ML13063A016
| ML13063A016 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/2013 |
| From: | Kyle G Nexus Technical Services |
| To: | Entergy Corp, Entergy Operations, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| EA-12-051, OCAN021303 12-4116.ANO.V002, Rev 1 | |
| Download: ML13063A016 (20) | |
Text
Enclosure to OCAN021303 Arkansas Nuclear One Overall Integrated Plan for Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation
Entergy - Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO)
Overall Inteagrated Plan for Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation: EA-12-051 Document No.: 12-4116.ANO.V002 Revision: I Date: 28 January 2013 Prepared for:
Enterg.
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POWEIR OF PIOPLE.
Entergy Corporation Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO)
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ENGINEERING-Prepared by: Nexus Technical Services Corporation One Trans Am Plaza Drive, Suite 200 Oakbrook Terrace, IL 60181 630-627-2277 Page 1 of 19
Entergy Corporation Arkansas Nuclear One Overall Integrated Plan For Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Document No.12-411 6.ANO.V002 Revision: 1 Date: 28 January 2013 NE S
ENGINEERING' Responsible Engineer:
Manager, SFPI Project:
Director, SFPI Project:
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28 January 2013 George Kyle ', Nexus Engineering / Date A*
1 28 January 2013 Gary MacDermid, Nexus Engineering / Date 8January 2013 S
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RECORD OF REVISION Revision Date Description of Change 0
23 Jan 2013 Initial Issue 1
24 Jan 2013 Clarified Section 8 wording to show system is mounted to Seismic Category I.
Added hard spaces in Section 3 to ensure elevation levels are on the same line.
In Section 9, added words "impact of' to clarify that an example of post event conditions to be considered is "The impact of mitigating strategies..."
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Arkansas Nuclear One Overall Integrated Plan for Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Introduction The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Order EA-12-051,' Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, (Reference 1) on March 12, 2012. The Order requires licenses to have a reliable indication of the water level in spent fuel storage pools. The indication must permit identification of the following pool water level conditions by trained personnel: (1) level that is adequate to support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system, (2) level that is adequate to provide substantial radiation shielding.for a person standing on the spent fuel pool operating deck, and (3) level where fuel remains covered and actions to implement make-up water addition should no longer be deferred. The Order also requires submittal of an overall integrated plan that describes how the requirements of the Order will be achieved.
NEI 12-02 Revision 1, Industry Guidance for Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051, "To Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation,"
(Reference 2) provides an approach for complying with the Order. NRC Interim Staff Guidance JLD-ISG-2012-03 Revision 0, Compliance with Order EA-12-051, Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, (Reference 4) evaluated the methodologies and guidance in NEI 12-02 Revision 1 and considered them an acceptable method of complying with the Order subject to the clarifications and exceptions related to Qualification in Section 3.4 of NEI 12-02 Revision 1.
This Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) describes the Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Unit 1 and Unit 2 approach for complying with Order EA-12-051 using the methods described in NEI 12-02 Revision 1 and NRC JLD-ISG-2012-03 Revision 0. The current revision of the Overall Integrated Plan is based on a conceptual design. If the final design is different than described in this plan, then the Overall Integrated Plan will be revised and resubmitted.
Consistent with the requirements of Order EA-12-051 and the guidance in NEI 12-02 Revision 1, six-month reports will describe progress made, any proposed changes in compliance methods, schedule updates, and if needed, requests for relief and the bases.
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- 1. Applicability This Overall Integrated Plan (QIP) applies to Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Unit 1 and Unit 2.
- 2. Schedule The installation of reliable spent fuel pool level instrumentation for the single spent fuel pool associated with ANO Unit 1 is scheduled for completion prior to startup from the Unit 1 Fall 2014 refueling outage (1R25). This is the end of the second Unit 1 refueling outage following submittal of this Overall Integrated Plan.
Installation for the single spent fuel pool associated with ANO Unit 2 is scheduled for completion prior. to startup from the Unit 2 Fall 2015 refueling outage (2R24).
This is the end of the second Unit 2 refueling outage following submittal of this Overall Integrated Plan.
