Text

301 Draft RO Written Exam
	ML13169A184
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	06/18/2013
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Duke Energy Carolinas
References
	50-369/12-301, 50-370/12-301
	Download: ML13169A184 (225)
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FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS003 K5.04 - Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

QUESTION 1 1 B Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RCPS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Effects of RCP shutdown on secondary parameters, such as steam pressure, steam flow, and feed flow .........................

Unit 1 was operating at 30% RTP. Given the following events and conditions:

1A NC pump trips

No operator action has been taken After conditions have stabilized, with unit load unchanged, total steam flow from all S/Gs will be (1) as compared to total steam flow from all S/Gs prior to the NC pump trip AND Pressure in the UNAFFECTED Steam Generators will be (2) as compared to UNAFFECTED Steam Generator pressures prior to the NC pump trip.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. lower

2. lower B. 1. the same

2. lower C. 1. lower

2. the same D. 1. the same

2. the same Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 1 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 1 1 B General Discussion The reactor will not trip below P-8. After the NC pump trip with the plant stabilized, total steam flow will be the same and SG pressures will be lower.

Total steam flow will be the same because steam demand (turbine load) has not changed. Steam flow from the affected SG will be lower because there is now very little heat input from the primary side. Because turbine load hasn't changed, steam flow from the unaffected SGs will increase to compensate for the loss of steam flow from the affected SG. But, total steam flow will be the same as prior to the NC pump trip.

Steam Pressure in the affected SG will be lower because of the loss of heat input due to the NC pump trip. Steam pressue in the unaffected SGs will be lower because of the increase in steam demand on those steam generators due to the loss of steam flow from the affected SG.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant confuses the steam flow from the affected SG with total steam flow. The steam flow from the affected SG will be lower.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT. See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant confuses the steam flow from the affected SG with total steam flow. The steam flow from the affected SG will be lower.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant concludes that since power/total steam flow is the same that pressure has remained the same as well.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant concludes that since power/total steam flow is the same that pressure has remained the same as well.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant is given a condition where an NC pump has tripped and must determine the effect (steady-state to steady-state) on both SG pressures and total secondary steam flow.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must determine what the effect of losing NC flow to one SG is (i.e. loss of heat input to the affected SG). The applicant must then determine how the loss of heat input to one SG effects steady-state total secondary steam flow and SG pressures.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-TA-AT (Abnormal Transients), Section 2.5.7 Learning Objective:

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 2 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination TAAT005 QUESTION 1 1 B SYS003 K5.04 - Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RCPS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Effects of RCP shutdown on secondary parameters, such as steam pressure, steam flow, and feed flow .........................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 3 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS003 K6.04 - Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

QUESTION 2 2 B Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RCPS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45/5)

Containment isolation valves affecting RCP operation .................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is at 100% RTP

An inadvertent Phase A Containment Isolation occurs Which ONE (1) of the following is the effect of the inadvertent Phase A on the NC Pumps?

A. RN, KC and Seal Water Return flow is isolated.

B. Seal Water Return flow ONLY is isolated.

C. RN and KC flow ONLY is isolated.

D. KC flow ONLY is isolated.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 4 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 2 2 B General Discussion The RN and KC supply and return, as well as the Seal Water return lines have Containment Isolation Valves that will close, isolating NCP support systems under certain conditions.

The Seal Water return line is isolated under a Phase A Containment Isolation condition, while the RN and KC supply and return lines are isolated under a Phase B Containment Isolation condition.

Plant conditions indicate that a Phase A containment isolation signal has occurred. Phase B Containment Isolation occurs on a Hi-Hi Containment Pressure Signal, or by manual action. In this event, Containment Isolation Phase B has not occurred. Therefore, only the Seal water return line will isolate, while the RN/KC lines will remain unisolated.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Seal Water Return isolation on a Phase A signal is correct.

RN and KC isolation is plausible because Phase A signal will isolate some cooling water flow to some non-essential Heat Exchangers in the reactor building (i.e. NCDT HX and Excess Letdown HX).

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanaton above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Seal Water Return is isolated on a Phase A signal. The applicant may incorrectly think that the Seal Return is isolated on a Safety Injection signal and would therefore remain open.

RN and KC isolation is plausible because Phase A signal will isolate some cooling water flow to some non-essential Heat Exchangers in the reactor building (i.e. NCDT HX and Excess Letdown HX), just not to the NCPs.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

KC isolation is plausible because Phase A signal will isolate KC flow to some non-essential Heat Exchangers in the reactor building (i.e. NCDT HX and Excess Letdown HX).

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the effect of an inadvertent (malfunction) Phase A Containment Isolation signal and how it affects cooling water support systems to the Reactor Coolant pumps.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cog question because the applicant given an initiating transient must analyze plant response and then determine the effect of RN, KC, and NV System alignment on the reactor coolant pumps.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2008 NRC Question 1 Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PSS-RN Section 2.4 Lesson Plan OP-MC-PSS-KC Section 3.2.2 & 3.2.4 Lesson Plan OP-MC-PSS-NV Section 2..16 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 5 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Learning Objectives:

QUESTION 2 2 B OP-MC-PSS-RN, Objective10 OP-MC-PSS-KC, Objectives 3, 4 SYS003 K6.04 - Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RCPS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45/5)

Containment isolation valves affecting RCP operation .................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 6 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS004 2.2.35 - Chemical and Volume Control System QUESTION 3 3 D SYS004 GENERIC Ability to determine Technical Specification Mode of Operation. (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit has just completed a refueling outage and a plant heat-up to normal operating temperature is in progress

The 1B NC pump is running

NC system temperature is 375°F Based on the conditions above:

The Selected Licensing Commitments (SLC) require a MINIMUM of (1) .

boration flowpath(s) to be OPERABLE.

Tech Specs require a MINIMUM of (2) NV pump(s) to be OPERABLE.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. ONE

2. ONE B. 1. ONE

2. TWO C. 1. TWO

2. ONE D. 1. TWO

2. TWO Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 7 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 3 3 D General Discussion Based on the conditions given, the unit is currently in MODE 3. In MODES 1, 2, and 3, Selected Licensing Commitment 16.9.9 requires that TWO of the THREE boration flowpaths be OPERABLE.

For the conditions given, Tech Spec 3.5.2 requires that a minimum of TWO NV pumps be OPERABLE.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant fails to determine the correct plant MODE for the conditions given OR if the applicant does not recall the Boration Flowpath MODE applicability correctly. If either were the case the applicant would chose this as the correct answer since the would be correct for MODES 4, 5, & 6.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant fails to determine the correct plant MODE for the conditions given OR if the applicant does not recall the ECCS Train MODE applicability correctly. If either were the case the applicant would chose this as the correct answer since the would be correct for MODES 4.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant fails to determine the correct plant MODE for the conditions given OR if the applicant does not recall the Boration Flowpath MODE applicability correctly. If either were the case the applicant would chose this as the correct answer since the would be correct for MODES 4, 5, & 6.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant fails to determine the correct plant MODE for the conditions given OR if the applicant does not recall the ECCS Train MODE applicability correctly. If either were the case the applicant would chose this as the correct answer since the would be correct for MODES 4.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must determine the plant MODE from the conditions given and based on the MODE determine the operability requirements for the boration flowpaths and the charging pumps.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must first analyze the conditions given and determine the current plant MODE based on those conditions. The applicant must then recall from memory the operability requirements for the NV pumps and boration flowpaths based on the plant MODE.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

SLC 16.9.9 (Boration Systems - Flow Path (Operating))

SLC 16.9.12 (Boration Systems - Flow Path (Shutdown))

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 8 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Tech Spec 3.5.2 (ECCS - Operating)

QUESTION 3 3 D Tech Spec 3.5.3 (ECCS - Shutdown)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-ADM-TS Objectives 4 & 8 SYS004 2.2.35 - Chemical and Volume Control System SYS004 GENERIC Ability to determine Technical Specification Mode of Operation. (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 9 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS005 K4.12 - Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

QUESTION 4 4 C Knowledge of RHRS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide or the following : (CFR: 41.7)

Lineup for piggyback mode with CSS ................................

Unit 1 was operating at 100% RTP when a LOCA occurred. Given the following events and conditions:

The crew attempted to align 1A Train of the ND system to supply Containment Spray

1NS-43A (1A ND Hx Outlet to NS Cont Outside Isol) failed to open Which ONE (1) of the following statements describes the interlock that prevented 1NS-43A from opening?

A. 1NI-173A (1A ND to A & B Cold Legs Cont Outside Isol) was not closed.

B. 1ND-58A (Train A ND to NV & NI Pumps) was not closed C. 1NI-185A (RB Sump to Train A ND & NS) was not open D. CPCS signal was not present.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 10 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 4 4 C General Discussion From OP-MC-ECC-NS lesson, section 2.6:

The ND spray header isolation valves (NS38 & 43) are manually aligned by the operator (if required) after establishing cold-leg recirculation.

An interlock prevents opening the header supply valves unless the containment sump valves (NI184 & 185) are open.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the procedure, FR-Z.1, directs closing NI-173A to ensure sufficient head to establish spray flow. However, this is not an interlock preventing operation of NS-43A.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant concludes the piggy back alignment is isolated to allow alignment to Aux Spray. Additionally, ND-58A and NS-43A are both interlocked with various other valves in the ND system. The applicant may incorrectly associate ND-58A with NS-43A.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant concludes that CPCS is an interlock to align ND Aux spray as it is for NS.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must know the interlocks associated with aligning RHR system to Auxiliary Spray.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED CNS Bank 1217 MODIFIED Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-ND Section 3.2.4 Lesson Plan OP-MC-ECC-NS Section 2.6 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-ECC-NS (Unit 1) Objectives 5, 6, & 8 SYS005 K4.12 - Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Knowledge of RHRS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide or the following : (CFR: 41.7)

Lineup for piggyback mode with CSS ................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 11 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 4 4 C Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 12 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS006 K2.02 - Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

QUESTION 5 5 A Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Valve operators for accumulators ...................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

A small break LOCA has occurred

Bus 2EMXB is locked out on protective relay actuation

The crew is performing ES-1.2 (Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization)

In accordance with ES-1.2, during the NC system cooldown and depressurization, the Operators will isolate Cold Leg Accumulators (CLAs) (1) and depressurize CLAs (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. A and C

2. B and D B. 1. A and B

2. C and D C. 1. B and D

2. A and C D. 1. C and D

2. A and B Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 13 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 5 5 A General Discussion With the loss of 2EMXB, there will be no power to Accumulator (CLA) isolation valves for 2B and 2D CLAs. Therefore, when the point in the cooldown and depressurization is reached requiring CLAs to be isolated, the Operators will isolate CLAs 2A and 2C. However, since there is no power to the isolation valves for 2B and 2D CLAs the Operators will be required to vent those two accumulators.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant concludes that the Accumulator isolations are divided up into trains as Train A - A&B, Train B - C&D.

If that were the case, they would conclude that they would isolate CLA's 2A & 2B which would have power and depressurize CLA's 2C & 2D.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses the CLA trains. These are the correct CLAs to isolate and vent - just reversed.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant concludes that the Accumulator isolations are divided up into trains as A&B, C&D. If they confuse the two trains they could plausibly conclude that Train A was CLAs C&D and that they still have power while Train B (CLAs A&B) would not have power. If that were the case, they would conclude that they would isolate CLA's 2C & 2D and depressurize CLA's 2A & 2B.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the power supplies to all CLAs isolation valves.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to analyze the conditions given to determine that power is lost to one train of CLA isolation valves. The applicant must then recall from memory which valves are power from which train.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2010 AUDIT Q26 MODIFIED (Bank 2926)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-ECC-CLA Section 2.3 ES-1.2 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization Learning Objectives:

NONE SYS006 K2.02 - Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Valve operators for accumulators ...................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 14 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 5 5 A Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 15 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS004 K5.14 - Chemical and Volume Control System QUESTION 6 6 D Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS: (CFR: 41.5/45.7)

Reduction process of gas concentration in RCS: vent-accumulated non-condensable gases from PZR bubble space, depressurized during cooldown or by alternately heating and cooling (spray) within allowed pressure band (drive more gas out of solution) .........................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

Unit is in Mode 5

Preparations for refueling are in progress

The crew is preparing to perform a Nitrogen purge of the VCT Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements below?

Nitrogen is aligned to the VCT from (1) .

The purpose for performing this evolution is to (2) .

A. 1. Bulk Nitrogen

2. Remove air and non- condensable gases from the NC System in preparation for taking the plant solid.

B. 1. Bulk Nitrogen

2. Remove Dissolved Hydrogen from the NC System to prevent formation of an explosive Hydrogen / Oxygen mixture.

C. 1. Shutdown Waste Gas Decay Tank B

2. Remove air and non- condensable gases from the NC System in preparation for taking the plant solid.

D. 1. Shutdown Waste Gas Decay Tank B

2. Remove Dissolved Hydrogen from the NC System to prevent formation of an explosive Hydrogen / Oxygen mixture.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 16 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 6 6 D General Discussion The VCT is normally aligned to bulk H2 in order to maintain a minimal concentration for 02 scavenging in the NC system.

Prior to unit shutdown a degas is performed to remove the dissolved hydrogen to prevent an explosive hydrogen/oxygen mixture. In order to perform a degas of the RCS, Radwaste will align the 'B' Shutdown Waste Gas Decay Tank to the VCT in order to provide a Nitrogen overpressure. The PZR Stm space sample is then aligned to the WG compressor which is also aligned to the 'B' SWGDT. The alignment is maintained until the Hydrogen concentration in the VCT is less than 4 % and the NCS hydrogen is less than 5cc/kg.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT PLAUSIBLE:

First part incorrect. Plausible because during degas, the NCDT and the PRT are aligned to bulk Nitrogen, it would be reasonable to believe that the VCT would be aligned there as well.

Second part incorrect. Plausible because this is also part of the degas evolution but is not accomplished by Nitrogen alignment.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT PLAUSIBLE:

First part incorrect. Plausible because during degas, the NCDT and the PRT are aligned to bulk Nitrogen, it would be reasonable to believe that the VCT would be aligned there as well.

Second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part incorrect. Plausible because this is also part of the degas evolution but is not accomplished by Nitrogen alignment.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because the applicant must understand the process to reduce gas concentration in the RCS (dissolved hydrogen) during degas.

The operational implication would be alternate alignment required to be performed associated with the WG system, SWGDT B alignment to the VCT (CVCS). The candidate must also understand the operational implication of performing this alignment (To prevent an explosive mixture from being created in the NC system).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2009 NRC Q3 (Bank 2203)

Development References Student References Provided Technical Reference(s): OP-MC-WE-WG Rev 14 Pg. 61 Learning Objective: OP-MC-WE-WG Obj. 2 SYS004 K5.14 - Chemical and Volume Control System Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS: (CFR: 41.5/45.7)

Reduction process of gas concentration in RCS: vent-accumulated non-condensable gases from PZR bubble space, depressurized during cooldown or by alternately heating and cooling (spray) within allowed pressure band (drive more gas out of solution) .........................................

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 17 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 6 6 D 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 18 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS008 A1.02 - Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

QUESTION 7 7 A Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCWS controls including : (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

CCW temperature ................................................

The following conditions exist on Unit 2:

A normal plant shutdown is in progress

All NC pumps are in service

Train A of ND cooling was placed in service 5 minutes ago and a cooldown of the NC system has been initiated

3 minutes ago the following alarms were received on the OAC:

o "2A KC HX Outlet Temp Hi Hi" o "NC Pump Thermal Barrier KC Outlet Temp Hi" for all NCPs o "NC Pump Mtr Upper BRG CLR KC Outlet Temp Hi" for all NCPs

The following readings exist on all running NCPs:

o Motor bearing temperatures are 190°F o Lower radial bearings are 200°F o Seal outlet temperatures are 165°F Operator action in response to these conditions will be to (1) because (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. reduce the KC heat load by reducing NC system cooldown rate

2. KC system piping temperature limits are being approached B. 1. reduce the KC heat load by reducing NC system cooldown rate

2. a temperature limit has been exceeded on all running NC pumps due to a loss of cooling flow C. 1. stop all running NCPs

2. KC system piping temperature limits are being approached D. 1. stop all running NCPs

2. a temperature limit has been exceeded on all running NC pumps due to a loss of cooling flow Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 19 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 7 7 A General Discussion In the scenario provided in this question, indications are provided in which an excessive heat load has been placed on the operating train of KC.

NCP pump temperatures are elevated but have not exceeded any operational limits. To address this condition the crew will need to reduce the NC cooldown rate which will decrease the heat load on the KC system and provide additional cooling to the NCPs.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct, The second part is plausible if the applicant does not recall the bearing temperature limits for the NC pumps.

This combination of answers is plausible because reducing the KC system heat load would reduce the KC water supply to the NC pumps and thus reduce NC pump temperatures.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first plart is plausible as the applicant may conclude that NCP limits have been exceeded. The values given in the stem are close to design limits.

The second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first plart is plausible as the applicant may conclude that NCP limits have been exceeded. The values given in the stem are close to design limits.

The second part is plausible if the applicant does not recall the bearing temperature limits for the NC pumps.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant demonstrates the ability to monitor changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits associated with excessive KC system heat loads an high KC system temperatures by being able to determine if an NC pump temperature limit has been exceeded, that the KC Hx design temperature limit is being approached, and the actions that need to be taken regarding the specified conditions.

Basis for Hi Cog The question is higher cog because the candidate must predict an outcome and select an action to solve the problem. This requires using the knowledge and its meaning to solve a problem.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS NRC RO Retake Q8 (Bank 2208)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PSS-KC Section 1.2 Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-NCP Section 3.1 SDS OAC 2A KC Hx Outlet Temperature Alarm Response Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 20 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Learning Objectives:

QUESTION 7 7 A OP-MC-PSS-KC Objective 8 SYS008 A1.02 - Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCWS controls including : (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

CCW temperature ................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 21 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS008 A3.08 - Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

QUESTION 8 8 C Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CCWS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Automatic actions associated with the CCWS that occur as a result of a safety injection signal ................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is initially operating at 100% RTP

2A1 and 2A2 KC pumps are in service

The 2B sequencer is in TEST

An SI signal is received on BOTH Unit 2 ESF Trains Based on the conditions above, (1) are running.

To maintain minimum KC pump flow, each KC train has a recirc valve which discharges to (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 2A1 and 2A2 KC pumps ONLY

2. the KC Surge tank B. 1. 2A1 and 2A2 KC pumps ONLY

2. its respective train's suction line C. 1. 2A1, 2A2, 2B1 and 2B2 KC pumps

2. the KC Surge tank D. 1. 2A1, 2A2, 2B1 and 2B2 KC pumps

2. its respective train's suction line Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 22 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 8 8 C General Discussion Even though the 2B sequencer is in TEST, when a valid SI signal is received, the test relays are automatically reset and the SI sequence is initated on that train. Any pumps that were in service prior to the SI are unaffected by the SI sequence and remain in service.

Each KC train has a recirc valve which discharges to the KC Surge tank.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausibe if the applicant concludes that the sequencer in test prevents the 'B' Train KC pumps from starting. This has additional plausibility because the train-related pumps can not be controlled manually while the sequencer is in test.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausibe if the applicant concludes that the sequencer in test prevents the 'B' Train KC pumps from starting. This has additional plausibility because the train-related pumps can not be controlled manually while the sequencer is in test.

Part 2 is plausible because having the pump discharge flow directed back to the pump suction is a common method of ensuring pump minimum flow. For example, the CA pumps recirc back to the CAST which is their suction source. Minimum flow recirc for the CM Booster pumps is provided by the CF pump recirc valves which recirc back to the Hotwell (i.e. the suction source for the CM Booster Pumps).

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part 2 is plausible because having the pump discharge flow directed back to the pump suction is a common method of ensuring pump minimum flow. For example, the CA pumps recirc back to the CAST which is their suction source. Minimum flow recirc for the CM Booster pumps is provided by the CF pump recirc valves which recirc back to the Hotwell (i.e. the suction source for the CM Booster Pumps).

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the automatic actions (i.e. KC pump auto start) that occurs as the result of a Safety Injection signal.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First, the applicant must analyze the given conditions to determine that with 2B Sequencer in TEST and a valid SI signal on that train that the B Train KC pumps will start. The applicant must also recall from memory where the KC pump recirc line discharge flow path.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PSS-KC Section 2.1, 3.2.2 & 3.2.4 Lesson Plan OP-MC-DG-EQB Section 3.9 Learning Objectives:

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 23 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination OP-MC-PSS-KC Objective 4 QUESTION 8 8 C SYS008 A3.08 - Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CCWS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Automatic actions associated with the CCWS that occur as a result of a safety injection signal ................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 24 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS010 K4.01 - Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)

QUESTION 9 9 A Knowledge of PZR PCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Spray valve warm-up ..............................................

Regarding the design of the Pressurizer:

1) Why are the Pressurizer Spray lines connected to the NC System cold legs?

2) Why is a constant flow maintained through the PZR spray lines?

A. 1. To provide a differential pressure between the surge line and the spray lines.

2. Prevents large differential temperature buildup across the spray nozzles.

B. 1. To provide a differential pressure between the surge line and the spray lines.

2. Reduces the P across the spray valves to minimize the hydraulic stress on the valve internals.

C. 1. Turbulent flow at the NCP discharge provides better mixing of Reactor Coolant and more constant pressure control.

2. Prevents large differential temperature buildup across the spray nozzles.

D. 1. Turbulent flow at the NCP discharge provides better mixing of Reactor Coolant and more constant pressure control.

2. Reduces the P across the spray valves to minimize the hydraulic stress on the valve internals.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 25 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 9 9 A General Discussion During steady state operation, if there were no flow through the spray line, the line temperature could decrease to a much lower temperature (perhaps 300°F- 450° F) which would result in a significant thermal stress to spray piping and the pressurizer spray nozzle when flow was initiated. Thus spray valves have small bypass lines around them which provide 0.5 gpm flow each to keep the spray line "hot".

The driving force for the spray valves is provided by the delta P between the surge line connection and the cold leg spray connection and the velocity head of the NCPs due to cold leg spray scoops.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because spray bypass flow does reduce the delta-P across the spray valve. However, the reason for bypass flow is reducing thermal stress as previously stated.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because the turbulent flow at the discharge of the NCPs does provide for better mixing and is the reason that only one Cold Leg Narrow Range Temperature RTD is required as opposed to three Hot Leg Narrow Range Temperature RTDs mounted in wells with scoops.

Hence, it is plausible to believe that better mixing of the water going into the spray line would provide a more constant temperature water thus more consistent pressure control. Additionally one of the reasons for having spray bypass flow is to provide better mixing between the NC system and PZR to maintain the boron concentration between the two closer.

Second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because the turbulent flow at the discharge of the NCPs does provide for better mixing and is the reason that only one Cold Leg Narrow Range Temperature RTD is required as opposed to three Hot Leg Narrow Range Temperature RTDs mounted in wells with scoops.

