ML13008A555
| ML13008A555 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/19/2013 |
| From: | Persinko A NRC/FSME/DWMEP |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13008A465 | List: |
| References | |
| NRC-2011-0145 | |
| Download: ML13008A555 (9) | |
Text
[7590-01-P]
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE DOCKET NO. 50-409 LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR EXEMPTION FROM CERTAIN EMERGENCY PLANNING REQUIREMENTS IN 10 CFR PART 50 AND 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX E
[NRC-2011-0145]
1.0 BACKGROUND
The La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) is owned and was operated by the Dairyland Power Cooperative (DPC). LACBWR was a nuclear power plant of nominal 50 Mw electrical outputs, which utilized a forced-circulation, direct-cycle boiling water reactor as its heat source. The plant is located on the east bank of the Mississippi River in Vernon County, Wisconsin. The plant was one of a series of demonstration plants funded, in part, by the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The nuclear steam supply system and its auxiliaries were funded by the AEC, and the balance of the plant was funded by DPC. The Allis-Chalmers Company was the original licensee; the AEC later sold the plant to DPC and provided them with a provisional operating license.
LACBWR was permanently shut-down on April 30, 1987, and reactor defueling was completed on June 11, 1987. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved DPCs decommissioning plan on August 7, 1991. DPC has been conducting dismantlement and decommissioning activities. All of the spent nuclear fuel has been transferred to an onsite Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) under the general license provisions of 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart K.
2.0 REQUEST / ACTION Section 50.47, Emergency plans, of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50) provides in part, no initial operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by the NRC that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Appendix E, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities," to 10 CFR Part 50provides in part, "This appendix establishes minimum requirements for emergency plans for use in attaining an acceptable state of emergency preparedness."
On November 23, 2011, the NRC issued a Final Rule modifying or adding emergency planning (EP) requirements in Section 50.47, Section 50.54, and Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50 (76 Federal Register (FR) 72560). The EP Final Rule was effective on December 23, 2011, with specific implementation dates for each of the rule changes, varying from the effective date of the Final Rule through December 31, 2015.
The EP Final Rule codified certain voluntary protective measures contained in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events, and generically applicable requirements similar to those previously imposed by NRC Order EA-02-026, Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures, dated February 25, 2002. In addition, the EP Final Rule amended other licensee emergency plan requirements to: (1) enhance the ability of licensees in preparing and in taking certain protective actions in the event of a radiological emergency; (2) address, in part, security issues identified after the terrorist events of September 11, 2001; (3) clarify regulations to effect consistent emergency plan implementation among licensees; and (4) modify certain EP requirements to be more effective and efficient. However, the EP Final Rule was only an enhancement to the NRCs regulations and was not necessary for adequate protection. On page 72563 of the Federal 2
Register notice for the EP Final Rule, the Commission determined that the existing regulatory structure ensures adequate protection of public health and safety and common defense and security.
By application dated June 18, 2012, Request for Exemption from Emergency Planning Requirements (ADAMS Accession No. ML12171A462), DPC requested exemption from specific emergency planning requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 for the LACBWR facility and ISFSI.
3.0 DISCUSSION Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, when (1) the exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) when special circumstances are present.
NRC staff reviewed the licensees request and determined that exemptions were previously granted or should be granted from the following requirements: the requirement: and, except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, offsite of 10 CFR 50.47(b); the requirement: within the Emergency Planning Zones of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1); the requirement:
arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensees Emergency Operations Facility have been made of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3); the requirement: and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4); the requirement: and the public, and and means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5); the requirement: and to the public of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6); the requirement:
Information is made available to the public on a periodic basis on how they will be notified and 3
what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g., listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors) and (including the physical location or locations) of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7); the requirement: offsite of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9); the requirement of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10); the requirement:, and onsite protective actions during hostile action of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1; the requirement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2; the requirement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.3; the requirement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.4; the requirement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.5; the requirement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.6; the requirement:, plant of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.1; the requirement:, Plant of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.A.2.b; the requirement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.3; the requirement:
offsite of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.4; the requirement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.5; the requirement: By June 23, 2014, a description of the and including hostile action at the site. For purposes of this appendix, hostile action is defined as an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end.
