L-PI-12-099, Emergency Preparedness (EP) Communications Assessment Requested Bv NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54 (F) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near- Term Task

Emergency Preparedness (EP) Communications Assessment Requested Bv NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54 (F) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near- Term Task For

ML12306A198
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	10/31/2012
From:	Jeffery Lynch Xcel Energy, Northern States Power Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
L-PI-12-099
Download: ML12306A198 (28)

Text

Xcel Energy@ Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant 1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch. MN 55089 L-PI-12-099 10 CFR 50.54(f)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-282 and 50-306 Renewed License Nos. DPR-42 and DPR-60 Emeraencv Preparedness (EP) Communications Assessment Requested bv NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Reaulations 50.54ff) Reaardina Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near- Term Task Force Review of lnsiahts from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012

References:

1. NRC letter, "Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A046.

2. NSPM letter, M.A. Schimmel to NRC Document Control Desk, "60-Day Response to NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(19 Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012," dated May 11, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12142Al97.

3. NSPM letter, J.E. Molden to NRC Document Control Desk, "Emergency Preparedness lnformation Requested by NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations

2. 1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident, dated March 12, 2012," dated June 11,2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12163A571.

This letter provides the EP Communications Assessment for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP), as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory

Document Control Desk Page 2 Commission (NRC) in Recommendation 9.3 of Reference I.Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation (NSPM), doing business as Xcel Energy, committed to provide this assessment and a schedule for implementation of the results of the communications assessment by October 31, 2012 (Reference 2). This letter and its enclosure provide the requested information and are submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f).

The PlNGP EP Communications Assessment identified essential communications capabilities to be maintained following a beyond design basis natural disaster impacting the plant and causing an extended loss of offsite power, considering the assumptions of NEI 10-05, "Assessment of On-Shift Emergency Response Organization." As an aspect of its overall and ongoing Fukushima response initiatives, NSPM will determine the means to ensure required communications functions will be maintained. Options to enhance the communications capabilities and to meet the functional communications requirements post-event are being identified.

Currently, the primary option being considered and evaluated is the use of stand-alone and plant infrastructure-integrated satellite phones. It is assumed that satellite phone communication will be an integral aspect of maintaining critical communications functions with the Offsite Response Organizations for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the NRC under the assumptions of NEI 10-05. Backup power supplies for the satellite phones are described in NSPM letter dated June 11, 2012 (Reference 3). Internal communications within the plant (i.e., Emergency Response Facility to Emergency Response Facility) are planned to be assured through the implementation of actions (both communications and power supply) that will maintain a reliable internal phone network. Key offsite response organizations in the impacted area have been or will be provided satellite phone capability.

The following is a summary of actions under development to enhance EP communications:

Function Action Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities 1 4.1.1 Communications from Communications will be maintained post event the Control Room, TSC and through the use of satellite phone technologies EOF with Offsite Response until normal systems are restored.

Facilities 2 4.1.2 NRC Communications Communications with the NRC via the ENS line with the Control Room will be supported by a satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Control Room.

3 4.1.2 NRC Communications Communications with the NRC via the ENS line with the Technical Support will be supported by a satellite communications Center phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Technical Support Center.

Document Control Desk Page 3 Function Action Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities 4 4.1.2 NRC Communications Communications between the site and the NRC via the HPN Network will be supported by satellite communications capabilities in both the TSC and near site EOF.

5 4.1.3 Emergency Response Communications between site ERFs will be Facility Communications (Site maintained post event through the use of the ERFs) Sound Powered Phone System and enhanced reliability of the site PBX system. Satellite phones may also be used.

6 4.1.3 ERF Communications The Key Site functions with offsite officials with Offsite Response (Management links, Radiological support, etc)

Organizations will be maintained through the use of satellite phone capabilities in the site ERFs.

7 4.1.4 Field Team Environmental Field Monitoring Teams will be Communications provided with satellite phone capabilities to backup the normal radio links. Team direction from the EOF will similarly be supported by satellite capabilities.

EP communications enhancements will be coordinated with the development of the FLEX strategies supporting the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 4.2 four months prior to the beginning of PlNGP 2R29 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.

Until the enhancements to EP communications at PlNGP can be completed, interim corrective actions are being taken as described in Reference 3.

If there are any questions or if additional information is needed, please contact Ms.

Jennie Eckholt, Licensing Engineer, at 612-330-5788.

