ML12335A464
| ML12335A464 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/2008 |
| From: | Electric Power Research Institute |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| SECY RAS | |
| References | |
| RAS 21618, 50-247-LR, ASLBP 07-858-03-LR-BD01, 50-286-LR, NYS00307B, 1016596 | |
| Download: ML12335A464 (54) | |
Text
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Official Hearing Exhibit In the Matter of:
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
(Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3)
ASLBP #: 07-858-03-LR-BD01 Docket #: 05000247 l 05000286 Exhibit #:
Identified:
Admitted:
Withdrawn:
Rejected:
Stricken:
Other:
NYS00307B-00-BD01 10/15/2012 10/15/2012 NYS00307B Submitted: December 22, 2011 c:..\\,.~p..R REGlI~;.
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Component Categorization and Aging Management Strategy Development
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A A
P A
A A
A A
P Plenum Cover Support Flange 304SS C
A A
P A
A A
A A
P Alloy X-750 Dowels-to-Plenum Cover Alloy 82 Weld B
N A
A A
A A
A A
N Bottom Flange Welds Control Rod Guide Tube (CRGT)
Assembly CRGT Spacer Castings CF3M B
A A
A A
E A
A A
E CRGT Rod Guide Tubes 304L SS B
A A
N A
A A
A A
N CRGT Rod Guide Sectors 304L SS B
A A
N A
A A
A A
N Core Support Shield Assembly CSS Top Flange 304SS C
A A
P A
A A
A A
P UCB Bolts Alloy A-286 or C
P A
A A
A A
A A
P Alloy X-750 CSS Cast Outlet Nozzles (ONS-3, CF8 B
A A
A A
P A
A A
P DB)
CSS Vent Valve Top Retaining Ring 15-5PH B
A A
A A
P A
A A
P CSS Vent Valve Bottom Retaining 15-5PH B
A A
A A
P A
A A
P Ring CSS Vent Valve Discs CF8 B
A A
A A
P A
A A
P CSS Vent Valve Disc Shaft or Hinge 431 SS B
A A
A A
P A
A A
P Pin 3-17
Component Categorization and Aging Management Strategy Development Table 3-1 Final disposition of category Band C B&W internals (continued)
Component Material Initial sec IASCC Wear Fatigue TE IE vs ISR Final Category andiC Group Core Barrel Assembly Core Barrel Cylinder (Including 304 SS, 308L Vertical and Circumferential Seam SS Welds B
A A
A A
A E
A A
E Welds)
Alloy X-750 Core Barrel-to-Former Alloy X-750 B
N A
A A
A N
A A
N Plate Dowel Alloy X-750 Dowel-to-Core Barrel Alloy 82 Weld B
N A
A A
A A
A A
N Cylinder Fillet Welds Thermal Shield Upper Restraint Cap 304SS B
A A
N N
A A
A N
N Screws (Not Exposed)
Baffle Plates 304SS c
A N
A A
A p
N A
p Former Plates 304 ss c
A N
A A
A E
N A
E CB Bolts 304 ss c
A E
E E
A E
N E
E FB Bolts (Note 1) 304 ss c
A p
p p
A p
N p
p Internal BB Bolts (Note 1) 304 ss c
A N
E E
A E
N E
E External BB Bolts 304 ss c
A E
E E
A E
N E
E Accessible Locking Device and 304 SS Locking Locking Weld (FB Bolts and Internal Device, 308L SS B
A p
A A
A p
A A
p BB Bolts)
Locking Weld Inaccessible Locking Device and 304 SS Locking Locking Weld (CB Bolts and External Device, 308L SS B
A E
A A
A E
A A
E BB Bolts)
Locking Weld 3-18 IPEC_PA_OAG0000050 COII/I)(ment Categnrizatinn and Agil/g Management Strategy Develnpmel/t Table 3-1 Final disposition of category Band C B&W internals (continued)
Component Material Initial sec IASee Wear Fatigue TE IE VS ISR Final Category andlC Group Core Barrel Assembly Core Barrel Cylinder (Including 30488, 308L Vertical and Circumferential Seam SSWeids B
A A
A A
A E
A A
E Welds)
Alloy X-750 Core Barrel-to-Former Alloy X-750 B
N A
A A
A N
A A
N Plate Dowel Alloy X*750 Dowel-to-Core Barrel Alloy 82 Weld B
N A
A A
A A
A A
N Cylinder Fillet Welds Thermal Shield Upper Restraint Cap 304 88 B
A A
N N
A A
A N
N Screws (Not Exposed)
Baffle Plates 30488 C
A N
A A
A P
N A
P Former Plates 30488 C
A N
A A
A E
N A
E CB Bolts 30488 C
A E
E E
A E
N E
E FB Bolts (Note 1) 30488 C
A P
P P
A P
N P
P Internal BB Bolls (Note 1) 30488 C
A N
E E
A E
N E
E External BB Bolts 30488 C
A E
E E
A E
N E
E Accessible l ocking Device and 304 SS l ocking l ocking Weld (FB Bolts and Internal Device, 30Bl SS B
A P
A A
A P
A A
P BB Bolts) l ocking Weld Inaccessible l ocking Device and 304 SS l ocking l ocking Weld (CB Bolts and External Device, 30Bl SS B
A E
A A
A E
A A
E BB Bolts) l ocking Weld
Component Categorization and Aging Management Strategy Development Table 3-1 Final disposition of category Band C B&W internals (continued)
Initial TE IE vs ISR Final Component Material Category sec IASCC Wear Fatigue andiC Group LCB Bolts Alloy A-286 or c
p A
A A
A A
A A
p Alloy X-750 UTS Bolts Alloy A-286 or B
E A
A A
A A
A A
E Alloy X-750 SSHT Bolts (CR-3, DB)
Alloy X-750 B
E A
A A
A A
A A
E Upper Grid Assembly Alloy X-750 Dowel-to-Upper Grid Rib Alloy 82 Weld B
N A
A A
A A
A A
N Section Bottom Flange Welds Upper Fuel Assembly Support Pads:
Alloy 82 Weld B
E A
A A
A A
A A
E Alloy X-750 Dowel Locking Weld Lower Grid Assembly Lower Fuel Assembly Support Pads:
304SS with 308L Pad, Pad-to-Rib Section Weld, Alloy SS Weld, Except A orE X-750 Dowel, Cap Screw, Their Alloy X-750 B
A A
A A
E A
A E
Locking Welds Dowel with Alloy (Note 2) 69 Weld Lower Grid Assembly Alloy X-750 Alloy 82 Weld B
p A
A A
A A
A A
p Dowel-to-Guide Block Welds Alloy X-750 Bolts for Lower Grid Alloy X-750 B
E A
A A
A A
A A
E Shock Pads (TMI-1 only)
Alloy X-750 Dowel-to-Lower Grid Alloy 82 Weld B
N A
A A
A A
A A
N Shell Forging Welds Alloy X-750 Dowel-to-Lower Grid Rib Alloy 69 Weld B
N N
A A
A N
A A
N Section Welds 3-19 IPEC_PA_OAG0000051 Compollent Categorizatioll alld Agillg Mallagement Strategy Developmellt Table 3-1 Final disposition of category Band C B&W internals (continued)
Component Material Initial sec IASee Wear Fatigue TE IE VS ISR Final Category andlC Group LCB Bolls Alloy A-286 or C
p A
A A
A A
A A
P Alloy X-750 UTS Bolls Alloy A-286 or B
E A
A A
A A
A A
E Alloy X-750 SSHT Bolts (CR-3, DB)
Alloy X-750 B
E A
A A
A A
A A
E Upper Grid Assembly Alloy X-750 Dowel-la-Upper Grid Rib Alloy 82 Weld B
N A
A A
A A
A A
N Section Boltom Flange Welds Upper Fuel Assembly Support Pads:
Alloy 82 Weld B
E A
A A
A A
A A
E Alloy X-750 Dowel Locking Weld Lower Grid Assembly Lower Fuel Assembly Support Pads:
304SS with 308L Pad, Pad-to-Rib Section Weld, Alloy SS Weld, Except A or E X-750 Dowel, Cap Screw, Their Alloy X-750 B
A A
A A
E A
A E
Locking Welds Dowel wilh Alloy (Note 2) 69 Weld Lower Grid Assembly Alloy X-750 Alloy 82 Weld B
p A
A A
A A
A A
P Dowel-to-Guide Block Welds Alloy X*750 Bolts for Lower Grid Alloy X-750 B
E A
A A
A A
A A
E Shock Pads (TMI*1 only)
Alloy X-750 Dowel-la-Lower Grid Alloy 82 Weld B
N A
A A
A A
A A
N Shell Forging Welds Alloy X-750 Dowel-la-Lower Grid Rib Alloy 69 Weld B
N N
A A
A N
A A
N Section Welds
Component Categorization and Aging Management Strategy Development Table 3-1 Final disposition of category Band C B&W internals (continued)
Initial IE vs ISR Final Component Material sec IASCC Wear Fatigue TE andiC Group Category Lower Grid Rib-to-Shell Forging Cap 304SS B
A A
N N
A A
A N
N Screws Lower Grid Support Post Pipe Cap 304SS B
A A
N N
A A
A N
N Screws LTS Bolts Alloy A-286 or B
E A
A A
A A
A A
E Alloy X-750 Flow Distributor Assembly FD Bolts Alloy A-286 or c
E A
A A
A A
A A
E Alloy X-750 Alloy X-750 Dowel-to-Flow Distributor Alloy 82 Weld B
N A
A A
A A
A A
N Flange Welds IMI Guide Tube Assembly IMI Guide Tube Spiders and Spider-CF8, 308L SS B
A A
A A
p p
A A
p to-Lower Grid Rib Section Welds Weld Notes:
- 1.
Bolt overload after hard contact with the baffle and former plates is identified in Reference 13. This mechanism is only applicable to the FB bolts and internal BB bolts; "Primary" for the FB bolts, and "Expansion" for the internal BB bolts.
- 2.
Only the Alloy X-750 dowel locking weld in the listed items for the lower fuel assembly support pads is susceptible to SCC and categorized as Expansion for SCC. Other items are Category A for SCC.
3-20 IPEC_PA_OAG0000052 COII/I)(ment Categnrizatinn and Agil/g Management Strategy Develnpmel/t Table 3-1 Final disposition of category Band C B&W internals (continued)
Component Material Initial 5ee IA5ee Wear Fatigue TE IE V5 15R Final Category andlC Group Lower Grid Rib-la-Shell Forging Cap 304 55 B
A A
N N
A A
A N
N Screws Lower Grid Support Posl Pipe Cap 304 55 B
A A
N N
A A
A N
N Screws LTS Bolls Alloy A-286 or B
E A
A A
A A
A A
E Alloy X-7S0 Flow Distributor Assembly FD Bolls Alloy A-286 or C
E A
A A
A A
A A
E Alloy X-7S0 Alloy X-7S0 Dowel-la-Flow Dislribulor Alloy 82 Weld B
N A
A A
A A
A A
N Flange Welds IMI Guide Tube Assembly IMI Guide Tube Spiders and Spider-CFB. 30Bl SS B
A A
A A
P P
A A
P la-Lower Grid Rib Section Welds Weld Notes:
- 1.
Bolt over1oad after hard contact with the baffle and former plates is identified in Reference 13. This mechanism is only applicable to the FB bolts and internal BB bolts;
' Primary" for the FB bolts, and "Expansion* for the intemal BB bolts.
- 2.
Only the Alloy X-750 dowel locking weld in the listed items for the lower fuel assembly support pads is susceptible to SCC and categorized as Expansion for SCC. Other items are Category A for SCC.
Component Categorization and Aging Management Strategy Development Table 3-2 Final disposition of category B and C CE internals Component Material Initial sec IASCC Wear Fatigue TE IE vs ISR Final Category (Note 1) (Note 1) andiC Group Upper Internals Assembly Fuel Alignment Plate (Core Shrouds 304SS B
N A
N p
A A
A A
p with Full-Height Shroud Plates)
Lower Support Structure Core Support Plate 304 ss c
N N
N p
A p
A A
p 304L SS Fuel Alignment Pins (Core Shrouds A286 SS c
A X
X X
A X
A X
X with Full-Height Shroud Plates)
Core Support Columns 304 ss B
E E
A E
A E
A A
E Core Support Columns CF8 B
E E
A E
E E
A A
E Core Support Deep Beams (Core 304SS Shrouds with Full-Height Shroud c
X X
A p
A p
A A
p Plates)
Core Support Column Bolts 316 ss B
A E
N E
A E
A N
E Control Element Assembly (CEA)-
Shroud Assemblies Instrument Tubes 304 ss B
p A
A p
A A
A A
p Core Support Barrel Assembly Upper Cylinder Welds 304 ss B
E A
A A
A A
A A
E Lower Cylinder Welds 304 ss c
E N
A A
A E
A A
E Upper Core Barrel Flange Weld 304 ss B
p A
X A
A A
A A
p Lower Core Barrel Flange 304 ss B
E A
A E
A A
A A
E Lower Core Barrel Flange Weld 304 ss B
E A
A p
A A
A A
p 3-21 IPEC_PA_OAG0000053 Compollent Categorizatioll alld Agillg Mallagement Strategy Developmellt Table 3-2 Final disposition of category Band C CE internals Component Material Initial sec IASee Wear Fatigue TE IE VS ISR Final Category (Note 1) (Note 1) andlC Group Upper Internals Assembly Fuel Alignment Plate (Core Shrouds 304 88 B
N A
N P
A A
A A
P with Full-Height Shroud Plates)
Lower Support Structure Core Support Plate 30488 C
N N
N P
A P
A A
P 304L 88 Fuel Alignment Pins (Core Shrouds A28688 C
A X
X X
A X
A X
X with Full-Height Shroud Plates)
Core Support Columns 30488 B
E E
A E
A E
A A
E Core Support Columns CF8 B
E E
A E
E E
A A
E Core Support Deep Beams (Core 304 88 Shrouds with Full-Height Shroud C
X X
A P
A P
A A
P Plates)
Core Support Column Bolts 31688 B
A E
N E
A E
A N
E Control Element Assembly (CEA)-
Shroud Assemblies Instrument Tubes 30488 B
P A
A P
A A
A A
P Core Support Barrel Assembly Upper Cylinder Welds 30488 B
E A
A A
A A
A A
E Lower Cylinder Welds 30488 C
E N
A A
A E
A A
E Upper Core Barrel Flange Weld 30488 B
P A
X A
A A
A A
P Lower Core Barrel Flange 30488 B
E A
A E
A A
A A
E Lower Core Barrel Flange Weld 30488 B
E A
A P
A A
A A
P
Component Categorization and Aging Management Strategy Development Table 3-2 Final disposition of category Band C CE internals (continued)
Component Material Initial sec IASCC Wear Fatigue TE IE vs ISR Final Category (Note 1) (Note 1) andiC Group Thermal Shield Positioning Pins UNS S21800 B
A A
N N
A A
A N
N (Note 2)
Core Shroud Assembly Shroud Plates (Bolted) (Entire 304SS c
N E
A A
A p
p A
p Assembly)
Shroud Plates (Welded) 304 ss c
N p
A A
A p
p A
p Former Plates (Bolted) (Entire 304SS B
N E
A A
A p
p A
p Assembly)
Former Plates (Welded) 304 ss B
N p
A A
A p
p A
p Ribs 304SS B
N E
A A
A E
N A
E Rings (Core Shrouds with Full-Height 304SS B
N E
A A
A E
N A
E Shroud Plates)
Core Shroud Bolts 316 ss B
A p
N N
A p
p p
p Barrel-Core Shroud Bolts 316 ss B
A E
N N
A E
A E
E Core Shroud Tie Rods 348 ss B
A A
N N
A N
A N
N Core Shroud Tie Rod Nuts 316 ss B
A A
N N
A N
A N
N Guide Lug Insert Bolts (Note 3)
A286 SS B
A A
X X
A A
A X
X In-Core Instrumentation (ICI)
ICI Thimble Tubes-Lower Zircaloy-4 c
A A
X A
A A
A A
X Notes:
- 1.
The significance of thermal and irradiation embrittlement is directly related to the probability of a flaw existing in the component. There are no recommendations for inspection to determine embrittlement level because these mechanisms cannot be directly observed. However, potential embrittlement must be considered in flaw tolerance evaluations.
- 2.
One plant has an existing program for this item.
- 3.
Bolt deterioration may lead to degradation in lug fixtures. Inspection recommendations relate to the entire guide lug fixture.
3-22 IPEC_PA_OAG0000054 COII/I)(ment Categnrizatinn and Agil/g Management Strategy Develnpmel/t Table 3-2 Final disposition of category B and C CE internals (continued)
Component Material Initial sec IASee Wear Fatigue TE IE VS ISR Final Category (Note 1) (Note 1) andlC Group Thermal Shield Positioning Pins UN8821800 B
A A
N N
A A
A N
N (Note 2)
Core Shroud Assembly Shroud Plates (Bolted) (Entire 30488 C
N E
A A
A P
P A
P Assembly)
Shroud Plates (Welded) 30488 C
N P
A A
A P
P A
P Former Plates (Bolted) (Entire 304 88 B
N E
A A
A P
P A
P Assembly)
Former Plates (Welded) 30488 B
N P
A A
A P
P A
P Ribs 304 88 B
N E
A A
A E
N A
E Rings (Core Shrouds with Full-Height 304 88 B
N E
A A
A E
N A
E Shroud Plates)
Core Shroud Bolts 31688 B
A P
N N
A P
P P
P Barrel-Core Shroud Bolls 31688 B
A E
N N
A E
A E
E Core Shroud Tie Rods 34888 B
A A
N N
A N
A N
N Core Shroud Tie Rod Nuts 31688 B
A A
N N
A N
A N
N Guide Lug Insert Bolts (Note 3)
A28688 B
A A
X X
A A
A X
X In-Core Instrumentation (lei)
ICI Thimble Tubes-Lower Zircaloy-4 C
A A
X A
A A
A A
X Notes:
- 1.