- 3. Identification of Spent Fuel Pool Water Levels Key spent fuel pool (SFP) water levels, including the three critical levels defined in NEI 12-02 Revision 1 will be identified in related guidance. Both the primary and backup instrument level channels are permanent, mounted directly within the SFP, and will measure level over a single continuous span from above Level I down to below the upper limit of Level 3 (taking into account instrument uncertainty). Access to the SFP area is not required to operate the instrument channels or obtain level data. Displays and signal processors will be located in the Main Control Room (MCR). Each channel displays indicated level to reasonably high accuracy when accounting for worse case environmental conditions and instrument uncertainties. A channel accuracy or instrument loop uncertainty of +/- 3 inches is applied which is conservative and bounding thereby precluding the need for formal accuracy analyses. As such, SFP level instrument span or range will be 3 inches or more above Level 1 and 3 inches or more below the Level 3 upper limit.' The three critical levels are as follows:
- LEVEL 1: Level 1 is the level adequate to support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system. It is the higher of the following two points:
(1) the level at which reliable suction loss occurs due to uncovering the coolant inlet pipe or any weirs or vacuum breakers associated with suction loss. This level, (1), is established for Unit 1 based on nominal coolant inlet pipe elevation [as it does not incorporate a vacuum (or siphon breaker)] and is established for Unit 2 based on nominal vacuum (or siphon) breaker elevation. The elevation associated with this level is 397 feet 5.21 inches for Unit 1 (References 6, 12, 13, 14,15)1. The elevation associated with this level is 401 feet 0 inches for Unit 2 (References 7, 12, 16, 17).
1 Horizontal pipe centerline 397' - 0"; Pipe Sched. 10S with I.D. 10.42" & 1/2 I.D. 5.21".
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(2) the level at which the normal fuel pool cooling pumps lose required NPSH assuming saturated conditions in the pool. It can be demonstrated that this elevation is below the elevation that defines Level 1 per (1) above. Unit 1 SFP Cooling pumps are at elevation 337'-0" with a required NPSH of 14 FT for suction temperatures up to 200°F (References 18, 19, 20). Unit 2 SFP Cooling pumps are at elevation 336'-2.5" with a required NPSH of 20 FT for suction temperatures up to 200°F (References 21, 22, 23).
The higher of the above points is (1). Therefore, LEVEL 1 is elevation 397 feet 5.21 inches for Unit 1 and LEVEL I is elevation 401 feet 0 inches for Unit 2.
The SFP level instrument upper range will'be at least 3 inches above LEVEL 1 to account for channel accuracy or instrument loop uncertainty.
From a practical perspective, the upper range capability will extend even higher (e.g. above normal operating level).
LEVEL 2: Level 2 is the level adequate to provide substantial radiation shielding for a person standing on the spent fuel pool operating deck.
Level 2 may be based on either of the following:
(1) 10 feet + 1 foot above the highest point of any fuel rack seated in the spent fuel pool. The elevation associated with this level is 385 feet 11.5675 inches +/- 1 foot for Unit 1. The elevation associated with this level is 388 feet 3.3125 inches +/- 1 foot for Unit 2.
(2) A designated level that provides adequate radiation shielding to maintain personnel dose within acceptable limits while performing local operations in the vicinity of the pool. This level is based on plant-specific or appropriate generic shielding calculations. The elevation associated with this level is not calculated since item (1) is used to establish Level 2.
In lieu of plant specific dose calculations required by (2), (1) is used as the conservative accepted level as suggested by NEI 12-02 Revision 1.
Therefore, LEVEL 2 is elevation 385 feet 11.5675 inches +/- 1 foot for Unit 1 and LEVEL 2 is elevation 388 feet 3.3125 inches +/- 1 foot for Unit 2 (i.e. 10 1 feet above Top of Fuel Rack).
The equipment and instructions needed to reestablish SFP inventory will be provided as required by NEI 12-06 (Reference 3). This guidance will require action to reestablish SFP inventory at or before Level 3 is reached.
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- LEVEL 3: Level 3 is the level where fuel remains covered. It is defined as the highest point of any fuel rack seated in the spent fuel pool (within + 1 foot).
The highest point (nominal) of any fuel rack seated in the spent fuel pool is 375 feet 11.5675 inches for Unit 1 (References 8, 10)2 and 378 feet 3.3125 inches for Unit 2 (References 9, 11). Therefore, LEVEL 3 is elevation 375 feet 11.5675 inches +/- 1 foot for Unit 1 and LEVEL 3 is elevation 378 feet 3.3125 inches +/- 1 foot for Unit 2.