Summarv of Commitments Submittal of the enclosed information completes a commitment in Enclosure Iof Reference 2. This letter makes the following new commitment:

NSPM will implement recommendations from the Emergency Preparedness Communications Assessment in coordination with development of FLEX mitigating strategies four months prior to the beginning of the PlNGP 2R29 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.

Document Control Desk Page 4 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on QCT 3 1 2012 w -

Site Vice President, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company - Minnesota Enclosure cc: Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), USNRC NRR Project Manager, PINGP, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, PINGP, USNRC

Communications Assessment Prairie and Nuc ear Generating Plant Revision 0: September 28,201 2 Revision I: October 17,2012 Page 1 of 24 Revision 1

Communications Assessment Prairie and Nuc ear Generating P Index Purpose References

Background

Planned Actions Schedule Communication Equipment - Location and Current Configuration Communication Equipment - Power Sources Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Page 2 of 24 Revision 1

Purpose In response to the NRC Near-Term task force recommendations a Request for lnformation pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations was issued.

Included in that request was information pertaining to communications capabilities following a beyond design basis event. Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (NSPM) responded to this request for information in a letter dated May 11, 2012 with a plan to respond to the various components of the request. This assessment provides the response to the following commitments. By October 31, 2012:

0 Provide an assessment of the current communications systems and equipment used during an emergency event to identify any enhancements that may be needed to ensure communications are maintained during a large scale natural event meeting the conditions described for Recommendation 9.3.

0 Provide an implementation schedule of the time needed to implement the results of the communications assessment.

This report documents the communications assessment required to be performed as a result of the March 2012 USNRC Request for Additional lnformation pertaining to lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Event. Attachments 1 and 2 provide the details on the current communications capabilities. Attachment 3 and the body of this assessment discuss enhancements and proposed schedules.

References

1. NRC Letter, "Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident dated March 12, 2012, ADAMs Accession No. ML12056A046

2. Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) letter dated May 11, 2012 (L-PI 037), 60-Day Response to NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2. 1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012

3. Nuclear Energy Institute, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities (NEI 12-01)

4. PINGP letter dated June 11, 2012 (L-PI-12-049), Emergency Preparedness lnformation Requested by NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2. 1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 Page 3 of 24 Revision 1

=

Background===

Pursuant to the US NRC Request for Additional Information (Reference 1) NSPM committed in Reference 2 to perform an assessment of communications capabilities using the methodology outlined in NEI 12-01 (Reference 3).

The assessment involved reviewing pertinent documents, such as the Emergency Plan, associated Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, the Updated Safety Analysis Report, and responses to INPO IER 11-4.

The NRC information request indicates that the communications assessment must assume a total loss of all AC power with severe impact on the infrastructure within 25 miles of the site. The current communications systems were designed and installed to assure reliability of communications, both on-site and off-site, during normal and emergency conditions. The potential on-site issues are related to the required assumption that all AC power is lost. Offsite impact assumptions outlined in NEI 12-01 assumed failure of key infrastructure (e.g., phone lines, radio towers) out to 25 miles.

The assumed off-site impacts stem from the assumptions that public infrastructure, including public telephone networks, microwave towers, and cellular phone towers/networks, are unavailable. Observations and recommendations for technology solutions to various challenges were discussed as the project progressed.

Assessment of Existing Communication Equipment Attachments 1 and 2 provide the details of the existing communications equipment and power supplies Public Address Svstem On-site power for the Public Address (PA) System is provided from battery backed essential power busses. The Gaitronics hub is powered from the inverter. Battery backup is available for the repeaters, comparators and satellite receivers of the in-plant radio system; however under the assessment guidelines these batteries are susceptible to flooding and are assumed to be unavailable.

Telephone System The telephone system supplies normal off-site communications capability. Off-site communications with the telephone system are dependent on the functionality of the equipment powered offsite and within the 25 mile radius of the plant. On-site telecommunications are provided with power from batteries and the plant's non-safeguards diesel generators; however under the assessment guidelines theses sources are susceptible to flooding and are assumed to be unavailable. In addition, the equipment is not located in safety related buildings.

Radio Svstem The site 800 MHz radio equipment is distributed in the site Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) and powered from the non safety related service building. The in-plant radio system is used extensively for emergency response purposes, including equipment operation, fire brigade, and in-plant monitoring. Under normal conditions, the in-plant radio system uses repeaters to ensure radio Page 4 of 24 Revision 1

coverage throughout the plant. The PA and the in-plant sound powered phone system provide alternates to the radios.

