ML12335A584

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Official Exhibit - CLE00012A-00-BD01 - Michael R. Edelstein, Ph.D., Environmental Justice Impacts from the Proposed Relicensing of the Indian Point Nuclear Power Complex: a Focus on Sing Sing Prison (October 5, 2011) Part 1
ML12335A584
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/05/2011
From: Edelstein M
Hudson River Sloop Clearwater
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
References
RAS 21641, ASLBP 07-858-03-LR-BD01, 50-247-LR, 50-286-LR
Download: ML12335A584 (19)


Text

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Official Hearing Exhibit Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Exhibit CLE00012a In the Matter of:

(Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3)

Submitted 12/22/11 c:..\,.~p..R REGlI~;. ASLBP #: 07-858-03-LR-BD01 I I

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Docket #: 05000247 l 05000286 0

0 Exhibit #: CLE00012A-00-BD01 Identified: 10/15/2012

~ Admitted: 10/15/2012 Withdrawn:

o'e-,..", O~" Rejected: Stricken:

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        • il Other:

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IMP ACTS FROM THE PROPOSED RELICENISNG OF THE INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR POWER COMPLEX:

A FOCUS ON SING SING PRISON Michael R. Edelstein, Ph.D.

Testimony on Behalf of Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc.

October 5, 2011

Introauction I am an Environmental Psychologist with a Ph.D. in Social Psychology. My career has largely been spent in the field of impact assessment. My specialty is psycho-social impact assessment of environmental disaster and change. What I have been able to contribute to the field of EmirOlIDlental Justice is analysis of the psychological and ,nental hanns encountered by victims of the injustice and the consequences of those hanns. An injustice can be appreciated rhetorically as a violation to a given demographic group; but it can further be inspected to identify its key consequences. As an impact assessor, my concern has been to anticipate impacts to daily life and to understand challenges to cognitive assumptions underlying daily life---things like trust, health, feeling in control and being secure---and the emotional consequences.

This report provides my expert opinion on the extent to which the minority popUlation in Sing-Sing prison would be disproportionately affected by a severe accident at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant in Buchanan, N.Y. The plant is approximatei'y 10 miles from the prison. Because I conclude that such disproportionate impacts are likely ifradiation reaches the prison or there is a perception among the prison population that radiation exposure is likely or has occurred, I also discuss potential approaches to mitigation of such impacts.

Regulatory Context and History On New Year's Day 1970, President Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act, a sweeping statement of environmental, social and economic sustainability that promised among other things, to

... assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundingi The action forcing mechanism included in the bill developed with regulatory and court refinement as a tool for fully infonning decision makers about the significant adverse impacts of the action under consideration and the best alternatives and mitigations that might circumvent these outcomes. In order to do this, a "hard look" was to be taken. The scope of "environmental" impacts to be assessed was not limited to environment, but broadened to include a range of social and economic factors as well.

Refinements to NEPA have continued over time. In 1994 President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12898 "Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations" in order to address issues of "Environmental Justice." The recognition ofEJ as an issue arose from pioneer research by Bullard that demonstrated inequitable placement of waste sites in Houston, a finding that was subsequently replicated by the United Church of Christ, the GAO and in countless studies in varied contexts.;; This increasingly hard evidence 2

merged with the civil rights actions inspired by the 1982 pennitting of a disposal site for PCBs in

-apoor minority communityin Wan*en eounty, North Carolina. In-a rare instance-where social science research incited a social movement, environmental justice acquired enough cache to influence policy formation in a relatively short period of time. iii In promulgating his EJ executive Order, Clinton targeted disproportionately high and adverse human health and envirolUnent effects on minority and low-income populations, deliberately broadening the scope of protection found originally in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Clinton added these responsibilities to NEPA to require federal agencies to analyze impacts to human health in light of cumulative and multiple environmental exposures. Among the factors to be addressed in environmental impact statements, as a result, is risk, as well as risk communication needs, where minority and low income communities were placed at a .

disadvantage. Although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has claimed it is not bound by the Executive Order, it nonetheless modified its NEPA regulations to include EnvirolUnental Justice.

The Agency chose to closely integrate EJ into nonnal NEP A review with NEP A as the authority rather than viewing EJ analysis as stand alone. Accordingly, the agency stated that Disproportionately high and adverse impacts of a proposed action that fall heavily on a particular community call for close scrutiny-a hard look-under NEPA. j, v Further clarification of the required approach is given by the NRC in its Policy Statement on the Treatment of Environmental Justice Matters in NRC Regulatory and Licensing Actions pursuant to NEPA (69 Fed. Reg. 52,040, 52,044, August 24, 2004). Here, the Commission again acknowledged its obligation to consider and assess adverse impacts that fall disproportionately on minority or low-income populations.

NRC believes that all analysis of disproportionately high and adverse impacts needs to be done as part of the agency's NEPA obligations to accurately identify and disclose all significant environmental impacts associated with a proposed action. vi The policy (69 Fed. Reg. 52,048) requires two sequenced steps of analysis, assessment of impacts peculiar to those EJ communities and identification of disparate impacts. Following vii from these steps, two questions can be specifically delineated.