Hence, it is plausible to believe that better mixing of the water going into the spray line would provide a more constant temperature water thus more consistent pressure control. Additionally one of the reasons for having spray bypass flow is to provide better mixing between the NC system and PZR to maintain the boron concentration between the two closer.

Second part is plausible because spray bypass flow does reduce the delta-P across the spray valve.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the question requires the applicant to know why spray valve bypass flow is provided for the spray line.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2011 MNS AUDIT Q10 (Bank 4453)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-NC (Reactor Coolant System), Section 2.6 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 26 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 9 9 A Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-PS-NC, Objective 8 and Objective 9 SYS010 K4.01 - Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)

Knowledge of PZR PCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Spray valve warm-up ..............................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 27 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS012 K1.06 - Reactor Protection System (RPS)

QUESTION 10 10 A Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the RPS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

T/G ............................................................

With Unit 1 operating at 50% RTP, a Reactor Trip signal will be generated on a Turbine trip provided 2/3 Auto Stop Oil pressures are less than a MINIMUM of (1) PSIG OR 4/4 (2) are closed.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. 45

2. Throttle valves B. 1. 75

2. Throttle valves C. 1. 45

2. Governor valves D. 1. 75

2. Governor valves Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 28 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 10 10 A General Discussion If power is >P8 (48% RTP), the reactor will trip if A.S.O. pressure is < 45 PSIG OR 4/4 Turbine Throttle Valves are closed.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because 75 PSIG is the setpoint for the Thrust Bearing Wear turbine trip.

Second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because has the same effect on the turbine as having all four throttle valves closed. It is also plausible because Operators frequently confuse the throttle and governor valves as to which one provides the turbine trip signal to RPS.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because 75 PSIG is the setpoint for the Thrust Bearing Wear turbine trip.

Second part is plausible because has the same effect on the turbine as having all four throttle valves closed. It is also plausible because Operators frequently confuse the throttle and governor valves as to which one provides the turbine trip signal to RPS.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the question requires the applicant to know the turbine trip signals which will provide a signal to RPS to trip the reactor (i.e. cause-effect).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2010 MNS AUDIT Q8 (Bank 2908)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-IPE Section 3.1.2 Learning Objectives:

ICIPE010 SYS012 K1.06 - Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the RPS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

T/G ............................................................

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 29 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 10 Remarks/Status 10 A Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 30 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS012 K3.01 - Reactor Protection System (RPS)

QUESTION 11 11 B Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RPS will have on the following : (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

CRDS ..........................................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

Unit is operating at 70% RTP

The OATC determines that AUTO rod withdrawal is not functioning

Further investigation reveals that manual rod withdrawal is functioning normally

Control Bank D rods are currently at 190 steps Which ONE (1) of the following failures has caused this condition?

A. Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel II fails low.

B. Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I fails low.

C. Loop 2 T Channel fails high.

D. PR Channel N-41 fails high.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 31 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 11 11 B General Discussion Impulse Channel I failing low will actuate rod stop C-5 (1/1 Impulse Pressure channels < 15%) which will stop automatic rod withdrawal but will NOT stop manual rod withdrawal.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because Impulse pressure channel failing low is the correct answer. However, Impulse Pressure Channel I is the channel which provides the rod stop.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because Loop T within 2% of the OP or OTT setpoint will stop automatic rod withdrawal (C-3 & C-4). However, it requires 2/4 channels to be within 2% of the setpoint and it stops both automatic and manual rod withdrawal.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because 1 PR channel failing high (>103%) will stop automatic rod withdrawal (C-2). However, this is also a manual rod withdrawal block.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because the candidate must understand the reactor protection signals associated with interlocks which will prevent control rod motion.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive level because it requires multiple mental steps. The applicant must first determine the potential effect of each malfunction given on the Rod Control System by recalling the setpoint and coincidence for each failure. The applicant must then determine if each failure affects Rod Control in MANUAL, AUTOMATIC, or BOTH.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS NRC Q45 (Bank 3030)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

OP-MC-IC-IPE, Section 3.1.4 and 7.8 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-IC-IPE, Obj. 12 SYS012 K3.01 - Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RPS will have on the following : (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

CRDS ..........................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 32 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 11 11 B Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 33 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS013 A1.06 - Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

QUESTION 12 12 C Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to Prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ESFAS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

RWST level .....................................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A Reactor Trip and Safety Injection have occurred due to a LOCA inside Containment Based on the following FWST level trend:

TIME 1500 1515 1530 1545 At what time would you expect the ND pump suction to automatically swap to the Containment Sump?

A. 1500 B. 1515 C. 1530 D. 1545 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 34 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 12 12 C General Discussion On Unit 1 the ND pump suction will automatically swap to the Containment when FWST level decreases to 95 inches.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Less than 180" is plausible since this is the "old" number for ND pump suction swapover prior to the ECCS water conservation modification. It is also the ND pump suction swapover for Unit 2.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Less than 135" is plausible since the Pre-Lo Level Annuciator alarm comes in at this level. Also, there are E-1 (Loss or Reactor or Secondary Coolant) enclosure actions to be performed when this alarm comes in.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Less than 20" is plausible since the LO-LO Level alarm annunciates at this level. Also, there are E-1 (Loss or Reactor or Secondary Coolant) actions to be performed when this alarm comes in.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the implications of different FWST levels on when automatic operation of the ESFAS system controls should have occurred and consequently, when manual operation of the ESFAS system controls is required to prevent exceeding the design operating limits of the system.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-ND Section 2.3.10 OP/1/A/6100/011A (Annunciator Response for 1AD-14)

OP/2/A/6100/011A (Annunciator Response for 2AD-14)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-PS-ND Objective 7 SYS013 A1.06 - Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to Prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ESFAS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

RWST level .....................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 35 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 12 12 C Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 36 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS013 K6.01 - Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

QUESTION 13 13 B Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the ESFAS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Sensors and detectors ............................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is operating at 100% RTP

Containment pressure Channel II fails

The Channel II Containment Pressure - High B/S has been TRIPPED

The Channel II Containment Pressure - High High B/S has been BYPASSED Which ONE (1) of the following identifies the correct ESF actuation logic for the remaining Containment Pressure channels?

A. Safety Injection - 1/2; Phase B - 2/2 B. Safety Injection - 1/2; Phase B - 2/3 C. Safety Injection - 1/3; Phase B - 2/2 D. Safety Injection - 1/3; Phase B - 2/3 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 37 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 13 13 B General Discussion According to ECC-ISE, the logic required for hi-containment pressure to actuate SI is 2 of 3 channels. According to ECC-ISE, Figure 7.5, Channel II inputs into this logic. Therefore, the logic required for hi-containment pressure to actuate SI has changed from 2 of 3 to 1 of 2.

According to ECC-ISE, the logic required for hi-hi containment pressure to actuate Phase B is 2 of 4 channels. According to ECC-ISE, Figure 7.9, Channel II inputs into this logic. However, according to Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Condition E, when this instrument is removed from service, the channel is bypassed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Since the information provided indicates that the channel has been removed from service in accordance with plant procedures, the channel is bypassed, and the logic required to actuate Phase B is now 2 of 3 Channels.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

1st part correct.

2nd part is plausible if the applicant incorrectly concludes that the original logic for a Phase B is 2/3 instead of 2/4. If that were the case this would be correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

1st part is plausible if the operator incorrectly concludes that the actuation logic for SI is 2 of 4, rather than 2 of 3. .

2nd part is plausible if the applicant incorrectly concludes that the original logic for a Phase B is 2/3 instead of 2/4. If that were the case this would be correct.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

1st part is plausible if the operator incorrectly concludes that the actuation logic for SI is 2 of 4, rather than 2 of 3. .

2nd part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the operator must have knowledge (i.e. logic changes when a signal is bypassed or tripped) of the effect that a loss of or a malfunction of a Sensor/detector (i.e. Channel II of Containment Pressure) will have on the ESFAS.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must first recall from memory the actuation logics for both Safety Injection and Phase B. The applicant must then determine the effect of bistable manipulations on the actuation logic for each ESFAS signal.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS Audit Q11 (Bank 1566 & 3127)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-ECC-ISE LCO 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Conditions D & E Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-ECC-ISE Objectives 5, 6, 13, and 16 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 38 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS013 K6.01 - Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

QUESTION 13 13 B Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the ESFAS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Sensors and detectors ............................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 39 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS022 K3.02 - Containment Cooling System (CCS)

QUESTION 14 14 A Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Containment instrumentation readings ...............................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is currently operating at 100% RTP

A leak on the RV system occurs inside Containment

The crew isolates RV to Containment to stop the leak Assuming RV remains isolated to Containment, what is the effect on NC Pressurizer and SG NR level indications?

NR SG indicated level will be (1) than actual level.

NC PZR indicated level will be (2) than actual level.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. higher

2. higher B. 1. higher

2. lower C. 1. lower

2. higher D. 1. lower

2. lower Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 40 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 14 14 A General Discussion As Containment temperature increases, the water in the reference leg for a wet leg transmitter heats up and becomes less dense. Therefore, the differential pressure between the reference leg and the variable leg decreases and the indicated level increases.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible if the applicant concludes that PZR level uses a dry reference leg transmitter. Also, the applicant could confuse the PZR level instrument with the SG level WR and NR instruments. Because these instruments are calibrated at different temperatures, under certain conditions S/G NR levels will indicate higher than actual level while S/G WR levels will indicate lower than actual level. Consequently, the applicant could conclude that PZR level and SG NR level will respond differently to increasing Containment temperature.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

First part is plausible if the applicant confuses the response of SG NR level the response SG level WR and NR instruments at different NC system temperatures. Because these instruments are calibrated at different temperatures, under certain conditions S/G NR levels will indicate higher than actual level while S/G WR levels will indicate lower than actual level. Consequently, the applicant could conclude that PZR level and SG NR level will respond differently to increasing Containment temperature.

Second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant realizes that both instruments should respond in the same direction but confuses the effect of increasing Containment temperature on the instrument. It is a common mistake among experienced Operators to confuse the effect of Containment temperature on level instrument indications. Since the EOP network requires higher levels under adverse containment temperature it is a common misconception among Operators that this is because indicated levels are lower under adverse conditions without rationalizing why the higher levels are actually required.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the effect of increasing Containment temperature on level instruments inside Containment.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must determine the effect of the loss of RV to Containment (increasing Containment temperature), the effect of increasing Containment temperature on reference leg density, and then the effect of the change in reference leg density on indicated level.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

BNT-CP02R10P - Sensors and Detectors Section 4.5 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 41 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Learning Objectives:

QUESTION 14 14 A BNT-CP02R10P Objective 10F SYS022 K3.02 - Containment Cooling System (CCS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Containment instrumentation readings ...............................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 42 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS025 A2.03 - Ice Condenser System QUESTION 15 15 A Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ice condenser system; correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Opening of ice condenser doors ....................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

NCS temperature is 205°F

A plant heatup to normal operating temperature is in progress

Annunciator 1AD-9, A/5 (ICE COND LOWER INLET DOORS OPEN) is lit

A NEO reports that ONE of the Ice Condenser Lower Inlet doors is partially open

An HVAC maintenance technician is dispatched to inspect the door and has determined that the door will open but cannot be closed

The Ice Condenser Chart Recorder (1NPRC-5000) indicates temperature for the affected ice bed is 19°F and slowly increasing

No other annunciator alarms are present

1) With regards to Tech Specs 3.6.12 (Ice Bed) AND 3.6.13 (Ice Condenser Door),

what LCO(s) is/are required to be entered?

2) What is the primary concern with the increasing ice bed temperature?

A. 1. 3.6.13 ONLY

2. Increased ice bed sublimation B. 1. 3.6.12 AND 3.6.13

2. Increased ice bed sublimation C. 1. 3.6.13 ONLY

2. Blockage of air through the NF AHUs due to ice buildup D. 1. 3.6.12 AND 3.6.13

2. Blockage of air through the NF AHUs due to ice buildup Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 43 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 15 15 A General Discussion Per TS 3.6.13 (Ice Condenser Doors) The ice condenser inlet doors, intermediate deck doors, and top deck doors shall be OPERABLE and closed while in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. With one Ice Condenser Lower Inlet door open, TS 3.6.13 applies.

Per TS 3.6.12 (Ice Bed), ice bed operability is affected by temperature, chemical composition, mass, structural integrity of the ice baskets, and blockage of flow channels through the ice bed.

In the conditions presented, there are no operability concerns with the ice bed. Control Room annunciators will alarm if ice bed temperature reached the Tech Spec limit (27°F). While ice bed temperature is increasing, the applicant should determine it has not reached Tech spec limit because no other annunciator alarms are present.

Per lesson plan, OP-MC-CNT-NF, section 3.1.2, operation of the NF system with elevated ice condenser temperatures increases sublimation of the ice. Per section 2.2.3, the Ice condenser ice bed temperature is maintained by: keeping the ice condenser inlet, intermediate, and top deck doors closed and insulated.

Blockage of air through the NF AHUs due to ice buildup is NOT a concern with increased temperature. Per CNT-NF, section 2.2.3, Air passing through the AHUs will gradually deposit a layer of ice on the coils. To keep the AHUs from "icing up" internally (reduces airflow through the AHU), a Defrost cycle is used.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See discussion above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant concludes that the door being open and/or increasing ice bed temperature affects operability of the ice bed.

The ice bed remains operable until temperature increases to greater than 27°F.

The second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because warmer, more humid air due to the open ice condenser door can increase the icing of the NF AHU coils.

However, the normal defrost cycles will prevent flow blockage.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant concludes that the door being open and/or increasing ice bed temperature affects operability of the ice bed.

The ice bed remains operable until temperature increases to greater than 27°F.

Second part is plausible because warmer, more humid air due to the open ice condenser door can increase the icing of the NF AHU coils.

However, the normal defrost cycles will prevent flow blockage.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant is given a set of conditions where an Ice Condenser door is stuck open and 1) must predict the consequence of the door being open (i.e. increased sublimation) and 2) use procedures (Tech Specs) to mitigate the consequences of the event.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 44 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType QUESTION 15 Question Source 15 A RO Memory MODIFIED 2011 AUDIT Q15 (Bank 4456)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

TS 3.6.13 and bases TS 3.6.12 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-CNT-NF Objective 21 SYS025 A2.03 - Ice Condenser System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ice condenser system; correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Opening of ice condenser doors ....................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 45 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS025 A4.02 - Ice Condenser System QUESTION 16 16 C Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Containment vent fans ............................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit was initially operating at 100% RTP

A LOCA occurs inside Containment

1) To MANUALLY start the Containment Air Return Fans (CARFs) a CPCS signal required.

2) An AUTOMATIC start of the CARFs requires an Air Return Damper OPEN AND a CPCS signal AND a/an .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. is

2. Sp signal (No Time Delay)

B. 1. is not

2. 10 min. time delay after S p signal C. 1. is

2. 10 min. time delay after S p signal D. 1. is not

2. Sp signal (No Time Delay)

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 46 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 16 16 C General Discussion The Containment Air Return Fans will automatically start following a Hi Hi Containment Pressure signal 10 minutes ( actual is 9 minutes +/- 1 minute ) after the 3.0 psig in Containment if the following interlocks are met:

1) Air Return Isolation Damper (RAF-D-2/4) is open

2) The 0.35 psig CPCS signal is present The C.A.R.F.s can be manually started by depressing the associated trains "NS/Phase B" manual actuation push button, provided the CPCS signal is present.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant does not recall that there is a 10 minute time delay associated with the fan auto start after the Sp signal is received. This is plausbile since most actuations as a result of an Sp signal occur immediately with no time delay.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant does not recall that the CPCS signal applies to both automatic and manual.

The second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant does not recall that the CPCS signal applies to both automatic and manual.

The second part is plausible if the applicant does not recall that there is a 10 minute time delay associated with the fan auto start after the Sp signal is received. This is plausbile since most actuations as a result of an Sp signal occur immediately with no time delay.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the interlocks which must be met associated with the Containment Vent Fans (i.e. Containment Air Return Fans) to be able to manually operate or monitor the system in the Control Room.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CNT-VX Section 2.1 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-CNT-VX Objective 4 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 47 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS025 A4.02 - Ice Condenser System QUESTION 16 16 C Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Containment vent fans ............................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Rewrote question and answers using "is" or "is not" design. For psychometric considerations, new answer is 'C'. Old answer was

'B'.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 48 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS026 A4.01 - Containment Spray System (CSS)

QUESTION 17 17 B Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

CSS controls ....................................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A LOCA has occurred inside Containment

ES-1.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg Recirc) has been implemented

Containment pressure is 3.2 PSIG As a MINIMUM, to MANUALLY START the "A" Train NS Pump:

1) CPCS Train A pressure must be greater than (1) .

AND

2) (2) "A" Train NS Pump Discharge valve(s) must be OPEN.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 0.8 PSIG

2. ONE B. 1. 0.35 PSIG

2. ONE C. 1. 0.8 PSIG

2. BOTH D. 1. 0.35 PSIG

2. BOTH Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 49 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 17 17 B General Discussion To manually start a Containment Spray pump, at least one of its discharge valves must be OPEN with power available.

In addition, Containment pressure, as seen by CPCS must be greater than .35 PSIG (i.e. 'CPCS Train A/B Inhibit' status light must be DARK).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because 0.8 PSIG is the pressure at which an NS pump will automatically restart on UNIT 2 if it has automatically stopped.

Second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT. See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because 0.8 PSIG is the pressure at which an NS pump will automatically restart on UNIT 2 if it has automatically stopped.

Second part is plausibe if the applicant concludes that both pump discharge valves must be open to meet the pump start interlock.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausibe if the applicant concludes that both pump discharge valves must be open to meet the pump start interlock.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the pump start permissives to be able to manually start the NS pump from the control room.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because evaluate a given set of conditions and predict an outcome. This will require using the system knowledge and applying its meaning to predict the impact.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-ECC-NS (Unit 1) Section 3.2 Lesson Plan OP-MC-ECC-NS Section 3.2 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-ECC-NS Objective 5 SYS026 A4.01 - Containment Spray System (CSS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

CSS controls ....................................................

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 50 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 17 Remarks/Status 17 B Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 51 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS039 A3.02 - Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)

QUESTION 18 18 C Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MRSS, including : (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Isolation of the MRSS ............................................

Unit 1 is in Mode 3 conducting a plant cooldown and depressurization in accordance with OP/1/A/6100/SD-2 (Cooldown to 400°F).

The following conditions exist:

NC System pressure 1900 PSIG

NC System temperature 557°F

All Steam Generator pressures 1100 PSIG

Low Pressure SI and Low Pressure Steamline Isolation have been blocked

The operator has just begun an 80°F/hour cooldown.

Which ONE (1) of the following conditions would automatically close all four Main Steam Isolation Valves?

A. NC Pressure increases to 2000 PSIG.

B. Containment Pressure increases to 1 PSIG.

C. 1A Steam Generator Pressure drops to 900 PSIG in 2 seconds.

D. 1B Steam Generator Pressure drops to 700 PSIG consistent with NC Cooldown.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 52 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 18 18 C General Discussion Per ECC-ISE, a Main Steam Isolation signal closes the MSIVs. It is actuated by one of the following:

Hi Hi Containment Press (3 psig),

Low Steam Pressure (< 775 psig) >P-11 Steamline negative rate (-100 psig/sec) <P-11 with Lo Press Steam Line Isol BLOCKED After the Low Steam pressure (< 775 psig) MSI signal is blocked, if NC pressure increased above P-11, the Low Steam pressure MSI is enabled. IF steam pressure were below 775 psig, a MSI would occur.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not recall that Steam Pressure must be less than 775 psig for the MSI to occur >P-11 (NC system pressure >2000 psig).

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because a MSI will occur on Hi Hi Containment pressure (>3 psig).

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not recall that NC system pressure must be greater than P-11 (>2000 psig) for a MSI to occur as a result of low steam pressure (<775 psig).

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because the applicant must demonstrate a knowledge of the signals that will result in an Automatic Main Steam Line Isolation signal.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must first recall from memory all of the MSI signals and their setpoints. The applicant must then analyze the conditions given and apply them to the recalled knowledge to determine which response meets the criteria for a MSI.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2008 MNS NRC Q18 (Bank 3236)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-ECC-ISE Section 3.1 Learning Objectives: OP-MC-ECC-ISE Objective 13 SYS039 A3.02 - Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MRSS, including : (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Isolation of the MRSS ............................................

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 53 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 18 Remarks/Status 18 C Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 54 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS059 A1.03 - Main Feedwater (MFW) System QUESTION 19 19 D Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MFW controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Power level restrictions for operation of MFW pumps and valves. .......

The following conditions exist on Unit 1:

The plant is at 20% RTP

Power increase in progress At a MINIMUM steam flow of (1) , the CF Control Bypass valves receive a full close demand signal from DCS and will receive a full open demand signal when steam flow increases to a MINIMUM of (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. 25%

2. 75%

B. 1. 25%

2. 85%

C. 1. 30%

2. 75%

D. 1. 30%

2. 85%

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 55 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 19 19 D General Discussion During a power increase, DCS sends a full close (0% Demand) signal to the CF Control Bypass valves when steam flow increases to 30%. When steam flow increases to 85%, DCS sends a full open (100% Demand) signal to the CF Control Bypass valves and they ramp open over 2 minutes.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible because this is the steam flow setpoint at which the CF Control Bypass valves receive an open signal from DCS on a power decrease.

Part 2 is plausible because this is the steam flow setpoint at which the CF Control Bypass valves receive a full close signal from DCS on a power decrease.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible because this is the steam flow setpoint at which the CF Control Bypass valves receive an open signal from DCS on a power decrease.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part 2 is plausible because this is the steam flow setpoint at which the CF Control Bypass valves receive a full close signal from DCS on a power decrease.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT. See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is match because the applicant is required to have knowledge of the power levels at which DCS provides operating signals to the CF Control Bypass valves.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires multiple mental steps. The applicant must first recall from memory all conditions that will result in an AMSAC actuation. The applicant must the evaluate the given conditions compared to each supplied answer to determine the correct response.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CF-IFC Section 2.3.3.

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-CF-IFC Objectives 6 & 7 SYS059 A1.03 - Main Feedwater (MFW) System Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MFW controls Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 56 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

QUESTION 19 19 D Power level restrictions for operation of MFW pumps and valves. .......

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 57 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS061 K6.02 - Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System QUESTION 20 20 D Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Pumps .........................................................

Given the following on Unit 2:

A reactor trip from 100% RTP has occurred

The TD CA pump tripped on overspeed upon starting

Bus 2ETB locked out due to a ground fault on the bus Which ONE (1) of the following describes which S/Gs are currently being fed and the associated flow rates?