The SFP level instrument span will extend down to at least 3 inches below the upper limit of the range of LEVEL 3 to account for channel accuracy or instrument loop uncertainty. Therefore, the SFP level probe will extend down to at least elevation 376 feet 8.5675 inches for Unit 1 and 379 feet 0.3125 inches for Unit 2.
- 4. Instruments The design of the instruments will be consistent with the guidelines of NRC JLD-ISG-2012-03 Revision 0 and NEI 12-02 Revision 1. Specifically, the channels will be designed as discussed below.
Primary (fixed) Instrument Channel (Channel A)
The primary instrument channel is a permanent, fixed channel and located at the approximate locations shown on Attachment 1 (Unit 1) and Attachment 2 (Unit 2).
The primary instrument channel will provide level indication through the use of Guided Wave Radar (GWR) technology using the principle of Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR). The instrument provides a single continuous span from above Level 1 to within 1 foot of the top of the spent fuel racks (Level 3).
Backup Instrument Channel (Channel B)
The backup instrument channel is identical to the primary channel and is a permanent, fixed channel. Components are located in the approximate locations shown on Attachment 1 (Unit 1) and Attachment 2 (Unit 2). The backup instrument channel will provide level indication through the use of Guided Wave Radar (GWR) technology using the principle of Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR). The instrument provides continuous level indication from above Level 1 to within 1 foot of the top of the spent fuel racks (Level 3).
- 5. Reliability Reliability of the primary and backup instrument channels will be assured by conformance with the guidelines of NRC JLD-ISG-2012-03 Revision 0 and 2 362' - 0" Top of Concrete SFP Floor + 0.1875" (3/16") Liner Plate + 13' - 11.38" (165.5"+1.88") Rack Height 3 362' - 0" Top of Concrete SFP Floor + 0.1875" (3/16") Liner Plate + 16' - 3.125" (195.125") Rack Height Page 7 of 19
NEI 12-02 Revision 1, as discussed in the sections below.
- 6. Instrument Channel Design Criteria Instrument channel design will be consistent with the guidelines of NRC JLD-ISG-2012-03 Revision 0 and NEI 12-02 Revision 1.
Instrument channels will consist of a corrosion and radiation resistant metal probe submerged in the pool and connected to a corresponding display/processor by coaxial cable. The probe will span the length of the measured range of pool levels. It will be seismically mounted. The probe will be designed to operate in borated and non-borated water over the entire expected range of pool conditions from normal temperatures to boiling temperatures. Cables and connections are designed for expected radiation levels and environments of greater. than 2120 F and 100 % humidity. Probes, cables, connectors, and mounting hardware in the area of the SFP will be designed to function after the effects of seismically induced sloshing.
In the SFP area, cables shall be routed in seismically mounted rigid metal conduit. Outside the pool area, cables shall be routed in seismically mounted rigid metal conduit, trays, or raceways. Display!Processors shall be mounted in promptly accessible areas outside of the SFP area as defined in Section 14.
Channels shall be physically separated by routing instrument cables in separate conduits, trays, or raceways, locating sensors near opposing SFP corners, etc.
Physical channel separation will be maintained down through and including each channel display/processor where convergence may be allowed so that displays/processors can be located in close proximity or side by side.
Movement of the probe during a seismic event will not damage the pool liner and will not result in contact with spent fuel. Indication will remain reliable after a seismic event.
Minor debris or boric acid buildup on the probe will not adversely impact performance.
- 7. Arrangement Level instruments will be installed in the approximate locations shown on (Unit 1) and Attachment 2 (Unit 2). Separation of the channels/probes reduces the potential for falling debris or missiles affecting both channels of instrumentation. This placement coupled with routing cables on the SFP floor in rigid conduit provides reasonable protection against falling debris and structural damage. Additional protection may also be afforded by objects in the vicinity which rise above the floor grade (e.g. SFP curbs and/or SFP Bridge tracks/rails).
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Instrument power is derived from the display/processors. The location of the display/processors is in the Main Control Room as shown on Attachment 3. This building is expected to be a mild environment after a Beyond Design Basis External (BDBE) event and is easily accessible. This building provides adequate protection against the effects of temperature, flood, humidity, radiation, seismic events, and missile hazards.