The significance of thermal and irradiation embrilliement is directly related to the probability of a flaw existing in the component. There are no recommendations for inspection to determine embrilliementievel because these mechanisms cannot be directly observed. However, potential embrilliement must be considered in flaw tolerance evaluations.
- 2.
One plant has an existing program for this item.
- 3.
Bolt deterioration may lead to degradation in lug fixtures. Inspection recommendations relate to the entire guide lug fixture.
Component Categorization and Aging Management Strategy Development Table 3-3 Final disposition of category B and C Westinghouse internals Component Material Initial sec IASCC Wear Fatigue TE IE vs ISR Final Category (Note 1) (Note 1) andiC Group Control Rod Guide Tube Assembly Lower Flanges CF8 B
p A
A p
p p
A A
p Guide Plates (Cards) 304 ss c
N A
p N
A A
A A
p C-Tubes (Note 2) 304 ss c
A A
p A
A A
A A
N Sheaths (Note 2) 304SS c
A A
p A
A A
A A
N Guide Tube Support Pins Alloy X-750 c
X A
X X
A A
A N
X Upper Internals Assembly Upper Support Ring or Skirt 304 ss B
E A
A X
A A
A A
X Baffle-Former Assembly Baffle-Edge Bolts 316 SS, 347 c
A p
N p
A p
p p
p ss Baffle Plates and Former Plates 304 ss B
A N
A A
A N
p A
p (Note 3)
Baffle-Former Bolts 316 SS, 347 c
A p
N p
A p
p p
p ss Barrel-Former Bolts 316 SS, 347 c
A E
N E
A E
E E
E ss Bottom Mounted Instrumentation System BMI Column Bodies 304 ss B
N N
A E
A E
N A
E BMI Column Collars 304 ss B
A N
A A
A N
N A
N BMI Column Cruciforms CF8 B
A N
A A
N N
N A
N BMI Column Extension Tubes 304 ss B
N N
A A
A N
N A
N Flux Thimble Tube Plugs 304 ss B
N N
A A
A N
N A
N Flux Thimbles (Tubes) 316 ss c
N N
X A
A N
N A
X 3-23 IPEC_PA_OAG0000055 Compollent Categorizatioll alld Agillg Mallagement Strategy Developmellt Table 3-3 Final disposition of category Band C Westinghouse internals Component Material Initial sec IASee Wear Fatigue TE IE VS ISR Final Category (Nole 1) (Nole 1) andlC Group Control Rod Guide Tube Assembly Lower Flanges CF8 B
P A
A P
P P
A A
P Guide Plates (Cards) 304 88 C
N A
P N
A A
A A
P C-Tubes (Note 2) 30488 C
A A
P A
A A
A A
N Sheaths (Note 2) 304 88 C
A A
P A
A A
A A
N Guide Tube Support Pins Alloy X-7S0 C
X A
X X
A A
A N
X Upper Internals Assembly Upper Support Ring or Skirt 30488 B
E A
A X
A A
A A
X Baffle-Former Assembly Baffle-Edge Bolls 31688,347 C
A P
N P
A P
P P
P 88 Baffle Plates and Former Plates 30488 B
A N
A A
A N
P A
P (Note 3)
Baffle-Former Bolts 31688,347 C
A P
N P
A P
P P
P 88 Barrel-Former Bolts 31688,347 C
A E
N E
A E
E E
E 88 BoHom Mounted Instrumentation System BMI Column Bodies 304 88 B
N N
A E
A E
N A
E BMI Column Collars 304 88 B
A N
A A
A N
N A
N BMI Column Cruciforms CF8 B
A N
A A
N N
N A
N BMI Column Extension Tubes 30488 B
N N
A A
A N
N A
N Flux Thimble Tube Plugs 304 88 B
N N
A A
A N
N A
N Flux Thimbles (Tubes) 31688 C
N N
X A
A N
N A
X
Component Categorization and Aging Management Strategy Development Table 3-3 Final disposition of category Band C Westinghouse internals (continued)
Component Material Initial sec IASCC Wear Fatigue TE IE vs ISR Final Category (Note 1) (Note 1) andiC Group Core Barrel Assembly Core Barrel Flange 304 ss B
E A
X A
A A
A A
Core Barrel Outlet Nozzle Welds 304 ss B
E A
A E
A A
A A
Core Barrel Axial Welds 304 ss c
E E
A A
A E
A A
Upper Core Barrel Flange Weld 304 ss c
p E
A A
A A
A A
Lower Internals Assembly Lower Core Plate 304SS c
N X
X X
A X
N A
XL Lower Core Plate 304SS c
N X
X X
A X
A A
Lower Support Assembly Lower Support Column Bodies CF8 B
A E
A A
N E
N A
Lower Support Column Bodies 304 ss B
A E
A A
A E
N A
Lower Support Column Bolts 304SS B
A E
N E
A E
N E
Thermal Shield Assembly Thermal Shield Flexures 304SS B
A N
p p
A N
A N
Alignment and Interfacing Components Clevis Insert Bolts Alloy X-750 B
A A
X A
A A
A A
Internals Hold Down Spring (Note 4) 304 ss B
A A
p A
A A
A A
Upper Core Plate Alignment Pins 304 ss B
X A
X A
A A
A A
Notes:
- 1.
The significance of thermal and irradiation embrittlement is directly related to the probability of a flaw existing in the component. There are no recommendations for inspection to determine embrittlement level because these mechanisms cannot be directly observed. However, potential embrittlement must be considered in flaw tolerance evaluations.
- 2.
Some of the items in the control rod guide tube (CRGT) assembly, namely the C-tubes and sheaths, have been placed in the No Additional Measures group, because decisions on remediation of wear and degradation in the CRGT assembly will be based only on the conditions detected in the Primary CRGT item, the guide tubes (cards).
- 3.
The concern is a result of the collective interaction of all components that comprise the assembly and not strictly focused on the plates.
- 4.
The hold-down spring does not directly degrade by wear. It first degrades by loss in preload, which leads to wear when an inadequate preload remains.
3-24 X
E E
p X
X E
E E
p X
p X
IPEC_PA_OAG0000056 COII/I)(ment Categnrizatinn and Agil/g Management Strategy Develnpmel/t Table 3-3 Final disposition of category Band C Westinghouse internals (continued)
Component Material Initial sec IASee Wear Fatigue TE IE VS ISR Final Category (Note 1) (Note 1) andlC Group Core Barrel Assembly Core Barrel Flange 304SS B
E A
X A
A A
A A
Core Barrel Outlet Nozzle Welds 30488 B
E A
A E
A A
A A
Core Barrel Axial Welds 30488 C
E E
A A
A E
A A
Upper Core Barrel Flange Weld 30488 C
P E
A A
A A
A A
Lower Internals Assembly Lower Core Plate 30488 C
N X
X X
A X
N A
XL Lower Core Plale 304 88 C
N X
X X
A X
A A
Lower Support Assembly Lower Support Column Bodies CFB B
A E
A A
N E
N A
Lower Support Column Bodies 30488 B
A E
A A
A E
N A
Lower Support Column Bolls 30488 B
A E
N E
A E
N E
Thermal Shield Assembly Thermal Shield Flexures 304 88 B
A N
P P
A N
A N
Alignment and Interlacing Components Clevis Insert Bolts Alloy X-7S0 B
A A
X A
A A
A A
Internals Hold Down Spring (Nole 4) 30488 B
A A
P A
A A
A A
Upper Core Plate Alignment Pins 30488 B
X A
X A
A A
A A
Notes:
- 1.
The significance of thermal and irradiation embrittlement is direclly related to the probability of a flaw existing in the component. There are no recommendations for inspection to determine embrittlement level because these mechanisms cannot be direclly observed. However, potential embrittlement must be considered in flaw tolerance evaluations.
- 2.
Some of the items in the control rod guide tube (CRGT) assembly, namely the C-tubes and sheaths, have been placed in the No Additional Measures group, because decisions on remediation of wear and degradation in the CRGT assembly will be based only on the conditions detected in the Primary CRGT item, the guide tubes (cards).
- 3.
The concern is a result of the collective interaction of all components that comprise the assembly and not striclly focused on the plates.
- 4.
The hold-down spring does not directly degrade by wear. It first degrades by loss in preload, which leads to wear when an inadequate preload remains.
X E
E P
X X
E E
E P
X P
X
4 AGING MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS The ultimate goal of an aging management program (AMP) is to monitor the condition of the internals to maintain appropriate levels of plant safety and reliability. Properly managed, the plants will fulfill their license renewal commitments. Appendix A identifies the elements of a complete AMP that these guidelines support.
Inspection and evaluation in support of aging management requirements typically consists of the following:
selection of items for aging management; selection of the type of examination or other methodologies appropriate for each applicable degradation mechanism; specification of the required level of examination qualification; schedule of first and frequency of any subsequent examinations; sampling and coverage; expansion of scope if sufficient evidence of degradation is observed; examination acceptance criteria; methods for evaluating examination results not meeting the examination acceptance criteria; updating the program based on industry-wide results; and contingency measure to repair, replace, or mitigate.
The listed elements of inspection and evaluation interrelate. For example, the particulars of the examination acceptance criteria may affect the rules for sampling or frequency of examination.
This section of the guidelines specifies aging management requirements that are appropriate to detect the expected effects of the degradation mechanisms, and are considered acceptable for the development of an AMP. The criterion for acceptability of an aging management requirement is that it accomplishes the AMP goal, namely, ensuring the continued achievement of safety related and economically important functions of the internals. The technical bases used to develop these aging management requirements are documented [13, 14].
Some of the aging management requirements listed, for example, examination acceptance criteria, deserve greater elaboration and are therefore discussed in Section 5.
4-1 IPEC_PA_OAG0000057 4
AGING MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS The ultimate goal of an aging management program (AMP) is to monitor the condition ofthe internals to maintain appropriate levels of plant safety and reliability. Properly managed, the plants will fulfill their license renewal commitments. Appendix A identifies the clements of a complete AMP that these guidelines support.
Inspection and evaluation in SUppOll of aging management requirements typically consists of the following; selection of items for aging management; selection of the type of examination or other methodologies appropriate for each applicable degradation mechanism; specification of the required level of examination qualification; schedule of first and frequency of any subsequent examinations; sampling and coverage; expansion of scope if sufficient evidence of degradation is observed; examination acceptance criteria; methods for evaluating examination results not meeting the examination acceptance criteria; updating the program based on indu s try~wide results; and contingency measure to repair, replace, or mitigate.
The listed elements of inspection and evaluation interrelate. For example, the particulars of the examination acceptance criteria may affect the rules for sampling or frequency of examination.
This section of the guidelines specifics aging management requirements that are appropriate to detect the expected effects of the degradation mechanisms, and arc considered acceptable for the development of an AM P. The criterion for acceptability of an aging management requirement is that it accomplishes the AM P goal, namely, ensuring the continued achievement of safety related and economicaJly important functions of the intemals. The technical bases used to develop these aging management requirements are documented [1 3, 14].
Some of the aging management requirements listed, for example, examination acceptance criteria, deserve greater elaboration and are therefore discussed in Section 5.
4-1
Aging Management Requirements Section 4.1 describes the overall aging management approach. Then, Section 4.2 describes the various examination methodologies, ranging from general condition visual examinations to more rigorous visual, surface, and volumetric examinations, with a final sub-section that describes physical measurement. Section 4.3 summarizes the examination requirements that are recommended for two groups of PWR internals - Primary and Expansion.
The requirements stated within this section may revert to those required by ASME Code Section XI [2] if components are repaired, modified or replaced such that the effects of aging are fully mitigated. Demonstration of the adequacy of repair, replacement, or modification activities to fully mitigate the effect of aging is the responsibility of the owner. In addition, repair, replacement or modification activities may also warrant revision to the scope and/or frequency of the generic requirements stated in these guidelines. This includes re-establishing the technical basis for the replaced components (if not fully mitigated) and the technical basis for examination of any linked Expansion components, which was developed on the basis of expert panel solicitation [ 15]. Individual utilities will be responsible for the technical justification of such activities to demonstrate their acceptability for different requirements than those stated in these guidelines.
The requirements for the PWR internals in the Existing Programs group are described in Section 4.4. As described in Section 4.5, those PWR internals in the No Additional Measures group require no further actions with respect to management of aging degradation, other than to continue any existing requirements that affect these components.
4.1 Aging Management Approach The aging management approach for PWR internals consists of four major elements: (1) component categorization and aging management strategy development; (2) selection of aging management methodologies for PWR internals that are both appropriate and based on an adequate level of applicable experience; (3) qualification of the recommended methodologies that is based on adequate technical justification; and ( 4) implementation of the recommendations based on the Industry Initiative for the Management of Materials Issues [1]. Each element in the approach is described in greater detail in the following paragraphs.
4.1.1 PWR Internals Categorization and Aging Management Strategy Development The PWR internals categorization and aging management strategy development were summarized in Section 3.
- 4. 1.2 Selection of Established Aging Management Methodologies The second part of the aging management approach involved the selection of aging management methodologies for the PWR internals. The criteria for selection were based on:
the methodologies should be appropriate for the characterization of particular age-related degradation effects; and the aging management methodologies should concentrate on techniques that have been subject to widespread application.
4-2 IPEC_PA_OAG0000058 Aging Management Requiremenis Sect jon 4. 1 describes the overall aging management approach. Then, Section 4.2 describes the various examination methodologies, ranging from general condition visual examinations to more rigorous visual, sUiface, and volumetric examinations, with a final sub-section that describes physical measurement. Section 4.3 summarizes the examination requirements that are recommended for two groups of PWR internals ~ Primary and Expansion.
The requirements stated within this section may revert to those required by ASME Code Section XI [21 if components are repaired, modified or replaced such that the effects of aging are full y mitigated. Demonstration of the adequacy of repair, replacement, or modification activities to fully mitigate the effect of aging is the responsibility of the owner. In addition, repair, replacement or modificatjon activities may also warrant revision to the scope and/or frequency of the generic requirements stated in these guidelines. This includes re-establishing the technical basis fo r the replaced components (if not fully mitigated) and the technical basis for examination of any linked Expansion components, which was developed on the basis of expel1 panel solicitation [1 5]. Individual utilities will be responsible for the technical justificatjon of such activities to demonstrate their acceptability for different requirements than those stated in these guidelines.
The requirements for the PWR internals in the Existing Programs group are described in Section 4.4. As described in Section 4.5, those PWR internals in the No Additional Measures group require no fUl1her actions with respect to management of aging degradation, other than to contjnue any existing requirements that affect these components.
4.1 Aging Management Approach The aging management approach fo r PWR internals consists of four major elements: ( I) component categorization and agjng management strategy development; (2) selection of aging management methodologies for PWR jnternals that are both appropriate and based on an adequate level of applicable experience; (3) qualification of the recommended methodologies that is based on adequate technical justification; and (4) jmplementation of the recommendations based on the Industry Initiative for the Management of Materials Issues ['II. Each element in the approach is described in greater detail in the following paragraphs.
4.1.1 PWR Internals Categorization and Aging Management Strategy Development The PWR internaJs categorization and aging management strategy development were summarized in Section 3.
4.1.2 Selection of Established Aging Management Methodologies The second part of the aging management approach involved the selection of aging management methodologies for the PWR internals. The criteria for selection were based on:
the methodologies should be appropriate for the characterization of particular age-related degradation effects; and the aging management methodologies should concentrate on techniques that have been subject to widespread application.
4-2
Aging Management Requirements For these two reasons, the selected aging management methodologies emphasize existing, well-proven techniques that have been subject to widespread, relevant application. These methodologies are described in Section 4.2.
- 4. 1.3 Aging Management Methodology Qualification An extensive experience base for the aging management methodologies described in this section of the I&E guidelines permits selection of known aging management methodologies. Some of these methodologies already have well established procedural qualifications, such as volumetric examination of bolting. For those requiring additional procedural qualification, Article 14 of Section 5 of the ASME Code [ 16] provides the criteria for the possible levels of rigor that can be selected for the qualification of examination methodologies. For example, the level of procedural qualification for volumetric (UT) examination of bolting is limited to technical justification.
This level of qualification is appropriate. Failures of internals do not result in pressure boundary failures. Internals are either of robust design resulting in flaw tolerance well above the detection level that can be established via technical justification or consist of assemblies for which a single component item failure does not prevent the assembly from performing its function.
The Inspection Standard [3] provides detailed guidance for conducting and justifying the selected examination techniques and the technical justifications required for different examination methodologies and component configurations.
- 4. 1.4 Implementation of Aging Management Requirements Information on the implementation of the aging management requirements is provided in Section 7 of these I&E guidelines.
