Text

Official Exhibit - NYS00422A-00-BD01 - Interim Report (Main Text), Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company (Dec. 26, 2011)
	ML12340A609
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	12/26/2011
From:	; Tokyo Electric Power Co
To:	; Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
	SECY RAS
References
	RAS 22873, 50-247-LR, 50-286-LR, ASLBP 07-858-03-LR-BD01
	Download: ML12340A609 (50)
	v • d • e

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Official Hearing Exhibit NYS00422A Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Submitted: June 29, 2012 In the Matter of:

(Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3) c:..\,.~""R REGlI~;. ASLBP #: 07-858-03-LR-BD01

l~'~...

Docket #: 05000247 l 05000286 Exhibit #: NYS00422A-00-BD01 Identified: 10/15/2012

0 Admitted: 10/15/2012 Withdrawn:

~ ~

....,,1-

? ~

0.... Rejected: Stricken:

- - - il Other:

Interim Report (Main text)

December 26, 2011 Investigation Conlrnittee on the LA.. ccident at Fukushinla ~~uclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company OAGI0001550_00001

V. Emergency Response Measnres Primarily Implemented ontside the Fnknshima Dai-ichi i,juciear rOWel' Station in Response to the Accident

1. Env!nmmenta! radianon monitmi.1!g (1) Preparedness for enviromnental mdiation monitoring and the initial situation regarding radiation after the accident H.. Role sharing a.-nong the ccntn*J government, loc~J governments, ~u... d nuclear po,,,'c;'

opemtors before the accident occnrred The "Basic Disaster Prevention Plans " created by the Centml Disaster Management Council stipulates that the radiation nlonitoring at the nuclear disaster should be l!..l1dertnken by local goverrnnents; a.l1d that the rvIWistry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (hereinafter referred to as "MEXT"), operators, and designated public institutions including the National Institute of Radiological Sciences (hereinafter referred to as r'~IRSI!) lli'1d Japlli'1 Atomic Energy Agency* (JAEA), should support L.1.C emergency monitoring of local governments by mobili7ing both a mandatory emergency mortitoring workforce and all necessary equipment to disaster-stricken areas.

Acconling to lhe "Nuclear EUlergem..:y Respunse l'vl;mual" (hereinafter re[eneu Lo as Lhe "NE Response I\1,uTLwl", after tl}e declaration of a nuclear emergency, a radiation mortitoring tearn from the Nuclear Emergency Response Local Headquaters

('"NERLHQ" ) of Japanese Government shouid coHect and arrange radiation mortitoring data Such data \\;11 provide the basis ror establishing \vhich areas \\,;11 be evacuated or all residents, as well as detemlining where the consumption or rood and drink hy the residents is to be restricted or rorbidden. Moreover, the NE Response Manual stipulates that ir a nuciear accident has occurred at a commercial reactor, the NERLHQ should provide a comprehensive summa.ry of all monitoring data to the Secretariat of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (hereinafter referred to as the "MITI-ERHQ), "hich is iocated at the Emergency Response Center (ERC) of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry C~vnTI"), 3.Lld tlm! the r-~TER.Jq.Q Secret3.L"'i.at should provide ttIis data to the Cabinet Secretariat of' the Nuclear Safety Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "NSC"), as well as all other designated admirtistrative agencies.

Tne FukushIma regIOnal disaster prevention plan stipulates thai me Fukusrunm

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prefectural government should implement monitoring tasks even during normal times, that they should Luake provisions to take s\vift CQuntenlleasw-es if they receive a rep0l1 of any tmusual state of aIIairs based on Lhe Act on Special Measures Concewing Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, and thal they should make an elTor! to be well-positioned to implement emergency monitoring. Tnis inciudes the need to work out a radiation monitoring strategy, prepare UI'1d maintain radiation monitoring facilities a'-'ld equipment, secure all required radiation monitoring personnel, and ensure cooperation among relevant organizations.

The Fukushima prefectural govenllnent has 111onitOling posts established in hventy-four locations based on the Fukushil11.1l regional disaster prevention pla..l1. Moreover, the Ful:ushirna prefectural government constantly observes the radiation levels in the surrounding areas of the nuclear power station, which are measured through the nlOnitoring posts operated by En\"ironIncntal Radioacti viiy ~l'1onitoring Centre (hereinafter referred to as the "Monitoring Center"), which is adjacent to the emergency preparedness and response center (hereinafter referred to as the "Off-site Center"). The prefectural guveuliUent has a tulal uf lhilL~Jl JIlUIllLuring L:::US fur all relev::Ult urg::uilLatiuns induwng t..l:le off-site center. Lt} addition, tl:le loc(ll govemment1s (l~t}(llytic(ll equipment includes four gennanium semiconductor detectors as well as Nal scintillation detectors located within

_ ** _. 1 the Momtonng Center".

Concerning nuclear operators roles in monitoring, the Basic Disaster Prevention Plai'ls l

stipulates that nuclear operators should prepare and maintain all the required measuring equipment (lor each nuclear operator's facility), including sile border monitoring posts, portable type measuring instruments and stack monitors in order to enSlll"e that monitoring results are reported accurately \vhen a specific incident occurs, a.l1d that nuclear operators should continue monitoring at site borders in order to notilY the Nuclear Emergency Response Local Headqualers of any monitoring resuits.

Based on tl-Iis stipulation, L.~e Nuclear Operator Emergency Action Plail" of the Toky-o

'lhe Monitoring Center Fuk"1l:,>hima branch, located in ~'uhl:'>hima City, ha:'> 1\\'0 gemlanium :'\emiconductor detectors and one NaT scintillation detector. Tn addition, each of the :'\even Development hureau:'> tn l'uku..;;htma Prefecture ha..;; one NaT :'ICtntillation detector.

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Electric Power Company (hereinafter referred to as "TEPCO") stipulates that the health physics team of the Elllergency Response Centel~ ,,,,hieh is to be established at the En1ergenc:v Response Control ROOlTI in Lhe Seislnic Isolation Building of Lhe pmver station, should be in charge of monitoring activities if an accident occurs at either the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi Nudear Power Station (hereinailer referred to as the "Fukushima Dai-ichi 1'-WSII) or the TEPCO Fukushima Dm-ni Nuclear Pm,ver Station (hereinafter referred to as the "Fukushima Dai-ni NPS"). With regard to monitoring equipment, TEPCO has eight monitoring posts, 14 stack monitors (two stack monitors for each stack), six liquid discharge 11lonitors, and one 11lonitoring car (located at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS).

Government's NE response manual stipulates that the monitoring data collected by the N!ORLHQ is to be reieased to the public. The N!ORLHQ radiation monitoring team shall create press releases on C111crgcncy* 111onitoring for press conferences. The l'ffiRLHQ public relations team shall deal with the press and all PR presentations and answer reporters' questions, while maintaining close contact and cooperation with the NERLHQ aWIlinisLralive lecUIl, the Sel:retariai uf the NERHQ ;mu the PR gruups uf the eUlergem.:y response headqmuiers of various loc[ll governments. it} addition, TEPCO shall publish [Ill data collected through the monitoring posts and stack monitors installed in each power station on its homepage.

This section mainly describes monitoring activities concernmg the decisions the Government makes to limit the extent or any hazards.

o. The pl;mary mOllitOl;llg activities that were conducted outside the premises of the Fukushima Dm-ichi NPS after the accident As a result of the earthquake and the ensuing tsunami damage, 23 of the 24 monitoring posts the Fukushima government had instaHed in the prefecture were rendered inoperative, the sole exception being th.e one installed at Ono station2 . In addition, due to severe Sometime after 16:00, four monitOTing lX)~ts (those installed at Tana"hio, 1Jkedo, Hotokehama and Kmnagmva stations) were S\vept away hy the tsunami. 'Ihe monitoling post at Namilmra station had its line for transfening data rendered inoperative due to the t~unami. Eighteen additional monitOTing IX)sts \vere unable to tran~fer data to the Monitoring Center because the hack-up power supply to the hase station fix the tran~fer data line \vas cut off.

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earthquake damage, two of the four germanium semiconductor detectors that had been installed at the !vlonitOling Center ,vere rendered inoperative.

The Fukushima prefectural govenunent discussed the possibility of nlOni!oring being conducted via monitoring cars starting on March 11, 2011. They detemlined, however, that it might be too risky to conduct monitoring at night with caved-in roads and \yjdespread po\'ver failure. Instead, they sta."'ied the monitoring early In the mommg of jo,,1arch 12, 2011'.

Also, following the nuclear accident on March I L 201 L the Ministry of Education, Culture, Spotts, Science and Technology decided to dispatch Inonitoring cars to the Off-site Center, pursuant to the National Basic Disaster Prevention Pla..l1s .. Hm\'ever, it \vas some time late in the evening of March 12 that they actually issued directions for their dispatch. It was around 11 :20 the next day on March 13 that their professional support n1cn1bcrs aLL~vcd at the ~,,1or.dtoring CcnLcr4 From March 13, staff from the Fukushima local government as well as the national government used the monitoring cars, working together to conduct monitoring activities such as Ineaswing rawatiun levels in Lhe air, (;ullecLing uusL suspemleu in ihe atIIlusphere, enviromnent samples al1d soil s(l~mples based on ti}e radiation monitoring strategy developed by the staff of the Monitoring Center and accepted by the Local Emergencv Response Center. The collected sampies were analyzed using the two genllanium semiconductor detectors, located at the 1\1onitoring Center. The resuhs orthe arw1ysis \vere On Lhe night of March 11, 2011, Lhe Ful<.ushima Prefectural Emergency Response Center summoned approximately :10 monitoling memher.:; from relevant organi7ations at the request of the Monitoling Center The foUowmg day, on Mmdl 12, these mOllltOlmg members were dIspatched to the MOllltonng Center together \\1th 12 vehicles that could be used as monitoring cars. "lhe same day, the Monitoring Center staff started monitoring activities \\-ih ihe~ members .,vilO had been summoned to moniLOf. Ilmvever, hy 21:00 Lhat smne day, mey had disbanded Lhe moniLoring leam, wilh lhe exceplion or len or Lheir slaJT v.,ho had speciaii/'.ed knmviedge or and skills in radioacti,re substances, ,vlienmonitoring activities tLUlled out to be impossible due to devastating damage of t,e mads cau&d by t,e em1hquake, fuel sh()rtages, and increased radiation finm the e:\-plosion at the Reactor Building of 1Jnit 1 that had OCCLUTed earlier in the day.

