PNP 2013-013, Response to Clarification Request - License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors

Response to Clarification Request - License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors

ML13079A090
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	02/21/2013
From:	Vitale A Entergy Nuclear Operations
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
PNP 2013-013
Download: ML13079A090 (81)

Text

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Palisades Nuclear Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043 Tel 269 764 2000 Anthony J Vitale Site Vice President PNP 2013-013 February 21, 2013 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

Response to Clarification Request - License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Palisades Nuclear Plant Docket 50-255 License No. DPR-20

References:

1. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. letter, PNP 2012-106, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors, dated December 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12348A455)

Dear Sir or Madam:

In Reference 1, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENO) submitted a license amendment request to adopt the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 performanced-based standard for fire protection for light water reactors.

On February 5, 2013, a conference call was held with the NRC to discuss clarification questions which were sent via electronic mail on February 4, 2013. A follow-up call was conducted with the NRC on February 6, 2013, to confirm the clarification questions and required response timeframe.

provides the ENO responses to the clarification questions.

A copy of this response has been provided to the designated representative of the State of Michigan.

This letter contains no new or revised commitments.

PNP 201 3-013 Page 2 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 21, 2013.

Sincerely, ajv471

Attachment:

1.

Response to Clarification Requests License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors cc:

Administrator, Region III, USNRC Project Manager, Palisades, USNRC Resident Inspector, Palisades, USNRC State of Michigan

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 1 of 79 A request for clarification was received from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), by electronic mail on February 4, 2013. Subsequent conference calls with the NRC on February 5, 2013 and February 6, 2013 were conducted to confirm the clarification questions and required response timeframe.

The Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENO) response is provided below.

NRC Request

1. Several critical review elements from the last full-scope fire PRA peer review were either incomplete or received a significant number of findings, indicating the fire PRA was not able to be fully reviewed by the peer review team. As such, a focused-scope peer review is needed for the following elements to support the close out of the licensee proposed dispositions/resolutions: FSS (Fire Scenario Selection), FQ (Fire Quantification), HRA (Human Reliability Analysis) and UNC (Uncertainty Analysis). A list of the findings includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the following: FQ-C1-01, HRA-A2-01, HRA-A3-01, HRA-A4-01, HRA-B3-01, HRA-C1-01, HRA-D2-01, HRA-E1-01, PRM-B11-01, CS-A9-01, CS-C1-01, FSS-B1-01, FSS-E3-01, FSS-H5-01, CS-B1-01, PRM-B3-02, PRM-B9-01, PRM-B5-01, FQ-A4-01, ES-A3-01 and UNC-A2-01.

ENO Response

1. Attachment V of the Palisades license amendment request (LAR), presents the cumulative results of three independent Peer reviews of the Palisades fire probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) model and supporting documentation; two in-process Peer reviews and one Final Peer review. The resulting findings and observations (F&Os), as written by the Peer review team, were presented verbatim in Attachment V. The Staff was concerned that the F&O descriptions imply several PRA elements were incomplete or received a number of findings indicating that they could not be reviewed. This document provides supplemental information to demonstrate that all applicable PRA high level requirements (HLR) were reviewed in detail by the Peer review team.

The Palisades Fire PRA Peer Review was evaluated in three phases against the requirements of ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Part 4 [15] by essentially the same personnel.

1. The first in-process Peer review (Phase 1) was conducted during the week of January 18th, 2010.

2. The second in-process Peer review (Phase 2) which included two NRC observers was conducted during the week of August 27, 2010.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 2 of 79

3. The final phase (Final) was conducted during the week of March 21, 2011.

The final report as described in paragraph two in Attachment V of the LAR, SCIENTECH document 17825-1, was released in July 2011.

The Peer review team consisted of subject matter experts from SCIENTECH, Edan Engineering, SAIC, and ABS Consulting; two of the team members were authors of NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities. The final report as described in paragraph two in Attachment V of the LAR, SCIENTECH document 17825-1 [16], describes the Phase 1, Phase 2 and Phase 3 (Final) findings.

The two in-process reviews were provided to assist Palisades in assessing the technical adequacy and to refine plans, if necessary, to ensure the technical requirements of the final fire PRA would meet the ASME/ANS PRA standard.

Although the in process reviews were not conducted on a completed fire PRA, the reviews were conducted in strict accordance with the standard. Not Met or Not Reviewed was assigned if tasks needed to meet the standard requirements were not complete, depending on the degree of completion. In addition, the in process reviews identified actions necessary to achieve as a minimum Category II, where deemed appropriate.

A Final Peer review, of selected technical elements, was deemed necessary to meet the intent of the standard. The final report [16] provides the results of the Final Peer review and the in-process Peer reviews for those technical elements sufficiently reviewed during the in process reviews. Findings and observations from in-process Peer reviews were revisited by the Peer review team, but the finding descriptions were not eliminated or revised due to time constraints. For example, a number of supporting requirements with associated findings in the final report were categorized as meeting CC II (capability category) or greater. In other cases, every element as required by the standard is met, however, a singular refinement or enhancement is found to be needed and hence a finding would result.

There were no changes in applied methodology from the conduct of the Final Peer review on March 21, 2011 to the formal LAR submittal release on December 12, 2012.

Table 1, below illustrates the overall results presented in the summary table from the final report [16]. These results show that 94 supporting requirements meet the ASME standard CC II or greater, 58 supporting requirements (SRs) were not met, 3 met category I, and 14 were classified as not applicable. Four SRs had a final status of not reviewed after the Final peer review; these are presented in Table 3.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 3 of 79 Additional information is provided in Table 2, below to illustrate during which Peer review phase F&Os were identified and reviewed, as well as summary information from the final report to clarify the teams conclusions for each ASME standard element in which a finding was noted. This table re-presents the information provided in LAR Attachment V, Table V-1, with the addition of three new columns, annotated in bold and italics, as shown below. The SR, Topic, Status, and Finding or Suggestion columns were not changed from Attachment V, Table V-1. The disposition description for several SRs was revised to clarify the basis for status of these requirements.

SR Initial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition Supplemental Information In the SR Initial Peer Review Status column, the status from when the supporting requirement (SR) was initially reviewed is provided.

In the SR Subsequent Peer Review Status column, the status from the Final Peer review for the SR is provided.

When a supporting requirement was categorized as not met this was the status at completion of the Final Peer review conducted during the week of March 21, 2011. If the supporting requirement was subsequently addressed prior to the LAR submittal in December 2012, it was categorized as closed in the status column (per the disposition discussion). In these cases the SR finding or suggestion has been fully addressed and the intent of Capability Category II has been met to properly support the LAR submittal.

In the Supplemental Information column, additional information is provided that supports the review for this supporting element was complete; especially if the F&O implies the work was not in a state that could be reviewed. This information was primarily obtained from the Summary of Review Results (Section 4) of the Final Peer review report [16].

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 4 of 79

Table1:SummaryofOverallResultsofthePalisadesFirePRAPeerReview NumberofSupportingRequirementsMeetingEachCapabilityCategory FirePRA Element NotMet Met CCI CCI/II CCII CCII/III CCIII Not Applicable (NA)

Not Reviewed (NR)

Total PP 1

8

3

12 ES 9

2

1

1 1

14 CS 4

9

1

1 1

16 QLS

6

1

7 PRM 10 5

1 4

20 IGN 2

9

1 1

2

15 QNS*

6

6 CF 1

1

1

3 HRA 6

1 3

1

1

12 SF 6

6 FQ 4

5

1

10 FSS 13 16

3 9

6 2

1

50 UNC 2

2 Total 58 62 3

3 12 11 6

14 4

173

%ofTotal 34%

36%

2%

2%

7%

6%

3%

8%

2%

%excluding NAorNR 37%

40%

2%

2%

8%

7%

4%

9%

3%

• Palisades did not perform quantitative screening so the requirements of QNS are not applicable

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 5 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)

Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation CSA401 (Suggestion)

Ifadditionalcablesareselected basedonSRCSA3,VERIFYthat theadverseeffectsduetofailure oftheselectedcablesare includedtheFirePRAplant responsemodel.

Closed TheFirePRAcabledatais maintainedintheSAFE softwareandanadjunct Excelspreadsheet.Thedata shouldbeintegratedintoa singledatasetwithinthe SAFEsoftwaretoensure properlongterm maintenanceoftheanalysis.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (met)

Suggestionclosedby documentationupdate.No impacttoNFPA805analysis.

CabledatafromtheadjunctExcel spreadsheethasbeenintegrated intotheSAFEdatabasetoensure longtermmaintenanceofthe analysis.

DuringthePhase1andPhase2reviews, thisSRwasclassifiedasNotMet DuringtheFinalPeerreviewinMarch 2011,additionalreviewsofthecable selectionelementwereconductedto assessresolutionofF&Osidentifiedduring theinprocessreviews.Thefindingsfrom Phase1andPhase2forthisSRwere resolvedandthissuggestionwasidentified duringthatreview.

PerthefinalScientechreport178251, Thecableselectionandlocationtaskis essentiallycomplete.Futureworkwill typicallyinvolveiterationstorefinethe FirePRA.

Specifically,thePhase1reviewidentified7 findingsand5suggestions.ThePhase2 Peerreviewmodified8F&Osandadded2 additionalsuggestions.TheFinalPeer reviewresultedin4findings,2suggestions, and1bestpractice;supportingthefactthe workhadtransitionedsatisfactorilyfrom thefirstinprocessPeerreview.

CSA901 (Finding)

INCLUDEconsiderationofproper polarityhotshortson ungroundedDCcircuits;requiring uptoandincludingtwo independentfaultscouldresultin adverseconsequences.

Open PLPhasconductedupdates totheoriginalcable selectiontoensuremultiple hotshortfailuresare identified.Itisnotevident thatthesupplemental analysisworkspecifically lookedforproperpolarity hotshortsonungrounded DCcircuits.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet)

Findingopen.Althoughthedata gatheringiscomplete,itwasnot fullyimplementedintothemodel usedfortheLAR.

CabledataforthePLPFPRAwas obtainedfromtwoseparate sources:theSAFEdatabaseand NEXUSspreadsheets.TheSAFE databasewaspopulatedwiththe originalPalisadesAppendixRcable AfindinginthisSRwasidentifiedduring thePhase1Peerreview.CableSelection elementsweresubsequentlyreviewedin thePhase2andFinalPeerreviews.The findinginthisareawasrevisedaspartof theFinalPeerreview,butremainsopenas someminornumericalchangesare anticipatedoncetheFirePRAmodelis updatedtoutilizethefullsetofcabledata maintainedinjustonelocation(SAFE).

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 6 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)

Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation data,thecabledatacollectedfor offsitepowercomponents,andthe initialsetofcomponentsselected forcableanalysisforthefirePRA.

Subsequenteffortswere performedtoanalyzeadditional components,refinepreviously collectedcabledataandtorevisit vintagedatausingmoderncriteria includingproperpolaritydchot shorts.

CSB101 (Finding)

ANALYZEallelectricaldistribution busescreditedintheFirePRA plantresponsemodelforproper overcurrentcoordinationand protectionandIDENTIFYany additionalcircuitsandcables whosefailurecouldchallenge powersupplyavailabilitydueto inadequateelectricalovercurrent protectivedevicecoordination Closed Theanalysisandreviewof electricalovercurrent coordinationandprotection hasbeeninitiatedbutisnot yetcomplete.Thefinal analysisshouldaddress coordinationforallFirePRA electricaldistributionbuses.

RefertoF&OCSC401fora relateddiscussionon documentationofthe coordinationandprotection analysis.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Palisadeshasdocumenteda completebreakercoordination studyforallbusesconsideredin thefirePRAasdescribedinEA APR95004,Ref(9).

Thefollowingmodificationswillbe performedtoresolvetheidentified ElectricalCoordinationChallenges:

ThecircuitbreakersinMCC 3buckets(Breakers52345 and52325)willbereplaced.

Replacementof,or supplementtheovercurrent protectioninDCdistribution panels,111,112,11A,21 1,212,and21Autilizing fusestoassurecoordination athigherfaultcurrents.

Replacementofthefuses ThisFindingwasnotedduringtheinitial Phase1Peerreview.Cableselection elementswereagainreviewedbythePeer reviewaspartofthePhase2andFinal Peerreviews,butthisfindinghadnotbeen resolved.Thebreakercoordinationstudy wassubsequentlycompletedand modificationsidentifiedtoresolvethe finding.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 7 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)

Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation currentlyinstalledinpanels servedbytheY01.

Adjustmentofthe breaker/relaysettingsin breakers152201,152115, 152108.

Plantmodificationswilladdressall buseswhereelectrical coordinationcouldnotbe demonstrated.NoimpacttoNFPA 805analysis.

CSC101 (Finding)

DOCUMENTthecableselection andlocationmethodology appliedintheFirePRAina mannerthatfacilitatesFirePRA applications,upgrades,andPeer review.

Open Thecableselectionand locationmethodologyis documentedinSection4 theModelDevelopment Report(0247070005.03) andassociatedappendices.

Themethodologyfor completedworkis documentedinamanner consistentwiththis supportingrequirement; however,themethodology forthesupplementalcable selectionreview (Attachment1)isnot formallydocumentedina mannerthatensures consistentinterpretationfor FirePRAapplicationsand upgrades.Additionally,the samplecablerouting verificationcheckisnot formallydocumentedinthe Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet)

Findingisopenbecausealthough thedataverificationiscomplete, theresultshavenotbeenfully implementedintothemodelused fortheLAR.

Section4oftheModel DevelopmentReport,Ref(3),has beenupdatedinamannerthat ensuresconsistentinterpretation ofFirePRAapplications.

Additionally,theverificationof AppendixRNonSafeShutdown CableRoutingtoSupporttheFire PRAhasbeenseparately documentedinPLPRPT1200134, Ref(10).

ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringthePhase 1Peerreview.TheCSC1supporting requirementwassubsequentlyreviewed duringboththePhase2andFinalPeer review.Thisfindingremainsopenassome minornumericalchangesareanticipated oncetheFirePRAmodelisupdatedto utilizethefullsetofcabledatamaintained injustonelocation(SAFE).

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 8 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)

Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation FirePRAReportoranyother plantdocument,andthus doesnotlenditselfto consistenttreatmentfor futureFirePRAapplications andupgrades.

CSC201 (Suggestion)

DOCUMENTcableselectionand locationresultssuchthatthose resultsaretraceabletoplant sourcedocumentsinamanner thatfacilitatesFirePRA applications,upgrades,andPeer review.

Closed AppendixFoftheModel DevelopmentReport(0247 070005.03)documentsthe processbywhichthecable datawascompiledand organizedforthePLPFPRA.

However,tofacilitateFPRA applications,upgrades,and Peerreview,the consolidatedcabledataset (combiningtheNexusand SAFEdatabases)shouldbe documentedinsucha format(includingsuch informationascableID, correspondingequipment ID,cablefunction,andcable faultconsequences,etc.)

thatprovidesendtoend datatraceability.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Thesourcesofthecabledataare documentedintheFirePRAModel DevelopmentReport,024707 0005.03,Ref(03).

ThisSRwascategorizedasNotMetbythe Phase1Peerreview.Thefindingwas revisedtoaSuggestionintheFinalPeer reviewandsubsequentlyresolvedby documentationprovidedintheModel DevelopmentReport.

CSC401 (Finding)

DOCUMENTthereviewofthe electricaldistributionsystem overcurrentcoordinationand protectionanalysisinamanner thatfacilitatesFirePRA applications,upgrades,andPeer Closed Unlikeotherelementsof thisTechnicalElement,the FirePRAReportdoesnot addressthemethodology, process,orcriteriaforthe electricalcoordinationand Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Palisadeshasdocumenteda completebreakercoordination studyforallbusesconsideredin AfindinginthisSRwasidentifiedduring thePhase1Peerreview.TheCSC1 supportingrequirementwassubsequently reviewedduringboththePhase2andFinal Peerreview.

ThefindingwasrevisedduringthePhase2

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 9 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)

Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation review.

protectionanalysis.This informationwillneedtobe includedinfinaldocuments tosatisfythissupporting requirement.

thefirePRAasdescribedinEA APR95004,Ref(9).

Peerreview,butremainedopenfollowing theFinalPeerreviewsasthebreakerco ordinationstudywasincomplete.

Subsequentlythisstudywascompleted andthefindingresolvedpriortotheLAR submittal.

ESA201 (Finding)

REVIEWpowersupply,interlock circuits,instrumentation,and supportsystemdependencies andIDENTIFYadditional equipmentwhosefireinduced failure,includingspurious actuation,couldadverselyaffect anyoftheequipmentidentified perSRESA1.

Closed Itisunclearatthispointif allinterlock/permissive circuitswhichmayleadto specificconsequentialIEs havebeenproperly capturedforthefunctions beingcreditedinthePRA.

Thismaybeparticularly importantwherethe functioncreditedinthe AppendixRanalysisis differentfromtheFirePRA, orautoactuationofthe componentisrequiredin thePRAbutnotinAppendix R.

Needtodocumentprocess bywhichallsupporting equipmentandinterlocks havebeenaddressed.The PRAteamappearsto recognizethisdeficiency existsatpresentandhave plansinplacestorectify onceallautoactuation modelingissuesare resolved.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

AcompletereviewofSafety InjectionSignal(SIS),Containment HighPressure(CHP),Containment HighRadiation(CHR),Containment IsolationSignal(CIS)and RecirculationActuationSignal (RAS)logicwasperformedto identifypotentialadverse componentactuationsthatcould occurduetoaspurioussignalfrom anyofthesesources.

Logicwasaddedfor45PRA componentstoconsiderspurious operationfromanyofthe automaticactuationcircuits.

Report0247070005.04,Ref(4),

wasupdatedtoreflectthese changes.

Theselogicchangeswere addressedpriortotheconductof Phase2.

ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring theFinalPeerreview.