Sound Powered Phones Sound powered phones are located throughout the site and provide alternates to the radios.

Offsite Communications Communications with the off-site response organizations (OROs) depend on the on-site telephone system and the PBX system. Some of these telephones are direct lines and do not pass through the PBX; however, they do pass through the local phone company central office. Per the assessment assumptions all such lines are assumed to be non-functional. Similarly, based on the assumptions of NEI 12-01, cell phones are assumed to be non-functional due to the impact on cell towers in the impacted 25-mile area. Ten-mile EPZ Offsite Response Organizations are required to receive timely (within15-minute) notifications of Classifications and/or Protective Action Recommendations.

Field Teams dispatched from the site use the 800 MHz radio system to communicate with the EOF with cell phone back-up. For Prairie Island, the primary EOF for this event is expected to be the approved back-up EOF located in downtown Minneapolis, outside the 25-mile impact zone. The radios in the vehicles are powered by the vehicle's electrical system. With the postulated loss of AC power to the on-site repeater, these radios will be limited to line of sight effectiveness. Satellite phones will be provided as a tertiary means of communication. Dose Assessment and communication of key radiological data and any required Protective Action Recommendations will be performed from the fully functional back-up EOF.

Planned actions:

The PlNGP Communications Assessment identified essential communications capabilities to be maintained following a beyond design basis natural disaster impacting the plant and causing an extended loss of offsite power, considering the assumptions of NEI 10-05. As an aspect of its overall and ongoing Fukushima response initiatives, NSPM will determine the means to ensure required communications functions will be maintained. Options to enhance the communications capabilities and to meet the functional communications requirements post-event are being identified.

Following a station blackout and loss of all power in the surrounding 25 miles, the PBX system has battery backup capability for one to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> depending on load capacity.

Load shedding could extend the battery life up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> but would not provide needed capacity to support the needs defined in this assessment.

Existing satellite capabilities will be enhanced. An improvement being evaluated to the plant telephone system could allow the site telephone system to call offsite during a station blackout by integrating a satellite phone into the telephone system.

Page 5 of 24 Revision 1

Currently, the primary option being considered and evaluated is the use of stand-alone and plant infrastructure-integrated satellite phones. It is assumed that satellite phone communication will be an integral aspect of maintaining critical communications functions with the Offsite Response Organizations for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the assumptions of NEI 10-05. Backup power supplies for the satellite phones are described in NSPM letter dated June 11, 2012 (Reference 4). Internal communications within the plant (i.e.,

Emergency Response Facility to Emergency Response Facility) are planned to be assured through the implementation of actions (both communications and power supply) that will maintain a reliable internal phone network. Key offsite response organizations in the impacted area have been or will be provided satellite phone capability.

A summary of actions under development include:

I Function I Action I Roll-up Table 4.1.1 1 4.1.1 Communications from the Communications will be maintained post event through the use of Control Room, TSC and EOF with satellite phone technologies until normal systems are restored.

Offsite Response Facilities 2 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Communications with the NRC via the ENS line will be supported by a Control Room satellite communications phone (in addition t o the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Control Room.

4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Communications with the NRC via the ENS line will be supported by a Technical Support Center satellite communications phone (in addition t o the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Technical Support Center.

4.1.2 NRC Communications via the Communications between the site and the NRC will be supported by HPN Network satellite communications capabilities in both the TSC and near site 4.1.3 Emergency Response Facility Communications between site ERFs will be maintained post event Communications (Site ERFs) through the use of the Sound Powered Phone System and enhanced reliability of the site PBX system. Satellite phones may also be used.

4.1.3 ERF Communications with The Key Site functions with offsite officials (Management links, Offsite Response Organizations Radiological support, etc) will be maintained through the use of I sate~litd~hone-capabilities in the site ERFs.

4.1.4 Field Team Communications I Environmental Field Monitoring Teams will be provided with satellite phone capabilities t o backup the normal radio links. Team direction from the EOF will similarly be supported by satellite capabilities.

Schedule These enhancements will be coordinated with the development of the FLEX strategies supporting the Near Term Task Force Recommendation 4.2 four months prior to the beginning of PlNGP 2R29 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.

Page 6 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment I Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from Protected from Protected from 11 11 Comments Primary System Seismic as defined in this Flooding as defined in this 11 Wind as defined in this 1 SystemlEquipment Component document document document I

1. PP Reasonably 1. PP power is 1. PP reasonably 1. PP relies on power from Plant Public Address Paging System protected due to subject to flooding protected due to Service Building UPS (PP) located in most locations loss. most locations batteries.