The display/processors will normally be powered using 120VAC that is provided from separate 480V buses at a minimum. On loss of normal AC power, each processor automatically continues to operate on its own dedicated backup battery supply. The backup batteries and associated UPS are located at the processor, seismically mounted, and qualified for the expected environment. The processor will also have connections designed to allow powering the processor from an external, portable DC source.
- 8. Mounting Both the primary and backup system installation will incorporate seismic category I mounting to meet the NRC JLD-ISG-2012-03 and NEI 12-02 guidance requirements.
Other hardware stored in the SFP will be evaluated to ensure that it does not adversely interact with the SFP instrument probes during a seismic event.
- 9. Qualification 4
Design criteria will ensure instrument channel reliability during normal, event, and post-event conditions for no fewer than seven days or until off-site resources can be deployed. Analyses, operating experience, and/or manufacturer testing of channel components will be used to validate design criteria and will consider the following:
Post event conditions in the area of instrument channel components Effects of shock and vibration on all instrument channel components
- Seismic effects on instrument channel components during and following a potential seismic event.
Components in the area of the SFP will be designed for the temperature, humidity, and radiation levels expected during normal, event, and post-event conditions for no fewer than seven days post-event or until off-site resources can be deployed by the mitigating strategies resulting from Order EA-1 2-049, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External 4 Qualification as used in the Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) is understood to be within the context of the requirements of Order EA-12-051 dated 3/12/2012, NEI 12-02 Rev 1, JLD-ISG-2012-03 Rev 0 Page 9 of 19
Events. Examples of post event conditions that will be considered are:
Radiological conditions for a normal refueling quantity of freshly discharged (100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />) fuel with SFP water level with in 1 foot of the top of the SFP racks (Level 3),
- Temperature of 212 degrees F and 100% relative humidity environment, Boiling water and steam environment
- Concentrated borated water environment, and
- The impact of mitigating strategies developed in response to NEI 12-06, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX).
Equipment located in the SFP will be qualified to withstand a total accumulated dose of expected lifetime at normal conditions plus accident dose received at post event conditions with SFP water level within 1 foot of the top of the fuel rack seated in the spent fuel pool (Level 3).
The metal probe and cable in the spent fuel pool area are robust components that are not adversely affected by expected radiation, temperature, or humidity. The areas selected for display/processor installation are considered mild environments, such that personnel access is not prohibited by radiation, temperature or humidity, and are readily accessible by operators during or after a BDBE event.
Components of the instrument channels will be qualified for shock and vibration using one or more of the following methods:
- Components will be supplied by manufacturers that implement commercial quality programs (such as IS09001, Quality Management Systems - Requirements) with shock and vibration requirements included in the purchase specification at levels commensurate with portable hand-held devices or transportation applications;
- Components have a history of operational reliability in environments with significant shock and vibration loading, such as portable hand-held device or transportation applications; or
" Components are inherently resistant to shock and vibration loadings, such as cables.
For seismic effects on instrument channel components used after a potential seismic event for only installed components (with the exception of replaceable batteries and chargers), the following measures will be used to verify that the design and installation is adequate:
- Components will be rated by the manufacturer (or otherwise tested) for seismic effects at levels commensurate with those of postulated design Page 10 of 19
basis event conditions in the area of instrument channel component use using one or more of the following methods:
o demonstration of seismic motion will be consistent with that of existing design basis loads at the installed location;
" substantial history of operational reliability in environments with significant vibration, such as for portable hand-held devices or transportation applications. Such a vibration design envelope will be inclusive of the effects of seismic motion imparted to the components proposed at the location of the proposed installation; o demonstration of seismic reliability using methods that predict equipment performance (e.g., analysis, testing, combination thereof, or use of experience data) where demonstration should be based on the guidance in Sections 7, 8, 9, and 10 of Reference 5 or a substantially similar industrial standard; o demonstration that proposed devices are substantially similar in design to models that have been previously tested for seismic effects in excess of the plant design basis at the location where the instrument is to be installed (g-levels and frequency ranges); or o seismic qualification using seismic motion consistent with that of existing design basis loading at the installation location.