A. C and D S/Gs at 450 GPM to each S/G B. C and D S/Gs at 450 GPM total flow C. A and B S/Gs at 450 GPM to each S/G D. A and B S/Gs at 450 GPM total flow Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 58 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 20 20 D General Discussion The Turbine Driven CA pump is tripped. If it were running it would feed all 4 S/Gs. 2A CA Pump normally feeds S/Gs 2A and 2B. 2B CA Pump normally feeds S/Gs 2C and 2D. With the loss of power to Emergency Bus 2ETB, the 2B CA Pump will not be running. Therefore, only 2A CA Pump will be running feeding 2A and 2B S/Gs.

Each motor driven CA Pump is capable of supplying two S/Gs at a design total flow rate of 450 GPM.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because it is a common mistake for applicants to confuse which SGs are fed by the CA pumps.

The second part is plausible because 450 GPM would be correct if it was TOTAL flow. The applicant could also confuse the flow from the MDCA pump with the flow from the TDCA.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because it is a common mistake for applicants to confuse which SGs are fed by the CA pumps.

The second part regarding 450 GPM total flow is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part regarding which SGs are being fed is correct.

The second part is plausible because 450 GPM would be correct if it was TOTAL flow. The applicant could also confuse the flow from the MDCA pump with the flow from the TDCA.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must know the effect of the loss of one CA pump on CA (AFW) system.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a comprehension level question because the applicant must associate mulitple pieces of information, some given and some recalled from memory. First, the candidate must analyze the given conditions and determine that with the Emergency Bus 2ETB locked out, the 2B MDAFW pump will be unavailable. The candidate must then recall which S/Gs are fed from each MDAFW pump. The applicant must also recall the rated flow for the MDAFW pumps and that the rated flow is total flow.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2009 MNS RO Retake Q20 MODIFIED (Bank 2919)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

OP-MC-CF-CA Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-CF-CA Objectives 2, 7, & 8 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 59 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS061 K6.02 - Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System QUESTION 20 20 D Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Pumps .........................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 60 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS062 2.4.1 - AC Electrical Distribution System QUESTION 21 21 A SYS062 GENERIC Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is at 100% RTP

D/G 1A is out of service

A loss of off-site power occurs

The crew enters E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

While determining if SI is required, D/G 1B trips Which ONE (1) of the following actions is required?

A. Immediately enter ECA-0.0 (Loss of all AC Power).

B. Refer to AP-07 (Loss of Electrical Power), while continuing in E-0.

C. Immediately enter AP-07 and return to E-0 when the actions of AP-07 are complete.

D. Continue in E-0 while attempting to restore D/G 1B, until directed to transition to another procedure.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 61 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 21 21 A General Discussion ECA-0.0 is entered from the following.

1. E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Step 4, on the indication all emergency AC busses are deenergized.

2. Directly from symptoms that both emergency AC busses are deenergized.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because AP-07 would be used if power to only one emergency bus was lost. And, AP-07 would be performed concurrently with E-0.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because AP-07 would be used if power to only one emergency bus was lost.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the step to check ETA and ETB energized has already been passed. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to continue in E-0 until directed to another procedure if the applicant does not understand that a transition to ECA-0.0 is warranted ANY time ETA and ETB are both de-energized.

Basis for meeting the KA The applicant must possess knowledge of EOP entry condtions related to the AC Electrical Distribution System (i.e. ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power). These entry conditions are part of the immediate actions of E-0. Therefore, the KA is matched.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because the applicant must analyze the conditions given and determine the appropriate procedure to enter based on that analysis.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2007 MNS NRC Q24 (Bank 2974)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

ECA-0.0 (Loss of All AC Power)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-ECA-0 Section 3.2 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-ECA-0 Objective 2 SYS062 2.4.1 - AC Electrical Distribution System SYS062 GENERIC Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 62 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 21 21 A Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 63 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS062 K2.01 - AC Electrical Distribution System QUESTION 22 22 C Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following : (CFR: 41.7)

Major system loads ..............................................

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is at 100% RTP

All NCPs are running and powered from their normal sources Subsequently the following occurs:

A Generator -Switchyard protective lockout occurs on 1B Bus Line Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect of the 1B Bus Line lockout on the 1B NC pump AND Bus 1TB?

A. NCP 1B trips. Bus 1TB automatically fast transfers to its alternate power supply.

B. NCP 1B trips. Bus 1TB automatically slow transfers to the alternate power supply.

C. NCP 1B continues to run. Bus 1TB automatically fast transfers to the alternate power supply.

D. NCP 1B continues to run. Bus 1TB automatically slow transfers to the alternate power supply.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 64 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 22 22 C General Discussion An Automatic Fast Bus Transfer will operate in 8 cycles if the following conditions are met:

1. The normal incoming breaker is tripped by a generator-switchyard protective lockout (86A/1A, 86A/1B, 86B/1A, 86B/1B, 86TTA/1A, 86TTA/1B, 86TTB/1A, or 86TTB/1B).

2. The (AUTO/MANUAL) Mode select switches on the main control board in the control must be in AUTO

3. The Normal and Standby sources are in synchronization. (Synchronism is determined automatically in the transfer circuit by the position of breakers auxiliary contacts. These contacts reflect the position of the unit generator/switchyard circuit breakers.)

4. The NC Pumps on the two affected switchgear are both operating.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible since the normal supply breaker to the bus has tripped. Therefore, the applicant could conclude that the NC pump trips also.

The second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible since the normal supply breaker to the bus has tripped. Therefore, the applicant could conclude that the NC pump trips also.

The second part is plausible if the applicant does not understand the requirements for a fast bus transfer or slow bus transfer. If so, it would be reasonable for the applicant to conclude that a slow bus transfer has occurred.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant does not understand the requirements for a fast bus transfer or slow bus transfer. If so, it would be reasonable for the applicant to conclude that a slow bus transfer has occurred.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the power supplies to the NC pumps to know if a fast or slow transfer occurs.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must first recall from memory the requirements for a fast bus and slow bus transfer. The applicant must then apply the recalled memory to the given conditions and analyze each answer based on that analysis to determine the correct response.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2007 MNS NRC Q22 (Bank 3543)

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 65 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Development References QUESTION 22 Student References Provided 22 C

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EL-EP Section 2.5 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EL-EP, Objectives 23, 24, 25 SYS062 K2.01 - AC Electrical Distribution System Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following : (CFR: 41.7)

Major system loads ..............................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 66 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS063 K1.03 - DC Electrical Distribution System QUESTION 23 23 B Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the DC electrical system and the following systems: (CFR:

41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

Battery charger and battery ........................................

Given the following plant conditions:

Both Units are operating at 100% RTP

Battery 1DP is aligned for equalizing charge

The DC Output breaker for Charger 1DS has tripped open Based on the conditions above, Bus 1DP is .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. energized from Charger 1DP and Battery 1DP B. energized from Chargers 1DP and 2DP C. energized from Charger 1DP ONLY D. de-energized Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 67 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 23 23 B General Discussion During an "equalizing charge", the battery (1DP) is disconnected from its distribution center and the standby charger (1DS) performs the charging operation while the normal battery charger supplies the distribution center. Both distribution centers are electrically cross-connected through the bus tie breakers (Normally Closed). This alignment ensures that there is a battery to supply both busses so that a loss of power will not result in the loss of either bus (1DP or 2DP).

During the battery charge, the DC bus (distribution center) must be disconnected from the battery (1DP) and the charger performing the charge (1DS) due to the high voltage (approx. 271 VDC) and current conditions existing during the charge.

In this alignment, if the charger 1DS output breaker trips, the U-1 and U-2 250 VDC buses (1DP and 2DP) would be supplied by their normal chargers (1DP and 2DP). On a complete loss of power, buses 1DP and 2DP would be supplied by the 2DP battery.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Charger 1DP is electrically aligned to bus and is supplying power to it. If the applicant does not remember that during a equalize charge the battery and the Stby Charger are disconnected from the bus this would be a reasonable choice. All the applicant is given is that the Stby charger output breaker has tripped open, there is no information given about how the system is aligned other than the type of charge that is being performed.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Charger 1DP is electrically aligned to bus and is supplying power to it. If the applicant does not remember that during a equalize charge the cross ties between the two unit 250 VDC buses are closed, this could seem a reasonable answer. This information is not given in the stem and therefore required the recall of system knowledge to eliminate it as a possible answer.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The situation described in the stem would result in the loss of battery charger 1DS and effectively the loss of battery 1DP as well because both the battery and the standby charger are electrically disconnected from the bus. If the applicant does not remember that during a equalize charge the cross ties between the two unit 250 VDC buses are closed, this could seem a reasonable answer. Also, the applicant could confuse the alignment during an equalize charge with how it is accomplished for the 125V Vital Buses where the 'Normal' charger is used for the equalize charge and the stby charger supplies the bus.

Basis for meeting the KA K/A is matched because the applicant must understand the alignment of the battery chargers during an equalizing charge (i.e. physical connections) and the subsequent cause-effect relationship between the battery charger and the bus normally supplied by the battery if the battery charger is lost.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a high cog question because it requires more than one mental step. First, the applicant must recall from memory the electrical lineup during and equalizing charge on the 1DP Battery. The applicant must then determine the effect of the DC Output breaker on the battery charger opening on the 1DP Bus.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2010 NRC Q22 (Bank 2722)

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 68 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Development References QUESTION 23 Student References Provided 23 B

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EL-EPJ Section 3.1 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EL-EPJ Objective 5 SYS063 K1.03 - DC Electrical Distribution System Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the DC electrical system and the following systems: (CFR:

41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

Battery charger and battery ........................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 69 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS064 2.1.30 - Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System QUESTION 24 24 A SYS064 GENERIC Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls. (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The 1A D/G has been placed in operation to facilitate a power swap on 1ETA from 1ATC to SATA

Indicated load is 400 KW and 75 KVARS

1A DG is currently powering 1ETA which is separated from the grid When the "Gov Control" "Raise" pushbutton is depressed, frequency will (1) .

When the "Voltage Adjust" is rotated to "Raise" indicated KVAR's will (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Increase

2. Remain the same B. 1. Remain the same

2. Remain the same C. 1. Increase

2. Increase D. 1. Remain the same

2. Increase Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 70 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 24 24 A General Discussion The Diesel Governor Each diesel unit at McGuire will be operated in either the speed droop or the isochronous modes. Selection of the droop or Isochronous modes will be determined by the normal and/or standby breaker positions on the 4160V bus.

Two OAC points provide a droop permissive indication and a droop mode indication. The droop permissive provides operations with indication that the droop contact on the normal or standby breaker is closed before the diesel is started. The droop mode indication will provide indication that the diesel engine is in the droop mode which indicates that the droop permissive is available and the droop contact on the diesel generator feeder breaker is closed.

Objective # 14, 15 The diesel generator control circuit will place the Governor and Voltage Regulator in the Droop Mode if all of the following conditions are true:

Either the 4160 Volt Bus Normal or Standby breaker is closed The Diesel Generator Output Breaker is closed The Diesel Generator start relay is energized While in the Droop mode, (with the D/G tied to the power grid), adjusting the Gov Cntrl pushbutton changes KW (load), but does NOT affect FREQUENCY (D/G speed). Adjusting the "Volt Adjust" switch changes Power Factor and KVars, but does NOT affect VOLTAGE.

The diesel generator control circuit will place the Governor and Voltage Regulator in the Isochronous Mode if all of the following conditions are true:

The 4160 Volt Bus Normal and Standby breakers are open, The Diesel Generator Output Breaker is closed, and The Diesel Generator start relay is energized While in the Isochronous mode, (with the D/G separated from the power grid), adjusting the "Gov Cntrl" pushbutton changes FREQUENCY (D/G speed), but does NOT affect load (KW). Adjusting the "Volt Adjust" switch changes VOLTAGE, but does NOT affect Power Factor or KVars.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant confuses the operation of the Gov Control pushbutton with its operation when the DG is paralleled to the bus.

When the DG is paralleled to the bus depressing the Raise button will cause load to increase but frequency will remain the same.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant confuses the operation of the Voltage Adjust control with its operation when the DG is paralleled to the bus. If the DG was paralleled to the bus, going to Raise on the Voltage Adjust would cause KVARs to increase.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant confuses the operation of the Gov Control pushbutton with its operation when the DG is paralleled to the bus.

When the DG is paralleled to the bus depressing the Raise button will cause load to increase but frequency will remain the same.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant confuses the operation of the Voltage Adjust control with its operation when the DG is paralleled to the bus. If the DG was paralleled to the bus, going to Raise on the Voltage Adjust would cause KVARs to increase.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant demonstrates the ability to locate and operate controls associated with the Emergency Diesel Generator by demonstrating a knowledge of the effect of those controls in both parallel and isochronous mode.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 71 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Basis for Hi Cog QUESTION 24 24 A This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First, the applicant must analyze the given conditions to determine if the DG is operating in parallel or isochronous mode. Then the applicant must determine the effect of operating each of the controls in the specified position.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2011 MNS AUDIT Q23 (Bank 4461)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-DG-DG Section 2.5 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-DG-DG Objective 14 & 15 SYS064 2.1.30 - Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System SYS064 GENERIC Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls. (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 72 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS073 A2.01 - Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System QUESTION 25 25 A Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to cor- rect, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Erratic or failed power supply ......................................

While performing daily surveillance checks on 1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust), you determine that the OPERATE light is OFF.

Which ONE (1) of the following actions is required in accordance with PT/1/A/4600/003 B (Daily Surveillance Items)?

A. Perform a source check to determine if the EMF is operable.

B. Perform a source check to ensure the EMF alarm setpoints remain valid.

C. Depress CLR (Clear) on the EMF touch controls to reset the OPERATE light.

D. Place the sample Pump in OFF and then back to RUN to reset the OPERATE light.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 73 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 25 25 A General Discussion During the unit's Daily Surveillance 1EMF-33 OPERATE light is checked to be lit. One of the failures that can cause the OPERATE light not being lit is a loss of power (either to the instrument of loss of high voltage to the detector).

If the OPERATE light is not lit, PT/1/A/4600/003 B requires a source check to be performed.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because performing a source check is correct. However, the source check verifies operability of the instrument.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the applicant may conclude that depressing "CLEAR" will reset any EMF malfunctions and cause the OPERATE light come back on.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant concludes that the OPERATE light being off is due to a low flow conditions on the EMF cause by a tripped sample pump. The could conclude that taking the sample pump to OFF and back to RUN would reset the sample pump and cause the OPERATE light to come back on.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant is given a condition where abnormal EMF indications could be caused by an "erratic or failed power supply" and must determine the correct actions from the Daily Surveillance procedure to mitigate the abnormal condition.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2007 MNS NRC Q25 (Bank 3546)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-WE-EMF Section 2.4 PT/1/A/4600/003 B Daily Surveillance Items Learning Objectives: WEEMF009 SYS073 A2.01 - Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to cor- rect, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Erratic or failed power supply ......................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 74 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 25 25 A Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 75 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS076 A3.02 - Service Water System (SWS)

QUESTION 26 26 C Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SWS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Emergency heat loads ............................................

Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is at 100% RTP

A Loss of Offsite Power occurs on both Units 1 and 2 Which ONE (1) of the following provides the assured source of cooling water to maintain Containment temperatures within Tech Spec limits for Unit 2?

A. BOTH 2A AND 2B RN pumps B. RV pump selected in Auto C. 2A RN pump ONLY D. 2B RN pump ONLY Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 76 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 26 26 C General Discussion On a Blackout, RV system pumps lose power so they will be unavailable to supply cooling to the Upper and Lower Containment AHUs.

However, RN-42A remains open which allows A RN pump to supply the Containment AHUs. RN-42A is the supply to the Auxiliary Building "Non-Essential" header. However, containment cooling is considered an "emergency heat load" and RN-42A must remain open to allow the RN header to supply containment cooling under Blackout conditions.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the candidate does not realize one train of valves close on the blackout.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because RV pump C could be considered the supply since it will try to start on loss of cooling water pressure.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the candidate concludes that the supply comes from the B RN train.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because candidate must have knowledge of how the RV System (Containment Ventilation Cooling Water System) is supplied during a loss-of-offsite power. This requires both knowledge of the physical connections and the effects of a station Blackout on the automatic operation of both the RN (Service Water) and RV systems.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because the candidate must analyze the given plant conditions, determine that cooling water is unavailable from the RV system and that cooling water is still available from the RN system via RN-42A but only from the A Train of RN due to the train separation caused by the Blackout.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS NRC Q31 (Bank 3059)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CNT-RV, Section 3.2 Lesson Plan OP-MC-PSS-RN, Section 2.4 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-CNT-RV, Objective 13 OP-MC-PSS-RN Objective 11 SYS076 A3.02 - Service Water System (SWS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SWS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Emergency heat loads ............................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 77 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 26 26 C Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 78 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS078 A4.01 - Instrument Air System (IAS)

QUESTION 27 27 B Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Pressure gauges .................................................

Given the following plant conditions:

Both units are operating at 100% RTP

An instrument air system leak develops in the Unit 1 Turbine Building The following indications are observed in the Control Room:

Based on the indications above, the Diesel VI Compressors (G & H) are (1) .

AND 1VI-1812 (VI Air Dryer Bypass Filter Isol) is (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. NOT running

2. closed B. 1. running

2. closed C. 1. NOT running

2. open D. 1. running

2. open Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 79 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 27 27 B General Discussion The Diesel VI Compressors (G & H) are normally aligned for automatic start and will start if VI header pressure decreases to 90 PSIG.

If VI Header pressure decreases to 85 PSIG, 1VI-1812 (VI Dryer Bypass Filter Isol) will open to bypass the dryers.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant confuses the Diesel VI Compressor auto start setpoint with the Air Dryer Bypass Isolation open setpoint.

Second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant confuses the Diesel VI Compressor auto start setpoint with the Air Dryer Bypass Isolation open setpoint.

Second part is plausible if the applicant confuses the 1VI-1812 opening setpoint with the 1VI-820 (VI to VS Control Valve) closing setpoint (90 PSIG) or with the Diesel VI Compressor auto start setpoint.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible if the applicant confuses the 1VI-1812 opening setpoint with the 1VI-820 (VI to VS Control Valve) closing setpoint (90 PSIG) or with the Diesel VI Compressor auto start setpoint.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must be able to determine the status of the VI system by monitoring the Control Room VI Header pressure indication provided.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First, the applicant must read the meter indication provided to determine the current VI header pressure. Second, the applicant must recall from memory all of the automatic actions and setpoints associated with the VI system. Finally, the applicant must associate the two pieces of information (given and recalled) to identify the correct response.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-SS-VI Sections, 1.2.10, 1.2.13, and 1.3.1.1 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-SS-VI Objectives 7 & 15 SYS078 A4.01 - Instrument Air System (IAS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Pressure gauges .................................................

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 80 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 27 Remarks/Status 27 B Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 81 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS103 A2 04 - Containment System QUESTION 28 28 D Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Containment evacuation (including recognition of the alarm) ............

Given the following conditions:

Fuel reload is in progress on Unit 1

1EMF-16 (Containment Refueling Bridge) display goes dark due to a loss of Bus KRA Which ONE (1) of the following describes the procedure to be implemented AND the effect of 1EMF-16 on the Containment Evacuation alarm?

Procedure Containment Evacuation Alarm A. AP-07 (Loss of Electrical Power) Defeated B. AP-07 (Loss of Electrical Power) Actuated C. AP-15 (Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power) Defeated D. AP-15 (Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power) Actuated Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 82 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 28 28 D General Discussion The correct procedure to enter for this case would be AP-15 (Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power).

The loss of power to 1EMF-16 would result in initiation of the Containment Evacuation alarm.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

AP-07 is plausible because the entry conditions for Case II specify "Loss of normal operating components supplied from affected bus". The applicant could confuse this with the entry conditions for AP-15.

The second part is plausible if the applicant does not recall that a loss of power to an RP-86A module results in a Trip II condition. The applicant could conclude that a loss of power to the module could prevent it from performing its intended function (in this case, initiating a Containment evacuation alarm).

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

AP-07 is plausible because the entry conditions for Case II specify "Loss of normal operating components supplied from affected bus". The applicant could confuse this with the entry conditions for AP-15.

The second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

AP-07 is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant does not recall that a loss of power to an RP-86A module results in a Trip II condition. The applicant could conclude that a loss of power to the module could prevent it from performing its intended function (in this case, initiating a Containment evacuation alarm).

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant is given a set of conditions where an EMF monitor which effects the Containment Evacuation Alarm has lost power and must determine whether or not the alarm should have sounded (i.e. predicting the impact) and what procedure should be implemented to mitigate the consequences of the loss of power.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2007 MNS NRC Exam Q93 (Bank 3514)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

AP-15 (Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power)

AP-07 (Loss of Electrical Power)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-WE-EMF Sections 2.2 & 2.4 Learning Objectives:

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 83 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination OP-MC-AP-15 Objective 1 QUESTION 28 28 D OP-MC-WE-EMF Objectives 3 & 9 SYS103 A2 04 - Containment System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Containment evacuation (including recognition of the alarm) ............

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 84 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS001 A1.03 - Control Rod Drive System QUESTION 29 29 A Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CRDS controls including: (CFR: 41.5/45.5)

S/G level and pressure ............................................

A reactor start-up is in progress on Unit 2

Reactor power is 2%

The OATC is withdrawing control rods

Another RO is monitoring/controlling SG level, steam dumps, and feedwater flow Based on the conditions above:

1. To control NCS temperature, OP/2/A/6100/003 (Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation) Enclosure 4.1 (Power Increase) directs the Operators to maintain within the desired range by adjusting steam dump control.

2. Assuming the steam dump controller setpoint is not changed, with each rod pull SG pressure increases .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Tcold

2. initially, then returns to the original value B. 1. Tave

2. initially, then returns to the original value C. 1. Tcold

2. and stabilizes at a higher steam pressure D. 1. Tave

2. and stabilizes at a higher steam pressure Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 85 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 29 29 A General Discussion As Steam Header Pressure increases above the controller setpoint, the Steam Dumps will begin to open. For example, during plant startup, when withdrawing control rods, reactor power increases from 0% to 12%, TAVG will increase, and the corresponding secondary steam pressure will increase causing the steam dumps to open more while returning steam header pressure back to the setpoint. Operators can adjust to a lower/higher value as necessary to help control primary temperature.

This is directed by OP/1(2)/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation, Enc. 4.1. Direction is given to adjust the Setpoint to control Tcold 557° to 559°, and 1060 psig to 1110 psig as power is increased to 15% RTP.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the procedure does provide a cross-reference of reactor power to expected Tave (OP/1/A/6100/003, Enclosure 4.14). Plus, at a higher power level with the turbine on-line, the operator will monitor and control Tave.

The second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible if the applicant thinks a higher temperature will bring a corresponding higher SG pressure and does not comprehend that with steam dumps in Steam Pressure Mode, steam pressure will return to the value set on the steam pressure controller.

