.14.1 - Initialed twice.

Step 3.14.2 - Checkbox checked.

Step 3.14.3 - Checkbox checked.

Step 3.14.4.1 - Checkbox checked.

Step 3.14.4.2 - Checkbox checked.

Step 3.14.4.3 - Checkbox checked.

Step 3.14.4.4 - Checkbox checked.

Step 3.14.5 - Initialed twice.

Step 3.14.6 - 2nd Checkbox checked.

Step 3.14.7 - Initialed.

Step 3.14.8 - Initialed.

Step 3.14.9 - 2nd Checkbox checked.

Step 3.14.10 - NA/Initialed.

Step 3.14.11 - Initialed.

Step 3.14.12 - Checkbox checked.

Step 3.14.13 - Initialed.

Step 3.14.13.1 - Checkbox checked.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Step 3.14.13.2 - Initialed.

Step 3.14.13.3 - Both Checkboxes checked.

Step 3.14.13.4 - Initialed.

Step 3.14.14 - Checkbox checked.

Step 3.14.18 - NA/Initialed

7. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At examiner direction of Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N12-1-5.

At direction of examiner Event 1 Raise power to 4%

At examiner direction of Event 2 Swap Letdown Orifices At direction of examiner Event 3 1A SG PORV Controller failure insert XMT-SM_1SMPT5520 = 1150 (1A SG PORV Controller Failure)

At direction of examiner Event 4 IR Channel Compensating Voltage failure insert MAL-ENB007A =

0 (N35 Compensating Voltage failure)

At direction of examiner Event 5 Ground Fault on 1ETA insert MAL-EP008A AP-7 Actions ACTIVE (Ground Fault insertLOA-RN087 = ON delay = 60 seconds on 1ETA) (Start 2A RN Pump) insertREM-RN0040A_1 = 0 (Close 1RN-40A) insert REM-KC0003A = 0 (Close 1KC-3A) insert REM-KC0230A = 0 (Close 1KC-230A)

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At examiner direction of Event 6 High Vibration on 1A NCP insertMAL-NCP003A=4.5 (HI Vibration Alarm) insertMAL-NCP003A=5.0 cd =

X05_001E11_1 = 1 (Hi Vibration Alarm Ramp

= 300 seconds) (HI-HI Vibration Alarm)

At examiner direction of Event 7 LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B insert MAL-EP001 EDG automatically ACTIVE (Loss of Offsite Power/SBO) insert MAL-EQB003B On_BO_AND_LOCA (1B D/G Fails to Auto Start on BO or LOCA due to Sequencer Failure)

Post-Reactor Trip Event 8 PORV Fails Open NOTE: This malfunction will occur automatically on Reactor Trip.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION ECA-0.0 SSF Actions (See Page 30) insertXSF_059_3 = 1 (SSF D/G Test/Emerg) insertXSF_060_2 = 1 Delay = 5 seconds (SSF D/G Start Cont ON) insertXSF_065_2 = 1 Delay = 10 seconds (Normal Incoming Breaker Cont Trip ON) insertLOA-EP092 = OPEN Delay = 15 seconds (1SLXG Breaker 6B 1EMXH-1 Feeder) insertLOA-EP113 = OPEN Delay = 20 seconds (Battery breaker 1SLXG-5D) insertLOA-EP112 = OPEN Delay = 25 seconds (1SMXG-1 Breaker 1SLXG-5C) insertLOA-EP091 = OPEN Delay = 30 seconds (1SLXG-04C SMXG Feeder from 1SLXG) insertLOA-EP356 = OPEN Delay = 35 seconds (BKR C SMXG1 - FAE OPEN/CLOSE CTRL) insertLOA-EP357 = OPEN Delay = 40 seconds (BKR C SMXG1 - RAD OPEN/CLOSE CTRL) insertXSF_064_1 = 1 Delay = 45 seconds (Gen BKR Control Close Pushbutton) insertLOA-EP112 = CLOSE Delay = 50 seconds (1SMXG-1 Breaker 1SLXG-5C) insertLOA-EP091 = CLOSE Delay = 55 seconds (1SLXG-04C SMXG Feeder from 1SLXG) insertXSF_034_1 = 1 Delay = 60 seconds (1NV-842A, C Standby M/U Pump Inlet Isol Open PB) insertXSF_037_1 = 1 Delay = 65 seconds (1NV-849A, C Standby M/U Pump Cont Isol OTSD Open PB) insertXSF_040_1 = 1 Delay = 70 seconds (1NV-1013C Standby M/U Pump to NC PMP Seals) insertXSF_023_2 = 1 Delay = 75 seconds (1NV-94A, C NC Pumps Seal Return C/I Inside Closed PB) insertLOA-EP356 = CLOSE Delay = 140 seconds (BKR C SMXG1 - FAE OPEN/CLOSE CTRL) insertLOA-EP357 = CLOSE Delay = 85 seconds (BKR C SMXG1 - RAD OPEN/CLOSE CTRL) insertLOA-EP113 = OPEN Delay = 90 seconds (Battery breaker 1SLXG-5D) insertXSF_019_1 = 1 Delay = 95 seconds (U1 Standby M/U Pump ON PB)

ECA-0.0 EMXA-4 Actions insertLOA-EP057 OPEN_BOTH (1EXMA-4 Bkrs 1A, 1EXMA2-01B and 3A SMXG-F02C Norm/Alt Sup) insertLOA-EP057 CLOSE_ALT Delay = 10 seconds (1EXMA-4 Bkrs 1A, 1EXMA2-01B and 3A SMXG-F02C Norm/Alt Sup)

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION ECA-0.0 Securing SSF Actions (Part 1) insertXSF_019_2 = 1 Delay = 5 seconds (U1 Standby M/U Pump OFF PB) insertXSF_037_2 = 1 Delay = 10 seconds (1NV-849A, C Standby M/U Pump Cont Isol OTSD Closed PB) insertXSF_034_2 = 1 Delay = 15 seconds (1NV-842A, C Standby M/U Pump Inlet Isol Closed PB)

ECA-0.0 Securing SSF Actions (Part 2) insertLOA-EP057 OPEN_BOTH Delay = 5 seconds (1EXMA-4 Bkrs 1A, 1EXMA2-01B and 3A SMXG-F02C Norm/Alt Sup) insertLOA-EP057 CLOSE_ALT Delay = 10 seconds (1EXMA-4 Bkrs 1A, 1EXMA2-01B and 3A SMXG-F02C Norm/Alt Sup)

Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 11 of 59 Event

Description:

Raise power to 4%

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power in accordance with Step 3.14.15 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/1/A/6100/003, CONTROLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATION ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE RO (Step 3.14.15) Record the following: (CRH Data)

RO (Step 3.14.16) Record the above parameters NOTE: Autolog is NOT in Auto Log. simulated.