Augmented quality requirements will be applied to all components in the instrumentation channels for:
o design control o procurement document control o instructions, procedures, and drawings o control of purchased material, equipment, and services o inspection, testing, and test control o inspections, test, and operating status o nonconforming items o corrective actions o records o audits 10.Independence The primary instrument channel will be independent of the backup instrument channel. Independence is obtained by physical separation of components between channels and the use of normal power supplied from separate 480V buses.
Independence of power sources is described in Section 11. The two (2) permanently mounted instruments in the pool are physically separated as described in Sections 6 Page 11 of 19
and 7.
- 11. Power Supplies The power supplies for the instrument channels are shown on Attachment 3 and arranged as follows:
Each instrument channel is normally powered from 120VAC 60 Hz plant power to support continuous monitoring of SFP level. The primary channel receives power from a different 480V bus than the backup channel.
Therefore, loss of any one 480V bus does not result in loss of normal 120VAC power for both instrument channels.
" On loss of normal 120VAC power, each channel's UPS automatically transfers to a dedicated backup battery. If normal power is restored, the channel will automatically transfers back to the normal AC power.
- The backup batteries are maintained in a charged state by commercial-grade uninterruptible power supplies. The batteries are sized to be capable of supporting intermittent monitoring for a minimum of 3 days of operation. This provides adequate time to allow the batteries to be replaced, or until off-site resources can be deployed by the mitigating strategies resulting from Order EA-12-049 Revision 0.
- An external connection permits powering the system from any portable DC source.
" Instrument accuracy and performance are not affected by restoration of power or restarting the processor.
- 12. Accuracy Accuracy will be consistent with the guidelines of NRC JLD-ISG-2012-03 Revision 0 and NEI 12-02 Revision 1. Accuracy and indication features are as follows:
" Accuracy: The absolute system accuracy is equal or better than + 3 inches. This accuracy is applicable for normal conditions and the temperature, humidity, chemistry, and radiation levels expected for BDBE event conditions.
- Trending: The display trends and retains data when powered from either normal or backup power.
- Restoration after Loss of Power: The system automatically swaps to available power (backup battery power or external DC source) when normal power is lost. Neither the source of power nor system restoration impact accuracy. Previously collected data is retained.
- Diagnostics: The system performs and displays the results of real-time information related to the integrity of the cable, probe, and instrument channel.
The above features ensure that trained personnel can easily determine when Page 12 of 19
SFP level falls below each regulatory level (levels 1, 2 and 3) without conflicting or ambiguous indication.
13.Testing Testing and calibration will be consistent with the guidelines of NRC JLD-ISG-2012-03 Revision 0 and NEI 12-02 Revision 1 and vendor recommendations.
The display/processor performs automatic in-situ calibration and automatically monitors for cable, connector, and probe faults using time domain reflectometry (TDR) technology. Channel degradation due to age or corrosion is not expected but associated testing, calibration, and monitoring provides reasonable opportunity for identification thereof.
Station procedures and preventive maintenance tasks will be developed as necessary (e.g. to perform required surveillance testing, calibration, backup battery maintenance, functional checks, and visual inspections of the probes).
- 14. Display The primary and backup instrument displays will be located in the Main Control Room (MCR) shown on Attachment 3.
The display will be consistent with the guidelines of NRC JLD-ISG-2012-03 Revision 0 and NEI 12-02 Revision 1.
For both normal and expected beyond design basis conditions, the displays are in mild environments that are:
- promptly accessible to plant staff and decision makers properly trained in the use of the equipment. Station operators can obtain SFP level data trends and report those to decision makers within 30 minutes of request.
" outside the area surrounding the SFP floor and protected from the environmental and radiological sources resulting from an event impacting the SFP.
- inside a seismic structure that provides protection from adverse weather or flooding.
- outside of any high radiation area or locked high radiation area during normal or expected beyond design basis conditions.
- 15. Instrument Channel Program Criteria The program criteria will be consistent with the guidelines of NRC JLD-ISG-2012-03 Revision 0 and NEI 12-02 Revision 1 as described in the sections below.
Training The Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) will be used to identify the population to be trained and to determine both the initial and continuing elements of the required Page 13 of 19
training. Training will be completed prior to placing the instrumentation in service.
Procedures Procedures for maintenance and testing will be developed using regulatory guidelines and vendor instructions.