System (PA)

Relay Room and located in located within

2. PA power is 2. PA relies on power from includes Site seismically robust structures.

Evacuation, Fire subject to flooding Service Building UPS rugged loss. 2. PA reasonably batteries and audio interface and Security structures.

Alarms. protected due to from Plant PBX system.

2. PA Reasonably most locations

2. Plant Public protected due to located within Address System most locations robust structures.

(PA) amplifiers located in located in various seismically locations. rugged structures.

Security Stentofon Dual exchange 1. Both exchange 1. Guardhouse 1. Exchange servers lntercome System - servers located in servers are exchange server is are reasonably Voice Over Internet SAS and reasonably powered from the protected due to Guardhouse. protected being Security UPS both locations Protocol (VOIP) locally located in located in the located within based communication Access intercom seismically Guardhouse and robust structures.

system. stations are rugged SAS exchange located in various 2. lntercom stations structures. server is powered locations reasonably from Service throughout the 2. lntercom stations protected due to Building UPS.

site. may or may not most locations Both power be located in located within sources would be rugged locations. robust structures.

subject to flooding loss.

2. lntercom stations are connected via Page 7 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment 1 Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from 1I Protected from Protected from Comments SystemlEquipment Primary System Component

/1 Seismic as defined in this document Flooding as defined in this document 1

I Wind as defined in this document 1

I Location Power over Ethernet (PoE) cable and would also be lost when UPS or server power is lost.

Emergency Response 1. Long Range and 1. LRP & SRP 1. LRP & SRP 1. LRP & SRP 1. LRP & SRP data interface Paging System Short Range transmit from transmitters antennas located requires Plant PBX to be Radio ERO local Microwave located in on Microwave functional. Long range Paging System Tower which is Microwave shack is Tower are pagers can be activated via (LRP & SRP) not seismically elevated above designed and guy- a satellite phone as servers interface with designed. flood; however wired for elevated are outside of 25 miles.

Plant PBX normal power and winds.

located in OAB emergency 3rdfloor generator are Communications subject to flood Room. loss.

Plant Private Branch 1. Plant PBX 1. PPBX 1. PPBX power 1. PPBX and TCPBX 1. PPBX relies on power from Exchange (PBX) (PPBX) located in Reasonably comes from are reasonably Service Building UPS Telephone System OAB 3rdfloor protected due to Service Building protected from batteries.

Communications location in UPS and is subject wind damage due Room. seismically to flooding loss. 2. TCPBX only relies on to being located rugged unprotected AC power from within robust

2. Training Center 2. TCPBX power and PITC normal or backup AC structures. structures.

PBX (TCPBX) all related interface power sources (no battery located in PITC 2. TCPBX equipment are backup) and is assumed as Communications Reasonably subject to flooding completely lost.

closet. protected due to loss.

location in 3. PPBX and TCPBX both rely on SONET interface to seismically transmit off site.

rugged structure.

Local Commercial Tele~honeSvstem / 1. Direct Sysop phone link 1 1. Direct access phone interfaces I 1. Non-Plant PBX interface I I. Reasonably protected due to all

1. Non-PBX lines support multiple voice and data links Page 8 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment I Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from Protected from Comments Seismic Flooding Wind Primary System as defined in this as defined in this as defined in this SystemlEquipment Component document document document Location Interface (Non-PBX located in Control are located in components and locations located throughout site.

interface direct access Room. Plant SONET main within robust voiceldata lines) Communications power is from structures.

2. Direct NRC Room and Service Building phone links reasonably UPS however located in EOF protected from SONET System, and PlTC Room seismic effects. including system interface devices, SONET Fiber

3. Direct EOF FAX are backed up with interface inlout going an independent components are machines local UPS for 8 located in Plant located in EOF.

Communications

4. Tech Support Room and direct line reasonably located in EOF.

5. Assistant EOF Coordinator direct line located in EOF.

6. Emergency Director city line.

7. Eau Clair Emergency direct lines located in TSC.

8. SONET Fiber Network voice and data interfaces are located in OAB srdfloor communications Page 9 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment I Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from Protected from Protected from Comments Seismic Flooding Wind Primary System as defined in this as defined in this as defined in this SystemlEquipment Component document document document Location room.

NRC ETS Emergency 1. Direct access for 1. All ETS phone Reasonably 1. Offsite communication using Communications Response all ETS phone interface protected due to all this system depends on Notification interfaces are components and locations located installed telephone lines.

