DCL-12-110, Response to Recommendation 9.3 Communications Requests 1 and 3 and the Evaluation of Existing Communications Systems Power Supplies

Response to Recommendation 9.3 Communications Requests 1 and 3 and the Evaluation of Existing Communications Systems Power Supplies

ML12305A427
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	10/29/2012
From:	Halpin E Pacific Gas & Electric Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
DCL-12-110
Download: ML12305A427 (51)

Text

Pacific Gas and Electric Company0 Edward D. Halpin Diablo Canyon Power Plant Senior Vice President Mail Code 104/6 Nuclear Generation & Chief Nuclear Officer P. O. Box 56 Avila Beach, CA 93424 805.545.4100 October 29, 2012 E-Mail: E1H8@pge.com PG&E Letter DCL-12-110 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 CFR 50.54(f)

ATTN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82 Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 Pacific Gas and Electric Company's Response to Recommendation 9.3 Communications Requests 1 and 3 and the Evaluation of Existing Communications Systems Power Supplies

Reference:

1. NRC Letter, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012.

2. PG&E Letter DCL-12-048, "60-Day Response to NRC Letter, 'Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1,2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident,'

dated March 12,2012," dated May 9,2012.

3. PG&E Letter DCL-12-061, "Pacific Gas and Electric Company's Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Emergency Preparedness Aspects of Recommendation 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident," dated June 7, 2012.

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

On March 12,2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Staff issued Reference 1. Enclosure 5 of Reference 1 contains specific Requested Actions and Requested Information associated with Recommendation 9.3 for Emergency Preparedness (EP) programs. In accordance with -10 CFR 50.54, "Conditions of licenses," paragraph (f), addressees were requested to submit a written response to the information requests. The letter also provided requested due dates for written responses.

A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Callaway

• Comanche Peak

• Diablo Canyon

• Palo Verde

• San Onofre

• South Texas Project

• Wolf Creek

Document Control Desk PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 October 29, 2012 Page 2 In accordance with Reference 1, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) submitted its alternative course of action for providing the requested information in Reference 2. The alternative course of action included revised due dates and the basis for Communications Requests 1 and 3. In accordance with Reference 2, PG&E submitted Reference 3, which described its response to Communications Request 2 and committed to conduct an evaluation of existing communications systems power supplies.

As described in Reference 2, Enclosure 1 of this letter provides PG&E's response to Communications Requests 1 and 3. Enclosure 2 of this letter provides PG&E's conclusions on the evaluation of existing communications systems power supplies.

PG&E is making regulatory commitments (as defined by NEI 99-04) in Enclosure 3 of this letter. This letter includes no revisions to existing regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions, or require additional information, please contact Mr. Terence L. Grebel at (805) 545-4160.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on October 29, 2012.

Sincerely,

~LA9/'----

Edward D. Halpin Senior Vice President - Chief Nuclear Officer ckf6/SAPN 50465913 Enclosures cc: Diablo Distribution cc:/enc: Elmo E. Collins, NRC Region IV Administrator Eric J. Leeds, NRC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Laura H. Micewski, NRC, Senior Resident Inspector Joseph M. Sebrosky, NRR Project Manager A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Callaway

• Comanche Peak

• Diablo Canyon

• Palo Verde

• San Onofre

• South Texas Project

• Wolf Creek

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Page 1 of 15 Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) NRC Request for Information (NTTF Recommendation 9.3 Communications, Requests 1 and 3 Pacific Gas and Electric Company Executive Summary On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a request for information (RFI) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f), "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1,2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident." Recommendation 9.3 requested addressees to provide an assessment of the current communications systems and equipment used during an emergency event to identify any enhancements that may be needed to ensure communications are maintained during a large-scale natural event.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) conducted an assessment to review Diablo Canyon Power Plant's (DCPP's) capability of Emergency Preparedness communications systems to perform their intended function during a large-scale loss of alternating current (AC) power event.

The assessment was conducted in accordance with the NEI 12-01, Revision 0, "Guideline for Assessing Beyond-Design-Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities." The assessment team conducted walkdowns and reviewed associated documentation and procedures to confirm reasonable protection of current onsite and offsite communications systems.

The assessment team concluded that the fixed and portable satellite phones and portions of the onsite plant telephone network and radio systems will be available during a large scale loss of AC power. Based on the quality, maintenance, and operational contracts of the communications equipment, it was concluded that the communications equipment will be ready for use by trained personnel during a loss of AC power. DCPP personnel are a part of the national communications system, which provides priority communications services during an emergency.

The assessment team identified 11 enhancements. The enhancements will be implemented into two phases. Phase 1 will be completed by December 31,2013.

Phase 2 will be completed by October 27, 2015.