ThefinalreportsummaryfortheES elementstates:

Extensivemodelingchangeshavebeen madetoexplicitlyrepresentbothrandom andfireinducedfailuresofinterlock circuits,instrumentationandassociated powersupplies.Whenthiseffortis completethemodelingofthisaspect shouldbeamongoneofthemost comprehensiveintheindustry.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 10 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)

Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation ESA301 (Finding)

INCLUDEequipmentwhosefire inducedfailure,notincluding spuriousoperation,contributes toorcauses (a)fireinducedinitiatingevents treatedintheFireSafe Shutdown/AppendixRanalysis (b)InternalEventsPRAinitiators asidentifiedusingtheIE requirementsinPart2(including anygradationsacrosscapability categoriesinthatstandard)as modifiedper42.5,or (c)uniquefireinducedinitiating eventsnotaddressedor otherwisescreenedfromthe abovetwoanalysesifSRIEC4in Part2cannotbemet Closed Thereviewofinitiating eventsconsideredinthe internaleventsanalysisis describedinReport0247 070005.03AppendixB.A rationaleforreexamining thescreeningprocessto identifynewIEswhichmay havebeenscreenedor subsumedinthatanalysisis discussed.Nonewinitiating eventsoradditional equipmentwereidentified.

However,thereview processundertakenisnot welldocumented.Itis unclear,e.g.,ifmultiple coincidentpathwayswere addressedwhenidentifying thesizeofLOCAthatmay beinducedbyfireandany potentialsuccesscriteria conflictswhichmayarisein themappingofthefire inducedIEtotheinternal eventsIE.(e.g.verysmall LOCA,SmallLOCAvs.

mediumLOCA).(Notethe sameconcernsarisewhen addressingthescreening processforContainment isolationpathwayswhere suchpathwayswere screenedonthesizeofa singlepathway.)

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

AppendixBofRef(3)wasupdated toprovideadditionaldetailasto howinitiatingeventswere screenedastotheirapplicability forfirescenarios.

Thesuccesscriteriafor consequentialLOCAeventsand theirassociatedpathwaysand sizeswereupdatedinSection5.0 ofnotebookNBPSAETSC,Ref (11).Theupdatednotebook detailsconsequentialLOCAevents thatmayresultfromfireincluding:

multipleprimarycoolantpump (PCP)sealfailures,demandsonthe pressurizersafetyvalves,and spuriousoperationofthereactor headventandletdownisolation valves.Additionaldetailwasalso addedtoreport0247070005.04, Ref(4),forthePCPsealfailures andchemicalandvolumecontrol system(CVCS)pathways.

Themodelingapproachfor containmentisolationpathways wasupdatedasdescribedin AttachmentDofEAPSAFPIEFIRE 1204,Ref(12).Consequential ISLOCAevents,potentiallycaused byfire,arespecificallyaddressed intheXFRISLOCAeventtree describedinSection5.6ofNBPSA ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring theFinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedbyfullydocumentingconsequential LOCAeventdevelopmentintheeventtree andsuccesscriterianotebookpriortothe LARsubmittal.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 11 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)

Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation ETSC,Ref(11).

ESA501 (Finding)

CONSIDERuptoandincluding twospuriousactuationsof equipmentaloneorin combinationwithotherfire inducedlossoffunctionfailures forthespecialcasewherefire inducedfailurescouldcontribute notonlytoaninitiatingeventbut alsosimultaneouslyeither (a)affectthe operability/functionalityofthat portionoftheplantdesigntobe creditedinresponsetothe initiatingeventintheFirePRA (b)resultinaninitiatingevent wherethemitigatingfunctionis notaddressedintheFireSafe Shutdown/AppendixRAnalysisor (c)resultinalossofreactor coolantsystemintegrity Closed AreviewoftheMSOreport 024707000504Appendix Afoundseveraldeficiencies.

Theseareindicatedbelow.

General:TheMSOpanel wasconvenedin2008.

Westinghousepublishedthe latestMSOreportinApril 2009[WCAPNP16933].

ThecurrentMSOreference numbersanddescriptionin AppendixAdonotmatch thelistinWCAPNP16933.

Therearesomenewissues whicharenotcoveredby thecurrentMSOpanel report.

Suggestafinalreconciliation oftheMSOpanelresults

[eitherwithanewpanel meetingorarewriteofthe report]withWCAPNP 16933.

PLP1,PLP2,PLP3:The MSOdescriptionsinthese WCAPissuesareintended forWestinghouseplants whichhave2diverse methodsofsealcooling.The MSOreportstatestheissue isnotapplicabletoPLP.

However,itisnecessaryto ensurethatallfailure combinationsoflossofCCW Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

TheMSOexpertpanelwas reconvenedon03/15/2011atthe Palisadessitetoaddressall additions,deletionsand/or changestotheMSOassessment thathaveoccurredduetopost expertpanelreviewsandin considerationofthemostcurrent informationavailablefromthe PWROGOwnersGroup.The resultsofthisexpertpanelreview aredocumentedin024707 0005.04,MultipleSpurious Operations,Ref(4).

PLP1,PLP2,andPLP3were updatedinreport024707 0005.04.PalisadesPCPsealLOCA modelhasbeenupdatedtobe consistentwiththelatestindustry guidance(WCAP15749P,Revision 1,Guidanceforthe ImplementationoftheCEOG ModelforFailureofRCPSeals GivenLossofSealCooling(Task 2083),CombustionEngineering OwnersGroup(CEOG),December 2008).Furtherdetailisprovidedin AppendixBof0247070005.04.

PLP10wasfinalizedas documentedin0247070005.04 ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring theFinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedbyincorporatingmodelinglogicand updatingtheMSOreportpriortotheLAR submittal.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 12 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)

Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation sealcoolingareincludedfor PLP.

PLP10:Resolutionnot final.;

PLP11:WCAPissue misunderstoodbyMSO panel.Issueisforclosureof bothRWSTsuctionvalves andisapplicabletoPLP.

Simultaneousspurious closureofCV3031and CV3057isthisissue.;

PLP12:Resolutionnotfinal PLP14:InWCAPNP16933, issue14isapplicableto Palisades.Issue14isCHP runoutwhenRCSis depressurized.Palisades needstolookatpump runoutpossibilityforall ECCS,CCW,AFW,andSWS pumps.;

PLP18:ResolutionforPLP 18statesRWSTmaydrain, whichisnotconsideredin PRA.IfRASoccursandCV 3029orCV03030opens, RWSTwillnotdrain, becauseofcheckvalvein sumpline.Other possibilitiesinvolving deadhead/NPSHofECCS pumpsarenotexplored.If 3029/3030openona Section5.10.ThePRAmodelwas updatedtoincludespuriousvalve failurestoaddressthisMSO.

PLP11iscorrectlyevaluatedin report0247070005.04Section 5.11.TheMSOpanelcorrectly understoodthescenario.

Simultaneousspuriousclosureof CV3031andCV3057doesnot isolatechargingsuctionfromthe SIRWTasthechargingsuctionis fromaseparatenozzle.Closureof thesevalvesisaddressedinMSO scenarioswhichimpactthe engineeredsafeguardspumps.

MSOscenarioPLP10considers spuriousisolationofcharging pumpsuctionvalves,including thosewhichwouldisolatecharging fromtheSIRWT.

TheresolutionofMSOscenario PLP12wascompletedinSection 5.12of0247070005.04.Spurious closureofMO2087duetofirewas addedtothePRAmodel.

EvaluationofPLP14wasupdated inSection5.14of024707 0005.04.Theevaluationnow describeshowthisscenariois addressedinthemodel.

MSOscenarioPLP18wasupdated.

Theevaluationdescribesmodel changesincorporatedtoexplicitly addressearlydraindownofthe SIRWTinthePRAmodelanddead

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 13 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)

Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation spurioussignal, CV3031/CV3057and CV3027/3056willreceivea signaltoclose.Poweris disabledto3027/3056.

Scenariosforinsufficient NPSHincludea)spuriousSI; b)openingof3029/3030;c) closureof3031/3057.

PossibilitiesforECCS deadheadinclude:a) spuriousSI;b)openingof 3029/3030;c)operator mistakenlyrestorespower to3027/3056[basedon falseinstruments]resulting indeadheadofECCSpumps.

PLP19:Needsfinal resolution; PLP27,PLP34,PLP35:MSO statesSGADVdoesnot needtobeincludedbecause overcoolingisnotanissue atPalisades.However,need toconsiderotheraffectsof SOADV,whichare:a)AFW pumprunout;b)FaultedSG maybeunsuitablefordecay heatremovalinthelong term[i.e..,notabletoraise steam].;c)Heatremovalis lessthaneffectiveand condensateinventory makeupisrequired.

PLP39:Needbetterreason headingoftheECCSpumps.

PLP19wasfinalizedperSection 5.19of0247070005.04.This scenarioinvolvesearlydraindown oftheSIRWTviacontainment sprayandisaddressedinthe resolutiontoscenarioPLP18.

ScenariosPLP27,PLP34,PLP35 wererevisedaddressaffectsother thancooldownduetoastuckopen atmosphericdumpvalve(ADV).

Thedirecteffectsofablowdown ofasteamgeneratoraremodeled explicitlyinthePRAintermsofthe impactonsteamsupplytothe turbinedrivenAFWpump.The resultingSIsignalalsohas potentiallynegativeeffectssuchas loadshedofbus1Eandisolationof thenoncriticalservicewater header(CV1359)andonthe shrinkandswellofthePCSwhich couldresultinapotentialdemand onapressurizersafetyvalve(ad describedinscenarioPLP42).

AppendixFwasaddedto024707 0005.04toevaluatethepotential forAFWpumprunoutonspurious fullopeningoftheAFWflow controlvalvestoadepressurized steamgenerator.

Additionalevaluationwas performedtoaddressMSO scenarioPLP39andaddedas AppendixGto0247070005.04.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation toexcludeblowdownvalves aspotentialflowdiversion ratesappeartobe significant.;

PLP43:Resolutionfor pressurizersprayvalves statesthatSOsprayvalve wouldleadtolossof subcooling.Lossof subcoolingwillleadtoSI signal.Spurioussprayvalve openingwillleadtoSIin[on theorderof]5minutes.

Sprayvalvespuriousshould beincludedinFirePRAas leadingtoSIsignal.

PLP45:Basiceventsfor pressurizerheaterscould notbefoundinCAFTAas indicatedintheresolution; PLP47:Resolutionnotfinal.

PLP57PLP58:Effectof spuriousoperationofload sequencersnotevaluated.

Possiblescenariosinclude1) failureofcablecauses spuriousloadshedon operatingbus,2)failureof cablecausesloadofDGon operatingbus.

PLP60,PLP80,PLP84:Need finalresolution.

General:Noindicationof searchforcontainment isolationfailurepathways Thisevaluationprovidesthebasis forexcludingtheblowdownvalves asapotentialflowdiversionpath.

Additionalevaluationwas performedtoaddressMSO scenarioPLP43andaddedas AppendixIto0247070005.04.

Thisevaluationprovidesthebasis forexcludingspuriousopeningof thepressurizersprayvalvesfrom thePRAmodel.

Itwasvalidatedthatthefaulttree referredtoinPLP45iscorrectly identifiedintheCAFTAmodel.

TheresolutionofPLP47was finalizedwiththeadditionof evaluationsinAppendicesNandO of0247070005.04todescribethe treatmentofborondilutionevents inthePRA.

MSOscenariosPLP57andPLP58 havebeenfinalizedand incorporatedintothePRAmodel asdescribedinSections5.57and 5.58of0247070005.04.

TheevaluationsforMSOscenarios PLP60,PLP80,andPLP84have beenfinalized.

Themodelingapproachfor containmentisolationpathways wasupdatedasdescribedin AttachmentDofEAPSAFPIEFIRE 1204,Ref(12).Consequential ISLOCAandcontainmentbypass

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation whichcancontributeto LERF.

events,potentiallycausedbyfire, arespecificallyaddressedinthe XFRISLOCAeventtreedescribedin Section5.6ofNBPSAETSC,Ref (11)

ESC101 (Finding)

IDENTIFYinstrumentationthatis relevanttotheoperatoractions forwhichHFEsaredefinedor modifiedtoaccountforthe contextoffirescenariosinthe FirePRA,perSRsHRAB1and HRAB2.

Closed Sincethefullcomplementof OMAstobeincludedinthe firePRAhasyettobe identifiedinstrumentsetis incomplete.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

Instrumentationrelevantto operatoractionsinfirescenarios wereidentifiedandvalidatedby completionofPostInitiator OperatorActionQuestionnaires(P IOAQ).

AcopyoftheHumanFailureEvent (HFE)PostInitiatorCalculation(P IC)andPIOAQwereprovidedto currentSROlicensedonshift OperationsDepartmentpersonnel andTrainingDepartment personnelforuseinvalidatingHFE informationaccuracy.

HFEswereassignedtoOperations DepartmentOperatingCrewsand

/orOperationstrainingpersonnel forreview.Theirreviewsincluded ensuringindications,procedure selectionanduse,andactivity performancemanpowerand timingiscorrect.Training personnelreviewsincluded ensuringprocedureselectionand usewereconsistentwithcurrent trainingexpectations,andthe ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring theFinalPeerreview.

WithrespecttothisSRtheFinalPeer reviewreportstates:

Theidentificationofinstrumentationto supportoperatoractionsofomission, carriedoverfromtheinternaleventsPRA model,iscompleteandcomprehensive.

Whileadditionalpostfirerecoveryactions maybeidentifiedduringtherefinementof thefirePRAmodel,itappearsunlikelythat significantadditionalinstrumentationwill beneededtosupporttheseactions.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation trainingtypeandfrequencyare accurate.

Thefinalsetofoperatormanual actions(OMA),recordsofthe currentoperatingcrews,and trainingpersonnelareprovidedin notebookNBPSAHR,Ref(13).

ESC201 (Finding)

IDENTIFYinstrumentation associatedwitheachoperator actiontobeaddressed,basedon thefollowing:fireinducedfailure ofanysingleinstrumentwhereby oneofthemodesoffailuretobe consideredisspuriousoperation oftheinstrument.andfire inducedfailure,including spuriousindication,evenifthey arenotrelevanttotheHFEsfor whichinstrumentationis identifiedwithinthescope definedbyESC1,ifthefailure couldcauseanundesired operatoractionrelatedtothat portionoftheplantdesign creditedintheanalysis.

Closed Instrumentswhichprovide supportingcuesfor operatoractionshavebeen identifiedandarebeing explicitlymodeledinthefire PRAtogetherwiththeir associatedpowersupplies

Undesiredoperatoractions potentiallyoccurringasa resultofspuriousplant monitoringandalarm instrumentsdonotappear tohavebeenaddressedat thepresenttime.Neither hasaprocessforidentifying, screeningandmodeling suchoccurrencesbeen discussed.Thisshouldbe addressed.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

Asimulatorexercisewas performedwithcurrentPalisades licenseholdersinwhichseveral scenarioswereevaluatedto determinehowOperatorswould respondgivenspuriousorfalse instrumentindications.Theresults oftheseexerciseswereconsidered intheHFEdevelopmentprocess.

Theprocessandevaluationresults aredocumentedinNBPSAHR,Ref (13).

ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring theFinalPeerreview.

WithrespecttothisSRtheFinalPeer reviewreportstates:

Phase2:Theidentificationofoperator actionsofcommissionarisingduetofire inducedspuriousalarmshasnotbeen completedasyet.Whilethisiscanbea fairlyextensiveeffortveryfewalarms typicallyremainunscreenedandrequire explicitmodeling.

Final:Extensiveefforthasbeenconducted.

Documentationisprogressing.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

ESD101 (Suggestion)

DOCUMENTtheidentified equipmentinamannerthat facilitatesFirePRAapplications, upgrades,andPeerreviewandis sufficienttosupporttheother Closed Plantspecificvalidationof therationaleforexcluding fireinducedfailureoftrip shouldbeprovidedunder Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet) 1 Suggestionresolvedby documentationandmodelupdate.

NoimpacttoNFPA805analysis.

MSOScenarioPLP38wasrevised ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation FirePRAtaskssothat (a)itisclearwhichequipment willbeassociatedwith determininginitiatingeventsin theFirePRAplantresponse modelforthepostulatedfires (b)theequipmentanditsfailures includingspuriousoperationor indicationcanbemodeled appropriately (c)cablesassociatedwiththe equipmentcanbeidentified (d)failuremodesofinterestfor theequipmentareclearsoasto supportcircuitanalysesif requiredJustificationsare providedwithregardto equipmentconsideredbut screenedoutoftheFirePRA includingwhenmeetingSRESA3 relevanttomeetingSRIEC4in Part2forinitiatingevents, meetingSRESB6forthe mitigatingequipmenttobe creditedintheFirePRA,and usingthe"exception"underSR ESC2forinstrumentation considerations.

MSOPLP38.

asdocumentedinSection5.38of 0247070005.04,Ref(4).ThePRA modelwasupdatedtoinclude spuriousoperationoftheAFW pumplowsuctionpressuretrips.

theFinalPeerreview.

Thesuggestionwasnotfullyresolvedfor theFinalPeerreview,butwas subsequentlyclosedpriortotheLAR submittal.

FQA401 (Finding)

QUANTIFYthefireinducedCDF inaccordancewithHLRQUAand itsSRsinPart2withthe followingclarification:

(a)quantificationistoincludethe fireignitionfrequency(perthe IGNrequirements)andfire Closed Manyoftheaccident sequencesinvolveaFire initiatorwhichgoesstraight tocoredamage[i.e..,there isnosuccesspath].This impliesasinglefireevent canfailbothtrainsofsafe Phase2 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

Recoveryactionsandproposed modificationshavebeen incorporatedintothefinalversion Thefireriskquantification(FQ)element wasreviewedindetailinboththePhase2 andFinalPeerreviews.

ThefindinginthisSRwasprovidedduring theFinalPeerreview.