RO (Step 3.14.17) Select "LO" on "Nuclear Power (%)" recorder. (1ENBCR9450)

RO (Step 3.14.19) Ensure one PR channel selected on "Nuclear Power (%)" recorder.

(1ENBCR9450)

CRS (Step 3.15) Begin performance of Enclosure 4.8 (Guidelines For Power Increase).

RO (Step 3.16) Perform the following to control NC System temperature until Turbine Generator is paralleled to the grid:

Maintain the following by adjusting setpoint on STM PRESS CONTROLLER:

Tcold 557-559°F SM Pressure 1060-1110 psig

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 12 of 59 Event

Description:

Raise power to 4%

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO Refer to Enclosure 4.14 (Reactor Power/Expected Tavg), Table 4.14-1 (Reactor Power/Expected Tavg) for expected Tavg for a given Reactor Power level.

CRS (Step 3.17) IF feedwater flow is aligned to NOTE: CF flow is NOT aligned CA nozzles, perform the following: to CA Nozzles.

Ensure Reactor Power will remain less than 20% RTP.

Evaluate swapping to CF nozzles per OP/1/A/6250/001 (Condensate and Feedwater System)

BOP (Step 3.18) Ensure in service CF Pump NOTE: 1B CF Pump is aligned Turbine LP GOV CNTRL and HP GOV as needed.

CNTRL in auto.

RO/ (Step 3.19) IF AT ANY TIME S/G N/R Level NOTE: This is a Continuous BOP decreases to 28% OR exceeds 52%, perform Action. The CRS will make the following both board operators aware.

RO (Step 3.20) HOLD at 2% RTP (2.0-2.5%) for NOTE: The RO will pull rods to a minimum of 10 minutes. raise power.

Examiner NOTE: Cue that ten minutes has elapsed.

RO (Step 3.21) Increase Reactor Power to 2%

RTP (2.0-2.5%).

RO (Step 3.22) Increase Reactor Power to 4% NOTE: The RO will withdraw RTP (3.5-4.0%). Control Rods to raise power.

RO (Step 3.22.1) Begin power increase to 4%

RTP (3.5-4.0%).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 13 of 59 Event

Description:

Raise power to 4%

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3.22.2) WHEN greater than 3% RTP, perform the following:

Open: NOTE: These valves are already OPEN.

1SM-83 (A SM Drain Line) 1SM-89 (B SM Drain Line) 1SM-95 (C SM Drain Line) 1SM-101 (D SM Drain Line)

RO (Step 3.22.2.2) Ensure Turbine in MANUAL.

RO (Step 3.22.2.3) Close Governor Valves using NOTE: These valves are GV Lower. already CLOSED.

RO (Step 3.23) WHEN at 4%, perform the following:

(Step 3.23.1) HOLD at 4% RTP (3.5-4.0%) for a minimum of 10 minutes.

(Step 3.23.2) Using Plant Mode Change

& Alarm Look Ahead, change the OAC to Mode 1.

(Step 3.23.3) On the DCS Workstation, change the DCS Modal Alarming to Mode 1 as follows:

(Step 3.23.3.1) Access DCS PLANT MODE SELECTION Screen (6012).

(Step 3.23.3.2) Select MODE 1.

(Step 3.23.3.3) Select ACCEPT MODE.

(Step 3.23.3.4) Check MODE 1 is displayed in CURRENT PLANT MODE.

RO (Step 3.24) Increase reactor power to 6%

RTP (6.0-6.5%).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 14 of 59 Event

Description:

Raise power to 4%

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 15 of 59 Event

Description:

Swap Letdown Orifices Following this, the operator will be directed to swap Letdown from 1NV-457A to 1NV-35A (1NV-459). The operator will perform Enclosure 4.3, Swapping Letdown Orifices, of OP/1/A6200/001A, Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown.

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP/1/A/6200/001 A, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM LETDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.3, SWAPPING LETDOWN ORIFICES BOP (Step 3.3) Perform the following sections as applicable:

Section 3.6, Swapping from 1NV-457A OR 1NV-458A to 1NV-459 BOP (Step 3.6) Swapping from 1NV-457A OR 1NV-458A to 1NV-459 Ensure closed 1NV-459 (Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl).

HOLD Open on 1NV-35A (Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol) until fully open.

Place 1NV-35A (Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol) to AUTO.

Place 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) in manual.

Open 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) to reduce letdown pressure to 150-250 psig.

IF Cation Bed Demineralizer is service NOTE: The Cation Bed Demineralizer is NOT in service.

Perform the following simultaneously:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 16 of 59 Event

Description:

Swap Letdown Orifices Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Slowly open 1NV-459 (Variable L/D NOTE: LD Hx Outlet Hi Temp Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl) increasing annunciator may alarm. IF so, letdown flow to 90-120 gpm. BOP will address annunciator response and increase charging flow to clear alarm.

Adjust 1NV-124 to increase letdown pressure to 150-425 psig.

BOP Perform the following simultaneously:

IF plant conditions require reduced letdown operation, adjust 1NV-459 (Variable L/D/Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl) to maintain 150-425 psig letdown pressure.

Close one of the following:

1NV-457A (45 gpm L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol)

BOP Perform the following simultaneously:

Adjust 1NV-459 (Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl) to desired flow rate.

Adjust 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) to maintain 150-375 psig letdown pressure.

BOP Ensure 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) setpoint at actual letdown pressure.

BOP Place 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) in auto.

BOP Adjust 1NV-241 (Seal Inj Flow Control) to maintain NC Pump seal injection flow.

Examiner NOTE: The Surrogate on Feedwater Control Station should be dismissed prior to the next event.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 17 of 59 Event

Description:

1A SG PORV Controller failure After this, the 1A SG PORV Controller will fail such that the PORV fails fully open. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/01, Steam Leak. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs), and will determine that all SG PORVs are OPERABLE; and may enter 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert XMT-SM_1SMPT5520 = 1150 (1A SG PORV Controller Failure)

Indications Available:

1SV-19AB Red status light is LIT 1SV-19AB Controller black needle to 100%

Steam Dump Valves close Tavg lowers Power level starts to rise Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the operator will take actions to close the 1A SG PORV prior to being directed by the CRS.

(Step 13)

AP/1/A/5500/01, STEAM LEAK RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

BOP RO (Step 2) Reduce turbine load to maintain the NOTE: The Turbine is NOT following: operating.

Excore NIs - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%.

NC Loop D/Ts - LESS THAN 60°F D/T T-Avg - AT T-REF.