I. As a result of the proposed action, is the EJ community SUbjected to a disproportionate adverse environmental impact compared to non-EJ communities?

2. If so, has the NRC taken the appropriate hard look at the issue in the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement to detennine the significance of the effect and feasible mitigation?

An EJ Frame for Relicensing of Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant 3

Clearwater, Inc., a non-govenunental envirolilllental organization, sought intervener status before the Atomic Safety-and LiGensing Board in the matter-of-Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

(Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3; henceforth Indian Point). Cleatwater's contention EC-3 asserted that the Environmental Review submitted by Entergy failed to

... acknowledge or describe potential impacts upon the large minority and low-income populations that surround the plant. viii Among several EJ populations cited by Clealwater are those housed in "special facilities" within fifty miles ofIndian Point. Among these, Sing Sing was highlighted.

In its subsequent issues ruling, the Board found that NEPA required a review of

... environmental/actors peculiar to minority or low-income populations that may cause them to suffer harm disproportionate to that suffered by the general population. ix Moving on to consider Clearwater's contention regarding effects to EJ populations, the Board wrote:

Finally, Clearwater identified minority and low-income populations located in numerous institutions located near Indian Point. Specifically, Clearwater identified Sing Sing, a maximum security correctional/acility located less than ten miles Fom Indian Point that houses more than 1,750 predominantly minority inmates .... CleO/water then contends among other things that Entergy's ER and the NRC's FSEIS are both deficient because they do not address the impact 0/ a severe accident at Indian Point on these EJ populations. "x In fact, an examination of the FSEIS reveals that Environmental Justice impacts are not addressed.

  • In section 3.2.10, EJ impacts of refurbishment are dismissed without being examined.'i
  • In section 4.4.6, the NRC staff fails to acknowledge EJ issues at the required census block level despite claiming to do so. The FSEIS fails to specifically mention Sing Sing.

This is despite the fact that Sing Sing has its own dedicated census tract, and the NRC's own analysis reveals it to be an EJ community, as indicated on both Figure 4-5 (Minority block groups in 2000 within a 50-mi radius ofIndian Point) and Figure 4-6 (Low-income block groups in 2000 within a 50-mi radius of Indian Point).'ii

  • The FEIS correctly points out that the popUlation within the 50 mile radius ofIndian Point is 48.7 percent minority, just shy of the majority needed to signal an EJ population.

However, they fail to acknowledge that such demographics may constitute a concentration of minorities "meaningfully greater than the minority population percentage in the general popUlation or other appropriate unit of geographic analysis,"

another EJ trigger.'iii NRC also fails to acknowledge that 48.7% on the 2000 census is potentially more than 50% in 2011 .'iv

  • In Chapter 5.28, the FSEIS discusses the environmental impacts from postulated accidents that might occur during the license renewal telm, which include both design 4

basis and severe accidents!V In both cases, the risks were dismissed as either insignificant

- or unlikely. The potential for an EJ effect is accordingly dismissed because the NRC concludes that there is no impact. Since unlikely events do occur, this analysis begs the question of an EJ impact on Sing Sing during an emergency or chronic release producing exposure of the inmate population to radioactive byproducts. And , even in the absence of an emergency, per se, its potential has palpable consequences, as acknowledged by the requirement to do emergency planning and prepare contingencies. NRC can't have it both ways. If the risk is significant enough to require emergency planning, then it is significant enough to be recognized for potential effects to those potentially affected by an emergency.

The goal here is to explore the issues of EJ impacts to Sing Sing prison sufficiently to illustrate the kind ofleaming that would accrue if the NRC reviewed in some depth all institutionalized EJ populations in the vicinity of the plant. Although it would be hard to argue that Sing Sing is representative of other institutions or settings at risk from Indian Point, it certainly is an exemplar of the EJ impacts of relic en sing the Entergy complex, which the NRC Staff has inexplicably ignored. Clearwater noted some "twenty five other prisons and jails located within fifty miles ofIndian Point. " xvi The Board has acknowledged Clearwater's reference to these many other institutions that would suffer potentially significant adverse effects from a disaster at Indian point. A declaration by Drew Claxton in March 2011 and other testimony demonstrates the existence of other bone fide environmental justice issues for adjudication beyond the scope of this repOlt, including other institutionalized EJ populations, such as Head Start pre-schools, nursing homes, homeless shelters, and hospitals.

Recently, the Board has acknowledged this deficiency, issuing an amended findingxvii that reads Entergy's environmental report and the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement contain seriously flawed environmental justice analyses that do not adequately assess the impacts of relicensing Indian Point on the minority, low-income and disabled populations in the area surrounding Indian Point.

While each of these institutions has peculiar attributes that would influence impacts suffered from an emergency event at Indian Point, the focus here remains on one institution, Sing Sing prIson.