WithrespecttotheFQelementtheFinal

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation specificconditionaldamage probabilityfactors(pertheFSS requirements)

(b)QUA4inPart2istobemet basedonmeetingHLRHRADin 42.10 and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRQUAin Part2.

shutdowncapability.The CDFistoohightoacceptso manyindividualsequences withnosuccesspath.There hasnotbeensufficient investigationdoneto indicatewhetherrecovery actionsaretrulynot possible,orsimplynot modeledyet.

ofthefirePRAmodel.Thefinal modelhasnosequenceswitha conditionalcoredamage probabilityof1.Resultsare describedinAppendixBof0247 070005.01,FireRisk QuantificationandSummary,Ref (1).

reportstates:

Overallprocessisconsistentwithprevailing goodpractices.Resultsarenotfinaland thuscertainSRscannotbedemonstrated tohavebeenmet.Continuingthe refinementinprocessandplannedprovides confidencethistechnicalelementwillmeet theStandard.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FQB101 (Finding)

PERFORMthequantificationin accordancewithHLRQUBand itsSRsinPart2 and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRQUBin Part2.

Closed QUB3requires demonstrationof acceptabletruncationvalue byaniterativeconvergence process.ThePLPfirePRA doesnothavethisprocess.

Althoughthereisno indicationthecurrent truncationvalueisnot acceptable,theconvergence processexercisewasnot done.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Theconvergenceprocessto determineacceptabletruncation limitsforthefinalfirePRAmodel weredocumentedinSection6of 0247070005.01,Ref(1).The truncationlevelsarebasedon convergencecalculationsperthe ASMEPRAstandard,whichstates thatconvergencecanbe consideredsufficientwhen successivereductionsintruncation valueofonedecaderesultin decreasingchangesinCDForLERF, andthefinalchangeislessthan 5%.

Thefireriskquantification(FQ)element wasreviewedindetailinboththePhase2 andFinalPeerreviews.

ThefindinginthisSRwasinitiallynoted duringFinalPeerreviewandsubsequently resolvedbydocumentingtheconvergence processtodetermineacceptable truncationlimits.

FQC101 (Finding)

ADDRESSdependenciesduring theFirePRAplantresponse modelquantificationin Open PRAdocumentNBPSAHR 1,Rev3providesanHEP dependencyanalysisand Phase1 (not reviewed)

Final (reviewed notmet)

Thisfindingisconsideredopen giventhattheprocedure development,modification Thefireriskquantification(FQ)element wasreviewedindetailinboththePhase2 andFinalPeerreviews.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation accordancewithHLRQUCand itsSRsinPart2 and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRQUCin Part2.

developsadjustmentfactors toapplytothecutsets.

MultipleHFE'sareevaluated fordependenciesusingthe EPRIHRAcalculator.

Dependencyadjustment factorsaredevelopedand appliedinthecutsets.

However,the"Q"model

[whichwasreviewed]does notincorporatethiswork.

ThereforetheF&Oandthe notmetassessment.

detaileddevelopment,and operationsreviewsareongoing.

Adependencyanalysiswas completedtoidentify combinationsofhumanfailure events(HFEs)inwhich dependenciesbetweenactions maycontributetoanincreasein coredamagefrequency(CDF) whencomparedtotheCDF calculatedwhenscreeningvalues forhumanerrorprobabilities (HEPs)areused.

Dependenciesbetweenactions wereassignedbasedonsequence specificevaluationsofcues,timing, location,andavailableresources, andtheHEPsadjustedifnecessary torepresentthelevelof dependence;theCDFwasthen recalculatedusingthemodified HEPs.HFEsnotexplicitlyevaluated fordependencewereassigned HEPsof1(i.e.,therepresented operatoractionsareassumedto failwithaprobabilityofunity),and thustheresultingCDFrepresents anupperboundforthepotential impactofdependenciesuponthe results.Sharedcuesconservatively assumed100%dependence.This approachhasidentifiedimportant HFEsforwhichthecompletionof detailedhumanreliabilityanalyses maybebeneficial.

ThisfindingremainsopenasdetailedHEPs cannotbedevelopeduntilupdated proceduresandmodificationdetailsare complete.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation ThefirePRAHRAdependency analysisisdocumentedinNBPSA HR,Ref(13).

Screeningvaluesarestillapplied forfireHEPspendingdevelopment offinalprocedures,modifications, andoperationsreviews.

FQE101 (Finding)

IDENTIFYsignificantcontributors inaccordancewithHLRQUD andHLRLEFandtheirSRsinPart 2withthefollowingclarifications:

(a)SRQUD5aandQUD5bof Part2aretobemetincluding identificationofwhichfire scenariosandwhichphysical analysisunits(consistentwiththe levelofresolutionoftheFirePRA suchasfireareaorfire compartment)aresignificant contributors (b)SRQUD5bofPart2istobe metrecognizingthat "component"inPart2is generallyequivalentto "equipment"inthisStandard (c)SRQUD3forcomparisonto similarplantsisnotapplicable (d)SRLEF3includingthe"Note" forthatSRofPart2istobemet (1)followingHLRQUDofPart2 withtheclarificationsabove concerningSRsQUD5aandQU D5b.

(2)buttheuncertainty Closed Thediscussionofdominant resultsisnotpresentedin the0247070005.01.The resultsarecategorizedand sortedintermsofthe dominantcontributors[as perFQE1],butthereisno discussionasrequiredby thisSR.

Phase1 (not reviewed)

Final (reviewed notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section6.0of0247070005.01, FireRiskQuantificationand Summary,Ref(1),wasrevisedto includeadiscussionofthe dominantresults.

Thefireriskquantification(FQ)element wasreviewedindetailinboththePhase2 andFinalPeerreviews.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation requirementandreferenceto Table22.76(e)inPart2does notapplyhere.See42.13.

and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderthese sectionsinPart2.

FSSA101 (Finding)

IDENTIFYallriskrelevantignition sources,bothfixedandtransient, ineachunscreenedphysical analysisunitwithintheglobal analysisboundary Closed ThetreatmentofMCC'sis notproperlyjustified.FSS document0247070005.06 includesthestatement"All MotorControlCenters (MCC)havebeentreatedas closed,sealedandrobustin whichdamagebeyondthe ignitionsourcewillnotbe postulated."No documentationof inspectionsoftheMCC's, includingthetopofthe cabinetshavebeen providedtojustifynot propagatingfiresoutside theMCC.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section6.1of0247070005.06, Ref(6),hasbeenrevisedtoinclude areferencetothewalkdown informationandphotographs whichprovideabasisforthis statement.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreviewandresolvedbysubsequent documentationupdate.

FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:

Significantprogresshasbeenmadein supportoftheFSStechnicalelements (Mathcad,detailedanalysisonareassuch asPAU4(1C);documentationisin progress).Thisprogressallowedthepeer reviewteamtoconductareviewofthefire scenarioselectionanalysis.

• AllsupportingrequirementsinFSShave beenreviewed,whichisevidenceofallthe workconductedoverthelastperiod.

• Theinconsistenciesidentifiedinearlier reviewshavebeengenerallyaddressed.

• Thecommentsgeneratedfromthis

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation reviewareforthemostpartdirectedto individualSRsandshouldnotimpactthe overalltechnicalstrategycurrentlyin placedtomeettheFSSrequirements.

FSSA301 (Finding)

Iftheexactroutingofacable(or groupofcables)hasnotbeen established(seeSRsCSA10and CSA11),ASSUMEthatthose cablesfailforanyfirescenario thathasadamagingeffecton anyracewayorconduitwhere thesubjectcablemight reasonablyexist.

Closed Theprocessofmappingand accountingfortargetsinthe FirePRAisnotdocumented.

Technicaldiscussionduring thereviewperiodindicates thattargetswithunknown routingaremappedtoall thescenarioswithinaPAU unlessithasbeenverified thatthetargetisnotina specificscenario.However, thisprocesswasnotclearly demonstratedduringthe reviewandisnot documentedinreport0247 070005.06.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Intheeventthatacablesplant locationcannotbeestablished,the processofcreditingbyassumed routingwasperformed.The processinvolveddetermining,with ahighdegreeofconfidence, locationsintheplantthatdonot containthecableinquestion.This isaccomplishedbyconsideringthe likelyroutingofacableandwas performedbyexperiencedplant personnel.Inmanycases,this assessmentwasmadebygrouping componentsintoanappropriate surrogatecategory(asdescribedin section5.3oftheModel DevelopmentReport#024707 0005.03,Ref(3)).Theresultsof thisdetailedassessmentare providedinAppendixIofthe ModelDevelopmentReport0247 070005.03.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSB101 (Finding)

DEFINEandJUSTIFYthe conditionsthatareassumedto causeMCRabandonmentand/or relianceonexcontrolroom Open ThecurrentFirePRAdoes notconsiderabandonment ofthemaincontrolroom duetolackof Phase1 (met)

Final (notmet)

Findingopen.Controlroom abandonmentscenarioswith respecttoenvironmentaleffects havebeenaddressed.However, DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation operatoractionsincluding remoteand/oralternate shutdownactions.

equipment/controldueto firedamage.

thecurrentmodeldoesnot specificallyidentifyscenariosthat resultinabandonmentdueto equipmentdamage.

requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Equipmentdamageleadingtocontrol roomabandonmentisaddressedinthe FirePRAmodel;however,thisfinding remainsopenpendingformaldevelopment ofthelistofequipmentwhosefireinduced damagecouldcausecontrolroom abandonment.Themodelincludeslogicat thecomponentlevelforoperationofkey equipmentoutsideofthecontrolroomas prescribedforcontrolroomabandonment suchaslocaloperationofequipmentatEC 150,andforotherlocalactionssuchas localcontrolofP8B.Thesesequencesare evaluatedforallscenarios,notonly scenarioswherethecontrolroom abandonmenteventtreeisemployed (controlroomevacuationduetosmokeor hightemperature).

FSSB201 (Finding)

SELECToneormorefire scenarios,eitherintheMCRor elsewhere,leadingtoMCR abandonmentand/orareliance onexcontrolroomoperator actionsincludingremoteand/or alternateshutdownactions, consistingofacombinationofan ignitionsource(orgroupof ignitionsources),suchthatthe selectedscenariosprovide reasonableassurancethatthe MCRabandonmentfirerisk Closed TheCCDPquantification doesnotreflectthehuman errorprobabilities associatedwithcontrol roomabandonmentandthe fireimpactedcablesmay notreflectthe equipment/controlthatmay ormaynotbeavailable afterabandonment.

Phase1 (reviewed met)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

MainControlroomabandonment scenarioshavebeenpostulated basedondamagetoequipment andcontrols.Postulatedfiresin theControlRoom(CR)havethe potentialtochallengehabitability orvisibilityduetosmoke generationorexcessiveheat.An abandonmentanalysis (Attachment1of0247070005.06, Afindingwasidentifiedduringtheinitial Peerreviewandmodifiedaspartofthe FinalPeerreview.Asindicatedthe identifiedissuewascorrected.Thisis consistentwiththePeerreviewteamfinal assessmentforFSSwhichindicated:

Thecommentsgeneratedfromthisreview areforthemostpartdirectedtoward individualSRsandshouldnotimpactthe overalltechnicalstrategycurrentlyinplace tomeettheFSSrequirements.

Thespecificconcerncitedbythepeer

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation contributioncanberealistically characterized.

Ref(6))wasperformedto determinetheresponseoftheCR envelopegivenarangeofpossible fireevents.Theanalysis consideredthreedifferent operatingstatesoftheCR mechanicalventilationsystemand threedifferentconfigurationsof theCRDoor.Basedonthis assessment,threescenarios,each involvingmultiplecabinets,were implementedintothemodel.

Humanactionsthatcouldnotbe performedpriortothetime controlroomabandonmentwas necessarywereconsideredfailed.

reviewteamduringthereviewwasthat onlyindividualcabinetfailureswere consideredforcontrolroomabandonment scenarios.Therevisedtreatment considersthreemultiplecabinetfailure groupswhichwhencombinedencompass allthecabinetsinthecontrolroom.

Thequantificationforthesethree scenariosreflectthehumanerror probabilitiesassociatedwithcontrolroom abandonmentandthefireimpactedcables thatarenotavailableafterabandonment.

FSSC301 (Suggestion)

JUSTIFYtheheatreleaserate profilestagesincludedinthe analysis(i.e.,firegrowth,steady burning,ordecaystages).

Closed Thesupportingrequirement statesthatthegrowth stagesincludedinthe analysisshouldbejustified.

Thejustificationisnot includedinthe documentation.

Phase1 (reviewed asnot applicable)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis TheModelDevelopmentReport, Ref(3),wasrevisedtoincludea discussionofthetreatmentforthe growthstagesofafiresheat releaserate.

DuringPhase1fireburnouttimesappear nottobeafactoraffectingtheanalysis results.

SubsequenttothePhase1review,thefire growthstageswereappliedintheanalysis.

Hence,thePhase1notapplicable determinationchangedtoamet, satisfyingcapabilitycategoryII/III.

ThissuggestionwasclosedpriortotheLAR submittal.

FSSC401 (Finding)

Ifaseverityfactoriscreditedin theanalysis,ENSUREthat (a)theseverityfactorremains independentofother quantificationfactors Closed Theseverityfactorfor hotworkfiresof0.01isnot properlyjustified.The documentationdoesnot provideadescriptionhow Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

The0.01severityfactorfor hotworkisnolongerappliedin DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation (b)theseverityfactorreflectsthe fireeventsetusedtoestimate firefrequency (c)theseverityfactorreflectsthe conditionsandassumptionsof thespecificfirescenariosunder analysis,and (d)atechnicalbasissupporting theseverityfactors determinationisprovided thevaluewascalculated andanexplanationofwhy thevalueremains independentofthegeneric ignitionfrequency.

finalfirePRAmodel.Severity factorsarenowbasedon NUREG/CR6850.Section8.3of 0247070005.06,Ref(6),was updatedtoreflectthischange.

FinalPeerreview.

ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreviewandresolvedbysubsequent documentationandmodelupdate.

FSSC501 (Finding)

JUSTIFYthatthedamagecriteria usedintheFirePRAare representativeofthedamage targetsassociatedwitheachfire Closed Noscenarioisevaluatedfor conditionswherethetarget damagecriteriaisthatof sensitiveelectronics.

Phase1 (reviewed met)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section5.2of0247070005.06, Ref(6),wasrevisedtoprovide furtherbasisforexcluding scenarioswiththesensitive electronicscriteria.Theexclusion isbasedprimarilyonphysical cabinetdistancesfromfireignition sourcesandthatthesetargetsare generallywithinanenclosurethat providessomeprotectionfromthe heatsource.

ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreview.Asindicatedtheidentified issuewascorrected.Thisisconsistent withthePeerreviewteamfinal assessmentforFSSwhichindicated:

Thecommentsgeneratedfromthisreview areforthemostpartdirectedtoward individualSRsandshouldnotimpactthe overalltechnicalstrategycurrentlyinplace tomeettheFSSrequirements.

FSSC701 (Finding)

Ifmultiplesuppressionpathsare credited,EVALUATEand PROPERLYMODELdependencies amongthecreditedpaths includingdependencies associatedwithrecoveryofa failedfiresuppressionsystem,if suchrecoveryiscredited.

Closed Noevaluationof independenceof suppressionpathshasbeen includedintheanalysis.

Phase1 (reviewed asnot applicable)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section10.1of0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasrevisedtodescribethe treatmentofdependencebetween suppressionpathsinthescenario Suppressioncapabilitieswereinitiallynot credited.

Subsequentanalysisidentifiedthe treatmentofdependencebetween suppressionpathsinthescenario suppressioneventtreeasdescribedinthe dispositioncolumn.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation suppressioneventtree.

FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSC801 (Finding)

Ifracewayfirewrapsare

credited, (a)ESTABLISHatechnicalbasis fortheirfireresistancerating, and (b)CONFIRMthatthefirewrap willnotbesubjecttoeither mechanicaldamageordirect flameimpingementfromahigh hazardignitionsourceunlessthe wraphasbeensubjectto qualificationorotherproofof performancetestingunderthese conditions.

Closed Thereportdoesnotdiscuss thetreatmentoffire barrierscreditedinthe analysis.

Phase1 (reviewed asnot applicable)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Documentationwasaddedto Section2.2ofreport024707 0005.02,Ref(2),whichdiscusses thetreatmentoffirebarriers creditedintheanalysis.Creditfor racewayfirebarriers,thermal wrapsorotherlocalizedprotection featureshavenotbeencreditedin identifyingaphysicalanalysisunit.

Additionally,ascanbenotedinthe FireScenarioDevelopmentReport (0247070005.06,Ref(6)),no creditistakenforthepresenceof racewayfirewraps.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSD101 (Finding)

SELECTappropriatefiremodeling toolsforestimatingfiregrowth anddamagebehaviorconsidering thephysicalbehaviorsrelevantto theselectedfirescenarios.

Closed Althoughingeneral appropriatefiremodels havebeenselected,the justificationfortheuseof theselectedtoolsneedsto beimproved.Thisfindingis specificallyapplicabletothe useofthetimetodamage modelsprogrammedin MathCAD,whichare calculationsthathavenot beendocumentedand Phase1 (reviewed met)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

AppendixEof0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasupdatedtoincludefurther discussionontheapplicabilityof theMathCADtoolforcalculation ofthenonsuppressionprobability.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation reviewedbytheindustry.

FSSD201 (Finding)

USEfiremodelsthathave sufficientcapabilitytomodelthe conditionsofinterestandonly withinknownlimitsof applicability Closed Nofiredetectionanalysis hasbeenconductedin supportoftheactivationof fixedsuppressionsystemsor thetimetosmoke detection.

Phase1 (reviewed met)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section10.1of0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasrevisedtodescribethe treatmentofautomatic suppressionsystemactivation timesonthesuppression probability.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSD401 (Finding)

ESTABLISHatechnicalbasisfor firemodelingtoolinputvalues usedintheanalysisgiventhe contextofthefirescenarios beinganalyzed.