4.2 Aging Management Methodologies The aging management methodologies described in these guidelines include visual examinations, surface examinations, volumetric examinations, and physical measurements. Each of these methodologies is suitable for managing the effects of one or more aging degradation mechanisms for PWR internals, depending upon:
tolerance of the component functionality to the progression of particular effects; accessibility of the component by the equipment needed for the examination; and suitability of the equipment for detecting the particular effect.
Where appropriate the examination methodologies selected for use in these guidelines are as specified in the latest U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved edition and addenda of ASME Code Section XI [2], including those discussed in 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
These methodologies are described in the following sub-sections.
4-3 IPEC_PA_OAG0000059 Aging Management Reqlliremenl.~
For these two reasons, the selected aging management methodologies emphasize existjng, wel1-proven techniques that have been subject to widespread, relevant application. These methodologies are described in Section 4.2.
4.1.3 Aging Management Methodology Qualification An extensive experience base for the aging management methodologies described in thjs section of the I&E guidelines permjts selection of known aging management methodologies. Some of these methodologies already have wel1 established procedural qualifications, such as volumetric examination of bolting. For those requiring additional procedural quaJification, Article 14 of Section 5 of the ASME Code [16] provides the criteria for the possible levels of rigor that can be selected for the qualification of examination methodologies. For example, the level of procedural qualification for volumetric (UT) examination of bolting is limited to technical justification.
This level of qualification is appropriate. Failures of internals do not result in pressure boundary failures. Internals are either of robust design resulting in flaw tolerance wel1 above the detection level that can be established via technical justification or consist of assemblies for which a single component item fa jJun~ does not prevent the assembly from penormjng its function.
The Inspection Standard 13 J provides detailed guidance for conducting and justifyi ng the selected examination techniques and the technical justifications required for different examination methodologies and component configurations.
4.1.4 Implementation of Aging Management Requirements Information on the implementation of the aging management requirements is provided in Section 7 of these I&E guidelines.
4.2 Aging Management Methodologies The aging management methodologies described in these guidelines include visual examinations, sUlface examinations, volumetric examinations, and physical measurements. Each of these methodologies is suitable for managing the effects of one or more aging degradation mechanisms for PWR jnternals, depending upon:
tolerance of the component functionality to the progression of particular effects; accessibility of the component by the equipment needed for the examination; and suitability of the equipment for detecting the pUl1icuiar effect.
Where appropriate the examination methodologies selected for use in these guidelines are as specified in the latest U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved edition and addenda of ASME Code Section XI 1'2(, including those discussed in 4.2. 1 and 4.2.2.
These methodologies are described in the following sub-sections.
4-3
Aging Management Requirements 4.2.1 Visual {VT-3) Examination One examination methodology selected for use in these guidelines, which has an extensive history of use for PWR internals, is visual (VT-3) examination. Such visual examinations are exclusively relied upon for detection of general degradation of PWR internals subject to IWB-2500 B-N-3 [2] requirements. Visual (VT-3) examinations are conducted to determine the general mechanical and structural condition of components by detecting discontinuities and imperfections, such as loss of integrity at bolted or welded connections, loose or missing parts, debris, corrosion, wear, or erosion; and by identifying conditions that could affect operational or functional adequacy of components. This type of examination has been determined to be acceptable for the continued monitoring of many of the internals within the scope of these guidelines.
When specified in these guidelines, a visual (VT-3) examination is conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Inspection Standard [3]. Visual (VT-3) examinations of internals are conducted using remote examination techniques, because of personnel radiation exposure issues.
A large amount of industry experience is available relative to the application of visual (VT -3) examination procedures for examining PWR internals; however, implementation of character height requirements for VT-3 is relatively new. Thus the VT-3 required by these guidelines has greater detection capability than most of the IWB-2500 B-N-3 [2] examinations previously conducted.
4.2.2 Visual {VT-1 and EVT-1) Examinations Other examination methodologies selected for use in these guidelines are visual (VT -1 and EVT-
- 1) examinations. The visual (VT -1) examination and the enhanced visual (EVT -1) examination were selected where a greater degree of detection capability than visual (VT-3) examination was needed to manage the aging effect. Unlike the detection of general degradation conditions by visual (VT-3) examination, visual (VT -1) and enhanced visual (EVT -1) examinations are conducted to detect discontinuities and imperfections on the surface of components, including such conditions as cracks, wear, corrosion, or erosion. Specifically, VT -1 is used for the detection of surface discontinuities such as gaps, while EVT -1 is used for the detection of surface breaking flaws.
When specified in these guidelines, a visual (VT -1) examination is conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Inspection Standard [3]. Enhanced visual (EVT-1) examination is also conducted in accordance with the requirements described for visual (VT -1) examination with additional requirements (such as camera scanning speed) as specified in the Inspection Standard
[3].
As with visual (VT-3) examination, the current ASME Code [2] requirements for visual (VT-1) examination became more rigorous than the previous ASME Code versions. Many previous VT-1 examinations were only required to discern a 1/32" black line on a gray background. These limitations led the NRC and industry to adopt modified visual examinations for use in detecting flaws discovered in boiling water reactor (BWR) internals. The most recent research conducted by the EPRI Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) Center established the VT -1 character heights specified in Reference 2 as equally or better able to detect the degradation effects than the modified visual examination requirements developed previously [ 17].
4-4 IPEC_PA_OAG0000060 Aging Management Requiremenis 4.2.1 Visual (VT-3) Examination One examination methodology seleeted for use in these guidelines, whieh has an extensive history of use for PWR internals, is visual (YT-3) examination. Sueh visual examinations are exclusively relied upon for deteetion of general degradation of PWR internals subject to IWB-2500 B-N-3 121 requirements. Yisual (YT-3) examinations are conducted to determine the general mechanical and structural condition of components by detecting discontinuities and imperfections, such as loss of integrity at bolted or welded connections, loose or missing parts, debris, cOITosion, wear, or erosion; and by identifying conditions that could affect operational or functional adequacy of components. This type of examination has been determined to be acceptable for the continued monitoring of many of the internals within the scope of these guidelines.
When specified in these guidelines, a visual (YT-3) examination is conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Inspection Standard 13 J. Yisual (YT-3) examinations of internals are conducted using remote examination techniques, because of personnel radiation exposure issues.
A large amount of industry experience is available relative to the application of visual (YT-3) examination procedures for examining PWR internals; however, implementation of character height requirements for YT-3 is relatively new. Thus the YT-3 required by these guidelines has greater detection capability than most of the IWB-2500 B-N-3 [2 1 examinations previously conducted.
4.2.2 Visual (VT-1 and EVT-1) Examinations Other examination methodologies selected for use in these guidelines are visual (YT - I and EYT-I) examinations. The visual (YT-I) examination and the enhanced visual (EYT-I) examination were selected where a greater degree of detection capability than visual (YT-3) examination was needed to manage the aging effect. Unlike the detection of general degradation conditions by visual (YT-3) examination, visual (YT-I) and enhanced visual (EYT-I ) examinations arc conducted to detect discontinuities and impelfections on the surface of components, including such conditions as cracks, wear, corrosion, or erosion. Specifically, YT - I is used for the detection of sUiface discontinuities such as gaps, while EYT-I is used for the detection of surface breaking flaws.
When specified in these guidelines, a visual (YT-I) examination is conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Inspection Standard [3 1. Enhanced visual (EYT-I) examination is also conducted in accordance with the requirements described for visual (YT-I ) examination with additional requirements (such as camera scanning speed) as specified in the Inspection Standard
[3J As with visual (YT-3) examination, the current ASME Code [2] requirements for visual (YT-I) examination became more rigorous than the previous ASME Code versions. Many previous YT-I examinations were only required to discern a 1132" black line on a gray background. These limitations led the NRC and industry to adopt modified visual examinations for use in detecting flaws discovered in boiling water reactor (BWR) internals. The most recent research conducted by the EPR) Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) Center established the YT-I character heights specified in Reference 2 as equally or better able to detect the degradation effects than the modified visual examination requirements developed previously r 17 1.
4-4
Aging Management Requirements 4.2.3 Surface Examination In order to further characterize discontinuities on the surface of components, surface examination can supplement either visual (VT-3) or (VT -1/EVT -1) examinations specified in these guidelines. This supplemental examination may thus be used to reject or accept relevant indications. A surface examination is an examination that indicates the presence of surface discontinuities, and the ASME Code [2] lists magnetic particle, liquid penetrant, eddy current, and ultrasonic examination methods as surface examination alternatives. Here, only the electromagnetic testing (ET), also called eddy current surface examination method, is covered.
When selected for use as a supplemental examination to examinations performed in these guidelines, an ET examination is conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Inspection Standard [3].
ET examination is widely used for heat exchanger tubing inspections. Eddy currents are induced in the inspected object by electromagnetic coils, with disruptions in the eddy current flow caused by surface or near-surface anomalies detected by suitable instrumentation. Industry experience with ET examination is relatively robust, especially in the aerospace and petroleum refinery industries. The experience base for PWR nuclear systems is moderately robust, in particular for examination of steam generator, flux thimble, and heat exchanger tubing.
4.2.4 Volumetric Examination Another methodology selected for use in these guidelines is volumetric examination. An ultrasonic examination (UT) was selected where visual or surface examination is unable to detect the effect of the age-related degradation for some PWR internals. For example, irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) in baffle/former bolts may occur under the bolt head
- in the shank or threaded region - and will be undetectable by visual or surface examination unless the bolt is removed and subject to examination over its entire length.
When specified in these guidelines, an ultrasonic examination (UT) is conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Inspection Standard [3].
While UT has only been selected for use in these guidelines for detection of aging effects in bolting, UT is also permissible as an alternative or supplement to the specified visual examinations for other configurations such as plates and welds. This is consistent with Reference 2.
The industry has had extensive experience with the application of ultrasonic examination (UT) to PWR internals bolts, pins, and fasteners, in particular with baffle/former bolting examinations.
The industry also has extensive experience in applying UT to BWR internals to detect intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) in stainless steel and nickel-base welded plates, stainless steel internals piping, and nickel-base forgings and bolting.
4-5 IPEC_PA_OAG0000061 Aging Management Reqlliremenl.~
4.2.3 Surface Examination In order to further characterize discontinuities on the sUiface of components, surface examination can supplement either visual (VT-3) or (VT-1IEVT-I) examinations specified in these guidelines. This supplemental examination may thus be used to reject or accept relevant indications. A surface examination is an examination that indicates the presence of sUlface discontinuities, and the ASME Code ["2 1 lists magnetic particle, liquid penetrant, eddy current, and ultrasonic examination methods as surface examination alternatives. Here, only the electromagnetic testing (ET), also called eddy current sUiface examination method, is covered.
When selected for use as a supplementaJ examination to examinations perfol111ed in these guidelines, an ET examination is conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Inspection Standard [3].
ET examination is widely used for heat exchanger tubing inspections. Eddy currents are induced in the inspected object by electromagnetic coils, with dislUptions in the eddy current flow caused by surface or near-surface anomalies detected by suitable instrumentation. Industry experience with ET examination is relatively robust, especially in the aerospace and petroleum refi nery industries. The experience base for PWR nuclear systems is moderately robust, in particular for examination of steam generator, flux thimble, and heat exchanger tubing.
4.2.4 Volumetric Examination Another methodology selected for use in these guidelines is volumetric examination. An ultrasonic examination (UT) was selected where visual or surface examination is unable to detect the effect of the age-related degradation for some PWR internals. For example, irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (lASCC) in baffle/former bolts may occur under the bolt head
- in the shank or threaded region - and will be undetectable by visual or surface examination unless the bolt is removed and subject to examination over its entire length.
When specified in these guidelines, an ultrasonic examination (UT) is conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Inspection Standard 13 1.
While UT has only been selected for use in these guidel ines for detection of aging effects in bolting, UT is also permissible as an alternative or supplement to the specified visual examinations for other configurations such as plates and welds. This is consistent with Reference 2.
The industry has had extensive experience with the application of ultrasonic examination (UT) to PWR internals bolts, pins, and fasteners, in particular with baffle/former bolting examinations.
The industry also has extensive experience in applying UT to BWR internals to detect intergranular stress corrosion cracking (1GSCC) in stainless steel and nickel-base welded plates, stainless steel internals piping, and nickel-base forgings and bolting.
4*5
Aging Management Requirements 4.2.5 Physical Measurements The effects of loss of material caused by wear, the loss of pre-load or clamping force caused by such mechanisms as thermal and irradiation-enhanced stress relaxation, and excessive distortion or deflection caused by void swelling can be managed in some cases by physical measurements.
Satisfaction of prescribed limits on these physical measurements (see Section 5.2) is intended to demonstrate that the affected components remain functional and can continue in service for a determined period until the next set of physical measurements. If the prescribed limits are exceeded, corrective action or evaluation for continued service is required.
In some cases, these effects may involve changes in clearances, settings, and physical displacements that can be monitored by visual means, supplemented by physical measurements that characterize the magnitude of the effects. This methodology may be used in conjunction with visual (VT-3) examination, which includes "verifying parameters, such as clearances, settings, and physical displacements." The measurement of these parameters and their comparison to prescribed limits extends beyond visual (VT-3) examination, and will be referred to as "physical measurement of the effects of degradation."
4.3 Primary and Expansion Component Requirements The aging management requirements for Primary and Expansion PWR internals are covered in this section. As described in Section 3.3, Primary components are those for which the effects of at least one of the eight aging mechanisms is above the screening criteria, and for which additional aging management is needed to manage those effects. The particular additional aging management methodologies were selected from the methodologies described in Section 4.2.
The implementation schedule for the Expansion components will depend on the findings from the application of the additional aging management methodologies to the Primary components.
The expansion criteria are defined in Section 5.
Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2, and 4.3.3 identify and discuss the aging management methodologies for the Primary and Expansion components for B&W, CE, and Westinghouse plants, respectively.
The requirements for these components are listed in Tables 4-1 through 4-6. For example, the Primary and Expansion requirements for Westinghouse internals are listed in Tables 4-3 and 4-6.
These tables contain columns describing the component; any particular applicability requirement for that component; the degradation effect to be detected; the examination method; the examination coverage; and any linkage between the Primary and Expansion components. The technical bases for the examination requirements are contained in the aging management strategy reports [13, 14].
There are no specified examinations where inadequate coverage is anticipated to be an issue.
However if a utility determines that the examination coverage is questionable with respect to meeting the intent of the guidelines, the condition should be entered in the utility's corrective action program for disposition.
4-6 IPEC_PA_OAG0000062 Aging Management Requirements 4.2.5 Physical Measurements The effects of loss of material caused by wear, the loss of pre-load or clamping force caused by such mechanisms as thermal and irradiation-enhanced stress relaxation, and excessive distortion or deflection caused by void swelling can be managed in some cases by physical measurements.
Satisfaction of prescribed limits on these physical measurements (see Section 5.2) is intended to demonstrate that the affected components remain functional and can continue in service for a determined period until the next set of physical measurements. If the prescribed limits are exceeded, corrective action or evaluation for continued service is required.
In some cases, these effects may involve changes in clearances, seuings, and physical displacements that can be monitored by visual means, supplemented by physical measurements that characterize the magnitude of the effects. This methodology may be used in conjunction with visual (VT-3) examination, which includes "verifying parameters, such as clearances, settings, and physical displacements." The measurement of these parameters and their comparison to prescribed limits extends beyond visual (VT-3) examination, and will be referred to as "physical measurement of the effects of degradation."
4.3 Primary and Expansion Component Requirements The aging management requirements for Primary and Expansion PWR intel11als are covered in this section. As described in Section 3.3, Primary components are those for which the effects of at least one of the eight aging mechanisms is above the screening criteria, and for which additional aging management is needed to manage those effects. The particular additional aging management methodologies were selected from the methodologies described in Section 4.2.
The implementation schedule for the Expansion components will depend on the findings from the application of the additional aging management methodologies to the Primary components.
The expansion criteria are defined in Section 5.
Sections 4.3. 1, 4.3.2, and 4.3.3 identify and discuss the aging management methodologies for the Primary and Expansion components for 8&W, CE, and Westinghouse plants, respectively.
The requirements for these components are listed in Tables 4-1 through 4-6. For example, the Primary and Expansion requirements for Westinghouse internals are listed in Tables 4-3 and 4-6.
These tables contain columns describing the component; any particular applicability requirement for that component; the degradation effect to be detected; the examination method; the examination coverage; and any linkage between the Primary and Expansion components. The technical bases for the examination requirements are contained in the aging management strategy reports [1 3, 14].
There are no specified examinations where inadequate coverage is anticipated to be an issue.
However if a utility determines that the examination coverage is questionable with respect to meeting the intent of the guidelines, the condition should be entered in the utility's corrective action program for disposition.
4*6
Aging Management Requirements The term "accessible" as used in Tables 4-1 through 4-6 is defined as a component surface or volume for which an examination is specified in accordance with MRP-228 that can be examined with the technologies specified in MRP-228. This accessibility is consistent with current ASME Section XI practices.
4.3. 1 B& W Components Tables 4-1 and 4-4 describe the examination requirements for PWR internals Primary and Expansion components forB& W plants.
The following is a list of the B& W Primary and Expansion components by examination technique.
Visual (VT-3) Examination Primary (applicable to all plants):
Baffle plates Expand to:
Core barrel cylinder (including vertical and circumferential seam welds)
Former plates Since the regions around flow or bolt holes are preferential crack initiation sites, the surface area within one inch of the flow and bolt hole edges represents the required examination coverage.