Phone (ENS Red located in Plant SONET main within robust Phone). Direct Communications power are from structures.

access phones Room and Service Building located in: reasonably UPS however Control Room, protected from SONET System, TSC, EOF and seismic effects. including system Resident interface devices, Inspector. is backed up with an independent Reactor Safety local UPS for 8 Counterpart Link .

hour mission time.

Direct access phones located in 2. SONET link TSC and EOF. external to site has sections that may

3. Protective be prone to flood Measures interruption; Counterpart Link however the link is Direct access designed as a phone located in bidirectional ring TSC and EOF.

such that the loss

4. Health Physics of one node will not Counterpart Link disable the system.

Direct access phones located in EOF and PITC P

Room 9.

5. Emergency Management Counter art Link I I Page 10 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment 1 Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from Protected from Protected from Comments Seismic Flooding Wind Primary System as defined in this as defined in this as defined in this SystemlEquipment Component document document document Location Direct access phones located in TSC and EOF.

6. NRC Operations LAN Data Link Terminals located in TSC and PlTC Room 8

7. SONET voice and data interface located in OAB 3rdfloor communication room.

Emergency Response 1. Access terminals 1. Terminals and 1. Power for 1. Reasonably Data System (ERDS) are located in computer computer system in protected; all VPN System. Control Room, systems in Service Building onsite and offsite TSC, EOF, and various locations comes from components are Plant Computer are reasonably Service Building located within Room. protected from UPS and is subject seismic effects. to flooding loss.

2. Internet access is located in Plant 2. SONET Fiber SONET main Computer Room, interface power is from components are Service Building

3. VPN appliance is located in Plant UPS however located off site at Communications SONET System is Edina Data Room and also backed up Center.

reasonably with local UPS for protected from 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> mission seismic effects. time.

3. VPN appliance located at Edina Page 11of 24 Revision 1

Attachment 1 Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from Protected from Protected from Comments Seismic Flooding Wind Primary System as defined in this as defined in this as defined in this SystemlEquipment Component document document document Data Center is than 25 miles from greater than 25 PI and assumed to miles away and is be protected from assumed to be flooding.

protected from seismic effects.

Plant 800 MHZ Trunked 1. Radio consoles Radio consoles 1. Communications 1. A11 800 MHz 1. All major radio components Radio System are located in and interface Room power components are (transceivers, controllers and Control Room, components comes from located within antenna couplers) are Central Alarm located in various Service Building robust structures. powered from AC sources Station (CAS), locations are UPS and is subject without battery backup.

2. 800 MHz antennas Secondary Alarm reasonably to flooding loss. Upon loss of main located on Station (SAS), protected from transceivers, all handheld Microwave Tower TSC and EOF. seismic effects. portable radios will still are designed and operate on a single channel

2. Audio interface 2. Transceivers are guy-wired for point-to-point with line-of-components from located in elevated winds.

sight limited range and radio consoles to seismically subject to available battery radio transceivers designed life.

are located in building; however OAB 3'"loor are not 2. 24 Spare batteries for Communications seismically handheld radios are Room. installed. available

3. Main transceivers 3. Antennas for are located in some channels 755' Level of are located on or Auxiliary Building. within the Aux.

Building and are

4. Radio system seismically antennas are rugged; antennas either locally for other distributed within channels are buildings or located on the mounted Mirrowave Tower Page 12 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment 1 Communications Equipment Location and Current Configuration Equipment prote ted from the below hazards Protected from Protected from Seismic Flooding Wind Primary System as defined in this as defined in this as defined in this Component document document document Location remotely on and are not Microwave seismically Tower. rugged.

Sound Powered Phone 1. Sound Powered 1. Sound powered 1. Multiple jack boxes 1. All sound powered System Phone boxes are phone cabling are located in flood components are located at and jack boxes prone locations located in robust multiple locations are located in which would render structures.

throughout the seismically entire system plant. rugged locations. nonfunctional.

2. Powered audio 2. Amplifier and 2. Amplifier and amplifier for monitors are monitor receive system located in power from Service monitoring is seismically Building UPS and located in the rugged locations. are subject to Relay Room. flooding loss.

Emergency Cellular 1. Dedicated cell 1. Cell phone 1. Cell phone towers 1. Cellular towers are 1. Priority Emergency service is Phones (Sprint service phones located in towers that that interface are typically designed ordered.

provider) Control Room, interface are less less than 25 miles and supported to TSC and EOF than 25 miles from site, are withstand high from site and are located on high assumed to be ground above the lost due to local local flood plain, seismic event. and are assumed to be available.