BDBE event operations guidance will also address the following:
A strategy to ensure SFP water addition is initiated at an appropriate time consistent with implementation of NEI 12-06 Revision 1.
" Restoration of non-functioning SFP level channels after an event.
Restoration timing will be consistent with the emergency condition. After an event, commercially available components that may not meet all qualifications may be used to replace components to restore functionality.
Testing and Calibration Reference 13 above. Testing and calibration processes will be developed consistent with the guidelines of NRC JLD-ISG-2012-03 Revision 0, NEI 12-02 Revision 1, and vendor instructions.
- 16. Need for Relief and Basis There are no exceptions to the requirements of EA-12-051 or NEI 12-02 Revision 1 as endorsed by JLD-ISG-2012-03 Revision 0; therefore, there is no request for relief.
Consistent with the requirements of Order EA-12-051 and the guidance in NEI 12-02 Revision 1, six-month update reports will be submitted to the NRC to provide progress and schedule updates, identify any changes in compliance methods, as well as any requests for relief and their bases.
- 17. References
- 1. EA-1 2-051, Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, March 12, 2012
- 2. NEI 12-02 Revision 1, Industry Guidance for Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051, "To Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation,
Implementation Guide Page 14 of 19
- 4. NRC Interim Staff Guidance JLD-ISG-2012-03 Revision 0, Compliance with Order EA-12-051, Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation
- 5. IEEE Standard 344-2004, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
- 6. M-235 Sh 1 Revision 68, P&ID, ANOI Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
- 7. M-2235 Sh 1 Revision 73, P&ID, AN02 Fuel Pool System
- 8. 1W062A-017(4) Revision 0, VP, AN0I SFP Rack Elevation View FF, Items 03&04
- 10. C-231 Revision 11, ANOI SFP Liner Plan and Sections
- 11. C-2251 Revision 17, AN02 SFP Liner Plan and Sections
- 12. ULD-0-SYS-03 Revision 5, ANO-1 & ANO-2 New and Spent Fuel Storage, Spent Fuel Cooling, New and Spent Fuel Handling Systems
- 14. SPEC-ANO-M-555 Revision 2, ANO-1 ISO Spent Fuel System
- 15. Crane Technical Paper No. 410, 2 5 th Printing 1991, Flow of Fluids Through Valves, Fittings, and Pipe (Appendix B Pipe Data)
- 19. M-421 Revision 8, Logic Diagram, ANOI SFP Cooling
- 22. M-2421 Revision 7, Logic Diagram, AN02 SFP Cooling
- 24. EA-1 2-049, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Page 15 of 19
Mitigation for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events
- 18. Sketches : : :
ANO Unit 1-SFPI Simplified Spent Fuel Pool Instrument Approximate Locations and Approximate Cable Routing ANO Unit 2-SFPI Simplified Spent Fuel Pool Instrument Approximate Locations and Approximate Cable Routing ANO Unit 1 & Unit 2-SFPI Simplified Connection and Power Supply Diagram Page 16 of 19 ANO Unit I - SFPI Simplified Spent Fuel Pool Instrument Approximate Locations and Approximate Cable Routing
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PLAN ELEV. 404'-0" Page 17 of 19 ANO Unit 2 - SFPI Simplified Spent Fuel Pool Instrument Approximate Locations and Approximate Cable Routing tHk
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-t.tt PLAN ELEV. 404'-0" Page 18 of 19
'I ANO Unit 1 & 2 - SFPI Simplified Connection and Power Supply Diagram 000000.-
EQUIPMENT ADDED BY THIS DESIGN CHANGE 120VAC (Channels A and B powered from separate 480V MCCs)
/
SFPI PROCESSOR/INDICATION CHANNEL (A) LOCATION AT MAIN CONTROL ROOM 1
120VAC (Channels A and B powered from separate 480V Mjs SFPI PROCESSOR/INDICATION CHANNEL (B) LOCATION AT MAIN CONTROL ROOM
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t Backur) Power Each SFPI Processor has its own:
(1) dedicated UPS with three (3) day minimum backup battery and (2) external connections for a second DC source 600F,-
SIGNAL CABLE (FLEXIBLE COAXIAL)
I I
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/
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I POE A I
PROBE B
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0010 Page 19 of 19