'lhe:--:e support teams had a total offourvehicles consisting of three monitoring cars, from the Mito atomic energy office of tvfrXT, the Tharaki Preteetu.ml nudear safdy office and .T.A.EAJNrAT, a.lld one pa.ssenger ear that tailed the monit01ing em'S. These frmr vehicles gathered at the .TAEA Nuclear Emergency Re~prm<e SUppOl1 and Nuclem' Emergency As."istance & Training Center (JAEA!'Nf7AT). According to tvfFXT staff the rea."',(m the directions to dispatch the 1110nitoling cars were not given until some time after the evening of March 12 is that they decided it \vas too Tisk:v tt1r the monitoring members to move aT"Olmd dUTing the night f.,;nce tf.o'lmami waminp.s \vere still in effect and the condition of the roads in the affected mea was unknmvn.

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reported to the NERLHQ located at the ac!iacent off-site center.

The initial 11lonitoring activities did not work out as intended due to a host of reasons including hazardous road conditions frmn earthquake danlage, fiat tires, vehicles Lhal had fallen into cracks in the ground and fuel shortages. In addition, as described in Chapter III 5(i) b5 , it was diilicult to consolidate the monitoring data i'or sharing with the Secretariat or the Go\'emment Nuclear Emergency Response Headquai'ters Headquarters (NERHQ) and other agencies since the Oft:site Center had very limited means of communication due to widespread power failure.

The l~'ERLHQ and the Prefectural Nuclear Elnergency Response Center have played a central role in conducting monitor1~l1g activities since March 15, "'hen the NE!U.HQ that had been located at the Off-site Center, was moved to the Fuk-ushima Prefectural Office'-

In addition, the NERLHQ (the Orr:site Center) was supposed to publish the monitoring data L.hilll \vas gathered [rOln L.~c alIcctcd areas bchv*ccn I',,1arch 11 lli'1d 15. HO\vcvcr, th.c press conference scheduled at the Off-site Center was not held since, as described in 1115(2), the Off-site Center was located in the mandatory evacuation zone that was CUlIlOLUlceu e(U-ly ill Lhe IIlUJIllIlg uf l'vlan.:h 12.

Hmve"/er, tl-te NERLHQ staff f::L'::ed tl-te monitoring data th..at had been co!!ected via monitoring cars from March 12 to the ERC where the NERHQ Secretariat was located.

On March 12, the NERLHQ staff delivered a report of the measurement results to the ERe as mcasucd, \\'hlch had been crcatcd by a team ofmonltoring membcrs. It ,vas detcn111ncd, however, that from the follo\Ving day, March 13. the radiation monitoring team of the NERLHQ should summarize the monitoring results each day and deliver them to the ERC under the name oftne site superintendent of the NERLHQ.

The Secretariat of the NERHQ, \Cvhich received monitoring data from the NERLHQ, successively published only the data that was believed to be summarized well enough to Once the NERL! lQ ,-vas moved to the Fukushima ]Jrefectural Office, the staff dispatched from the national govemment left the monitnring cars (yvhich \vere ()IJ.t of filel) behind at the nft'~site center /\ft..er that, there yvere nn me:mit01ing Gars availahle in the affected areas_ l'v1T7XT thus ordered (If reque~1:ed all relevant organi7ations te.

dispatch monitoling cars and monitoring personnel. A maximum of 15 monitoring cars '.",ere used ti'om March 15 to measure the radiation levels in the air. The Fuhlshima prefectural govemment had no choice but to leave most of the monitoring devices at the Off-site Center when the NERT .HQ \va" moved to the Fukushima Prefectural Office.

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be officially published. As described above, the data and monitoring results, which the radiation 11lonitoring team of the NERLHQ sllllllnarized each day to deliver to the ERe, frOlll March 13 ,vas published on Lhe \vebsite ofLhe Nuclear and Industrial Safety' Agency (hereinaller rererred to as "NTSA").

Moreover, on June 3, NiSA published additional data, which had not yet been made public, Irom the monitoring datu that ;,,'as collected bet\veen iVfarch 11 a.."'1d 15 induding the results ofthe monitoring that was conducted on March 12 (refer to Section 8(0)).

c. The m.onitol'ing activities thai WCI""C conducted within the preluises of the Fuirusililua Dai-ichi NPS after Lite accident Due to the total loss of AC power supplies resulting from the earthquake and the impact of the ensuing tsunami, on March 11 the eight monitoring posts that had been installed

\\'iL.l-..tin the premises of L."'Ie Fukusr..inm Dai-icr..i NPS lli'1d the fourteen stack 111onitors that had been connected to each Unit were all unable to be used to monitor. Thus monitoring activities at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS began at 17:00 on the same day at more than two lut..:aLiuIls within Lhe premises uf Ute pu\ver SlaLiUIl tU evaluate dmnges in the level uf radiation dose ,m.d estlnmte tl}e situation of tl}e pmver piarLts USiILg tl}e mopitorirLg car6 tl}at belonged to the power station. The monitoring results were successively made available to the public on the websites ofTEPCO and NISA Allcnvards, from iVfarch 23, TEPCO installed three temporai'}' monitoring posts \\,ithin the premises orthe Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS to collect data and puhlished their monitoring results Irom March 27. On March 25 and 29, the existing eight monitoring posts, which had been rendered inoperative, "vere restored to their former state using a temporary power supp!y_ TEPCO resumed collecting data by making the rounds once a rhy from Apri! 1.

On April 9, the data transmission systems of these existing eight monitoring posts were restored to their former states enabling them to collect and publish data automaticaily.

At the Fukusllirrw Dai-ichi 1'-~TS, TEPeO st<u*ted collecting ill1d arwlyziL'1g sUJ.llples from

'lhe nexi day_ March 12. another monitoling car dispatched hy the 'I'HI)C() Kashi\va7aki-Kmi\va Nuclear Pmver Plant joined the monitoring activities within the premises of the fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. 1l1is vehicle was.

hmvever, rendered inoperative due to fuel sholiages from March 14.

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1he sea near 1he two water discharge canals on 1he premises from March 21, when 1he lubble imd debris created by the tswlami \'vere sufficiently cleared away to allmv access to the seashore, Because semva!er "vas sprayed into Lhe reactor building, and due 10 rainfall, waler contaminated with radioactivity may have Ilowed out into the sea Tn addition, ror the comparison oC data, TErco also started coiiecting and analyzing samples Crom the sea near the two \vater discharge ennuIs on the premises oCthe Fukushima Dal-ni l'WS7.

On or around March 20, TEPCO corrected its previously published data concerning neutron measurement frequency. Taking advantage ofthis opportunity, TEPCO conducted an in-depth investigation and discovered that SOlne 1l10llltoring data for a celtain period of time that had been collected "lithin the pre!1lises of the Fukushiw.R Dai-ichi NPS immediately after 1he accident had not yet been published.

Follmv1ng l'USNs directions, TEPCO started preparmg to publish these data. Ali data that had not been published \vas added to L.1.C previously published data bct\\"ccn ~..1:arch 11 and 21 and this combined data was published on May 28. In addition, as directed by 1he Prime Ministers Office to explain 1he delay in 1he publication of 1he data, TEPCO put 1he JIlUIuturing uala on its website again accoIIlpanieu by all expl:matiull [ur the uday 1Il publisp.ing tl-te dat(l~

uai-idliTbPCO also monitored me \vaier in me \vaier imake and lhe suoorain aL the Ful<'Llsruma uai-ichi NPS as roilmvs

- Onlv1arch 2G, it \vas discovered that highly concentrated radioactive \vater had accumulated in the 1'irst basement of the tLu-bine building of Unit 2. Based on expert advice provided by NSC on tv1areh 2g that SillllpliIlg of the grm.md\.vater in t"'1e suhdrain should he conductecL sampling of the "vater in the suhdmin star..ed from lvfarch 30.

- ()n ,il,pril 2, it '.vas discovered that highly contaminated radioactive '.vater had heen tlmving into the sea from the part of concrete near the \Ovater intake of 1 Jnit 2. TIms the sampling of seawater hegan near t1)e water intake f["(")m the same day

- Tt \va" decided that the highly concentrated radioactive \va"re \vater should be tran~feTTed to the main processing building of the centrali7ed \,,'aste treatment facility from ApTil 19 Based on this decision, sampling and analysis of the water in the ~ulxlrain of the centrali7.ed \vaste treatment facility started from ApTil 16 to continn that no radioactive mateTials had leaked fTDm the transteTTed contaminated wateT* into the ground\vater.

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(2) Efforts to assign responsibility for radiation monitoring and the snbseqnent enhancement of 111onitoring activities overland area more than 20km fmm the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS As described in Section (i)b above, radiation monitoring activities based in the Local Emergency Response Center located in the On:. site Center were not sumcient to salis1)' the parties concemed within the govemment. Thus around and after March 13. Special Advisor to the Prime Minister, Mr. Goshi Hosono (hereinafter referred to as "Special Advisor Hosono"), contacted execu1ive officials at lviEAlto for details on the status of the radiation moraitoring, and the government asked all parties concerned several times to conduct more proactive radiation monitornig activities on a national basis.

On the night of March 15, the monitoring of the radiation level in the air conducted by a nlOnitoring car traveling aroui'1d Hirusonc in Narnic-macr~ in Futaba-gu.. ....,. Fukusr.dma Prefecture observed radiation levels as high as 330)lSvih. MEXT thus recognized that it might also be necessary to explain its evaluation of how these levels should be dealt with.

On the uther ham!, ihe Niiulsuy alsu nx;ugnlzeu lhal ii Hughl be ilifficull Lu hamlle everything on its O\\'n.. induding tl-te collection,. publication <:J~t}d eV91uation of t~e monitoring data'.

A meeting in relation to the above chaired by Chief Cabinet Secretary, Mr. Yukio Edano (hcreinallcr rcfLTIcd to as "Chicr Cabinet Sccrctar:y' Edw"'lO"), \vas held on the morning or March I (, It \Va, decided in the meeting that the roles and responsihilities within the govemment should be as follows: MEXT should compile and publish the monitoring data collected by each organization concerned using monitoring cars in the land area beyond 20km from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS; the NSC should e-;/aluate t~is monitoring data; and the Govemment Emergency Response Center should take any necessary measures based on the evaluations of the NSC.

g 7vlT:XT \vas asked hy the media hmv the Ministry hac1 evaluated the rw,nit01ing data mentioned aho\'e "'-'hen it relea.;;ed the re~ult"> of the monitoring conducted around Hirusone at a press conference held hy the Ministry on March 16_ 'lhe oftlcial:'1 from the Ministry re:'lrxmded hy saying that the result:'l of monitoling activities \vere to he evaluated by the NSC tinm March 16 ba:'led on the a">:'Iignment ofre~pon:'lihility conceming radiation monit01ing acti"ities \\ithin the Govemment (refer to the next paragraph ofthi:'l report) on the :'Iatne day.

