ML12338A574
| ML12338A574 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/06/2011 |
| From: | Glander L Entergy Corp |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| SECY RAS | |
| References | |
| RAS 22118, 50-247-LR, 50-286-LR, ASLBP 07-858-03-LR-BD01 IP-EP-120, Rev 6 | |
| Download: ML12338A574 (30) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Official Hearing Exhibit Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. In the Matter of: (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3) ASLBP #: 07-858-03-LR-BD01 Docket #: 05000247 l 05000286 Exhibit #: ENT000280-00-BD01 Identified: 10/15/2012 ENT000280 Admitted: 10/15/2012 Withdrawn: Submitted: March 29, 2012 Rejected: Stricken: Other: ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 Entergy IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES L---------------.--------______ ________________ ~ REFERENCE USE Page 1 of 30 L __________________*_ _ _ _~ Emergency Classification
~{!iJII Prepared by: Lori Glander Print Name Approval: Brian Sullivan Print Name 0/6/;1 Date Effective Date: June 9, 2010 IP-EP-120 (Class) R6.doc
~ Entergy ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON..QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE IP-EP-120 Page ~
Revision 6 of 30 T able of Contents Section 1.0 PURPOSE ... ..... .. ..... ...... .. .......... .... .. .. ....... ... ... ...... .. .. .... ... .. .. .. ......... ...... ...... .. .. .. . 3
2.0 REFERENCES
.......... ......................... .... ....... .. ...... ... .. ...... .. ... .. ..... ....... ...... ... ...... 3 3.0 DEFINITIONS ... ... ..... ... .. .. ........... .. ...... .. .. :... .. .. ..... ............ .. ...... ........ ........... .. .. ... 3 4.0 RESPONSiBILITIES ... ... .. .... .. ..... .. .. ........... ....... .. .. ................ ....... .... .. .. .. ...... .... .. 3 5.0 DETAILS .. .... .. .......... ......... ................. .. .. ... ... ... .. .... ..... ...... .. ... ........... ... .. .. ... .... .... 5 5.1 Recognizing an Emergency ..... .... .. .. .... .. .......... .............. .. ........................ 5 5.2 Initial Emergency Declaration from the Control Room .... .. .. .. ........ ... ... ..... 5 5,3 While In a Classified Emergency ...... ... ... ... .. .. ... ... ............. .... ...... ..... .. .. .. .. 6 5.4 Transitory Events, Spikes and Spurious Indications ....... .. ............ .. ......... 6 5.5 Compensatory Measures of Out-of-Service EAL Instruments ... ... .... .. ..... 7 6.0 INTERFACES ... ... ... .... ..... ..... ...... ... ...... .. .. ... ........ .. .... ... ........ ..... ..... .. ..... .. ........... 7 7.0 RECORDS ..... .. .. .. ............................................................. ... ............ .. ..... ........... 7 8.0 REQUIREMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ... ....... ............. ..... ... ....... .. .. ............. ... 7 9.0 ATTACHMENTS ... ....... .... ... ... .. .. .. ............. ........ .... ... .... .. .... ....... ....... .................. 7 9.1 :Emergency Action Levels ....................................... ............ .. ...... ..... ........ ... .. 8 9.2:Fission Product Barrier Thresholds .. .. .... ........ .. .................... .. ..... ... ......... .. . 29
ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED EMERGENCY PLAN IP-EP-120 Revision 6 PROCEDURE
~ Entergy IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page ~ of 30 Emergency Classification 1.0 PURPOSE To describe the method for classification of emergencies at IPEC as a Notification of Unusual Event (NUE), Alert, Site Area Emergency (SAE) or General Emergency (GE). It also described actions to take regarding Out-of-Service instruments that are used to evaluate EAL's.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 Indian Point Energy Center Emergency Plan 2.2 NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels 2.3 IP-EP-AD13 IPEC Emergency Action Level Technical Bases 2.4 Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs for Hostile Action, May 2005 (Revised November 18, 2005) 2.5 IP-EP-AD40 Equipment Important to Emergency Response 3.0 DEFINITIONS Refer to Reference 2.3 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 The Shift Manager (Control Room Supervisor if the Shift Manager is unavailable or incapaCitated) of the affected unit shall implement this procedure for the initial emergency classification. For classifiable events that potentially impact both units (security, natural or man-made events), the Shift Managers for each unit shall confer about the need to classify the event. If it is determined that emergency classification is warranted, the Unit 2 Shift Manager shall declare the event in accordance with this procedure. Once an initial emergency classification has been made, the unit Shift Manager making the initial declaration shall be responsible for any subsequent emergency classifications, regardless of which unit is affected, until such time as relieved by the on-call Emergency Director. 4.2 The Shift Manager, upon initial emergency classification, shall assume the role of Emergency Director and shall act as the Emergency Director until relieved by the On-Call Emergency Director or other qualified Emergency Director (Plant Operations Manager). 4.3 The Emergency Director is responsible for overall command and control of the emergency response , including classifications; notifications, PARs and ensuring all resources are available to mitigate emergency conditions. The Emergency Director is the final authority for determining the emergency classification level (initial
ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED EMERGENCY PLAN IP-EP-120 Revision 6 PROCEDURE
-Et '"~ nergy IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page 1 of 30 classification, upgrading, or terminating to recovery). This authority may not be delegated.