Note that even though the core barrel cylinder and the former plates are Expansion components, they require an evaluation and not an inspection.
Primary (applicable to all plants):
Locking devices, including locking welds, of baffle-to-former bolts and internal baffle-to-baffle bolts Expand to:
Locking devices for the external baffle-to-baffle bolts and barrel-to-former bolts Note that even though the locking devices for the external baffle-to-baffle bolts and barrel-to-former bolts are Expansion components, they require an evaluation and not an inspection.
Primary (applicable to all plants):
Alloy X-750 dowel-to-guide block welds Expand to:
Alloy X-750 dowel locking welds to the upper and lower fuel assembly support pads 4-7 IPEC_PA_OAG0000063 Aging Management Reqlliremenl.~
The telm "accessible" as used in Tables 4-1 through 4-6 is defined as a component sUiface or volume for which an examination is specified in accordance with MRP-228 that can be examined with the technologies specified in MRP-228. This accessibility is consistent with current ASME Section XI practices.
4.3.1 B& W Components Tables 4-1 and 4-4 describe the examination requirements for PWR internals Primary and Expansion components for B& W plants.
The following is a list of the B& W Primmy and Expansion components by examination technique.
Visual (VT-3) Examination Primmy (applicable to all plants):
Baffle plates Expand to:
Core barrel cylinder (including vertical and circumferential seam welds)
Former plates Since the regions around flow or bolt holes are preferential crack initiation sites, the sUiface area within one inch of the flow and bolt hole edges represents the required examination coverage.
Note that even though the core barrel cylinder and the former plates are Expansion components, they require an evaluation and not an inspection.
Primmy (applicable to all plants):
Locking devices, including locking welds, of baffle-to-former bolts and internal baffle-to-baffle bolts Expand to:
Locking devices for the external baffle-lo-baffle bolts and barrel-to-fonner bolts Note that even though the locking devices for the external baffle-to-baffle bolts and barrel-to-fonner bolts are Expansion components, they require an evaluation and not an inspection.
PrimalY (applicable to all plants):
Alloy X-750 dowel-to-guide block welds Expand to:
Alloy X-750 dowel locking welds to the upper and lower fuel assembly support pads 4*7
Aging Management Requirements The locking welds may be susceptible to cracking as a result of stress corrosion cracking (i.e.,
primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC)). The recommended program to manage cracking of the locking welds is in conjunction with the existing Examination Category B-N-3 of the ASME Section XI [2] lSI program. The guide block area is accessible when the core support assembly is removed from the vessel. The 10-year interval is considered adequate due to the low consequences of failure. Due to weld residual stresses and the constrained geometry, it is anticipated that significant cracks will be accompanied by locking device/weld separation and therefore be detectable by the visual (VT-3) examination method.
Primary (applicable to all plants):
IMI guide tube spiders IMI guide tube spider-to-lower grid rib section welds Expand to:
CRGT spacer castings Lower fuel assembly support pad items: pad, pad-to-rib section welds, Alloy X-750 dowel, cap screw, and their locking welds The IMI guide tube spiders and their associated welds, the CSS cast outlet nozzles, the CSS vent valve discs, the control rod guide tube (CRGT) spacer castings, and the lower grid fuel assembly support pads and their associated welds may have degradation by thermal or irradiation embrittlement. The effects of thermal and irradiation embrittlement can be detected by inspection to detect fracture in the items.
The CRGT spacer castings (Figure 4-5) are an expansion item for thermal embrittlement.
The primary items are the IMI guide tube spiders, the CSS cast outlet nozzles, and the CSS vent valve discs (see following primary item sub-section). The spacer castings are a part of the CRGT structure. The spacer castings do have limited accessibility from the top or bottom of the CRGT through a center free path. This of course presumes that the plenum assembly is removed from the vessel. Remote video can be used to perform a visual (VT-3) examination at the quarter points where the threaded connections are present. These lanes are not blocked by the rod guide tubes. The examination would look for fracture of the spacer surface or evidence that the spacer is not approximately centered. The threaded fasteners are welded to the OD of the pipe column, so it is possible that a degraded threaded location would not be detected. In this case, it is assumed that the redundant support is acceptable for continued operation.
The lower fuel assembly support pad items (Figure 4-6) consist of the stainless steel block, Alloy X-750 dowels, and stainless steel cap screws, all susceptible to irradiation embrittlement. The primary item is the IMI guide tube spider and associated fillet welds. Cracking of the dowel or cap screw tack weld may be observed, but more likely, the aging mechanism will be detected by the grid pad not being properly located.
4-8 IPEC_PA_OAG0000064 Aging Management Requiremenis The locking welds may be susceptible to cracking as a result of stress cOITosion cracking (i.e.,
primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC)). The recommended program to manage cracking of the locking welds is in conjunction with the existing Examination Category 8-N-3 of the ASME Section XI (2) lSI program. The guide block area is accessible when the core support assembly is removed from the vessel. The IO-year interval is considered adequate due to the low consequences of failure. Due to weld residual stresses and the constrained geometry, it is anticipated that significant cracks will be accompanied by locking device/weld separation and therefore be detectable by the visual (VT-3) examination method.
Primary (applicable to all plants):
IMI guide tube spiders IMI guide tube spider-to-lower grid rib section welds Expand to:
CRGT spacer castings Lower fuel assembly support pad items: pad, pad-to-rib section welds, Alloy X-750 dowel, cap screw, and their locking welds The IMI guide tube spiders and their associated welds, the CSS cast outlet nozzles, the CSS vent valve discs, the control rod guide tube (CRGT) spacer castings, and the lower grid fuel assembly SUpp0l1 pads and their associated welds may have degradation by thermal or irradiation embrittlement. The effects of thermal and irradiation embrittlement can be detected by inspection to detect fracture in the items.
The CRGT spacer castings (Figure 4-5) are an expansion item for thennal embrittlement.
The primary items are the IMI guide tube spiders, the CSS cast outlet nozzles, and the CSS vent valve discs (see following primary item sub-section). The spacer castings are a part of the CRGT structure. The spacer castings do have limited accessibility from the top or bottom of the CRGT through a center free path. This of course presumes that the plenum assembly is removed from the vessel. Remote video can be used to perfOim a visual (VT-3) examjnation at the quarter pojnts where the threaded connections are present. These lanes are not blocked by the rod guide tubes. The examjnation would look for fracture of the spacer sUiface or evidence that the spacer is not approximately centered. The threaded fasteners are welded to the 00 of the pipe column, so it is possible that a degraded threaded location would not be detected. In this case, it js assumed that the redundant support is acceptable for continued operation.
The lower fuel assembly SUppOl1 pad items (Figure 4-6) consist of the stainless steel block, Alloy X-750 dowels, and stainless steel cap screws, all susceptible to irradiation embrittlement. The primary item is the IMI guide tube spider and associated fillet welds. Cracking of the dowel or cap screw tack weld may be observed, but more likely, the aging mechanism will be detected by the grid pad not being properly located.
4-8
Aging Management Requirements Primary:
CSS cast outlet nozzles (applicable to Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 (ONS-3) and Davis-Besse (DB) only)
CSS vent valve discs (applicable to all plants)
Expand to:
CRGT spacer castings The CSS outlet nozzles are currently inspected by the existing ASME Section XI [2] 10-year lSI program, while the CSS vent valve discs are inspected every refueling outage as part of the existing vent valve inspection program defined in BAW-2248A, Page 4.3 and Table 4-1 [18].
The lower grid fuel pads and their associated welds are already part of the ASME Section XI [2]
10-year lSI program and are inspected via visual (VT-3) examination.
The expansion item is covered in the previous primary component sub-section.
Primary (applicable to all plants):
CSS vent valve top retaining ring CSS vent valve bottom retaining ring CSS vent valve disc shaft or hinge pin There are no expansion items for these components.
The vent valves are contained in the core support shield assembly where the plenum assembly resides. These valves are check valves meant to relieve pressure in the interior of the core support assembly during a large break LOCA, preventing backpressure from reversing coolant flow through the core. These vent valves can be damaged due to mishandling when inserting and removing the plenum. The vent valve components listed above were identified as being susceptible to thermal aging embrittlement, which may lead to cracking. An existing program is in place at each of the B& W -designed units that requires testing and inspection of the vent valve assemblies each refueling outage. The aging management measures provided in these requirements include a provision to visually inspect the valve body and disc seating surfaces.
Continuation of the existing vent valve testing and inspection requirements will manage cracking of the vent valve component items that could cause loss of the vent valve function.
Primary (applicable to all plants):
Plenum cover weldment rib pads Plenum cover support flange CSS top flange 4-9 IPEC_PA_OAG0000065 Aging Management Reqlliremenl.~
Primary:
CSS cast outlet nozzles (applicable to Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 (ONS~3 ) and Davis-Besse (DB) only)
CSS vent valve discs (applicable to all plants)
Expand to:
CRGT spacer castings The CSS outlet nozzles are currently inspected by the existing ASME Section Xl [2] lO~yea r lSI program, while the CSS vent valve discs are inspected every refueling outage as part ofthe existing vent valve inspection program defined in BA W ~224SA, Page 4.3 and Table 4~ I [I S].
The lower grid fuel pads and their associated welds are already paJ1 of the ASME Section XI [2]
IO-year lSI program and are inspected via visual (VT~ 3 ) examination.
The expansion item is covered in the previous primary component sub ~sectio n.
Primary (applicable to all plants):
CSS vent valve top retaining ring CSS vent valve bottom retaining ring CSS vent valve disc shaft or hinge pin There are no expansion items for these components.
The vent valves are contained in the core support shield assembly where the plenum assembly resides. These valves are check valves meant to relieve pressure in the interior of the core suppOl1 assembly during a large break LOCA, preventing back pressure from reversing coolant flow through the core. These vent valves can be damaged due to mishandling when insel1ing and removing the plenum. The vent valve components listed above were identified as being susceptible to thermal aging embrittlement, which may lead to cracking. An existing program is in place at each of the B& W -designed units that requires testing and inspection of the vent valve assemblies each refueling outage. The aging management measures provided in these requirements include a provision to visually inspect the valve body and disc seating surfaces.
Continuation of the existing vent valve testing and inspection requirements will manage cracking of the vent valve component items that could cause loss of the vent valve function.
Primary (applicable to aJi plants):
Plenum cover weldment rib pads Plenum cover SUppOl1 flange CSS top flange 4-9
Aging Management Requirements There are no expansion items for these components.
The potential age-related degradation mechanism for the core clamp region is wear. The purpose of the clamping is to stabilize and significantly restrict rigid body pendulum motion of the core support assembly. Wear at these locations will progress from motions generated by fluid flow once the loss of core clamping is initiated. Note that a one-time physical measurement is to be performed prior to subsequent visual (VT-3) examination.
Primary:
Upper core barrel (UCB) bolt locking devices (applicable to all plants)
Expand to:
Lower core barrel (LCB) bolt locking devices (Expansion to LCB applies if the required Primary examination of LCB bolt locking devices has not been performed as scheduled in Table 4-1)
Upper thermal shield (UTS) bolt locking devices (applicable to all plants)
Lower thermal shield (LTS) bolt locking devices (applicable to all plants)
Flow distributor (FD) bolt locking devices (applicable to all plants)
Surveillance specimen holder tube (SSHT) bolt locking devices (Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) and Davis-Besse (DB) only)
Lower grid shock pad bolt locking devices (TMI-1 only)
Lower core barrel (LCB) bolt locking devices (applicable to all plants)
Expand to:
Upper thermal shield (UTS) bolt locking devices (applicable to all plants)
Lower thermal shield (LTS) bolt locking devices (applicable to all plants)
Flow distributor (FD) bolt locking devices (applicable to all plants)
Surveillance specimen holder tube (SSHT) bolt locking devices (Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) and Davis-Besse (DB) only)
Lower grid shock pad bolt locking devices (TMI-1 only)
Note that these bolts are also examined by volumetric (UT) examination.
Volumetric (UT) Examination Primary:
4-10 Upper core barrel (UCB) bolts (applicable to all plants)
Expand to:
Lower Core Barrel (LCB) bolts (Expansion to LCB applies if the required Primary examination of LCB bolts has not been performed as scheduled in Table 4-1)
IPEC_PA_OAG0000066 Aging Management Requiremenis There are no expansion items for these components.
The potential age-related degmdation mechanism for the core clamp region is wear. The purpose of the clamping is to stabilize and significantly restrict rigid body pendulum motion of the core suppOl1 assembly. Wear at these locations will progress from motions generated by fluid flow once the loss of core clamping is initiated. Note that a one-time physical measurement is to be perfonned prior to subsequent visual (VT-3) examination.
Primary:
Upper core baITeI (UCB) bolt locking devices (applicable to all plants)
Expand to:
Lower core barrel (LCB) bolt locking devices (Expansion to LCB applies if the required Primary examination of Le B bolt locking devices has not been perfonned as scheduled in Table 4-1)
Upper thermal shield (UTS) bolt locking devices (applicable to all plants)
Lower thermal shield (LTS) bolt locking devices (applicable to all plants)
Flow distributor (FD) bolt locking devices (applicable to all plants)
Surveillance specimen holder tube (SSHT) bolt locking devices (Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) and Davis-Besse (DB) only)
Lower grid shock pad bolt locking devices (TMI-l only)
Lower core barrel (LCB) bolt locking devices (applicable to all plants)
Expand to:
Upper thermal shield (UTS) bolt locking devices (applicable to all plants)
Lower thermal shield (LTS) bolt locking devices (applicable to all plants)
Flow distributor (FD) bolt locking devices (applicable to all plants)
Surveillance specimen holder tube (SSHT) bolt locking devices (Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) and Davis-Besse (DB) only)
Lower grid shock pad bolt locking devices (TM141 only)
Note that these bolts arc also examined by volumetric (UT) examination.
Volumetric (UT) Examination Primary:
4-10 Upper core baITeI (UCB) bolts (applicable to all plants)
Expand to:
Lower Core Barrel (Le B) bolts (Expansion to LeB applies if the required Primary examination of LCB bolts has not been performed as scheduled in Table 4-1)
Aging Management Requirements Upper thermal shield (UTS) bolts (applicable to all plants)
Lower thermal shield (LTS) bolts (applicable to all plants)
Flow distributor (FD) bolts (applicable to all plants)
Surveillance specimen holder tube (SSHT) bolts (Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) and Davis-Besse (DB) only)
Lower grid shock pad bolts (TMI-1 only)
Lower core barrel (LCB) bolts (applicable to all plants)
Expand to:
Upper thermal shield (UTS) bolts (applicable to all plants)
Lower thermal shield (LTS) bolts (applicable to all plants)
Flow distributor (FD) bolts (applicable to all plants)
Surveillance specimen holder tube (SSHT) bolts (Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) and Davis-Besse (DB) only)
Lower grid shock pad bolts (TMI-1 only)
Note that the locking devices of these bolts are also examined by visual (VT -3) examination.
The potential degradation mechanism for the structural bolting rings is stress corrosion cracking.
For bolting, this mechanism is best detected using ultrasonic examination techniques.
The upper core barrel bolts are accessible for ultrasonic examination while the core support shield assembly is in the reactor vessel and the plenum is removed. Ultrasonic examination of the upper core barrel bolts can be performed during a normal refueling outage. The lower core barrel bolts are only accessible when the core support shield assembly is removed from the reactor vessel. Some lower core barrel bolts are more difficult to examine and are inaccessible for replacement due to the presence of the core guide blocks mounted on the side of the lower grid assembly.
Primary (applicable to all plants):
Baffle-to-former (FB) bolts Expand to:
Baffle-to-baffle (BB) bolts Core barrel-to-former (CBF) bolts Note that the locking devices of these bolts are also examined by visual (VT -3) examination.
Note that even though the baffle-to-baffle (BB) bolts and core barrel-to-former (CBF) bolts are Expansion components, they require an evaluation and not an inspection.
4-11 IPEC_PA_OAG0000067 Aging Management Reqlliremenl.~
Upper thermal shield (UTS) bolts (applicable to all plants)
Lower thermal shield (LTS) bolts (applicable to all plants)
Flow distributor (FO) bolts (applicable to all plants)
Surveillance specimen holdertube (SS HT) bolts (Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) and Davis-Besse (DB) only)
Lower grid shock pad bolts (TMI-I only)
Lower core barrel (LCB) bolts (applicable to all plants)
Expand to:
Upper thermal shield (UTS) bolts (applicable to all plants)
Lower thermal shield (LTS) bolts (applicable to all plants)
Flow distributor (FO) bolts (applicable to all plants)
Surveillance specimen holder tube (SS HT) bolts (Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) and Davi s~Besse (DB) only)
Lower grid shock pad bolts (TMI-I only)
Note that the lock ing devices of these bolts are also examined by visual (VT-3) examination.
The potential degradation mechanism for the structural bolting rings is stress corrosion cracking.
For bolting, this mechanism is best detected using ultrasonic examination techniques.
The upper core barrel bolts are accessible for ultrasonic examination while the core support shield assembly is in the reactor vessel and the plenum is removed. Ultrasonic examination of the upper core barrel bolts can be pelformed during a nonnal refueling outage. The lower core barrel bolts are only accessible when the core support shield assembly is removed from the reactor vessel. Some lower core barrel bolts are more difficult to examine and are inaccessible for replacement due to the presence of the core guide blocks mounted a ll the side of the lower grid assembly.