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OAGI0001550_00009

From March 16, based on the roles and responsibilities within the government that had been decided in the aforelnentioned 11leeting, theNERLHQ9, located at the Fukushinla Prefectural Office, decided to deliver Lhe nlOflitoring data con1piled by its o\vnl0 both Lhe ERC and the Emergency Operating Center (EOC) or MEXT while MEXT collected this data to deliver to the NSC ror its evaluation ror its evaluation and staned publishing it leom the same day 1o.

Moreover, the NSC shared the results of its evaluation of the monitoring data with the all relevant ministries and agencies by delivering the data to the ERe, EOC, and the Prime ivIinister's Office 11. TIle Commission did not initially release its evaluation results ,vhen the roles and responsibilities "ithil1 the government \vere dete!111il1ed on March 16 as Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano had continually held press conferences, addressing various issues including the evaluation of the monitoring activities, Subsequently, however, the Conllnission sta...,.j~cd to release its evaluation results frOlTI ~l'1arch 25 since it had been strongly urged to and also because it had been pointed out by the media that its activities were hard for the general public to understand.

()n March 15, the [.clCal I ~mcrgcncy R.csponsc Center was moved hom the ()tf-Sltc Center to the jiuf...'llShnna Preltx:tlll1u OlIi<..:e (lOr details of the cin.:umshmces sUITOlmding this move, reler to Section TTT5(3)above).

](I 1'v1EXT decided that if any discrepancies \vere lCllllld in the monitored v,uues, the monitoring data should be v(..rillcd and validated first within the I'vfinistl)' before bi...1Ug made public. If no disc[(..11,mcies W("TC fOLmd in the monitoring data, then to ensure speed the J\.1inistry should contact the three most impOltmlt officials (the fviinister, lhe Vice lv1inisler, and lhe Parliarnenlm), Secrelary) of lhe lvlinisilY and lhe Fukushima prefecLUral govell1menl in 1 1 {' ,. ,1 .*. 1. ".

auv,Ulce llelOIt IIHUI.lIlg Ule IIlOIlllunug uaw pUllllC.

11 Onlv1arch 21, Ml:::~Xl released a "plan to impro"\re monitoring activities in the area beyond 2Ukm from the Fulushima Dai-ichi NPS" based on recommendations (illcludiIlg implementing etI'icient environIllent2J radiation 11101llLuring in exLen~ive wntu...'UillaLea zune:>, ~trengtheni..'1g the en\'iwnlllental radiatiun I11Ulllturing temll ,md ilTIplementing reasomble enviror..rnenial radiation l11L'luicrr1ng) ofL~e li~dvisory Team led. by t-..fr. Tosb..i:ic'u Ko~.ako, a profe3....---:or at the Upj*versity of Tokyo Graduate School, ,,,ho had l-ween appoillted eabillet Secretariat advisor on Iv1arch 16 (referto Section 1112(6>>).

/\lso, em /\pril 22, the Govennnent PmergenC)' Re:*ronse Center relea..;;;ed a "plan to enhance environmental radiation monitoring activities" TIlis plan "ias created hy a team led hy Cahinet Offic*e achisof, Mr Kenkichi Hirose, \vith a \ie\\' to enhancing the environmental radiation monitoring acti"ities in order to capnu*e the full scope of the nuclear accident and to reduce or eliminate the designated evacuation 70ne and the emergency evacuation preparation zone (refer to Section 3(2)d below), the implementation of which had been discussed within the p.ovemment.

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b. The monitoring activities condncted in the area beyond 20km from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NP8 f:l'o:m l\larch 15 As described in Section (l)b above, the nlOniloring activities inlplenlenled inllnedialely aner the nuclear accident were based on the radiation monitoring plan that had been devised by the Fukushima prefectural govemment staiT and approved by N t:RLHQ. On the contrary, regarding the monitoring acti\,'ities in the area beyond 20km from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. the monitoring plans had been separately devised by the NERLHQ and the Ful:ushima Prefectural Emergency Response Center since NERLHQ was moved to the Fukushima Prefectural Office on Ivlarch 15.

Subsequently, the national government decided to conduct f!1niation mopiton.l1g rrmipJy in an area where high levels of radiation had been detected in order to estimate the levels in a wider area On Ihe contrary. in response to requests from local c0111111unities. the Fukushinm prefectural govcnn:l1cnt decided to develop a radiation 111onitorillg strategy in the Fukushima Prefectural Emergency Response Center (hereinafter referred to as the "Prefectural Headquarters") and collaborate closely with the NERLHQ to implement JIlUIUwring acLivities slul:e il hatl b~n phuming LU cunuuct rawalluIl Illuruturing IIIainly 111 pig..hJy populated areas viiti-li..fl ti-Ie prefecture.

MEXT started to discuss monitoring bv aircraft in order to do survey a wide area from around March 12 and released its ;; MExr Aircraft Monitoring Action Pro6'farn" on March

25. On the same day, \\ith the coopcration or the Japw'1 Aerospace Exploration Agency

(.TAXA), an independent administrative organi/ation, the Ministry measured the levels or radiation in the air beyond 30km Irom the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS 12 Tn response to a request from MEXT, the Self Defense Forces measured the concentration of radioactive materials in airborne dust particles above FlLl~hima Prefecture bet-.cveen ]\/!arch 24 al1d April L In addition. the Japanese and US Gove111111ents met to start discussing how fue two nations could cooperate to conduct aircraft monitoriiig in a U.S.-Japanese conference (hereina.ller rererred 10 as the "1JS,-Japanese conference"), vv-hich began around the end or 12 TIlis aircraft monit01ing \vas conducted using .TAXA's :.oman aircraft equipped with radiation meac,,'llnng inf.'tmments provided by the Nuclear Safety Technology Center.

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March. Previously, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) had independently conducted aircraft 1l10lutoring after the nuclear accident. Two subsequent joint U.S.-japan mrcTELf1 surveys H*ere conducted 13 ,

Moreover, irom March 21, with the cooperation of the Maritime Safety Agency and the Fisheries Agency, iViExr monitored the sea area beyond a 30km radius orlhe Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. The geographical scope or the monitoring area \\'as extended because TEPCO had discharged retained water including low-level radioactive water into the sea on April 4'4 TEPCO also conducted coastal sea area monitoring in Fukushima Prefecture and roaraki Prefecture in 1he sea area beyond a 30km radius of the Fukushinru Dai-iehi NPs.

13 Tnis aircraft monitoring \va", conducted hy TvmXT and the llS. DOE vi'Orking \\ithin thcirrcspcctivc designated air space from 1\pril6 [0 29 ,md from :May 18 to 26. They mCaSLLI\;d the levels or radiation in the air aL a hl,;'ghl or 1m <i[Il'VC the ground \vilhin an 80km uKlius and within an 80 to lOOkm nKlius (and \'vilhin a 120km radius to the south of the }.JPS) rC=:'}JCctivcly fiDm the Fukushima Dai-ic.rIi }.JPS and confinued the accumulation of radlOactivc substance on the ground. :t'AEXT n.:lea:ul. the:,c re;:>U.ll:, em :t'kly 6 and on Junc 16. In addition, bet\vCL'll :t'kly 31 and July 2, with the C()()rx.'faticlll

. of thc Den..:n&: Ag1...11Cy, ~v1E-,XT cond.uctcd its third aip.;raft l110r..itGT..ng within an 80k111 radiu:~. of thi...: Fukushima Dai-icbi l'-IPS to 111eaSlLrr..; Lhe lcvd of radiation in the air do~.i"; at a height of 1m above lhe ground and the accumulation of mdioactive subslmK~ on the ground. 1he 1'-..-1illlstry rdeHsed these.

resulls on July R Tn addition 10 the ain.:raft lllonilming dc~rihcd Ilhovc, in re~'J1<mse 10 reqllesls fmm the prefeelures COnCLTIled, 11EXT conducted joint Clircraft monitoring in Myagi, T()Chigi, Ibaraki, (Jnd Yamagala prefectmes. 'lhe results ohhe monitoling were subsequently released.

14' In resj.XJnse to Lhe recommendations u{ the Advisorr'- '!'emI; led by Cabinet Secrelmiat advisor, 1v1r. loshisoLl Kosak.o, :tvfEXT devdoped a policy lo eondud sea area monitoring with the Clx.lJ.)(.ration of the Marilime Safely Agency on Mm-ch 21 mId released its sea area monitoring action pmgrmn" on Mm-ch 22. The next day on Mm"dl PI 23, MEXl' requested that the Japml Agency for Mmine-Em1h Science mld leclmology (JAMS'J'EC) conducted a smnpling of seawater II-mIl the st:a area precisely lik.e the "comprehensive evalualion ol'radioactivity in the mlliine envimnment" that the Maline J-illlogy Research imrtitute had been conducting hefore the nuclear accident occlmed. The results of the sampling ,:vere compared \vith those of past surveys in tenllS of concentratlon of radioactive mateli.als in the Srea\vater, levels of radiation in the air aL")()ve the sea mId concentration of radioactive materials in dust pa111cles 1Tl the atmosphere ahove the sea.

in aduiLlon, III response LO the "plan [0 enhance the envlTonmel1Lal radiaLlon l11011110nng aCLlVllles, \,,'hich \.vas released by NbRIIQ 011 April 22, (vdlich stipulates that, ill tenllS of ocean areas, the llUluber of measurement IXlints should he increased and blat predictions em the di:;..persion of radioactive materials should r.e succes,.'-:ively perfi.irrned hased on the predictions of ocean CU1Tents), the 1"'v1inistry released i."'1e "planned enhancement of sea area monitoring" in re:",ponse to the "plan to enhance environmental monitoring," and!! :",ampling points '.vere added on April 25.

On May 6, hased on the anticipation that radioactive materials could disperse in the sea, the Ministry released a plan of -vider sea area monitoring." Tn response to this. it ,vas decided that JAMSTEC should conduct monitoli.ng in more pelagic zoncs and that mpco should pcril)nn \vater sampling at some of the r sampling lx)ints \\ithin the sea area of JOkm offshore fi"Om the ru1.ushima Dai-ichi NPS, a 70ne \\'hich had In*eviou..;;;ly been overseen by JAMSTEC since late March.

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c. The monitoring activities condncted in the areas snrrOlmding the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS As described in Section (l)b above, between March 12 and 14, Lhe nlOnilorl-Ilg activities were intennittently conducted using monitoring cars that were provided by the Fukushima prelecturai govemment in the areas within a 20km radius olthe Fukushima Dai-ichi N1'S.

From jo,,1arch 14, the monitoring activities using monitoring ca.-rs \,vere suspended because evacuations were completed within a 20km radius and the levels of radiation increased in the areas ofland outside that radius 15.

hI response to directions frOll1 Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano, the Enlergency Gathering Tea.m. subsequently started to discuss hm:v to c-Onduct mO!litonng in the area within a 20km radius of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS to establish restricted areas and make a temporary access plan to those restricted areas (refer to Section 3(2)g). On March 30 and 31, \vith the cooperation of the Federation of E1ccti-1C PO\V"cr Con1pw. ..tics .