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Page 2 of 15 Purpose The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued an information request pursuant to 10 50.54(f), 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) review of insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, dated March 12, 2012. of the letter contains specific Requested Actions and Requested Information associated with Recommendation 9.3 for Emergency Preparedness (EP) programs. This enclosure is divided into two parts (1) Communications and (2) ERO Staffing. This assessment will address the Communications request.

The NRC issued this information request regarding power supplies for communications systems and to determine if additional regulatory action is warranted. This assessment is to review the capability of DCPP communications systems to perform their intended function during a large-scale extended loss of off-site power. This assessment will also provide recommendations for a means to power communications equipment needed to communicate onsite (e.g., radios for response teams and between facilities) and offsite (e.g., cellular telephones and satellite telephones) during a prolonged station blackout (S80).

NRC Requested Information NRC Requested Actions It is requested that addressees assess their current communications systems and equipment used during an emergency event. It is also requested that consideration be given to any enhancements that may be appropriate for the emergency plan with respect to communications requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, Appendix E, and the guidance in NUREG-0696. Also, addressees are requested to consider the means necessary to power the new and existing communications equipment during a prolonged S80.

NRC Request Assumptions The NRC requests that the following assumptions be made in preparing responses to this request for information: the potential onsite and offsite damage is a result of a large scale natural event resulting in a loss of all AC power.

In addition, assume that the large-scale natural event causes extensive damage to normal and emergency communications systems both onsite and in the area surrounding the site. It has been recognized that following a large-scale natural event that AC power may not be available to cell and other communications infrastructures.

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Page 3 of 15 NRC Requested Information Addressees are requested to provide an assessment of the current communications systems and equipment used during an emergency event to identify any enhancements that may be needed to ensure communications are maintained during a large-scale natural event meeting the conditions described above.

• Identify any planned or potential improvements to existing onsite communications systems and their required normal and/or backup power supplies,

• Identify any planned or potential improvements to existing offsite communications systems and their required normal and/or backup power supplies,

• Provide a description of any new communications system(s) or technologies that will be deployed based upon the assumed conditions described above, and

• Provide a description of how the new and/or improved systems and power supplies will be able to provide for communications during a loss of all AC power.

Addressees are requested to describe any interim actions that have been taken or are planned to be taken to enhance existing communications systems power supplies until the communications assessment and the resulting actions are complete.

Provide an implementation schedule of the time needed to conduct and implement the results of the communications assessment.

Assessment Methodology NEI 12-01 provides the methodology for the preparation of assessments to determine the required staff necessary for responding to a beyond-design-basis external event that affects multiple units at a site, and the identification of enhancements that could provide a means to power equipment needed to communicate onsite and offsite during an extended loss of AC power event. The NRC endorsed NEI 12-01 in May of 2012.

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Page 4 of 15 Assessment Assumptions (NEI 12-01)

(1) A large-scale external event occurs that results in:

(a) all onsite units affected (b) extended loss of AC power (c) impeded access to the units (2) Initially, all onsite reactors are operating at full power and are successfully shut down.

(3) A Hostile Action directed at the affected site does not occur during the period that the site is responding to a beyond design basis external event.

(4) The event impedes site access as follows:

(a) Post event time: 0 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> - No site access. This duration reflects the time necessary to clear roadway obstructions, use alternate routes, mobilize alternate transportation capabilities, etc.

(b) Post event time: 6 to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> - Limited site access. The site may be accessed by walking, a helicopter, personal vehicle or small boat.

(c) Post event time: 24+ hours - Improved site access. Site access is restored to a near-normal status and/or augmented transportation resources are available to deliver heavy or big loads, and large numbers of personnel (d) A licensee may modify assumption #4 if supported by a documented basis.

(5) Installed sources of AC power, including alternate AC power sources, are not available. These power sources are typically classified as safety-related or governed by augmented quality requirements.

(6) Nonessential loads from DC battery buses are stripped in accordance with plant emergency or abnormal operating procedures, or other response guidelines to extend battery life.

(7) Installed inverters and battery chargers remain available provided they are protected from internal and external flooding events consistent with the current station design.

(8) Diesel fuel oil stored in seismic structures and protected from flooding and wind remains available.

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-12-110 Page 5 of 15 (9) Portable equipment staged for implementation of accident management strategies (e.g., SAMG and EDMG) may be used provided it is stored onsite; is reasonably protected from seismic, wind, and flooding events 1 ; is maintained through programmatic controls; and has implementing actions specified in existing procedures or guidelines. This includes use of portable AC and DC power sources.

(10) Offsite infrastructure supporting communications systems is inoperable, or operating with degraded capability, in the area surrounding the site (e.g.,

cellular telephone or microwave towers, telephone central office buildings, telephone lines, etc.). A licensee has two options for determining the affected a rea.