Primary (applicable to aJl plants):
Baffle-to-former (FB) bolts Expand to:
Baffl e~ to -baffl e (BB) bolts Core barrel-to-former (CBP) bolts Note that the lock ing devices of these bolts are also examined by visual (VT-3) examination.
Note that even though the baffle-to-baffle (B B) bolts and core barrel-to-former (CBF) bolts are Expansion components, they require an evaluation and not an inspection.
4-11
Aging Management Requirements Physical Measurement Primary (applicable to all plants):
Plenum cover weldment rib pads Plenum cover support flange CSS top flange There are no expansion items for these components.
Note: the measurement is performed to determine the differential height of top of the plenum rib pads to the reactor vessel seating surface with all three items inside the reactor vessel, but with the fuel assemblies removed.
Note that these components are subsequently examined by visual (VT-3) examination.
4.3.2 CE Components Tables 4-2 and 4-5 describe the examination requirements for the PWR internals Primary and Expansion components forCE plants.
The following is a list of the CE Primary and Expansion components by examination technique.
Visual (VT-3) Examination Primary (applicable to bolted plant designs):
Core shroud assembly (bolted)
There are no expansion items for this component.
Note that the core shroud assembly (bolted) is examined in order to detect void swelling effects as evidenced by abnormal interaction with fuel assemblies, gaps along high fluence shroud plate joints, vertical displacement of shroud plates near high fluence joint.
Primary (applicable to all plants with instrument guide tubes in the control element assembly (CEA) shroud assembly):
Instrument guide tubes (peripheral)
Expand to:
Remaining instrument guide tubes within the CEA shroud assemblies 4-12 IPEC_PA_OAG0000068 Aging Management Requiremenis Physical Measurement Primary (applicable to all plants);
Plenum cover weldment rib pads Plenum cover support flange CSS top flange There are no expansion items for these components.
Note; the measurement is pelformed to determine the differential height of top of the plenum rib pads to the reactor vessel seating sUiface with all three items inside the reactor vessel, but with the fuel assemblies removed.
Note that these components are subsequently examined by visual (VT*3) examination.
4.3.2 CE Components Tables 4*2 and 4*5 describe the examination requirements for the PWR internals Primary and Expansion components for CE plants.
The following is a list of the CE Primary and Expansion components by examination technique.
Visual (Vl'-3) Examination Primary (applicable to bolted plant designs):
Core shroud assembly (bolted)
There are no expansion items for this component.
Note that the core shroud assembly (bolted) is examined in order to detect void swelling effects as evidenced by abnormal interaction with fuel assemblies, gaps along high fluence shroud plate joints, vertical displacement of shroud plates near high fluence joint.
Primary (applicable to all plants with instrument guide tubes in the control element assembly (CEA) shroud assembly):
Instrument guide tubes (peripheral)
Expand to:
Remaining instrument guide tubes within the CEA shroud assemblies 4* 12
Aging Management Requirements Visual (VT-1 and EVT-1) Examinations Primary (applicable to plant designs with core shrouds assembled in two vertical sections):
Core shroud assembly (welded)
There are no expansion items for this component.
Note that the core shroud assembly (welded) is examined in order to detect void swelling effects as evidenced by separation between the upper and lower core shroud segments.
Primary (applicable to plant designs with core shrouds assembled in two vertical sections):
Core shroud plate-former plate weld Expands to:
Remaining axial welds Primary (applicable to plant designs with core shrouds assembled with full-height shroud plates)
Shroud plates Expand to:
Remaining axial welds Ribs and rings Primary (applicable to all plants):
Upper (core support barrel) flange weld Expands to:
Remaining core barrel assembly welds, starting with the lower core barrel flange weld Core support column welds (these components receive a visual (VT-3) examination)
Primary (applicable to all plants with core shrouds assembled with full-height shroud plates):
Deep beams There are no expansion items for this component.
Primary (depends on time-limited aging analysis [TLAA]):
Core support barrel assembly lower flange weld (applicable to all plants)
Core support plate (applicable to all plants with a core support plate)
Fuel alignment plate (applicable to all plants with core shrouds assembled with full-height shroud plates) 4-13 IPEC_PA_OAG0000069 Aging Management Reqlliremenl.~
Visual (VT-l and EVT-J) Examinations Primary (applicable to plant designs with core shrouds assembled in two vertical sections):
Core shroud assembly (welded)
There are no expansion items for this component.
Note that the core shroud assembly (welded) is examined in order to detect void swelling effects as evidenced by separation between the upper and lower core shroud segments.
Primary (applicable to plant designs with core shrouds assembled in two vertical sections):
Core shroud plate-fonner plate weld Expands to; Remaining axial welds Primary (applicable to plant designs with core shrouds assembled with full-height shroud plates)
Shroud plates Expand to:
Remaining axial welds Ribs and rings Primary (applicable to all plants):
Upper (core support barrel) flange weld Expands to:
Remaining core barrel assembly welds, startjng with the lower core barrel flange weld Core support column welds (these components receive a visual (VT-3) examination)
Primary (applicable to all plants with core shrouds assembled with full-height shroud plates);
Deep beams There are no expansion items for this component.
Primary (depends on time-bmited aging analysis [TLAA]):
Core SUpp0l1 barrel assembly lower flange weld (applicable to all plants)
Core SUppOl1 plate (applicable to all plants with a core SUppOl1 plate)
Fuel alignment plate (applicable to all plants with core shrouds assembled with full-height shroud plates) 4-13
Aging Management Requirements There are no expansion items for these components.
Volumetric (UT) Examination Primary (applicable to bolted plant designs):
Core shroud bolts Expand to:
Core support column bolts Barrel-shroud bolts 4.3.3 Westinghouse Components Tables 4-3 and 4-6 describe the examination requirements for the PWR internals Primary and Expansion components for Westinghouse plants.
The following is a list of the Westinghouse Primary and Expansion components by examination technique.
Visual (VT-3) Examination Primary:
Baffle-former assembly (applicable to all plants)
Thermal shield flexures (applicable to all plants with thermal shields)
Guide plates (cards) (applicable to all plants)
There are no expansion items for these components.
Note that the baffle-former assembly is examined in order to detect void swelling effects as evidenced by abnormal interaction with fuel assemblies, gaps along high fluence baffle joint, vertical displacement of baffle plates near high fluence joint, or broken or damaged edge bolt locking systems along high fluence baffle joint.
Also note that the PWROG is conducting a guide card wear project.
Primary:
Baffle-edge bolts (applicable to all plants with baffle-edge bolts) 4-14 IPEC_PA_OAG0000070 Aging Management Requiremenis There are no expansion items for these components.
Volumetric (UT) Examination Primary (applicable to bolted plant designs):
Core shroud bolts Expand to:
Core SUppOl1 column bolts BaITeI-shroud bolts 4.3.3 Westinghouse Components Tables 4-3 and 4-6 describe the examination requirements for the PWR internals Primary and Expansion components for Westinghouse plants.
The following is a list of the Westinghouse Primary and Expansion components by examination techn ique.
Visual (VT-3) Examinatioll Primary:
Baffle-folmer assembly (applicable to all plants)
Thermal shield flexures (applicable to all plants with thermal shields)
Guide plates (cards) (applicable to all plants)
There are 110 expansion items for these components.
Note that the baffle-former assembly is examined in order to detect void swelling effects as evidenced by abnormal interaction with fuel assemblies, gaps along high fiuence baffle joint, vertical displacement of baffle plates ncar high fiuence joint, or broken or damaged edge bolt locking systems along high fiuence baffle joint.
Also note that the PWROG is conducting a guide card wear project.
Primary:
Baffle-edge bolts (applicable to all plants with baffle-edge bolts) 4* 14
Aging Management Requirements There are no expansion items for these components.
Note that the baffle-edge bolts are examined in order to detect lost or broken locking devices, failed or missing bolts, or protrusion of bolt heads.
Visual (VT-1 and EVT-1) Examinations Primary (applicable to all plants):
Upper core barrel flange weld Expands to:
Remaining core barrel welds Lower support column bodies (non cast)
Primary (applicable to all plants):
Control rod guide tube (CRGT) assembly lower flange welds Expand to:
Bottom-mounted instrumentation (BMI) column bodies (these components receive a visual (VT-3) examination)
Lower support column bodies (cast)
Note that the examination coverage is 100% of outer (accessible) CRGT lower flange weld surfaces and adjacent base metal.
Volumetric (UT) Examination Primary (applicable to all plants):
Baffle-former bolts Expand to:
Lower support column bolts Barrel-former bolts Physical Measurement Primary (applicable to all plants with 304 stainless steel hold down springs):
Internals hold down spring There are no expansion items for this component.
4-15 IPEC_PA_OAG0000071 Aging Management Reqlliremenl.~
There are no expansion items for these components.
Note that the baffle-edge bolts are examined in order to detect lost or broken locking devices.
failed or missing bolts. or protlUsion of bolt heads.
Visual (VT-l and EVT-l) Examinations Primary (applicable to aJi plants):
Upper core barrel flange weld Expands to:
Remaining core barrel welds Lower support column bodies (non cast)
Primary (applicable to all plants):
Control rod guide tube (CRGT) assembly lower flange welds Expand to:
Bottom-mounted instrumentation (BMl) column bodies (these components receive a visual (VT-3) examination)
Lower support column bodies (cast)
Note that the examination coverage is 100% of outer (accessible) CRGT lower flange weld sUlfaces and adjacent base metal.
Volumetric (UT) Examination Primary (applicable to aJl plants):
Baffle-former bolts Expand to:
Lower SUppOl1 column bolts Barrel-former bolts Physical Measurement Primary (applicable to all plants with 304 stainless steel hold down springs):
Internals hold down spring There are no expansion items for this component.
4-15
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-1 B&W plants Primary components Item Applicability Effect (Mechanism)
Expansion Examination Examination Link (Note 2)
Method/Frequency (Note 2)
Coverage Plenum Cover Assembly &
All plants Loss of material and None One-time physical Determination of Core Support Shield associated loss of measurement no later than differential height of top Assembly core clamping two refueling outages from of plenum rib pads to Plenum cover weldment rib pre-load (Wear) the beginning of the license reactor vessel seating pads renewal period.
surface, with plenum in Plenum cover support flange reactor vessel.
CSS top flange Perform subsequent visual (VT-3) examination on the See Figure 4-1.
1 0-year lSI interval.
Core Support Shield ONS-3, DB Cracking (TE),
CRGT spacer Visual (VT-3) examination 100% of accessible Assembly including the castings during the next 1 0-year lSI.
surfaces.
CSS cast outlet nozzles detection of surface irregularities, such as Subsequent examinations on See Figure 4-9.
damaged or fractured Core Support Shield All plants material the 1 0-year lSI interval.
100% of accessible Assembly surfaces CSS vent valve discs (see BAW-2248A, page (Note 1) 4.3 and Table 4-1).
See Figures 4-10 and 4-11.
Core Support Shield All plants Cracking (TE),
None Visual (VT-3) examination 100% of accessible Assembly including the during the next 1 0-year lSI.
surfaces CSS vent valve top retaining detection of surface (see BAW-2248A, page ring irregularities, such as Subsequent examinations on 4.3 and Table 4-1).
damaged, fractured CSS vent valve bottom material, or missing the 1 0-year lSI interval.
retaining ring items See Figures 4-10 and CSS vent valve disc shaft or 4-11.
hinge pin (Note 1) 4-16 IPEC_PA_OAG0000072 Aging Management Requirements Table 4-1 B&W plants Primary components Item Applicability Effect (Mechanism)
Expansion Examination Examination Link (Note 2)
Method/Frequency (Note 2)
Coverage Plenum Cover Assembly &
All plants Loss of material and None One-time physical Determination of Core Support Shield associated loss of measurement no later than differential height of top Assembly core clamping two refueling outages from of plenum rib pads to Plenum cover weldment rib pre-load (Wear) the beginning of the license reactor vessel seating pads renewal period.
surface, with plenum in Plenum cover support flange reactor vessel.
CSS top flange Perform subsequent visual (VT-3) examination on the See Figure 4-1.
10-year lSI interval.
Core Support Shield ONS-3, DB Cracking (TE),
CRGT spacer Visual (VT-3) examination 100% of accessible Assembly including the castings during the next 1 O-year lSI.
surfaces.
CSS cast outlet nozzles detection of surface irregularities, such as Subsequent examinations on See Figure 4-9.
damaged or fractured the 10-year lSI interval.
Core Support Shield All plants material 100% of accessible Assembly surfaces CSS vent valve discs (see BAW-224BA, page (Note 1) 4.3 and Table 4-1).
See Figures 4-10 and 4-11.
Core Support Shield All plants Cracking (TE),
None Visual (VT-3) examination 100% of accessible Assembly including the during the next 1 O-year lSI.
surfaces CSS vent valve top retaining detection of surface (see BAW-224BA, page ring irregularities, such as Subsequent examinations on 4.3 and Table 4-1).
damaged, fractured CSS vent valve bottom material, or missing the 10-year lSI interval.
retaining ring items See Figures 4-10 and CSS vent valve disc shaft or 4-".
hinge pin (Note 1)
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-1 B&W plants Primary components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Expansion Examination Examination (Mechanism)
Link (Note 2)
Method/Frequency (Note 2)
Coverage Core Support Shield All plants Cracking (SCC)
LCB bolts Volumetric examination (UT) 100% of accessible Assembly (Note 3) of the bolts within two bolts.
Upper core barrel (UCB) refueling outages from bolts and their locking UTS, LTS, 1/1/2006 or next 1 0-year lSI See Figure 4-7.
devices and FD bolts interval, whichever is first.
SSHT bolts Subsequent examination to (CR-3 and DB be determined after evaluating the baseline only) results.
Lower grid Visual (VT-3) examination of shock pad bolt locking devices on the bolts (TMI-1 1 0-year lSI interval.
only)
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking (SCC)
UTS, LTS, Volumetric examination (UT) 100% of accessible Lower core barrel (LCB) bolts and FD bolts of the bolts during the next bolts.
and their locking devices 1 0-year lSI interval from SSHT bolts 1/1/2006.
See Figure 4-8.
(CR-3 and DB only)
Subsequent examination to be determined after Lower grid evaluating the baseline shock pad results.
bolts (TMI-1 only)
Visual (VT-3) examination of bolt locking devices on the 1 0-year lSI interval.
4-17 IPEC_PA_OAG0000073 Agillg Mallagemellt Requiremellts Table 4-1 B&W plants Primary components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Expansion Examination Examination (Mechanism)
Link (Note 2)
Method/Frequency (Note 2)
Coverage Core Support Shield All plants Cracking (SCC)
LCB bolts Volumetric examination (UT) 100% of accessible Assembly (Nole 3) of the bolts within two bolls.
Upper core barrel (UCB) refueling outages from bolts and their locking UTS, LTS, 1/1/2006 or next 1 O-year lSI See Figure 4-7.
devices and FO bolts interval, whichever is first.
SSHT bolts Subsequent examination to (CR-3 and DB be determined after evaluating the baseline only) results.
Lower grid Visual (VT-3) examination of shock pad bolt locking devices on the bolls (TMI-1 10-year lSI interval.
only)
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking (SCC)
UTS, LTS, Volumetric examination (UT) 100% of accessible Lower core barrel (LCB) bolts and FO bolts of the bolts during the next bolls.
and their locking devices 10-year lSI interval from SSHT bolts 1/1/2006.
See Figure 4-8.
(CR-3 and DB only)
Subsequent examination to be determined after Lower grid evaluating the baseline shock pad results.
bolls (TMI-1 only)
Visual (VT-3) examination of boll locking devices on the 10-year lSI interval.
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-1 B&W plants Primary components (continued)
Expansion Link Examination Examination Item Applicability Effect (Mechanism)
Method/Frequency (Note (Note 2)
- 2)
Coverage Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking (IASCC, IE, Baffle-to-baffle bolts, Baseline volumetric 100% of accessible Baffle-to-former bolts IC/ISR/Fatigue/Wear, Core barrel-to-former examination (UT) no later bolts.
Overload) bolts than two refueling outages from the beginning of the See Figure 4-2.
license renewal period with subsequent examination after 1 0 to 15 additional years.
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking (IE),
Core barrel cylinder Visual (VT-3) examination 100% of the Baffle plates including the detection (including vertical and during the next 1 0-year lSI.
accessible surface of readily detectable circumferential seam within 1 inch around cracking welds),
Subsequent examinations on each flow and bolt in the baffle plates Former plates the 1 0-year lSI interval.
hole.
See Figure 4-2.
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking (IASCC, IE, Locking devices for Visual (VT-3) examination 100% of accessible Locking devices, Overload), including the external baffle-to-during the next 1 0-year lSI.
baffle-to-former and including locking welds, the detection of baffle bolts and internal baffle-to-of baffle-to-former bolts missing, non-Barrel-to-former bolts Subsequent examinations on baffle bolt locking and internal baffle-to-functional, or removed the 1 0-year lSI interval.
devices.
baffle bolts locking devices or welds See Figure 4-2.