The second part is also plausible because under the previous Steam Dump Control system (recent plant mod), the Steam Header pressure controller was a Proportional (P) controller instead of the Proportional-Integral (P-I) controller with the new system. Therefore, while the old system would stop the pressure increase by sending a signal to open the steam dump valves, it would not open the steam dumps sufficiently to return Steam Header pressure back to setpoint.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the procedure does provide a cross-reference of reactor power to expected Tave (OP/1/A/6100/003, Enclosure 4.14). Plus, at a higher power level with the turbine on-line, the operator will monitor and control Tave.

Second part is plausible if the applicant thinks a higher temperature will bring a corresponding higher SG pressure and does not comprehend that with steam dumps in Steam Pressure Mode, steam pressure will return to the value set on the steam pressure controller.

The second part is also plausible because under the previous Steam Dump Control system, the Steam Header pressure controller was a Proportional (P) controller instead of the Proportional-Integral (P-I) controller with the new system. Therefore, while the old system would stop the pressure increase by sending a signal to open the steam dump valves, it would not open the steam dumps sufficiently to return Steam Header pressure back to setpoint.

Basis for meeting the KA The initial conditions in the question involves pulling control rods during a reactor startup (CRDS controls) and the applicant is asked to predict the effect of rod withdrawal on SG pressure. Operation of the CRDS will NOT result in a significant change in S/G level. The KA is matched with regards to operation of the CRDS and changes in S/G pressure.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 86 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType QUESTION 29 Question Source 29 A RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

OP-MC-STM-IDE OP-/1/A/6100/003 Learning Objectives:

NONE SYS001 A1.03 - Control Rod Drive System Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CRDS controls including: (CFR: 41.5/45.5)

S/G level and pressure ............................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 87 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS002 K6.12 - Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

QUESTION 30 30 A Knowledge of the effect or a loss or malfunction on the following RCS components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Code Safety valves ...............................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is currently at 100% RTP

NC system pressure is decreasing slowly due to a leaking Pressurizer Code Safety valve (2NC-2)

At 1500, PRT pressure is INITIALLY at 15 PSIG and increasing at 2 PSIG / min Over the next 30 minutes, the temperature downstream of 2NC-2 will (1) . AND the rate of NC system depressurization will (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. increase

2. decrease B. 1. remain the same

2. remain the same C. 1. increase

2. remain the same D. 1. remain the same

2. decrease Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 88 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 30 30 A General Discussion With the Safety Valve discharging to the PRT, the pressure in the PRT will be increasing. Therefore, the temperature downstream of 2NC-2 will be increasing (isenthalpic throttling process).

Since the pressure in the PRT is increasing while the NC system pressure is decreasing, the differential pressure between the two is decreasing resulting in a decrease in the leak rate and a slower rate of depressurization.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if they do not realize that the increasing pressure in the PRT will affect the isenthalpic throttling process. This is possible since applicants are normally asked to calculate a tailpipe temperature based on a static PRT pressure as opposed to a changing pressure.

Second part is plausible if the applicant does not comprehend that because the pressure in the PRT is increasing and the pressure in the NC system is decreasing, the resulting lower differential pressure would result in a slower rate of depressurization. This is also plausible because the applicant has not been given any information to indicate that the size of the leak has changed. They could therefore plausibly conclude that since the size of the leak has not changed that the depressurization rate would remain the same.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible if the applicant does not comprehend that because the pressure in the PRT is increasing and the pressure in the NC system is decreasing, the resulting lower differential pressure would result in a slower rate of depressurization. This is also plausible because the applicant has not been given any information to indicate that the size of the leak has changed. They could therefore plausibly conclude that since the size of the leak has not changed that the depressurization rate would remain the same.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if they do not realize that the increasing pressure in the PRT will affect the isenthalpic throttling process. This is possible since applicants are normally asked to calculate a tailpipe temperature based on a static PRT pressure as opposed to a changing pressure.

Second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant is given a set of conditions where a code safety valve is leaking and must determine the effect on the NC system as the NC system depressurizes.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because the applicant must analyze the condtions and determine the effect of the leaking safety valve on both downstream temperature and the rate of NC system depressurization.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

OP-BNT-TH04 Section 5.6.1 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 89 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Learning Objectives:

QUESTION 30 30 A OP-BNT-TH04 Objectives 29 and 31 SYS002 K6.12 - Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

Knowledge of the effect or a loss or malfunction on the following RCS components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Code Safety valves ...............................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 90 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS017 A2.02 - In-Core Temperature Monitor (ITM) System QUESTION 31 31 B Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ITM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)

Core damage ....................................................

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is responding to a LOCA

All sources of feedwater have been lost, S/G NR levels are 17% and decreasing

NC pumps are secured

FR-C.1 (Response to Inadequate Core Cooling) has been implemented

NI and NV pumps are unavailable

Peak Containment pressure reached 2.5 PSIG

S/G depressurization has failed to restore adequate core cooling

Core Exit Thermocouples are currently indicating 1210°F

NC pump support requirements can NOT be met

The ICCM Subcooling Margin Monitors (SMM) indicate:

o Train A (-)25°F o Train B (-)35°F The reason for the difference in SMM indication is that Train A Wide Range Loop pressure input has failed (1) .

Based on the conditions above, a major action required by FR-C.1 is to (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. LOW

2. restart NC pumps one at a time until CETs are less than 1200°F B. 1. HIGH

2. restart NC pumps one at a time until CETs are less than 1200°F C. 1. LOW

2. open all PZR PORVs and head vents to depressurize the NC system D. 1. HIGH

2. open all PZR PORVs and head vents to depressurize the NC system Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 91 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 31 31 B General Discussion The inputs to the ICCM SMM are Loop C and D Wide Range Pressure, the five Highest CETs, and Wide Range Thot. If the Wide Range pressure input to the SMM channel fails high, it will result in a higher indicated subcooling margin. For the example given, since the subcooling margin is already negative (due to the saturated core conditions), the Wide Range pressure failing high will result in a less negative indicated subcooling margin.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because this would be correct if the SMMs were indicating a positive subcooling margin instead of a negative subcooling margin.

The second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because this would be correct if the SMMs were indicating a positive subcooling margin instead of a negative subcooling margin.

The second part plausible because it would be the correct action if S/G levels were less than 11%.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

The second part plausible because it would be the correct action if S/G levels were less than 11%.

Basis for meeting the KA For this particular situation the applicant is presented with a situation where core damage is imminent and based on an additional failure must determine the effect on the Subcooling Margin Monitor (ITM). The applicant must also, based on the conditions given, determine the appropriate action to mitigate the consequences of the accident. Therefore, the KA is met.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must recall from memory the effect of the failed pressure instrument on Subcooling Margin indication. The applicant must also analyze the conditions given and determine the appropriate action from FR-C.1.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-ICM Section 2.3 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-IC-ICM Objective 9 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 92 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS017 A2.02 - In-Core Temperature Monitor (ITM) System QUESTION 31 31 B Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ITM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)

Core damage ....................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 93 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS027 K2.01 - Containment Iodine Removal System (CIRS)

QUESTION 32 32 C Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Fans ...........................................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A LOCA has occurred inside Containment

During the recovery Containment is vented to the annulus and a VE fan is to be started for Iodine removal

When the BOP attempts to start the 1A VE Fan, it will not start To which ONE (1) of the following locations should a NEO be dispatched to inspect the feeder breaker for the 1A VE Fan?

A. 1MXJ B. 1MXK C. 1EMXC D. 1EMXD Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 94 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 32 32 C General Discussion From Lesson Plan OP-MC-CNT-VE:

Annulus Ventilation Fans Each train has its own 100% capacity fan. Each fan is driven by a 30 hp, 575 VAC, 3 phase, 60 Hz motor, powered from EMXC or EMXD.

Design flowrate is 8000 cfm +/-10% at 190°F. A Status Light on the HVAC Board will light, if flowrate decreases to less than 80% flow.

Selector switches are provided for each fan in the Control Room with each switch having an auto, manual and a reset position. Each train has 2 flow indications on the HVAC board. One is "Inlet and Recirc Flow" that reads in CFM. The other flow indicator is "Flow to Unit Vent" and reads in inches of water. Power supplies to the Annulus Ventilation Fans are:

1(2)A VE Fan: 1(2)EMXC 1(2)B VE Fan: 1(2)EMXD Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because 1MXJ is a protected 600V motor control center that supplies other ventilation fans.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because 1MXK is a protected 600V motor control center that supplies other ventilation fans.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because 1 EMXD is an essential 600V motor control center that supplies the 1B VE fan.

Basis for meeting the KA MNS does not have a Containment Iodine Removal system per se. However, the Annulus Ventilation system does have an Iodine removal function. Since the applicant must have knowledge of the power supplies to the Annulus Ventilation fans which are part of a system which has an Iodine removal function, the KA is matched.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2010 AUDIT Q35 (Bank 2935)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CNT-VE Section 2.1 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-CNT-VE Objective 15 SYS027 K2.01 - Containment Iodine Removal System (CIRS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Fans ...........................................................

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 95 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 32 Remarks/Status 32 C Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 96 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS029 K4.02 - Containment Purge System (CPS)

QUESTION 33 33 A Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Negative pressure in containment ...................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

A LOCA has occurred inside Containment

Containment pressure peaked at 3.2 PSIG

Containment pressure is currently 2.8 PSIG and LOWERING slowly

Annulus pressure is -4.0" WG and LOWERING (more negative)

Based on the conditions above:

1) What is the discharge flowpath of the VE (Annulus Ventilation) fans?

2) At what pressure will the discharge flowpath of the VE fans swap?

A. 1. Unit Vent

2. -4.2" WG B. 1. Annulus

2. -7.0" WG C. 1. Unit Vent

2. -7.0" WG D. 1. Annulus

2. -4.2" WG Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 97 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 33 33 A General Discussion Due to the Phase B signal, both VE (Annulus Ventilaton) fans would get a start signal.

With Annulus pressure at -4.0" WG and LOWERING, the VE system would be discharging to the Unit Vent. If pressure decreased to less than -

4.2" WG, the VE dampers would swap to RECIRC mode and the system would be discharging to the Annulus.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant does not comprehend that with VE pressure between the VE damper swap setpoints of -1.2" WG to -

4.2" WG AND lowering, the VE fans have to be discharging to the Unit Vent. However, if the annulus pressure was between -1.2" WG and -4.2" WG AND rising, the VE fans would be in recirc mode and discharging to the annulus.

The second part is plausible if the applicant does not recall the setpoint for the damper swap to recirc mode or confuses the setpoint with the VE fan trip setpoint. If annulus pressure decreased to -7.0" WG the VE fans would automatically trip. This is plausible since the VE fan automatically restarts when the annulus pressure increases above -7.0" WG.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant does not recall the setpoint for the damper swap to recirc mode or confuses the setpoint with the VE fan trip setpoint. If annulus pressure decreased to -7.0" WG the VE fans would automatically trip. This is plausible since the VE fan automatically restarts when the annulus pressure increases above -7.0" WG.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant does not comprehend that with VE pressure between the VE damper swap setpoints of -1.2" WG to -

4.2" WG AND lowering, the VE fans have to be discharging to the Unit Vent. However, if the annulus pressure was between -1.2" WG and -4.2" WG AND rising, the VE fans would be in recirc mode and discharging to the annulus.

The second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of VE system design features which protect against negative pressure in the Annulus.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. It requires the applicant to analyze the given conditions to determine whether both VE fans have power. It also requires the applicant to determine from the given conditions that both VE fans should have received a start signal. It also requires the applicant to recall from memory the setpoints for the VE fan dampers and determine from the current annulus pressure and trend the status of the VE dampers.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CNT-VE Sections 2.1 and 2.3 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 98 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 33 33 A Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-CNT-VE Objectives 6, 7, 10, & 15 SYS029 K4.02 - Containment Purge System (CPS)

Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Negative pressure in containment ...................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status There are no design features or interlocks associated with the Containment Purge system related to a negative pressure in containment. However, there are interlocks for the Containment Annulus Ventilation system associated with negative pressure.

On past NRC exams, we have used Annulus Ventilation (VE) questions for Containment Purge (VP) type questions when KAs could not be met.

Sent question to Chief Examiner and he's okay with the KA match. HCF 3/15/12 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 99 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS033 K3.03 - Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFPCS)

QUESTION 34 34 B Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Spent fuel temperature ............................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The core has been off-loaded to the Spent Fuel Pool

2A KF Pump is running

2B KF Pump is off

A Loss of Off-Site Power occurs

2A and 2B D/Gs start and load normally

30 minutes after the loss of power, a Spent Fuel Pool Hi Temperature alarm is received Which ONE (1) of the following is the cause of this condition?

A. The 2A or 2B KF pump was not manually restarted (sequencer reset required).

B. The 2A or 2B KF pump was not manually restarted (sequencer reset NOT required).

C. The 2A KF pump ONLY did not automatically load on the Blackout sequence as designed.

D. The 2A and 2B KF pumps did not automatically load during the Blackout sequence as designed.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 100 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 34 34 B General Discussion On a Blackout signal, the KF pumps will receive a start permissive signal when 2ETA and 2ETB are re-energized by their respective D/Gs and Load Group 9 is sequenced onto the busses. However, they will not automatically start and must be manually started by the Operators in the Main Control Room.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because one of the KF Pumps must be started manually. However, the Blackout sequencer does not have to be reset prior to starting the pump.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because most important loads on ETA and ETB are sequenced on the bus automatically. The candidate may conclude that the KF pump which was running prior to the loss of power should automatically start during the Blackout sequence (since only one pump is normally running).

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because most important loads on ETA and ETB are sequenced on the bus automatically. For example, there would normally be one NV pump and one RN pump running on each unit. After a BO signal, both pumps would be running on each unit. Therefore, the candidate may conclude that both KF pumps should have been started by their respective Blackout sequencers.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because the candidate must understand how the KF System functions to analyze and determine the cause of the Spent Fuel Pool Hi Temperature alarm.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because the candidate must associate two data points, one given and one recalled from memory. The given data point is that a Blackout load sequence has occurred (although not given directly) and the data which must be recalled from memory is that the KF pumps do not automatically load on a Blackout and therefore the KF pumps should have been restarted manually.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS NRC Q46 (Bank 3031)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-FH-KF Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-FH-KF Objective 12 SYS033 K3.03 - Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFPCS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Spent fuel temperature ............................................

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 101 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 34 Remarks/Status 34 B Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 102 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS034 A4.01 - Fuel Handling Equipment System (FHES)

QUESTION 35 35 D Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Radiation levels .................................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is currently in MODE 5

Spent Fuel Pool fuel handling operations were secured 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ago

VF system is operating normally in accordance with OP/2/A/6450/004 (Fuel Pool Ventilation System)

Subsequently:

2EMF-42 (Fuel Building Ventilation Radiation Monitor) is in Trip 2 Which ONE (1) of the following describes the AUTOMATIC response of the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation system (VF)?

A. The Supply fan will stop.

B. The Outside Air damper (D-1) will close.

C. The Filter Isolation dampers (D-3 & D-4) will close.

D. The Exhaust Filter Bypass damper (D-5) will close.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 103 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 35 35 D General Discussion According to OP/2/A/6450/004, normal operation of the VF system is the Bypass Mode which bypasses the filter. In this situation Filter Train Bypass Damper (D-5) is OPEN, and Filter Train Inlet Damper (D-3) and Outlet Damper (D-4) are CLOSED.

According to FH-VF a Trip 2 condition on EMF-42, Fuel Building Ventilation Radiation Monitor, will result in automatic termination of BYPASS MODE operation and automatic alignment to the FILTRATION MODE of operation. In this condition the Filter Train Bypass Damper (D-5) will close, the Filter Train Inlet Damper (D-3) and the Filter Train Outlet Damper (D-4) will open.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

According to FH-VF, the Supply Fan has automatic trips associated with system temperature. Additionally, the Supply fan will automatically operate with the Exhaust Fan. Under the conditions given, it is plausible for the applicant to conclude that the fan would automatically stop to prevent a potential release.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

According to FH-VF, the Supply Damper (D-1) will operate automatically with Supply Fan status. When the fan is running the Damper opens and when it stops the Damper will close. This is plausible because in the stated condition the Supply Fan will be running and the Supply Damper will be OPEN Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

According to OP/2/A/6450/004, normal operation of the VF system is the Bypass Mode which bypasses the filter. In this situation Filter Train Bypass Damper (D-5) is OPEN, and Filter Train Inlet Damper (D-3) and Outlet Damper (D-4) are CLOSED. This is plausible because the applicant may not comprehend that these dampers are closed, and conclude that they close on high radiation to isolate the ventilation system.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The applicant demonstrates the ability to "monitor radiation levels in the Control Room" by demonstrating a knowledge of the automatic actions that should have occurred as a result of increasing radiation levels in the Fuel Handling Building. Therefore, the KA is matched.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2009 MNS Audit Exam Q38 (Bank 3156)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-FH-VF Section 2.2 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-FH-VF Objective 8 SYS034 A4.01 - Fuel Handling Equipment System (FHES)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Radiation levels .................................................

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 104 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 35 Remarks/Status 35 D Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 105 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS035 A3.01 - Steam Generator System (S/GS)

QUESTION 36 36 B Ability to monitor automatic operation of the S/G including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

S/G water level control ...........................................

Given the following indications/conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is operating at 100% RTP

A loss of 1EKVA occurs

NO Operator actions have been taken Based on the conditions above, what is the MINIMUM number of ADDITIONAL channels on S/G 1A that must trip to cause a/an:

1) Feedwater Isolation Actuation?

2) Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation?

Feedwater Isolation Aux Feedwater Actuation A. 2 2 B. 2 1 C. 1 2 D. 1 1 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 106 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 36 36 B General Discussion Since the logic for Feedwater Isolation is 2/3 P-14 (Hi-Hi SG LVL) on 1 SG (Channels 2,3, and 4), it would take two (2) channels on SG 1A tripping to cause a Feedwater Isolation.

The logic for Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation is 2/4 SG Lo-Lo Level on 1/4 SG to cause an Aux Feedwater Actuation. It would therefore take one (1) additional channel to cause an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Two channels for feedwater isolation is correct.

Two channels for auxiliary feedwater actuation is plausible if the applicant does not recall the actuation logic. The applicant could conclude that the actuation logic is 3/4 in which case they would chose 2 as the correct response.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

One channel for feedwater isolation is plausible if the applicant does not comprehend from the indications given that channel 1 of SG level does not input the feedwater isolation logic.

Two channels for auxiliary feedwater actuation is plausible if the applicant does not recall the actuation logic. The applicant could conclude that the actuation logic is 3/4 in which case they would chose 2 as the correct response.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

One channel for feedwater isolation is plausible if the applicant does not comprehend from the indications given that channel 1 of SG level does not input the feedwater isolation logic.

Two channels for auxiliary feedwater actuation is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because by demonstrating a knowledge of the actuation logics for feedwater isolation and auxiliary feedwater actuation, the applicant demonstrates the ability to monitor automatic operation of SG design features as they relate to SG level control.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must first recall from memory the actuation logics for feedwater isolation and auxiliary feedwater actuation. The applicant must then analyze the indictions provided to determine how many of the remaining channels would be required to trip to cause a feedwater isolation and auxiliary feedwater actuation.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2005 MNS NRC Q43 (Bank 3655)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-ECC-ISE Section 3.1 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-ECC-ISE Objectives 13 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 107 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS035 A3.01 - Steam Generator System (S/GS)

QUESTION 36 36 B Ability to monitor automatic operation of the S/G including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

S/G water level control ...........................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 108 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS068 K5.04 - Liquid Radwaste System (LRS)

QUESTION 37 37 A Knowledge of the operational implication of the following concepts as they apply to the Liquid Radwaste System: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Biological hazards of radiation and the resulting goal of ALARA .........

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

Unit shutdown in progress

Power = 80% RTP and DECREASING

1A SG Tube Leak = 20 GPM

Due to high activity, the Turbine Building Sump (TBS) is being pumped to the RC Discharge Based on the given plant conditions:

1. Which ONE (1) of the following would present a more significant radiation hazard to a member of the public at the site boundary due to the release?

2. What EMF Trip 2 actions would ensure the release of radioactive material is ALARA?

A. 1. Beta radiation from the decay of Tritium

2. TBS pump trips B. 1. Beta radiation from the decay of Tritium

2. 1WP-35 (WMT & VUCDT to RC Cntrl) closes C. 1. Gamma radiation from the decay of Nitrogen-16

2. TBS pump trips D. 1. Gamma radiation from the decay of Nitrogen-16

2. 1WP-35 closes Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 109 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 37 37 A General Discussion Of the two choices, Tritium (H-3) would be considered a radiological hazard, not Nitrogen-16.

Per CH-PC lesson, section 2.5, H-3 is considered an internal radiological hazard with a 12.3 year half-life and 12 day biological life. Since it exists as water or water vapor, it can easily enter the body through ingestion, inhalation, and/or skin absorption. Additionally, since it exists as water, it cannot be removed from the liquid release by filtration or chemical means Although N-16 produces an extremely high energy gamma (7MeV), it has a half-life of 7 seconds (per CH-PC lesson, section 2.1.2).

Additionally, since it is produced from a neutron, proton reaction with Oxygen-16, it would not be present outside of an operating reactor.

Hence this isotope would not be present in a radiological liquid release to the environment.

EMF-31 monitors liquid waste release from the Turbine Building sump to the RC discharge. Per WE-EMF lesson, section 2.1.1, a Trip 2 on EMF-31 will trip the Turbine Building Sump pumps, but does NOT cause 1WP-35 to close.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because the applicant may confuse the Trip 2 Actions of EMF-31 with the Trip 2 actions of other EMFs which cause closure of 1WP-35. Per WE-EMF lesson, section 2.1.9, a Trip 2 on EMF-44 (Containment Ventilation Unit Condensate Drain Tank Monitor) causes valves 1WL-320 and 1WP-35 to close. Per WE-EMF lesson, section 2.1.14, a Trip 2 on 0EMF-49 (Liquid Waste Monitor) closes 1WP-35.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the N-16 isotope is used to detect the presence of a SG tube leak (EMFs 71-74). The applicant may not recall the production mode and half-life of the N-16 isotope.

The second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the N-16 isotope is used to detect the presence of a SG tube leak (EMFs 71-74). The applicant may not recall the production mode and half-life of the N-16 isotope.

The second part is plausible because the applicant may confuse the Trip 2 Actions of EMF-31 with the Trip 2 actions of other EMFs which cause closure of 1WP-35. Per WE-EMF lesson, section 2.1.9, a Trip 2 on EMF-44 (Containment Ventilation Unit Condensate Drain Tank Monitor) causes valves 1WL-320 and 1WP-35 to close. Per WE-EMF lesson, section 2.1.14, a Trip 2 on 0EMF-49 (Liquid Waste Monitor) closes 1WP-35.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the question involves a normal liquid waste release (Turbine Building sump discharge to the RC discharge). This is the discharge flowpath used if the activity level of the sump is elevated. The applicant must recall the operational implications of how the liquid waste release is terminated on high rad levels.