(hereinafter referred to as "FEPC"). TEPCO thus conducted radiation monitoring at 33 locations in the area within a 20km radius of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. Subsequently UIl April 2, tviEXT cumludeJ aLl.wLiunal IIluluLuring al 17 lucaliuIC:i in ihe area wiLhin a 20km radius oftl}e Fukuspjma Dai-icpj NPS.

In mid-April, the zoning ofrestricted areas and the planning oftemporary access to the restricted areas were neariy finished. The emergency operations tearn decided to conduct radiation monitoring to grasp the areal dispersion or radioactive materials vvithin a 20km radius or the Fuku,hima Dai-ichi NPS in order to implement temporarY access to the restricted areas. Tn response to this decision. on April 18 and 19, MEXT, TEPCO and FEPC conducted joint monitoring activities at 128 locations in the area within a 20km radius of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. The results of these monitoring activities \vere published on MEXT website along with the joint monitoring activities that were conducted 15

[n the afie!111ath of the nudear accident, the [)efense ,il,gency prmrided dosimeters to an emergency team of Self-Defense Porce personnel, \:vhich had been ~ummcmed to \vork arOlmd the Nudear Prn:ver Station, to prevent them from 11t.'ing ex:posed t(l radiation and te. measure the levels e:,f radiation in the air ""here necessaT}', depending on the presClibed activities of the Self-Defense force personnel. On March 28, the Detense Agency shared its monitoring data obtained \vithin 20b" radius from the NI)S \vith the govemment emergency operations team in order to use as a reference for the establishment of re:-.tJicted areas and to help organize tempJJ"aT}' access to those restJicted area."!.

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by MEXT and TEPCO in the area within a 20km radius of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS fr01111ate Ivlarch to early April.

had accwnulated in the basement orthe turbine building orUnit 2. On March 28, and NSC issued an advisory that sea area monitoring activities should be enhanced ror sarety purposes. Thus from April 2, TEPCO started sea area monitoring activities at multiple locations in the area 15km offshore from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. To conduct sea area monitoriug activities, TEPCO initially requested, via the NERHQships and vessels frOll1 the lvlruitillle SafelY Agency because TEPCO could not afford to provide .henl.

Subsequently, in early April, pigbJy p:1t1ioactive \vater \vas discharged or fOll.l1d to be leaking. In response to this situation, TEPCO added water sampling points to the sea area monitoring zone situated in the area 30km olIshore hom the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nl'S after holdh'1g consultations \viL.1. I\,ffiXT and l'USA.

d. Monitoring coordination meeting ivlEXT \vas UJInpiling ;mu releasing Lhe uala ihal hOO been culledeu through Illululoring activities conducted by tl-te rvlirlistry, TEPCO, tlle National Police Agency ,md tl-te Defense Agencv based on the responsibility concerning radiation monitoring activities assigned within the Government on March 16. Subsequently, because fwther dispersion and accwllulation or radioactivc matcrials "v'crc obscn'cd, monitoring activities for a 'wider range or items including roods, were conducted hy relevant organi/ations (rerer to Section 5 below). Based on this situation, to ensure various monitoring activities both on the environment and foods the monitoring coordinationmeeting was heid on juiy 4.

Dwing this meeting, it ,vas decided that MEXT should not only conduct environmental radiation monitoring, but also provide comprehensive coordination of monitoring activities conducted by relevant organizations. The NSC was supposed to not only perform a comprellensive evaluation of the results 0[tl1ese monitorwg activities, but also to provide these relevant organizations with advice concerning their monitoring activities, Tn addition ,

each of the governmental organizations, relevant local governments and nuclear power operators w'ere supposed to conduct their own 111onitoring activities to collect lTIOnitOring

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data.

On August 2, the lneetlng patticipants released a "COInprehensive l"vionitoring Strategy" to clari~v the scope of nlOnitoring conducted by relevant govenn11en1s, local govel1unents and TEPCO as well as their respective roles and responsibilities.

2. Utilization ~u.... d dissemination ofinfonnation yielded by SPEED}

(l)Overview of the SPEEDI system The System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEED!)

quickly predicts the atnlospheric concentration of radioactive lllaterials and radiation dose in the su.rrounding area of a..11 emePJe!1C)' situ!1ti on, including nuclear pO';ver st!1ti ons, based on release sources, meteorolo[,'ical conditions and topo[,'raphical data Predicted results are shown wilh symbols and isolines on a map.

Release sources data for L.1.C calculations of k"1.c SPEEDI arc to be provided by L.1.C Emergency Response Support System (ERSS). The ERSS predicts and analynls the outcome and subsequent development of the accident based on information concerning the behavior of Lhe relli:Lm, which is provideu by nudear pu\ver slaLion uperaturs, miu i~ preuldeu <:unuLUd.s of discharged radioactive materials are provided to SPEED!.

The Basic Disaster Prevention Plans stipulates that MEXT should adequately prepare and maintain the SPEED! system even during normai times and improve necessary functions, including connections to the ClT-site centcr. The Plun also stipulates that TvrEXT showd shirt SPEED! to emergency mode immediately aller the Ministrv is noti oed or the occurrence or a specilied event (stipulated in Article 10 (I) or the Act on Special Measures Conceming Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Specific Event)). and make proper predictions on the impacts of radioation a.l1d share the results of those predictions \vith all re!eva.Ylt ministries and agencies.

The Governments NE Response Manuai stipulates that if an accident occurs m a commercial reactor, l'~TISA should activate ERSS to grasp release source infonTkLtion, \\hich is transrerred to the MEXT MEXT should predict based on this release source inrormation lhe impacts of radioation using the SPEED! computer, which is installed at the Nuclear Safety Technology: Center (nereinailer referred io as me !!Nuclear Safeiy Technology

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Center") and provide the results to the NISA, NSC, all relevant prefectural governments and the Off-site center This NE Response Manual stipulates that Lhe results of the SPEEDI calculations should be used at a nuclear incident as the basis or discussions on how to take measures to protect residents. in the vicinity 01' the NPS. Actuaiiy, when the national government conducted a comprehensive nuclear emergency response dril1 in Fukushima Prefecture in 2008, dril1s on shifting SPEED! to emergency mode. taking adequate protective actions and verirying the results using SPEED! were included.

In this Accident the release source information fronl ERSS on \",hieh SPEEDI calculations are based \vas not obt!1111ed. To be more precise, due to the loss of external pm:ver supply caused bY the earthquake on March 11, TEPCO's Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS),

which was installed within the prenrises of the Fukushima Dai-ichi 1'<PS to provide the reactor datu to ERSS, ended up being ui'lablc to Lrai'1Sfcr data to ERSS 16, ~,,1orcovcr, as described in Section 1115(1 )b, after 16:43 on March 1L the Government's dedicated line.

which sends data from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS to the main computer of ERSS through Thus in the implementation of response me[l.sures for the nuclear accident, SPEED! v/pich is based on release source information from ERSS, was not able to perform calculation predictions on the dispersion of radioactive materials since piant data couid not be transferred to ERSS as a result of at least 1\v"O trunsfer line failures. Against the expectation of lorementioned training drills, it wa, impossible to utilize the SPEED! ror setting the evacuation zones because SPEEDT could not predict the atomospheric concentration or radioactivity and radiation dose.

16 This "vas mo~~t prohahly due t..':; the fact t.~at neither 11i'1 emergency p.i\ver srmrce nor hatteries \vere mnnected to the equipment that \'/:1:": supposed to send data collected by SP])S to HESS. The equipment most likely stopped due to the loss of it.;;; emergency' :[X)\ver source after the earthquake hit.

17 On the other hand, some equipment at the Puk:l1shima nai-ni NPS including spns ""vas fimctioning properly even after the earthquake hit and the SPDS plant data wa.;; being tran~feTTed outside the NPS. H.1\vever, as desclibed ahove_ the dedicated line that connected the ()ff-site Center and the E[{SS main computer yvas rendered unavailable after 16:4J on March 11. Prom that point in time, the fuku~hima Dai-ni NPS \vas unable to send it.;;;

data to the main computer of ER SS.

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(2)Utilization and dissemination ofinfonnation yielded by SPEED! np to March 15

a. LJ tiiizanon and disse:mination of the resuits of a houdy basis caicuiation, assUluing a lLnjt radinartivity release rate As described in Section (1) above, MEXT directed the Nuclear Sarety Technology Center, which manages and operates SPEEDT, to switch the SPEEDT system to emergency mode at 1(;:40 on !',,1arch 11.

Tn response to this directive, the Center switched SPEEDT to emergency mode at 16:49 that day. At the same time, the Center started calculations to predict the atomospheric dispersion of radioactive materials on hourly basis using the lueteorological data frmll 16:00 tb.nt day an.d assuwmg a lltllt [!1(lioactivity release rate of a IBq/h from the Ful:ushima Dai-ichi NPS based on the Environmental Radiation Monitoring Guidelines prepared by NSC It sliould be noted, however, that the resuits of the calculations above

\\'"as not a prediction based on w'1 actual release rate, buL sinlply a prediction of L."1.c direction of dispersion and the relative concentration of radioactive materials in the air based on a unit release rate, in respunse tu the ilinxtlve [runl tviEXT, the Nudear Safety Tedmulugy CenLeI provided the predicted results of their u.njt release rate calculation, to !vlEXT, tl}e ERe, t~e NSC, the Off-site Center, the Fuk-ushima Prefectural Office, and JAEA", The Nuclear Center requested that the Nuclear Safe1y Teclinology Center adjacent to the Off-site Center pro\'ide the reswts or their lli"'1it release rate calcula1ion 19 , In response to the request, at approximately 23:00 on March 11, the Nuclear Safety Technology Center provided the results or their unit release rate calculations only once to the Fukushima prerectural 1R

'lile Fukushima Prefectural Oillce and the Oil-site Center were unable to provide SPi:J.:::<DI predicted results, since lheir dala communi calion links ror lnmsCen-ing SFf-<]-:i)i calculation resulls \-vere disrupled hy lhe emihquake onlvlarch 11. 1n addition, the SPl::J::,])1 tel1llinal that had been installed at the Fuku.shil11a Prefectural Gifice \vas unavailable sinee the l>refcetural G'Ttke building \vas severely d.amaged and the still+::'\Verc not able to access the data by any means. As a resul~ the Nuclear Safety Technology Center faxed c...'ipies of the results of the calcu1ation~ a~:'r.1ming radioactive release at the unit release rate, ,-vhich had been conducted tl-om March! !, to the off:'site center. "t-.-1emnvhile. the T'uk"ushima Prefectural Office ,vas ahle to use their inten1et lines effectively immediately after the earthquake and thus received the SPErnr ealculatirm results hy email to from the Nuclear Safety* Technology Center from the night of March 12.