Lower Grid Assembly All plants Cracking (SCC),
Alloy X-750 dowel Initial visual (VT-3) 100% of accessible Alloy X-750 dowel-to-including the detection locking welds to the examination no later than locking welds of the guide block welds of separated or upper and lower fuel two refueling outages from 24 dowel-to-guide missing locking welds, assembly the beginning of the license block welds.
or missing dowels support pads renewal period.
See Figure 4-4.
Subsequent examinations on ten-year interval.
4-18 IPEC_PA_OAG0000074 Aging Management Requirements Table 4-1 B&W plants Primary components (continued)
Expansion Link Examination Examination Item Applicability Effect (Mechanism)
Method/Frequency (Note (Note 2)
- 2)
Coverage Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking (IASCC, IE, Baffle-to-baffle bolts, Baseline volumetric 100% of accessible Baffle-to-former bolts IC/ISRJFatigue/Wear, Core barrel-to-former examination (UT) no later bolls.
Overload) bolls than two refueling outages from the beginning of the See Figure 4-2.
license renewal period with subsequent examination after 10 to 15 additional years.
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking (IE),
Core barrel cylinder Visual (VT-3) examination 100% of the Baffle plates including the detection (including vertical and during the next 10-year lSI.
accessible surface of readily detectable circumferential seam within 1 inch around cracking welds),
Subsequent examinations on each flow and bolt in the baffle plates Former plates the 10-year lSI interval.
hole.
See Figure 4-2.
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking (IASCC, IE, Locking devices for Visual (VT-3) examination 100% of accessible Locking devices, Overload), including the external baffle-to-during the next 10-year lSI.
baffle-to-former and including locking welds, the detection of baffle bolts and internal baffle-to-of baffle-to-former bolts missing, non-Barrel-to-former bolts Subsequent examinations on baffle bolt locking and internal baffle-to-functional, or removed the 10-year lSI interval.
devices.
baffle bolts locking devices or welds See Figure 4-2.
Lower Grid Assembly All plants Cracking (SCC),
Alloy X-750 dowel Initial visual (VT-3) 100% of accessible Alloy X-750 dowel-to-including the detection locking welds to the examination no later than locking welds of the guide block welds of separated or upper and lower fuel two refueling outages from 24 dowel-to-guide missing locking welds, assembly the beginning of the license block welds.
or missing dowels support pads renewal period.
See Figure 4-4.
Subsequent examinations on ten-year interval.
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-1 B&W plants Primary components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Expansion Examination Examination (Mechanism)
Link (Note 2)
Method/Frequency (Note 2)
Coverage lncore Monitoring All plants Cracking (TE/IE),
CRGT spacer Initial visual (VT-3) 1 00% of accessible top Instrumentation (IMI) Guide including the castings examination no later than two surfaces of 52 spider Tube Assembly detection of refueling outages from the castings and welds to IMI guide tube spiders fractured or missing Lower fuel beginning of the license the adjacent lower grid IMI guide tube spider-to-spider arms or assembly renewal period.
rib section.
separation of spider lower grid rib section welds arms from the lower support pad grid rib section at items: pad, Subsequent examinations on See Figures 4-3 and the weld pad-to-rib ten-year interval.
4-6.
section welds, Alloy X-750 dowel, cap screw, and their locking welds (Note: the pads, dowels, and cap screws are included because of TE/IE of the welds)
Notes:
- 1. A verification of the operation of each vent valve shall also be performed through manual actuation of the valve. Verify that the valves are not stuck in the open position and that no abnormal degradation has occurred. Examine the valves for evidence of scratches, pitting, embedded particles, variation in coloration of the seating surfaces, cracking of lock welds and locking cups, jack screws for proper position, and wear. The frequency is defined in each unit's technical specifications or in their pump and valve inservice test programs (see BAW-2248A, page 4.3 and Table 4-1[18]).
- 2. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the B&W components are in Table 5-1.
- 3. Expansion to LCB applies if the required Primary examination of LCB has not been performed as scheduled in this table.
4-19 IPEC_PA_OAG0000075 Agillg Mallagemellt Requiremellts Table 4-1 B&W plants Primary components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Expansion Examination Examination (Mechanism)
Link (Note 2)
Method/Frequency (Note 2)
Coverage Incore Monitoring All plants Cracking (TEll E),
CRGT spacer Initial visual (VT-3) 100% of accessible top Instrumentation (1M I) Guide including the castings examination no later than two surfaces of 52 spider Tube Assembly detection of refueling outages from the castings and welds to IMI guide tube spiders fractured or missing Lower fuel beginning of the license the adjacent lower grid IMI guide tube spider-to-spider arms or assembly renewal period.
rib section.
separation of spider lower grid rib section welds arms from the lower support pad grid rib section at items: pad, Subsequent examinations on See Figures 4-3 and the weld pad-to-rib ten-year interval.
4-6.
section welds, Alloy X-750 dowel, cap screw, and their locking welds (Note: the pads, dowels, and cap screws are included because of TElIE of the welds)
Notes:
- 1. A verification of the operation of each vent valve shall also be performed through manual actuation of the valve. Verily that the valves are not stuck in the open position and that no abnormal degradation has occurred. Examine the valves for evidence of scratches, pilling, embedded particles, variation in coloration of the seating surfaces, cracking of lock welds and locking cups, jack screws for proper position, and wear. The frequency is defined in each unit's technical specifications or in their pump and valve inservice test programs (see BAW-2248A, page 4.3 and Table 4-1[18]).
- 2. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the B&W components are in Table 5* 1.
- 3. Expansion to LCB applies if the required Primary examination of LCB has not been performed as scheduled in this table.
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-2 CE plants Primary components Item Applicability Effect Expansion Examination Examination (Mechanism)
Link (Note 1)
Method/Frequency (Note 1)
Coverage Core Shroud Assembly Bolted plant Cracking (IASCC, Core support Baseline volumetric (UT) 1 00% of accessible (Bolted) designs Fatigue) column bolts, examination between 25 and bolts, or as supported Barrel-shroud 35 EFPY, with subsequent by plant-specific Core shroud bolts bolts examination after 10 to 15 justification. Heads are additional EFPY to confirm accessible from the stability of bolting pattern.
core side. UT Re-examination for high-accessibility may be leakage core designs affected by complexity requires continuing of head and locking inspections on a ten-year device designs.
interval.
See Figure 4-24.
Core Shroud Assembly Plant designs Cracking (IASCC)
Remaining Enhanced visual (EVT-1)
Axial and horizontal (Welded) with core axial welds examination no later than 2 weld seams at the core shrouds refueling outages from the shroud re-entrant Core shroud plate-former assembled in beginning of the license corners as visible from plate weld two vertical renewal period and the core side of the sections subsequent examination on a shroud, within six ten-year interval.
inches of central flange and horizontal stiffeners.
See Figures 4-12 and 4-14.
Core Shroud Assembly Plant designs Cracking (IASCC)
Remaining Enhanced visual (EVT-1)
Axial weld seams at the (Welded) with core axial welds, examination no later than 2 core shroud re-entrant shrouds Ribs and refueling outages from the corners, at the core Shroud plates assembled rings beginning of the license mid-plane (+/- three feet with full-height renewal period and in height) as visible shroud plates subsequent examination on a from the core side of ten-year interval.
the shroud.
See Figure 4-13.
4-20 IPEC_PA_OAG0000076 Aging Management Requirements Table 4-2 CE plants Primary components Item Applicability Effect Expansion Examination Examination (Mechanism)
Link (Note 1)
MethodlFrequency (Note 1)
Coverage Core Shroud Assembly Bolted plant Cracking (IASCC, Core support Baseline volumetric (UT) 100% of accessible (Bolted) designs Fatigue) column bolts, examination between 25 and bolts, or as supported Barrel-shroud 35 EFPY, with subsequent by plant-specific Core shroud bolls bolts examination after 10 to 15 justification. Heads are additional EFPY to confirm accessible from the stability of bolting pattern.
core side. UT Re-examination for high-accessibility may be leakage core designs affected by complexity requires continuing of head and locking inspections on a ten-year device designs.
interval.
See Figure 4-24.
Core Shroud Assembly Plant designs Cracking (IASCC)
Remaining Enhanced visual (EVT-1)
Axial and horizontal (Welded) with core axial welds examination no later than 2 weld seams at the core shrouds refueling outages from the shroud re-entrant Core shroud plate-former assembled in beginning of the license corners as visible from plate weld two vertical renewal period and the core side of the sections subsequent examination on a shroud, within six ten-year interval.
inches of central flange and horizontal stiffeners.
See Figures 4*12 and 4+14.
Core Shroud Assembly Plant designs Cracking (IASCC)
Remaining Enhanced visual (EVT -1)
Axial weld seams at the (Welded) with core axial welds, examination no later than 2 core shroud re-entrant shrouds Ribs and refueling outages from the corners, at the core Shroud plates assembled rings beginning of the license mid-plane (+/- three feet with full-height renewal period and in height) as visible shroud plates subsequent examination on a from the core side of ten-year interval.
the shroud.
See Figure 4-13.
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-2 CE plants Primary components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Expansion Examination Examination (Mechanism)
Link (Note 1)
Method/Frequency (Note 1)
Coverage Core Shroud Assembly Bolted plant Distortion None Visual (VT-3) examination no Core side surfaces as (Bolted) designs (Void Swelling),
later than 2 refueling outages indicated.
Assembly including:
from the beginning of the license renewal period.
- Abnormal Subsequent examinations on See Figures 4-25 and interaction with a ten-year interval.
4-26.
fuel assemblies
- Gaps along high fluence shroud plate joints
- Vertical displacement of shroud plates near high fluence joint Core Shroud Assembly Plant designs Distortion None Visual (VT-1) examination no If a gap exists, make (Welded) with core (Void Swelling), as later than 2 refueling outages three to five shrouds evidenced by from the beginning of the measurements of gap Assembly assembled in separation license renewal period.
opening from the core two vertical between the upper Subsequent examinations on side at the core shroud sections and lower core a ten-year interval.
re-entrant corners.
shroud segments Then, evaluate the swelling on a plant-specific basis to determine frequency and method for additional examinations.
See Figures 4-12 and 4-14.
4-21 IPEC_PA_OAG0000077 Agillg Mallagemellt Requiremellts Table 4-2 CE plants Primary components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Expansion Examination Examination (Mechanism)
Link (Note 1)
MethodlFrequency (Note 1)
Coverage Core Shroud Assembly Bolted plant Distortion None Visual (VT-3) examination no Core side surfaces as (Bolted) designs (Void Swelling),
later than 2 refueling outages indicated.
Assembly including:
from the beginning of the license renewal period.
- Abnormal Subsequent examinations on See Figures 4-25 and interaction with a ten-year interval.
4-26.
fuel assemblies
- Gaps along high fluence shroud plate joints
- Vertical displacement of shroud plates near high fluence joint Core Shroud Assembly Plant designs Distortion None Visual (VT-1) examination no If a gap exists, make (Welded) with core (Void Swelling), as later than 2 refueling outages three to five shrouds evidenced by from the beginning of the measurements of gap Assembly assembled in separation license renewal period.
opening from the core two vertical between the upper Subsequent examinations on side at the core shroud sections and lower core a ten-year interval.
re-entrant corners.
shroud segments Then, evaluate the swelling on a plant-specific basis to determine frequency and method for additional examinations.
See Figures 4-12 and 4-14.
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-2 CE plants Primary components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Expansion Examination Examination (Mechanism)
Link (Note 1)
Method/Frequency (Note 1)
Coverage Core Support Barrel All plants Cracking (SCC)
Remaining Enhanced visual (EVT-1) 1 00% of the accessible Assembly core barrel examination no later than 2 surfaces of the upper Upper (core support barrel) assembly refueling outages from the flange weld.
- welds, beginning of the license Core support renewal period. Subsequent See Figure 4-15.
column welds examinations on a ten-year interval.
Core Support Barrel All plants Cracking (Fatigue)
None If fatigue life cannot be Examination coverage Assembly demonstrated by time-limited to be defined by plant-Lower flange weld aging analysis (TLAA),
specific fatigue enhanced visual (EVT-1) analysis.
examination, no later than 2 refueling outages from the See Figure 4-15.
beginning of the license renewal period. Subsequent examination on a ten-year interval.
Lower Support Structure All plants with Cracking (Fatigue)
None If fatigue life cannot be Examination coverage Core support plate a core support demonstrated by time-limited to be defined by plant-plate aging analysis (TLAA),
specific fatigue enhanced visual (EVT-1) analysis.
examination, no later than 2 refueling outages from the See Figure 4-16.
beginning of the license renewal period. Subsequent examination on a ten-year interval.
4-22 IPEC_PA_OAG0000078 Aging Management Requirements Table 4-2 CE plants Primary components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Expansion Examination Examination (Mechanism)
Link (Note 1)
MethodlFrequency (Note 1)
Coverage Core Support Barrel All plants Cracking (SCC)
Remaining Enhanced visual (EVT-1) 100% of the accessible Assembly core barrel examination no later than 2 surfaces of the upper Upper (core support barrel) assembly refueling outages from the flange weld.
- welds, beginning of the license Core support renewal period. Subsequent See Figure 4-15.
column welds examinations on a ten-year interval.
Core Support Barrel All plants Cracking (Fatigue)
None If fatigue life cannot be Examination coverage Assembly demonstrated by time-limited to be defined by plant-Lower flange weld aging analysis (TLAA),
specific fatigue enhanced visual (EVT-1 )
analysis.
examination, no later than 2 refueling outages from the See Figure 4-15.
beginning of the license renewal period. Subsequent examination on a ten-year interval.
Lower Support Structure All plants with Cracking (Fatigue)
None If fatigue life cannot be Examination coverage Core support plate a core support demonstrated by time-limited to be defined by plant-plate aging analysis (TLAA),
specific fatigue enhanced visual (EVT -1 )
analysis.
examination, no later than 2 refueling outages from the See Figure 4-16.
beginning of the license renewal period. Subsequent examination on a ten-year interval.
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-2 CE plants Primary components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Expansion Examination Examination (Mechanism)
Link (Note 1)
Method/Frequency (Note 1)
Coverage Upper Internals Assembly All plants with Cracking (Fatigue)
None If fatigue life cannot be Examination coverage Fuel alignment plate core shrouds demonstrated by time-limited to be defined by plant-assembled aging analysis (TLAA),
specific fatigue with full-height enhanced visual (EVT-1) analysis.
shroud plates examination, no later than 2 refueling outages from the See Figure 4-17.
beginning of the license renewal period. Subsequent examination on a ten-year interval.
Control Element Assembly All plants with Cracking (SCC, Remaining Visual (VT-3) examination, 100% of tubes in Instrument guide tubes instrument Fatigue) that instrument no later than 2 refueling peripheral CEA shroud guide tubes in results in missing guide tubes outages from the beginning assemblies (i.e., those the CEA supports or within the of the license renewal period.
adjacent to the shroud separation at the CEA shroud Subsequent examination on perimeter of the fuel assembly welded joint assemblies a ten-year interval.
alignment plate).
between the tubes and supports Plant-specific component See Figure 4-18.
integrity assessments may be required if degradation is detected and remedial action is needed.
Lower Support Structure All plants with Cracking (Fatigue)
None Enhanced visual (EVT-1)
Examine beam-to-Deep beams core shrouds that results in a examination, no later than 2 beam welds, in the assembled detectable surface-refueling outages from the axial elevation from the with full-height breaking indication beginning of the license beam top surface to shroud plates in the welds or renewal period. Subsequent four inches below.
beams examination on a ten-year interval, if adequacy of See Figure 4-19.
remaining fatigue life cannot be demonstrated.
Note:
- 1. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the CE components are in Table 5-2.
4-23 IPEC_PA_OAG0000079 Agillg Mallagemellt Requiremellts Table 4-2 CE plants Primary components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Expansion Examination Examination (Mechanism) link (Note 1)
Method/Frequency (Note 1)
Coverage Upper Internals Assembly All plants with Cracking (Fatigue)
None II fatigue life cannot be Examination coverage Fuel alignment plate core shrouds demonstrated by time-limited to be defined by plant-assembled aging analysis (TLAA),
specific fatigue with full-height enhanced visual (EVT*1 )
analysis.
shroud plates examination, no later than 2 refueling outages from the See Figure 4-17.
beginning of the license renewal period. Subsequent examination on a ten-year interval.
Control Element Assembly All plants with Cracking (SeC, Remaining Visual (VT-3) examination, 100% of tubes in Instrument guide tubes instrument Fatigue) that instrument no later than 2 refueling peripheral CEA shroud guide tubes in results in missing guide tubes outages from the beginning assemblies (Le., those the CEA supports or within the of the license renewal period.
adjacent to the shroud separation at the CEA shroud Subsequent examination on perimeter of the fuel assembly welded joint assemblies a ten-year interval.
alignment plate).
between the tubes and supports Plant-specific component See Figure 4-18.
integrity assessments may be required if degradation is detected and remedial action is needed.
Lower Support Structure All plants with Cracking (Fatigue)
None Enhanced visual (EVT -1)
Examine beam-to-Deep beams core shrouds that results in a examination, no later than 2 beam welds, in the assembled detectable surface-refueling outages from the axial elevation from the with full-height breaking indication beginning of the license beam top surface to shroud plates in the welds or renewal period. Subsequent four inches below.
beams examination on a ten-year interval, if adequacy of See Figure 4-19.
remaining fatigue life cannot be demonstrated.
Nole:
- 1. E:uJ.mination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the CE components are in Table 5-2.