4.4 Initial and subsequent emergency classification shall be made within 15 minutes following the identification of a classifiable event to ensure that prompt notification, mobilization , protective and corrective actions are taken. 4.5 Upon becoming aware of any condition or event that they believe may warrant an upgrade in emergency classification, Emergency Response Organization members shall promptly inform the Emergency Director via their chain of command. 4 .6 A broad spectrum of discretion in classifying events is provided under Category 9.0 "Other". In using the Category 9.0 "Other" and in classifying emergencies under circumstances which are not a straight-forward use of the EALs, ERO members should be mindful than an approach is needed which is conservative with respect to public, plant, and personnel safety and with respect to ensuring the adequacy of personnel and technical support. Conservative decisions must be made if the Emergency Director has any doubt regarding the health and safety of the public.
e
*~*Entergy ENN IPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 REFERENCE USE Page § of 30 5.0 DETAILS 5.1 Recognizing an Emergency NOTE All classifications are to be based upon VALID indications, reports or conditions.
Indications, reports or conditions are considered VALID when they are verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment. 5.1.1 When indications of abnormal conditions or events are received, personnel will verify the symptoms/indications and then compare with the Emergency Action Levels (Attachment 1) and Fission Product Barrier Thresholds (Attachment 2). 5.1.2 Identify the highest applicable emergency classification level (if multiple EALs are exceeded) for which an EAL has been met or exceeded considering the following: (a) The plant condition existing at the time the abnormal condition exists:
- Hot (Average reactor coolant temperature> 200°F)
- Cold (Average reactor coolant temperature ~ 20QoF)
- Defueled (no irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel)
(b) IF conditions warrant the issuance of offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PARs), THEN the classification of General Emergency is required. (c) IF plant conditions indicate a possible radiological release or a release is in progress or suspected, THEN evaluate the applicability of offsite dose-based EALs (IP-EP-310, Dose Assessment). (d) IF a classification level was met or exceeded but the classifiable condition no longer exists (a lesser classification level mayor may not still be appropriate), THEN refer to Section 5.4, Transitory Events, Spikes and Spurious Indications.
~ Entergy ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE IP-EP-120 Page Revision 6 Q of 30 5.2 Initial Emergency Declaration from the Control Room NOTE IF the condition or event requiring initial classification potentially affects both units (security, natural or man-made events), THEN the Unit Shift Managers shall contact each other and confer on the need to declare. Upon concurrence, the Unit 2 Shift Manager shall make the appropriate emergency classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.
5.2.1 The Shift Manager (Control Room Supervisor if the Shift Manager is unavailable or incapaCitated) shall announce to the Control Room operating staff: (a) That an emergency has been declared. (b) The emergency classification level. (c) That the (Unit 2 or Unit 3) Shift Manager (Control Room Supervisor if the Shift Manager is unavailable or incapacitated) has assumed the role of Emergency Director. 5.2.2 Implement procedure IP-EP-210 "Central Control Room" 5.3 While in a Classified Emergency 5.3.1 Emergency response personnel shall continuously review the Emergency Action Levels (Attachment 1) and Fission Product Barrier Thresholds (Attachment 2) to ensure appropriate event classification. 5.3.2 If an Emergency Action Level threshold is exceeded for an emergency classification higher than currently declared, the Emergency Director shall re-classify the event to the appropriate level and initiate all required notifications. 5.4 Transitory Events, Spikes and Spurious Indications 5.4.1 Transitory events that result in exceeding the Emergency Action Level criteria for event declaration, but which are terminated before they are declared , should still be identified , documented and reported (10CFR50.72), but not declared to implement the Emergency Plan.
ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED EMERGENCY PLAN IP-EP-120 Revision 6 PROCEDURE IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page Z of 30 ~--------------------------~----------------~-------------------- 5.4.2 In the case of a "spike" in a plant indication or event which rapidly exceeds and then decreases below an Emergency Action Level threshold , entry into the Emergency Plan or escalation to a higher classification "in retrospect" is not appropriate unless the "spike" is indicative of continuing degrading conditions which will lead to an escalated emergency classification level. Examples include momentary steam generator level shrink following reactor trip or brief wind gusts in excess of classifiable levels. 5.4.3 Spurious alarms or parameters, which are known to be invalid indicators of actual plant conditions or of the emergency classification, should not be used to declare emergency classifications. 5.5 Compensatory Measures for Out-ot-Service EAL Instruments. 5.5.1 IP-EP-AD40 provides guidance when planning to take an instrument OOS (Out of Service) that is used to determine an EAL condition or following an unplanned loss of the instrument. 6.0 INTERFACES 6.1 IP-EP-210, Central Control Room 6.2 IP-EP-220, Technical Support Center 6.3 IP-EP-310, Dose Assessment 6.4 IP-EP-410, Protective Action Recommendations 6.5 IP-EP-510, Meteorological, Radiological & Plant Data Acquisition System 6.6 IP-EP-340, Meteorological Information & Data Acquisition System (MIDAS) 6.7 IP-EP-520, Modular Emergency Assessment & Notification System (MEANS) 6.8 IP-EP-AD40, Equipment Important to Emergency Response 7.0 RECORDS Any logs or forms completed by members of the ERO during an actual declared emergency are permanent quality records. 8.0 REQUIREMENTS AND COMMITMENTS NONE 9.0 ATTACHMENTS 9.1 Emergency Action Levels 9.2 Fission Product Barrier Thresholds
ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING Entergy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels Gen'.r.L. ":;:{ . :Unu'U~1 Event
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~ "
.. Category ; , Site Area .: Alert .;1
' ,: / < .