19

'll1e Monitring Center \,,'as not able to receive the calculation results because the SI)l-]-<:[)] te1l11inal that had been inf-otalled at the Center \va..;;; lUlavailahle to use due to the emthquake on March II and could not receive the calculatuin ref-ou!ts.

OAGI0001550_00017

Monitoring Center via email, which had been intermittently available during that time.

Among the organizations that received the milt release rate calculations, the Ivlonitoring Center used Lhe results as a reference to fomlLJlale their 111onitoring progranl fron1 March

12. Other organizations did not use these results to discuss practical and concrete measures since they thought that the calculations based on an assumed unit release rate did not show ai'lY actual radiation dose levels. They also had no idea or making the results public. As described earlier, the results of the unit release rate calculation. however, had predict the direction of dispersion of radioactive materials and the distribution of relative amounts of radioactive materials, they could have been useful in detennining the direction of evacuation of residents (refer to Section 3(3)c and f).

b. Utilization and dissemination of the results of calculatious conducted by organizatious based on viuious assuHlptills Besides the unit release rate calculations. between March 11 and 15. MEXT. NISA and NSC conducted calculations to predict the impact of radioactive materials released from the FukushiIIlli Dai-idIi NPS by entering variuus asswIleu values iuLu SPEEDl as release source L.flformation. Bet"I.veen l\if(l.fch 12 an.d 16_ t~e l\'1EXTconducted 38 SPEED!

calculations \\ith various release source information and shared the results \\ithin the MEXT emergency operation Center (EOC), and provided some of the caiculation results to both the ERe a."'1d the NSC Aside Irom this, on the night of March 12, NSC made one request lor a SPEEDT calculation to the Nuclear Safety Technology Center. The NSC received the calculation results and shared them with its members, members of its technical advisory body at an emergency, and some staff members of the NSC Secretariat The NSC, hm:vever~ be!ie'l/ed that the calculation results should onlv be utilized for intemal discussion. As a result, the calcuiation resuits were not shared \Vith any other organizations.

rv1ean,vllile betv't'een ~v1arch 11 wid 15, 1'-~TfSA conducted 45 SPEED! calculations by entering various assumptions or release source inronnation in order to grasp the di ITusion feature of radioactive materials. The obtained predicted results were shared with various functional iemllS wiihin the lviEA'l-ERC, Tne lirsi sei of resubs \<V'ere provided to the

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Prime Minister's Office and the Off-site center NlSA had requested that the Nuclear Safety Technology Center to conduct a SPEEDi calculation to predict the ilnpacts of radioactive lnaierials released fron1 Unit 1 of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS and provided the SPEEDT predictions to the Agency staO' at just past I :30 on March 12. Tne omciais gave the predictions to the stall or the Cabinet Secretariat who attempted to share the predictions \\'ith the starr or various ministries \-vho were stationed in the basement ofthe Prime Ministers Office.

NISA sent the Prime Minister's Office the SPEEDT predictions with an accompanying 11lessage lhat. l~lSAbelieved that the SPEEDI predictions \vere of 10\'v reliability because of cmcmatiop..5 beased on assumed release source infofl1l.ation. Cabinet Secreta..riat st~ff.

vho received the predictions from NISA staff before dawn on the morning of March 12, treated them as reference information and did not report to Prime Minister Naoto Kan (hcrcinallcr referred to as "PrilTIC l\1inistcr Knn,,)20. Also l'~l]SA itself did not report L.~c predictions to Prime Minister Kan either.

Moreover, the SPEEDT predictions of various organizations based on assumed input uala as well as thuse uf the LUut release rate were Hul nJ.atle publiL: [Of a L:ertaiH periuu uf time after tl:le e::u*tl:lquake As a result, tl:le predictions ""ere not utilized by locl:Il governments for their implementation of evacuation measures (for details on how the SPEED! caicuiation resuits were made pubiic, refer to Section (3)c and for details on how local go\,'emmcnts implemented evacuation measures, refer to Section 3(3) bc1ov\".

(3) Utilization and dissemination of infOlmation produced by SPEEDI from March 16 onward

a. Assignment ofro!es and responsibilities concerning how to operate and utilize SPEED!

within the Gilvernment from March 16 onward MEXT was urged by the media to release SPEED! predictions at a press conference held by the ~vfirIistry on I'v1arch 15. 1"'1 response to trIis, the ~v1irIiSti')' held illl in-nlinistry meeting attended by the three most important olTicials (the Minister, the Vice Minister and the Parliamentary Secretary) of the Ministry. The predictions were obtained by both 20 Tt is exvected that this matter will be inve~tigated further.

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SPEEDI and ilie global version of SPEEDI (WSPEEDI), which covers wider regions, asswning that all radioactive 11lateliais (1018Bq of iodine and l019Bq of noble gas) are released at one 1in1e. The predictions provided in Lhe n1eeting sho\ved that high level radioactive clouds would move over the Tohoku District and there was opinions that a release of the predictions could cause people unnecessary confusion, No concrete decision

,vas made as to ;,vhether it might be necessa,: ~" to publicize the SPEEDT predictions.

The next day, on March l!i, at a meeting attended by the three most important officials of MEXT, Vice Minister Kan Suzuki of MEXT mentioned iliat ilie roles and responsibilities conceming 1l10llltOling activities \\'ithin the Govenllnent had been decided at a meeting held in the Prime Mnister's Office in the morning of that sa.l11e day (refer to Section 1(2) above): MEXT should collect and publicize monitoring data, ilie NSC should evaluate the dala and the NbRHQ sliouid implement measures based on the evaluation, No lTIcntion \vas nmdc of SPEEDl Thus he proposed k1.ut SPEEDI matters should hereafter be operated and its predictions should be publicized by ilie NSC. because ilie NSC was designated ilie role of evaluating monitoring data His proposal was agreed by the aLLemlarll.:e.

In response to this decision, 1\1E.XT verb(llly informed NSC this decision of a ch[l~t}ge of an operation bodv of SPEED!. The Ministry ilien sent boili ilie operators of ilie Nuclear Safety Technoloh'Y Center, who had been working in EOC, to the Secretariat ofNSe.

Tn response to this ivrEXT decision on the SPEEDT operation, the NSC understood that SPEED! control had not yet heen transferred to the Agency, hut that the Agency was supposed to conduct calculations using SPEEDL At that point, the Agency (NSC) started operating and maintaining the SPEEDi system.

b. Perfonning a retrospective estimation on release source infonnation by SPEED! and pnblicizing the predictions In response to the change of operation body of SPEEDI from ~v1EXT to NSC. as described in Section a above, rrom March 16, NSC began discussions on hO\v to utilize SPEED! in a situation where release source infonnation ]rom ERSS was not available.

As part of the discussion, on the following day, lviarch 17, in response to the direciion of

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1he Vice Chairrrum of NSC, Mr. Yutaka Kukita (hereinafter referred to as "NSC Vice Chairnnm Kukita") and lU1der the cooperation of jAEA and the japan Chemical Analysis Center, the NSC, led by a 111elnber of the Enlergency Response Teclmical Advisory Body, started discussions on how to estimate release source inlannalion using SPEED! and how to estimate the radiation dose based on the estimated release source inlomlation.

\Vhat is specifically mew"'1! by estimating release source infonnmion using SPEEDT in a situalion where release source information is not available, is to estimate the actual amount of radioactivity released by multiplying 1he unit amount of radioactivity released by a ratio of observed radiation dose rate at a specific point to a calculated radiation dose rate of the u..nit release rate at the sa.111e pointLl1 the calculation above, NSC used rnl1 iation dose rates in 1he air obtained by ail monitoring and 1he atulOspheric concentration of radioactive materiais obtained by dust sampling. To be more precise, the NSC selected data [or calculation by* anal:yzing the nlOnitrong data collected before !,,,1arch 15 and and nc\vly obtained data from MEXT As a result. at around 09:00 on March 23. NSC obtained 1he results of calculation concerning lhe cwnulative nuliaLiun uuse in the SWTuwu.llng areas uf lhe FukushiInu D(lJ-icpj NPS beD.:veen IVlarch 11 afld 24. It ,vas fOll..lld tl-tat an equiv91ent dose of tl-te 1hyroid gland of infants, which were part of1he calculation results, exceeded IOOmSvof1he criteria for stable iodine distribution (refer to Section 4(1)c below) indicated in the "Emcrgency PreparecL-.,ess Cor Nuclear Facilities" (hcrcinal1er rcCerred to as "Regwatory Guide"), which \Va, prepared by tbe NSC. Thu, NSC Cbaimlan Haruki Madarame (hereinaller referred to as "NSC Chainnan Madarame") and NSC member Ms. Shi/Uyo Kusumi reported these results to the Prime Minister's Office (for the resuhs of this report.

refer to Section 3(2)a be!mv).

As According to the direction of the Prime Minister's Office, the NSC held a press conference at around 21 p.m on Mrch 23 and publicize the calculation results".

21

[n addition to this press conference, the NSC suhsequently held three additional press conferences on Aplil [0, 25, and 27 and puhlished the SPEEDT calculation ref.,ult \vith higher precision of the retmspective estimation meted..

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c. Disclosure of SPEED1 calculation results People had becOlne increasingly interested in SPEEDl calculation results and the disclosure of then1 before they ,,,,ere disdosd on ~ch 23.

Subsequently, on the occasion ofMEXT response on March 24, to a request to disclose SPEEDi caicuiation resuits based on the Administrative Organs Inlollmtion Disclosure Act (hereinal1er referred to as "Tnfommtion Disclosure Act"), i',,1EXT, NTSA a'-'ld NSC discussed how to respond to a request to disclose SPEED! calculation results based on the Infonnation Disclosure Act.

As a result, by around mid-ApIiL a disclosure policy for SPEEDI calculation results ,vas decided as a result of discussion based on Infonnation Disclosure Act a.111ong lvfEXT.

NISA and NSC. In response to a request to disc10sethe SPEED! calculation results based on Info=tion Disclosure Act: (i) the results of calculation assuming radioactive release at the uj'lit rate of IBq/h should be disclosed; (Ii) L.~c results of SPEEDI calculations of cumulative dose,which is estimated by the retrospective method which contains the releae source infonnation estimated by the obserbed monitoring data should be disclosed when the prewcliumi are j oogeu by the NSC Lu be reliable enuugh [UI Ute wsdusw-e; ;mu (iii) the results of tl}e SPEED! calculations conducted by rvlEXT, N!Si\~ NSC ,uld otl}er organizations based on the assumption of input data should not be disclosed since people

,,,ould confuse if such the results ,,,,ere disclosed. 22.