Closed Thisfindingisassociated withtreatmentoftransient fires.1)Fireelevationfor transientfireshasbeen assumedtobeonthefloor.

2)theheatreleaseratefor transientfireshavebeen assumedtobecharacterized byelectricmotorfires.

Theseareimportantinput valuesfordeterminingzone ofinfluence.

Phase1 (reviewed met)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section7.0of0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasrevisedtodescribethe treatmentoffireelevationand heatreleaseratefortransient fires.Thetransientheatrelease ratewasincreasedto317kW;98th percentileheatreleaseratefor transientcombustibles,inlieuof thevalueforelectricmotorfires.

ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreview.Asindicatedtheidentified issuewascorrected.Thisisconsistent withthePeerreviewteamfinal assessmentforFSSwhichindicated:

Thecommentsgeneratedfromthisreview areforthemostpartdirectedtoward individualSRsandshouldnotimpactthe overalltechnicalstrategycurrentlyinplace tomeettheFSSrequirements.

FSSD701 (Finding)

Increditingfiredetectionand suppressionsystems,USEgeneric estimatesoftotalsystem unavailabilityprovidedthat (a)thecreditedsystemis installedandmaintainedin accordancewithapplicablecodes Closed Itemsa,b,andcintheCatII requirementarenot explicitlyaddressinthe analysis.

Phase1 (reviewed metCCI)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section10.1of0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasrevisedtodescribethe basisforavailabilityofautomatic DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation andstandards (b)thecreditedsystemisina fullyoperablestateduring plantoperation,and (c)thesystemhasnot experiencedoutlierbehavior relativetosystemunavailability suppressionsystemsandthe impactonsuppressionprobability, includingadiscussionofoutlier behavior.

Peerreviewandresolvedbysubsequent documentationupdate.

FSSD801 (Finding)

INCLUDEanassessmentoffire detectionandsuppression systemseffectivenessinthe contextofeachfirescenario analyzed.

Closed TheFirePRAcurrentlydoes notincludeanassessment oftheeffectivenessofthe firesuppressionand detectionsystemscredited intheanalysis.

Phase 1(reviewed not applicable)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section10.1of0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasrevisedtoprovidean assessmentoftheeffectivenessof automaticsuppressionsystems andtheimpactonsuppression probability.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSE301 (Finding)

PROVIDEameanvalueof,and statisticalrepresentationof,the uncertaintyintervalsforthe parametersusedformodeling thesignificantfirescenarios.

Open Aqualitative characterizationofthe parametersusedinthefire modelinginsignificantfire scenarioshavenotbeen completedastheFirePRA stillneedsdetailedanalysis toreducetheplantCDF.

Thequalitativediscussion requiredtomeetcategory1 shouldbecompletedonce keyscenariosareidentified.

Phase1 (reviewed metCCI)

Final (notmet)

Findingopenasthe characterizationhasnotbeen completed.NoimpacttoNFPA 805analysisastheresultsare basedonthepointestimatevalues whichapproximatethemean values.

Acharacterizationofthe parametersusedinthefire modelinginsignificantfire scenarioshasnotbeencompleted.

However,itisnotexpectedthat refinementoftheparameter uncertaintyintervalswillimpact thefirePRAconclusions.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreviewandremainsopen,butas indicatedthisfindingdoesnotimpactthe pointestimatevaluesusedintheNFPA805 analysis.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation FSSF101 (Finding)

DETERMINEifanylocations withintheFirePRAglobal analysisboundarymeetbothof thefollowingtwoconditions:(a) exposedstructuralsteelis present(b)ahighhazardfire sourceispresentinthatlocation andIfsuchlocationsare identified,SELECToneormore firescenario(s)thatcould damage,includingcollapse,the exposedstructuralsteelforeach identifiedlocation.

Closed Thereport024707 0005.08,whichdocuments structuralsteelanalysis, doesnotdescribewhatisa "highhazardfire".

Consequently,itisnotclear whatspecificfireswhere consideredashighhazard duringthewalkdownsand analysistoconcludethata scenarioshouldbe quantifiedintheanalysis.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Thedefinitionofasignificantfire hazardwasaddedtoSection2.0of theExposedStructuralSteel AnalysisReport,0247070005.08, Ref(8):Thefollowingdetailshave beenaddedtothetothereport, Forthepurposesofthisanalysis, asignificantfirehazardwas definedashavingatleastthesame orgreatercombustibleloading equivalentto50gallonsoffueloil, whichisinexcessofaheatvalueof 7E+6BTU[5].

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSF201 (Finding)

If,perSRFSSF1,oneormore scenariosareselected, ESTABLISHandJUSTIFYcriteria forstructuralcollapseduetofire exposure.

Closed Thecriteriaforidentifying andanalyzingfirescenarios associatedwithdamageto structuralsteelisnotclearly documented.Thecriteria utilizedhasbeeninferred fromtheanalysisandis consideredappropriate.

Thecriteriaincludes1) possibilityofahighhazard fire,2)exposedstructural steel,and3)asteel temperatureof1000F.

Phase1 (reviewed metCCI)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Theappropriatecriteriaforfire damagetostructuralsteelwere addedtoSection3.0ofthe, ExposedStructuralSteelAnalysis Report,0247070005.08,Ref(8).

Thefollowingcriteriaguidelines havebeenaddedto1)Presence ofsignificantfirehazard(Section 2.0),2)Presenceofexposed structuralsteel,3)SteelSurface temperatureinexcessof1000°F forfireconfigurationtoclearly documentthecriteriausedfor DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation identifyingandanalyzingfire scenariosassociatedwith structuralsteeldamage.Theone thousanddegreecriteriais consistentwiththestatement providedinReference2ofthe StructuralSteelAnalysisfrom NIST,FireProtectionofStructural SteelinHigh-RiseBuildings..

FSSF301 (Finding)

If,perSRFSSF1,oneormore scenariosareselected, COMPLETEaquantitative assessmentoftheriskofthe selectedfirescenariosina mannerconsistentwiththeFQ requirements,includingcollapse oftheexposedstructuralsteel.

Closed Thefourscenariosselected forevaluationhavebeen screenedandthereforenot includedintheCDF calculationfortheplant.

Thescreeningprocessfor oneofthescenariosis basedonthefrequencyof suchanevent(PAU23, turbinegeneratorfire).The calculatedfrequencyisnot basedonfireignition frequenciesdocumentedin currentFirePRAEPRI guidance.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section3.2.2oftheStructuralSteel AnalysisReport,Ref(8),was revisedusingthefrequencies foundinNUREG/CR6850(Vol.2) andEPRITR1016735tocalculatea newturbinegenerator catastrophicfirefrequencyof 3.13E6/yrand1.59E6/yr, respectively.SiteSpecific frequenciesdocumentsintheFIF andPlantPartitioningReport0247 070005.02,Ref(2),were implementedinthequantitative assessmentoftheFPRA.

Quantitativecalculationsand factorsappliedarealso documentedinsection3.2.2ofthe StructuralSteelReport.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSG201 (Finding)

DEFINEscreeningcriteriafor multicompartmentfirescenarios thatprovidereasonable Closed Elementsofthequalitative criteriarequirefurther evaluation.Specifically, Phase1 (not reviewed)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation assurancethatthecontribution ofthescreenedphysicalanalysis unitcombinationsareoflowrisk significance.

"exposingPAUisoutdoors; noHGLpostulated"and "exposedPAUhasa sufficientvolumethatany hotgasesthatmayenter PAU woulddissipatebefore significantdamagewould occur."Intheformer,the qualitativeassessment shouldincludeadiscussion ofyardtransformerfires nearturbinebuildingwalls.

Inthelater,assessmentof hotgaslayerconditions shouldbequantitatively addressed.

ThescreeningcriteriainTable31 of0247070005.07,Multi CompartmentAnalysis,Ref(7),

wererevisedtoadddiscussionof outdoortransformersnearturbine buildingwallsandhotgaslayer.A quantitativedefinitionfor sufficientvolumewasalso provided.Thislattercriterionis onlyappliedintwoareaswhereit wassubsequentlyverifiedthata hotgaslayercouldnotforminless than60minutes.

assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSG202 (Finding)

DEFINEscreeningcriteriafor multicompartmentfirescenarios thatprovidereasonable assurancethatthecontribution ofthescreenedphysicalanalysis unitcombinationsareoflowrisk significance.

Closed Thequantitativescreening criteriadonotinclude considerationforthe cumulativeriskscreened outduetomulti compartmentcombinations.

Currently,multi compartmentsarescreened atathresholdof1E7,but thereisnoverificationof thecumulativerisk screened.

Phase1 (not reviewed)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

RevisedSection3.5of024707 0005.07,MultiCompartment Analysis,Ref(7),todescribethe cumulativeimpactofCDF screeningat1E7.ThetotalCDF impactfromthescreenedareasis alsolessthan1E7/yr.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSG401 (Finding)

Ifpassivefirebarrierswithafire resistanceratingarecreditedin theFirePRA (a)CONFIRMthattheallowed Closed TheSRrequires confirmationofallowed credit,assessmentof effectivenessandreliability, Phase1 (not reviewed)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

RevisedAppendixAof024707 DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation creditisconsistentwiththefire resistanceratingas demonstratedbyconformanceto applicableteststandards (b)ASSESStheeffectiveness reliability,andavailabilityofany passivefirebarrierfeature credited,and (c)EVALUATEthepotentialfor fireinducedorrandomfailureof creditedpassivefirebarrier features andevaluationofrandom failuresofpassivebarriers.

Noanalysishasbeen presentedordocumented addressingthese requirements.

0005.07,Ref(7),todescribethe applicabilityandbasisforthe randomfailureprobabilityof passivefirebarriersfrom NUREG/CR6850usedinthemulti compartmentanalysis.

requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSG501 (Finding)

Foranyscenarioselectedper FSSG3,iftheadjoiningphysical analysisunitsareseparatedby activefirebarrierelements, QUANTIFYtheeffectiveness, reliability,andavailabilityofthe activefirebarrierelement.

Closed TheSRrequires quantificationof effectiveness,reliabilityand availabilityoftheactivefire barriers.Noanalysishas beenpresentedor documentedaddressing theserequirementsin additionofusingthegeneric valuesinNUREG/CR6850.

Phase1 (not reviewed)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

RevisedAppendixAof024707 0005.07,Ref(7),todescribethe applicabilityandbasisforthe randomfailureprobabilityofactive firebarriersfromNUREG/CR6850 usedinthemulticompartment analysis(MCA).Table34ofthis documentreflectsthe quantificationofMCAinteraction failures.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSG601 (Suggestion)

QUANTIFYtheriskcontribution ofanyselected multicompartmentfirescenarios inamannerconsistentwiththe FQrequirements.

Closed LERFresultsarenot reportedinthemulti compartmentanalysis report,buttheyhavebeen calculated.

Phase1 (not reviewed)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Updatedreport0247070005.07, Ref(7),toreporttheLERFresults fromthefinalfirePRAmodelin Section4.0ofthemulti DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thesuggestionwasnotfullyresolvedfor theFinalPeerreview,butwas

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation compartmentanalysis.

subsequentlyclosedpriortotheLAR submittal.

FSSH201 (Finding)

DOCUMENTabasisfortarget damagemechanismsand thresholdsusedintheanalysis, includingreferencesforany plantspecificortargetspecific performancecriteriaappliedin theanalysis.

Closed Thetreatmentofhydrogen firesisincorrectly documentedinreport0247 070005.06.

Phase1 (metCCI)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Thedocumentationfortreatment ofhydrogenfiresinreport0247 070005.06,Ref(6),wasupdated tobeconsistentwithapproach appliedinthefiremodelwhich complieswithAppendixNof NUREG/CR6850.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

ThefindingwasclosedtomeetCCIIprior totheLARsubmittal.

FSSH501 (Finding)

DOCUMENTfiremodelingoutput resultsforeachanalyzedfire scenario,includingtheresultsof parameteruncertainty evaluations(asperformed)ina mannerthatfacilitatesFirePRA applications,upgrades,andPeer review.

Closed TheFirePRAisinprocess.

Firemodelingresultsarenot complete.Documentation ofoutputresultsshouldbe consistentwithcurrent approachforscenarios analyzedwhilethefirePRA iscompleted.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Thefinalfiremodelingoutput resultsforeachanalyzedfire scenarioweredocumentedin Section6.0ofreport024707 0005.01,Ref(1).Additionally, Section7.1ofRef(1)wasrevised toincludeastatistical representationoftheuncertainty intervalsusedformodelingthe significantfirescenariosfromthe finalfirePRAmodel.

ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreviewbecauseadditional refinementswerestillanticipatedfollowing theFinalPeerreview.Asindicatedbythe metstatus,however,theformatofthe existingresultsdiscussionwasacceptable.

FSSH901 (Finding)

DOCUMENTkeysourcesof uncertaintyfortheFSStechnical element.

Closed Sourcesofuncertaintyin thefiremodelinganalysis arenotdocumentedin 0247070005.06.

Phase1 (not reviewed)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Sourcesofuncertaintyinthefire scenarioselectionprocesswere Thissupportingrequirementwasnot reviewedduringthePhase1Peerreview asthemodelprogresswasnotsufficiently complete.Thisfindingwasidentified duringtheFinalPeerreview,butwas

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation documentedinreport024707 0005.01,FireRiskQuantification andSummary,Ref(1).

subsequentlyaddressedpriortotheLAR submittal.

HRAA201 (Finding)

Foreachfirescenario,IDENTIFY anynewfirespecificsafe shutdownactionscalledoutin theplantfireresponse procedures(e.g.,deenergizing equipmentperafireprocedure foraspecificfirelocation)ina mannerconsistentwiththe scopeofselectedequipment fromtheESand PRMelementsofthisStandard, andinaccordancewithHLRHRE anditsSRsinPart2withthe followingclarifications:

(a)whereSRHRE1discusses procedures,thisistobe extendedtoproceduresfor respondingtofires (b)whereSRHRE1mentions"in thecontextoftheaccident scenarios,"specificattentionisto begiventothefactthatthese arefirescenarios (c)anothersourceforSRHRE1is likelytobethecurrentFireSafe Shutdown/AppendixRanalysis and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRHREin Closed Theidentificationoffire responseactionsisnotyet complete.Additionalfire safeshutdownactionsare stillbeingidentifiedasthe FirePRAanalysiscontinues toberefined.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

Thefinalidentificationoffire responseactionswascompleted anddocumentedinnotebookNB PSAHR1,Ref(13).Theseactions wereincorporatedintothefinal firePRAmodelwhereappropriate.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation Part2.

HRAA301 (Finding)

Foreachfirescenario,IDENTIFY anynew,undesiredoperator actionthatcouldresultfrom spuriousindicationsresulting fromfailureofasingle instrument,perSRESC2(e.g.,

duetoverbatimcompliancewith theinstructioninanalarm responseprocedure,when separateconfirmationisnot availableorrequired).

Closed Section6.3oftheHRA Notebookdiscussesthe reviewthatwasperformed withthelicensedoperators fortheidentificationofthe new,undesiredoperator actionsinresponseto spuriousindications.

However,thedetailed documentationforthe evaluationprocessandthe justificationsforthe conclusionthatno undesiredoperatoractions willbetakeninthese instrumentationfailure conditionswasnotyet completedforthereviewers toconfirmtheconclusion thatnoundesiredoperator actionsneedtobe considered.

Phase1 (metCCI)

Final (metCCI) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

Asimulatorexercisewas performedwithcurrentPalisades licenseholdersinwhichseveral scenarioswereevaluatedto determinehowOperatorswould respondgivenspuriousorfalse instrumentindications.Theresults oftheseexerciseswereconsidered intheHFEdevelopmentprocess.

Theprocessandevaluationresults aredocumentedinNBPSAHR,Ref (13).

DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

HRAA401 (Finding)

TALKTHROUGH(i.e.,reviewin detail)withplantoperationsand trainingpersonnelthe proceduresandsequenceof eventstoconfirmthat interpretationoftheprocedures relevanttoactionsidentifiedin SRsHRAA1,HRAA2,andHRAA3 isconsistentwithplant operationalandtraining Open Asthefirescenario refinementcontinues, additionalfireresponse actionswillbeidentifiedand evaluated,whichwill requiretheperformanceof additionaloperator interviews.Assuch,thistask isnotfullycompletedyet.

Also,operatorinterviewsfor Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet)

Findingopen,giventhatthe procedures,modificationdetail, operationsreview,anddetailed HRAmodeldevelopmentarenot yetcomplete.

AcopyoftheHumanFailureEvent (HFE)PostInitiatorCalculation(P IC)andassociatedPostInitiator OperatorActionQuestionnaire(P IOAQ)wereprovidedtocurrent DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

thecompletedportionoftheHRA

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation practices.

thosefireresponseactions thatarestillusingscreening values(e.g.,ACPDGOTB5B DG,ACPPMOE38311A, ACPPMOE38312A,AFW PMOAP8BCRAB,etc.)may nothavebeencompleted.

(Note:SpecificHEPbasic eventidentifierscitedbythe Peerreviewteammayhave beensubsequentlyrenamed orremovedfromthemodel aspartoftheF&O resolutionprocess.)

SROlicensedonshiftOperations Departmentpersonneland TrainingDepartmentpersonnelfor useinvalidatingHEPinformation accuracy.

HFEswereassignedtoOperations DepartmentOperatingCrewsand

/orOperationstrainingpersonnel forreview.Theirreviewsincluded ensuringindications,procedure selectionanduse,andactivity performancemanpowerand timingiscorrect.Training personnelreviewsincluded ensuringprocedureselectionand usewereconsistentwithcurrent trainingexpectations,andthe trainingtypeandfrequencyare accurate.

Operatorcommentswere reviewedanddiscussedwithPRA personnelandproposed resolutionsforwardedtothe commentinitiatorforfurther commentoracceptance.Comment acceptanceisdocumentedbytheir initialingtheHFEValidationform.

SignificantHFEswereevaluated anddevelopedinfurtherdetail.