(a) Apply a default distance value, in all directions, of approximately 25 miles from the plant site, or (b) Develop a site-specific distance assumption and document the basis.

(c) Communications infrastructure in locations beyond the area defined above is not significantly impacted by the event.

(11) Communications equipment located at an offsite response facility, and supplied from a backup power source, is assumed to be functional. The availability of this equipment must be determined in conjunction with Assumption #7, above. For example, a diesel generator-powered satellite telephone system at an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) located 4 miles from the plant would be available since the system does not rely upon ground-based communications infrastructure within the affected area. A land-line telephone in the same EOC would not be available due to local infrastructure impacts consistent with Assumption #7.

(12) To be assumed operable, a piece of onsite communications equipment should be in a location, and maintained in a manner, that maximizes survivability following a beyond design basis external event. In particular, the location or manner should reasonably preclude wetting from flooding or impact damage from a seismic event. The equipment itself does not need to be seismically qualified. Equipment should be stored, or otherwise available, in locations that can be readily accessed when needed. To the degree practical, consider potential constraints to equipment access or movement when selecting a storage location. When selecting storage locations, consider criteria presented in regulatory and industry guidance applicable to equipment associated with NRC Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (e.g., FLEX equipment). The If applicable per the site emergency plan

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-12-110 Page 6 of 15 above guidance applies to equipment at the point of use (e.g., a radio) as well as any supporting infrastructure components. Such components may include portable power sources, and radio system repeaters and antennas.

(13) End-point equipment identified for a communications link listed below should be used solely for the designated purpose. For example, a satellite telephone assigned to the Control Room should not be credited for performing both Offsite Response Organization (ORO) and NRC notifications.

Reasonable Protection Guidance Option 1: Reasonable protection from seismic, flooding, and wind is defined using the same criteria for the protection and deployment of Flex Strategies in accordance with NEI 12-06 Revision B-1, dated May 2012.

Option 2: Reasonable protection from seismic, flooding, and wind is defined using the following guidance: It is required that Emergency Preparedness (EP) communication equipment be confirmed as being reasonably protected from a beyond design basis seismic event. It is recommended that utilities use, to the extent possible, the existing guidance provided in EPRI NP-6041 for determination of the seismic/wind design capabilities of structures containing, and structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in the vicinity (adjacent and overhead) of, existing EP Communication equipment.

Additionally, existing seismic/wind housekeeping procedures should be used to establish secure storage of EP communication equipment and adjacent SSCs that may pose a potential seismic/wind interaction hazard. Where these procedures and guidance cannot be applied, it should be ensured that EP communication equipment be contained within one or more of the configurations:

(1) In an existing safety related structure designed for the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), or (2) In a structure designed to or evaluated equivalent to ASCE 7-10, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, or (3) Outside a structure and evaluated for seismic interactions to ensure equipment is not damaged by nonseismically robust components or structures.

SSCs in the vicinity of the EP Communications equipment where these procedures and guidance cannot be applied should also be confirmed to meet the design criteria given in Options 1 or 2 above.

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-12-110 Page 7 of 15 Option 3: Implement alternate and back-up communications systems and plans, given the beyond-design-basis event renders all on site and offsite communications systems inoperable. No assessment is necessary for this option.

Note: Equipment must be stored in a configuration that ensures survivability. Utilize Options 1 or 2 to meet this configuration requirement.

PG&E used criteria in Option 2 to establish the availability of existing communications systems and select storage and protection for the proposed equipment and systems.

References

1. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1,2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, dated March 12,2012.

2. 10 CFR 50.47 Emergency plans - Section (b)

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix 8 - Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants

4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix E - Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities

5. NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants

6. NUREG 0696, Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities

7. Federal Register Volume 76, Number 226; dated November 23,2011; Pages 72560-72600 Objective 1: Evaluate DCPP's ability to maintain required emergency communications, onsite and offsite, during a prolonged S80.

4.1.1 Notifications to, and communications with, OROs [per 10 CFR Appendix E.IV.D and E.9.a]

Results

1. Refer to Appendix A, Table 4.1.1, for information on PG&E's communication links.

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-12-110 Page 8 of 15

2. Refer to Appendix B, Table 4.1.1, for information on the power supplies of the PG&E communications links.

3. Refer to Appendices C and D for further background information on the applicable communications systems.

Commitment 1:

PG&E procured a satellite phone "football" for the Control Room. The "football" is self-contained in a rugged case with a self-positioning satellite antenna and a 6-hour rechargeable power supply. The "football" has the capability to support a single phone line or single network connection through an external port. The "football" is capable of reaching active cell phones or functional land line phones beyond 25 miles and active satellite phones within 25 miles. Two additional "footballs" have been purchased for the TSC and EOF as shown in Objective 1 Section 4.1.5. This commitment will be placed in service with approved procedures as part of Phase 1, which is scheduled for December 31,2013.