CRS (Step 3) Check containment entry - IN NOTE: A Containment Entry is PROGRESS. NOT in progress.

CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 18 of 59 Event

Description:

1A SG PORV Controller failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr pressure prior to event -

GREATER THAN P-11 (1955 PSIG).

BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr level - STABLE OR NOTE: Pzr level will most GOING UP. likely be stable.

BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this NOTE: This is a Continuous procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained Action. The CRS will make stable, THEN RETURN TO Step 6. both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 8) GO TO Step 12.

CRS (Step 12) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO system. to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 13) Identify and isolate leak on Unit 1 as follows:

(Step 13a) Check SM PORVs - NOTE: The 1A SG PORV is CLOSED. Open.

RO (Step 13a RNO) IF S/G pressure is less than 1092 PSIG, THEN CLOSE affected S/G SM PORV manual NOTE: Closing the Manual loader. Loader will CLOSE the valve.

IF SM PORV is still open, THEN NOTE: The 1A SG PORV is CLOSED.

RO (Step 13.b) Check condenser dump NOTE: The Steam Dumps valves - CLOSED. may be CLOSED with the PORV open.

BOP (Step 13.c) Check containment conditions - NORMAL:

Containment temperature Containment pressure

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 19 of 59 Event

Description:

1A SG PORV Controller failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Containment humidity Containment floor and equipment sump level.

RO / (Step 13.d) Check TD CA pump - OFF.

BOP BOP (Step 13.e) Check valves on STEAM LINE DRAIN VALVES board (1MC-9) -

CLOSED.

CRS (Step 13.f) Check opposite Unit (Unit 2) NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO STEAM HEADER PRESSURE - for AS Header pressure.

GREATER THAN 200 PSIG.

If so, Floor Instructor report as U2 RO that U2 Steam Header pressure is 1000 psig.

(Step 13.g) Dispatch operator to check NOTE: The CRS may dispatch for leaks. an NEO to look for leaks.

If so, Floor Instructor:

acknowledge.

Booth Instructor: Report back in 3-5 minutes that there are no leaks.

NOTE: The CRS may NOT dispatch NEOs to look for leaks because it is understood that the SM PORV opening was the reason that AP-1 was entered.

BOP (Step 14) Check UST level - STABLE OR GOING UP.

CRS (Step 15) Evaluate unit shutdown as follows:

Check unit status - IN MODE 1 OR 2.

Determine if unit shutdown or load NOTE: CRS may call reduction is warranted based on the WCC/Management to address following criteria: the startup.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. If needed, as Station management direct that the startup be put on hold.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 20 of 59 Event

Description:

1A SG PORV Controller failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Size of leak Location of leak Rate of depletion of secondary inventory IF steam is leaking from a secondary heater relief OR MSR relief valve THEN IF turbine trip will isolate steam leak (such as feedwater heater leak or MSR leak THEN Check unit shutdown or load reduction - NOTE: Shutdown/Load REQUIRED. Reduction will NOT be required.

CRS (Step 15.c RNO) Perform the following:

Maintain present plant conditions until leak can be isolated or repaired.

Exit this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.7, STEAM GENERATOR POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (SG PORVs)

CRS LCO 3.4.7 Three SG PORV lines shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 21 of 59 Event

Description:

1A SG PORV Controller failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: After evaluation, the ACTION TIME CRS will determine that LCO 3.4.7 is NOT entered.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for NOTE: If NC System Pressure pressurizer pressure, RCS average drops to < 2216 psig on the temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1. entered and exited during the transient.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. Pressurizer A.1 Restore DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months pressure or parameter(s)

RCS average to within limit.

temperature DNB parameters not within limits.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 22 of 59 Event

Description:

IR Channel Compensating Voltage failure After this, the Compensating Voltage for Intermediate Range Channel N35 will fail. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/16, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation, and perform Case II, Intermediate Range Malfunction The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation. This malfunction will require that the operator manually re-energize the Source range channels after a reactor trip has occurred.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-ENB007A = 0 (N35 Compensating Voltage failure)

Indications Available:

MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, C-2, I/R COMPENSATING VOLT FAILURE COMP VOLT status light on NI-35 Drawer is LIT.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/16, MALFUNCTION OF NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION CASE II, INTERMEDIATE RANGE MALFUNCTION RO (Step 1) Check one I/R channel - NOTE: N-36 is OPERABLE.

OPERABLE.

CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on paging NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO system. to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 3) Place failed or channel LEVEL TRIP switch on I/R Drawer to BYPASS.

BOP (Step 4) Check the following - LIT:

LEVEL TRIP BYPASS indicating light on failed I/R drawer.

S/R OR I/R TRIP BYPASS alarm (1AD-2, E-2).

The failed channels status light on 1SI-19:

1/N-35A I/R CHANNEL I TRIP BYPASS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 23 of 59 Event

Description:

IR Channel Compensating Voltage failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OR 1/N-36A I/R CHANNEL II TRIP BYPASS.

RO (Step 5) Place operable I/R channel to record on NIS Recorder.

CRS/ (Step 6) IF AT ANY TIME I/R fuses are RO/ pulled above P-10, THEN they should be inserted prior to lowering power below P-10 BOP (to prevent a reactor trip).

RO (Step 7) Check I/R channel - FAILED LOW.

RO (Step 7 RNO) WHEN reactor less than P-6 NOTE: The RO will need to during any subsequent shutdown (with failed take this action later in the IR channel), THEN place SOURCE RANGE scenario.

SELECT switches to RESET to energize S/R detectors.

RO (Step 8) WHEN malfunctioning I/R channel NOTE: The channel will repaired, THEN. remain OOS.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the malfunction.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE (Functions 4 and 16.a).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 24 of 59 Event

Description:

IR Channel Compensating Voltage failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1 CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A. One or more A.1 Enter the IMMEDIATELY Functions Condition with one or referenced in more Table 3.3.1-1 required for the channels channel(s).

inoperable.

F. THERMAL F.1 Reduce 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months NOTE: The CRS will POWER THERMAL determine that power must be

>P-6 and POWER to

<P-10, one <P-6. raised or lowered within 24 Intermediat hours.

e Range OR Neutron F.2 Increase NOTE: This Action is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Flux THERMAL associated with Function 4 (IR channel POWER to Neutron Flux).

inoperable >P-10.