In contrast to the finding in the FSEIS,"viii from the following analysis, I will conclude that because of the shelter-in-place policy, should an emergency occur at Indian Point, inmates at Sing Sing are at disproportionate risk for suffering significant and high rates of adverse health effects, including bodily impainnent, infinnity, illness and death. And, there is also a significant and disproportionate risk of environmental impact, as well. In particular, as discussed throughout this report, there is a potential for additional psycho-social impact caused by forced sheltering and potentially last minute or delayed evacuation after exposure has already occurred. xix Method 5

This report relies heavily on literature review, some of which was referenced in the original filing. The author was fortunate to pmiicipate in a class inside-Sing Sing prison in spring 20 I 0 and to discuss Indian Point impacts with inmates. This group conversation provided corroboration and insight into my understanding of potential impacts there. Subsequent efforts to re-enter the prison to hold further discussion with prisoners were not approved.

A Concept Map of this testimony There is an essential relationship between impact and mitigation in the environmental review process. NEPA makes clear that an action must be subjected to mitigation in order to remove or mollify any significant adverse impacts identified. Absent mitigation, the significant adverse impact serves as a tradeoff issue that might serve as grounds for denying the pemlit.

It has been argued that mitigation is merely a restatement of the hazard. xx Should the 1,1itigation fail, the hazard is released. Accordingly, the hazard is not really erased by mitigation.

Furthemlore, as seen here, mitigation can itself be a source of adverse impact.

This analysis is divided into two closely linked sections.

Section I: Impacts. This section establishes the potential significant adverse impacts of relicensing of the Indian Point reactors for the proximate "Enviro!Ullental Justice (i.e., low-income, minority and disempowered) population" at Sing Sing Prison.

Section 2: Mitigation. This section takes a hard look at the prospects for mitigation of these impacts and proposes steps needed for improvement.

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SECTION I:

The relicensing of the Indian Point reactors will potentially cause significant, disproportionately high and adverse impacts to a proximate "Environmental Justice (i.e., low-income, minority and disempowered) population" at Sing Sing Prison should a severe lIue/ear accident occur.

In thi s first section, four key points are made.

I. Citing detailed documentation from the Katrina disaster, potential adverse impacts are described due to a major disaster at a prison with an Environmental Justice population.

2. Sing Sing prison is then characterized as itself housing an Environmental Justice population.
3. The particular susceptibility of prisons and other total institutions to significant disaster impact is then discussed.
4. And, finally, the nature of a nuclear accident is described as a unique type of disaster, having adverse environmental effects beyond the direct hazard they represent.

I. Lessons of Katrina about Prison Disaster Response: Shelter in Place and Evacuation The recent case study that best documents consequences for prison populations caught up in disaster is the poignant story of the 2005 Katrina disaster in New Orleans and environs. ACLU compiled a comprehensive report on the Katrina disaster and its aftermath that addresses prison populations and therefore serves as a useful basis for this analysis."i The report is based upon I ,300 firsthand accounts by pri soners and guards. This report provides a firm foundation for several observations to be made about likely impacts at Sing Sing Prison during a severe accident at Indian Point.

In particular, the ACLU study provides important insight into the two available protective responses were such a disaster to unfold, "shelter-in-place" and evacuation. Here "shelter-in-place" and evacuation are examined as contexts for adverse impact. In the second section, they will be revisited under the rubric of mitigation.

The ACLU specifically focuses on Orleans Parish Prison (OPP), the jail facility for the city of New Orleans. At the time of the Katrina disaster (the storm and resultant flooding), OPP housed as many as 6,000 inmates, including those transferred from other prisons just before the storm hit. The population ranged from uncharged prisoners held for minor infractions to serious felons.

Those incarcerated included both male and female prisoners and a significant juvenile offender population.

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ACLU rep0l1s that OPP's population at the time of the storm was almost entirely African-American- 89.3% of-the population was black and only 9.6%-were white. Racial homogeneity was even greater for juveniles moved to OPP from the Conchetta Youth Center (98.7% African-American) and the Youth Study Center (95% African-American).

Of course, prisoners were not the only victims of the stoml at OPP. A significant number of cOITections officers were on hand, many bringing their families with them into the prison compound.

Katrina was a disaster that afforded a pre-event anticipatory period, as well as the participatory periods as stoml victims responded to the surging event and its protracted aftermath. During the Anticipatory Period, a deliberate decision was made not to evacuate OPP prisoners pre-st0l111, as were other Louisiana prisons. OPP inmates were instead sheltered in place for the first several days of the disaster before an evacuation was implemented. As a result, the Katrina case study provides a snapshot of the impacts of both "shelter-in-place" and evacuation conditions, discussed below under these respective topics.

Katrina As A Test of "Shelter in Place" The St01111 and subsequent flooding resulted in OPP's isolation for several days and the effective abandonment of its inhabitants. These primary conditions, in tum, caused a series of secondary impacts that also affected the degree of ha1111 experienced by inmates. Many interacting factors affected conditions in OPP during this period.