T, On the other h&'1d, some media reported that the Go\'emmcnt had not disclose the SPEEDT calculation results. Tn response to these reports, rurther discLl"ion was held regarding this malter. On April 25, according to the direction orthe Prime Minister's Omce, it v/as determined that all SPEEDi caiculation results of categories from (i) to (iii) above should be disclosed. !n response to this~ MEXT, NISA a.l1d NSC published the SPEED!

calculation results on their websites bv Mav 3.

22 The discussion and categorizalion was done in comultation \vith the Prime Minister's Office. It \vill be furlher investigated, however. hmv exactly the Prime Ministds Office \vas involved in, the discussion and categ01i7ation.

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3. Evacuation of Citizens (1) lnitiai situation regarding the decision, instrllction, connnunication and iInpielnentation

a. Implementation of evacuation programs regarding the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS accident Tn response to the fact that al1 AC power supplies were lost arld the Emergency Core Cooling System was unable to provide water to Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. Prime Minister Kan declared a nuclear emergency situation at 19:03 on March II and established the Nuclear Enlergency Response Headquaters O'~'ERHQ)in the P111ne l'viinister's Office (refer to Section 1II2(1)).

In response to the declaration of the nuclear emergency state at the Fukushima Dai-ichi 1'<"]>S. the Prefectural Nuclear Emergency Response Centerdiscussed an instruction of evacuation [or citizens \vithii'l a 2kIl1 radius of the nuclear power plw."'1t, 'where regular nuclear emergency drills and exercises were conducted. At 20:50 that day. Prefectural Governor Yuliei Sato instructed citizens an evacuation within a 2km radius of the Fukushium Dai-idli NPS.

This evacuation iIlstnlction \vas not issued on tl-te basis of a specific act but de facto measure to prevent a disastrous scenario. In response to this order. officials from the towns of Okurna and Futaba took all possible measures by alerting citizens in the area using a mUi'llcipa1 disaster ma"'lagement radio communication nehvork, sound trucks a"'ld having fire fighters mal,e door-to-door visits.

Later. alter a press conrerence by Chier Cabinet Secretary Edano conceming the deciaration of the nuciear emergency state. NSC Chairman iviaciarame, Vice Chairman of the Nuclear and Industria! Safety ,A~gency~ Eiji Hiraoka (hereinafter referred to as "Vice Director-General of NISA Hiraoka") and TEPCO executives convened on the fifth floor of the Prime Minister's Office (not at lhe Crisis Control Center on lhe basement floor).

vvhere concerned ministers asked [or L.~eir opinions on L.~e conditions of the nuclear reactors, the range orthe evacuation area and other maUers 23 ,

21 The Nr Ref.olx1nse Manual stipulates that if it is trX) ditlicult ti1r the Joint Council for Nuc1em' Pmergency Response, which is organi7ed hy T.ocal nmergency Response Center and otherre1evant organizations, to discu.<.)s a

=lOG*

OAGI0001550_00023

In that discussion, various opinions were offered including "reactor cores rnight be damaged in the *worst case scenarid' and" a vent operation is required to avoid that." In tenl1S of the range of Lhe evacuation area, theNuc1ear Enlergency Guidline, \vhich ,vas created by the NSC, states that the range or the emergency preparedness zone (EPZ) where emergency countemleasures are suiliciently taken shouid be within a i Okm radius but the preventive action zone (PAZ) that is described in a document oCthe International Atomic Energy Agency (TAEA) is the area within a 3km radius. So '\vithin a 3km radius" is sufficient even if it assumed that a vent operation is required. In addition, Vice Director-General of NiSA Hiraoka explained that a regular evacuation drill is conducted "itbin a 3lclll fflt1ius lU1der a supposed vent operation. Based on these opiPions al1d explanations, the evacuationwas instructed for the zone within a 3km radius, md a stay-indoors was instructed [or the zone within a 3 to IOkrn radius lfom the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS.

In response to this decision reached in a meeting held on the fifth floor of the Prime Minister's Office at 21:23 that day. the NERHQinstructed the Fukwhima Prefectural Guvt:IIlm lliIll. allrdev,mllul:al guvenlJIlents Lu issue an eVal:ualiuIl unler LO L:iljzeJ1~ within a 3knl radius oftl-te Fuk:uspima D(lj-icpj NPS mld to issue a stay-indoors order to citizens within a lOkm radius of the power station. At 21:52 the same day, Chief Cabinet Secretary Edana held a press conference concerning the evacuation orders.

Subsequently, no vent operation "V"as conducted despite &"'1 abnonllal increase in the pressure inside the primary containment vessel at Unit I and despite the lact that the implementation or a vent operation at Units I and 2 was instructedby the Prime Minister.

Before dmvn on the morning of March 12, concerned ministers discussed the range of the evacuation zone again on the fifth floor of the Prime Minister1s Office in the presence of Vice Director-General of NISA Hiraoka and NSC Chairmm Madarame. During this discussion, m opinion was expressed that it wouid not be necessary to extend the draft evacuation order in the case of a cOlmnercial nucIear jxnver pla.llt disaster, then the .t-.,1inistr y of Economy, Trade and Tndustry (1\1rTT) should discuss a draft t.',racuatir~n order and tht.' 1\.1"rTT Mini~1:t.'r, in the presenl"'.t.' r~f the Deputy Chief eahinet Secretmy f,x Clisis Management, the NTSA Vice Chainnan, and the Disaster Prevention Minister, should present the draft evacuation order to the Chief of the C:;-ovemment Emergency Response Center, who should thenPmergency Ref.ponse Center issue an evacuation order. Tn the case of the nuclear accident at the l'uku.<.;hima Nuclear Pmver Station, an evacuation order \vas ordered without follmving this protocol.

-807-OAGI0001550_00024

evacuation zone if a vent operation were conducted under well-controlled conditions but if taking a conservative stance on this Inatter, even a relatively significant hazard could be handled if an EPZ \vere expanded 10 \viLhin a lOkIl1 radius. Based on this opinion, it ,vas decided thal the evacualion zone would be expanded to within a 10km radius. At 05:44 on March 12, the NloRHQ instructed the Fukushima Prefectural Govemor and all relevant local governments to issue ai'1 evacuation order to citi/.ens within a IOkm radius of the Fuk-ushima Dai-ichi NPS. At 09:35 the same day. Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano held a press conference about the evacuation order. A 06: 15 the same day, after the deicision was made to expansion the evacuation zone. Prilne IvIinister Kan fie,\' to Fukushima Dill-iehi NPS by helicopter.

During a vent operation had still been tried at 15:36on March 12, there was an explosion in the Reactor Building of Unit I. A discussion was held On the iilih 1100r of the PrilTIC ~..finistcr's Officc about hO\v to grasp th.c plant situation lli'1d hO\\-' to takc protective measures. It was decided that an evacuation order would be issued to citizens within a 20km radius. At 18:25 on March 12, the NERHQinstructed the Fukushima Prefectural Guvt:IIlm (uHl rdevcUlL lucal guvenuuenls tu issue an evat.:uatluIl unlel lu citlLeIls willuIl a 20km radius oftl}e Fukuspjma Dai-icpj NPS.

At 20:32 the same day, Prime Minister Kan addressed the Japanese people to explain the expansion of the evacuation zone range. FoilO\\lng Prime Minister Kan, al 20:50 the same day, Chid' Cabinet Seeretai')' Edano talked about the explosion at the Reactor Building of Unit I, explaining that it ;va, not the explosion of the primary containment vessel so a large volume of radioactive material would not leak out. He also explained the expansion of the evacuation zone range.

Subsequently, the fo!!mving incidents occurred in succession: at 11:01 on March 14, Unit 3 exploded; at around 06:00 on March 15, a big boom was heard from Unit 4; at around 08: 11 the same day, some damage to the fifth floor of the Reactor Building of Unit 4 \\:as corJinned: and at 09:38 on L.~e Sfulle day, a fire broke out in the northv.'est section of the Ihird Iloor of the Reactor Building ol'Unit 4. Tn response to these incidents, at II :00 on the same day, theNERHQ issued an order to the Fukushima Prefectural Govemor and all relevant local governn1en1s to issue a stu;v-indoors order to citizens within a 20 to 30kIn

80R*

OAGI0001550_00025

radius of the Fukushima Om-ichi NPS 24 Immediately after this, A press conference by the Pllnle l'viinister and the Chief Cabinet Secretary \'vas held to explain the order in greater detail.

b. implementation of evacuation plans regarding the Fukushima Dai-ni N 1'8 At 18:33 on T\1arch 11, the cooling function of the reactor cores at Units 1,2 a.."'1d 4 of the Ful-ushima Om-ni NPS was lost Tn response to this incident a notice to that effect pursuant to the provisions of Article 10, Par"!,'faph I of the Act on Special Measures Conceming Nuclear Elllergency Preparedness ,vas issued. At 05:22 the next day, IvIarch 12, at Uflit 1, at 05:32 on the saIne day at Upit 2 an.d at 06:07 the same day at Upit 4, the pressure suppression fimction was lost A report of a specified event to that effect, pursuant 10 the provisions of Article 15, Paragraph 1 of the Acl on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear ElTICrgcncy Preparedness v~"as submitted.

In response to this report METI judged that a nuclear emergency had occurred and reported to this to Prime Minister Kan, who was at the Fukushima Oai-ichi NPS. Having ublainoo approval [WIll rrlIIle lViinisLer K;;u~ at 7:45 UIl tvlan.:h 12, lViETi issueu a declaration of a nude[l.f emergency state concerni..flg tl-te Fukushima D(lJ-ni NPS (l~fld established the government nuclear emergency response headquaters. This emergency response headquarters was integrated into the NERHQ, which had been established the previous day to take care of Fukushima Dai-ichi 1'-WS.

At the same time thal MET! issued a declaration ofnuc1ear emergency state in the name oflhe Prime Minister, they also issued an evacuation order to cilizens "ilhin a 3km radius of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS and issued a stay-indoors order to citizens within a 3 to 1Okm radius of the po\ver station.

At 15:36 on March 12, an explosion occurred in Unit I of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS.