This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7; the requirement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.8; the requirement 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.9; the requirements: and outside, and offsite, and By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, these action levels must include hostile action that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B.1; the requirements: and offsite, such as the pressure in containment and the response of the Emergency Core Cooling System) and (3) site area emergency, and (4) general emergency of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C.1; the requirements:, By June 20, 2012, within 15 minutes and to protect public health and safety provided that any delay in declaration does 4
not deny the State and local authorities the opportunity to implement measures necessary to protect the public health and safety of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C.2; the requirement: for the prompt notification of the public and for public evacuation or other protective measures, should they become necessary and within the EPZs of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.1; the requirement, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.2; the requirement:, within 15 minutes and The licensee shall demonstrate that the appropriate governmental authorities have the capability to make a public alerting and notification decision promptly on being informed by the licensee of an emergency condition. Prior to initial operation greater than 5 percent of rated thermal power of the first reactor at the site, each nuclear power reactor licensee shall demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the public with the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The design objective of the prompt public alert and notification system shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial alerting and notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this alerting and notification capability will range from immediate alerting and notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials are notified that a situation exists requiring urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time available for the appropriate governmental authorities to make a judgment whether or not to activate the public alert and notification system. The alerting and notification capability shall additionally include administrative and physical means for a backup method of public alerting and notification capable of being used in the event the primary method of alerting and notification is unavailable during an emergency to alert or notify all or portions of the plume exposure pathway EPZ population. The backup method shall have the capability to alert and notify the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, but does not need to meet the 15 minute design objective for the primary prompt public alert and notification system. When there is a decision to activate the 5
alert and notification system, the appropriate governmental authorities will determine whether to activate the entire alert and notification system simultaneously or in a graduated or staged manner. The responsibility for activating such a public alert and notification system shall remain with the appropriate governmental authorities of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3; the requirement, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.4; the requirement: onsite technical support center and a licensee near-site emergency operations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a.(i); the requirement: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a.(ii); the requirement, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.b; the requirement, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.c; the requirement, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.d; the requirement, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.e; the requirement: and one offsite communications system; each and titles and alternates for those in charge at both ends of the communication links and of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9; the requirement: contiguous and within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.a; the requirement: nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite technical support center, and the emergency operations, among the nuclear facility and the field assessment teams of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.c; the requirement: nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite technical support center, and the emergency operations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.d; the requirement: viii.
Licensees headquarters support personnel and local news media persons of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.1.(a); the requirement: test the public alert and notification system.
of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2; the requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a; the requirement: Nuclear power reactor licensees shall submit exercise scenarios under § 50.4 at least 60 days before use in an exercise required by this paragraph 2.b. The exercise may be included in the full participation biennial exercise required by paragraph 2.c. of this section and continues to be exempt from the requirement and offsite 6
and (Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.b; the requirement, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.c; the requirement, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.d; the requirement, located within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.e; the requirement: in consultation with FEMA and The extent of State and local participation in remedial exercises must be sufficient to show that appropriate corrective measures have been taken regarding the elements of the plan not properly tested in the previous exercises of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.f; the requirement, Such scenarios for nuclear power reactor licensees must include a wide spectrum of radiological releases and events, including hostile action of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.i; the requirement, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.j; and from the requirement, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.I.
The exemption request was reviewed against the acceptance criteria included in 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, 10 CFR 72.32 and Interim Staff Guidance - 16. The review considered the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the reactor, and the low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. These evaluations were supported by the previously documented licensee and staff accident analyses. The staff concludes that the LACBWR Emergency Plan provides: (1) an adequate basis for an acceptable state of emergency preparedness, and (2) in conjunction with arrangements made with offsite response agencies, provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the LACBWR facility.
The Commission has concluded that the licensees request for an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV as specified above are acceptable in view of the greatly reduced offsite radiological consequences 7
associated with the current plant status as permanently shutdown and spent nuclear fuel is stored in an ISFSI.
The NRC has determined that other requirements from which DPC requested exemptions were not applicable to the LACBWR facility and ISFSI or are being met by the LACBWR Emergency Plan. Therefore, an exemption was not necessary or was denied for those requirements. Additional information regarding the NRC staff evaluation is documented in a Safety Evaluation Report (ML13008A597).
The NRC has found that DPC meets the criteria for an exemption in § 50.12. The NRC has determined that granting the exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the Commissions regulations. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by law.
As noted in Section 2.0, REQUEST / ACTION, above, DPCs compliance with the EP requirements in effect before the effective date of the EP Final Rule demonstrated reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety and common defense and security. In the Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC staff explains that DPCs implementation of the LACBWR Emergency Plan, with the exemptions, will continue to provide this reasonable assurance of adequate protection. Thus, granting the exemptions will not present an undue risk to public health or safety and is not inconsistent with the common defense and security.
For the Commission to grant an exemption, special circumstances must exist. Under
§ 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances are present when [a]pplication of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. These special circumstances exist here. The NRC has determined that DPCs compliance with the regulations listed above is not necessary for the licensee to demonstrate that, under its emergency plan, there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological 8
emergency. Consequently, special circumstances are present because requiring DPC to comply with the regulations listed above is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the EP regulations.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, are consistent with the common defense and security, and special circumstances are present.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.21, 51.32, and 51.35, an environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact related to this exemption was published in the Federal Register. Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission has determined that issuance of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.
These exemptions are effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of July 2013.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/RA/
Andrew Persinko, Deputy Director Decommissioning and Uranium Recovery Licensing Directorate Division of Waste Management and Environmental Protection Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs 9