Although offering significant shelter from the rain and winds, the prison failed to protect many inhabitants from secondary impacts of the stoml. One contributing factor was the failure of teclmology relied upon to maintain habitability in the prison. Outside communications were cut off for prisoners even before the storm hit; as a result prisoners lacked any knowledge about their families' plans, how they fared in the stoml and their eventual safety and whereabouts. When power outages quickly occurred during the stoml, back-up generators failed to restore power in the prison, sometimes due to flooding, but also often due to a lack of fuel or trained operators.

The result was that OPP was plunged into darkness, ventilation failed and other key systems were debilitated, including the ability to open cells in some flooded sections, leaving prisoners trapped in rising flood waters. Even as they were inundated by the water rising around them, prisoners were ironically deprived of both functional water for flushing toilets and washing and potable water for drinking.

Other secondary impacts of the disaster involved the failure of social systems relied upon to maintain control and social order in the prison and the availability of basic requisites, including food, potable water and sanitation.

Given the disaster taking shape around them, deputies had to weigh their job responsibilities and future employment with issues of personal safety and family responsibility. So many apparently 8

abandoned their posts despite orders to report to work that, according to the New Orleans Times-

- Pica-yrrlfe;1h-ere-were "wholesale-job walk-offs by-deputies-(cited-by AG1,U)~To-avoid the~_ ~ _

dilemma of abandoning their families, many deputies who reported for duty brought them along to the prison, locating them in dry areas and providing them food and water intended for pnsoners.

Many deputies who reported found that they could then not function in their posts. Deputies were unaware of storm preparation and evacuation plans. Women deputies became fearful ofhann after the power went out. Guards had their days-off canceled and were forced to remain at their posts with no additional pay. ACLU sources describe how deputies were locked in during their shifts, preventing the option of abandoning their posts. Given all of this, it is unsurprising to leam that there was low reported staff morale.

Prisoners took the brunt of this "undennanned" situation. They were locked down and abandoned. In many cases, according to ACLU, they were stranded in cells with flood water rising around them. Prisoners were locked down in waist high water with no way of opening their doors. The condition of this water added to the predicament, making for a noxious as well as hazardous situation. The flood water was tainted with sewage and whatever other contaminated ingredients entered the ton'ential brew. Lacking water to flush toilets, many contributed further to the contamination of their environment except where groups of prisoners agreed not to. In such cases, prisoners were reported defecating out broken windows. Lacking any source of potable water some washed in the flood water and some even were reported to have drunk it. Others drank water that was barely less foul collected before the stonn hit in used garbage bins. Food was also largely unavailable, and prisoners went hungry for days. Medical care lapsed during the disaster and medicines were unavailable. Prisoners with serious health conditions were left to fight off asthma attacks and other problems, aided in some reported instances only by fellow inmates.

In this Dantesque situation, prisoners also became demoralized. It is not difficult to fathom why.

Like everyone else in New Orleans, they worried for their safety and the safety of their loved ones. Unlike most others, however, they were largely powerless to do anything about it. Even before the storm hit, inmates watching television witnessed the Sheriffs announcement that they would remain behind and shelter-in-place. One prisoner recalled his realization while listening to the announcement that inmates were being "left to die."xxii Control of the prisoners was a major focus once the disaster unfolded. While left to deal with come-what-may, prisoners were never briefed on the situation. Often false promises of food, drinking water and evacuation were used as a control mechanism by guards. As noted, prisoners were often locked in their cells even when water was rising. Handcuffs and leg shackles were used to hold cell doors tightly and to further trap prisoners. The failure of power meant that many cell doors could not be opened even when officers wanted them to.

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Responding to this situation, some prisoners took matters into their own hands, breaking

- windows to get-ventilation-and ripping the doors off their cells-to-escape into-the block. There- - - - -

were many desperate efforts to signal for rescuers. Some prisoners jumped into flood waters to escape, risking drowning, guards firing live bullets and impalement on the barbed wire. As prisoners gained access to parts of the prison, officers and their families had close encounters and felt threatened. It became unsafe for medical persolmel and deputies to move through the locked down areas. Numerous rumors about insurrection described prisoner takeover of OPP, including its almory, with rep0l1s of a resulting gun battle. Although unfounded, such stories nevertheless influenced response to the prisoners. Acts of desperation on the part of prisoners brought a surprisingly harsh response from guards. Crowd control techniques were used, including mace, stun guns, pepper spray and tear gas, "beanbag" shotguns and facial beating. Often victim choice was arbitrary, and the victims were innocent. ACLU cites evidence of discriminatory targeting of people of color. xx ;;;

It is interesting'that guards surveyed by ACLU were able to understand and even empathize with the prisoners' plight. They were well aware that inmates were incited by such basic needs as wanting food and water, to be with their families or to learn about their families' safety.