Page 13 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment 2 Communication Equipment - Power Sources Equipment Power Source(s)

Primary Power I Alternate Power I Backup power Comments Supply (List the Supply (List the availability (e.g.,

power source) power source) batteries, portable Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power generators, etc.) supplies?

YeslNo Normal off site power Alternate emergency Yes - Installed battery Service Building Batteries have an estimated 1-8 hour Plant Public supplied by non-vital sources via Diesel backup is from 33 capacity depending on loading. Selective load shedding Address System 480 volt Bus 310 via Generator 03. Battery. can be made to extend battery life beyond this time 33 lnverter to Panel estimate.

1. Guardhouse 1. Guardhouse 1. Yes - Installed 1. Current Guardhouse battery life is indeterminate due Security Stentofon Exchange - Exchange battery backup for to present state of battery; replacement battery to be lntercome System - Normal off site alternate Guardhouse installed October 2012 is estimated to have at least a Voice Over Internet power is emergency power Exchange is from 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> minimum capacity which could be extended Protocol (VOIP) supplied by non- source via the Security with selective load shedding.

locally based vital 480 volt Bus Guardhouse Battery. 2. Service Building Batteries have an estimated 1-8 communication 260 via Security Diesel Generator. 2. Yes - Installed hour capacity depending on loading. Selective load lnverter to Panel 2. SAS Exchange battery backup for shedding can be made to extend battery life beyond system) 237. alternate SAS Exchange is this time estimate.

2. SAS Exchange - emergency from 44 Battery.

Normal off site source is via power supplied Diesel Generator by non-vital480 D4.

volt Bus 420 via 44 lnverter to Panel 4145 Normal off site power Alternate emergency Yes - lnstalled battery Service Building Batteries have an estimated 1-8 hour Emergency supplied by non-vital sources via Diesel backup is from 33 capacity depending on loading. Selective load shedding Response Paging 480 volt Bus 310 via Generator 03. Battery. can be made to extend battery life beyond this time System 33 lnverter to Panel estimate.

Page 14 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment 2 Communication Equipment - Power Sources Equipment Power S urce(s)

Primary Power Backup power Comments Supply (List the Supply (List the availability (e.g.,

1 SystemlEquipment power source) power source) batteries, portable generators, etc.)

YeslNo Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power supplies?

1. Plant PBX - 1. Alternate 1. Yes - Installed 1. Service Building Batteries have an estimated 1-8 Plant Private Normal off site emergency battery backup is hour capacity depending on loading. Selective load Branch Exchange power supplied sources via from 33 Battery shedding can be made to extend battery life beyond (PBX) Telephone by non-vital480 Diesel Generator and 34 Battery. this time estimate.

System volt Bus 310 via D3 and D4. 2. No. 2. No additional actions available for PITC power.

33 lnverter and 2. Normal building Bus 320 to 34 power source has Inverter via alternate feed via automatic automatic transfer transfer switch to switch.

Panel 3146.

2. Training Center PBX - Normal power is provided from off site source to communications closet in PITC.

Normal off site power Alternate emergency Yes - Installed battery Service Building Batteries have an estimated 1-8 hour Local Commercial supplied by non-vital sources via Diesel backup is from 33 capacity depending on loading. Selective load shedding Telephone System 480 volt Bus 310 via Generator D3 and D4. Battery and 34 Battery. can be made to extend battery life beyond this time Interface (Non-PBX 33 lnverter and Bus estimate.

interface direct 320 to 34 lnverter via Additional backup UPS access voiceldata for SONET system has automatic transfer lines) additional 6 - 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> switch to Panel capacity.

Yes - Installed battery Service Building Batteries have an estimated 1-8 hour NRC ETS backup is from 33 capacity depending on loading. Selective load shedding Communications 480 volt Bus 310 via can be made to extend battery life beyond this time Page 15 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment 2 Communication Equipment Power Sources -

Equipment Power Source(s)

Primary Power Alternate Power Backup power Comments Supply (List the Supply (List the availability (e.g.,

power source) power source) batteries, portable Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power SystemlEquipment generators, etc.) supplies?

YeslNo 33 lnverter and Bus Generator D3 and D4. Battery and 34 Battery. estimate.

320 to 34 lnverter via automatic transfer Additional backup UPS switch to Panel for SONET system has 3146. additional 6 - 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> capacity.