The "biological hazards" aspect of the KA is met because the applicant must recall that tritium has a long half-life and cannot be removed via liquid waste processing.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 110 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType QUESTION 37 Question Source 37 A RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided References OP-MC-CH-PC, section 2.5, section 2.1.2 Lesson objectives 3 and 6 OP-MC-WE-EMF, section 2.1.1, 2.1.9. 2.1.14 Lesson objective 3 SYS068 K5.04 - Liquid Radwaste System (LRS)

Knowledge of the operational implication of the following concepts as they apply to the Liquid Radwaste System: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Biological hazards of radiation and the resulting goal of ALARA .........

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status This is possibly weak tie to the KA.

Sent question to Chief Examiner. He agrees that it is a weak KA match but acceptable. Also, revised question per Chief Examiner's recommendation. HCF 3/15/12 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 111 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination SYS079 K1.01 - Station Air System (SAS)

QUESTION 38 38 D Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the SAS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

IAS ............................................................

Given the following:

A leak occurs on the Instrument Air (VI) header

The VI header begins to slowly depressurize Which ONE (1) of the following describes how the Station Air (VS) system is prevented from depressurizing due to the break on the VI system?

A. The VI and VS headers are separated using a manual isolation valve.

The VS air compressor will start automatically to maintain VS header pressure.

B. The VI and VS headers are separated using a manual isolation valve.

The VS air compressor must be manually started to maintain VS header pressure.

C. A valve will automatically close to separate the VI and VS headers.

The VS air compressor will start automatically to maintain VS header pressure.

D. A valve will automatically close to separate the VI and VS headers.

The VS air compressor must be manually started to maintain VS header pressure.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 112 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 38 38 D General Discussion The Low Pressure VS System is normally supplied from the VI System via cross-connect valve VI-820 which automatically closes when VI header pressure decreases to 90 psig. The VS system has an air compressor which has an auto-start feature. However, the compressor is normally "OFF" and would therefore have to be manually started to restore VS System pressure.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the VS system is not safety-related and it is therefore reasonable to believe that a manual isolation valve would be used to prevent the VS from depressurizing. However, the automatic function is intended to protect the VI system which is safety-related.

There is an auto-start feature on the VS air compressor. However, the VS compressor is not normally aligned for automatic operation.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the VS system is not safety-related and it is therefore reasonable to believe that a manual isolation valve would be used to prevent the VS from depressurizing. However, the automatic function is intended to protect the VI system which is safety-related.

Also, the second part of the question about having to start VS compressor manually is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because VI-820 automatically closes to separate the headers and there is an auto-start feature on the VS air compressor.

There is an auto-start feature on the VS air compressor. However, the VS compressor is not normally aligned for automatic operation..

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because the applicant must understand the "cause-effect" relationship between the VI and VS systems to determine the correct response.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2009 MNS NRC Q52 (Bank 3070)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-SS-VI Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-SS-VI, Obj 4 & 7 SYS079 K1.01 - Station Air System (SAS)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the SAS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

IAS ............................................................

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 113 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 38 Remarks/Status 38 D Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 114 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination EPE007 2.4.49 - Reactor Trip QUESTION 39 39 D EPE007 GENERIC Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls. (CFR:

41.10 / 43.2 / 45.6)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is initially at 100% RTP

A valid Reactor trip signal has been generated

The Reactor did not trip automatically and will not trip manually from the Main Control Board In response to the failure of the Reactor to trip, E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) will direct the crew to (1) .

If the turbine does not trip automatically and will not trip manually, The OATC will FIRST be directed to (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. manually insert control rods

2. close the MSIVs AND MSIV bypasses B. 1. implement F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees) AND go to FR-S.1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS)

2. close the MSIVs AND MSIV bypasses C. 1. manually insert control rods

2. place the turbine in MANUAL AND close the governor valves D. 1. implement F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees) AND go to FR-S.1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS)

2. place the turbine in MANUAL AND close the governor valves Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 115 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 39 39 D General Discussion E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) will direct the crew to implement F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees) AND GO TO FR-S.1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS).

After transition to FR-S.1, the crew will be directed to manually insert control rods.

If the turbine will not trip, the crew will be directed to place the turbine in manual and close the governor valves. If this is unsuccessful, the crew will be directed to close the MSIVs and MSIV bypasses.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because this is an immediate action directed by FR-S.1.

The second part is plausible because this action is part of the immediate actions and would be performed if placing the turbine in MANUAL and closing the governor valves was unsuccessful.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because this action is part of the immediate actions and would be performed if placing the turbine in MANUAL and closing the governor valves was unsuccessful.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because this is an immediate action directed by FR-S.1.

The second part is plausible because this action is part of the immediate actions and would be performed if placing the turbine in MANUAL and closing the governor valves was unsuccessful.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of actions related to a Reactor Trip (i.e. immediate actions committed to memory) that require immediate operation of system controls.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

FR-S.1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-FRS Objective 6 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 116 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination EPE007 2.4.49 - Reactor Trip QUESTION 39 39 D EPE007 GENERIC Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls. (CFR:

41.10 / 43.2 / 45.6) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 117 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 40 APE008 AK3.02 - Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open) 40 D Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Why PORV or code safety exit temperature is below RCS or PZR temperature ..............................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is operating at 100% RTP

One PZR PORV is leaking past its seat

Pressurizer pressure is 2235 PSIG

Pressurizer temperature is 653°F

PRT pressure is 15 PSIG Which ONE (1) of the following is the expected temperature downstream of the leaking Code Safety valve and why that temperature is less than Pressurizer temperature?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 213°F This is a constant entropy throttling process.

B. 250°F This is a constant entropy throttling process.

C. 213°F This is a constant enthalpy throttling process.

D. 250°F This is a constant enthalpy throttling process.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 118 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 40 40 D General Discussion With Pressuizer pressure at 2235 PSIG (2250 PSIA), the enthalpy of the saturated vapor in the pressurizer steam space is approximately 1118 BTU/lbm. Using the Mollier Diagram, we would first follow the 1118 BTU/lbm line horizontally across to the Constant Pressure line associated with PRT pressure (15 PSIG or 30 PSIA). Since this point occurs in the area below the Saturation Curve, we know that the mixture exiting the Code Safety is a wet vapor. Therefore, to determine the temperature at the exit of the Code Safety we follow the Constant Pressure line up to the saturation line to determine the exit temperature. This yields a temperature of 250°F.

The reason this temperature is less than Pressurizer temperature is that it is a constant enthalpy (isenthalpic) throttling process.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The temperature is plausible because if the applicant uses the 15 PSIA constant pressure line as opposed to the 30 PSIA constant pressure line this would be the correct answer.

Concluding that this is a constant entropy throttling process is plausible if the applicant does not recall the difference between a constant entropy and constant enthalpy process. For this particular case, since the applicant must follow a constant pressure line in an upward direction toward the saturation line, it would be easy for the applicant to conclude that this is a constant entropy process.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The temperature is correct.

Concluding that this is a constant entropy throttling process is plausible if the applicant does not recall the difference between a constant entropy and constant enthalpy process. For this particular case, since the applicant must follow a constant pressure line in an upward direction toward the saturation line, it would be easy for the applicant to conclude that this is a constant entropy process.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The temperature is plausible because if the applicant uses the 15 PSIA constant pressure line as opposed to the 30 PSIA constant pressure line this would be the correct answer.

The second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the difference between an isentropic and isenthalpic process to determine why temperature downstream of the Code Safety is less than Pressurizer temperature.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires multiple mental steps. The first part requires the applicant to analyze the given conditions and apply those to the Mollier diagram to determine the temperature downstream of the Code Safety valve. The applicant must then recall from memory what type of process results in the temperature being less than Pressurizer temperature.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Steam Tables OP-BNT-TH04 Section 5.6.1 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 119 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Mollier Diagram QUESTION 40 40 D Learning Objectives:

OP-BNT-TH04 Objectives 29 and 31 APE008 AK3.02 - Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open)

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Why PORV or code safety exit temperature is below RCS or PZR temperature ..............................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 120 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination EPE009 EA2.14 - Small Break LOCA QUESTION 41 41 C Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

Actions to be taken if PTS limits are violated .........................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The operating crew initiated a manual SI due to a small break LOCA.

Equipment failures resulted in a RED condition on the Integrity CSF Status Tree.

NC Cooldown rate was approximately 220°F per hour

NC System temperature is currently 240°F

The crew is performing a soak in accordance with FR-P.1 (Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition).

Which ONE (1) of the following actions is permitted per FR-P.1?

A. Start an NV Pump B. Energize PZR heaters C. Place Auxiliary Spray in service D. Initiate a cooldown at less than 50°F per hour Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 121 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 41 41 C General Discussion When the step in FR-P.1 requiring performance of a soak is reached, the procedure allows performance of other procedures that do not cool down the NC system or increase NC system pressure.

For this particular condition placing Auxiliary Spray in service could be performed because the effect would be to reduce NC system pressure.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not understand the effect of starting an NV pump on NC system temperature.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant concludes that energizing the PZR heaters to establish normal pressure control is a desirable condition.

Under other circumstances it would be a desired action.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because this is an action that is directed by FR-P.1 within the same step that directs the soak to be performed. However, it is directed after the soak is completed.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of actions that are performed (i.e. soak requirements) when PTS limits have been exceeded.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to analyze each of the answers to determine the overall effect of that action on NC system temperature and pressure.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2007 MNS NRC Q64 (Bank 3585) MODIFIED Development References Student References Provided

References:

FR-P.1 (Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-FRP Objective 3 EPE009 EA2.14 - Small Break LOCA Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

Actions to be taken if PTS limits are violated .........................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 122 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 41 41 C Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 123 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination EPE011 EK2.02 - Large Break LOCA QUESTION 42 42 B Knowledge of the interrelations between the Large Break LOCA and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Pumps .........................................................

Unit 1 was operating at 100% RTP when a Large-Break LOCA occurred.

1) What is the MINIMUM time following the LOCA that E-1 (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant) directs an initiation of hot leg recirculation?

2) Which ECCS pumps are capable of being aligned to inject into the hot legs per ES-1.4 (Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation)?

A. 1. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

2. NI ONLY B. 1. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months

2. ND and NI C. 1. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

2. ND and NI D. 1. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months

2. NI ONLY Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 124 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 42 42 B General Discussion After 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , it is verified that the capability exists to tranfer to HLR. At 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months E-1 directs initiation of Hot Leg Recirc. ES-1.4 places NI in HLR but if no NI can be aligned the option exists to align ND.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible because E-1 directs checking HLR equipment available after 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Part 2 is plausible because ES-1.4 initially places NI in service and only places ND in service if an NI pump is unavailable. Since the ND pumps would not normally be used, it is plausible that the applicant would not recall that they are available for use.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible because E-1 directs checking HLR equipment available after 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Part 2 is correct.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part 2 is plausible because ES-1.4 initially places NI in service and only places ND in service if an NI pump is unavailable. Since the ND pumps would not normally be used, it is plausible that the applicant would not recall that they are available for use.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of which ECCS pumps would be run after a Large Break LOCA has occurred and transfer to HLR is required.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2009 MNS Audit Q46 MODIFIED (Bank 3164)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

E-1, Loss or Reactor or Secondary Coolant ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirc Learning Objectives:

EPE1003 EPE011 EK2.02 - Large Break LOCA Knowledge of the interrelations between the Large Break LOCA and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Pumps .........................................................

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 125 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 42 Remarks/Status 42 B Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 126 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE022 2.1.31 - Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup QUESTION 43 43 D APE022 GENERIC Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup. (CFR:

41.10 / 45.12)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

A load rejection from 100% RTP has occurred due to the trip of 2A CF pump

Pressurizer level is greater than setpoint

2NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) is in AUTOMATIC and CLOSING

NC pump seal injection is < 5 GPM per pump Based on the conditions above, the BOP must throttle 2NV-241 (Seal Injection Flow Control) in the (1) direction to increase seal injection flow to a MINIMUM of (2) GPM to clear 2AD-7, J/1 (NC PUMP SEAL INJ LO FLOW).

Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. OPEN

2. 6 B. 1. CLOSED

2. 6 C. 1. OPEN

2. 7 D. 1. CLOSED

2. 7 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 127 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 43 43 D General Discussion With Pressurizer level greater than setpoint Charging flow is reducing (via 2NV-238 closing) to reduce Pressurizer level back to program. This results in not only a reduction in charging flow but a reduction in seal injection flow to the NC pumps (since both are downstream of 2NV-238.

To restore adequate NC pump seal injection flow, the BOP should throttle closed on 2NV-241 to increase the backpressure in the charging line and force more flow to the NC pump seals.

Normal seal injection flow is 7-9 GPM and the setpoint for 2AD-7, J/1 (NC Pump Seal Inj Low Flow) is 7 GPM.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant incorrectly recalls that 2NV-241 is directly in the flowpath to the NC pump seals. If that were the case and the applicant concludes that 2NV-238 is fully closed, opening 2NV-238 while opening 2NV-241 would be the correct actions to restore flow to the NC pump seals. Also, Operators normally associate opening a valve with increasing flow to a component served by that valve.

The second part is plausible because many APs and EPs require a minimum of 6 GPM seal injection flow to the NC pumps.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because many APs and EPs require a minimum of 6 GPM seal injection flow to the NC pumps.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant incorrectly recalls that 2NV-241 is directly in the flowpath to the NC pump seals. If that were the case and the applicant concludes that 2NV-238 is fully closed, opening 2NV-238 while opening 2NV-241 would be the correct actions to restore flow to the NC pump seals. Also, Operators normally associate opening a valve with increasing flow to a component served by that valve.

The second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The applicant must have knowledge of the NV system controls and how to operate those controls based on plant conditions and the need to restore NC pump seal injection flow. By demonstrating that knowledge, the applicant demonstrates the ability to locate Control Room controls and determine that they are correctly aligned for current plant conditions. Therefore, the KA is matched.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2003 MNS Audit Q53 MODIFIED (Bank 3780)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-NV Sections 2.15 & 2.16 Learning Objectives:

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 128 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination OP-MC-PS-NV Objective 5 QUESTION 43 43 D APE022 2.1.31 - Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup APE022 GENERIC Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup. (CFR:

41.10 / 45.12) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 129 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination WE11 EK3.2 - Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation QUESTION 44 44 C Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation).

Unit 1 was operating at 100%. Given the following events and conditions:

0210 - reactor tripped due to a LOCA

0300 - crew enters ECA-1.2, (LOCA Outside Containment)

0320 - crew enters ECA-1.1, (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc)

0330 - The crew is at step 18.b of ECA-1.1

Current conditions:

o 1B NC pump running, all other NC pumps secured o 1A NI pump is running, indicating 185 GPM o 1B NI pump is running, indicating 165 GPM o Both NV pumps are running, indicating 340 GPM (Assume that the NV pumps have equal capacity) o Both ND pumps off o Subcooling is 35°F Based on the conditions above:

1) Which ONE (1) of the following describes the actions that will meet ALL requirements of ECA-1.1?

AND

2) What is the reason for those actions?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. Stop both NV pumps.

2. Flow from the remaining pumps will be greater than the minimum required flow of 345 GPM.

B. 1. Stop the 1B NI pump AND one NV pump.

2. Flow from the remaining pumps will be greater than the minimum required flow of 345 GPM.

C. 1. Stop the 1A NI pump AND one NV pump.

2. Flow from the remaining pumps will be greater than the minimum required flow of 330 GPM.

D. 1. Stop both NI pumps.

2. Flow from the remaining pumps will be greater than the minimum required flow of 330 GPM.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 130 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 44 44 C General Discussion Time after trip is 80 minutes, which makes the required flow 330 GPM.

Since the minimum flow required is 330 gpm, there are two possible answers that will meet the minimum flow of 330 GPM. The remaining flow after stopping the 1A NI pump and on NV pump would be 335 GPM. The remaining flow after stopping both NI pumps would be 340 GPM.

Since the crew is directed to "Minimize S/I flow while maintaining greater than or equal to the flow required by Enclosure 9", the correct answer would be to stop the 1A NI pump and one NV pump.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant determines that the minimum flow is 345 GPM. If so, the correct action would be to stop both NV pumps.

Part 2 - The minimum flow of 345 GPM is plausible if the applicant uses the time from the reactor trip to entry into ECA-1.1 as opposed to the time to reach step 18.b (70 min vs. 80 min) as this would be the correct minimum flow.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant determines that the minimimum required flow is 345 GPM. It is plausible for the applicant to determine that stopping the 1B NI and one NV pump would be correct as this would meet the minimum required flow.

Part 2 - The minimum flow of 345 GPM is plausible if the applicant uses the time from the reactor trip to entry into ECA-1.1 as opposed to the time to reach step 18.b (70 min vs. 80 min) as this would be the correct minimum flow.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct if the applicant determines 330 GPM and sees from the initial conditions that the flow from both NV pumps meets the required minimum flow. It is plausible that they will immediately pick stopping both NI pumps as the correct answer without calculating the effect of stopping 1A NI pump and one NV pump.

Part 2 - The minimum flow of 330 GPM is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must determine that the reason for the pump combination chosen is based on both maintaining the minimum required flow required by Enclosure 9 of ECA-1.1 (calculation and reading of graph) while at the same time minimizing S/I flow (following the requirements of the procedure step).

Basis for Hi Cog This is an analysis question as the applicant must interpret the graph from Enclosure 9 and then determine the correct combination of pumps based on maintaining the minimum required flow while minimizing S/I flow.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2009 MNS NRC RO Retake Q54 MODIFIED (Bank 2254)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1 (Step 18)

ECA-1.1 step 18 and Encl 9 - PROVIDED EP/1/A/5000/ECA-1.1 (Enclosure 9)

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 131 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Learning Objective:

QUESTION 44 44 C OP-MC-EP-EP2 Objective 29 WE11 EK3.2 - Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation).

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Original KA APE025AK3.02 replaced. Replacement provided by Chief Examiner. HCF 3/15/12 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 132 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE026 AA1. 07 - Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW)

QUESTION 45 45 B Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Flow rates to the components and systems that are serviced by the CCWS; interactions among the components ....................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is in HOT SHUTDOWN on ND Cooling (Both Train A and B)

B Train KC is aligned to supply Reactor and Aux Bldg Non-Essential Headers with both 1B1 and 1B2 pumps in operation

A Train KC is aligned to supply the A ND HX Header with both 1A1 and 1A2 pumps in operation

The 1A1 KC pump has just tripped Which ONE (1) of the following is the MAXIMUM allowable KC flow through the 1A ND Heat Exchanger?

A. 2000 GPM B. 4000 GPM C. 5000 GPM D. 6000 GPM Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 133 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 45 45 B General Discussion In accordance with the KC System Limits and Precautions:

IF one KC Pump tagged, KC to associated ND HX should be throttled to less than 4000 gpm using HX manual isolation (KC-52 or KC-55).

Basis: To prevent KC pump runout Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because 2000 GPM is the minimum KC flow to the operating ND train with NC system temperature greater than 200°F.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because AP-21 (Loss of KC or KC System Leakage) specifies a flow range of 2000 to 5000 GPM flow when starting a KC Train.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because 6000 GPM is the limit on total KC flow through the ND HXs with both trains of KC in service.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of the Component Cooling Water (KC) flow limit through the ND HX with only one KC pump in service.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must first analyze the conditions given to determine that there is only flow from one KC supplying the in service ND train. The applicant must then recall from memory the flow limit through the heat exchanger with only one KC pump supplying the HX.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2008 MNS NRC Q7 (Bank 3325)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PSS-KC Section 3.1.1 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-PSS-KC Objective 13 APE026 AA1. 07 - Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW)

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Flow rates to the components and systems that are serviced by the CCWS; interactions among the components ....................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 134 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 45 45 B Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 135 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE027 AK1.02 - Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) Malfunction QUESTION 46 46 A Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: (CFR 41.8 /

41.10 / 45.3)

Expansion of liquids as temperature increases ........................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

A failure of the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller occurs

All Pressurizer heaters energize due to the failure

NC system pressure is currently 2310 PSIG Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on the PZR Surge Line temperature AND the position of the Pressurizer Spray valves? (Assume NO Operator actions)

PZR Surge Line Temperature PZR Spray Valve Position A. INCREASED CLOSED B. DECREASED CLOSED C. INCREASED OPEN D. DECREASED OPEN Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 136 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 46 46 A General Discussion Due to the PZR pressure control malfunction, pressure will increase. This causes PZR outsurge which increases surge line temp as hotter PZR temp (approx 630°F) is expelled. Since the malfunction has caused all PZR heaters to energize, the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller output has failed low. So, even though the Pressurizer Spray valves should be full open at the current pressure, because they are controlled by the output of the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller (which has failed low), the Spray valves are closed.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant concludes that an INSURGE to the Pressurizer has occurred. This is plausible since the Pressurizer heaters would normally energize on an INSURGE to the Pressurizer.

Second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because the Pressurizer Spray valves should be open at this pressure.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant concludes that an INSURGE to the Pressurizer has occurred. This is plausible since the Pressurizer heaters would normally energize on an INSURGE to the Pressurizer.

Second part is plausible because the Pressurizer Spray valves should be open at this pressure.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the energizing of the Pressurizer heaters results in an increase in the liquid temperature in the pressurizer which results in an expansion of the Pressurizer liquid. The applicant must be able to identify the operation implication of the expansion of the Pressurizer liquid to determine the correct response.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to analyze the effect of energizing the pressurizer heaters on the liquid in the pressurizer and the resultant effect on Surge Line temperature and the effect of the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller malfunction on Spray Valve position.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2006 CNS NRC Q46 MODIFIED (Bank 123)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-NC Section 2.6 and 7.15 Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-IPE-DCS Section 1.2 Learning Objective: OP-MC-PS-NC Objective 7 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 137 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE027 AK1.02 - Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) Malfunction QUESTION 46 46 A Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: (CFR 41.8 /

41.10 / 45.3)

Expansion of liquids as temperature increases ........................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 138 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination EPE029 EK1.01 - Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)

QUESTION 47 47 C Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ATWS: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Reactor nucleonics and thermo-hydraulics behavior ...................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

An ATWS has occurred

FR-S.1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS) has been implemented

1) When the turbine is tripped, the amount of negative reactivity added by the resultant temperature increase will be greater if the unit is at .

2) The basis for immediately tripping the turbine during an ATWS event is to .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. EOL

2. generate a redundant reactor trip signal B. 1. BOL

2. generate a redundant reactor trip signal C. 1. EOL

2. maintain S/G inventory if the initiating event is a loss of feedwater D. 1. BOL

2. maintain S/G inventory if the initiating event is a loss of feedwater Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 139 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 47 47 C General Discussion Due primarily to the decrease in NC system boron concentration over core life, MTC becomes more negative. Therefore, the amount of negative reactivity added per degree of temperature increase on a turbine trip will be greater at EOL.