In response to this explosion, a discussion was held in a meeting held on the fifth floor of the Prime r-v1irIister's Office on hov..-to graSp tIle plillit situation and hov.' to take protective 24 On the previr)us day at the Ptime Mini~ter's Office, NSC Chainnan Madarame. NSC Vice Chailman Kukita and JAEA staff talked to 11ime Minister Kan and Chief Cabinet Secretary J--.:dano suggesting thatDai-ichi the evacuation 70ne should not he expanded he~vond a 20km radius of rukushima Dai-iehi NPS and that a stay-indoors order ti1rthose within a lOkm radius should he issued instead

,809, OAGI0001550_00026

measures. A similar incident is expected to occur at the Fuk-ushima Dai-ill NPS. Thus, on the off chmlce that an incident nlight OCCW-, it was decided that the range of the evacuation zone be extended. At 17:39 Lhe smne day, Lhe NERHQ instructed Lhe Fu1:JJsmnm prerectural government and other relevant local governments to issue an evacuation order to citizens within a I Okm radius orthe Fukushima Dai-ni NPS.

i',,1orever, it \vas less probable that ai'lY additiona1 hatardous incidents might occur at the Fuk-ushima Dai-ni NPS. Even if a hazardous incident were to occur. it would most likely be an incident that would not be too dificult to handle and its impact on the surrounding area aright be limited. In response to this probability, on April 21, the NERHQ issued an order to reduce the raflge of the evacuation zone to "itPjn an 8].:~111 of radius of the Fuk<Ishima Dai-ill NPS excluding the zone within a 20km radius of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS.

c. How evacuation orders were communicated The NE Response Manual prescribes that the head of Local Headquarters shall COIIlIIlWllcalt: an evacuaLiun unler to eCK;h IIlLUllL:lpalily iuduwng ciLies, tUWIlS amI villages.

In fact however, immediately after the earthquake, communication by telephone proved to be difficuit. Moreover, the reievant personnel were unabie to reach the Locai Emergency' Emergency' Response Headquarters (NERLHQ). Thus it \\"as decided L~at a new communication route through the Fuku,hima Prerectural Ornce and another one through the Secretariat orthe NERHQ be added to the NERLHQ communication route.

Hmvever, most of the municipalities actually learned of the evacuation orders through the mass media including TV since it took a long time for a telephone call to get through 25 ,

As far as most of the municipalities located ill the evacuation zone \vere conccmcd, no confin.nation "vas ever gi,,;en that any of the municipalities received notification of an evacuation order from the Secretariat of CrD1'emment Emergency Response Center, the ~'ukushima prefectural gmremment Of the ! .neal Hmergency Response Cente!: One significant rea.son for this is that communication from the Off~site Center to the cities, to\\'11S and villages took a lrmg time after an evacuation r:.rder ,'\'as iSfmed. Sinl"'.t.' citi7ens leamed through media such as TV that an evacuation order had heen issued and statted evacuating on their 0\\11, the city, town and village leaders did not dare to communicate the evacuation order directly to citi7ens. Instead, they simply confinned how the evacuation had been conducted, TI13t is mOf.ot likely why these cities, tm\TIS and villages have no recognition that the~y received any evacuation order

-810-OAGI0001550_00027

Some learned through the verbal announcements by police vehicles, including police patrol cars.

The cities, !OV.,.TIS and villages comnlLJnicated ,vith citizens in Lhe area by using a municipal disaster management radio communication network, sound trucks, police cars, and by llre lighters making door-to-door visilS.

Tn addition, when afl evacuation order \-vent out to residents in the area \\ithin a 3km radius of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS on March 1L nearly all ofthe residents had already evacuated outside a 3km radius. At 00:30 the nex1 day, March 12, the Emergency Operators Team confinned that all the residents \\'ithin a 3km radius had been evacuated (the tea.l11 confirmed that ag!1111 at 01 :45).

d. How evacuation buses were a ....anged Aller the declaration of a nuclear clncrgcncy state regarding the Fukusr..inm Dai-ichi NPS on March 11. the Crisis Control Center supposed a situation that a mandatory evacuation of residents might be required. The Center needed to arrange buses for evacuaLiun awl su at aruwul 21:00 the smIle Jay, it n:Kluesteu the Passenger Trwe:;purt Division of tl:le Automobile Bureau of tl}e !Vli.njstry of L(l~t}d, Ln.frastructure, Transport (l~t}d Tourism to charter about 100 buses for evacuation.

Since detailed information on dispatch locations, dispatch times and periods ofjobs was required in order to contact bus compai'1ies about orglli'1i,~ing buses, the Passenger Transport Division coordinaled all necessary mallers with the Prime Minister's Olliee and the Crisis Control Center and then asked bus companies in the Tohoku and Kanto areas to 26 organize the buses The buses that had been orga.'lizM , v/hich \vere gathered at the Off-site Center in the town of Okuma were allotted to the municipalities located in the evacuation 70ne by Local Emergency Response Center staff. In response to the evacuation order issued at 05:44 on ~v1arch 12, th_e buses v..-ere used [or the evacuation of residents in the area vvitl'.tin a 2(, A li~t of relevant ministries that are supposed to gather in the event of a nuclem- hazard contained in the NE Response Manual. The IJassenger Transport Division, Automobile Hureau of Ministry of Land, Infrastl1.lcture, Transp011 and Touri~1ll, hmvever, is not included in the list TIms, the Pa.;;senger Tran~port Division has never participated in any nuclem- emergency dlill or exercise

-811-OAGI0001550_00028

lOkmradius of the Ful..'USrnmaDrn-icrn NPS.

Hm;vever, since there \vere not enough personnel \>,rho had asselnbled at the NERLHQ, the buses ,,,'ere no! assigned ellicientl:v. In addition, since roads ,,,,ere dmnaged by' the earthquake and streets were congested with evacuation vehicles, the number or buses dispatched to the municipalities was not enough to luUiii their needs. As a resuit, most 01 the buses were only used to evacuate some of the mUJ'licipalities induding the to\\,TI or Okuma.

(2) Decision, insh'udion, conununication and irupienlen(ation of iong-tel'IlI evacuation programs (refer to Attachment V -1)

a. How high-level radiation points were fotmd outside the evacuation zone and how the Government handled them FrOlTI 1\1arch 16, the NSC evaluated the radiation nlOniLoring data L.killL \vas collected by MEXT (refer to Section 1(2)a) above. As a result, high levels of radiation (values greater than lOmSv of the stay-indoors evacuation criteria prescribed in the Nuclear Emergency Guideline) were lucaleu aL pUluls uu~jue the 30km railius. AU ivlan::h 18, the NSC asktxl NISA to investigate tl}e presence of private houses [I.rol1..11d tl}ese points. The NSC tl}en asked MEXT to install fixed cumulative radiation level meters at these points to conduct

* . * '"17 enVIronmental momtonng~'.

HO\\'cvcr, on 1\1arch 20, the NSC judged that high radiation 1c\*d had occurred at this time or year due to the inOuence or hoth radioactive clouds (plunles) that passed Irom midnight to the early moming or March 15 and the rainlaIl that deposited radioactive materials on the ground swface and that because radiation levels would decrease due to both physical decay of radioactive materials and rainfall, it ,vas not necessary to immediately change the stay-indoors evacuation zone in this situation.

In the meantime, the NSC, as described in Section 2(3)b above, perfonned the SPEED!

retrospecti\'e estirrilltion on release source infOnTilltion. On 1\1arch 23, tIle NSC perfonned 27 On March I K NI SA responded to the reque~ regarding the presence of plivate houses in the area as Sho\\l1 on house maps. On March 21, ~XT inf.o1alled cumulative radiation level meters in the m-ea and started taking mea~'mements, (which 1vmXT re1ea<.>ed on March 25).

,812, OAGI0001550_00029

a SPEED! infante thyroid gland equivalent dose calculation based on a limited number of 11lonitoring results. As a result, the NSC estimated that there \vere areas with high equivalent doses beyond the designated evacuation Lone to the north,,,'est and south ofLhe Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. The NSC took this lact serious and reported the following to the Prime Minister's Office: (i) the SPEEDT retrospective estimation on release source infonl1ution, \*vhich ;,vas conducted for ai'1 outdoor stay for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, should be considered to be overestimation of the radiation dose .. (ii) the estimation, which was based only on data obtained from two locations in Fukushima prefecture and one location (Tokai-mura) in Ibaraki prefecure, \vere lacking in accuracy, and (iii) it might require a great deal oftilne to m!11::e prior arral1gements to facilitate the implementation of evacuation prOb'Ta111.5. Based on this report, it was decided that the evacuation zone should not be expanded immediately and that further discussion should be devoted to this issue by conducting research on the exposure of infw"'1t thyroid gla.."'1ds to radiation to conl1nn L.1.C data values based on actual measurement In addition, the retrospective estimation results were publici7ed on the same day.

in response Lu lhe resulls uf lhe SPEEDI relruspecLive esLiIIlaliun" un Niarch 24, CabineL Secretariat advisor, l\1r. Tospiso 1(os[l.k:o (hereina..fter referred to as "Advisor 1(os[l.ko"),

provided an advisory report of "Advice for Evacuation Zone and Intake of Iodine Tablets" to the Prime Minister's Office stating that it wouid not be immediateiy necessary to implement the intake oCiodine tablets w"'1d that, as a temporai')' countcnnCa5ure against the current situa1ion. it might he preferable to hegin a voluntarY evacuation of residents in stay-indoors evacuation zones within a 20 to 30km radius. The NSC received an order from the Prime Minister's Office to summari7e what the NSC would suggest doing based on the advice of Advisor Kosako. On ]\/!arch 25, the NSC provided NERHQ ,vith "Advice for emergency monitoring and protective countermeasures," stating that, at this time, it might not be necessary to change the current evacuation and stay-indoors evacuation zones: it rrIight be necessa..*)' La strongly advise residents in areas v"here radiation le\els

",,-ere hkely to be relatively high to begin voluntary evacuation, even if they were in a stay-indoors evacua1ion zone within a 20 to 30km radius; and it might be better, [rom a protective point of view, to advise residents in areas where radiation levels were not velY

-818-OAGI0001550_00030

high to begin voluntary evacuation.

hI addition, on .ivlarch 29, in response to a request for fwther consideration [rmll the Prilne Mnis!er's Office, Lhe NSC submitted its SUlTlJ.1ULry report of recOIflJ.11endations on high radiation level locations (Namie-machi, Titate-mura) beyond a 30km radius or the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS to the Prime Minister's Onice stating that, concerning areas or high radiation doses, cwnulative radiation doses might be approximately 28mSv if' a person regularlv spent time outdoors from March 15 to March 28; cumulative radiation doses might be approximately 2lmSv, even taking into consideration the shield effect of

,,",ooden houses: and the cUl1mlative radiation doses *were already considered to be beyond the lOwS" of the staY-Ll1doors evacuation dose level al1d that residents in these areas should smy indoors for as long as possible.

Subsequently, in response to instructions 1rom the Prime Minister's Office. N1SA instructed olIicials fronl Nmric-m.achi ai'1d litate-Inurn. to tell residents to stay"-indoors [or as long as possible In order to avoid radiation exposure, even if they lived outside the 30km radius.

h. DissewJ.nation of !..liA's opinions In the meantime, on March 30, IAEA announced that the radiation dose level m Iitate-mura had exceeded the lAEA criterion for evacuation, which corresponded to lOOmSv [or 7 days.The IAEA \'aluc, which exceeded Its cnk,,;a \vas one datu from one point oJ'lotal 9 points, wa, presented aller converting the data mea,ured by Japan to the TAEA's standard.