1.1 1.1.3 {> 200°F} 1.1.2 {> 200°F} 1.1.1 {> 200°F} Subcriticality RED path in F-O.1, Subcriticality RED path in F-O.1 Subcriticality Any Failure of an automatic AND AND trip signal to reduce power range < 5% Actual or imminent entry into either: ALL manual attempts at tripping the reactor from the Control Room have ANQ RED Path in F-O.2, Core Cooling failed to reduce power range < 5% Manual trip is successful OR Red Path in F-O.3, Heat Sink 1.2 1.2.2 {> 200°F} 1.2.1 {> 200°F} Core Cooling RED path in F-O.2,Core Cooling ORANGE or RED path in F-O.2, Core Cooling AND Functional restoration actions taken and procedures not effective within 15 min . 1.3 1.3.1 {> 200°F} Heat Sink RED path in F-O.3, HEAT SINK AND Feed & Bleed is required 1.4 1.4.1 {> 200°F} Integrity RED Path on F-O.4, Integrity 1.5 1.5.1 {> 200°F} Containment RED Path F-O.5, Containment resulting from loss of coolant.
ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING Entergy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels I I
.*.. -*- Category ' " ,-,_ General, : .'.
CATEGORY 2.0 REACTOR FUEL sit8 Anta Alert
.-_...... ..-.-... ... - ~--- . - ..
Unu"u** Event s
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" ' - - - -_ .. ,'"j; 2.1 2.1.3 {> 200°F} 2.1.2 {> 2000F} 2.1.1 {All} ! Coolant Activity Coolant activity> 300 ~Cilcc 1-131 equivalent Coolant Activity> 300 I1Cilcc 1-131 equivalent Coolant sample activity and any of the following: in excess of Technical Specification limits RED path on F-O,4, INTEGRITY Primary system leakage exceeding capacity (> 75 gpm) of a Single charging pump RCS subcooling < SI initiation setpoint due to RCS leakage [Unit 2) R-41 > 1.2E-5 ~Ci/cc or R-42 off-scale due to RCS leakage [Unit 3) R-11 > 1.2E-5 IJCilcc or R- 12> 0.05 J,lCUcc 2.2 2.2.3 {> 200°F} 2.2.2 {> 200°F} 2.2.1 {> 200°F} Containment Containment Radiation Containment Radiation monitor [Unit 2] R-41 > 1.2E-5 ~Cilcc or Radiation monitor R-25 or R-26 > 17 RlHR R-42 off-scale due to RCS R-25 or R-26 leakage
> 68 RlHR
[Unit 3) R-11 > 1.2E-5 ~Cl/cc or R-12> 0.05 ~Cilcc
ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 EMERGENCY PLAN
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REFERENCE USE Page I 10 I of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 2.0 REACTOR FUEL ~, 2.3 \ ... . C.t.... ory . , ;:.
~
Genera. ;., I :~" ,j' Slte Area /' ,< '-T 2.3.2 {AU}
~11~~ -'- C,<,: <'v *1**
- U~u.u.IEvent 2.3.1 {All}
Refueling Confirmed sustained alarm on any of the (Unit 2) or (Unit 3] Accidents or following radiation monitors resulting Spent fuel pool Other Radiation from fuel damage caused by an (reactor cavity during Monitors uncontrolled fuel handling process: refueling) water level cannot be restored
- R-2/R-7 Vapor Containment Area and maintained:
Monitors
- above the Technical
- R-5 Fuel Storage Building Area Specification Monitor minimum water
- R-25/26 Vapor Containment High level [Unit 2]
Radiation Area Monitors
- above the spent
- R-12 Containment Gas Activity fuel pool low water (Unit 3] level alarm setpoint
[Unit 3] 2.3.3 {All} Report of visual observation of (Unit 2 or Unit 3) irradiated fuel uncovered
ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING
-=- Entergy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page I 11 I of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 3.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM - --: Category. - < > . : - ----- <General . ' , -. < . ,}' Site Area .c Ale,, **- Uriua"aIEv;ri,- -** -
~~~-----~----- 3.1
- - -~------------~--------;---+--~-------------------------~-------------------------
3.1.3 {>200°F. s 200°F} 3.1.2 {>200°F} 3.1.1 {>200°F} RCS Leakage RVLlS cannot be maintained [Unit 2} Primary system leakage exceeding Unidentified or pressure
> 41% [Unit 3} > 33% with no RCPs running capacity (> 75 gpm) of single charging boundary leakage OR pump > 10 gpm With the reactor vessel head removed, it is Q.B reported that water level in the Reactor Identified leakage Vessel is dropping in an uncontrolled manner > 25 gpm and core uncovery is likely 3.2 3.2.2 {>200°F} 3.2.1 {>200°F}
~~:~~~ Leakage Unisolable release of secondary side to Unisolable release of secondary atmosphere from the affected steam side to atmosphere from the generator(s) with primary to secondary affected steam generator(s) with leakage exceeding capacity (> 75 gpm) of a primary to secondary leakage>
single charging pump Technical Specifications limit in any steam generator 3.2.3 {>200°F} Unisolable release of secondary side to atmosphere from the affected steam generator(s) with primary to secondary leakage> Technical Specification limit in any steam generator ANO Coolant activity> 300 ~Cilcc of 1-131 equivalent ~---- --- .------t-------- ---------~~-------------------------------+----------------------------~------------------------ 3.3 3.3.1 {>200°F} RCS Subcooling RCS subcooling < SI initiation set point due to RCS leakage ' - - - -_________ _ _ _...1-_ ________ __ _ _ __ _ . '-- .. __
~ Elltergy ENN IPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