1 Normal off site 1. Alternate 1. Yes - Installed 1. Service Building Batteries have an estimated 1-8 Emergency power to emergency battery backup is hour capacity depending on loading. Selective load Response Data computer room sources via from 33, 34, 43 shedding can be made to extend battery life beyond System (ERDS) is supplied by Diesel Generator and 44 Batteries. this time estimate.

VPN System. non-vital480 volt D3 and D4. 2. Yes - Data Center 2. None known.

Buses 310, 320, 2. Alternate power systems are 410 and 420 via source for Edina powered from 33,34,43 and Data Center is battery backed 44 Inverters. unknown. UPS.

2. Normal power for off site Edina Data Center is unknown.

3. VPN appliance is located off site at Edina Data Center.

1. Normal off site 1. Alternate None. None Plant 800 MHz power for main emergency power Trunked Radio radio is from Diesel System transceivers and Generator D l or controllers is via maintenance from vital Bus feed from Panel 111 to Panel 217 and D5.

217. 2. None

2. Portable Radios Page 1 6 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment 2 Communication Equipment - Power Sources Equipment Power Source(s)

Primary Power Alternate Power Backup power Comments Supply (List the Supply (List the availability (e.g.,

power source) power source) batteries, portable Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power SystemlEquipment generators, etc.) supplies?

YeslNo are powered from contained batteries.

1. No power 1. No power 1. No power required 1. None required.

Sound Powered required for SP required for SP for SP phones. 2. Service Building Batteries have an estimated 1-8 Phone System phones. phones. 2. Yes - Installed hour capacity depending on loading. Selective load

2. Sound power 2. Alternate battery backup is shedding can be made to extend battery life beyond phone monitor emergency from 33 Battery. this time estimate.

amplifier sources via receives normal Diesel Generator off site power D3.

supplied by non-vital 480 volt Bus 310 via 33 Inverter to Panel 116.

Phone battery. None. None. None.

Emergency Cellular Phones (Sprint service provider)

Page 17 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment 3 Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method(s) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed NEI Assumed NEI Information 12-01 2.2 12-01 2.2 4.1.1 Notifications to, and communications with, OROs [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.1V.D and E.9.a]

Control Room 1 per Control Room Direct Phone1 No I. 800 MHz 1. No Integrate Note 1, pg 24 for Shift Fax Line radios Satellite Phones

2. Yes (6-8 Communicator into Protected hours)

Plant PBX

2. Plant PBX 3. No Telephone System System

3. Local Commercial Telephone System Technical Support 1 for Key TSC Direct Phone No 1. 800 MHz 1. No Integrate Note 1 Center (TSC) Communicator Line/ Fax Line radios Satellite Phones

2. Yes (6-8 hours) into Protected Plant PBX

2. Plant PBX 3. No Telephone System System

3. Local Commercial Telephone System Page 18 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment 3 Communication Equipment Summary and Improvements Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method@) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed NEI Assumed NEI Information 12-01 2.2 12-01 2.2 Emergency Operations 1 for Key EOF Direct Phone No for Primary 1. 800 MHz 1. No Integrate Note 1 Facility (EOF) Communicator Line1 Fax Line EOF radios Satellite Phones

2. Yes (6-8 hours) into Protected Yes for Back-up Plant PBX EOF (Outside 2. Plant PBX 3. No Telephone System for 25 miles)

System Primary EOF Back-up EOF

3. Local Commercial Telephone System 4.1.2 Notifications to, and communications with, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Headquarters Incident Response Center and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.1V.D and E.9.d]

Control Room 1 per Control Room ENSIFTS Yes No Perform ENS on Note 1 for ENS Phone Satellite Phone Communicator 6-8 hours Local Commercial Telephone System Technical Support 1 for ENS ENSIFTS Yes Local No Perform ENS on Note 1 Center (TSC) Communicator Phone Commercial Satellite Phone 6-8 hours Telephone System Page 19 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment 3 Communication Equipment Summary and Improvements Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method(s) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed NEI Assumed NEI Information 12-01 2.2 12-01 2.2 Location(s) where 1 for HPN HPN phone in Yes all Local No Perform HPN on Note 1 HPN communications Communicator TSC Commercial Satellite Phone 6-8 hours are performed Telephone from TSC HPN phone in System EOF HPN phone in Backup EOF 4.1.3 Communications between licensee emergency response facilities [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c. Additional links that support performance of critical response functions are also specified.] The minimum communications links to support this function are listed below by facility. For example, if the normally used telephone system cannot be restored to service, these links could rely upon some combination of radio, sound-powered and satellite-based communications systems.