S. One or more S.1 Verify 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months channel(s) interlock is in inoperable. required state for existing unit conditions OR S.2 Be in MODE 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 3.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 25 of 59 Event

Description:

Ground Fault on 1ETA Next, a ground fault will occur on 1ETA causing the bus to de-energize. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power, and start the equipment on the B Train. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, 3.8.4, DC Sources - Operating, and 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Operating.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-EP008A ACTIVE (Ground Fault on 1ETA)

Indications Available:

1SI-14 Status Light for ETA LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE X is LIT 1SI-14 Status Light for ETA LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE Y is LIT 1SI-14 Status Light for ETA LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE Z is LIT MCB Annunciator 1AD-11/A-1U ETA 4.16KV TROUBLE MCB Annunciator 1AD-11/A-2U ETA 600V LC TROUBLE MCB Annunciator 1AD-11/A-3U ETA 600V/120V TROUBLE 1ETA Normal Supply Breaker Green status light is LIT Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/07, LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER CASE II, LOSS OF NORMAL POWER TO EITHER 1ETA OR 1ETB NOTE: The RO may throttle CA flow to all SGs immediately after the LOP.

BOP (Step 1) Check affected bus(s) -

ENERGIZED AND SEQUENCER APPLYING LOADS.

BOP (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:

IF both busses deenergized, THEN.. NOTE: 1ETB is energized.

Ensure the following pumps running on energized bus:

NV pump NOTE: The BOP will start the 1B NV Pump.

KC pumps NOTE: The BOP will start the 1B1 and 1B2 KC Pumps RN pump. NOTE: The BOP will start the 1B RN Pump.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 26 of 59 Event

Description:

Ground Fault on 1ETA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 2) Ensure NC pump thermal barrier isolation valves on energized train(s) -

OPEN.

RO (Step 3) Maintain reactor power less than or equal to 100%.

BOP (Step 4) Check 1ETA and 1ETB - BOTH NOTE: ONLY 1ETB is ENERGIZED. energized.

CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 6.

BOP (Step 6) Check - S/I HAS OCCURRED NOTE: SI has NOT occurred.

DURING THIS EVENT.

BOP (Step 6 RNO) Perform the following:

IF both NV pumps off, NOTE: The 1B NV is running.

CRS IF any pump was manually started per NOTE: The 1B NV Pump was AP07 Immediate Actions, THEN GO TO manually started.

Step 8.

CRS (Step 8) Check D/Gs - OFF.

BOP (Step 9) Check ND System status:

ND System - IN RHR MODE AT TIME NOTE: ND is NOT in RHR OF B/O. Mode.

CRS (Step 9a RNO) GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) Check any RN pump - RUNNING. NOTE: The 1B RN Pump is running.

BOP (Step 11) Align KC as follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 27 of 59 Event

Description:

Ground Fault on 1ETA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP Place recirc valve on operating train in AUTO:

1KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol).

Ensure KC flow remains less than 4000 GPM per operating KC pump while performing next step.

Ensure the following valves on energized train are OPEN:

B Train:

OPEN 1KC-18B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol)

OPEN 1KC-228B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol)

OPEN 1KC-364B (B NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt)

OPEN 1KC-413B (D NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt).

BOP (Step 12) Check any charging pump -

RUNNING.

BOP (Step 13) Align RN as follows:

Check 1A RN pump - RUNNING. NOTE: The 1A RN is OFF.

BOP (Step 13a RNO) Align 1B RN as follows:

Ensure 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol) is OPEN.

THROTTLE 1RN-190B (RN To B KC Hx Control) for desired KC cooling, while ensuring 1B RN pump flow remains less than the following:

IF 1B RN pump suction is aligned to Low Level Intake, THEN limit flow to 16,000 GPM.

Start all available RV pumps. NOTE: Two additional RV pumps will be started.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 28 of 59 Event

Description:

Ground Fault on 1ETA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS GO TO Step 14.

CRS (Step 14) Notify Unit 2 RO to start 2A RN Floor Instructor: As U2 RO pump. report 2A RN Pump is running.

Booth Instructor:

insertLOA-RN087 = ON delay

= 60 seconds (Start 2A RN Pump)

BOP (Step 15) Check VCT makeup control system.

Ensure boric acid transfer pump on energized train running.

Ensure NC System makeup controller in auto.

Place NC System makeup switch to start.

BOP (Step 16) Check - B/O ON 1ETA.

BOP (Step 17) Check B and D Pzr heater group Examiner NOTE: IF NV supply breakers on vertical board - charging pumps not started on CLOSED. B Train within 20 secs of BO, loss of letdown/ Pzr heaters off will occur. Therefore requiring RNO actions BOP (Step 18) Perform one of the following to isolate RN train crosstie:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 29 of 59 Event

Description:

Ground Fault on 1ETA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Dispatch operator to close 1RN-40A NOTE: The CRS will dispatch (Train A To Non Ess Hdr Isol) (aux bldg, an NEO to close 1RN-40A.

716+7, GG-55 beside Unit 1 side Floor Instructor acknowledge stairway to 695 elevation).

as appropriate.

Booth Instructor:

insertREM-RN0040A_1 = 0, delay = 5 min (Close 1RN-40A)

After closing valve, Booth Instructor report action taken to Control Room.

CRS (Step 19) WHEN RN train crosstie is NOTE: This is a Continuous isolated, THEN 1RN-190B (RN To B KC Hx Action. The CRS will make Control) may be throttled further OPEN, both board operators aware.

while maintaining 1B RN pump flow less than the following:

IF 1B RN pump suction is aligned to Low Level Intake, THEN limit flow to 16,000 GPM.

CRS (Step 20) Dispatch operator to close the NOTE: CRS will dispatch an following valves: NEO to close 1KC-230A and 1KC-3A.

Floor Instructor:

acknowledge as appropriate, Booth Instructor:

insert REM-KC0003A = 0, delay = 5 min (Close 1KC-3A) insert REM-KC0230A = 0, delay = 5 min (Close 1KC-230A)

After closing valves, Booth Instructor report action taken to Control Room.

1KC-230A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol) (aux bldg, 750+12, JJ-55, above north end of KC HX 1A)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 30 of 59 Event

Description:

Ground Fault on 1ETA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1KC-3A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret NOTE: The CRS will NOT stop Isol) (aux bldg, 733+8, HH-55, north of to look at Tech Specs while in column HH-55). AP-07. Tech Spec review should occur after completion of scenario. Therefore, at the discretion of the lead examiner, move to Event 6 (page 35)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.4, DC SOURCES - OPERATING CRS LCO 3.8.4 The four channels of DC sources shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME A.. One A.1 Restore 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months channel of channel of DC source DC source to inoperable. OPERABLE status.

OR 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months A.2.1 Verify associated bus tie breakers are closed between DC channels.