However, in the heat of the moment, officers' impulse was to disperse and control prisoners. The larger situation was so out of control and staff so undermanned that guards were fearful of losing control and overreacted. xx;v Katrina as a Test of Prison Evacuation When the long delayed evacuation from OPP of more than 6,000 prisoners eventually commenced, it was a haphazard and poorly organized affair. The evacuation was not led by prison personnel and excessive force was used. Prisoners with special needs were handled haphazardly, ignoring their conditions and risk. Some prisoners could not be moved at first; they were locked in cells for which keys had been lost and could not be easily extracted. In some cases, supervisors had to go under water to open them. Prisoners were forced to leave belongings behind, including legal papers, never to see them again.

There were major delays and confusion during staging and transit. Only three boats were available to ferry 6,000 or more prisoners, hundreds of deputies and civilians a few at a time.

Some prisoners waited for evacuation standing in water between chest and neck high for as long as ten hours. An interim destination on the Broad Street Overpass was chaotic. Some prisoners were left for 3 days in the scorching sun without food, water or shelter. Tensions ran high and guards eager to control the unwieldy mass of convicts were prone to overreaction. Prisoners were pepper sprayed for asking to go to the bathroom or getting up. Tasers were also used, as well as beanbag guns and dogs were loosed on some inmates.

Once relocated, prisoners fared even worse, however. New receiving institutions were not prepared to feed, house or protect the large influx of incoming prisoners. Evacuees were housed 10

under improper conditions. Katrina evacuees were met with stigma and prejudice by guards and

- prisoners- alike in-their"TIew-facilities-:-Violence-and-selCual abuse between-prisoners_went. _ _ _ __

unchecked. In some facilities, guards systematically abused prisoners. The ACLU found evidence of racial motivation in assaults by guards. Opportunity for communication with families was denied for a protracted period, prolonging prisoners' ignorance about the fate of their loved ones.

Then there was the post-disaster legal context, in which mechanisms of the law were slow to recuperate. Post-disaster, the criminal justice system was incapacitated, resulting in the phenomenon of "Katrina time," i.e., serving unnecessary time while waiting for a hearing.

Meanwhile, OPP was under extreme pressure to reopen. The ACLU reports that the prison began operations under conditions of significantly degraded quality, failing to provide a suitable prison living environment and a safe place for inmates.

ACLU makes clear that prisoners were not the only victims of the situation. When prisoners were finally evacuated from the transit point, OPP guards found themselves abandoned and left on their own. One deputy who was injured during the storm reported to ACLU that he suffered afterward from depression and PTSD. He resents his depravation of food and water during the St0I111. He now fears thunder storms. During his violent dreams, he has assaulted his fiance:" If officers are reporting such trauma syndromes after the storm, what symptoms do prisoners have?

In the second section of this report on mitigation, the applicable lessons of Katrina are discussed.

The implications of the OPP experience during Katrina will be referenced throughout this report.

2. Inmates at Sing Sing Prison constitute an Environmental Justice population Environmental Justice (or EJ) populations are generally defined as being represented in the majority by members of low-income and minority individuals. A further distinction cited by the literature on Environmental Justice is that the impacted population lacks the power to protect itself or participate in decision-making that it will be affected by.

Race and Sing Sing Particularly for race, there is compelling evidence that Sing Sing is an EJ community. This is not a rare occurrence for U.S. prisons. According to sources cited by ACLU, incarceration rates are themselves reflective of an inherent environmental injustice. Thus, while only twelve percent of the U.S. population, blacks comprise upwards of 44% of the prison population, a trend particularly pronounced for males. All age groups across the spectrum evidence between 5 to 7 times the rates for incarceration for black, as opposed to white, males. To be a black male in the U.S. in your late twenties correlates to a 12% chance that you are behind bars.xxv; 11

If this demographic trend is true of prisons in general, it is even more pronounced in New York

- - - prisons, partiGularl y-Sing-Sing~Table-l-summari-zes-2008-data-on-race-from the-New-¥ork- State:- - - -

prison population, showing that slightly more than half of prisoners are Black and a quarter Hispanic. When the approximately 1,750 Sing Sing prisoners are examined, we find that the inmate population in this facility is 57% African American and 30% Hispanic. With most methods for calculating Environmental Justice populations looking for a simple majority of an impacted population to qualify, here we see 87% of the Sing Sing inmate population categori zed as EJ (a shade more when Native Americans are included).

White African- Hispanic Native Asian Total American American All NY 20.8% 51.3% 25.9% 0.6% 0.5% 62,599 Prisons Sing Sing 218 (13%) 974 (57%) 514(30%) 4 <<1 %) 13 <<1%) 1,723 Table 1: PopulatIon by Race/Ethl1lc Status New York Pnsons vs. Slllg SlIlg, 2008 data XXV "

Sing Sing is accorded its own Census Block, tract 13303. Table 2 displays data for the Sing Sing tract compared to adjacent census blocks using data through 2005-2009. 'xv;;; Two additional adjacent census tracts to the prison are shown to also have predominantly minority populations and would be likely to share adverse impacts from an emergency at Indian Point. The table further shows that other adjacent tracts are predominantly white. While these tracts might be at risk for similar exposures from an Indian Point incident, they would not be classified as having Environmental Justice Impacts. It would be appropriate for the FSEIS to have examined potential differences of impact from similar environmental conditions to these tracts.