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NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE Page IP-EP-120 I 12 I of Revision 6 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 4.0 CONTAINMENT t'--_C_ategory . **I -;~:...... ;! '{ ---- *Gene,.' *') I sb; ~-****AI.rt-*l *-*~ * - U~u.uai E~t' -'~ J 4.1 4.1.4 {>200°F} 4.1.2 {>200°F) 4.1 .1 {>200°F} Containment Confirmed Phase "S" isolation signal following confirmed Rapid uncontrolled decrease in Both doors open on a VC Integrity Status LOCA with less than minimum containment cooling safeguards containment pressure following initial airlock for> 4 hrs. equipment operating. Table 4.3 increase due to RCS failure OR AND OR Inability to close Any indicators of fuel clad loss. Table 4.1 Loss of primary coolant inside containment pressure relief containment with containment or purge valves which pressure or sump level response not results in a radiological 4.1.5 {>200°F} consistent with LOCA conditions release pathway to the EITHER: environment for> 4 hrs. Rapid uncontrolled decrease in containment pressure QR following initial increase due to RCS failure Any Phase "A" or Phase QR "S" or containment ventilation isolation valve(s) Loss of primary coolant inside containment with containment not closed when required pressure or sump level response not consistent with LOCA which results in a conditions radiological release AND pathway to the environment Any indications of fuel clad damage, Table 4.2
ENN IPEC NON-QUAUTY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6
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EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING
~ Entergy I 30 PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page I 13 of 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels
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CATEGORY 4.0 CONTAINMElfl . ~__'?.!!ego~ : ' ~: Ge~"'I " "" U~usu'IEY.nt :":.~
~.---.:. ....- ..- . Site AIM ~"rt 4.1 4.1.6 {>200°F} 4.1.3 {>200°F}
Containment EITHER: EITHER: Integrity Status Any Phase "Au or Phase "8" or Containment Any Phase "A" or Phase "8" (cont) Ventilation Isolation valve(s) not closed when required or Containment Ventilation following confirmed LOCA Isolation valve(s) not closed OR when required following confirmed LOCA Inability to isolate any primary system discharging outside containment OR AND Inability to isolate any primary system discharging outside Radiological release to the environment exists as a result containment AND AND Any indicators of fuel clad damage, Table 4.2 Radiological release to the environment exists as a result 4.2 4.2.2 {>200°F} 4.2.1 (>200°F) SG Tube Rupture Unisolable faulted (outside VC) ruptured steam generator Unisolable faulted (outside VC) w/Secondary ruptured steam generator At:f.Q Release Any indicators of fuel clad damage, Table 4.2 4.3 4.3.1 {>200°F} Combustible Gas 2:4% Hydrogen concentration in containment Concentrations
ENNIPEC Revision 6 NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING - Enlergy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 4.0 CONTAINMENT Table 4.1 Fuel Clad Loss Indicators Coolant activity> 300 J.lCi/cc of 1-131 equivalent Containment radiation monitor R-25/R-26 reading> 17 Rlhr RED path in F-0 .2, CORE COOLING Table 4.2 Fuel Clad Damage Indicators ORANGE or RED path in F-O.2, CORE COOLING RED path in F-0 .3, HEAT SINK AND Heat sink is required Coolant activity> 300 f.1Cl/cc of 1-131 equivalent Containment radiation monitor R-25/R-26 reading> 17 Rlhr Table 4.3 Minimum Containment Cooling Safeguards Equipment Fan Cooler Units Operating Spray Pumps Required
<3 2 3 1 5 o
ENN IPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 EMERGENCY PLAN
--- Entergy IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page 11~J of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action levels CATEGORY 5.0 RA!210ACTIVITY REbEASE Categor:v \ ' . ':.,
General " . . : Site ArM Alert {;;"
- -*-~ *Unuau";lE;;~t- \* -
5.1 5.1.4 {All} 5;1.3 {All} 5.1.2 {All} 5.1.1 {All} Effluent Monitors A valid reading on any A valid reading on any A valid reading on any monitors Table A valid reading on any monitors Table 5.1 column monitors Table 5.1 column 5.1 column "Alert for> 15 min. unless monitors Table 5.1 column "GE" for> 15 min. unless "SAE" for> 15 min. unless dose assessment can confirm "NUE" for> 60 min. unless dose assessment can dose assessment can confirm releases are below Table 5.2 column sample analysiS can confirm confirm releases are below releases are below Table 5.2 "Alert" within this time period. release rates Table 5.2 column "GE" column "SAE" within this time < Table 5.1 column "NUE" within this time period. period. within this time period. 5.2 5.2.5 {All} 5.2.4 {All} 5.2.2{AII} 5.2.1 {All} Dose Projections/ Dose projections or field Dose projections or field Confirmed sample analysis for Confirmed sample analysis for Environmental surveys resulting from an surveys resulting from an gaseous or liquid release rates gaseous or liquid release Measurementsl actual imminent release actual imminent release which >Table 5.1 column "Alert" limits for> rates Release Rates which indicate doses/dose indicate doses/dose rates> 15 min. > Table 5.1 column "NUE" rates> Table 5.2 column Table 5.2 column "SAE" at the 5.2.3 {All} limits for> 60 min.