AND A.2.2 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months channel of DC source to OPERABLE status.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 31 of 59 Event

Description:

Ground Fault on 1ETA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: Based on the transient nature of evaluating this TS, the Examiner may need to question the CRS after the scenario.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, AC SOURCES - OPERATING CRS 3.8.1 AC Source - Operating CRS LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System AND Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power Systems AND The automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS CRS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION The operator will determine ACTION TIME

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 32 of 59 Event

Description:

Ground Fault on 1ETA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments A. One offsite A.1 Perform SR 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months that one offsite line and one circuit 3.8.1.1 for AND DG are inoperable because inoperable. OPERABLE neither are capable of offsite Once per 8 circuit. supplying the Emergency Bus hours thereafter (TS Basis pB3.8.1-2).

AND A.2 Declare 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months from required discovery of no features offsite power to with no one train offsite concurrent with power inoperability of available redundant inoperable required with its feature(s).

redundant required feature(s) is inoperable.

AND A.3 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months offsite circuit AND to OPERABLE 6 days from status. failure to meet LCO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 33 of 59 Event

Description:

Ground Fault on 1ETA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments B. One DG B.1 Perform SR 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months inoperable. 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE AND offsite Once per 8 circuit. hours AND thereafter.

B.2 Declare required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from features discovery of supported Condition B by the concurrent with inoperable inoperability of DG redundant inoperable required when its feature(s).

required redundant feature(s) is inoperable.

AND B.3.1 Determine inoperable DG is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months not inoperable due to common cause failure.

OR B.3.2 Perform SR 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG.

AND B.4 Restore DG 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to OPERABLE AND status 6 days from failure to meet LCO.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.4, DC SOURCES - OPERATING CRS LCO 3.8.4 The four channels of DC sources shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 34 of 59 Event

Description:

Ground Fault on 1ETA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION The operator will determine ACTION TIME that the AC Battery Chargers A.. One A.1 Restore 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months are inoperable. (TS Basis channel of channel of pB3.8.4-3).

DC source DC source to inoperable. OPERABLE status.

OR 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months A.2.1 Verify associated bus tie breakers are closed between DC channels.

AND A.2.2 Restore 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months channel of DC source to OPERABLE status.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.9, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - OPERATING CRS LCO 3.8.9 Train A and Train B AC, four channels of DC, and four AC vital buses electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION The operator will determine ACTION TIME

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 35 of 59 Event

Description:

Ground Fault on 1ETA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments A. One or more A.1 Restore AC 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months that 1ETA is inoperable.

AC electrical electrical power power AND distribution distribution 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from subsystem(s) subsystem(s) discovery of inoperable. to failure to meet OPERABLE LCO.

status.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 Page 36 of 59 Event

Description:

High Vibration on 1A NCP Shortly afterwards, a high vibration condition will develop on the 1A NCP. The operator will respond in accordance with OAC Alarm M1D3041, 1A NC PUMP VIBRATION (HALM), and enter AP/1/A/5500/08, Malfunction of NC Pump, ultimately tripping the reactor and stopping the NCP. The operator will manually trip the reactor and enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Booth Operator Instructions: insertMAL-NCP003A=4.5 (HI Vibration Alarm) insertMAL-NCP003A=5.0 cd =

X05_001E11_1 = 1 (Hi Vibration Alarm Ramp = 300 seconds) (HI-HI Vibration Alarm)

Indications Available:

OAC Alarm: 1B NC Pump Vibration MCB Annunciator 1AD-6/E-11 NC Pump Hi Vibration 1B NC Pump hi vibration on NC Pump Vibration Monitor Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/08, MALFUNCTION OF NC PUMP CASE III, EXCESSIVE VIBRATION BOP (Step 1) Go to the NC pump vibration monitor panel and perform the following:

Compare all 9 vibration channels on the alarming pump.

Check if readings indicate - VALID VIBRATION PROBLEM.

BOP (Step 2) Check NC pump vibration indication within operating limits:

Motor frame vibration - LESS THAN 5 NOTE: The Pump Shaft MILS Vibration will be > 15 mils.

All of the following - LESS THAN 20 MILS Motor shaft vibration Pump shaft vibration Motor axial vibration Motor flywheel vibration

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 Page 37 of 59 Event

Description:

High Vibration on 1A NCP Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 3) IF AT ANY TIME vibration exceeds NOTE: CRS will make crew operating limits, THEN GO TO Step 5 aware.

CRS (Step 4) GO TO Step 6 CRS (Step 6) Announce occurrence on the NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO paging system. to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS (Step 7) Check NC pumps - ANY RUNNING NOTE: All 4 NCPs are currently running. The CRS will direct the crew to continue monitoring NCP vibrations until the Hi Hi Vibration alarm actuates. When alarm occurs, the crew will go to Step 5.

BOP (Step 5) Stop affected NC pump as follows:

IF A or B NC pump is the affected pump, Then CLOSE associated spray valve:

BOP 1NC-29C (B NC Loop PZR Spray Control).

Check unit status - IN MODE 1 OR 2.

RO Trip reactor BOP WHEN reactor power less than 5%,

THEN stop affected NC pump.

CRS GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #7-8.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 38 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open AFTER the 1A NCP is tripped, a Total Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP) will occur. The 1A EDG will not start due to a Ground Fault on 1ETA, and the 1B DG will not auto start due to a Sequencer failure. The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, however the operator will immediately recognize that all Essential AC Busses are de-energized and enter EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. Additionally, PORV 1NC-34A will fail open. Within ECA-0.0, the operator will need to recognize and close the failed PORV and take action to manually start the 1B DG. Safety Injection may actuate on low pressurizer pressure due to the failed PORV. If so, the SI pumps will need to be started manually. Upon restoration of power to 1ETB, the operator will transition to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and either terminate SI at Step 27.b of E-0, when the crew has closed 1NI-9A/10B; or determine that SI is not needed and transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, at Step 5 RNO.

Booth Operator Instructions: AFTER the 1A NCP is tripped:

insertMAL-EP001 ACTIVE (Loss of Offsite Power/SBO) insert MAL-EQB003B On_BO_AND_LOCA (1B D/G Fails to Auto Start on BO or LOCA due to Sequencer Failure)

Indications Available:

Main Control Room lights DIM 1SI-14 Status Light for ETB LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE X is LIT 1SI-14 Status Light for ETB LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE Y is LIT 1SI-14 Status Light for ETB LOSS/UNDERVOLTAGE PHASE Z is LIT 1B EDG not running Both Trains of DRPI DARK Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER CRS (Step 1) CSF Status trees should be NOTE: Crew will carry out monitored for information only. EPs Immediate Actions of ECA-0.0, referenced by them should not be prior to the CRS addressing implemented. the EP.

RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip: IMMEDIATE ACTION All rod bottom lights - LIT NOTE: DRPI is NOT available on the LOP.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 39 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Reactor trip and bypass breakers -

OPEN I/R amps - GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 2 RNO) Trip reactor. IMMEDIATE ACTION NOTE: other indications are used to determine that the reactor has tripped.

RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: IMMEDIATE ACTION All throttle valves - CLOSED.

CRS (Step 4) Establish NC pump seal injection from the SSF as follows:

Dispatch operator to SSF to perform the NOTE: The CRS will dispatch following: an NEO to complete Enclosure 1.

Booth Instructor/Floor Instructor acknowledge as appropriate.

Wait three minutes then, Insert ECA-0.0 SSF Actions (See Page 8)

Obtain Brown Folder at SSF and complete Enclosure 1 (Unit 1 SSF -

ECA-0.0 Actions).

Dispatch operator to 1ETA room as follows:

Check if operator will enter aux bldg

- FROM MG SET ROOM.

Give operator dosimeter from Unit 2 SRO desk.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 40 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Dispatch operator to perform NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Enclosure 2 (Unit 1 EMXA4 - ECA- an NEO to complete Enclosure 0.0 Actions). 2.

If so, Booth Instructor/Floor Instructor acknowledge as appropriate.

Booth Instructor: wait 2 minutes, then insertLOA-EP057 OPEN_BOTH (1EXMA-4 Bkrs 1A, 1EXMA2-01B and 3A SMXG-F02C Norm/Alt Sup) insertLOA-EP057 CLOSE_ALT Delay = 10 seconds (1EXMA-4 Bkrs 1A, 1EXMA2-01B and 3A SMXG-F02C Norm/Alt Sup)

Use any of the following to notify security NOTE: The CRS will dispatch to immediately dispatch officer with key a Security Officer to the SSF.

to SSF to ensure operator can access SSF:

Security ringdown phone (located on Unit 2 SRO desk) 2688 4900. Floor Instructor: If asked, U2 does NOT have normal power, and both DGs are running.

BOP (Step 5) Check NC System - ISOLATED:

Check the following letdown orifice isolation valves - CLOSED.

1NV-458A (U1 75 GPM L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

1NV-457A (U1 45 GPM L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

1NV-35A (U1 Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

CLOSE the following valves:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 41 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1NV-1A (U1 NC L/D Isol To Regenerative Hx)

BOP 1NV-2A (U1 NC L/D Isol To Regenerative Hx).

Check Pzr PORVs - CLOSED. NOTE: PORV 1NC-34A is OPEN (Unless previously closed by RO/BOP).

BOP (Step 5.c RNO) IF Pzr pressure less than 2315 PSIG, THEN CLOSE all Pzr PORVs.

ECA-0.0 A Isolate the NCS by closing the failed PORV before transition out of ECA-0.0.

Safety Significance: Failure to close the PORV under the existing plant conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance which leads to degradation of any fission product barrier. In this situation, the NCS Barrier can be restored to full integrity by manually closing the PORV. Therefore, a failure to close the PORV represents a demonstrated inability to take action that would present a challenge to a safety barrier.

BOP Check the following excess letdown isolation valves - CLOSED:

1NV-24B (1C NC Loop To Excess L/D Hx Isol) 1NV-25B (1C NC Loop To Excess L/D Hx Isol).

Check 1NV-121 (U1 ND Letdown Control) - CLOSED.

RO (Step 6) Check total CA flow - GREATER NOTE: The TD CA pump is THAN 450 GPM. NOT running.

RO/ (Step 6 RNO) Perform the following:

BOP Ensure TD CA pump on.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 42 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF flow is less than 450 GPM due to NOTE: The flow is NOT less operator action to control CA flow, than 450 gpm due to operator action to control flow for achieving a Secondary Heat Sink.

Ensure all TD CA pump flow control NOTE: The will open all TD valves are fully OPEN. Pump flow control valves previously closed.

IF TD CA PUMP STOP VLV NOT OPEN alarm (1AD-5, F-3) is lit, IF CA flow is less than 450 GPM, NOTE: CA flow is > 450 gpm.

THEN BOP (Step 7) Try to restore power to 1ETA or 1ETB as follows:

Place both trains D/G mode select switches to control room.

Perform the following for any D/G(s) that are off:

Depress, then release, RESET on sequencer.

Start D/G. NOTE: This action will start both the 1A and 1B D/Gs.

Check both D/Gs - RUNNING. NOTE: If failed Pzr PORV not closed in timely manner, it is possible Auto SI has occurred and "A" D/G will NOT be running. Thus requiring RNO actions.

BOP (Step 7.d).Check bus energized and NOTE: Neither Sequencer will sequencer applying loads. be applying loads automatically.

(Step 7.d RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure normal and standby breakers open to allow auto loading of bus.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 43 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF bus not energized OR sequencer not NOTE: The CRS will transition applying loads, THEN GO TO Enclosure to Enclosure 4.

4 (Manual Loading of Emergency Bus).

EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER ENCLOSURE 4, MANUAL LOADING OF EMERGENCY BUS BOP (Step 1) Reset S/I as follows:

Ensure 1 minute has elapsed since initiation of S/I.

Reset S/I.

BOP (Step 2) Check the following:

1A D/G - RUNNING.

1ETA Emergency Breaker - CLOSED. NOTE: The 1ETA Emergency Breaker will NOT close because of the previous Lockout.

CRS (Step 2.b RNO) GO TO Step 4.

RO/ (Step 4) Hold RESET on 1A sequencer BOP while completing Steps 5 through 7.

RO (Step 5) Unload 1ETA emergency bus as follows:

Open 1A CA pump breaker.

RO (Step 5.a RNO) Open breaker by depressing 1A CA pump START and STOP at same time.

RO (Step 5.b) Open remaining pump breakers on 1 ETA:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 44 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1A NV pump 1A ND pump 1A NI pump 1A1 KC pump 1A2 KC pump 1A RN pump 1A KF pump 1A NS pump.

RO (Step 5.c) Open the following 600 V essential transformer feeder breakers:

1ELXA 1ELXE 1ELXC.

RO (Step 6) Place 1A D/G Mode Select switch to control room.

RO (Step 7) Close 1ETA Emergency Breaker. NOTE: The 1ETA Emergency Breaker will NOT close because of the previous Lockout.

BOP (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

Release RESET on 1A sequencer.

Stop 1A D/G.

IF 1A D/G will not stop, THEN NOTE: The 1A D/G will stop when this action is taken.

CRS GO TO Step 12.