Tract # 13303 13304 13301 13201 13202 134 135 Population 1718 4462 2506 4311 2882 6395 3967 White 11 26 27 88 91 56 69 Black 58 26 25 4 2 5 3 Hispanic 31 42 44 2 1 29 23 Asian I 5 0 6 5 10 4 Other 0 1 4 I 1 0 0 Table 2: Smg Smg Census Tract 13303 Compared to Adjacent Tracts The FSEIS shows the Sing Sing tract as having a minority majority but does not explore this demographic as an EJ issue.xx;x Income and Sing Sing New York prisons show numerous indirect indicators of impoverishment, including low rates of educational achievement (49% non attainment of high school degrees for Sing Sing, 46.1 % for NY prisons in total) and deficiencies in reading skills (testing at or below 8th grade reading 12

level, 34.5% Sing Sing and 33% NY prisons in total). xxx The analysis of2008 Census Bureau

- dillePfesentecI inthe-FSEIS acknowledges-thanhdndian Point census-block- qualifies as-a-low- - -

income tract; however, no analysis -is provided. x,,;

The third EJ issue, disempowerment, is addressed in the next section.

Metropolitan New York Origin Another demographic trend is worthy of note. Sing Sing prisoners are predominantly from New York City (70.2% Sing Sing/52 . 1% all NY prisons) and from the New York metropolitan region including NYC (84.7% Sing Sing and 63.5% all NY prisons)."x;; Not only is Sing Sing's inmate population grounded in the local region, but it is grounded in the region to be potentially impacted by a serious event at IP. Prisoners would not only be affected directly, but also indirectly through their concerns for the plight of family, friends and community on the outside.

3. Sing Sing Inmates are Clients of a Total Institution Sing Sing is a maximum security prison in the New York State Correctional System, housing some 1,750 prisoners. The bulk of its prisoners were incarcerated for committing violent felonies (79%).xxx;;; Sing Sing has played a factual as well as mythological role in the history of the New York City region and is one of the most storied of penitentiaries.

As the Katrina assessment documents, disasters do not spare prisons and their inmates in their wake of destruction. The unanticipated but perhaps predictable outcomes of Katrina are instructive. With Sing Sing, we must consider the unknown interaction of two complex and unpredictable systems: Indian Point and the prison itself. Outcomes will depend on the mutual behavior of these systems and their secondary dependencies and consequences. Thus, one cali neither predict the events to be encountered nor the exact response of the system to these events with any certainty. However, one can anticipate a range of impacts that may occur, the potential consequence and address the mitigations or responses necessary.

The "total" institutional context of the prison magnifies the enormous challenge faced by disaster victims in the general population.xxx;v Incarceration serves as punishment through confinement to a small cell, impersonal clothing, forced separation from the larger world, including family and "life," immersion in a community of prisoners with its own norms and culture and subjugation to a rigid system of control. The prisoner is robbed of personhood and agency. They become "disabled" as they slllTender the conditions of their prior efficacy and choices ofnornlallife.

Others, within a bureaucratic hierarchy, now make fundamental decisions for them. And they require permission for any deviation. They are denied independent sources of information, social support and personal power essential to their prior lives. Contact with nature is replaced by "the yard." Recovery of control is channeled within new fornlal and infonnal rule sets. They are no longer free agents . Such dependency systems have adverse implications after prisoner release because they promote recidivism. There are built-in reasons for inmates and officers to be at 13

odds. During an event in the prison, however, the inmate is looking for officers and staff to

- -- - - -protect them:-A- failure-to-be-protective-for-those with extreme-dependency-Ieads-to a sense off-- -- - -- -

violation. Such conditions of disability do not, however, necessarily make the individual compliant.

Key to the analysis of Environmental Justice is the disabling nature of prisons which by design deprive imnates of efficacy over factors that affect them. Thus, illlilates constitute an EJ population by virtue of their powerlessness. Some of the disabling elements of the prison enviromllent are:

  • Prisons are total environments, literally representing the walls within which all activities occur. They are not only confilling but also defillillg because of their mandated rule sets.
  • At the same time as they are free of the responsibilities and pressures that daily life on the outside implies, prisoners lack freedom and individual choice.
  • Prisoners are clients of an involuntary social service system that addresses all recognized needs.
  • Prisoners are disabled by their dependence on and control by agents of the institutional environment.
  • Imnate self-growth is chalU1eled in directions that promote long tenn rehabilitation and short tenn institutional control but not in directions that give prisoners direct control over conditions of their incarceration.
  • The routines of a prison do not replicate those in the outside world. Life is simplified in ways that promote dependency and thus recidivism, since success inside does not translate to success outside.
  • Prisons contain complex social systems that reflect both cohesive community forces and divisive, cliquish and conflictive elements sometimes brought into the prison from the outside community.
  • Prisons are managed with a cautionary perspective, where prisoner freedom is directly restricted in proportion to the perceived need to control and manage the envirOlllilent.

Maximum security facilities such as Sing Sing represent the extreme instance of such control.