The basis for tripping the turbine during an ATWS event is for the worst case scenario which would be a loss of normal feedwater coincident with the ATWS. For this case the turbine must be tripped within 30 seconds to maintain S/G inventory.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part 2 is plausible because it is a common misconception among License Applicants and Licensed Operators that the Turbine is tripped to generate a redundant reactor trip signal and potentially initiate a Reactor trip.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant confuses what happens to MTC over core life.

Part 2 is plausible because it is a common misconception among License Applicants and Licensed Operators that the Turbine is tripped to generate a redundant reactor trip signal and potentially initiate a Reactor trip.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant confuses what happens to MTC over core life.

Part 2 is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the effects of reactor nucleonics on the thermo-hydraulic behavior of the reactor and the operational implications of that behavior during an ATWS event.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-BNT-RT04 Section 2.1.5 Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-FRS (Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-E0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

Learning Objectives:

OP-BNT-RT04 Objectives 3 & 4 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 140 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination EPE029 EK1.01 - Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)

QUESTION 47 47 C Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ATWS: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Reactor nucleonics and thermo-hydraulics behavior ...................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 141 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination EPE038 2.1.7 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)

QUESTION 48 48 B EPE038 GENERIC Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

A SGTR has occurred on the 2D SG

A Steam Line break occurred on the 2B SG

Containment pressure peaked at 3.1 PSIG and is now 0.9 PSIG and STABLE In accordance with E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture):

2D SG NR level shall be maintained greater than a MINIMUM of (1) .

During steps to depressurize the NC system, the crew shall FIRST attempt to depressurize the NC system using (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 11%

2. one PZR PORV B. 1. 32%

2. one PZR PORV C. 1. 11%

2. Auxiliary Spray D. 1. 32%

2. Auxiliary Spray Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 142 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 48 48 B General Discussion During performance of E-3 (SGTR), the Operators are directed to maintain ruptured SG level greater than 11% (32%) during recovery actions.

After the rapid cooldown is completed in E-3 and the NC system is to be depressurize to minimize subcooling and stop the tube leak, the Operators are directed to depressurize the NC system using normal PZR spray. If at any time Pressurizer spray is determined to be ineffective, the Operators are directed to depressurize the NC system using one PZR PORV. If a PORV is unavailable the Operator is directed to depressurize using Auxiliary Spray. The mitigating strategy here is to depressurize the NC system in an expeditious manner to stop NC system leakage into the ruptured SG prior to overfilling the ruptured SG.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant concludes that adverse containment numbers are not in effect.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant concludes that adverse containment numbers are not in effect.

Part 2 is plausible since Auxiliary Spray is one of the methods that can be used to depressurize the NC system and WOULD be used if NO PZR PORVs were available for the NC system depressurization.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part 2 is plausible since Auxiliary Spray is one of the methods that can be used to depressurize the NC system and WOULD be used if Pressurizer Sprays were ineffective and NO PZR PORVs were available for the NC system depressurization.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant demonstrates the ability to evaluate plant performance based on instrument interpretation (i.e.

Containtment pressure) and operating characteristics (i.e. SGTR and Steam Line break) and make operational judgements (i.e. what level must be maintained in the ruptured SG) based on their evaluation of those conditions.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must first analyze plant conditions to determine that adverse Containment conditions exist and that a higher NR level must be maintained in the ruptured SG based on those conditions. The applicant must then recall from memory the method used to depressurize the NC system if the PZR Sprays are determined to be ineffective.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2011 MNS NRC Q48 (Bank 4402)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 143 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Learning Objectives:

QUESTION 48 48 B OP-MC-EP-E3 Objectives 4 & 6 EPE038 2.1.7 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)

EPE038 GENERIC Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Question sent to Chief Examiner. CE evaluated question as matching the KA but believes that it is an SRO-only KA.

Original KA EPE038G2.4.8 replaced. Replacement provided by Chief Examiner. HCF 3/15/12 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 144 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE040 AA1.11 - Steam Line Rupture QUESTION 49 49 A Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

MFW system ....................................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit was initially at 100% RTP

A steam line break occurs inside Containment

Containment pressure is currently 3.5 PSIG Which ONE (1) of the following describes the operation of the CF system based on the conditions above?

A. Both CF Pumps are tripped The CF Control, CF Control Bypass, CF to CA Nozzle Isolations, and CF Containment Isolation valves are CLOSED B. Both CF Pumps are tripped The CF Control, CF Control Bypass, CF pump recirc, and CF pump discharge valves are CLOSED C. Both CF Pumps are running at 2800 RPM The CF Control, CF Control Bypass, CF to CA Nozzle Isolations, and CF Containment Isolation valves are CLOSED D. Both CF Pumps are running at 2800 RPM The CF Control, CF Control Bypass, CF pump recirc, and CF pump discharge valves are CLOSED Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 145 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 49 49 A General Discussion As a result of the Main Steam line break in Containment, an automatic Safety Injection signal and Feedwater Isolation (FWI) have occurred. The Safety Injection signal causes both CF pump turbines to trip. The FWI causes the S/G CF control and bypass valves to close, the S/G CF Containment isolation valves to close, and the CF to CA nozzle isolation valves to close. However, the CF pump discharge valves remain open.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because both FWPTs trip. Also, the CF Control and CF Control Bypass valves are closed. The CF pump discharge valves closing is plausible because on a Hi-Hi Doghouse level, the CF pump discharge valves get a close signal.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because both FWPTs get a signal to runback to 2800 RPM if only a Reactor Trip signal is present. In this particular case, there is a Reactor Trip signal which is initiated by a Safety Injection signal. Also, the CF Control and CF Control Bypass valves only being closed is correct.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because both FWPTs get a signal to runback to 2800 RPM if only a Reactor Trip signal is present. In this particular case, there is a Reactor Trip signal which is initiated by a Safety Injection signal. Also, the CF Control and CF Control Bypass valves being closed is correct. The CF pump discharge valves closing is plausible because on a Hi-Hi Doghouse level, the CF pump discharge valves get a close signal.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because the applicant is required to recall which CF system components operate/trip/reposition as a result of a Safety Injection signal caused by a Main Steam line rupture inside Containment. By demonstrating a knowledge of these, the applicant demonstrates the ability to monitor the operation of the CF system during a Steam Line Rupture.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must first recall all of the CF pump operations and CF valve alignments for various casualties. The applicant must then analyze the conditions given and apply them to the recalled knowledge to determine the response of the CF system.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CF-CF Sections 2.9 & 2.10 Lesson Plan OP-MC-CF-IFC Section 2.6.4 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-CF-CF Objectives 13 & 14 APE040 AA1.11 - Steam Line Rupture Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

MFW system ....................................................

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 146 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 49 Remarks/Status 49 A Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 147 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE054 AA2.03 - Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW)

QUESTION 50 50 B Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Conditions and reasons for AFW pump startup ........................

Regarding the operation of the CA system:

1) ONLY the Motor-Driven CA pumps will start if a occurs.

2) The CA system is capable of supplying sufficient flow to maintain S/G inventory provided reactor power is less than a MAXIMUM of .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Blackout

2. 3%

B. 1. Trip of both CF pumps

2. 3%

C. 1. Blackout

2. 5%

D. 1. Trip of both CF pumps

2. 5%

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 148 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 50 50 B General Discussion On a trip of both CF pumps, the MD CA pumps only will start. On a Blackout the MD and TD CA pumps will start.

In accordance with the AP-06 Basis document and the CF-CA lesson plan the CA system is capable of supplying all main feedwater during a normal plant startup and shutdown provided the flow is less than 3% maximum design feedwater flow (AP-06 checks reactor power less than or equal to 3% to verify this).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible as both CA pumps start on a Blackout signal.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible as both CA pumps start on a Blackout signal.

Part 2 is plausible as 5% is a power level that is a frequently used check in the Emergency Procedures. For example, when stopping an NC pump at power, the reactor is tripped and power is verified less than 5% prior to stopping the NC pump.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part 2 is plausible as 5% is a power level that is a frequently used check in the Emergency Procedures. For example, when stopping an NC pump at power, the reactor is tripped and power is verified less than 5% prior to stopping the NC pump.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of what will start the CA pumps on a loss of feedwater (i.e. both CF pumps tripped). Additionally, the applicant must have knowledge of the flow capability of the CA system (which is the basis for tripping the reactor if both CF pumps trip).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CF-CA Sections 1.1, 2.1, &2.2 AP-06 (S/G Feedwater Malfunction) Background Document Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-CF-CA Objectives 1 & 4 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 149 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE054 AA2.03 - Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW)

QUESTION 50 50 B Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Conditions and reasons for AFW pump startup ........................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 150 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination EPE055 EK3.02 - Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout)

QUESTION 51 51 D Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the Station Blackout : (CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite power ..........

Given the following conditions:

A loss of All AC power has occurred on Unit 1

Crew has implemented ECA-0.0 (Loss of All AC Power)

The Unit 1 Standby Make Up pump has failed

Incore Cooling Monitor indicates subcooling is - 5°F Which ONE (1) of the following describes the reason for depressurizing the S/Gs to 290 PSIG in accordance with ECA-0.0?

A. Initiate Cold Leg Accumulator injection to restore subcooling.

B. Initiate Cold Leg Accumulator injection to maintain the core subcritical.

C. Reduce NC system temperature and pressure to establish Natural Circulation conditions.

D. Reduce NC system temperature and pressure to reduce NC pump seal leakage and minimize NC system inventory loss.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 151 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 51 51 D General Discussion One of the major actions (mitigating strategies) of ECA-0.0 is to "Maintain plant conditions for optimal recovery. These actions include depressuizing the SGs to 290 psig to reduce NC system temperature and pressure to reduce NC pump seal leakage and minimize the NC system inventory loss until AC power can be restored.

If SGs are depressurized to less than 190 psig, the CLA accumulators will inject into the NC System. While it is desirable in some EOP mitigating schemes to depressuize the SGs to cause the CLAs to inject (i.e. ECA-1.1), in ECA-0.0 it is undesirable to have the CLAs inject as nitrogen which enters the NC system could disrupt Natural Circulation flow.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See Explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the step to depressurize the S/G's is not performed unless subcooling is lost. Additionally, injecting the CLAs would provide relatively cool water to the NC system which would act to improve subcooling.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See Explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because there is extensive discussion in the WOG background document regarding the potential to return to a critical condition during SG depressurization prior to reaching the CLA injection pressure.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See Explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because while establishing Natural Circulation conditions is desirable, reducing SG pressures to 290 psig is not required to establish Natural Circulation conditions.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA K/A is matched since the applicant must know the overall mitigating (including bases) of the procedures used during a Station Blackout.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2009 NRC Q49 (Bank 2249)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

ECA-0.0 (Loss of All AC Power) page 22 Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-ECA-0 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-ECA-0 Objective 4 EPE055 EK3.02 - Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout)

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the Station Blackout : (CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite power ..........

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 152 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 51 Remarks/Status 51 D Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 153 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE056 AK1.01 - Loss of Offsite Power QUESTION 52 52 D Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Offsite Power: CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Principle of cooling by natural convection ...........................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A Loss of Offsite Power has occurred

During the recovery, it is determined that a natural circulation cooldown needs to be performed Given the following list of conditions:

1. NC system subcooling > 0°F

2. NC system hot leg temperatures at saturation temperature for S/G pressure

3. NC system cold leg temperatures going up slowly

4. NC system hot leg temperatures going down

5. S/G pressure stable or going down

6. NC system cold leg temperatures at saturation temperature for S/G pressure

7. NC system pressure stable

8. Core Exit T/C's stable Which ONE (1) of the following sets of conditions confirm that Natural Circulation exists and is effective in cooling the core in accordance with Generic Enclosure 33 (Natural Circulation Parameters)?

A. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 B. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 C. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 D. 1, 4, 5, 6, 8 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 154 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 52 52 D General Discussion The indications of Natural Circulation are:

1. NC Subcooling - Greater than 0°F

2. S/G Pressures - Stable or going down

3. NC T-Hots - Stable or going down

4. Core Exit T/Cs - Stable or going down

5. NC T-Colds - At saturation temperature for S/G pressure Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Distracters 1, 4, and 5 are correct. If the candidate confuses Nat Circ (loss of all NC pumps) with the loss of 1 NC pump where T-Cold would increase, 3 is plausible. 7 is plausble since most parameters are "stable or going down" when monitoring for NC.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since 4, 6, and 8 are correct. 2 would be correct if it was T-Colds.7 is plausble since most parameters are "stable or going down" when monitoring for NC.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since 1, and 5 are correct. If the candidate confuses Nat Circ (loss of all NC pumps) with the loss of 1 NC pump where T-Cold would increase, 3 is plausible. 2 would be correct if it was T-Colds. 7 is plausble since most parameters are "stable or going down" when monitoring for NC.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA This KA is matched because in order for the applicant to monitor components associated with Natural Circlation, they must know which instruments are monitored to determine that Natural Circulation exist and must also know how those indications should be trending.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a comprehension level question because the applicant must analyze all conditions to determine all conditions that define Natural Circulation.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2009 MNS NRC Retake Q64 (Bank 2264)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

ECA-0.1 (Loss of All AC Power Recovery Without SI Required)

OP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Natural Circulation Paramters)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-ECA-0 Objective 3 APE056 AK1.01 - Loss of Offsite Power Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Offsite Power: CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Principle of cooling by natural convection ...........................

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 155 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 52 Remarks/Status 52 D Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 156 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE057 AA1.04 - Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus QUESTION 53 53 A Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

RWST and VCT valves ............................................

A sustained loss of power to Vital AC Panelboard will require that operators manually transfer NV Pump suction from the VCT to the FWST per AP-15 (Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power).

Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1EKVA B. 1EKVB C. 1EKVC D. 1EKVD Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 157 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 53 53 A General Discussion Per AP-15 Step 6 RNO, auto and manual VCT makeup capability is unavailable on a loss of EKVA. Direction is given to swap NV pump suction to the FWST when VCT level goes below 16%.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible because EKVB is the other vital AC panelboard. The applicant may conclude that VCT makeup is affected by Train "B" of vital AC instrument power.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible because EKVC is the other "A" train vital panelboard and the VCT makeup valves are "A" train. The applicant may conclude that either "A" train panelboard will affect the same components.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible because EKVD is the other vital AC panelboard. The applicant may conclude that VCT makeup is affected by Train "B" of vital AC instrument power.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because on a sustained loss of EKVA, with no auto or manual VCT makeup capability, the operator is directed to open 1NV-221A and NV-222B (NV pump suction from FWST isol) and then close 1NV-141A and 1NV-142B (VCT Outlet Isol)

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2008 MNS Audit Q52 (Bank 3371)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

AP-15 (Loss of Vital or Aux AC Control Power) Background Document Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-AP-15 Objective 4 APE057 AA1.04 - Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

RWST and VCT valves ............................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 158 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 53 53 A Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 159 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE062 AA2.04 - Loss of Nuclear Service Water QUESTION 54 54 B Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

The normal values and upper limits for the temperatures of the components cooled by SWS ..................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The 1B DG is running due to an inadvertent Blackout signal during testing

1RN-171B (B DG HX Supply Isolation Valve) did NOT open

1) Based on the conditions above, if the Lube Oil High Temperature trip setpoint is reached, will the DG trip?

2) What is the DG Lube Oil High Temperature trip setpoint?

A. 1. Yes

2. 190°F B. 1. No

2. 190°F C. 1. Yes

2. 200°F D. 1. No

2. 200°F Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 160 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 54 54 B General Discussion The DG Lube Oil High Temperature trip setpoint is 190°F. This trip is in effect during a Manual Mode start of the DG.

For this particular test the DG started automatically as part of the test. Therefore, most of the manual mode trips are defeated (including the DG Lube Oil High Temperature trip). Therefore, the DG will NOT trip.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant does not understand that the DG started automatically during testing. For most DG testing, the diesel is started manually which means that all of the manual mode trips are active. So, if the diesel had been started manually and 1RN-170B did not open, the DG would trip when the Lube Oil High Temperature trip setpoint is reached. Additionally, the applicant could confuse the Lube Oil High Temperature trip with the Lube Oil Low Pressure trip which is still active on an automatic start.

The second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant does not understand that the DG started automatically during testing. For most DG testing, the diesel is started manually which means that all of the manual mode trips are active. So, if the diesel had been started manually and 1RN-170B did not open, the DG would trip when the Lube Oil High Temperature trip setpoint is reached. Additionally, the applicant could confuse the Lube Oil High Temperature trip with the Lube Oil Low Pressure trip which is still active on an automatic start.

The second part is plausible since this is the DG Jacket Water High temperature trip setpoint.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible since this is the DG Jacket Water High temperature trip setpoint.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because a loss of Nuclear Service Water to the DG has occurred and the applicant must have knowledge of the upper temperature limit (i.e. trip setpoint) for the DG.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First the applicant must recall from memory the DG Lube Oil High Temperature trip setpoint. Then, the applicant must analyze the given conditions to determine that the diesel generator started automatically and that the DG Lube Oil High Temperature trip setpoint is not active.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

PT/1/A/4200/009 B (Engineered Safety Features Actuation Periodic Test Train B)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-DG-DG Sections 3.2 & 3.3 Learning Objectives:

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 161 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination OP-MC-DG-DG Objectives 5 & 6 QUESTION 54 54 B APE062 AA2.04 - Loss of Nuclear Service Water Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

The normal values and upper limits for the temperatures of the components cooled by SWS ..................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 162 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination WE04 EK2.2 - LOCA Outside Containment QUESTION 55 55 D Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Outside Containment) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

Unit 1 was initially at 100% RTP:

A Safety Injection has occurred due to a LOCA on 1A Train of ND

ECA-1.2 (LOCA Outside Containment) has been implemented The overall mitigating strategy of ECA-1.2 in attempting to isolate the LOCA includes:

Cooldown the NCS (1) and then depressurize the NCS to allow the (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. while maintaining a cooldown rate in NC Tcolds less than 100°F/hr

2. Cold Leg Accumulators to inject B. 1. at maximum rate while attempting to avoid a Main Steam Isolation

2. Cold Leg Accumulators to inject C. 1. while maintaining a cooldown rate in NC Tcolds less than 100°F/hr

2. 1A ND train to be isolated D. 1. at maximum rate while attempting to avoid a Main Steam Isolation

2. 1A ND train to be isolated Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 163 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 55 55 D General Discussion The objective of ECA-1.2 is to provide actions to identify and isolate a LOCA outside containment. For a LOCA on the Residual Heat Removal (ND) system, the valves used to do this isolation are NI-173A /178B (ND to Cold Legs Cont Isol). These valves are not designed to close against the DP that could be seen during an ISLOCA. To meet the intent of ECA-1.2 to isolate a break on low pressure ND piping, this EP includes actions to cooldown and depressurize the NC system to the point where the isolation valves are capable of closing.

ECA-1.2, step 9 first directs a cooldown to 430 °F. The method of cooldown is using the steam dumps and dumping steam at a maximum rate while attempting to avoid a Main Steam isolation. Cooling down at maximum rate is desired for a LOCA outside containment due to concerns with FWST depletion and no Cold Leg Recirc capability (no sump water).

When target temperature is reached, step 16 directs depressurizing the NCS to less than 450 psig using one PZR PORV. When NC is less than 450 psig, NI-173A / 178B are closed.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because only a few EPs direct cooldown at the maximum rate. The majority of the EPs will direct a cooldown limit of 100°F. (e.g. ECA-1.1, ES-1.2, etc).

The second part is plausible because if the ND leak cannot be isolated before depleting the FWST, a transition to ECA-1.1 (Loss of ECR) would occur, and then the NCS is depressurized to allow CLA injection.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanaton above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

The second part is plausible because if the ND leak cannot be isolated before depleting the FWST, a transition to ECA-1.1 (Loss of ECR) would occur, and then the NCS is depressurized to allow CLA injection.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT. First part incorrect, second part correct PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because only a few EPs direct cooldown at the maximum rate. The majority of the EPs will direct a cooldown limit of 100°F. (e.g. ECA-1.1, ES-1.2, etc).

The second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the operator must demonstrate knowledge (i.e. strategy for isolating a LOCA Outside Containment) of the interrelations between the (LOCA Outside Containment) and the Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant (NC) and emergency coolant (CA feeding the SGs, dumping steam from the SGs to cool the NCS).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 164 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Development References QUESTION 55 Student References Provided 55 D

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-E1 (Basis document for ECA-1.2, ECA-1.1, and ES-1.2)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-E1 Objective 3 WE04 EK2.2 - LOCA Outside Containment Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Outside Containment) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 165 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination WE05 EK2.2 - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink QUESTION 56 56 D Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

Unit 1 has tripped from 100% RTP with the following conditions:

The crew has implemented FR-H.1 (Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

All attempts to restore CA flow have been unsuccessful Which ONE (1) of the following identifies the next source of feedwater that FR-H.1 will prioritize for restoration AND when attempts to restore feedwater will be terminated?

A. Condensate (CM); AND When Bleed and Feed is initiated.

B. Condensate (CM); AND When a Secondary Heat Sink is restored.

C. Main Feedwater (CF); AND When Bleed and Feed is initiated.

D. Main Feedwater (CF); AND When a Secondary Heat Sink is restored.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 166 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 56 56 D General Discussion Major Actions for FR-H.1:

The recovery/restoration technique of FR-H.1 includes the following four major action categories.

1. Attempt restoration of feed flow to S/Gs.

2. Initiation of feed and bleed heat removal.

3. Restore and confirm secondary heat sink.

4. Termination of feed and bleed heat removal.

The operator attempts to restore or establish auxiliary feedwater flow, main feedwater flow, and condensate flow (in that order) while checking symptoms for a loss of secondary heat sink.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the applicant could conclude that there is insufficient steam flow to operate a CF pump after the reactor trip, making CM the logical choice.

The second part is plausible since the applicant could conclude that once heat removal was established via bleed and feed it would no longer be necessary to establish heat removal via a secondary heat sink. Also, if the applicant does not recall that the Feedwater Isolation signal is blocked prior to initiation of bleed and feed, it would be reasonable to conclude that attempts to restore a secondary heat sink need not be continued as they would be unsuccessful with a Feedwater Isolation signal present.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the applicant could conclude that there is insufficient steam flow to operate a CF pump after the reactor trip, making CM the logical choice.