BOP (Step 12) Check the following:

1B D/G - RUNNING.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 45 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1ETB Emergency Breaker - CLOSED. NOTE: The 1ETB Emergency Breaker will NOT close because of an Auto Sequencer failure.

CRS (Step 12.b RNO) GO TO Step 14.

BOP (Step 14) Hold RESET on 1B sequencer while completing Steps 15 through 17.

RO (Step 15) Unload 1ETB emergency bus as follows:

Open 1B CA pump breaker.

Open remaining pump breakers on 1ETB:

1B NV pump RO 1B ND pump 1B NI pump 1B1 KC pump 1B2 KC pump 1B RN pump 1B KF pump 1B NS pump.

Open the following 600 V essential transformer feeder breakers.

1ELXB 1ELXF 1ELXD RO (Step 16) Place 1B D/G Mode Select switch to control room.

RO (Step 17) Close 1ETB Emergency Breaker. NOTE: This action will restore power to 1ETB.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 46 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments E-0 C Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus before proceeding past Step 18 in ECA-0.0.

Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the Critical Task results in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the RCP Seals. Additionally, failure to perform the Critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which NCS inventory is being lost and cannot be replaced. This situation could potentially be equivalent to a situation in which a Small Break LOCA were to exist without the ability to add inventory through the ECCS.

BOP (Step 18) Release RESET om 1B sequencer.

BOP (Step 19) Load 1ETB emergency bus as follows:

Close 1ELXB feeder breaker.

Close 1ELXD feeder breaker.

Close 1ELXF feeder breaker.

CLOSE 1RN-41B (Train B to Non Ess Hdr Isol).

Ensure 1B RN pump suction and discharge flowpath is available.

Start 1B RN pump.

Ensure the following valves are OPEN:

1RN-171B (B D/G Hx Inlet Isol)

BOP 1RN-174B (B D/G Hx Outlet Isol).

Start 1B NV pump.

BOP (Step 20) Observe the following limitations while placing loads on 1ETB emergency bus in the next step:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 47 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Continuous load on 1B D/G should not exceed 4000 KW.

Voltage and frequency should be allowed to stabilize before applying the next load group.

BOP (Step 21) Continue loading 1ETB emergency bus as follows:

Ensure EVCB battery charger indicates ON.

Ensure EVCD battery charger indicates ON.

CLOSE 1KC-338B (NC Pump Sup Hdr Cont Outside Isol).

CLOSE 1KC-424B (NC Pumps Ret Hdr Cont Inside Isol).

Place info stickers next to 1KC-338B and If asked, U2 operator will place 1KC-424B switches stating: Do not info stickers reopen due to steam voiding in NCP thermal barriers.

Place 1KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) in AUTO.

Start 1B1 KC pump.

Start 1B2 KC pump.

Monitor KC surge tank levels for system leakage due to water hammers.

RO Start 1B CA pump.

RO/ On OAC graphic for 1ETB bus, check BOP 1ELXD load center breaker to 2EMXG-CLOSED.

BOP (Step 22) Check at least one bus - NOTE: 1ETB is energized.

ENERGIZED.

CRS (Step 23) GO TO Step 7.e in body of this procedure.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 48 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER CRS (Step 7.e.) Notify dispatched operators at NOTE: The CRS will direct the 1EMXA-4 and SSF to stop where they two dispatched NEOs to cease are at. and desist assigned actions at the SSF.

Booth Instructor:

insert ECA-0.0 Securing SSF Actions (Part 1) (See Page 9)

CRS Check status of the following local actions:

SSF D/G - OFF 1EMXA-4 normal incoming breaker -

CLOSED.

(Step 7.f RNO) Perform the following:

Have another operator perform NOTE: The CRS will direct the Enclosure 5 (Recovery from SSF two dispatched NEOs to cease Actions) while continuing with this and desist assigned actions at procedure. the SSF.

Booth Instructor:

insert ECA-0.0 Securing SSF Actions (Part 2) (See Page 9)

GO TO Step 7.h.

CRS (Step 7.h) Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

CRS RETURN TO procedure and step in NOTE: The CRS will transition effect. to E-0.

EP/1/A/5000/E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO/ (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page. NOTE: Crew will carry out BOP Immediate Actions of E-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 49 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip: Immediate Action All rod bottom lights - LIT NOTE: DRPI is NOT available on the LOP.

RO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:

Trip reactor.

IF reactor will not trip THEN NOTE: other indications are used to determine that the reactor has tripped.

RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action All throttle valves - CLOSED.

BOP (Step 4) Check 1ETA and 1ETB - Immediate Action ENERGIZED.

NOTE: Only 1ETB is energized.

BOP (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

IF both busses de-energized, THEN NOTE: Only 1ETB is energized.

WHEN time allows, THEN try to restore power to de-energized bus PER AP/1/A/5500/07 (Loss of Electrical Power) while continuing with this procedure.

RO/ (Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action BOP SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED Examiner NOTE: SI is NOT status light (1SI-18) - LIT. expected to be actuated. If otherwise, skip over Step 5.a RNO to Step 5.b.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 50 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ (Step 5.a RNO) Perform the following:

BOP Check if S/I is required Pzr pressure less than 1845 PSIG.

Containment pressure is greater than 1 PSIG IF S/I is required,.. NOTE: SI is NOT required.

IF S/I is not required, THEN perform the following:

Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees)

GO TO EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1 (Reactor Trip Response)

Examiner NOTE: It is expected that SI will NOT be actuated. Therefore, Transition out of E-0, and proceed to exam termination.

BOP Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status Examiner NOTE: ONLY lights (1SI-14) - LIT. continue if SI is actuated or required.

BOP (Step 5.b RNO) Initiate S/I.

CRS (Step 6) Announce Unit 1 Safety Injection. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 7) Check all Feed water Isolation status lights (1SI-4) - LIT.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 51 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A RESET lights -

DARK.

BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

Groups 1, 2, 5 - DARK.

Group 3 - LIT.

Group 4 - LIT A REQUIRED. NOTE: The 1B ND and 1B NI Pumps are OFF.

BOP (Step 9c RNO) Align or start components as required.

Group 6 - LIT.

GO TO Step 10.

RO (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

MD CA pumps - ON.

(Step 10a RNO) Start pumps. NOTE: Do not attempt to start the 1A MDCA Pump.

N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs - GREATER THAN 17%.

BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps - ON.

BOP (Step 11 RNO) Perform the following:

Start pumps. NOTE: Do not attempt to start the 1A KC Pumps.

IF all KC pumps running, THEN GO TO Step 12.

BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps - ON. NOTE: The 1A RN Pump is NOT running.