Control Room 1 per unit Direct Phone No Portable Cell No Integrate Note 1 Line Satellite Phones Plant Page Prairie into Protected system ERFs will be Plant PBX supported by Plant Radio System the enhanced System PBX system.

Sound Powered ERO CR to TSC responders requiring communication with offsite responders will be provided an integrated capability.

Page 20 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment 3 Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method(s) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed NEI Assumed NEI Information 12-01 2.2 12-01 2.2 Technical Support 1 each for: No Portable Cell No lntegrate Note 1 Center (TSC)

• SeniorILead TSC multiple Satellite Manager Plant Page Prairie Island Phones into Operations system ERFs will be Protected Plant Coordination supported by Plant Radio PBX System Maintenance the enhanced Coordination System PBX system.

Engineering Sound Powered ERO Coordination CR to TSC responders Radiological Support requiring communication Additional response with offsite coordination links for responders will multi-unit sites: be provided an

• 1 for each position integrated providing Unit capability.

Response

Coordination.

I Direct Phone I

Operational Support 1 each for: No Plant Page Integrate Note 1 Center (OSC) SeniorILead OSC Line system Satellite Phones Manager Prairie Island into Protected Radiological ERFs will be Plant PBX Support supported by System the enhanced Additional response PBX system.

coordination links for ERO multi-unit sites:

1 for each position responders providing Unit In- requiring Plant Team communication with offsite Coordination.

responders will Page 2 1 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment 3 Communication Equipment Summary and Improvements Emergency Primary Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method@) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed NEI Assumed NEI lnformation 12-01 2.2 12-01 2.2 be provided an integrated capability.

Emergency Operations 1 each for: I Direct Phone I No Portable Cell No Integrate Note 1 Facility (EOF) SeniorILead Line multiple Satellite Manager Plant Page Prairie Island Phones into Key Protective system ERFs will be Protected Plant Measures supported by Plant Radio PBX System Operations or the enhanced System Technical Support (as PBX system.

needed to support ERO I I projections, performance of dose responders requiring formulation of PARS communication and plant status with offsite updates to OR0 responders will authorities). be provided an integrated capability.

I Normal Means I I Back-Up Emergency There are no ( Yes Install additional Operations Facility enhanced functional are Available available means Satellite requirements for the capability in Back-up Facility Back-up EOF (Greater than 25 I miles from the site)

Joint lnformation The Joint lntegrate Note 1 Center (JIC) 1 for Senior Manager lnformation other direct dial Satellite Phones Center is lines into Protected located outside Plant PBX the 25 miles Svstem (this Page 22 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment 3 Communication Equipment Summary and Improvements Emergency Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method(s) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed NEI Assumed NEI Information 12-01 2.2 zone and is commitment protected by provides a line back-up power. from onsite Direct Phone ERFs to support Line information flow to the JIC 4.1.4 Communications with fieldloffsite monitoring teams [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c]

Primary location where Fieldloffsite Plant Radio No Personal Integrate Note 1 fieldloffsite monitoring monitoring team System Pagers Satellite Phones team coordination is into Protected performed Plant PBX System Primary location from 1 for each fieldloffsite Plant Radio No Personal Integrate Note 1 which field1 offsite monitoring team System Pagers Satellite Phones monitoring teams are into Protected deployed Plant PBX System 4.1.5 Communications with other Federal agencies as described in the site emergency plan (e.g., the US Coast Guard) [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.b]

Primary location where Coordination with There are no NIA NIA NIA Integrate Note 1 communication with Federal agencies commitments in Satellite Phones Federal agencies is the Prairie into Protected performed Island Plant PBX Emergency Plan System. The for direct proposed contact with system would other agencies. provide sufficient Page 23 of 24 Revision 1

1 Attachment 3 1 Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Refer to Response Facility Communications Method Method Method&) Method(s) Potential Following Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement Section for site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified? Additional Assumed NEI Assumed NEI Information 12-01 2.2 12-01 2.2 number of available lines to support any

/

event specific needs.

Note 1: The satellite phone system will be integrated with the enhanced plant PBX system. Those responders required to communicate with offsite agencies will be provided an integrated satellite system capable of functioning from the facility ERF and that will not require the responder to leave the facility. The system is also provided a transportable handset should the PBX system fail.

Page 24 of 24 Revision 1