  • A top down, military-style command structure is in place in which prisoners do not participate.
  • Prison is a very different social and psychological world to live in, just as it is an aberrant physical enviromnent.

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  • Things may be important to people inside a total institution that would not warrant attention on tl1e oufSioee:-. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_ __
  • Sense of security in this envirolID1ent comes from regularity and predictability.

Uncertainty and surprise are wildcards.

  • All human systems resist change. But prisons are designed to prevent it.
  • As a controlled institution, all depend on the power structure to protect them.

These characteristics make members of the inmate population susceptible to harm in ways not found in the larger population. Such vulnerabilities are readily overlooked in considering the impacts of disaster. xxxv Hoffman cites Robbins in discussing prisoner vulnerability.

Because they are in custody, prisoners are entirely dependent upon governmental authorities for their welfare during a disaster, and, therefore, they too are a vulnerable population. Prisoners cannot evacuate on their own, seek medical care, or obtain food, shelter, and supplies unless authorities provide these to them. Furthermore, in the chaos of an emergency, inmates could be subject to attacks by fellow prisoners or poorly trained, panicked guards:,",xvi Robbins expands on his point.

The very nature of correctional institutions makes it such that the state has deprived prisoners of their ability to care for themselves ..... As emergency preparedness becomes a regularfunction ofgovernment, we must not forget prisoners; they are dependent on others for their health and safety and consequently may sliffer unnecessary tragedy as tIIe resu It oJ,r ot Ilers ,.lila dequate emergency p IaJ1111ng.

. xxxvn In the sense that we use the term "disabled" to refer to those impaired in their freedom of movement, incarceration can be thought of as a fOlm of handicap. Most places in a prison are beyond prisoners' reach unless they have supervised assistance. The disability is not only physical but psychological. Prisoners are given freedoms to study and grow in certain acceptable ways, but when it comes to controlling their immediate physical and social environment, they are intended to feel powerless. These disabling factors are exacerbated by the temporal dimension of incarceration, evidenced by the extended sentences prevalent in Sing Sing.

In sum, prisoner vulnerability reflects an effective disability w ithin a total institution. This di sability includes spatial confinement, total dependence on others for one's need to be met and conformity both to an institutional rationality and an inmate prison culture. The loss and deprivation of freedom leaves the inmate popUlation highly vulnerable to victim ization both from an emergency at Indian Point, should it occur, and from the institutional and social response or 15

failure to respond to such an incident in the Sing Sing context. Thus, adverse impact from an Indian-Point emergeney-would-not e nly-be-environmentaI,-but-also-sociallorganizational,--And the- - - -

adverse impacts would not only be direct, but also secondary, tertiary and even more remotely causal in connection.

4. The conditions created by a nuclear accident represent a unique type of disaster Of the four types of accidents potentially occUlTing at Indian Point, the worst is the General Emergency, defined in the Westchester Emergency Plan xxxv ;;; as An event has occurred involving actual or imminent core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases of radioactive materials CO/I reasonably be expected to exceed federal exposure limits for more than the immediate plant area.

In this document, the term emergency will be used synonymously with a severe disaster or release of radioactive materials.

Although a matter of dispute, the potential for an emergency at Indi an Point is implicitly acknowledged by the NRC's licensing process and clearly stated by outside evaluators. For example, the Witt ReportX"";x cited a lack of "strategy that leads to structures and systems to protect frol1l radiation exposure, " a questionable assumption that people will follow directives rather than their own perceived best interests, failures to consider telTorism or spontaneous evacuation, inadequate plan evaluation, the large local population! and the lack of public and responder trust in concluding that

... the current radiological response system and capabilities are not adequate to overcome their combined weight and protect the people from an unacceptable dose of radiation in the event of a release from Indian Point. We believe this is especially true if the release is faster or larger than the typical exercise scenario.

Sing Sing prison is indisputably within plausible range of direct impact from an emergency at Indian Point. The prison is located ten miles due south of Indian Point along the Hudson River.

xl The Witt report cites meteorological data that shows Sing Sing, which lies due down river to the south/south east, to be directly in the path of nighttime low wind movement, where the 1 At the time of the Witt report (p.4), some 300,000 people lived within the 10 mile plume EPZ.

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dispersal of radioactive materials would be maximized. Sing Sing might also catch dispersal by 11ignwino conottlonstlmrwuuld-trend further to-the east:- . -------------------

The ten mile region around Indian Point is treated as a zone of special risk. Under NRC rules, ten miles constitutes the boundary between those viewed at risk for exposure to a radioactive plume should a release occur and those on the safe side of this margin.

The plume exposure pathway EPZ extends about 10 miles in radius around a plant. Its primary concern is the exposure of the public to, and the inhalation of, airborne radioactive cOlltamination . .,Ii A notable indication ofthis risk is the availability of Potassium Iodide inside the ten mile radius as a potential mitigation for thyroid exposure to radioactive iodine.

Beyond the Plume EPZ, the NRC delineates a second boundary based upon a different exposure pathway, ingestion.