The second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible since the applicant could conclude that once heat removal was established via bleed and feed it would no longer be necessary to establish heat removal via a secondary heat sink. Also, if the applicant does not recall that the Feedwater Isolation signal is blocked prior to initiation of bleed and feed, it would be reasonable to conclude that attempts to restore a secondary heat sink need not be continued as they would be unsuccessful with a Feedwater Isolation signal present.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the operator must demonstrate knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant (NC), emergency coolant (CA), the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility (i.e. CF and CM).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 167 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType QUESTION 56 Question Source 56 D RO Memory BANK 2009 MNS Audit Q43 (Bank 3161)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-FRH Section 3.0 FR-H.1 (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

Learning Objectives: OP-MC-EP-FRH Objective 3 WE05 EK2.2 - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 168 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE003 2.2.22 - Dropped Control Rod QUESTION 57 57 A APE003 GENERIC Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.2 / 45.2)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is operating at 80% RTP

Control rod M14 drops into the core In accordance with Tech Spec 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment Limits), within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months the crew is required to (1) .

Tech Spec 3.1.4 is applicable in MODES (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. perform a SDM determination ONLY

2. 1 & 2 ONLY B. 1. perform a SDM determination AND reduce power to 75% RTP

2. 1 & 2 ONLY C. 1. perform a SDM determination ONLY

2. 1, 2, & 3 D. 1. perform a SDM determination AND reduce power to 75% RTP

2. 1, 2, & 3 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 169 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 57 57 A General Discussion In accordance with Tech Spec 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment Limits) a SDM calculation must be performed within one hour.

Tech Spec 3.1.4 is applicable in MODES 1 & 2 only.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because the SDM is correct and the Tech Spec does require power to be reduced to less than or equal to 75% RTP.

However, power must be reduced within two hours.

Second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because MODE 1, 2. & 3 applicability is common for many Tech Specs. Additionally, the rod control system can be in service and a dropped / misaligned condition can occur with the unit in MODE 3.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because the SDM is correct and the Tech Spec does require power to be reduced to less than or equal to 75% RTP.

However, power must be reduced within two hours.

Second part is plausible because MODE 1, 2. & 3 applicability is common for many Tech Specs. Additionally, the rod control system can be in service and a dropped / misaligned condition can occur with the unit in MODE 3.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the Tech Spec limiting conditions for operation associated with a dropped control rod.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-RT-RB Section 2.3 Lesson Plan OP-BNT-RT03 Section 5.2 Tech Spec 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment Limits)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-RT-RB Objective 9 OP-BNT-RT03 Objective 7 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 170 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE003 2.2.22 - Dropped Control Rod QUESTION 57 57 A APE003 GENERIC Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.2 / 45.2) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 171 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE005 AK2.02 - Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod QUESTION 58 58 C Knowledge of the interrelations between the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches ........................................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

After withdrawing Control Bank D, the RO identifies that Control Rod M-4 (Control Bank D, Group 2) indicates 92 steps on DRPI

Bank D Group Step Counters indicate 100 steps on both banks

I&E has determined that Control Rod M-4 stopped moving due to a failed Lift Coil Disconnect switch

The failed switch has been replaced and the Operating crew is ready to realign Control Rod M-4

As Control Rod M-4 begins to move, annunciator 1AD-2, A/10 (Rod Control Urgent Failure) alarms The cause of this alarm is an Urgent Failure in Power Cabinet .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1AC B. 2AC C. 1BD D. 2BD Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 172 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 58 58 C General Discussion An Auctioneer Amp and Comparator circuit monitors the "ordered" current versus the actual current to the coils and generates a Regulation Failure anytime the difference is out of tolerance. This is the condition that gives an Urgent Alarm when re-aligning a dropped rod.

Possible causes of a Power Cabinet Rod Control Urgent Failure are:

A Regulation Failure - "actual" current does not match demanded "current" or FULL current demanded longer than setpoint for every rod in that Power Cabinet. Any rod in a Power Cabinet that has "actual" matching "demanded" will prevent Req. failure in that Power Cabinet.

For this particular case since there is NO rod in the power cabinet for Control Bank D Group 1 that has an actual current that matches the demanded current, a Regulation Failure occurs resulting in an Urgent Failure for that Power Cabinet.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not fully understand the arrangement of the Power Cabinets and how they are designated, they could conclude that the failure is in Power Cabinet 1AC. This is additionally plausible if the applicant concludes that the Urgent Failure is caused by an effect on bank overlap between Control Banks C and D since this power cabinet is associated with Control Bank C.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not fully understand the arrangement of the Power Cabinets and how they are designated, they could conclude that the failure is in Power Cabinet 2AC. This is additionally plausible if the applicant concludes that the Urgent Failure is caused by an effect on bank overlap between Control Banks C and D since this power cabinet is associated with Control Bank C.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not fully understand the arrangement of the Power Cabinets and how they are designated, they could conclude that the failure is in Power Cabinet 2BD especially since this is the power cabinet associated with the misaligned rod.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must understand the relationship between the lift coil disconnect switches for the control rod and the resultant Urgent Failure alarm that occurs in Power Cabinet 1BD as the result of having all lift coil disconnect switches open for group 1D.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because the applicant must analyze the given conditions to determine which rod groups are affected by the rod realignment and evaluate the given answers to determine which Power Cabinet supplies the effect group that causes the Urgent Failure alarm.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED MNS Bank AICIRER04 MODIFIED Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-IRE Learning Objectives: OP-MC-IC-IRE Objective 10 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 173 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE005 AK2.02 - Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod QUESTION 58 58 C Knowledge of the interrelations between the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Breakers, relays, disconnects, and control room switches ........................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 174 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE024 AA1.18 - Emergency Boration QUESTION 59 59 B Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to Emergency Boration: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Emergency boron flow meter ......................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

An ATWS has occurred on the unit

FR-S.1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS) has been implemented

Emergency Boration has been initiated FR-S.1 directs the BOP to:

1) verify a MINIMUM Emergency Boration flow of (1) ..

AND

2) check that charging flow is (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 20 GPM

2. greater than boration flow B. 1. 30 GPM

2. greater than boration flow C. 1. 20 GPM

2. less than boration flow D. 1. 30 GPM

2. less than boration flow Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 175 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 59 59 B General Discussion FR-S.1 directs that the MINIMUM boric acid flow during an emergency boration is 30 GPM.

To ensure that boric acid flow is adequate, FR-S.1 directs the operators to ensure that charging flow is greater than boric acid flow.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant confuses the required emergency boration flow with the minimum charging flow to prevent an automatic letdown isolation.

The second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant confuses the required emergency boration flow with the minimum charging flow to prevent an automatic letdown isolation.

The second part is plausible if the applicant concludes that having charging flow greater than boration flow would dilute the amount of boric acid being added to the NC system and thus prevent boric acid from being added at the required rate.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant concludes that having charging flow greater than boration flow would dilute the amount of boric acid being added to the NC system and thus prevent boric acid from being added at the required rate.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the requirements for emergency boration during FR-S.1. By demonstrating that knowledge the applicant demonstrates the ability to adequately monitor the emergency boration flow meter.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

FR-S.1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-FRS Objective 3 & 4 APE024 AA1.18 - Emergency Boration Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to Emergency Boration: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Emergency boron flow meter ......................................

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 176 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 59 Remarks/Status 59 B Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 177 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE032 AA2.05 - Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation QUESTION 60 60 B Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Nature of abnormality, from rapid survey of control room data ..........

Unit 1 is operating at 97% RTP when a Reactor Trip occurs.

Given the following conditions:

Channel Flux Level SUR SR N31 0 CPS 0 DPM SR N32 0 CPS 0 DPM IR N35 1.1x10 -10 AMPS -1/3 DPM IR N36 9.5x10 -11 AMPS -1/3 DPM PR N41 12%

PR N42 0%

PR N43 0%

PR N44 0%

Which ONE (1) of the following statements describes why the Source Range Nuclear Instruments are NOT indicating?

A. P-10 (Nuclear at Power) status light is LIT.

B. P-6 (S/R Block Permissive) status light is LIT.

C. P-10 (Nuclear at Power) status light is DARK.

D. P-6 (S/R Block Permissive) status light is DARK.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 178 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 60 60 B General Discussion 3 of 4 power range channels must be < 10% to auto-unblock SR NIs. Both intermediate range channels must be below P6 at 1x10-10. When the P-6 permissive is DARK, the source range block permissive is removed and source range NIs will normally be energized. Based on one IR channel being greater than P-6, the P-6 permissive light should be LIT and the SRs will not energize. Since 3/4 PR channels are less than P-10, the P-10 permissive should be dark and therefore is NOT preventing the SRs from energizing.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses the logic for the P-10 permissive. The P-10 Persmissive light being LIT would prevent the SRs from energizing. However, in this case since 3/4 PR channels are less than 10% the light should NOT be LIT. The applicant could also confuse P-6 with P-10 and choose this as the correct answer.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses the logic for the P-10 permissive or does not understand which state for the P-10 Permissive light allows automatic re-energizing of the SRs. It is common for Operators to confuse the meaning of permissive lights being LIT or DARK. If the applicant confuse the meaning of the status light being DARK and confuses P-6 with P-10, they would choose this as a correct answer.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not recall which state for the P-6 permissive light allows for automatic energizing of the SRs. It is common for Operators to confuse the meaning of permissive lights being LIT or DARK. If the applicant confuse the meaning of the status light being DARK, they would choose this as a correct answer.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because a loss of the Source Range instruments has occurred (i.e. the Source Range Instruments are not indicating when they should be) and the applicant must determine from a scan of other control room indications why the loss of the Source Range Instruments has occurred.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to analyze a given set of conditions and compare them to what the NI readings (recalled from memory) should be for this condition.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2010 MNS NRC Q59 (Bank 2759)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

OP-MC-IC-IPE Section 3.1.3 OP-MC-IC-ENB Section 3.1.4 Lesson Plan Objective:

OP-MC-IC-ENB Objective 12 OP-MC-IC-IPE Objective 11 APE032 AA2.05 - Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Nature of abnormality, from rapid survey of control room data ..........

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 179 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 60 Remarks/Status 60 B Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 180 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE033 AK3.01 - Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation QUESTION 61 61 B Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Termination of startup following loss of intermediate range instrumentation .............................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A Reactor startup is in progress

Based on the following indications, the startup has been placed on hold:

o N-31 indicates 3.1x104 cps o N-32 indicates 3.0x104 cps o N-35 indicates 1.5x10-9 amps o N-36 indicates 1.0x10-10 amps

Rods are in manual with no rod motion

SR and IR NIs are slowly increasing

T ave is holding steady Which ONE of the following is the reason for placing the startup on hold?

A. N-35 compensating voltage is set too high B. N-35 compensating voltage is set too low C. N-36 compensating voltage is set too high D. N-36 compensating voltage is set too low Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 181 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 61 61 B General Discussion With the Source Ranges reading 3E04, the Intermediate Ranges should be indicating 1E-10. Therefore, N-35 is indicating too high. That means that N35 compensating voltage is set too low, allowing an additional gamma signal to be added to the neutron signal.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because N-35 is the affected Intermediate Range channel. If the applicant confuses the effect of compensating voltage on IR indication, it is plausible for them to conclude that this is the correct response. This is a common error for operators when determining this type of malfunction.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not recall the relationship of Source Range indication to Intermediate Range indication. If that was the case they could conclude that N-36 was malfunctioning and indicating too low. If N-36 was indicating too low it would be because the compensating voltage was set too high.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not recall the relationship of Source Range indication to Intermediate Range indication. If that was the case they could conclude that N-36 was malfunctioning and indicating too low. Also, the applicant could confuse the effect of compensating voltage on IR indication and conclude that a lower compensating voltage would result in a lower indication and consequently determine this to be the correct response.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the startup has been terminated due to a malfunction (i.e. in effect a loss) of an intermediate range instrument. The applicant must have knowledge of the reasons for the "loss" of the intermediate range instrument to determine the correct response.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must first recall from memory the relationship of SR indication and IR indication at various power levels. The applicant must then determine which of the IR channels in malfunctioning from the indications provided and the reason for the malfuncting indication.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2003 CNS NRC Q2 MODIFIED (Bank 202)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-ENB Section 2.2.2 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-IC-ENB Objective 7 APE033 AK3.01 - Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Termination of startup following loss of intermediate range instrumentation .............................................

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 182 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 61 Remarks/Status 61 B Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 183 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination WE06 EK1.2 - Degraded Core Cooling QUESTION 62 62 A Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Degraded Core Cooling)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with ((Degraded Core Cooling).

Given the following conditions:

EP/2/A/5000/FR-C.2 (Response to Degraded Core Cooling) is in progress

Reactor coolant pumps (NCP) 2A and 2C are in service

Reactor vessel dynamic D/P is decreasing and is 3% less than required

The crew has just completed depressurizing the S/Gs to 190 PSIG What is the mitigation strategy in accordance with EP/2/A/5000/FR-C.2?

A. Shutdown all NCPs. Depressurize the NC system by depressurizing the steam generators to atmospheric pressure.

B. Shutdown all NCPs. Do not depressurize the steam generators further.

C. Continue to run both NCPs. Depressurize the NC system by depressurizing the steam generators to atmospheric pressure.

D. Continue to run both NCPs. Do not depressurize the steam generators further.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 184 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 62 62 A General Discussion In FR-C.2, after S/G's have been depressurized to 190 psig, they will subsequently be depressurized to atmospheric pressure. All NCPs are secured prior to this step because required seal DP will be lost during the depressurization that is performed to reduce NC pressure below the shutoff head of the ND pumps.

A note prior to step 1 states: Normal conditions for running NC pumps are desired, but NC pumps should not be tripped if normal conditions cannot be established or maintained.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Shutting down the NC pumps is correct.

The applicant may conclude that the reason for shutting down the NC pumps is to eliminate the NC pump heat input to the NC system. They may therefore conclude that this action is sufficient and that depressurizing the S/Gs further is NOT required or will not be sufficient since the S/Gs have already been depressurized to 190 PSIG.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The applicant may conclude that both pumps need to continue to run due to the note prior to step 1.

Depressurizing the S/Gs to atmospheric pressure is correct.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The applicant may conclude that both pumps need to continue to run due to the note prior to step 1 and that further S/G depressurization is unwarranted since they are at 190 psig.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the operational implications related to the mitigating strategy of FR-C.2 (Response to Degraded Core Cooling) (i.e. whether to run NC pumps and whether to depressurize S/Gs).

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to analyze the conditions given and then select the appropriate mitigating strategy based on that analysis.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2008 CNS AUDIT Q16 (Bank 1816)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

FR-C.2 And background document Learning Objectives:

WE06 EK1.2 - Degraded Core Cooling Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Degraded Core Cooling)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 185 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 62 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with ((Degraded Core Cooling).

62 A 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 186 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE067 AA1.06 - Plant Fire On Site QUESTION 63 63 C Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Fire alarm ......................................................

Given the following on Unit 1:

The Fire Detection system computer indicates a fire in Zone 70 (AB 716' Unit 1 M/D CA Pump Room)

An Operator dispatched to the area reports that there is smoke and some cables with glowing embers but, no visible flames

1) In accordance with AP-45 (Plant Fire) and the conditions above, this classified as an ACTIVE fire.

2) In accordance with RP-25 (Fire Brigade Response), in addition to making an announcement on the Fire Brigade Radio AND activating the Fire Brigade Pagers, a Plant PA announcement required when dispatching the Fire Brigade.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. is

2. is B. 1. is

2. is NOT C. 1. is NOT

2. is D. 1. is NOT

2. is NOT Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 187 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 63 63 C General Discussion In accordance with RP-025, the fire bridage is dispatched via a Plant PA announcement, activating the Fire Brigade pagers, and making an announcement on the Fire Brigade radio system.

In accordance with AP-45 (Plant Fire) visible flames are required to classify a fire as ACTIVE.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the presence of smoke and glowing embers means that the fire may have been ACTIVE at one time.

The second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the presence of smoke and glowing embers means that the fire may have been ACTIVE at one time.

The second part is plausible because the announcement on the Fire Brigade Radio and activating the Fire Brigade Pagers is more than adequate to dispatch the Fire Brigade. Making an announcement on the PA does not necessarily provide any additional assurance that all Fire Brigade members will respond. However, it does ensure that personnel not on the Fire Brigade stay clear of the area and it is required by RP-025.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because the announcement on the Fire Brigade Radio and activating the Fire Brigade Pagers is more than adequate to dispatch the Fire Brigade. Making an announcement on the PA does not necessarily provide any additional assurance that all Fire Brigade members will respond. However, it does ensure that personnel not on the Fire Brigade stay clear of the area and it is required by RP-025.

Basis for meeting the KA Unlike many plants, MNS does not have a specific plant fire alarm. The plant fire alarm would normally be used to alert the plant staff of the presence of a fire and to dispatch the fire brigade. In lieu of sounding a plant fire alarm, at MNS alerting the plant staff to the presense of a fire and dispatching the fire brigade is done by a PA announcement, initiating the Fire Brigade pagers, and an announcement over the Fire Brigade radios. Therefore, these methods constitute the plant fire alarm at MNS. By demonstrating a knowledge of the methods used to dispatch the fire brigade, the applicant demonstrates the ability to "operate the fire alarm" at MNS. Therefore, the KA is matched.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

RP/0/A/5700/025 (Fire Brigade Response)

AP-45 (Plant Fire)

Learning Objectives:

NONE Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 188 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination APE067 AA1.06 - Plant Fire On Site QUESTION 63 63 C Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Fire alarm ......................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Original KA APE067AA1.01 replaced. Replacement provided by Chief Examiner. HCF 3/15/12.

Originally thought the new KA AA1.06 (Fire Alarm) was referring to an alarm on the Fire Detection system computer.

However, if it was referring to the Fire Detection system computer it would be AA1.09 (Plant fire zone panel (including detector location)). Therefore, concluded that this KA is referring to a "plant" fire alarm which is used to alert plant personnel and the fire brigade of the presence of a fire. MNS does not have a plant fire alarm per se. At MNS we use other methods to alert plant personnel and the fire brigade of the presence of a fire on site. This question will be written based on a knowledge of those methods. HCF 3/29/12 Revised after Chief Examiner's pre-401-9 review comments to be more discrimminating. HCF 06-19-12 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 189 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination WE13 EK3.4 - Steam Generator Overpressure QUESTION 64 64 A Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is in MODE 3

FR-H.2 (Response to S/G Overpressure) has been implemented

1B S/G pressure is 1235 PSIG

1B S/G NR level is 75%

The 1A, 1C and 1D S/G pressures are all 850 PSIG and 50% NR level

All feedwater isolation status lights are LIT Which ONE (1) of the following statements describes the FIRST action to be taken per FR-H.2 AND the reason for this action?

A. Open the 1B S/G PORV to immediately reduce pressure in the 1B S/G.

B. Dump steam from the 1B S/G using CA pump #1 to immediately reduce pressure in the 1B S/G.

C. Manually isolate CA flow to the 1B S/G to prevent additional feedwater from further pressurizing the 1B S/G.

D. Dump steam from the 1A, 1C and 1D S/Gs to reduce NC system temperature and reduce pressure in the 1B S/G.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 190 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 64 64 A General Discussion In accordance with FR-H.2 the first action to alleviate the S/G Overpressure condition would be to open the PORV to reduce pressure.

Other actions which could be performed later in FR-H.2 to reduce S/G pressure would be to dump steam using the TD CA pump.

FR-H.2 also directs isolating CA flow to the affected S/G and directs initiating an NC system cooldown using the unaffected S/Gs.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because this is a step that is performed later in FR-H.2 if the PORV can not be opened or is unsuccessul at reducing SG pressure.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because this is a step that is performed later in FR-H.2 if the PORV can not be opened or is unsuccessul at reducing SG pressure.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because this is a step that is performed later in FR-H.2 if the PORV can not be opened or is unsuccessul at reducing SG pressure.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the reasons for performing steps in FR-H.2 and the overall mitigating strategy to function as a part of the control room team and ensure adherence to the mitigating strategy of FR-H.2.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to analyze the conditions given and determine the correct mitigating strategy. For example if the affected SG level was greater than 92%, the crew would transition to FR-H.3 and the first step would be to isolate feedwater flow to the SG.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2008 CNS AUDIT Q22 MODIFIED (Bank 1822)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-FRH Section 4.0 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-FRH Objecties 3 & 4 WE13 EK3.4 - Steam Generator Overpressure Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 191 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 64 Remarks/Status 64 A Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 192 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination WE16 EA2.2 - High Containment Radiation QUESTION 65 65 A Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (High Containment Radiation)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility*s license and amendments.

Regarding the use of FR-Z.3 (Response To High Containment Radiation):

1. At what minimum reading on 1EMF 51A (Reactor building Activity) is the YELLOW path for Containment High Radiation valid?

2. What mitigative strategy does this procedure direct to reduce activity in the containment atmosphere?

A. 1. 35 R/hr

2. Ensure VE (Annulus Ventilation) system in operation and start Aux Carbon Filter fan B. 1. 25 R/hr

2. Ensure VE system in operation and start Aux Carbon Filter fan C. 1. 35 R/hr

2. Ensure VX (Containment Air Return) system is in operation D. 1. 25 R/hr

2. Ensure VX system is in operation Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 193 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 65 65 A General Discussion FR-Z.3 is entered when Containment radiation levels are greater than 35 R/hr.

When FR-Z.3 is entered, the procedure directs placing the VE (Annulus Ventiltion) system in service and starting an Aux Charcoal Filter Fan.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant confuses the Emergency Dose limit for lifesaving with the setpoint for a Containment Yellow path.

Second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

Second part is plausible because the VX (Containment Air Return) system has the same auto-start as the VE system (Hi-Hi Containment pressure).

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant confuses the Emergency Dose limit for lifesaving with the setpoint for a Containment Yellow path.

Second part is plausible because the VX (Containment Air Return) system has the same auto-start as the VE system (Hi-Hi Containment pressure).

Basis for meeting the KA K/A is matched because the candidate is given that a High Containment Radition condition exists and must recall the correct mitigating strategy from FR-Z.1 to ensure that the plant is operated within the limits of the facility's license.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

F-0 (Containment CSFST)

OP-MC-EP-FRZ Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-FRZ Objective 2 WE16 EA2.2 - High Containment Radiation Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (High Containment Radiation)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 194 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 65 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility*s license and amendments.

65 A 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 195 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination GEN2.1 2.1.5 - GENERIC - Conduct of Operations QUESTION 66 66 D Conduct of Operations Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Given the following plant conditions:

Unit 1 is at 50% RTP

Unit 2 is in a refueling outage, with fuel movement in progress from the Reactor Cavity to the Spent Fuel Pool Based on the conditions above and the requirements of SLC 16.13.4 (Minimum Station Staffing Requirements):

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the MINIMUM required number of ROs to be present at all times in the "NORMAL" area (total for both units);

AND the total MINIMUM required number of ROs on shift?

REFERENCE PROVIDED Total Minimum ROs in the Total Minimum Required "NORMAL" Area ROs on Shift A. 1 3 B. 1 4 C. 2 3 D. 2 4 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 196 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 66 66 D General Discussion In accordance with the procedure for Minimum Station Staffing Requirements (SLC 16.13.4), one of the requirements is that 1 RO shall be present at the controls at all times for each fueled unit. Since both units have fuel in the vessel, this requirement applies, and therefore, a minimum of 2 ROs are required at all times in the area marked "NORMAL" on the provided procedure excerpt. The applicant must also know that the area marked "NORMAL" is the definition of ATC (at the controls), and that the requirement applies for this area.