"GE" at the site boundary or site boundary or beyond .
beyond. Dose projections or field surveys resulting from an actual imminent release which indicate doses/dose rates > Table 5.2 column "Alert" at the site boundary or beyond.
ENNIPEC NON-QUAUTY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 EMERGENCY PLAN J J IMPLEMENTING
~ Erzlergy REFERENCE USE Page of 30 PROCEDURES
---- ---- - -~
16 9.1 - Emergency Action levels CATEGORY 5.0 RADIOACTIVITY RElEA~E ," ," ",'C. leg
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Site Area Alert ' {' .- -- -'J.. "'" - -, " UnusuaIE"enf ",' ~.-..... 5.3 5.3.2 {All} 5.3.1 {AU} Area Radiation Sustained area radiation levels Any sustained direct ARM Levels > 15 mRem/hr in EITHER: readings> 100 x alarm or Control Room offscale high resulting from an uncontrolled process OR Central Alarm Station and Secondary Alarm Station 5.3.3 {All} Sustained abnormal area radiation levels> 8 Rlhr within any areas, Table 5.3 AND Access is required for safe operation _L-or shutdown
r-- - ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 tl Entergy EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page I 171 of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 5.0 RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE
- - ~
Table 5.1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Monitor GE SAE Alert UE R-27 44IJ Ci/ee 4.4 IJCi/ee 4.4E-1 IJCi/ec 4.4E-3 IJCi/ce (1200 Cilsec) (120 Ci/see) (12 Cilsec) (1.2E-1 Cilsee) N R-44 N/A N/A N/A 4.4E-3 IJCi/ee
.~
c:
- > R-54 N/A N/A Off Scale 2.5E-3 IJCi/ee
(>4E-2 uCi/ee) R-49 N/A N/A 2.7E-2 IJCi/ee 2.7E-4 IJCi/ee R-27 44 IJCilee 4.4 IJCi/ee 4.4E-1 IJCilee 4.4E-3 IJCilee (1200 Cilsec) (120 Cilsec) (12 Cilsec) (1.2E-1 Cilsee) M
=:c: R-14 N/A N/A N/A 4.4E-3 /lCilee
- > R-18 N/A N/A Off Scale 2.5E-3 uCi/ee
(>4E-2 uCi/ee) R-19 N/A N/A 2.7E-2 uCi/ee 2.7E-4 uCi/ee Table 5.2 Dose Projeetion/Env. Measurement Classification Thresholds
-.. ~--
GE SAE Alert TEDE 1000 mRem 100 mRem 10 mRem CDE Thyroid 5000mRem 500 mRem N/A External Exposure Rate 1000 mRem/hr 100 mRemlhr 10 mRem/hr Thyroid exposure rate (for 1 5000 mRem/hr 500 mRemlhr N/A hr. of inhalation)
ENNIPEC -E NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING ~";:' *nlergy REFERENCE USE Page ~ of 30 PROCEDURES I -- 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 5.0 RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE Table 5.3 Plant Areas UNIT 2 UNIT 3
- Condensate Storage Tank
- Auxiliary Feedpump Building
- RWST
- P.A.B.
- Service Water Intake Structure
- Fuel Storage Building
- Service Water Valve Pit East
- Control Building
- Fuel Storage Building
- Service Water Pumps
- Primary Auxiliary Building/Fan House
- Refueling Water Tank
- 480 Volt Switchgear Room (Control
- Diesel Fuel Tank Building)
- Vital Area Access to Containment
- Cable Spreading Room/Electrical
- Appendix R Diesel Generator Tunnel
- Backup Service Water
- Diesel Generator Building/Fuel Tank Area
- Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Building
- Battery Room (Control Building 33' 0" ele.)
ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 A~ Entergy EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page J 19 1 of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 6.0 ELECTRICAL FAILURES
. - ., . . .----,.. . - .-.- -.-- . .--.-.~, --.. -" -~
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SIte ArM Alert . .. Unu.~.1 Event ' , 6.1 6.1.5 {>200°F) 6.1.4 {>200°F} 6.1.2 {s200°F, Defuel) 6.1.1 {All) Loss of AC Power Loss of all 480 volt Loss of AC power to all 480 Loss of AC power to all 480 volt busses Unplanned loss of offsite power Sources safeguards bus (5A, volt safeguard busses (5A, (5A, 2A13A, 6A) for> 15 min. capability to all 480V safeguard 2A13A, 6A) AC power 2A13A, 6A) for> 15 min. 6.1.3 {Hot} b~sses (SA, 2A13A, 6A) for> 15 AND EITHER: AND AC power capability to 480 volt min. Power restoration to Inability to power required safeguard busses (5A, 2N3A, 6A) required core cooling core cooling systems with reduced to only one Table 6.1 source for systems is not likely in alternate power sources for > 15 min. I
- 4 hrs. > 15 min, OR Actual or imminent entry into ORANGE or RED path on F-0.2. "CORE COOLING" r----- .------ . -- j - - - - - .- - - -- - + - - - - - - - - - - I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - f - - - - - - - - -- --
6.2 6.2.2 {> 200°F) 6.2.1 {~200°F} Loss of DC Power Loss of bus voltage << 105 (Unit 2] Unplanned loss of bus Sources vdc) for> 15 min. on all of voltage << 105 vdc) for> 15 the DC Busses. min. on any DC Bus resulting in the loss of decay heat removal capability [Unit 3] Unplanned loss of bus voltage << 105 vdc) for> 15
.... min. on all of the DC Busses
ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING O Entergy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page 20 of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 6.0 ELECTRICAL FAILURES Table 6.1 Safeguard Bus AC Power Sources UNIT 2 UNIT 3
- 480 V EDG 21
- 480V EDG 31
- 480V EDG 22
- 480V EDG 32
- 480 V EDG 23
- 480V EDG 33
- Unit Auxiliary transformer*
- Unit Auxiliary transformer
- Station Auxiliary transformer*
- Station Auxiliary transformer
- 13.8 KV gas turbine auto
- 13W92 feeder transformer*
- 13W93 feeder
- With 86P or 86BU tripped, all offsite
- Appendix R Diesel power supplies must be considered as one power supply.
-:::=- Entergy ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE Page IP-EP-120 21 I of Revision 6 I 30 l
- - --- - - ---- I 9.1 - Emergency Action Level$
CATEGORY 7.0 EQUIPMENT FAILURES
":Catagory \, I General .', " Sitlt Area -, *,--'------Alert --'~"",
UnuSual Event 7.1 7.1.1 {>200°F} Technical Plant is not brought to required Specificationsl operating mode within Technical Requirements Specifications LCO Action Statement Time. 7.2 7.2.5 {All} 7.2.2 {>200°F} 7.2.1 {>200°F} System Control Room Turbine failure generated missiles Report of main turbine failure Failures or evacuation which causes or potentially causes requiring turbine trip resulting in: Control Room AND any required safety related system or Damage to turbine generator Evacuation structure to become inoperable. Plant control cannot be seals causing a release of established per AOP- 7.2.3 {All} lubricating oil or hydrogen SSD-1 in [Unit 2] ~ 15 Entry into AOP-SSD-1 OR min. 7.2.4 {s200°F} Turbine casing penetration [Unit 3] ~ 30 min. Reactor coolant temperature cannot be maintained s 200°F
-::::-- Erztergy ENN IPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE Page IP-EP-120 I 22 I of RevisIon 6 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels f--,-~----,-,-----:--~-,-----:--~~---:--~---:--..............,~C:--ATEGORY_~EQUIPM~_NT FAI LURES . . . . ... . . ... . . . .. .. I ,~ . Category ... General * ;;Slte Area .*. . . Alert j'.' .. Unus"'al event .,.. ".' .~, ..
~.. - -~ ... - - - - - - -"'-- - - ' - - - - - - f . - 7.3 7.3.4 {>200°F} 7.3.3 {>200°F} 7.3.1 {>200°F} Loss of Loss of most (approx. Unplanned loss of most (approx. 75%) Unplanned loss of most (approx. Indicationsl 75%) safety system safety system annunciators or 75%) safety system annunciators Alarmsl annunciators or indications on Control Room Panels or indications on Control Room Communicatio indications on Control for> 15 min . Panels for> 15 min. n Capability Room Panels AND AND AND Increased surveillance is required for Increased surveillance is required Loss of ability to safe plant operation for safe plant operation monitor critical safety. AND EITHER: function status - A . ifi Itt . t' sign Icant pan ranslen In 7.3.2 {All} AND progress Loss of all communications A significant plant OR capability affecting the ability to transient in progress [Unit 2] PICS [Unit 3] CFMS and EITHER: QSPDS are unavailable Perform routine operations OR Notify offsite agencies or personnel
.--=- Enlergy ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE Page IP-EP-120 I 23 I of Revision 6 30 9.1 - Emergency Action levels CATEGORY 8.0 HAZARDS categoryiiJ5,:(,Gen*l1IIf - - j >-: ' SlteArea I AI.rt --*~ Un~ual E~.nt---- --*-- 8.1 I 8.1.10 {All} I 8.1.7 {All} 8.1.4 {All} 8.1.1 {All} Security Threats A Hostile Force Intrusion into a plant Vital Any security event which represents an Notification of any credible site has taken control Area by a Hostile Force actual substantial degradation of the level specific security threat by the Security of plant equipment 8.1.8 {All} of safety of the plant Shift Supervisor or outside agency. such that plant 8.1.5 {All} 8.1.2 {All} personnel are Any security event which unable to operate represents actual or likely A validated notification from NRC of an Indication of attempted sabotage equipment failures of plant systems airliner attack threat < 30 minutes away within the plant Protected Area required to needed to protect the public, 8.1.6 {All} 8.1.3 {All} maintain safety 8.1.9 {All} Notification from the site security force A validated notification from NRC functions. Notification from the site that an armed attack, explosive attack, providing information of an aircraft security force that an armed airliner impact or other Hostile Action is threat. attack, explosive attack, occurring or has occurred within the airliner impact or other OCA. Hostile Action is occurring or has occurred within the Protected Area
ENN IPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING Entergy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action levels CATEGORY 8.0 HAZARDS
*. . , Category , :/,! //-:,Genttral I" SlteAru Alert I , ',
Unusual Event
' - -'- ~ .,- 707"- - -- 7
'",1;!