Screeningvaluesarestillapplied forfireHEPspendingdevelopment offinalprocedures,modifications, andoperationsreviews.

Therecordsofthecurrent operatingcrewsandtraining assessment.

Thisfindingremainsopenasindicatedin theDispositioncolumn.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation personnelareprovidedin notebookNBPSAHR,Ref(13).

HRAB201 (Finding)

INCLUDEnewfirerelatedsafe shutdownHFEscorrespondingto theactionsidentifiedperSRHRA A2intheFirePRAplantresponse modelinamannerconsistent with42.2andSection42andin accordancewithHLRHRFandits SRsinPart2and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRHRFin Part2.

Closed Identificationofnew,fire responseactionsand incorporationofthe identifiedfireresponse actionsintotheFirePRA modelarenotcompleted.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

Thefinalidentificationoffire responseactionswascompleted anddocumentedinnotebookNB PSAHR1,Ref(13).Theseactions wereincorporatedintothefinal firePRAmodelwhereappropriate.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

HRAB301 (Finding)

COMPLETEthedefinitionofthe HFEsidentifiedinSRsHRAB1 andHRAB2byspecifyingthe following,takingintoaccountthe contextpresentedbythefire scenariosintheFirePRA:

(a)accidentsequencespecific timingofcues,andtimewindow forsuccessfulcompletion (b)accidentsequencespecific proceduralguidance(e.g.,AOPs, EOPs)

(c)theavailabilityofcuesor otherindicationsfordetection andevaluationerrors (d)thespecifichighleveltasks Open Theimpactoflossofall redundant/diverse instrumentationonHEPs hasbeenmodeledbyORing theinstrumentationlogic withitsassociatedHEP.

Thus,incaseswheretotal instrumentfailure(by hardwarefaultorfire) occurs(includingthefailure oftheonlyinstrument available),theHEPis appropriatelyfailed.

However,thefailureimpact ofpartialinstrumentation onanHEPhasnotyetbeen Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet)

Findingopen,giventhatthe procedures,modificationdetail, operationsreview,anddetailed HRAmodeldevelopmentarenot yetcomplete.

Thesimulatorexerciseperformed withcurrentPalisadeslicense holdersevaluatedoperator responsetoseveralscenarioswith false,partialortotallossof instrumentindications.Theresults oftheseexerciseswereconsidered intheHFEdevelopmentprocess forpurposesofdevelopingtiming ofcuesandtimewindows.

ThefinaldevelopedfireHFEs DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.

Thisfindingremainsopenasindicatedin theDispositioncolumn.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation (e.g.,trainlevel)requiredto achievethegoaloftheresponse.

implemented.Thereare casesinthemodelwhere multipleinstruments providecuestothe operatorstoperform actions.Operatoractions basedonfalseindication havenotbeenconsidered.

Inaddition,HFEsmodeled usingscreeningvalues(for someofthefireresponse actionsidentified;e.g.,ACP DGOTB5BDG,FPSPMOE STARTL,ACPPMOE383 12A,ACPPMOE38311A, etc.)andthosefireresponse actionsthatwillbe identifiedasthefire scenariorefinement continueshavenotyet accountedforthescenario contextincludingtiming, proceduralguidance, instrumentation,task complexity,etc.Also,HRA Calculatorevaluationsheets cannotbelocatedforPCP PMOFP50XLOCandEDG PMOEPORTPUMP,and AFWAVOACV2010D, SWSAVOACV082326,and SWSAVOBCV082447M stillneedtobemodifiedfor firerelatedconditions.

incorporatetaskcomplexityand proceduralguidanceas documentedinthePostInitiator OperatorActionQuestionnaire(P IOAQ)providedtocurrentSRO licensedonshiftOperations Departmentpersonneland TrainingDepartmentpersonnelfor useinvalidatingHFEinformation accuracy.

SignificantHFEswereevaluated anddevelopedinfurtherdetail.

Screeningvaluesarestillapplied forfireHEPspendingdevelopment offinalprocedures,modifications, andoperationsreviews.

ThefinallistoffireHFEsandtheir associateddocumentationare providedinNBPSAHR,Ref(13).

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation HRAC101 (Finding)

Foreachselectedfirescenario, QUANTIFYtheHEPsforallHFEs andACCOUNTFORrelevantfire relatedeffectsusingdetailed analysesforsignificantHFEsand conservativeestimates(e.g.,

screeningvalues)for nonsignificantHFEs,in accordancewiththeSRsforHLR HRGinPart2setforthunderat leastCapabilityCategoryII,with thefollowingclarification:

(a)Attentionistobegivento howthefiresituationaltersany previousassessmentsinnonfire analysesastotheinfluencing factorsandthetiming considerationscoveredinSRsHR G3,HRG4,andHRG5inPart2 And (b)DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRHRGin Part2.

Open FireresponseHFEsmodeled withscreeningvalueshave notyetbeenevaluatedina manneraccountingfor relevantPSFs(e.g.,ACP DGOTB5BDG,FPSPMOE STARTL,ACPPMOE383 11A,ACPPMOE38312A, etc.).Also,HRACalculator evaluationsheetcannotbe locatedforPCPPMOFP 50XLOCandEDGPMOE PORTPUMP,andAFW AVOACV2010D,SWS AVOACV082326,and SWSAVOBCV082447M stillneedtobemodifiedfor firerelatedconditions.This taskisnotcompleted.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (metCCI)

Findingopen,giventhatthe procedures,modificationdetail, operationsreview,anddetailed HRAmodeldevelopmentarenot yetcomplete.

SignificantHFEswereevaluated anddevelopedinfurtherdetailas documentedinNBPSAHR,Ref (13).Screeningvaluesarestill appliedforfireHEPspending developmentoffinalprocedures, modifications,andoperations reviews.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.

Thisfindingremainsopenasindicatedin theDispositioncolumn.

HRAD101 (Finding)

INCLUDEoperatorrecovery actionsthatcanrestorethe functions,systems,or componentsonanasneeded basistoprovideamorerealistic evaluationofsignificantaccident sequences.

Closed Identificationandevaluation ofrecoveryactionsforrisk significantscenariosare expectedtocontinueasthe refinementoffirescenario analysiscontinues.

Currently,someofthetop coredamagefirescenarios stilldonotaccountfor Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

Thefinalidentificationoffire responseactionswascompleted anddocumentedinnotebookNB PSAHR1,Ref(13).Theseactions wereincorporatedintothefinal firePRAmodelwhereappropriate.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation realisticrecoveryactions.

Thistaskisnotcompleted yet.

thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

HRAD201 (Finding)

INCLUDEoperatorrecovery actionsthatcanrestorethe functions,systems,or componentsonanasneeded basistoprovideamorerealistic evaluationofsignificantaccident sequences(sameasHRAD101).

Open Manyoftheoperator recoveryactionsassociated withfireresponsearestill modeledwithscreening values;i.e.,notaccounting foralloftherelevantPSFs.

Dependencyanalysishas beenperformedforthe currentsetoffirescenarios andoperatoractionsinthe "T"model.Theresults generatedfromthe"Q" modeldidnotincorporate thedependencyanalysis.

Thedependencyanalysis needstobereanalyzed beforefinalizationofthe FirePRAmodel.Thistaskis notcompleteyet.Also,HRA Calculatorevaluationsheets cannotbelocatedforPCP PMOFP50XLOCandEDG PMOEPORTPUMP,and AFWAVOACV2010D, SWSAVOACV082326,and SWSAVOBCV082447M stillneedtobemodifiedfor firerelatedconditions Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet)

Thisfindingopenistreatedas opensincescreenvalueswere usedasrecoveryvalues.Thisisa resultgiventhattheprocedures, modificationdetail,operations review,anddetailedHRAmodel developmentarenotyetcomplete.

Screeningvaluesarestillapplied forfireHEPs.

Adependencyanalysiswas completedtoidentify combinationsofhumanfailure events(HFEs)inwhich dependenciesbetweenactions maycontributetoanincreasein coredamagefrequency(CDF) whencomparedtotheCDF calculatedwhennominalscreening valuesforhumanerror probabilities(HEPs)areused.

Dependenciesbetweenactions wereassignedbasedonsequence specificevaluationsofcues,timing, location,andavailableresources, andtheHEPsadjustedifnecessary torepresentthelevelof dependence;theCDFwasthen recalculatedusingthemodified HEPs.HFEsnotexplicitlyevaluated DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.

Thisfindingremainsopenasindicatedin theDispositioncolumn.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation fordependencewereassigned HEPsof1(i.e.,therepresented operatoractionsareassumedto failwithaprobabilityofunity),and thustheresultingCDFrepresents anupperboundforthepotential impactofdependenciesuponthe results.Sharedcuesconservatively assumed100%dependence.This approachhasidentifiedimportant HFEsforwhichthecompletionof detailedhumanreliabilityanalyses maybebeneficial;thoseanalyses havenotbeencompleted.

ThefirePRAHRAdependency analysisisdocumentedinNBPSA HR,Ref(13).

HRAE101 (Finding)

DOCUMENTtheFirePRAHRA including (a)thosefirerelatedinfluences thataffectthemethods, processes,orassumptionsused aswellastheidentificationand quantificationoftheHFEs/HEPs inaccordancewithHLRHRIand itsSRsinPart2,andDEVELOPa definedbasistosupportthe claimofnonapplicabilityofanyof therequirementsunderHLRHRI

inPart2, and (b)anydefinedbasestosupport theclaimofnonapplicabilityof Open DocumentationforHFEs associatedwithselectedfire responseHFEs(e.g.,FPS PMOESTARTL,ACPPMOE 38311A,ACPPMOE383 12A,etc.)intherisk significantfirescenarios needtobeprovided.Also, HRACalculatorevaluation sheetscannotbelocatedfor PCPPMOFP50XLOC,EDG PMOEPORTPUMP,and PULLFUSE;AFWPMOTP 8BLOCseemstohavebeen changedtoAFWPMOTP 8BSBOinHRAnotebook Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet)

Findingopen,giventhatthe procedures,modificationdetail, operationsreview,anddetailed HRAmodeldevelopmentarenot yetcomplete.Screeningvalues arestillappliedforfireHEPs pendingdevelopmentoffinal procedures,modifications,and operationsreviews.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.

Thisfindingremainsopenasindicatedin theDispositioncolumn.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation anyofthereferenced requirementsinPart2beyond thatalreadycoveredbythe clarificationsinthisPart (butnotchangedinFirePRA model);andAFWAVOACV 2010D,SWSAVOACV 082326,andSWSAVOB CV082447Mstillneedtobe modifiedforfirerelated conditions.Thistaskisnot complete.

IGNA1001 (Finding)

PROVIDEameanvalueof,anda statisticalrepresentationof,the uncertaintyintervalsfor significantfireignition frequencies.

Closed Thecharacterizationof uncertaintiesinthefire ignitionfrequencieshasnot beenaddressedinthe reportqualitativelyor quantitatively.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Thecharacterizationof uncertaintiesinthefireignition frequencieshavebeenaddressed inReport0247.07.005.01,Ref(1).

Thechangeinignitionfrequency hasadirectimpactonCDFsince ignitionfrequencyisincludedin thecalculationofCDFforevery scenario.Thereportdescribesthe sensitivitiesrunbychangingthe binignitionfrequenciestothe5th and95thpercentilevaluesofthe originalfrequenciesforbothEPRI andNUREG/CR6850values.

Calculatingthe5thand95th percentileswasdonesousingthe GAMMADISTfunctioninExcelfor theEPRIfrequenciesandprovided asBARToutputfortheNUREG/CR 6850frequencies.Thissensitivity providesanadequateupperand lowerboundofthefinalCDFwhich usedthemeanfrequencies.

Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.

ThefindingwasclosedpriortotheLAR submittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation

IGNA601 (Suggestion)

Whencombiningevidencefrom genericandplantspecificdata, USEaBayesianupdateprocessor equivalentstatisticalprocess.

JUSTIFYtheselectionofany informativepriordistribution usedonthebasisofindustry experience.

Closed TheBayesianupdate processusedtoupdate genericignitionfrequencies toplantspecificisnot documented.Aquestion wassubmittedduringthe Peerreviewactivitiesand theresponsesuggeststhat theBayesianapproachis documentedandwillbe addedtothereport.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

TheBayesianupdateprocessused toupdatethegenericfrequencies toplantspecificfrequenciesis documentedinSection4.2ofthe FireIgnitionFrequencyandPlant Partitioning,report024707 0005.02,Ref(2).Section4.2.1of thereportidentifiestheBayesian statisticalupdateoftheEPRITR 1016735genericfrequenciesthat wasperformedusingPLPspecific fireeventsdata.Therevisedfire ignitionfrequencies,includingthe frequenciescalculatedinAppendix GofReport0247070005.02,have gammauncertaintydistributions.

Therefore,thepriordataprovided included:themean,alpha,and betafactors.TheBayesiananalysis wasperformedinamanner consistentwiththeassertionthat thebinignitionfrequencieswere gammadistributions.

Section4.2.2ofthereport 0247.070005.02identifiesthe Bayesianstatisticalupdateofthe NUREG/CR6850generic frequencieswasperformedusing PLPspecificfireeventsdata.

NUREG/CR6850providesthe Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation mean,5th,50th,and95th percentiles,andstandarddeviation foreachbinignitionfrequency.

TheBayesiananalysisassumesthe NUREG/CR6850binignition frequenciesarelognormal distributions.FrequenciesforBins 16a,16b,16c,and16dare providedinFAQ060017andFAQ 070035.Thegenericfrequency distributionsalongwiththeplant evidencediscussedinSection4.2 ofReport0247070005.02were inputintotheBayesiansoftware toolBART,andthenewbin frequenciesdeveloped.Table45 ofReport0247070005.02 providestheposteriormean,5th percentile,95thpercentile, median,andrangefactorvalues associatedwitheachbinforusein futureupdate.

IGNA701 (Finding)

USEaplantwideconsistent methodologybasedon parametersthatareexpectedto influencethelikelihoodof ignitiontoapportionhighlevel ignitionfrequencies(e.g.,plant widevalues)toestimatephysical analysisunitorignitionsource levelfrequencies.

Closed Page31ofreport024707 0005.02appearstosuggest thatnofrequencyfor miscellaneoushydrogen fireshasbeenassignedto applicablephysicalanalysis units.Thismayaffectthe PAUlevelquantificationby reducingthefireignition frequencyassignedtothe applicableplantlocations.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Report0247.07070005.02,Ref (2),andFireIgnitionFrequency calculationdatabaseshavebeen updatedtoassignmiscellaneous hydrogenfirestoallapplicable PhysicalAnalysisUnits(PAUs).As notedinSection4ofreport0247 070005.02,thefrequency associatedwithBin19, Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation MiscellaneousHydrogenFires,has beenallocatedbasedonlinear feet,valvelocationandtank locationinPAUswherehydrogen equipmentexists.Applyingthese criteriahasapportioned miscellaneoushydrogenfrequency tothefollowingPAUs:04(1C SwitchgearRoom),13(Reactor Building),and23(Turbine Building).

IGNA901 (Suggestion)

POSTULATEthepossibilityof transientcombustiblefiresforall physicalanalysisunitsregardless oftheadministrativerestrictions.

Closed Thereport0247070005.02 doesnotlistthetransientor fixedignitionsource frequenciesineachfire zone.Thereportappearsto onlylistthetotalfrequency.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Report0247.070005.02,Ref(2),

hasbeenupdatedtoinclude transientandfixedignitionsource frequenciesforeachPAU(fire zone).AppendixEandFofReport 0247070005.02includes frequenciesonaPAUbasisbroken downintoTransient,Fixedand Totalforeach.EachAppendix providesadetailedIgnitionSource Datasheet(ISDS)offrequenciesby binandPAUforthecorresponding frequency.TheISDSutilizesdata fromthecountingwalkdowns,the transientandcableweighting factors,locationweightingfactors, andtheBayesianupdatedfire ignitionfrequenciestocalculate theFireFrequencyforeach PhysicalAnalysisUnit.

Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation TheISDSprovidesthePhysical AnalysisUnitidentificationand description,thegenericlocation categories(fixedandtransient source)weightingfactorsand countsummarynecessaryto calculatethefirefrequencyin accordancewiththeequations providedinthebodyofthis notebookinaccordancewiththe guidelinesestablishedin NUREG/CR6850.

IGNB201 (Suggestion)

DOCUMENTreferencesforfire eventsandfireignitionfrequency sourcesused.

Closed Thereport0247070005.02 doesnotreferenceplant specificfireeventsusedto updatefireignition frequencies.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Report024707005.02,Ref(2),

hasbeenupdatedtodocumentthe plantspecificfireeventsthatwere usedtoupdatethefireignition frequenciesinAppendixAofthe report.Theappendixdocuments thereviewofallfireeventsatPLP forthedatesofJanuary1,2001 throughDecember31,2011.This reviewwasperformedto determineifanyfireeventswere classifiedaspotentiallychallenging inaccordancewithNUREG6850.

Fireeventsthatareidentifiedas potentiallychallengingrequired theupdatingofthegenericfire frequenciesprovidedin NUREG/CR6850andEPRITR 1016735foruseintheplant Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation specificfirePRA.

IGNB401 (Suggestion)

DOCUMENTtheplantspecific frequencyupdatingprocess.

INCLUDEinthedocumentation

(a)theselectedplantspecific events

(b)thebasisfortheselectionand orexclusionofevents

(c)theanalysissupportingthe plantspecificreactoryears,and

(d)theBayesianprocessfor updatinggenericfrequencies Closed Thereport0247070005.02 doesnotclearlydescribe theprocessforclassifying fireeventsaspotentially challengingornot challenging.Thereport doesprovideatable indicatingwhichportionof thecriteriawasmet.

However,thereportshould describehowthistablewas populated.Itisnotevident fromthetablehowthe criteriawasmet/notmet fromtheinformation provideintheevent descriptioncolumn.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

The0247070005.02,Ref(2),

reportdocumentstheprocessof classifyingfireeventsaspotentially challengingornotchallengingin AppendixA.