The total minimum required ROs on shift is 4 in accordance with the Table in Minimum Station Staffing Requirements for the given plant conditions (One Unit in Modes 1-4).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant does not recall that the minimum number in the "normal" area applies ANY TIME there is fuel in the reactor.

Since Unit 2 is in a refueling outage and only partially fueled the applicant could conclude that an RO is not required to be in the "normal" area on Unit 2.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant confuses the requirement for "One Unit in Modes 1-4" with the requirement for "Both Units in Mode 5, 6 or No Mode".

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant does not recall that the minimum number in the "normal" area applies ANY TIME there is fuel in the reactor.

Since Unit 2 is in a refueling outage and only partially fueled the applicant could conclude that an RO is not required to be in the "normal" area on Unit 2.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant confuses the requirement for "One Unit in Modes 1-4" with the requirement for "Both Units in Mode 5, 6 or No Mode".

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant is provided with a page from a procedure (SOMP 01-04), and must use it, along with knowledge of another procedure (for Minimum Station Staffing Requirements), and apply that to the conditions in the stem of the question to determine the level of shift staffing for the area delineated in the procedure excerpt, and for the plant conditions specified in the stem of the question.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a high cognitive level question because the applicant must use a page from an Operations Department procedure, which depicts a graphic layout drawing of the control room to determine required shift staffing. The applicant recalls shift staffing requirements and applies that knowledge to interpret the drawing, and make a final determination on whether the given staffing level is acceptable for the plant modes.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED CNS Bank Question 4319 MODIFIED Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 197 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Development References QUESTION 66 Student References Provided 66 D

References:

SOMP 01-04 Attachment 7.14 (Surveillance Area Selected Licensee Commitment 16.13-4, (Minimum Station Staffing Requirements), Maps)

SOMP O1-04 (Conduct of Operations)

Learning Objectives:

NONE GEN2.1 2.1.5 - GENERIC - Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 198 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination GEN2.1 2.1.14 - GENERIC - Conduct of Operations QUESTION 67 67 C Conduct of Operations Knowledge of criteria or conditions that require plant-wide announcements, such as pump starts, reactor trips, mode changes, etc. (CFR: 41.10 /

43.5 / 45.12)

SOMP 01-04 (Conduct of Operations) specifically requires an announcement using the plant paging system prior to initiation of .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. Excess Letdown B. Normal Letdown C. Steam Generator Blowdown D. a radioactive Waste Liquid Release Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 199 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 67 67 C General Discussion The following safety-related or major secondary components shall be checked out (as described in Step 2.3) prior to manually starting during routine operation. A SRO may evaluate and exempt this requirement under certain conditions (example: rotating NCPs during startup after initial checkout). If safety-related or major secondary components automatically start, the component shall be checked out as soon as practical unless exempted by a SRO.

Large motor/pump loads greater than 600V Starting Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Opening/closing Main Steam safeties Energizing 6900V and 4160V transformers Returning Main Buslines to service (closing PCBs)

Latching and tripping of Main Turbine and Main Feedwater Pump Turbines Evolutions with the potential for the release of high energy steam/fluids Any other case where the RO feels these precautions are warranted to ensure personnel safety The following apply to MNS and CNS Only:

Starting Emergency Diesel Generators Opening/closing MSIVs Opening/closing Pzr PORVs Opening/closing Main Feedwater Isolation Valves Opening/closing Main Steam PORVs Initiation of Steam Generator Blowdown Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because initiation of excess letdown is not a normal evolution and the applicant may conclude that it is therefore significant enough as to require a plant wide announcement.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because initiation of normal letdown will result in an increase in radiation levels in the area of the letdown line.

Therefore, the applicant may conclude that it is significant enough to require a plant wide announcement.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because initiation of a radioactive Waste Liquid Release will result in an increase in radiation levels in certain areas of the Auxiliary Building. Therefore, the applicant may conclude that it is significant enough to require a plant wide announcement.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of SOMP 01-04 with regards to the requirements for plant-wide announcements.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 200 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType QUESTION 67 Question Source 67 C RO Memory BANK 2008 MNS Audit Exam Q67 (Bank 3386)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

SOMP 01-04 (Conduct of Operations) Attachment 7.15 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-ADM-OP Objective 33 GEN2.1 2.1.14 - GENERIC - Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Knowledge of criteria or conditions that require plant-wide announcements, such as pump starts, reactor trips, mode changes, etc. (CFR: 41.10 /

43.5 / 45.12) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 201 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination GEN2.1 2.1.29 - GENERIC - Conduct of Operations QUESTION 68 68 C Conduct of Operations Knowledge of how to conduct system lineups, such as valves, breakers, switches, etc. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.1 / 45.12)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The WCC SRO has dispatched two NEOs to perform valve manipulations inside a contaminated area in accordance with an Operating Procedure

The operator performing the valve manipulations inside the contaminated area is in direct communication with the other operator who is outside the contaminated area and is reading each procedure step sequentially

The documenter cannot see the valve manipulations being performed If the performer does NOT have the procedure in hand as he performs the steps, what are the requirements of NSD 704 (Technical Procedure Use and Adherence),

regarding the sign off for each step?

A. The documenter checks off each step as the step is completed. The performer initials each step upon completion of the task.

B. The performer signs off the steps using his own initials, upon completion of the task after leaving the contaminated area.

C. The documenter signs off each step as the step is completed using his own initials AND the initials of the performer.

D. The documenter signs off each step as the step is completed using his own initials ONLY.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 202 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 68 68 C General Discussion In accordance with NSD 704:

IF another person signing a procedure step is NOT the performer AND does NOT have positive verification:

Both the performers initials and the documenters initials (or names) shall be entered at each applicable step or group of steps (Doer/Documenter and Verifier/Documenter method).

The documenter shall have positive communication from the performer via face-to-face, radio, telephone, or other communication device.

The performer is accountable for correct step performance.

The documenter is accountable for correct step sequencing, proper placekeeping, and correct documentation.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because each step is "designated as completed" prior to moving on to the next step. And, the performers initials are placed in each step. However, the method of designating a step as being completed is via the documenter initialling the step instead of checking it off. Additionally, the performers initials are placed in the step at the time of completion by the documenter.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the performers initials are placed on the procedure by the documenter.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because it is partially correct. The documenter does sign off each step as it is completed using his own initials. However, the documenter also signs the step using the initials of the performer.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant has to have knowledge of the NSD-704 procedure requirements for performing and signing off steps to correctly perform the valve lineup.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2011 MNS AUDIT Q43 (Bank 3486)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

NSD 704 (Technical Procedure Use and Adherence)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-ADM-OP Objectives 12 & 13 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 203 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination GEN2.1 2.1.29 - GENERIC - Conduct of Operations QUESTION 68 68 C Conduct of Operations Knowledge of how to conduct system lineups, such as valves, breakers, switches, etc. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.1 / 45.12) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 204 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination GEN2.2 2.2.2 - GENERIC - Equipment Control QUESTION 69 69 D Equipment Control Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels. (CFR: 41.6 / 41.7 /

45.2)

With Unit 1 conducting a plant startup the following conditions exist:

Reactor is at 40% RTP

Impulse Pressure Channel 1 is 295 PSIG

Impulse Pressure Channel 2 is 305 PSIG

All AMSAC S/G LOW FLOW status lights are DARK

The S/G PATH CLSD > 30 SEC annunciator is DARK

The AMSAC UNBLOCK light is DARK Which ONE (1) of the following describes the operation of the AMSAC System, AND describes the action that should be taken in accordance with OP/1/A6100/003, Enclosure 4.1 (Power Increase)?

A. AMSAC has NOT reached the point where the system will automatically unblock; Continue with the power increase and AMSAC will automatically unblock when Impulse Pressure rises above a MINIMUM of 360 PSIG.

B. AMSAC has NOT reached the point where the system will automatically unblock; Continue with the power increase and AMSAC will automatically unblock when Impulse Pressure Channel I rises above a MINIMUM of 300 PSIG.

C. AMSAC has failed to automatically unblock; Suspend the power increase until the failure has been resolved.

D. AMSAC has failed to automatically unblock; Depress the AMSAC Unblock Pushbutton, verify the Unblock lit is LIT, and continue with the power increase.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 205 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 69 69 D General Discussion According to OP/1/A/6100/003, Enclosure 4.1, the Note prior to Step 3.33.15, AMSAC will automatically unblock when Impulse Pressure increases to 290 PSIG. According to CF-CF requires both Channel I and Channel II to be > 290 PSIG. According to OP/1/A/6100/003, .1, Step 3.33.17, the operator must check the AMSAC System status when Impulse Pressure is between 295-305 PSIG, and if the system is NOT unblocked, the operator is directed to depress the Unblock Pushbutton, and then check that the Unblock light is LIT.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This is plausible because the applicant may incorrectly conclude that AMSAC is NOT required until 50% power, and its Impulse Pressure equivalent of 360 PSIG.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This is plausible because the applicant may incorrectly conclude that Impulse Pressure channel I is just below the setpoint, and only seconds away from reaching the point where the AMSAC will automatically unblock (which may be true), the procedure requires that when the stated conditions are observed, the system be manually unblocked.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This is plausible if the applicant does not understand the function of the Unblock switch, or does not recall the procedural direction regarding unblocking AMSAC.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the operator must demonstrate the ability to operate the AMSAC controls during a plant startup.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level because it requires more than one mental step. First the applicant must recall from memory the block and unblock setpoints for AMSAC. The applicant must then analyze the indications provided to determine what the status of AMSAC should be for the given conditions. The applicant must then recall the required actions from the unit operation procedure.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS Audit Q69 (Bank 3187)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CF-CF Section 2.11 Learning Objectives: OP-MC-CF-CF Objectives 16, 17, & 21 GEN2.2 2.2.2 - GENERIC - Equipment Control Equipment Control Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels. (CFR: 41.6 / 41.7 /

45.2)

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 206 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 69 Remarks/Status 69 D Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 207 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination GEN2.2 2.2.13 - GENERIC - Equipment Control QUESTION 70 70 B Equipment Control Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Given the following plant conditions:

It is the end of a shift and there is an outstanding Configuration Control Card (CCC) that is being maintained in the Control Room

The component being tracked on the CCC can NOT be returned to its AS FOUND position before the end of shift Which ONE (1) of the following describes the required disposition of the CCC?

A. Document the CCC as part of your turnover at shift relief.

B. Return the CCC to the OSM. An R&R will be issued prior to shift turnover.

C. Return the CCC to the CRS to determine whether it should be turned over, or if a procedure change will be required.

D. Return the CCC to the WCC SRO. The CCC will be tracked as open until the component can be repositioned to its AS FOUND position.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 208 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 70 70 B General Discussion Per SOMP 02-01 (Safety Tagging and Configuration Control):

If a component CANNOT be returned to the "As Found Position", the normal process will be to issue an R&R prior to shift turnover. All CCCs shall be returned to the OSM or CHM Manager/designee at the end of shift.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because CCCs maintained outside the Control Room can be turned over provided they are documented on a CCC log and discussed as part of the CRS turnover. The applicant could confuse this allowance with the actual requirement.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because CCCs maintained outside the Control Room can be turned over provided they are documented on a CCC log and discussed as part of the CRS turnover. The applicant could confuse this allowance with the actual requirement.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because CCCs maintained outside the Control Room can be turned over provided they are documented on a CCC log and discussed as part of the CRS turnover. The applicant could confuse this allowance with the actual requirement.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because the applicant must determine when an R&R (tagout) must be issued for configuration control.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2008 MNS NRC Q70 (Bank 3288)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

SOMP 02-01 (Safety Tagging and Configuration Control) Section 12 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-ADM-OMP Objective 35 GEN2.2 2.2.13 - GENERIC - Equipment Control Equipment Control Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 209 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 70 70 B Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 210 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination GEN2.3 2.3.5 - GENERIC - Radiation Control QUESTION 71 71 A Radiation Control Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc. (CFR: 41.11 / 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9)

Regarding the use of Electronic Dosimeters (ED):

If a DOSE alarm setpoint is exceeded, the alarm will (1) .

If a DOSE RATE alarm setpoint is exceeded, the alarm will (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. not clear until the ED is reset

2. clear when the dose rate drops below the alarm setpoint B. 1. not clear until the ED is reset

2. not clear until the ED is reset C. 1. automatically clear after 10 seconds

2. clear when the dose rate drops below the alarm setpoint D. 1. automatically clear after 10 seconds

2. not clear until the ED is reset Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 211 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 71 71 A General Discussion This information comes from NSD 507 (Radiation Protection). This is not taught during Generic Rad Worker Training. It is covered during Admin Procedure training in Operator License training.

Electronic Dosimeter (ED) Alarms ED Dose and Dose Rate Alarms - EDs are programmed during log-on to alarm at a predetermined dose and dose rate. The alarm setpoints are specified by the RWP. The alarm setpoints can be viewed during EDC log-on and they are also located on the RWP. Set points can also be viewed any time after logging on to EDC by pressing and holding the Dose/Dose Rate toggle switch on the ED for 10 seconds. The alarm setpoints and stay time will be displayed and then will automatically return to dose monitoring mode. The dose alarm consists of an audible alarm and a visual alarm. If the dose setpoint is exceeded the dose alarm will sound and a red light will flash on the ED. The audible alarm and the flashing red light will not stop until the ED is reset. The dose rate alarm automatically resets when the dose rate drops below the alarm setpoint. The ED display will indicate the type of alarm. The ED is also programmed to alarm when it is activated for 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months or when RWP specific stay time is exceeded.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part 2 is plausible because that is how the DOSE alarm works.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible because the 10 seconds is associated with using the DOSE/DOSE RATE toggle switch to view the alarm setpoints.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible because the 10 seconds is associated with using the DOSE/DOSE RATE toggle switch to view the alarm setpoints.

Part 2 is plausible because this is how the dose alarm works.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must be familiar with how the ED alarms works to be able to use an Electronic Dosimeter correctly.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2010 MNS NRC Q71 (Bank 2771)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

NSD 507 Section 507.6.3 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 212 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination Learning Objectives:

QUESTION 71 71 A OP-MC-RAD-RP Objective 38 GEN2.3 2.3.5 - GENERIC - Radiation Control Radiation Control Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc. (CFR: 41.11 / 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 213 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination GEN2.3 2.3.7 - GENERIC - Radiation Control QUESTION 72 72 C Radiation Control Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal orabnormal conditions. (CFR: 41.12 / 45.10)

A radiation worker is repairing a valve in a contaminated area, which has the following radiological characteristics:

The workers present exposure is 1938 MREM for the year

The RWP states:

o General area dose rate = 30 MREM/hr o Airborne contamination concentration = 10.0 DAC The job will take 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months if the worker wears a full-face respirator. It will only take 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months if the worker does not wear the respirator.

If the RP Manager grants all applicable dose extensions, which ONE (1) of the following choices for completing this job would maintain the workers exposure within the station administrative requirements and the principles of ALARA AND why is that action appropriate?

A. The worker must wear the respirator.

He will exceed DAC limits.

B. The worker must wear the respirator.

The calculated TEDE dose received will be less than if he does not wear one.

C. The worker should not wear the respirator.

The calculated TEDE dose received will be less than if he does wear one.

D. The worker should not wear the respirator.

The dose received wearing a respirator will exceed site annual personnel dose limits.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 214 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 72 72 C General Discussion Radiation exposure comparison:

Without respirator DDE = 30 mrem/hr x 1 hr = 30 mrem From airborne contamination: CEDE = 10 DAC 1 hr x 2.5 mrem/DAC-hr = 25 mrem TEDE = 30 + 25 = 55 mrem from job Total exposure for year = 1938 + 55 = 1993 mrem With respirator DDE = 30 mrem/hr x 2 hr = 60 mrem CEDE = 0 TEDE = 60 mrem Total exposure for year = 1938 + 60 = 1998 mrem (With respirator) (Without respirator)

TEDE = 60 mrem > 55 mrem = do not use a respirator Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not understand the concept of DAC-hours and DAC-hour limits.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant incorrectly computes the exposure. This was the correct answer on a previous exam.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant miscalculates the dose.

Basis for meeting the KA K/A is matched because the information given in the stem of the question would be provided on a room survey map. This information would then be used to comply with the associated RWP for the work being performed. This question represents the kind of evaluaton which could be encountered in order to comply with the requirements on an RWP.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a comprehension level question because the applicant must recall multiple pieces of information such as DAC hour conversion and Exposure limits. He must them perform a calculation and predict an outcome.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS RO Retake Q73 (Bank 2971)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

RP Policy III-07 Section 3.5 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-RAD-RP Objectives 22 & 29 GEN2.3 2.3.7 - GENERIC - Radiation Control Radiation Control Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal orabnormal conditions. (CFR: 41.12 / 45.10)

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 215 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination 401-9 Comments:

QUESTION 72 Remarks/Status 72 C Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 216 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination GEN2.4 2.4.2 - GENERIC - Emergency Procedures / Plan QUESTION 73 73 A Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions. (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is operating at 8% RTP Which ONE (1) of the following indications will result in entry into an emergency procedure? (Consider each indication separately)

A. Intermediate Range channel N-35 indicates 10-4 AMPS B. 1A NC Loop Flow 1NCP-5000 (Channel 1) indicates 90%

C. Pressurizer Level 1NCP-5160 (Channel 1) and 1NCP-5151 (Channel 2) indicate 100%

D. 1C S/G NR Level 1CFP-5560 (Channel 3) and 1CFP-5550 (Channel 4) indicate 82%

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 217 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 73 73 A General Discussion With power less than P-7 (10% RTP), one IR channel with AMPS indicating greater than 25% equivalent RTP (approximately 5.5 x E-5 Amps) will result in a reactor trip.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant incorrectly recalls the trip setpoint for NC loop flow or confuses it with the setpoint for the high PZR level trip. With power less than P-7 it would only take one loop flow channel less than the trip setpoint to cause a reactor trip.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because it would be correct if power was greater than P-7.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant incorrectly recalls the P-14 setpoint for S/G level. If S/G level was greater than 83% this would be correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must demonstrate knowledge of reactor trip setpoints which would result in entry into E-0.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must analyze the given conditions against each answer, recall from memory various Reactor trip setpoints and coincidences, and determine if the answers given meet the conditions to result in a reactor trip.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-E0 Objective 7 GEN2.4 2.4.2 - GENERIC - Emergency Procedures / Plan Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions. (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 218 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 73 73 A Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 219 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination GEN2.4 2.4.34 - GENERIC - Emergency Procedures / Plan QUESTION 74 74 D Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of RO tasks performed outside the main control room during an emergency and the resultant operational effects. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5

/ 45.13)

Given the following plant conditions:

Chlorine gas is entering the Control Room due to a dropped gas cylinder

AP-17 (Loss of Control Room) has been implemented In accordance with AP-17:

1) the Reactor Operator at the CA Pump panels is directed to control S/G WR levels between .

2) the reason for controlling S/G levels in this range is to .

A. 1. 80 - 90%

2. prevent S/G overfill B. 1. 55 - 65%

2. prevent S/G overfill C. 1. 80 - 90%

2. minimize cooldown of the NC system D. 1. 55 - 65%

2. minimize cooldown of the NC system Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 220 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 74 74 D General Discussion In accordance with AP-17 (Loss of Control Room) Symptoms (Entry Conditions):

SG W/R levels are maintained 55-65% as read at the CA Pump panels. SG W/R levels are maintained based on minimizing NC system cooldown.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because 80-90% is the W/R level that is maintained if S/G level is being maintained from the SSF.

The second part is plausible because S/G overfill is generally always a concern. However, for this particular situation NC system cooldown is the primary consideration.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because S/G overfill is generally always a concern. However, for this particular situation NC system cooldown is the primary consideration.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because 80-90% is the W/R level that is maintained if S/G level is being maintained from the SSF.

The second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of RO actions outside the Control Room (i.e. both facilities are manned by licensed operators), and the potential operational effect of not maintaining S/G levels within the band specified by AP-17.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

AP-17 (Loss of Control Room)

AP-24 (Loss of Plant Control Due to Fire or Sabotage)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-AP-17 Objective 1 OP-MC-AP-24 Objective 1 Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 221 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination GEN2.4 2.4.34 - GENERIC - Emergency Procedures / Plan QUESTION 74 74 D Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of RO tasks performed outside the main control room during an emergency and the resultant operational effects. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5

/ 45.13) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 222 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination GEN2.4 2.4.45 - GENERIC - Emergency Procedures / Plan QUESTION 75 75 C Emergency Procedures / Plan Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.12)

Unit 1 is being returned to full power following a refueling outage when the following annunciators are received in the Control Room:

1AD-4 / A1 (S/G A FLOW MISMATCH LO STM FLOW)

1AD-6 / E10 (LOOP D/T DEV)

1AD-6 / F1 (A NC PUMP LO FLO ALERT)

The Safety breaker AND the Feeder breaker for 1A NC pump indicate CLOSED

Reactor power remains at 55% RTP Based on the above conditions, which ONE (1) of the following actions is required to be performed?

A. Reduce reactor power to less than 48% and trip 1A NC pump.

B. Place the 1A S/G CF Control valve in Manual and reduce feed flow.

C. Manually trip the reactor and go to E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

D. Select Delta-T defeat for the affected loop per the Annunciator Response Procedure.

Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 223 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 75 75 C General Discussion The indications and annunciators presented are indicative of a NC Pump with a sheared shaft. Flow had been lost to the 'A' Loop and with reactor power > 48 % a reactor trip due to Lo Flow should have occurred.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because reducing power to less than 48% would place the unit less than the single loop low flow trip setpoint allowing the NC pump breakers to be opened without tripping the unit.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the Annunciator Response procedure for 1AD-4 directs the operators to place the CF Control valve in MANUAL to control flow.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the Annunciator Response procedure for 1AD-6 prior to the DCS mod (recent plant mod) directed the operators to defeat the affected Delta-T loop.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because the candidate is expected to take a given set of annunciators and indications to determine that a ATWS has occurred and determine the appropriate action required per Emergency Procedures. The candidate must both understand the significance of the alarms but also prioritize which require action. This is also the basis for this question reaching the Analysis cognitive level.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because the applicant is required to analyze the conditions given to determine the correct actions to be taken.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS NRC Q72 (Bank 3087)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan BNT-CP04R12 (Pumps)

Learning Objectives:

NONE GEN2.4 2.4.45 - GENERIC - Emergency Procedures / Plan Emergency Procedures / Plan Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.12) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 224 of 300

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2012 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 75 75 C Thursday, June 21, 2012 Page 225 of 300

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