ML12366A191
| ML12366A191 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun |
| Issue date: | 12/21/2012 |
| From: | Hay M NRC/RGN-IV/DRP |
| To: | Cortopassi L Omaha Public Power District |
| References | |
| EA-12-174 IR-12-005 | |
| Download: ML12366A191 (3) | |
See also: IR 05000285/2012005
Text
December 21, 2012
Louis P. Cortopassi, Site Vice President
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4
P.O. Box 550
Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550
SUBJECT:
ERRATA FOR FORT CALHOUN STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000285/2012005
Dear Mr. Cortopassi:
An error was discovered in NRC Inspection Report 05000285/2012005, Enclosure 2, dated
November 13, 2012. It was identified that the cross-cutting aspect for noncited violation (NCV)05000285/2012005-02, Untimely Corrective Actions for 480 VAC Breaker Issues was
described incorrectly on page 2 of the report. Please replace page 2 of Enclosure 2 to NRC
Inspection Report 05000285/2012005 with the enclosed page 2.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRC's Agency wide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is
accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public
Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michael C. Hay, Chief
Project Branch F
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No.: 50-285
License No.: DPR-40
Enclosure:
Errata page 2 for NRC Inspection Report 05000285/2012005
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
RE G IO N I V
1600 EAST LAMAR BLVD
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4511
L. Cortopassi
-2-
Electronic distribution:
Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov)
Deputy Regional Administrator (Steven.Reynolds@nrc.gov)
DRP Director (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov)
Acting DRP Deputy Director (Barry.Westreich@nrc.gov)
Acting DRS Director (Tom.Blount@nrc.gov)
Acting DRS Deputy Director (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)
Senior Resident Inspector (John.Kirkland@nrc.gov)
Resident Inspector (Jacob.Wingebach@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, DRP/F (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/F (Rick.Deese@nrc.gov)
Project Engineer, DRP/F (Chris.Smith@nrc.gov)
FCS Administrative Assistant - Vacant
Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)
Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Ray.Kellar@nrc.gov)
Project Manager (Lynnea.Wilkins@nrc.gov)
RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)
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OEMail Resource
Inspection Reports/MidCycle and EOC Letters to the following:
ROPreports
Only inspection reports to the following:
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DRS/TSB STA (Dale.Powers@nrc.gov)
ADAMS ACCESSION NO: ML12366A191
SUNSI Rev Compl.
Yes No
Yes No
Reviewer Initials
MCH
Publicly Avail.
Yes No
Sensitive
Yes No
Sens. Type
Initials
MCH
SRI:DRP/F
SPE:DRP/F
BC:DRP/F
JKirkland
RDeese
MHay
/RA Via email/
/RA/
/RA/
12/19/12
12/21/12
12/21/12
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
-2-
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000285/2012005; 08/19/2012 - 09/30/2012; Fort Calhoun Station, Integrated Resident,
Inservice Inspection, and Confirmatory Action Letter Report
The report covered a 6-week period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced
baseline inspections by region-based inspectors. One Green noncited violation and one
Severity Level IV cited violation were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by
their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance
Determination Process. The cross-cutting aspect is determined using Inspection Manual
Chapter 0310, Components Within the Cross Cutting Areas. Findings for which the
significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level
after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of
commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 4, dated December 2006.
A.
NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
Green. The NRC identified a noncited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, for the failure to take timely corrective actions with
respect to nonconforming conditions in several circuit breakers. These conditions were
determined to have been the cause of the 1B4A bus bar failure that initiated a fire on
June 7, 2011. These conditions were not corrected in a timely manner and the licensee
continued to operate with a degraded breaker for nine months after the breaker tripped
unexpectedly during the June 7, 2011, fire event. The licensee entered this issue into
their corrective action program as CRs 2012-01884 and 2011-5414.
The violation was determined to be more than minor because it affected the Initiating
Events Cornerstone attribute of protection against external events (i.e., fire). The issue
adversely affected the associated cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those
events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown
as well as power operations because the condition that contributed to the fire event was
left uncorrected. The finding screened to Green in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix
G because RCS makeup capability was not degraded. The inspectors determined that
the issue had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision
Making, in that the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions and adopt a
requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather
than a requirement to demonstrate that it is unsafe in order to disapprove the action
H.1(b) (4OA4.1.c.(3).1).
Cornerstone: Miscellaneous
SLIV. The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e), Maintenance of
Records, Making of Reports, for the failure to update the Updated Safety Analysis
Report with a detailed description of the Original Steam Generator Storage Facility.
Specifically, since December 2006, the licensee stored a significant source of