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-3 Westinghouse plants Primary components Item Applicability Effect Expansion Link Examination Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
Method/Frequency (Note 1)
Control Rod Guide Tube All plants Loss of Material None Visual (VT-3) examination no 20% examination of the Assembly (Wear) later than 2 refueling outages number of CRGT Guide plates (cards) from the beginning of the assemblies, with all guide license renewal period, and cards within each no earlier than two refueling selected CRGT assembly outages prior to the start of examined.
the license renewal period.
Subsequent examinations See Figure 4-20 are required on a ten-year interval.
Control Rod Guide Tube All plants Cracking (SCC, Bottom-mounted Enhanced visual (EVT-1) 1 00% of outer Assembly Fatigue) instrumentation examination to determine the (accessible) CRGT lower Lower flange welds (BMI) column presence of crack-like flange weld surfaces and
Lower support no later than 2 refueling column bodies outages from the beginning See Figure 4-21.
(cast) of the license renewal period and subsequent examination on a ten-year interval.
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking (SCC)
Remaining core Periodic enhanced visual 1 00% of one side of the Upper core barrel flange weld barrel welds, (EVT-1) examination, no later accessible surfaces of Lower support than 2 refueling outages from the selected weld and column bodies the beginning of the license adjacent base metal.
(non cast) renewal period and subsequent examination on a See Figure 4-22.
ten-year interval.
Baffle-Former Assembly All plants with Cracking (IASCC, None Visual (VT-3) examination, Bolts and locking devices Baffle-edge bolts baffle-edge Fatigue) that with baseline examination on high fluence seams.
bolts results in between 20 and 40 EFPY 1 00% of components
- Lost or broken and subsequent accessible from core locking devices examinations on a ten-year side.
- Failed or interval.
missing bolts See Figure 4-23.
- Protrusion of bolt heads 4-24 IPEC_PA_OAG0000080 Aging Management Requirements Table 4-3 Westinghouse plants Primary components Item Applicability Effect Expansion Link Examination Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
. (Note 1)
Method/Frequency (Note 1)
Control Rod Guide Tube All plants Loss of Material None Visual (VT-3) examination no 20% examination of the Assembly (Wear) later than 2 refueling outages number of CRGT Guide plates (cards) from the beginning of the assemblies, with all guide license renewal period, and cards within each no earlier than two refueling selected CRGT assembly outages prior to the start of examined.
the license renewal period.
Subsequent examinations See Figure 4-20 are required on a ten-year interval.
Control Rod Guide Tube All plants Cracking (SCC, Bottom-mounted Enhanced visual (EVT-1) 100% of outer Assembly Fatigue) instrumentation examination to determine the (accessible) CRGT lower Lower flange welds (BMI) column presence of crack-like flange weld surfaces and
Lower support no later than 2 refueling column bodies outages from the beginning See Figure 4-21.
(cast) of the license renewal period and subsequent examination on a ten-year interval.
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking (SCC)
Remaining core Periodic enhanced visual 100% of one side of the Upper core barrel flange weld barrel welds, (EVT-1) examination, no later accessible surfaces of Lower support than 2 refueling outages from the selected weld and column bodies the beginning of the license adjacent base metal.
(non cast) renewal period and subsequent examination on a See Figure 4-22.
ten-year interval.
Baffle-Former Assembly All plants with Cracking (IASCC, None Visual (VT-3) examination, Bolts and locking devices Baffle-edge bolts baffle-edge Fatigue) that with baseline examination on high fluence seams.
bolts results in between 20 and 40 EFPY 100% of components
- Lost or broken and subsequent accessible from core locking devices examinations on a ten-year side.
- Failed or interval.
missing bolts See Figure 4-23.
- Protrusion of bolt heads
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-3 Westinghouse plants Primary components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Expansion Link Examination Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
Method/Frequency (Note 1)
Baffle-Former Assembly All plants Cracking (IASCC, Lower support Baseline volumetric (UT) 100% of accessible bolts Baffle-former bolts Fatigue) column bolts, examination between 25 and or as supported by plant-Barrel-former 35 EFPY, with subsequent specific justification.
bolts examination after 10 to 15 Heads accessible from additional EFPY to confirm the core side. UT stability of bolting pattern.
accessibility may be Re-examination for high-affected by complexity of leakage core designs head and locking device requires continuing designs.
examinations on a ten-year interval.
See Figures 4-23 and 4-
- 24.
Baffle-Former Assembly All plants Distortion (Void None Visual (VT-3) examination to Core side surface as Assembly Swelling), or check for evidence of indicated.
Cracking (IASCC) distortion, with baseline that results in examination between 20 and See Figures 4-24, 4-25,
- Abnormal 40 EFPY and subsequent 4-26 and 4-27.
interaction with examinations on a ten-year fuel assemblies interval.
- Gaps along high fluence baffle joint
- Vertical displacement of baffle plates near high fluence joint
- Broken or damaged edge bolt locking systems along high fluence baffle joint 4-25 IPEC_PA_OAG0000081 Agillg Mallagemellt Requiremellts Table 4-3 Westinghouse plants Primary components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Expansion Link Examination Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
Method/Frequency (Note 1)
Baffle-Former Assembly All plants Cracking (IASCC, Lower support Baseline volumetric (UT) 100% of accessible bolts Baffle-former bolts Fatigue) column bolls, examination between 25 and or as supported by plant-Barrel-former 35 EFPY, with subsequent specific justification.
bolls examination after 10 to 15 Heads accessible from additional EFPY to confirm the core side. UT stability of bolting pattern.
accessibility may be Re-examination for high-affected by complexity of leakage core designs head and locking device requires continuing designs.
examinations on a ten-year interval.
See Figures 4-23 and 4-
- 24.
Baffle-Former Assembly All plants Distortion (Void None Visual (VT-3) examination to Core side surface as Assembly Swelling), or check for evidence of indicated.
Cracking (IASCC) distortion, with baseline that results in examination between 20 and See Figures 4-24, 4-25,
- Abnormal 40 EFPY and subsequent 4-26 and 4-27.
interaction with examinations on a ten-year fuel assemblies interval.
- Gaps along high fluence baffle joint
- Vertical displacement of baffle plates near high fluence joint
- Broken or damaged edge bolt locking systems along high fluence baffle joint
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-3 Westinghouse plants Primary components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Expansion Link Examination Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
Method/Frequency (Note 1)
Alignment and Interfacing All plants with Distortion (Loss None Direct measurement of spring Measurements should be Components 304 stainless of Load) height within three cycles of taken at several points Internals hold down spring steel hold down the beginning of the license around the circumference springs Note: This renewal period. If the first set of the spring, with a mechanism was of measurements is not statistically adequate not strictly sufficient to determine life, number of measurements identified in the spring height measurements at each point to minimize original list of must be taken during the next uncertainty. Replacement age-related two outages, in order to of 304 springs by 403 degradation extrapolate the expected springs is required when mechanisms [7].
spring height to 60 years.
the spring stiffness is determined to relax beyond design tolerance.
See Figure 4-28.
Thermal Shield Assembly All plants with Cracking None Visual (VT-3) no later than 2 100% of thermal shield Thermal shield flexures thermal shields (Fatigue) refueling outages from the flexures.
or Loss of beginning of the license Material (Wear) renewal period. Subsequent See Figures 4-29 and 4-that results in examinations on a ten-year
- 36.
thermal shield interval.
flexures excessive wear, fracture, or complete separation Notes:
- 1. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the Westinghouse components are in Table 5-3.
4-26 IPEC_PA_OAG0000082 Aging Management Requirements Table 4-3 Westinghouse plants Primary components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Expansion Link Examination Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
Method/Frequency (Note 1)
Alignment and Interfacing All plants with Distortion (Loss None Direct measurement of spring Measurements should be Components 304 stainless of Load) height within three cycles of taken at several points Internals hold down spring steel hold down the beginning of the license around the circumference springs Note: This renewal period. If the first set of the spring, with a mechanism was of measurements is not statistically adequate not strictly sufficient to determine life, number of measurements identified in the spring height measurements at each point to minimize original list of must be taken during the next uncertainty. Replacement age-related two outages, in order to of 304 springs by 403 degradation extrapolate the expected springs is required when mechanisms [7].
spring height to 60 years.
the spring stiffness is determined to relax beyond design tolerance.
See Fiqure 4-28.
Thermal Shield Assembly All plants with Cracking None Visual (VT -3) no later than 2 100% of thermal shield Thermal shield flexures thermal shields (Fatigue) refueling outages from the flexures.
or Loss of beginning of the license Material (Wear) renewal period. Subsequent See Figures 4-29 and 4-that results in examinations on a ten-year
- 36.
thermal shield interval.
flexures excessive wear, fracture, or complete separation Noles:
- 1. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria lor the Westinghouse components are in Table 5-3.
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-4 B&W plants Expansion components Item Applicability Effect Primary Link Examination Method Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
(Note 1)
Upper Grid Assembly All plants Cracking (SCC),
Alloy X-750 Visual (VT-3) examination.
1 00% of accessible Alloy X-750 dowel-to-upper (except DB) including the dowel-to-guide dowel locking welds.
detection of block welds fuel assembly support pad separated or welds missing locking See Figure 4-6 welds, or missing (i.e., these are similar to dowels the lower fuel assembly support pads).
Control Rod Guide Tube All plants Cracking (TE),
CSS cast outlet Visual (VT-3) examination.
1 00% of accessible Assembly including the
- nozzle, surfaces at the 4 screw CRGT spacer castings detection of CSS vent valve locations (at every 90°)
fractured spacers or disks, or (limited accessibility).
missing screws IMI guide tube spiders See Figure 4-5.
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking (SCC)
UCB and LCB Volumetric examination 100% of accessible Upper thermal shield bolts bolts (UT).
bolts.
(UTS)
Core Barrel Assembly CR-3, DB See Figure 4-7.
Surveillance specimen holder tube (SSHT) studs/nuts (CR-
- 3) or bolts (DB)
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking (IE),
Baffle plates Justify by evaluation or by Inaccessible.
Core barrel cylinder (including including readily replacement.
detectable vertical and circumferential cracking See Figure 4-2.
seam welds)
Former plates 4-27 IPEC_PA_OAG0000083 Agillg Mallagemellt Requiremellts Table 4-4 B&W plants Expansion components Hem Applicability Effect Primary link Examination Method Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
(Note 1)
Upper Grid Assembly All plants Cracking (SCC),
Alloy X-750 Visual (VT-3) examination.
100% of accessible Alloy X-750 dowel-to-upper (except DB) including the dowel-to-guide dowel locking welds.
detection of block welds fuel assembly support pad separated or welds missing locking See Figure 4-6 welds, or missing (i.e.. these are similar to dowels the lower fuel assembly support pads).
Control Rod Guide Tube All plants Cracking (TE),
CSS cast outlet Visual (VT-3) examination.
100% of accessible Assembly including the
- nozzle, surfaces at the 4 screw CRGT spacer castings detection of CSS vent valve locations (at every 90°)
fractured spacers or disks, or (limited accessibility).
missing screws IMI guide tube spiders See Figure 4-5.
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking (SCC)
UCB and LCB Volumetric examination 100% of accessible Upper thermal shield bolls bolts (UT).
bolts.
(UTS)
Core Barrel Assembly CR*3, DB See Figure 4*7.
Surveillance specimen holder tube (SSHT) studs/nuts (CR-
- 3) or bolts (DB)
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking (IE).
Baffle plates Justify by evaluation or by Inaccessible.
Core barrel cylinder (including including readily replacement.
detectable vertical and circumferential cracking See Figure 4-2.
seam welds)
Former plates
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-4 B&W plants Expansion components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Primary Link Examination Method Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
(Note 1)
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking Baffle-to-former Internal baffle-to-baffle bolts:
N/A.
Baffle-to-baffle bolts (IASCC, IE, bolts No examination IC/ISR/Fatigue/
requirements, Core barrel-to-former bolts Wear, Overload)
See Figure 4-2.
Justify by evaluation or by replacement.
External baffle-to-baffle Inaccessible.
- bolts, Barrel-to-former bolts:
See Figure 4-2.
No examination requirements, Justify by evaluation or by replacement.
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking Locking devices, Justify by evaluation or by Inaccessible.
Locking devices, including (IASCC, IE) including locking replacement.
welds, of baffle-locking welds, for the external to-former bolts or See Figure 4-2.
baffle-to-baffle bolts and core barrel-to-former bolts internal baffle-to-baffle bolts Lower Grid Assembly All plants Cracking (IE),
IMI guide tube Visual (VT-3) examination.
1 00% of accessible Lower fuel assembly support including the spiders and pads, dowels, and cap detection of spider-to-lower screws, and associated pad items: pad, pad-to-rib separated or grid rib section welds.
section welds, Alloy X-750 missing welds, welds dowel, cap screw, and their missing support locking welds pads, dowels, See Figure 4-6.
(Note: the pads, dowels, and cap screws and cap screws are included locking welds, or because of TE/1 E of the misalignment of welds) the support pads 4-28 IPEC_PA_OAG0000084 Aging Management Requirements Table 4-4 B&W plants Expansion components (continued)
Hem Applicability Effect Primary link Examination Method Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
(Note 1)
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking Baffle-to-former Internal baffle-to-baffle bolls:
N/A.
Baffle-to-baffle bolls (IASCC. IE.
bolls No examination IC/lSRIFatiguel requirements, Core barrel-to-former bolls Wear, Overload)
See Figure 4-2_
Justify by evaluation or by replacement.
External baffle-to-baffle Inaccessible_
- bolls, Barrel-to-former bolts:
See Figure 4-2_
No examination requirements, Justify by evaluation or by replacement.
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking Locking devices, Justify by evaluation or by Inaccessible.
Locking devices, including (IASCC. IE) including locking replacement.
welds, of baffle-locking welds, for the external to-former bolls or See Figure 4-2.
baffle-to-baffle bolls and core barrel-to-former bolls internal baffle-to-baffle bolls Lower Grid Assembly All plants Cracking (IE),
IMI guide tube Visual (VT-3) examination.
100% of accessible Lower fuel assembly support including the spiders and pads, dowels, and cap detection of spider~to-Iowe r screws, and associated pad items: pad, pad-to-rib separated or grid rib section welds.
section welds, Alloy X-7S0 missing welds, welds dowel, cap screw, and their missing support locking welds pads, dowels, See Figure 4-6_
(Note: the pads, dowels, and cap screws and cap screws are included locking welds, or because of TElIE of the misalignment of welds) the support pads
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-4 B&W plants Expansion components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Primary Link Examination Method Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
(Note 1)
Lower Grid Assembly All plants Cracking (SCC),
Alloy X-750 Visual (VT-3) examination.
1 00% of accessible Alloy X-750 dowel-to-lower including the dowel-to-guide dowels welds.
detection of block welds fuel assembly support pad separated or welds missing locking See Figure 4-6.
welds, or missing dowels Lower Grid Assembly TMI-1 Cracking (SCC)
UCB and LCB Volumetric examination 100% of accessible Lower grid shock pad bolts bolts (UT).
bolts.
See Figure 4-4.
Lower Grid Assembly All plants Cracking (SCC)
UCB and LCB Volumetric examination 100% of accessible Lower thermal shield (L TS) bolts (UT).
bolts.
bolts Flow Distributor Assembly See Figure 4-8.
Flow distributor (FD) bolts Note:
- 1. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the B&W components are in Table 5-1.
4-29 IPEC_PA_OAG0000085 Agillg Mallagemellt Requiremellts Table 4-4 B&W plants Expansion components (continued)
Hem Applicability Effect Primary link Examination Method Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
(Note 1) lower Grid Assembly All plants Cracking (SCC),
Alloy X-750 Visual (VT-3) examination.
100% of accessible Alloy X-750 dowel-to-lower including the dowel-to-guide dowels welds.
detection of block welds fuel assembly support pad separated or welds missing locking See Figure 4-6.
welds, or missing dowels lower Grid Assembly TMI-l Cracking (SCC)
UCB and LCB Volumetric examination 100% of accessible Lower grid shock pad bolls bolts (UT).
bolts.
See Figure 4-4.
lower Grid Assembly All plants Cracking (SCC)
UCB and LCB Volumetric examination 100% of accessible Lower thermal shield (L TS) bolts (UT).
bolts.
bolts Flow Distributor Assembly See Figure 4-8.
Flow distributor (FD) bolts Note:
- 1. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the B&W components are in Table 5-1.
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-5 CE plants Expansion components Item Applicability Effect Primary Link Examination Method Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
(Note 1)
Core Shroud Assembly Bolted plant Cracking Core shroud Volumetric (UT) 100% (or as supported (Bolted) designs (IASCC, bolts examination, with initial and by plant-specific Barrel-shroud bolts Fatigue) subsequent examination justification) of barrel-frequencies dependent on shroud and guide lug the results of core shroud insert bolts with neutron bolt examinations.
fluence exposures > 3 displacements per atom (dpa).
See Westinghouse design Figure 4-23.
Core Support Barrel All plants Cracking (SCC, Upper (core Enhanced visual (EVT-1) 100% of accessible Assembly Fatigue) support barrel) examination, with initial and welds and adjacent flange weld subsequent examinations base metal.
Lower core barrel flange dependent on the results of the upper (core support barrel) flange weld See Figure 4-15.
examinations.