(Step 12 RNO) Perform the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 52 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Start pump(s). NOTE: Do not attempt to start the 1A RN Pump.

IF any RN pump off, THEN perform the following:

IF 1A RN pump is off, THEN stop NC NOTE: NC Pumps are OFF.

pumps.

IF affected train is deenergized, AND its D/G is off, THEN GO TO Step 13.

CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the Floor Instructor: As U2 RO following: report 2A RN Pump is running.

Start 2A RN pump.

THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant condition.

RO (Step 14) Check all S/G pressures -

GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure - NOTE: Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG. is normal.

BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:

Check NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW gauge - INDICATING FLOW.

Check NC pressure - LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.

BOP (Step 16b RNO) Perform the following:

Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) OPEN:

1ND-67B (1B ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).

CRS IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 53 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to NOTE: The CRS may ask perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic OSM to address.

Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions If so, Floor Instructor Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

acknowledge as OSM.

RO (Step 18) Check CA flow:

Total CA flow - GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

(Step 18a RNO) Perform the following:

IF N/R level in all S/Gs is less than NOTE: There is at least one 11%. (32% ACC) S/G with a NR level > 11%.

IF N/R level in all S/Gs is less that NOTE: There is at least one 11% (32% ACC) AND feed flow S/G with a NR level > 11%.

greater than 450 GPM cannot be established BOP Check VI header pressure - GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

RO WHEN each S/G N/R level is greater NOTE: This is a Continuous than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA Action. The CRS will make flow to maintain that S/G N/R level both board operators aware.

between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.

RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:

IF all NC pumps on, NOTE: All NC Pumps will be OFF.

OR IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T-Colds - STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 54 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 19 RNO) Perform the following based NOTE: The CRS may assign on plant conditions: the RO to perform this action.

If so, RO Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3.

Others should move ahead to Step 20 on Page 49 to continue in E-0.

IF temperature less than 557°F AND going down, THEN attempt to stop cooldown PER Enclosure 3 (Uncontrolled NC System Cooldown).

E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 3, UNCONTROLLED NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN RO (Step 1) Check steam dump valves - Examiner NOTE: Follow the CLOSED. actions associated with Enclosure 3 if RO is assigned by CRS to perform.

RO (Step 2) Check all SM PORVs - CLOSED.

RO (Step 3) Check MSR RESET light - LIT.

RO (Step 4) Check any NC pump - ON.

RO (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

IF any NC T-Cold is still going down, THEN GO TO Step 6.

RO (Step 6) Control feed flow as follows:

IF S/G N/R level is less than 11% (32% NOTE: There is at least one ACC) in all S/Gs, S/G with a NR level > 11%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 55 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments WHEN N/R level is greater than 11% NOTE: There is at least one (32% ACC) in at least one S/G, THEN S/G with a NR level > 11%.

THROTTLE feed flow further to:

Minimize cooldown Maintain at least one S/G N/R level greater than 11% (32% ACC).

RO (Step 7) Check MSIVs - ANY OPEN.

RO (Step 8) CLOSE 1SM-15 (U1 SM To MSR NOTE: This valve has no 2nd Stg Tube Bundles Isol). power.

RO (Step 9) Check any NC pump - ON. NOTE: All NC Pumps will be OFF.

RO (Step 9 RNO) Perform the following:

IF any NC T-Cold is still going down THEN GO TO RNO for Step 10.

RO (Step 10 RNO) IF cooldown continues, THEN CLOSE the following valves:

All MSIVs.

All MSIV bypass valves.

RO (Step 11) Notify Control Room Supervisor of the following:

NC temperature trend Status of MSIV and bypass valves.

E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners NOT following RO actions in Enclosure 3, continue HERE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 56 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:

All Pzr PORVs - CLOSED.

BOP Normal Pzr spray valves - CLOSED.

At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve -

OPEN.

BOP (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 0°F.

BOP (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:

All S/G pressures - STABLE OR GOING UP All S/Gs - PRESSURIZED.

BOP (Step 23) Check if S/G tubes intact:

The following secondary EMFs -

NORMAL:

1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust) 1EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (Lo Range))

1EMF-24 (S/G A) 1EMF-25 (S/G B) 1EMF-26 (S/G C) 1EMF-27 (S/G D).

S/G levels - STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER.

BOP (Step 24) Check if NC System intact as follows:

1EMF-38(L) (Containment Particulate (LR)) - NORMAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 57 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1EMF-39(L) (Containment Gas (Lo Range)) - NORMAL 1EMF-40 (Containment Iodine) -

NORMAL Check containment pressure - LESS THAN 1 PSIG Check containment sump level -

NORMAL.

BOP (Step 25) Check S/I termination criteria:

NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs -

GREATER THAN 0°F.

Secondary heat sink:

N/R level in at least one S/G =

GREATER THAN 11%

OR Total feed flow to S/Gs - GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

NC pressure - STABLE OR GOING UP.

Pzr level - GREATER THAN 11%.

BOP (Step 26) Reset the following:

S/I Sequencers.

BOP (Step 27) Stop all but one NV pump.

BOP (Step 28) Check NC pressure - STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 29) Isolate NV S/I flowpath as follows:

Check NV pumps miniflow valves -

OPEN:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N12-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 7&8 Page 58 of 59 Event

Description:

LOOP/Failure of DG Sequencer to start 1B EDG automatically/

PORV Fails Open Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 1NV-150B (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol) 1NV-151A (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol).

CLOSE the following valves:

1NI-9A (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV) 1NI-10B (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV).

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power Level: 10-8amps NCS [B] 1916 ppm Pzr [B]: 1918 ppm Xe: Per OAC Power History: At this power level for .5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months Core Burnup: 25 EFPD CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/1/A/6100/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation (Step 3.16)

OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

Unit 1 is at 1x10-8 amps in accordance with OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, following a severe weather induced plant shutdown two days ago.

45 gpm Letdown orifice is in service.

The Cation Bed Demineralizer is NOT in service.

The crew is expected to raise power to 30% on this shift.

The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

1D RC Pump is OOS due to motor replacement.

1NIP-5270, Containment Sump Level, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).

MCB Annunciator 1AD-13, B-3, Cont Press Alert Hi, has been in constant alarm over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Crew Directions:

1. Raise power to POAH and stabilize at 6% starting from Step 3.14.15 of OP/1/A/6100/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.

2. During the 4% power hold, swap letdown Orifices from 1NV-457 to 1NV-459 per Enclosure 4.3 of OP/1/A/6200/001 A Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown.

Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe NLO's AVAILABLE Unit 1 Unit 2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob Turb Bldg. Mike 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill Ed Wayne Tanya

ML13169A188

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