Fireeventreportswereobtained fromplantpersonnelforthe stationcoveringtheperiodof January1,2001throughDecember 31,2011.Plantpersonnelmadean extensivesearchoftheir conditionreportandIdeas databasesforfireincidentreports.

Thesearchcriteriaincludeddates 1/1/01through12/31/11andkey wordsfire,heat,andsmoke.

Thissearchrevealedthousandsof hitsbutareviewofeachidentified onlyatotalofeleven(11)fire incidentswithintheprotectedarea andinareasincludedintheglobal analysisboundary.

Eachofthesereportswas reviewed,summarized, categorizedandclassifiedaseither potentiallychallengingornot potentiallychallenging.The criteriaforafiretobedeemed potentiallychallengingare providedinNUREG6850.

Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation AppendixCin6850,SectionC.3.3.1 providescriteriaforclassifyinga fireeventas"potentially challenging."

MUA101 (Finding)

ThePRAconfigurationcontrol processshallincludemonitoring ofchangesindesign,operation, andmaintenancethatcould affectthePRA.Suchchanges shallincludeoperating procedures,designconfiguration, initiatingeventfrequencies, unavailabilities,andcomponent failureratedata.

Closed ThePalisadesPRAModel Updateprocedureincludes maintenanceandupgrades tothePRAtobeconsistent withtheasbuilt,as operatedplant.Resolution oftheFullPowerInternal Events(FPIE)PeerReview F&Osandincorporationof designandoperational informationrelevanttoa FirePRAshouldresultin meetingtheStandard.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section3.3oftheconfiguration controlnotebook,NBPSACC,Ref (14),hasbeenrevisedtoincludea requirementforaPeerreview againsttheASMEstandardforPSA modelupgrades.

Thefindingwasresolvedpriortothe conductoftheFinalPeerreview.ThisSR wasnotreexaminedduringtheFinalPeer review.Thefinalreportisinconsistentand doesnotreflectresolutionofthisfinding.

PPA101 (Finding)

INCLUDEwithintheglobal analysisboundaryallfireareas, firecompartments,orlocations withinthelicenseecontrolled areawhereafirecouldadversely affectanyequipmentorcable itemtobecreditedintheFire PRAplantresponsemodel includingthoselocationsofa sisterunitthatcontainshared equipmentcreditedintheFire PRA.

Closed RequirementPPA01 includesNotePPA12 whichclarifiesthatthe intentoftherequirementis toincludeplantlocations withnocreditedplant equipmentthatmayaffect locationswithcreditedplant equipmentinmulti compartmentfirescenarios.

Withrespecttothemulti compartmentanalysis,the report0247070005.02 makesnomentiononthe treatmentofqualitatively screenedbuildingsorplant Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

AtthecompletionofTask1(Plant Partitioning)asetofPAUswere establishedforthefirePRA.These PAUsareevaluatedandundergo thescreeningprocessoutlinedin Section2.1ofreport024707 0005.02,Ref(2).Thescreening analysisqualitativelydetermines thefireriskassociatedwitheach PAU.TheresultsoftheTask4 screeningareusedinTask6(Fire IgnitionFrequency),wherefire frequenciesareestimatedforeach Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation locations.

oftheunscreenedfire compartments.

Qualitativescreeningasdescribed inTask4(QualitativeScreening)of NUREG/CR6850isintendedto identifythosefirecompartments where,accordingtopre determinedcriteria,thefireriskis expectedtoberelativelylowor nonexistentcomparedtoothers.

Thistaskassumesthattherisk(i.e.

CDFand/orLERF)associatedwith thefirescenarioswherea controlledmanualplantshutdown maybeattemptedasa precautionarymeasureandno otherfirePRAcomponentsare affectedislow.Ifacompartments exclusionfromthefirePRAis uncertain(forinstance,whetheran automaticormanualplanttripwill occurmaynotbeknownwith certainty),thatcompartment shouldberetainedforquantitative analysistobetterdetermineits contribution,ifany,totheoverall firerisk.

InthePalisadesfirePRAthere weretwoPAUsqualitatively screened.Thequalitative screeningprocessandcriteriaare describedinSection2ofreport 0247070005.02.

PPB101 DEFINEFirePRAphysicalanalysis Closed Theplantpartitioningreport Phase1 Final Suggestionresolvedby Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP)

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation (Suggestion) unitsbasedonacombinationof plantfireareasasdefinedinthe plantsfireprotectionprogram andphysicalanalysisunitswhere eachphysicalanalysisunit representsasubdivisionofafire area,andIfanyfireareais subdividedintotwoormore physicalanalysisunits,ENSURE thatthephysicalanalysisunit definitionscomplywiththe balanceofthePPBSRs(PPB2 throughPPB7).

doesnotdescribecable trenches,ductbanks, manholes,etc.thatmaybe presentintheyard.The FirePRAshouldhavea dispositionfortheseareas astowhytheremay/may notbetheneedfor postulatingfirescenarios andwhereintheyardthe scenariosmaybe postulated.

(met)

(met) documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Physicalanalysisunitsforthe PalisadesfirePRAcorrespondto FireAreasdefinedintheFire ProtectionProgram.Confirmatory walkdownnoteshavebeen documentedinAttachment3of Report0247070005.02,Ref(2).

Sixplantlocationswereidentified thatwerenotspecifically addressedintheFHAandnew physicalanalysisunitswere createdforuseinthefirePRA.

Thesefirelocationswerethe CoolingTowerPumpHouse, FeedwaterPurityBuilding,Yard Area,Switchyard,Administration Building,andServiceBuilding.The boundaryrequirementsforafire riskassessmentweresufficiently metbytheboundariesofthe FeedwaterPurityBuildingand CoolingTowerPumpHouse.The YardAreaandSwitchyardwere outdoorareasandthereforedid nothaveanyfireratedbarriers exceptfortheseparationsfrom theindooranalysisunits.Spatial separationhasbeeninherently creditedwiththeuseofcurrent FireProtectionProgramfire boundaries.Spatialseparationis presentbetweenthefollowing PAUsboundaries:Component CoolingPumpWaterRoomsand elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation TurbineBuilding,AuxiliaryBuilding andRadwasteAdditionVRS,and lastlyEastEngineeredSafeguards RoomsandAuxiliaryBuilding.

Theseboundarieshavebeen documentedandreferencedinthe currentFireHazardsAnalysisto meettherequirementsofthisfire riskassessment.

Theswitchyardislocated approximatelyaquartermile outsideoftheprotectedareabut withintheOwnerControlledArea.

TheYardAreaisdefinedasall outsideareaswithintheprotected areafencing.TheFireScenario DevelopmentReport,024707 0005.02accountsforthepresence ofcables,busducts,etc.inthe developmentofthepostulatedfire scenariosintheyardarea.

PPB201 (Suggestion)

Ifpartitioningcreditswall,ceiling, orfloorelementsthatlackafire resistancerating,JUSTIFYthe judgmentthatthecredited elementwillsubstantiallycontain thedamagingeffectsoffires giventhenatureofthefire sourcespresentineach compartmentseparatedbythe nonratedpartitioningelement.

Closed Report0247070005.02 doesnotprovideadequate justificationforcrediting barrierswhenoutsidethe fireprotectionprogram.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Physicalanalysisunitsforthe PalisadesfirePRAcorrespondto FireAreasdefinedintheFire ProtectionProgram.Confirmatory walkdownnoteshavebeen documentedinAttachment3of report0247070005.02,Ref(2).

Creditforracewayfirebarriers, thermalwrapsorotherlocalized protectionfeatureshavenotbeen Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation creditedinidentifyingaphysical analysisunit.

PPB301 (Suggestion)

Ifspatialseparationiscreditedas apartitioningfeature,JUSTIFY thejudgmentthatspatial separationissufficientto substantiallycontainthe damagingeffectsofanyfirethat mightbepostulatedineachof thefirecompartmentscreatedas aresultofcreditingthisfeature.

Closed Report0247070005.02 doesnotclearlydiscussthe creditforspatialseparation.

Therearetwoareasnoted thatdorelyonspatial separation:theSwitchyard andYardAreawhichare outdoorsandthushaveno ratedfirebarriers.F/O relatedtotheyardhasbeen documentedundera differentSRandmay addresstheconcernof spatialseparation.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Report0247070005.02,Ref(2),

hasbeenupdatedtodiscussthe creditofspatialseparationin Section2.2.

Thephysicalanalysisunitsusedfor thefireriskassessmentcorrelate tofireareasusedfortheFire ProtectionProgram.Thisapproach allowedthefireriskassessmentto relyontheexistingprogrammatic controlsanddesignrequirements formaintainingtheintegrityofthe associatedphysicalanalysisunit boundaries.Basedonthe documentationprovidedinthe FireHazardsAnalysis(FHA),the boundariesforthesePAUshadfire withstandratingsconsistentwith therequirementsoftheFire ProtectionProgram.Thetestand maintenancerequirementsofthe FireProtectionProgramwere sufficienttosatisfytheboundary requirementsforthefirerisk assessment.

Inaddition,utilizationofthearea boundariesestablishedbytheFire Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation ProtectionProgramallowstheuse ofpreviouslygatheredequipment andcablelocationdataand facilitatestheverificationand controloftheboundaries.

Walkdownswereconductedto confirmthataccessibleboundaries ofeachphysicalanalysisunitwere ofsubstantialconstruction,and thatphysicalopeningsinthe barrierswerenoted.Physical analysisunitsforthePalisadesfire PRAcorrespondtoFireAreas definedintheFireProtection Program.Confirmatorywalkdown noteshavebeendocumentedin of0247070005.02.

Creditforracewayfirebarriers, thermalwrapsorotherlocalized protectionfeatureshavenotbeen creditedinidentifyingaphysical analysisunit.

Theswitchyardislocated approximatelyaquartermile outsideoftheprotectedareabut withintheOwnerControlledArea.

TheYardAreaisdefinedasall outsideareaswithintheprotected areafencing.

PPB401 (Suggestion)

DONOTCREDITracewayfire barriers,thermalwraps,fire retardantcoatings,radiant energyshields,oranyother localizedcableorequipment Closed Report0247070005.02 doesnotdiscusscreditingof racewayfirebarriers.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Report0247070005.02,Ref(2),

hasbeenupdatedtoreflectthat Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation protectionfeatureaspartitioning elementsindefiningphysical analysisunits.

racewaysfirebarriershavenot beencreditedinthefirePRA analysis.

Thephysicalanalysisunitsusedfor thefireriskassessmentcorrelate tofireareasusedfortheFire ProtectionProgram.Thisapproach allowedthefireriskassessmentto relyontheexistingprogrammatic controlsanddesignrequirements formaintainingtheintegrityofthe associatedphysicalanalysisunit boundaries.Basedonthe documentationprovidedinthe FireHazardsAnalysis(FHA),the boundariesforthesePAUshadfire withstandratingsconsistentwith therequirementsoftheFire ProtectionProgram.Thetestand maintenancerequirementsofthe FireProtectionProgramwere sufficienttosatisfytheboundary requirementsforthefirerisk assessment.

Inaddition,utilizationofthearea boundariesestablishedbytheFire ProtectionProgramallowstheuse ofpreviouslygatheredequipment andcablelocationdataand facilitatestheverificationand controloftheboundaries.

Walkdownswereconductedto confirmthataccessibleboundaries ofeachphysicalanalysisunitwere ofsubstantialconstruction,and March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation thatphysicalopeningsinthe barrierswerenoted.

PPB501 (Suggestion)

DEFINEANDJUSTIFYthebasis andcriteriaappliedwhenactive firebarrierelements(suchas normallyopenfiredoors,water curtains,andfiredampers)are creditedinpartitioning.

Closed Report0247070005.02 doesnotdiscusscrediting activefirebarriers.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Report0247070005.02,Ref(2),

hasbeenupdatedtodiscussthe creditofactivefirebarriers.

ThereportnotesthatthePhysical analysisunitsforthePalisadesfire PRAcorrespondtoFireAreas definedintheFireProtection Program.Additionally, confirmatorywalkdownnoteshave beendocumentedinAttachment3 of0247070005.02.Creditfor racewayfirebarriers,thermal wrapsorotherlocalizedprotection featureshavenotbeencreditedin identifyingaphysicalanalysisunit.

Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.

PPB701 (Suggestion)

CONDUCTaconfirmatory walkdownoflocationswithinthe globalanalysisboundaryto confirmtheconditionsand characteristicsofcredited partitioningelements.

Closed Walkdownformsare referencedinreport0247 070005.02butwalkdown resultsarenotattachedor available.Aquestiononthis topicwassubmittedduring thePeerreviewandthe responsetothequestion clarifiedtheconcernoflack ofdocumentationforthe walkdowns.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Walkdownswereconductedto confirmthataccessibleboundaries ofeachphysicalanalysisunitwere ofsubstantialconstruction,and thatphysicalopeningsinthe barrierswerenoted.These walkdownsaredocumentedin ofReport024707 0005.02,Ref(2).

Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.AlthoughlistedinTable416 asnotmetfromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.

Thefindingwasverifiedclosedpriortothe LARsubmittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation PPC201 (Finding)

JUSTIFYtheexclusionofany locationswithinthelicensee controlledareathatarenot includedintheglobalanalysis boundarybydemonstratingthat theydonotsatisfytheselection criteriaasdefinedperPPA1.

Closed Itisnotentirelyclearhow someexcludedareaslisted inSection2.1.2.2ofReport 0247070005.02satisfythe exclusioncriteria,namely theServiceBuildingand Administrativebuilding.

Thesebuildingsappearto shareacommonboundary withtheAuxiliaryBuilding.

Forexample,wouldnota majorfireintheService buildingbedesignateda challengingfirerequiringa plantshutdown?Thereport statesthatfireswithinthe AdministrationBuilding, ServiceBuilding,andService BuildingAdditionwerenot expectedtopropagateto theincludedphysical analysisunits,causeaplant transient,orrequireplant shutdown.

Areexcludedbuildings permanentlyexcluded,or aretheyconsideredduring multicompartment evaluations?

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

ReportSection2.1.2.2ofReport 0247070005.02,Ref(2),hasbeen updatedtosatisfytheexclusion criteriaoftheServiceBuildingand AdministrativeBuilding.The buildingscommonboundarywith theAuxiliaryBuildinghasbeen detailedandthePAUsareretained forMCAanalysis.

Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.

PRMB1101 (Finding)

MODELalloperatoractionsand operatorinfluencesin accordancewiththeHRA elementofthisStandard.

Open Completework Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet)

Findingopen,giventhatthe procedures,modificationdetail, operationsreview,anddetailed HRAmodeldevelopmentarenot yetcomplete.

ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponse model(PRM)technicalelementwasmostly completeduringthePhase1review.A limitedreviewwasconductedduringthe Final.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation Screeningvaluesarestillapplied forfireHEPspendingdevelopment offinalprocedures,modifications, andoperationsreviews.

FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:

TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwas reviewedwithveryfewfindings.There werenotechnicalF&Osonthescopeor contentofthePRMmodelitself.TheF&Os assignedtoPRMwereeithera)cross referencedfromothertasks[HRAandES]

orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.

ThisHRArelatedfindingremainsopen.

PRMB301 (Finding)

IDENTIFYanynewinitiating eventsarisingfromthe considerationsoftheESandCS technicalelementsthatmight resultfromafireeventthatwere notincludedintheInternal EventsPRAincludingthose arisingfromtheconsiderationof spuriousactuation.

Closed Thefaulttreemodel developmentomittedthe DCpowerdependency requirementfortheRCP breakertripfunction.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

Thefaulttreemodelappliedtothe firePRAwasupdatedtoinclude theDCpowerdependencyforthe primarycoolantpumpbreakertrip function.Thislogicwasaddedat modelgatesPCPSEALSSW20, PCPSEALSSW22,PCPSEALSSW 21,andPCPSEALSSW23foreach ofthefourprimarycoolantpumps.

ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponse model(PRM)technicalelementwasmostly completeduringthePhase1review.A limitedreviewwasconductedduringthe Final.

FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:

TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwas reviewedwithveryfewfindings.There werenotechnicalF&Osonthescopeor contentofthePRMmodelitself.TheF&Os assignedtoPRMwereeithera)cross referencedfromothertasks[HRAandES]

orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

PRMB302 (Finding)

IDENTIFYanynewinitiating eventsarisingfromthe considerationsoftheESandCS technicalelementsthatmight resultfromafireeventthatwere notincludedintheInternal EventsPRAincludingthose Closed SpuriousSIisnotincluded asapotentialinitiating event Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

AcompletereviewofSafety InjectionSignal(SIS),Containment HighPressure(CHP),Containment ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponse model(PRM)technicalelementwasmostly completeduringthePhase1review.A limitedreviewwasconductedduringthe Final.

FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation arisingfromtheconsiderationof spuriousactuation.

HighRadiation(CHR),Containment IsolationSignal(CIS)and RecirculationActuationSignal (RAS)logicwasperformedto identifypotentialadverse componentactuationsthatcould occurduetoaspurioussignalfrom anyofthesesources.

Logicwasaddedfor45PRA componentstoconsiderspurious operationfromanyofthe automaticactuationcircuits.

Report0247070005.04,Ref(4),

Section5.71wasupdatedtoreflect thesechanges.

TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwas reviewedwithveryfewfindings.There werenotechnicalF&Osonthescopeor contentofthePRMmodelitself.TheF&Os assignedtoPRMwereeithera)cross referencedfromothertasks[HRAandES]

orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

PRMB501 (Finding)

Forthosefireinducedinitiating eventsincludedintheInternal EventsPRAmodel,REVIEWthe correspondingaccidentsequence modelsand (a)IDENTIFYanyexistingaccident sequencesthatwillrequire modificationbasedonunique aspectsoftheplantfireresponse proceduresinaccordancewith HLRASAandHLRASBofPart2 andtheirsupporting requirements And (b)IDENTIFYanynewaccident sequencesthatmightresultfrom afireeventthatwerenot includedintheInternalEvents PRAinaccordancewithHLRASA Closed TheMSOexpertpanel issueshavenotbeen completelyresolvedand incorporatedintothePRA model.Thus,allmodeling workassociatedwithMSO incorporationhasnotbeen doneatthistime.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

AllMSOexpertpanelissueshave beenresolvedandintegratedinto thefinalPRAfiremodelas appropriate.AllMSOscenario dispositionsaredocumentedinthe finalMSOreport0247070005.04, Ref(4).

ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponse model(PRM)technicalelementwasmostly completeduringthePhase1review.A limitedreviewwasconductedduringthe Final.

FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:

TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwas reviewedwithveryfewfindings.There werenotechnicalF&Osonthescopeor contentofthePRMmodelitself.TheF&Os assignedtoPRMwereeithera)cross referencedfromothertasks[HRAandES]

orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation andHLRASBofPart2andtheir supportingrequirements.

PRMB901 (Finding)

Foranycaseswherenewsystem modelsorsplitfractionsare needed,orexistingmodelsor splitfractionsneedtobe modifiedtoincludefireinduced equipmentfailures,firespecific operatoractions,and/orspurious actuations,PERFORMthe systemsanalysisportionofthe FirePRAmodelinaccordance withHLRSYAandHLRSYBand theirSRsinPart2withthe followingclarifications,and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthese requirementsinPart2:

AlltheSRsunderHLRSYAand HLRSYBinPart2aretobe addressedinthecontextoffire scenariosincludingeffectson systemoperability/functionality accountingforfiredamageto equipmentandassociated cabling.

Closed FailuretotripPressurizer heatersisnotexplicitly addressed Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

FaulttreePZRSPURHTRFT(45) wasaddedtothefirePRAto modelspuriousoperationof pressurizerheatersandfailureof pressurizerspray.Failureofthis faulttreeresultsinapotential stuckopenpressurizersafety valve,orvalves.

Section5.45ofreport024707 0005.04,MultipleSpurious OperationReport,Ref(4),was updatedtoreflectthischange.

ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponse model(PRM)technicalelementwasmostly completeduringthePhase1review.A limitedreviewwasconductedduringthe Final.

FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:

TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwas reviewedwithveryfewfindings.There werenotechnicalF&Osonthescopeor contentofthePRMmodelitself.TheF&Os assignedtoPRMwereeithera)cross referencedfromothertasks[HRAandES]

orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

QLSB201 (Finding)

DOCUMENTthedispositionof eachphysicalanalysisunit definedbytheplantpartitioning analysisaseither"screenedout" or"retainedforquantitative analysis"andinamannerthat Closed SeePPC201.

Phase1 (reviewed not applicable)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section2.1.2.2ofReport024707 0005.02,Ref(2),hasbeenupdated tosatisfytheexclusioncriteriaof Reviewofthequalitativescreening(QLS) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkwascompletedand reviewedinAugust2010;Noadditional reviewinMarch2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation facilitatesFirePRAapplications, upgrades,andPeerreview.

theServiceBuildingand AdministrativeBuilding.The buildingscommonboundarywith theAuxiliaryBuildinghasbeen detailedandthePAUsareretained forMCAanalysis.

SFA101 (Finding)

Forthosephysicalanalysisunits withintheFirePRAglobal analysisboundary, (a)LOOKforfireignitionsource scenariosthatmightariseasthe resultofanearthquakethat wouldbeuniquefromthose postulatedduringthegeneral analysisofeachphysicalanalysis

unit, and (b)PROVIDEaqualitative assessmentofthepotentialrisk significanceofanyuniquefire ignitionsourcescenarios identified Open Thecurrentseismicfire interactionsanalysisrelies ontheIPEEEstudy.The reportneedsto demonstratethatthescope ofthatworkmeetsthe objectivesoftheStandard andthatplantchangessince theworkwasperformeddo notcompromisethe conclusions.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet)

Findingopen.NoimpacttoNFPA 805quantifiedresults.

Report0247070005.05,Seismic FireInteraction,Ref(5),evaluates Palisadeswithrespectto NUREG/CR6850Task13,Seismic FireInteractionsAssessment..

Theseismicfireinteractions analysishasnotbeenupdated.

However,sincetheStandardonly requiresaqualitativeanalysis, thereisnoimpactonthe quantifiedresultsinfirePRA model.

Reviewoftheseismicfire(SF)elementwas completedduringthePhase1Peerreview.

Fromthefinalreport:

CompletedinJanuary2010andnotre reviewedinAugust2010orMarch2011.

Thisfindingremainsopen,butthishasno impactonthequantifiedresults.

UNCA101 (Finding)

PERFORMtheuncertainty analysisinaccordancewithHLR QUEanditsSRsinPart2aswell asSRsLEF2andLEF3under HLRLEFinPart2andDEVELOPa definedbasistosupportthe claimofnonapplicabilityofany oftherequirementsunderthese sectionsinPart2.

Closed Onlyalimitednumberof parameterandmodeling uncertaintiesandassociated assumptionshavebeen identified.Thelistis incompleteandnotdefined insufficientdetailto supportareasonable characterizationor evaluation.Uncertainties havebeenpropagated Phase1/

Phase2 (not reviewed)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section7.1ofthefirerisk summaryreport,0247070005.01, Ref(1),wasrevisedtoinclude additionaldiscussionand evaluationofthestateof knowledgecorrelationandthe impactofuncertaintyassociated withseverityfactorsandnon Theuncertaintyandsensitivitysupporting requirementswerenotreviewedduring thePhase1andPhase2Peerreviewsas themodelprogresswasnotsufficiently complete.Thisfindingwasidentified duringtheFinalPeerreview,butwas subsequentlyaddressedpriortotheLAR submittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation throughaMonteCarlo approach.However, correlationofstateof knowledgeuncertaintieshas notbeenaddressed,i.e.all initiatorshavebeentreated asindependentvariables, SeverityFactor(SF)andNon SuppressionProbabilities (NSP)andspurious actuationprobabilitiesare notcorrelated.

(Uncertaintiescarriedover fromtheinternalevents analysisarecorrelated).This approachhasledto unrealisticallynarrow predictionsofCDFandLERF distributions(errorfactorof 2)andthepotential underestimationofthe meanvaluesforscenarios whicharequantifiedbased ontheproductoflike distributions(e.g.multiple spuriousactuation probabilities).

suppressionprobability.The discussionindicatedthatthe distributionsmightbemorebroad ifamoredetailedparametric uncertaintyassessmentweretobe performed.

UNCA201 (Finding)

INCLUDEthetreatmentof uncertainties,includingtheir documentation,ascalledoutin SRsPRMA4,FQF1,IGNA10, IGNB5,FSSE3,FSSE4,FSSH5, FSSH9,andCFA2andthat requiredbyperformingPart2 referencedrequirements Open Theuncertaintyintervals assignedtoFireIEs,Severity FactorsandNon SuppressionProbabilities arenotbasedonacceptable systematicmethods.

1)Uncertaintydistributions forfireIEshavebeen Phase1/

Phase2 (not reviewed)

Final (notmet)

Findingopenastheapproachfor performingtheparametric uncertaintyevaluationhasnotyet beenupdated.

NoimpacttoNFPA805analysisas theresultsarebasedonthepoint estimatevalueswhich Theuncertaintyandsensitivitysupporting requirementswerenotreviewedduring thePhase1andPhase2Peerreviewsas themodelprogresswasnotsufficiently complete.Thisfindingwasidentified duringtheFinalPeerreview,butas indicatedthisdoesnotimpactthepoint estimatevaluesusedintheNFPA805

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation throughoutthisStandard.

assignedthesameerror factorof10ratherthan usingposteriordistributions fromBayesianupdate 2)SFdistributionshave beenassignedwithoutan underlyingbasis.

3)NSPuncertainty distributionhasbeen derivedonthebasisof NUREG/CR1278.This providesguidanceonHEP uncertaintyassessment.

However,NSPtermsarean outputofacombinationof firegrowthandsuppression modelingandguidancein NUREG/CR1278has thereforelittlerelevance.A validapproachwouldbeto addresstheuncertaintiesin damagetimesin combinationwith uncertaintiesinsuppression probabilitiesbasedon specificcontributingfactors.

4)Uncertaintiesassociated withspuriousactuation probabilitieshavebeen characterizedaccordingtoa setofrulesdefinedfor severityfactors.Inthiscase spuriousactuation probabilitieswithafailure probabilityof>0.25are assignedanerrorfactorof approximatethemeanvalues.The parametricuncertaintyanalysisis presentedinSection7.1ofthefire risksummaryreport,024707 0005.01,Ref(1).Theissues identifiedhavenotbeenfully addressed,butthisprimarily impactsthepotentialrangeofthe uncertaintydistributionanddoes nothaveasignificantimpacton themeanvalue;andhasnoimpact onthepointestimatemeanvalues usedintheanalysis.

analysis.

Thisfindingremainsopen.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation 1.0.IncontrastNUREG/CR 6850recommenduseofa uniformdistributionwith thefollowinglimits Cableswith15orless conductors:+20%

Cableswithmorethan15 conductors:+50%

Alternativelythevalues includedintables101to 105NUREG/CR6850could beusedwherelimitsappear tobewider.ThePalisades analysishasnotaccounted forlargeruncertainties associatedwithcableswith

>15conductors.

1)ThesupportingrequirementwascategorizedasnotmetatcompletionoftheFinalPeerreviewconductedduringtheweekofMarch21,2011.Thesupportingrequirementwassubsequentlyaddressedand categorizedasmet/closed(perthedispositiondiscussion),priortotheLARsubmittalinDecember2012.

2)StatusClosedimpliesF&OdispositionissufficienttomeetCategoryII.

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Status PeerReviewBasisforAssessment Disposition PRMA3 CONSTRUCTtheFirePRAplantresponsemodelso thatitiscapableofdeterminingthesignificant contributorstothefireinducedriskwith42.7.12.

Not Reviewed ThisSRisnotreviewedbecausethesequence infrastructuretoprovidethiscapabilityisnot availableatthistime.Thecapabilityto calculateriskimportanceinasinglescenariois availableatthepresenttime.Theinternal eventsPRAprovidesanacceptablemethodfor developmentofriskimportance.Palisadesuses SAPHIREforquantification,whichclaimstobe abletointegrateallfirescenariosintoaglobal coredamageequationandcalculateglobal importanceusingreplacementeventsforbasic eventsthathavedifferentprobabilitiesin differentrooms.Palisadesclaimsthishasbeen doneininternalflooding,whichhasthesame multipleeventquantificationchallenges.Ifthis methodissuccessful,Palisadeswouldbean industryleadingplantinthedevelopmentof globalimportance.

ThissupportingrequirementismeanttorefertotheFireRiskQuantification supportingrequirementsinSection42.12(asthereisnoSection42.7.12in thePRAstandard).SincetheFireRiskQuantificationSRswerefully reviewedduringthePhase2andFinalPeerreviews,thePRMA3supporting requirementwasimplicitlyreviewedduringthatprocessasthemodelhad tobeconstructedtodeterminethesignificantcontributorstoperformthe FQreview.ForthefinalPeerreview,FRANCwasusedtoquantifythe PalisadesFirePRA.FRANCprovidesCCDPandCLERPresultsonafire scenariobasisand,whencombinedwiththescenariofirefrequencies, calculatesanddisplaysCDFandLERF.Theseresultswerepresentedtothe firePRApeerreviewteamintheinitialissueofthecompletedFireRiskand QuantificationSummaryReport,0247070005.01(Rev.0[17],March2011).

Additionally,thedispositionsforthefindingsoftheFQelementinTable2 areapplicabletoPRMA3.

Thefireriskquantification(FQ)elementwasreviewedindetailinboththe Phase2andFinalPeerreviews.

WithrespecttotheFQelementtheFinalreportstates:

Overallprocessisconsistentwithprevailinggoodpractices.Resultsarenot finalandthuscertainSRscannotbedemonstratedtohavebeenmet.

Continuingtherefinementinprocessandplannedprovidesconfidencethis technicalelementwillmeettheStandard.

PRMB2 VERIFYthepeerreviewexceptionsanddeficiencies fortheInternalEventsPRAaredispositioned,and thedispositiondoesnotadverselyaffectthe developmentoftheFirePRAplantresponsemodel.

Not Reviewed NotcompletedyetbecausethefinalInternal EventsPRAPeerReviewhasnotbeenprovided toPalisades ThefirePeerreviewteamdidnotformallyreviewtheresolutionofthefull powerinternaleventsfindingsandobservations.Theresolutionsare discussedinAttachmentUoftheLARandtheirimpactsonthefirePRAare noted.NoneoftheopenitemsimpacttheNFPA805submittal.

Thefullpowerinternalevents(FPIE)peerreviewreport,datedMarch12, 2010wasreceivedbetweenthePhase1andPhase2firePRApeerreviews.

ResolutionoffindingsfromthisreportwereinprogressduringthePhase2 andFinalfirepeerreviews.

Withrespecttotheinternaleventsmodel,theFinalreportstates:

TheFirePRAandInternalEventsPRAusethesamemodel,thusthefidelity betweenthetwoisgood.TheinternaleventsPRAunderwentaRG1.200 peerreviewinOctober2009.TheF&Oshavebeenformallyaddressedand incorporatedintotheFirePRAmodel.

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Status PeerReviewBasisforAssessment Disposition PRMB4 MODELanynewinitiatingeventsidentifiedperSR PRMB2inaccordancewithHLRIEA,HLRIEB,and HLRIECandtheirSRsinPart2withthefollowing clarifications:

(a)AllSRsunderHLRIEAandHLRIEB,andSRsIE C4,IEC6,IEC7,IEC8,IEC9,andIEC12inPart2are tobeaddressedinthecontextofafireinducingthe initiatingeventsexcludinginitiatingeventsthat cannotbeinducedbyafire and (b)DEVELOPadefinedbasistosupporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyoftheserequirementsinPart 2.

Not Reviewed Nonewinitiatingeventswereidentified,so thisSRwasnotrequired.However,PRMB3 indicatesspuriousSIshouldbeconsidered,so thattheSRmustbecompleted.

Asstatedinthepeerreviewassessment,nonewinitiatingeventswere identifiedsothisSRwasnotrequired.

TwofindingswerenotedinthePRMB3SRandwereclosedasdescribedin Table2above.

ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponsemodel(PRM)technicalelementwas mostlycompleteduringthePhase1review.Alimitedreviewwas conductedduringtheFinal.

FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:

TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwasreviewedwithveryfewfindings.

TherewerenotechnicalF&OsonthescopeorcontentofthePRMmodel itself.TheF&OsassignedtoPRMwereeithera)crossreferencedfromother tasks[HRAandES]orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.

ThePRMB3findingswerenotfullyresolvedfortheFinalPeerreview,but weresubsequentlyclosedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

PRMB14 IDENTIFYanynewaccidentprogressionsbeyondthe onsetofcoredamagethatwouldbeapplicableto theFirePRAthatwerenotaddressedforLERF estimationintheInternalEventsPRA.

Not Reviewed LERFanalysisdidnotlookforanyLERF phenomenaapplicabletothefirePRAwhich werenotincludedintheinternaleventsPRA.

F&Owasnotwritten.Thereviewersarenot awareofanyFirePRAwhichlookedfor beyondinternalevents"LERFphenomena.

TherearenoopenF&OsassociatedwiththeLERFelementfromtheinternal eventsPRA.NonewLERFphenomenawereidentifiedforthePalisadesfire PRA.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 66 of 79 References for Question 1 Response

1)

Report 0247-07-0005.01 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Fire Risk Quantification and Summary.

2)

Report 0247-07-0005.02 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Plant Partitioning and Fire Ignition Frequency Development.

3)

Report 0247-07-0005.03 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model Development Report.

4)

Report 0247-07-0005.04 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Multiple Spurious Operations Report.

5)

Report 0247-07-0005.05 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Seismic/Fire Interaction Report.

6)

Report 0247-07-0005.06 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Fire Scenario Development Report.

7)

Report 0247-07-0005.07 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Multi-Compartment Analysis.

8)

Report 0247-07-0005.08 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Exposed Structural Steel Analysis.

9)

EA-APR-95-004 Rev. 5, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Associated Circuits Analysis for Common Power Supply and Common Enclosure.

10)

PLP-RPT-12-00134 Rev. 0, Validation of Appendix R Non-Safe Shutdown Cable Routing to Support the Fire PRA.

11)

Palisades Probabilistic Safety Assessment Notebook NB-PSA-ETSC Rev. 3, Event Trees and Success Criteria.

12)

EA-PSA-FPIE-FIRE-12-04 Rev. 0, Palisades Full Power Internal Events and Fire Model.

13)

Palisades Probabilistic Safety Assessment Notebook NB-PSA-HR Rev. 4, Human Reliability Analysis Notebook Volume 1 (Post Initiator Operator Actions).

14)

Palisades Probabilistic Safety Assessment Notebook NB-PSA-CC Rev. 1, PSA Model Configuration Control.

15)

ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Addenda to ASME/ANS RA-S-2008 Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, 2009.

16)

SCIENTECH report 17825-1, Palisades Fire PRA Peer Review to Requirements in Part 4 of the ASME/ANS Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessments for Nuclear Power Plant Applications.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 67 of 79

17)

Report 0247-07-0005.01 Rev. 0, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Fire Risk Quantification and Summary.

NRC Request

2. There is no indication which Supporting Requirements were ranked below Capability Category II by the Peer Review Team (i.e., no Table V-2,) provide Table V-2.

ENO Response

2. Table V-2 is provided below:

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 68 of 79 Table V-2 Fire PRA - Category I Summary SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryIIText)

Status 1

FindingorSuggestion Disposition HRAA3 Foreachfirescenario,IDENTIFYanynew,undesired operatoractionthatcouldresultfromspurious indicationsresultingfromfailureofasingleinstrument, perSRESC2(e.g.,duetoverbatimcompliancewiththe instructioninanalarmresponseprocedure,when separateconfirmationisnotavailableorrequired).