Core Support Barrel All plants Cracking (SCC)
Upper (core Enhanced visual (EVT-1) 1 00% of one side of the Assembly support barrel) examination, with initial and accessible weld and Remaining core barrel flange weld subsequent examinations adjacent base metal dependent on the results of surfaces for the weld assembly welds core barrel assembly upper with the highest flange weld examinations.
calculated operating stress.
See Figure 4-15.
4-30 IPEC_PA_OAG0000086 Aging Management Requirements Table 4-5 CE plants Expansion components Item Applicability Effect Primary Link Examination Method Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
(Note 1)
Core Shroud Assembly Bolted plant Cracking Core shroud Volumetric (UT) 100% (or as supported (Bolted) designs (IASCC, bolts examination, with initial and by plant-specific Barrel-shroud bolts Fatigue) subsequent examination justification) of barrel-frequencies dependent on shroud and guide lug the results of core shroud insert bolts with neutron bolt examinations.
fluence exposures > 3 displacements per atom (dpa).
See Westinghouse design Figure 4-23.
Core Support Barrel All plants Cracking (SCC, Upper (core Enhanced visual (EVT -1 )
100% of accessible Assembly Fatigue) support barrel) examination, with initial and welds and adjacent flange weld subsequent examinations base metal.
Lower core barrel flange dependent on the results of the upper (core support barrel) flange weld See Figure 4-15.
examinations.
Core Support Barrel All plants Cracking (SCC)
Upper (core Enhanced visual (EVT -1 )
100% of one side of the Assembly support barrel) examination, with initial and accessible weld and Remaining core barrel flange weld subsequent examinations adjacent base metal dependent on the results of surfaces for the weld assembly welds core barrel assembly upper with the highest flange weld examinations.
calculated operating stress.
See Figure 4-15.
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-5 CE plants Expansion components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Primary Link Examination Method Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
(Note 1)
Lower Support Structure All plants Cracking (SCC, Upper (core Visual (VT-3) examination, Examination coverage Core support column welds except those IASCC, Fatigue) support barrel) with initial and subsequent determined by plant-with core including flange weld examinations based on plant specific analysis.
shrouds damaged or evaluation of sec assembled fractured susceptibility and with full-height material demonstration of remaining See Figures 4-16 and shroud plates fatigue life.
4-31.
Core Shroud Assembly Bolted plant Cracking Core shroud Ultrasonic (UT) examination, 100% (or as supported (Bolted) designs (IASCC, bolts with initial and subsequent by plant-specific Core support column bolts Fatigue) examination frequencies analysis) of core dependent on the results of support column bolts core shroud bolt with neutron fluence examinations.
exposures > 3 dpa.
See Figures 4-16 and 4-33.
Core Shroud Assembly Plant designs Cracking Core shroud Enhanced visual (EVT-1)
Axial weld seams other (Welded) with core (IASCC) plate-former examination, with initial and than the core shroud re-shrouds plate weld subsequent examination entrant corner welds at Remaining axial welds assembled in frequencies dependent on the core mid-plane.
two vertical the results of the core sections shroud weld examinations.
See Figure 4-12.
4-31 IPEC_PA_OAG0000087 Agillg Mallagemellt Requiremellts Table 4-5 CE plants Expansion components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Primary Link Examination Method Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
(Note 1)
Lower Support Structure All plants Cracking (SCC, Upper (core Visual (VT-3) examination, Examination coverage Core support column welds except those IASCC, Fatigue) support barrel) with initial and subsequent determined by plant-with core including flange weld examinations based on plant specific analysis.
shrouds damaged or evaluation of SCC assembled fractured susceptibility and with full-height material demonstration of remaining See Figures 4-16 and shroud plates fatigue life.
4-31.
Core Shroud Assembly Bolted plant Cracking Core shroud Ultrasonic (UT) examination, 100% (or as supported (Bolted) designs (IASCC, bolts with initial and subsequent by plant-specific Core support column bolts Fatigue) examination frequencies analysis) of core dependent on the results of support column bolts core shroud bolt with neutron fluence examinations.
exposures> 3 dpa.
See Figures 4-16 and 4-33.
Core Shroud Assembly Plant designs Cracking Core shroud Enhanced visual (EVT*1 )
Axial weld seams other (Welded) with core (IASCC) plate-former examination, with initial and than the core shroud re-shrouds plate weld subsequent examination entrant corner welds at Remaining axial welds assembled in frequencies dependent on the core mid-plane.
two vertical the results of the core sections shroud weld examinations.
See Figure 4-12.
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-5 CE plants Expansion components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Primary Link Examination Method Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
(Note 1)
Core Shroud Assembly Plant designs Cracking Shroud plates of Enhanced visual (EVT-1)
Axial weld seams other (Welded) with core (IASCC) welded core examination, with initial and than the core shroud re-shrouds shroud subsequent examination entrant corner welds at Remaining axial welds, assembled assemblies frequencies dependent on the core mid-plane, plus Ribs and rings with full-height the results of the core ribs and rings.
shroud plates shroud weld examinations.
See Figure 4-13.
Control Element Assembly All plants with Cracking (SCC, Peripheral Visual (VT-3) examination, 100% of tubes in CEA instrument Fatigue) that instrument guide with initial and subsequent shroud assemblies.
Remaining instrument guide guide tubes in results in tubes within the examinations dependent on tubes the CEA missing supports CEA shroud the results of the instrument shroud or separation at assemblies guide tubes examinations.
See Figure 4-18.
assembly the welded joint between the tubes and supports.
Note:
- 1. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the CE components are in Table 5-2.
4-32 IPEC_PA_OAG0000088 Aging Management Requirements Table 4-5 CE plants Expansion components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Primary Link Examination Method Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
(Note 1)
Core Shroud Assembly Plant designs Cracking Shroud plates of Enhanced visual (EVT*1 )
Axial weld seams other (Welded) with core (IASCC) welded core examination, with initial and than the core shroud re-shrouds shroud subsequent examination entrant corner welds at Remaining axial welds, assembled assemblies frequencies dependent on the core mid-plane, plus Ribs and rings with full-height the results of the core ribs and rings.
shroud plates shroud weld examinations.
See Figure 4-13.
Control Element Assembly All plants with Cracking (SCC, Peripheral Visual (VT-3) examination, 100% of tubes in CEA instrument Fatigue) that instrument guide with initial and subsequent shroud assemblies.
Remaining instrument guide guide tubes in results in tubes within the examinations dependent on tubes the CEA missing supports CEA shroud the results of the instrument shroud or separation at assemblies guide tubes examinations.
See Figure 4-18.
assembly the welded joint between the tubes and supports.
Note:
- 1. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the CE components are in Table 5-2.
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-6 Westinghouse plants Expansion components Item Applicability Effect Primary Link Examination Method Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
(Note 1)
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking Baffle-former Volumetric (UT) 1 00% of accessible Barrel-former bolts (IASCC, bolts examination, with initial and bolts. Accessibility may Fatigue) subsequent examinations be limited by presence dependent on results of of thermal shields or baffle-former bolt neutron pads.
examinations.
See Figure 4-23.
Lower Support Assembly All plants Cracking Baffle-former Volumetric (UT) 1 00% of accessible Lower support column bolts (IASCC, bolts examination, with initial and bolts or as supported by Fatigue) subsequent examinations pi ant -specific dependent on results of justification.
baffle-former bolt examinations.
See Figures 4-32 and 4-
- 33.
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking (SCC, Upper core Enhanced visual (EVT-1) 1 00% of one side of the Core barrel flange, Fatigue) barrel flange examination, with initial accessible surfaces of weld examination andre-the selected weld and Core barrel outlet nozzles, examination frequency adjacent base metal.
Lower core barrel flange dependent on the examination results for weld upper core barrel flange.
See Figure 4-22.
Lower Support Assembly All plants Cracking Upper core Enhanced visual (EVT-1) 1 00% of accessible Lower support column bodies (IASCC) barrel flange examination, with initial surfaces.
weld examination andre-(non cast) examination frequency dependent on the See Figure 4-34.
examination results for upper core barrel flange weld.
4-33 IPEC_PA_OAG0000089 Agillg Management Requiremellts Table 4-6 Westinghouse plants Expansion components Item Applicability Effect Primary Link Examination Method Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
(Note 1)
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking Baffle-former Volumetric (UT) 100% of accessible Barrel-former bolts (IASee, bolts examination, with initial and bolts. Accessibility may Fatigue) subsequent examinations be limited by presence dependent on results of of thermal shields or baffle-former bolt neutron pads.
examinations.
See Figure 4-23.
lower Support Assembly All plants Cracking Baffle-former Volumetric (UT) 100% of accessible Lower support column bolts (IASee, bolts examination, with initial and bolts or as supported by Fatigue) subsequent examinations plant-specific dependent on results of justification.
baffle-former bolt examinations.
See Figures 4-32 and 4-
- 33.
Core Barrel Assembly All plants Cracking (SCC, Upper core Enhanced visual ( EVT~ 1 )
100% of one side of the Core barrel flange, Fatigue) barrel flange examination, with initial accessible surtaces of weld examination and re-the selected weld and Core barrel outlet nozzles, examination frequency adjacent base metal.
Lower core barrel flange dependent on the examination results for weld upper core barrel flange.
See Figure 4-22.
lower Support Assembly All plants Cracking Upper core Enhanced visual (EVT~ 1) 100% of accessible Lower support column bodies (IASeC) barrel flange examination, with initial surtaces.
weld examination and re-(non cast) examination frequency dependent on the See Figure 4-34.
examination results for upper core barrel flange weld.
Aging Management Requirements Table 4-6 Westinghouse plants Expansion components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Primary Link Examination Method Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
(Note 1)
Lower Support Assembly All plants Cracking Control rod Visual (EVT-1) examination.
100% of accessible Lower support column bodies (IASCC) guide tube support columns.
including the (CRGT) lower (cast) detection of flanges fractured See Figure 4-34.
support columns Bottom Mounted All plants Cracking Control rod Visual (VT-3) examination of 100% of BMI column Instrumentation System (Fatigue) guide tube BMI column bodies as bodies for which Bottom-mounted including the (CRGT) lower indicated by difficulty of difficulty is detected instrumentation (BMI) column detection of flanges insertion/withdrawal of flux during flux thimble completely thimbles. Flux thimble insertion/withdrawal.
bodies fractured column insertion/withdrawal to be bodies monitored at each inspection interval.
See Figure 4-35.
Note:
- 1. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the Westinghouse components are in Table 5-3.
4-34 IPEC_PA_OAG0000090 Aging Management Requirements Table 4-6 Westinghouse plants Expansion components (continued)
Item Applicability Effect Primary Link Examination Method Examination Coverage (Mechanism)
(Note 1)
(Note 1) lower Support Assembly All plants Cracking Control rod Visual (EVT-1) examination.
100% of accessible Lower support column bodies (IASeC) guide tube support columns.
including the (CRGT) lower (cast) detection of flanges fractured See Figure 4-34.
support columns Bottom Mounted All plants Cracking Control rod Visual (VT-3) examination of 100% of BMI column Instrumentation System (Fatigue) guide tube BMI column bodies as bodies for which Bottom-mounted including the (CRGT) lower indicated by difficulty of difficulty is detected instrumentation (BMI) column detection of flanges insertion/withdrawal of flux during flux thimble completely thimbles. Flux thimble insertion/withdrawal.
bodies fractured column insertion/withdrawal to be bodies monitored at each inspection interval.
See Figure 4-35.
Note:
- 1. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the Westinghouse components are in Table 5-3.
Figure 4-1 Plenum Cover Weldment Rib Pads Typical upper internals arrangement for B&W-designed PWRs Aging Management Requirements 4-35 IPEC_PA_OAG0000091 Figure 4-1 Plenum Cover Wektnent Rib Pads Agil/g Mal/agemelll Reqlljrelllenl.~
Plenum Cover Assembly Typical upper internals arrangement for 8&W-designed PWRs 4-35
Aging Management Requirements Baffle-to-Baffle Bolt Locations I
Baffle-to-Former Bolt Locations Figure 4-2 Baffle Plate Typical internals core barrel assembly for B&W-designed PWRs 4-36 IPEC_PA_OAG0000092 Aging Management Requiremenis Baffle-Io-Baffle Boll Locations Core Barrel-Io-Former Bolt and Baffle-Io-Former Boll Locations Figure 4-2 Baffle Plale Former Plale Thermal Shield Typical internals core barrel assembly for 8&W-designed PWRs 4-36
Spider to Lower Grid Section Weld IMI Guide Tube Spider Castings Core Barrel Lower Core Barrel Bolts Lower Grid Assembly Lower Rib Section Figure 4-3 Typical lower internals arrangement for B&W-designed PWRs Aging Management Requirements 4-37 IPEC_PA_OAG0000093 Spider to Lower Grid Section Weld IMI Guide Tube Spider Castings Core Barrel Lower Core Barrel Bolts Lower Grid Assembly Lower Rib Section Figure 4-3 Typical lower internals arrangement for 8&W-designed PWRs Agil/g Mal/agemelll Reqlljremenl.~
4-37
Aging Management Requirements Figure 4-4 Typical guide block and shock pad locations for B&W-designed PWRs 4-38 IPEC_PA_OAG0000094 Aging Management Requiremellis Figure 4-4 Guide Block Bolt Location Typical guide block and shock pad locations for 8&W-designed PWRs 4-38 Shock Pad Bolt Location
Aging Management Requirements Figure 4-5 Typical control rod guide tube (CRGT) for B&W-designed PWRs (one of 69 CRGTs shown) 4-39 IPEC_PA_OAG0000095 Agil/g Mal/agemelll Reql/jremenl.~
Figure 4-5 Typical control rod guide tube (CRGT) for 8&W-designed PWRs (one of 69 CRGTs shown) 4-39
Aging Management Requirements Location of Lower Grid Rib-to-Shell Forging Cap Screw Figure 4-6 Typical lower grid assembly and fuel assembly support pads for B&W-designed PWRs 4-40 IPEC_PA_OAG0000096 Aging Mww.gement Requirements Location of Lower Grid Rib-to-SheJl Forging Cap Screw Figure 4-6 Location of Cap Screw for Lower Grid Support Post Pipes Typical lower grid assembly and fuel assembly support pads for 8&W-designed PWRs 4-40
Upper Core Barrel Bolts Upper Thermal Shield Bolts Figure 4-7 Aging Management Requirements Typical upper thermal shield bolts and upper core barrel bolts for B&W-designed PWRs 4-41 IPEC_PA_OAG0000097 Upper Core Barrel Bolts Upper Thermal Shield Bolts Figure 4-7 Agillg Mallagemellt Requjrelllent.~
Typical upper thermal shield bolts and upper core barrel bolts for B&W-designed PWRs 4A I
Aging Management Requirements Figure 4-8 Lower Core Barrel Bolts Lower Thermal Shield Bolts Typical lower thermal shield bolts, lower core barrel bolts, and flow distributor bolts for the B&W-designed PWRs 4-42 IPEC_PA_OAG0000098 Aging Management Requiremenis Figure 4-8 Lower Core Barrel Bolts Lower Therma I Shield Bolts Flow Distributor Bolts Typical lower thermal shield bolts, lower core barrel bolts, and flow distributor bolts for the B& W-designed PWRs 4-42
Aging Management Requirements Figure 4-9 CSS Outlet Nozzle Casting Typical core support shield (CSS) outlet nozzle for the B&W-designed PWRs 4-43 IPEC_PA_OAG0000099 Agil/g Mal/agemelll Reql/jrelllent.~
Figure 4-9 CSS Outlet Nozzle Casting Typical core support shield (eSS) outlet nozzle for the 8&W-designed PWRs 4-43
Aging Management Requirements Figure 4-10 Typical core support shield (CSS) vent valve-outside view-for the B&W-designed PWRs 4-44 IPEC_PA_OAG0000100 Aging Management Requiremenis Figure 4-10 Typical core support shield (eSS) vent valve - outside view - for the 8&W-designed PWRs 4-44
CSS Vent Valve Bottom Retaining Ring Figure 4-11 Aging Management Requirements Typical core support shield (CSS) vent valve-inside view-for the B&W-designed PWRs 4-45 IPEC_PA_OAG0000101 CSS Vent Valve Bottom Retaining Ring Figure 4-11 Agillg Managcmelll Reql/jrelllent.~
Typical core support shield (eSS) vent valve - inside view - for the 8&W-designed PWRs 4-45
Aging Management Requirements 1'1"1
- Mil Weld locations potentially affected by I
swelling in horizontal stiffeners I
I
- zlli
~
Core shroud plate-former plate weld
~ "' r ~
locations with stresses potentially above IASCC threshold.
' v '
/
Weld locations potentially affected by
- Jilll swelling in horizontal stiffeners I '
I io-
=-a Lll Figure 4-12 Potential crack locations for CE welded core shroud assembled in stacked sections 4-46 IPEC_PA_OAG0000102 Aging Management Requiremellts e-Weld locations pOlrntiaHy afTr.cll'd hy I "
I "
swelling in horizontal Sl.irren~rs 1- '
Core shmud plJte-fonner plate weld
/' i"\\
locations with stresses potentially above IASCC threshold_
...... r'
...... r'
\\VPld locations potentially afTCClCd by I "
I " i'""
swelling in horiwntill stiffeners 1- '
=-
w Figure 4-12 Potential crack locations for CE welded core shroud assembled in stacked sections 4-46