8.2 8.2.3 {All} 8.2.1 {All} Fire or explosion in any plant area, Confirmed fire in or contiguous to Fire or any plant area, Table 8.1 not Explosion Table 8.1, which causes or potentially causes any required safety related extinguished in system or structure to become :s 15 min. of Control Room inoperable notification. 8.2.2 {All} Report by plant personnel of an explosion within Protected Area boundary resulting in visible damage to non-vital permanent structures or equipment.
~ Efltergy ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE REFERENCE USE Page IP-EP-120 I 25 I of Revision 6 30 9.1 - Emergency Action levels
.. Category '. .*'. Genera.
. ...f '. ..
Site Area
'J CATEGORY 8.0 HAZARDS Alert
--. ~[ - -- . -- - ~
Unusual Event
*~ -c-**~-* **~
8.3 8.3.4{AII} 8.3.1 {All} Man-Made Vehicle crash or projectile impact Vehicle crash into or projectile Events which causes or potentially causes which impacts plant safety related any required safety related system or structures or systems within structure to become inoperable, Protected Area boundary Table 8.1 8.3.2 {All} 8.3.5 {All} Report or detection of toxic or Report or detection of toxic or flammable gases that could enter flammable gases within a plant area, or have entered within the Table 8.1, in concentrations that will Protected Area boundary in be life threatening to plant personnel amounts that could affect the or preclude access to equipment health of plant personnel or safe (even when using personal protective plant operation equipment) needed for safe plant OR operation Report by local, county or state officials, for potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event 8.3.3 {All} Accident Conditions affecting a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDRY Cask Tip-Over OR Dropped Cask Resulting in Cask Tip-Over
ENNIPEC EMERGENCY PLAN NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 IMPLEMENTING Entetgy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page 26 of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 8.0 HAZARDS r ..: catego ? :" l ".:>Gerl!r8I;:L.:}l,
- StteAr.. I Alert . *-- ~-T";-* "<**-*Unu.u~'Ev~~t--*- * * ."--'--'-
8.4 8.4.4 {All} 8.4.1 {All} Natural Events Earthquake felt inplant based upon a Earthquake felt in plant based consensus of Control Room upon a consensus of Control Operators on duty Room Operators on duty AND AND EITHER Kinemetrics Strong Motion Kinemetrics Strong Motion Accelographs in the Unit 3 VC Accelographs in the Unit 3 VC produce an alarm in the Control produce an alarm in the Room Control Room M!Q OR Amber and red Peak Shock At least one amber Peak Shock Annunciators indicate seismic activity Annunciator is lit 8.4.5 {All} 8.4.2 {All} Sustained winds> 90 mph onsite OR Report by plant personnel of tornado within plant Protected Tornado strikes a plant vital area, Area boundary Table 8.1 8.4.6 {All} 8.4.3 {All} Assessment by the Control Room River level ~ 14.5' (0 MSL) personnel that a natural event has OR occurred which causes or potentially Service water bay (intake causes any required safety system or structure) level < -4'5" (0 MSL) structure to become inoperable, Table 8.1 8.4.7 {All} River level ~ 15' (0 MSL) OR Low service water bay (intake structure) level resulting in a loss of
ENNIPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING - Entergy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page 27 of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels CATEGORY 8.0 HAZARDS Table 8.1 Plant Areas Unit2 Unit 3
- Condensate Storage Tank
- Auxiliary Feedpump Building
- RWST
- P.A.B.
- Service Water Pump Structure
- CAS/SAS
- Service Water Valve Pit East
- Fuel Storage Building
- Fuel Storage Building
- Control Building
- Primary Auxiliary Building/Fan
- Control Room House
- Service Water Pumps
- Vapor Containment Building
- Refueling Water Tank
- 480 Volt Switchgear Room (Control
- EDG Rooms Bldg.)
- Diesel Fuel Tanks
- Cable Spreading Room/Electrical
- Vital Area Access to Tunnel Containment
- Central Control Room
- Appendix R Diesel Generator
- Diesel Generator Building/Fuel
- Backup Service Water Tank Area
- Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Building
- Battery Room (Control Bldg. 33'0" ele.)