Closed Section6.3oftheHRANotebookdiscussesthe reviewthatwasperformedwiththelicensed operatorsfortheidentificationofthenew, undesiredoperatoractionsinresponseto spuriousindications.However,thedetailed documentationfortheevaluationprocessand thejustificationsfortheconclusionthatno undesiredoperatoractionswillbetakenin theseinstrumentationfailureconditionswas notyetcompletedforthereviewerstoconfirm theconclusionthatnoundesiredoperator actionsneedtobeconsidered.

Findingresolvedbydocumentationandmodelupdate.NoimpacttoNFPA 805analysis.

AsimulatorexercisewasperformedwithcurrentPalisadeslicenseholders inwhichseveralscenarioswereevaluatedtodeterminehowOperators wouldrespondgivenspuriousorfalseinstrumentindications.Theresultsof theseexerciseswereconsideredintheHFEdevelopmentprocess.The processandevaluationresultsaredocumentedinthePalisadesProbabilistic SafetyAssessmentNotebookNBPSAHR,HumanReliabilityAnalysis NotebookVolume1(PostInitiatorOperatorActions),Rev.4.

HRAB4 INCLUDEHFEsforcaseswherefireinduced instrumentationfailureofanysingleinstrumentcould causeundesiredoperatoraction,consistentwithHLR ESCofthisPartandinaccordancewithHLRHRFand itsSRsinPart2 and DEVELOPadefinedbasistosupporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyoftherequirementsunderHLR HRF Part2.

Closed SameasHRAA301.ThisSRwasassignedCCI basedontherelatedfindingHRAA301.

Findingresolvedbydocumentationandmodelupdate.NoimpacttoNFPA 805analysis.

AsimulatorexercisewasperformedwithcurrentPalisadeslicenseholders inwhichseveralscenarioswereevaluatedtodeterminehowOperators wouldrespondgivenspuriousorfalseinstrumentindications.Theresultsof theseexerciseswereconsideredintheHFEdevelopmentprocess.The processandevaluationresultsaredocumentedinthePalisadesProbabilistic SafetyAssessmentNotebookNBPSAHR,HumanReliabilityAnalysis NotebookVolume1(PostInitiatorOperatorActions),Rev.4.

HRAC1 Foreachselectedfirescenario,QUANTIFYtheHEPsfor allHFEsandACCOUNTFORrelevantfirerelatedeffects usingdetailedanalysesforsignificantHFEsand conservativeestimates(e.g.,screeningvalues)for nonsignificantHFEs,inaccordancewiththeSRsforHLR HRGinPart2setforthunderatleastCapability CategoryII,withthefollowingclarification:

(a)Attentionistobegiventohowthefiresituation altersanypreviousassessmentsinnonfireanalysesas totheinfluencingfactorsandthetimingconsiderations coveredinSRsHRG3,HRG4,andHRG5inPart2And (b)DEVELOPadefinedbasistosupporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyoftherequirementsunderHLR HRGinPart2.

Open FireresponseHFEsmodeledwithscreening valueshavenotyetbeenevaluatedina manneraccountingforrelevantPSFs(e.g.,ACP DGOTB5BDG,FPSPMOESTARTL,ACP PMOE38311A,ACPPMOE38312A,etc.).

Also,HRACalculatorevaluationsheetcannot belocatedforPCPPMOFP50XLOCandEDG PMOEPORTPUMP,andAFWAVOACV2010 D,SWSAVOACV082326,andSWSAVOBCV 082447Mstillneedtobemodifiedforfire relatedconditions.Thistaskisnotcompleted.

Findingopen,giventhattheprocedures,modificationdetail,operations review,anddetailedHRAmodeldevelopmentarenotyetcomplete.

SignificantHFEswereevaluatedanddevelopedinfurtherdetailas documentedinthePalisadesProbabilisticSafetyAssessmentNotebookNB PSAHR,HumanReliabilityAnalysisNotebookVolume1(PostInitiator OperatorActions),Rev.4.ScreeningvaluesarestillappliedforfireHEPs pendingdevelopmentoffinalprocedures,modifications,andoperations reviews.

1)

StatusClosedimpliesF&OdispositionissufficienttomeetCategoryII.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 69 of 79 NRC Request

3. Individual VFDRs and the associated disposition are documented for each fire area in LAR Attachment C. However, the dispositions of the VFDRs in Attachment C state no modifications are required and the fire area Risk Summary in Attachment C contains the following generic statement: There were no additional modifications identified that are specific to a given VFDR resolution in this fire area. However, LAR Attachment S, Table S-2, contains modifications that are described as resolving VFDRs. Clarify the discrepancy in Attachment S wherein certain modifications are identified as resolving VFDRs and Attachment C where no VFDRs are identified as being resolved by modifications.

ENO Response

3. Based on plant knowledge and risk analysis insights, it was decided to identify and evaluate modifications for overall plant fire risk reduction, prior to an evaluation of specific variances from deterministic requirements (VFDRs). These plant modifications were developed independently of whether or not specific VFDRs may or may not have been resolved. Modifications identified with this approach, in combination with modifications identified to resolve code-compliance issues, lowered overall plant fire risk and eliminated the need for any additional modifications to be postulated to address specific VFDRs during the fire risk evaluation process.

In the Palisades LAR, Attachment C was meant to communicate that no additional modifications were required - beyond the set of modifications identified in Attachment S - to address any residual risk from any given VFDR.

Attachment S indicated whether a modification explicitly modeled in the PRA resolved any VFDRs, but did not identify the specific VFDRs resolved or distinguish between partial and full resolution. Attachment S therefore designated modifications that partially resolve VFDRs as modifications required for compliance. Modifications that partially resolve VFDRs are considered required (necessary) but not alone sufficient for compliance.

The tables below provide the correlation of each modification to specific VFDRs resolved, either partially or fully. The first column, Item, contains a modification identifier corresponding to the modification identifier in Attachment S. The second column contains the set of VFDRs by fire area (if any) that are fully or partially resolved by the modification. The third column contains additional clarifying comments.

As discussed above, not all modifications were designed to resolve VFDRs:

some were designed for overall plant fire risk reduction (and intentionally, risk

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 70 of 79 reduction with respect to other hazards), while others were purely code-compliance type modifications. Likewise, not all VFDRs are fully or partially resolved by a modification.

The residual risk of all VFDRs not resolved fully by modification has been evaluated as acceptable, either with our without credit for recovery actions, as indicated in the Palisades LAR, Attachments G and W.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 71 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-1: Plant Modifications Completed Item VFDRs Resolved /

• Partially Resolved Comments S1-1 None Completed modification resolved an Appendix R non-compliance issue.

S1-2 None Completed modification resolved an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S1-3 FA-01:

VFDR-0231/ENP-1270*

FA-02:

VFDR-0232/ENP-1269*

FA-04:

VFDR-0177/ENP-1177*

FA-09:

VFDR-0091/ENP-1348*

FA-23:

VFDR-0218/ENP-1195*

Completed modification resolved an Appendix R non-compliance issue.

Modification does not eliminate need for ex-primary control station actions to align fire protection pumps for long term AFW supply.

Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification. Modification ensures survivability of fire pump such that ex-primary control station action remains feasible.

However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 72 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /

• Partially Resolved Comments S2-1 None Modification provides overall plant risk reduction for combinations of failures of recovery actions, fire-induced failures and random failures in secondary side decay heat removal.

S2-2 FA-03:

VFDR-0146/ENP-1092*

VFDR-0343/ENP-1408*

FA-04:

VFDR-0350/ENP-1417*

Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions for EDG alignment to safety-related 2400 VAC buses.

Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.

However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.

S2-3 FA-03:

VFDR-0146/ENP-1092*

VFDR-0343/ENP-1408*

FA-04:

VFDR-0350/ENP-1417*

Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions for EDG alignment to safety-related 2400 VAC buses.

Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.

However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.

S2-4 FA-01:

VFDR-0323/ENP-1387 FA-02:

VFDR-0330/ENP-1394 FA-03:

VFDR-0134/ENP-1078 Modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.

S2-5 FA-01:

VFDR-0086/ENP-1051 FA-02:

VFDR-0055/ENP-1007 FA-03:

VFDR-0154/ENP-1100 FA-04:

VFDR-0188/ENP-1128 FA-06:

VFDR-0364/ENP-1470 FA-13:

VFDR-0362/ENP-1467 FA-14:

VFDR-0247/ENP-1210 FA-21:

VFDR-0363/ENP-1468 FA-23:

VFDR-0216/ENP-1193 Modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.

S2-6 FA-03:

VFDR-0128/ENP-1071*

Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions for AFW pump operation.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 73 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /

• Partially Resolved Comments FA-04:

VFDR-0166/ENP-1138*

FA-13:

VFDR-0266/ENP-1256*

Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.

However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.

S2-7 FA-13:

VFDR-0272/ENP-1262*

Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions to align and support HPSI pump operation for inventory control.

Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.

However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDR it is considered a modification required for compliance.

S2-8 None Modification ensures additional time margin is available for ventilation alignment for EDG room cooling.

S2-9 FA-04:

VFDR-0350/ENP-1417*

Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions for EDG alignment to safety-related 2400 VAC buses.

Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.

However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDR it is considered a modification required for compliance.

S2-10 FA-01:

VFDR-0231/ENP-1270 VFDR-0307/ENP-1351 FA-02:

VFDR-0232/ENP-1269 VFDR-0308/ENP-1352 FA-03:

VFDR-0151/ENP-1097 FA-04:

VFDR-0177/ENP-1177 VFDR-0309/ENP-1353 FA-05:

VFDR-0097/ENP-1107 FA-06:

VFDR-0108/ENP-1150 FA-07:

VFDR-0189/ENP-1154 FA-08:

VFDR-0191/ENP-1156 FA-09:

VFDR-0091/ENP-1348 FA-10:

FA-22:

VFDR-0197/ENP-1184 FA-23:

VFDR-0218/ENP-1195 VFDR-0306/ENP-1350 FA-24:

VFDR-0202/ENP-1199 FA-25:

VFDR-0208/ENP-1236 FA-26:

VFDR-0234/ENP-1205 FA-27:

VFDR-0195/ENP-1203 FA-28:

VFDR-0235/ENP-1208 FA-29:

VFDR-0275/ENP-1220 FA-30:

VFDR-0276/ENP-1221 FA-31:

VFDR-0278/ENP-1223 FA-32:

Modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 74 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /

• Partially Resolved Comments VFDR-0209/ENP-1160 FA-11:

VFDR-0290/ENP-1271 FA-12:

VFDR-0292/ENP-1272 FA-13:

VFDR-0263/ENP-1253 FA-14:

VFDR-0243/ENP-1212 FA-15:

VFDR-0221/ENP-1161 FA-16:

VFDR-0212/ENP-1171 FA-17:

VFDR-0112/ENP-1158 FA-18:

VFDR-0116/ENP-1174 FA-19:

VFDR-0211/ENP-1175 FA-21:

VFDR-0118/ENP-1178 VFDR-0125/ENP-1266 FA-33:

VFDR-0200/ENP-1267 FA-34:

VFDR-0282/ENP-1227 FA-35:

VFDR-0284/ENP-1229 FA-36:

VFDR-0285/ENP-1230 FA-38:

VFDR-0286/ENP-1231 FA-39:

VFDR-0287/ENP-1232 FA-40:

VFDR-0288/ENP-1233 FA-41:

VFDR-0289/ENP-1234 FA-56:

VFDR-0359/ENP-1469 S2-11 FA-01:

VFDR-0088/ENP-1054*

FA-02:

VFDR-0058/ENP-1010*

FA-03:

VFDR-0143/ENP-1089 VFDR-0144/ENP-1090*

VFDR-0361/ENP-1464*

FA-04:

VFDR-0180/ENP-1120 FA-05:

VFDR-0101/ENP-1111 FA-06:

VFDR-0109/ENP-1151*

FA-13:

VFDR-0257/ENP-1247 FA-16:

VFDR-0026/ENP-0975*

FA-21:

VFDR-0193/ENP-1268*

Modification fully resolves the VFDRs that involve charging pump spurious actuation / loss of control only (i.e., those without asterisks).

Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions to eliminate spurious charging pump operation and support inventory control.

Therefore, only some VFDRs (those without asterisk) are fully resolved by this modification.

Since the modification partially resolves the VFDRs indicated with asterisk and fully resolves VFDRs without asterisks it is considered a modification required for compliance.

S2-12 None Modification provides overall plant risk reduction by supporting steam generator depressurization to provide alternate means of secondary side decay heat removal.

S2-13 FA-13:

VFDR-0272/ENP-1262*

Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions to align and support HPSI pump operation for inventory control.

Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 75 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /

• Partially Resolved Comments However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDR it is considered a modification required for compliance.

S2-14 None Modification provides overall plant risk reduction by preventing spurious isolation of CCW to containment due to fire-induced valve-related cable faults.

S2-15 FA-01:

VFDR-0322/ENP-1386 FA-02:

VFDR-0329/ENP-1393 FA-03:

VFDR-0156/ENP-1102 FA-04:

VFDR-0176/ENP-1116 FA-14:

VFDR-0248/ENP-1211 FA-26:

VFDR-0241/ENP-1207 FA-34:

VFDR-0280/ENP-1225 Modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.

S2-16 None Modification increases availability of a Non-Power Operation credited component under certain conditions.

S2-17 None Modification increases availability of a Non-Power Operation credited component under certain conditions.

S2-18 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-19 None Modification extends operation of EC-150 panel under certain conditions.

S2-20 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-21 FA-01:

VFDR-0077/ENP-1044*

FA-02:

VFDR-0042/ENP-0994*

FA-03:

VFDR-0140/ENP-1086*

FA-04:

VFDR-0165/ENP-1137*

FA-06:

VFDR-0104/ENP-1146*

FA-11:

VFDR-0006/ENP-0951*

FA-15:

VFDR-0224/ENP-1164*

FA-21:

VFDR-0122/ENP-1182*

Modification does not eliminate need for ex-primary control station actions to align charging suction from the SIRWT.

Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification. Modification ensures survivability of valve such that ex-primary control station action remains feasible.

However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 76 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /

• Partially Resolved Comments S2-22 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-23 None Modifications prevent overall plant risk increase by ensuring electrical coordination remains consistent with PRA assumptions.

S2-24 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-25 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-26 FA-01:

VFDR-0070/ENP-1037 VFDR-0071/ENP-1038 FA-02:

VFDR-0050/ENP-1002 VFDR-0051/ENP-1003 FA-05:

VFDR-0095/ENP-1105 FA-11:

VFDR-0008/ENP-0954 FA-12:

VFDR-0012/ENP-0962 FA-21:

VFDR-0360/ENP-1463 Modification resolves VFDRs that exist during cross-train charger alignment only. Cross-train alignment is not the standard alignment modeled in the PRA.

S2-27 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-28 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-29 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-30 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-31 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-32 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-33 None Modification eliminates 3-phase proper polarity hot short potential for FOGG valves.

S2-34 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-35 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-36 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 77 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /

• Partially Resolved Comments S2-37 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-38 FA-32:

VFDR-0123/ENP-1264 VFDR-0124/ENP-1265 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue, and in addition modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.

S2-39 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-40 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-41 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-42 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 78 of 79 NRC Request

4. LAR Attachment F describes the process for evaluating MSOs at Palisades, including use of the expert panel approach per FAQ 07-0038, Revision 3. In the Results of Step 1 section, generic industry sources of information used for both MSO reviews are cited but no plant-specific sources are cited. Describe how plant-specific insights were used to identify and evaluate MSOs at Palisades.

ENO Response

4. Experienced, multi-disciplined expert panel review teams at Palisades utilized the following types of plant-specific knowledge bases to postulate possible fire damage scenarios and brainstorm possible plant consequences involving multiple spurious operations:

first-hand operating experience, typical and off-normal equipment performance, original and as-modified plant design, actual and potential plant consequences resulting from upset conditions, thermal-hydraulic/neutronic licensing basis safety analysis, boundary conditions and assumptions, and integrated plant and operator response experience.

The expert panel included personnel with extensive Palisades-specific expertise in:

Operations, Fire Fighting (Fire Marshall),

Design Engineering, Electrical Engineering, System Engineering, Safe Shutdown Analysis, Circuit Analysis, Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis, Neutronics Analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment The expert panel and/or multiple spurious operation (MSO) development teams included many of the same plant individuals that developed detailed logic models, containment analysis, and source term modeling supporting historic licensing basis activities, such as a 1982 SEP issue. The expert panel and/or MSO development teams also included individuals responsible for several areas

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 79 of 79 of the FSAR Chapter 14 licensing analysis and basis, Appendix R, and Fire Protection safety reviews.

Plant specific data sources included:

piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs),

electrical single line and circuit drawings, training documents, internal and external events PRA models and insights, safe shutdown equipment list, safe shutdown logic diagrams, post-fire safe shutdown analysis (SSA),

plant operating procedures (normal, emergency, post-fire and abnormal operating procedures),

self-assessment results, operating experience, and walk-down notes and pictures.

These information sources provided insights that were used in conjunction with the expertise of the team and generic industry information sources to identify potential MSO scenarios of concern for Palisades. Plant-specific and generic industry information sources are explicitly referenced in Report #: 0247 0005.04, Multiple Spurious Operations (MSO) Report, which was authored by plant personnel.

The effort to identify and evaluate potential MSOs did not end with the conclusion of the expert panel. NFPA 805 project staff continually evolved and refined the MSO work during NFPA 805 model development and analysis. The expert panel was re-convened at the conclusion of the work to ensure concurrence with any new MSOs, insights and evaluations, as documented in Report #: 0247 0005.04.

This report was then used to identify component MSO failure combinations to be included in the safe shutdown analysis to develop VFDRs and ensure the nuclear safety capability assessment also identified these MSO conditions. The results of this work are outlined in PLP-RPT-12-00110, Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Identification and Evaluation.