The ingestion pathway EPZ extends about 50 miles in radius arollnd a plant. Its primary concern is the ingestion offood and liquid that is contaminated by radioactivity. xlii Despite these two Emergency Planning Zones, actual response to a "General Emergency" would take a flexible form determined by an analysis of actual conditions. Evacuation would be concentrated in the two mile zone around the plant, plus a 5 mile "key hole" area corresponding to the wind direction at the time of the accident. The remainder of the ten mile zone would likely be ordered to shelter-in-place. xliii Profile of Nuclear Events I have written that different kinds of environmental disasters have their own "personalities" that xliv influence how they are addressed before, during and after a catastrophic event. In particular, their perception rests on questions of cause, consequence and controllability. These "three C's or risk perception influence public and expert alike. For Sing Sing inmates:

  • A nuclear disaster at Indian Point would clearly be human-caused, even if set off by a naturally-occurring event. Thus, the event would invite anger and blame. xlv
  • It's "dreaded" direct consequences would be potentially life and health-threatening, ranging from fast acting radiation sickness to long latency disease onset.
  • And the controllability of both release and exposure would be managed by others, to the extent that it was amenable to management at all.

The invisibility of radiation is a relevant factor here. One aspect of invisible hazards is that, while you don't know they are there, you also don't know that they are not there. Those affected might not even know of their exposure, let alone their dose and prospects. Those suspecting 17

exposure might believe that their fate was sealed with no chance of modification. Beyond taking Potassium-Iodide-irrtime;-there-might-be-nothing-to-be-done.

Lessons of Fukushima Some indication of the context of nuclear disaster can be derived from the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and recent Fukushima nuclear incidents. Between Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and the Fukushima Diiachi complex, many different disaster scenarios are revealed. These include explosion and fire and core melt down, both with significant air release of radioactive material, as well as leaking of radioactive materials to the ocean. The range of "what could happen" is undoubtedly larger yet. The lessons added by the current Japanese disaster are worthy of note.

1. Ever since the Rasmussen Reactor Safety study established the classic perspective that the potential for high consequence accidents is acceptable if the probability is considered low, there has been a tendency to rationalize risk from high consequence facilities. The Japanese experience, much as Chernobyl and Three Miles Island (as well as the Windscale and Mayak disasters), demonstrate the fallacy of this fundamental logic.

Namely, unacceptably high consequence events occur, even if their probability is low.

And, as the global nuclear industry mounts more and more days of operation and nuclear plants age, probabilities during remaining operation life are not be as low as they once were.

2. In the wake ofFukushoma's triple disaster, combining earthquake, tsunami and multiple nuclear meltdowns, any assumptions that disasters strike singly and independently must be reevaluated. There is no rule that says that natural disasters and human caused disasters cannot interact in complex ways. As a result, the full range of events that high consequence facilities have to defend against cannot be anticipated. This is a useful frame of consideration in light of seismic fault zone issues and terrorism and other potential yet undefined calamities.
3. It shows that nuclear questions are wicked problems that defy simple answers. xlvi Nuclear plants can go out of control in unexpected ways. They, thus, defy the rational frame of Environmental Impact Statements, permit submissions and pen11it conditions that are primarily directed at simple, predictable and addressable problems, not emergent anomalies that defy norn1alcy. "Worst case" thinking is treated as a marginal exercise in pel'l11itting when in fact it proves to be the necessary framework when normal operations are superseded.
4. We create our own vulnerabilities, as with grouping multiple reactors or building, as was done in Fukushima, in ston11 prone areas and in ways that calmot withstand storn1S.

Similarly, the well known proximity to the Ramapo Fault would be cited in hindsight were seismicity to contribute to a problem at Indian Point.

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5. Susceptibility is inherent in siting decisions that are not precautionary, with resultant

~p= o*teffriaIWrc<YlIatenrlhann:-iIrthe-case of-Indian Point, 10eating-a-reaGtor-c()mplex.- - - - - -

nearby and upwind of a major city creates an inherent vulnerability. Sing Sing represents a unique EJ community with additional levels of susceptibility to harm. It is the combination of the hazard and such vulnerabilities that detem1ine the outcomes should a worst case event occur.

The protracted Japanese nuclear disaster had repercussions for the perception ofIndian Point.

Early in the Fukushima incident, the NRC advised Americans in Japan to move 50 miles away from the troubled nuclear plants. Westchester officials subsequently cited this advisory as a basis for questioning the 10 mile emergency planning zone for Indian Point and the plan to shelter the county's students just outside the emergency zone. One legislator noted, "nuclear impacts don't know boundaries all a map." xivii Conclusion to Section One In sum, a nuclear emergency at Indian Point has the potential for adverse impacts to the inmate population at Sing Sing paralleling, if not identical to, those experienced by inmates at the OPP facility during the Katrina disaster. Such impacts would be influenced by at least three contextual factors, that Sing Sing represents an EJ community, that it is a total institution and that nuclear disasters have their own profile, just as do hurricanelflood events.

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