- Central Alarm Station
ENN IPEC NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 ! fa EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING
~ Enlergy PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page I 28 I of 30 9.1 - Emergency Action Levels
- 9. i Catagory 9.1.7 {All} G.';.r8I I~~1.5 ~~I:AT~~~:':.o - -~.1-.3-{A-~~-rt--~_~u_1n_;_:_~._I_E_;~_*n-_t--*-
Other As determined by the Shift As determined by the Shift Manager Any event, as Any event, as Manager or Emergency or Emergency Director, events are in determined by the determined by the Director, events are in progress progress which indicate actual or Shift Manager or Shift Manager or which indicate actual, or likely failures of plant systems needed Emergency Director, Emergency Director, imminent core damage and the to protect the public. Any releases that could cause or that could lead to or potential for a large release of are not expected to result in has caused actual has led to a potential radioactive material in excess of exposures which exceed EPA PAGs. substantial degradation of the EPA PAGs outside the site degradation of the level of safety of the boundary. 9.1.6 {>200°F} level of safety of the
- plant.
Any event, as determined by the Shift plant. 9.1.8 {>200°F} 9.1.2 {>200°F} Manager or Emergency Director, that 9.1.4 {>200DF} Any event, as determined by could lead or has led to EITHER: Any event, as the Shift Manager or Any event, as determined by the Emergency Director, that could Loss or potential loss of both fuel determined by the Shift Manager or lead or has led to a loss of any clad and ReS barrier, Attachment A. Shift Manager or Emergency Director, two fission product barriers and QB Emergency Director, that could lead to or loss or potential loss of the Loss or potential loss of either fuel that could lead or has has led to a loss or third, Attachment 2. clad or ReS barrier in conjunction led to a loss or potential loss of with a loss of containment, potential loss of either containment, Attachment 2. fuel clad or ReS Attachment 2. barrier, Attachment 2.
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ENNIPEC
-E NON-QUALITY RELATED P~OCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING ~ nlergy REFERENCE USE Page 29 I of 30 i.-
PROCEDURES I 9.2 - Fission Product Barrier Thresholds FUEL CLADDING BARRIER Potential Loss Loss
- ORANGE path in F-O.2, CORE COOLING
- RED path in F-O.2. CORE COOLING
- RED path in F-0.3, HEAT SINK AND Heat sink is required
- Coolant activity> 300 l-ICi/cc 1-131 equivalent
- Core Exit Thermocouple Readings [Unit 2] > 700°F
- Core Exit Thermocouple Readings> 1200 OF
[Unit 3] > 715 of
- RVLlS [Unit 2] ::; 41% [Unit 3] ::; 33% wi no RCPs running ~ II
- Containment radiation monitor R-25 or R-26 > 17 Rlhr
- Emergency Director Judgment I I
- Emergency Director Judgment Res BARRIER Potential Loss Loss
- RED path on F-O.4, INTEGRITY
- RCS subcooling < SI initiation setpoint due to RCS leakage
- RED path on F-O.3, HEAT SINK AND Feed & Bleed is required
- Unisolable faulted (outside VC) ruptured steam generator
[Unit 2] R-41 > 1.2E-5 ~Ci/cc or
- Primary system leakage exceeding capacity (> 75 gpm) of a single charging pump R-42 off-scale due to ReS leakage
[Unit 3] R-11 > 1.2E-5 ~Ci/cc or R-12 > 0.05 ~Ci/cc
- Emergency Director Judgment
- Emergency Director Judgment
ENN IPEC a~ Entergy EMERGENCY PLAN NON-QUALITY RELATED PROCEDURE IP-EP-120 Revision 6 IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE Page j 30 I of 30 9.2 - Fission Product Barrier Thresholds CONTAINMENT BARRIER Potential Loss Loss
- RED path F-0.5, CONTAINMENT
- Rapid uncontrolled decrease in containment pressure following initial
- EITHER: increase due to RCS failure Core exit thermocouples >1200° F
- EITHER:
Any Phase "A" or Phase "8" or containment ventilation isolation valve(s) OR not closed when required following confirmed LOCA Core exit thermocouples [Unit 2] >700 of [Unit 3] > 715 of OR with RVLlS [Unit 2] <41% [Unit 3] <33% wi no RCPs Inability to isolate any primary system discharging outside containment AND AND Restoration procedures not effective within 15 min. Radiological release to the environment exists as a result
- Confirmed phase "8" isolation signal following confirmed LOCA
- 80th doors open on a VC airlock for> 4 hrs.
with less than minimum containment cooling safeguards OR equipment operating Fan Cooler Units Oper. Spray Pumps Reg 'd Inability to close containment pressure relief or purge valves which results in a radiological release pathway to the environment for> 4 hrs.
<3 2 3 1 OR 5 o Any Phase "A" or Phase "8" or containment ventilation isolation valve(s) not
- Containment pressure 47 psig and increasing closed when required which results in a radiological release pathway to the environment
* ~4 % hydrogen concentration in containment
- Unisolable release of secondary side to atmosphere from the affected steam
- Containment radiation monitor R-25 or R-26 reading generator(s) with primary to secondary leakage> Technical Specifications
>68 Rlhr limit in any steam generator
- Emergency Director Judgment
- Loss of primary coolant inside containment with containment pressure or sump level response not consistent with LOCA conditions
- Emergency Director Judgment}}