Tne inconsitency behveen japan and iAEA happned even the same original data ,vas used. !t might be caused by different criteria and method of judgement for evacuation.

2 IAEA criteria " was based on a value of the ground surface density of radioactivity (Bq/m2) which was derived by converting lOOmSv for 7days, while Japanese criteria for

'lht: IAJ::<:A criteria prescribes 1.hat the criterion lor radioacLi ve iodine 131 should be 101v1Bql Hf, It \vas discovered Lhat the value Lhal. had been measured ':Uld converted at one pmticuhu- PJint was

iodine

NSC

c. H~lt of daily services From March 15, when ilie stay-indoors evacuation order was issued, more and more residents began to slay indoors. Supermarkets, banks and other stores, which were ncccssa..~y* for daily life, \\"crc rapidl)' disappca..-ing. Under L.~csc conditions, it \\"as hard not only for residents who lived within the stay-indoors evacuation zones_ but also for those who lived outside ilie zones to live ilieir lives.

l' l' (' ..

1 ~ r .

1 .' 1 1 ror exarnpH::), 1Il1Wlli\.1-SIll, UUIIllVlaIUl 1..), a SLaY-lllUUUfS evat..:UaLlUIl UlueI was lssueu to residents in one area in tl}e north oft~e city. Hm:vever, since filisinfonnation had spread iliat ilie stay-indoors evacuation order had been issued to ilie whole city, convenience stores and supennarkets, whose empioyees had been evacuated, successiveiy dosed down.

v1lmuni-sunta-shi

d. Establislullent of deliberate evacuation zones and emergency evacuation preparation 7.0nes Tn the NE Guideline, it is not assumed that a stay-indoors evacuation is carried out lor a iong period of time. As per the description above. the results of radiation monitoring and SPEED! retrospective estimation sho\ved there \vere areas v/ith high levels of radiation dose even in areas more than 20km from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. The distribution of essentiai items was interrupted in stay-indoors evacuation zones and it was hard for residents to conduct L1.eir daily lives. In response, from ~v1arch 31, the l\TE~RHQ stili'ted further discussions on additional evacuation zones based on e31imation results or the annual cumulati ve exposure that had been created by MEXT.

Emergency Preparedness

Fukushima Dai-ichi

NPS

e. Radiation monitoring activities in evacnation zones The NERHQ developed an environmental radiation 11lonitoring enhancenlent progralll to grasp the entire picture o[Lhe nuclear accident a..nd establish deliberate evacuation Lones and other zones. and then released a statement to that elTect on April 22.

NPS

NSC

Emergency Preparedness

lill provide infoffil.ation to alert them to the possibility of radiation exposure and support residents ifiliey need to be evacuated.

g. Establishment of restricted m-eas and temporal)' access to the restricted m-e?ts Following an evacuation order issued at 1X:25 on March 12. residents in regions within a 20km radius were evacuated to areas outside ilie designated regions. During ilieir unguing amI prulunged life as twaL:uet)s, SUIne uf the resiuenLs slar-teu tu rei.wIl hUIne Lu Lhe evacuation zones to collect tl-Ieir belongings. The Local Nuclear Emergency Response Center (NERLHQ) submitted a report on this situation the Govemment Emergencv Response Center (NERHQ). Around and after March 24, ilie NERHQ started discussions on hov~** to deal vvith this situation a.-'ld enthusiastically \\-urk on this matter corresponding to, ChiefCahinet Secretary Edano's directive issued on March 28.

0 As of ()Gtoher 2~( a total of an additional 3IX) staff\yere subsequently dispatched from ME-I-' to create nuclear evacuation programs and disaf.oier recovery pmgrams, and support decontamination-related work to reconstmct the disaster areas

NPS

Fukushima Dai-ichi

NPS

a. Implementation of evacuation programs in Okmna-machi Okllina-m.acr..i received ai'1 evacuation order [or residents wiL.w a 3kIn radius of the FukOlShima Dai-ichi NPS at 21 :23 on March 11. Okuma-machi officials took all possible measures by alerting citizens in the area, using a municipal disaster management radio COIIlIIlWllcaLion netwurk anu making uum-Lo-Juur visits Lo lake H:::slueuLs to safer places.

b. ltnpienlentation of evacuation program.s in Futaba-lnachi Futaba-nmchi received an evacuation order for residents \\.iLhin a 3km radius of Lhe Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS at 21 :23 on March 11. Futaba-machi omcials took all possible measures by alerting citizens in the area, using a municipal disaster managenlent radio commui'1ication network a.."'1d making door-to-door visits in order to take residents to safer places. Futaba-machi received a second evacuation order for residents within a 10km radius of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS at 05:44 the next day on March 12. Finally, Futaba-machi officials order residents throughout the entire to\\*11, including the area beyond a lOkm radius, to evacuate to Kn,,'a..f11.Rta-!11..achi. The Futnh a-!11.RcPi town office is located about 3km from the Ful:ushima Dai-ichi NPS. Although the town office was situated within the evacuation zone, some Futaba-machi officials chose to remain to help residents lTIOVe to safer places. At approximately 15:30 L.~e SaI11e day', a big bOOlTI \vas heard and white smoke was seen rising" from the site of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS.

11 .. , ' l' l' 1 leswts mu Hot oeeIl pULJlllaZeU . 1-\UUlUunallY, lIIaIme-IIlaCIll, \VTUCLl \vas ueslgnateU 1', 1

d. Implementation of evacuation progra.....s in Tomio ..~-machi Tomioka-machi received an evacuation order for residents within a lOkm radius of the Ful.:ushima Dai-ichi NpS at 05:44 on March 12 and then received a second evacuation order [or residents \vitllin a 3kl'11 radius of h~e FukusrIirrill Dai-rIi l'""tTS at 07:45 the SUtlie 39 As described in Section 2(\) (2), predictive data on the di:'lper:'lion of radioactive matelials ha:'led on release source intt)lmation from ERSS \va.;;; not obtainecL but ref..'lllts of the calculation a%'llming radioactive release at a unit release rate had been obtained

Fukushima Dai-ichi

NPS

e. Implementation of evacuation programs in Kawauchi-mura Kawauchi-mura received a request from Tomioka-machi, which had been designated as a restricted area wifuin a lOkm radius of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS at 05:44 on March 12, to accept its residents. The head of Kavvauclli-mura agreed to accept them (hid established evacuation facilities mainly in buildings at elementary and junior high schools 40 A NISA executive official did not attend a meeting at Prime Minif.o1er's Office to discuss a stay-indr>ors evacuation order that wa..;; issued on March 15.

NPS

Fukushima Dai-ichi

NPS

f. Implementation of evacuation programs in Minami-soma-shi iviinami-soma-shi received an evacuation order for residents within a20km radius of the FlLlcushima Dai-ichi NPS at 1g:25 on ]\/Iarch 12. In response to this ~/acuation order, residents in the southern part of the city, within the evacuation zone, began evacuating to Haramachi district located in the central part of the city. Subsequently, Minami-soma-shi received a stwy-indoors evacuation order [or residents \\ltl"lin a 20 to 30kIn radius of th.e Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS al II :1111 on March 15. To make mal1ers worse, Haramachi district was within a stay-indoors evacuation zone. Following a discussion about this evacuation plan ivIinann-sOlna-shi oilicials helped residents willing to be evacuated fron1

h. Implementation of evacnation programs in Iwaki-shi In response to requests fr0111 Naralla-ulachi and Hirono-machi, I\vaki-shi allmved residents to be evacuated to the city. Subsequently, the city received an evacuation order for residents within a 20 to 30km mdius oflhe Ful:ushima Dai-ichi NPS at 18:25 on March

12. Although part of the city was beyond the 30 km radius and thus outside the evacuation zone, city olIicials discussed \vhcL.1.cr, in {cnTIS of safety', a total evacuation was nCCCSSai')'

NPS

i. Implementation of evacuation programs in Tamura-shi Tamura-shi received a request from Ok<Jma-machi, which had been designated as a restt-;cted area vvltl".tin a 10kill radius of the Fukusr.tirrill Dai-icr.ti NPS at 05 :44 on rv1arch 12.

j. Implementation of evacuation progra!!!s in !C~tsurao-mura Katsurao-mura received requests from Namie-machi, Futaba-machi and Okuma-machi, which had been designated as restricted areas wi1hin a IOkm radius of 1he Fukushima Dai-ichi 1'-WS at 05:44 on iVfarch 12, to accept their evacuees a..,d Katsurao-mura lcadcG agreed to do so. Katsurao-mura received an evacuation order ror residents within a 20km radius or the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS at 18:25 the same day. Part or the village was vvithin the specified radius. The village office gave notice to that effect to concerned residents using an ! P te!ephone system~ \Cvhich had been installed throughout the entire village.

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k. Implementation of evac.uation programs in Hirono-machi Hirono-machi received an evacuation order lor residents within a 10km radius or the FtTh."UShima Dai-ni NPS at j 7:39 on March 12. On behalf of the mayor. the town office.

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m. Implementation of evacuation programs in Kawamata-machi Kmva.-'l1ata-machi, which is located beyond a 30km radius or the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, was not initially designated as an evacuation zone. Kawamata-machi town office accepted evacuees from Futaba-machi. Namie-machi. Minami-sorna-shi and Okwna-machi. Hmvever, the southeastenl pat1 of the tOY'.1} (Yamakiya district) ,vas pa..ttially designated as a deliberate evacuation zone on April 22 "'hen Futaba-!11..achi tmvn office had its office functions transferred to Saitama Prefecture. Subsequently, nearly all 1,250 residents in that area have been evacuated. Additionally, as of November 7, 140 residents frOln Kmvamata-nmchi (excluding L.'osc in L.'c deliberate c\'ucuation zone) lulVc voluntarily evacuated mainly out of concern about ilie effect of radiation on ilieir infants.

n. impiementation of evacuation programs in Date-sui Date-sp.l to\,*TI office had accepted about 1,800 evacuees maiPJy from Soso district (Soma district and Futaba district) since ilie ear1hquake disaster on March 11. MEXT monitoring data iliat was pubiished on April 11 (,;Estirnated Values of Cumulative Dose Bascd on Actual T',,1easurcmcnt" (refcr to Section (2) d above) shmvcd that some spots in the city exceeded the estimated annual cumulative dose of20mSv. Tn response to this, the city ollice conducted its own monitoring. On June 30. spots where some (113) of the city's househoids 'vere iocated 'vere designated as specific spots recommended for evacuation.

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