Commitment 2:

Three communications trailers have been procured to facilitate further communications.

The trailers will be outfitted with equipment such as radio repeaters (multiple frequencies), base station radios, satellite uplink, and Voice-Over-Internet Protocol phones. Two of the trailers will be staged onsite and one trailer will be staged offsite.

These trailers will be equipped with an onboard diesel generator capable of supplying sufficient power to run all of the installed equipment. These trailers will have antennas at sufficient height such that the range of the radio repeaters and base stations will support onsite communications and emergency response efforts. This commitment will be placed in service with approved procedures as part of Phase 1, which is scheduled for December 31, 2013.

4.1.2 Notifications to, and communications with, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Headquarters Incident Response Center and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E./V.D and E.9.d]

Results

1. Refer to Appendix A, Table 4.1.2, for information on PG&E's communication links.

2. Refer to Appendix B, Table 4.1.2, for information on the power supplies of the PG&E communications links.

3. Refer to Appendices C and D for further background information on the applicable communications systems.

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-12-110 Page 9 of 15 Commitments Refer to Section 4.1.1, Commitment 2, for information on the communications trailers.

4.1.3 Communications between licensee emergency response facilities [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E. 9. c. Additional links that support performance of critical response functions are also specified.]

Results

1. Refer to Appendix A, Table 4.1.3, for information on PG&E's communication links.

2. Refer to Appendix B, Table 4.1.3, for information on the power supplies of the PG&E communications links.

3. Refer to Appendices C and D for further background information on the applicable communications systems.

Commitments Refer to Section 4.1.1, Commitment 2 for information on the communications trailers.

4.1.4 Communications with field/offsite monitoring teams [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E. 9. c]

Results

1. Refer to Appendix A, Table 4.1.4, for information on PG&E's communication links.

2. Refer to Appendix B, Table 4.1.4, for information on the power supplies of the PG&E communications links.

3. Refer to Appendices C and D for further background information on the applicable communications systems.

Commitment 3:

The 80 dual band radios (450 MHz and 800 MHz) radios procured for operators and Industrial Fire Officers, and the 75 single band (800 MHz) radios procured for use by the in-plant emergency response teams and offsite responders will be placed in service with approved procedures as part of Phase 1, which is scheduled for December 31,2013.

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Page 10 of 15 Additional Information:

The 800-MHz radios have better in-plant penetration than the 450 MHz radios. The 800 MHz radios will perform better that the 450 MHz radios during line of sight operation. The 450 MHz radio has a greater coverage area than the 800 MHz radio.

The 450 MHz and 800 MHz radios will provide widespread communications capabilities at DCPP.

Commitment 4:

PG&E will improve the Operational Support Center (OSC) radio communications by installing a radio console. Installation of the radio console will enable efficient radio communications with field teams. Radios, batteries, and chargers will be relocated to support continued radio communications. The equipment will be placed in service with approved procedures as part of Phase 2, which is scheduled for October 27,2015.

Commitment 5:

PG&E will relocate onsite Field Monitoring Team (FMT) satellite phones to the onsite FMT vehicle. Currently, the onsite FMT satellite phones are not stored in a structure that is considered to be seismically robust in accordance with NEI 12-01, Revision o.

Relocating the onsite FMT satellite phones to the onsite FMT vehicle will ensure the equipment is reasonably protected since these vehicles meet the guidance of NEI 12-01, Revision O. The onsite FMT vehicle is outfitted with a car charger. This commitment will be implemented as part of Phase 2, which is scheduled for October 27, 2015.

Refer to Section 4.1.1 above for information on the communications trailers.

4.1.5 Communications with other Federal agencies as described in the site emergency plan (e.g., the US Coast Guard) [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.b]

Results

1. Refer to Appendix A, Table 4.1.5, for information on PG&E's communication links.

2. Refer to Appendix B, Table 4.1.5, for information on the power supplies of the PG&E communications links.

3. Refer to Appendices C and 0 for further background information on the applicable communications systems.

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-12-110 Page 11 of 15 Enhancements PG&E procured two additional satellite phone "footballs" for the TSC and EOF. Refer to Section 4.1.1 above for information on the satellite phone "footballs."

Refer to Section 4.1.1 above for information on the communications trailers.

4.1.6 Coordination and direction of onsite and in-plant response teams. This includes teams necessary to affect emergency repairs,Jirefighting, search and rescue, radiological monitoring, and implementation of Transition Phase coping and severe accident management strategies.

Results

1. Refer to Appendix A, Table 4.1.6, for information on PG&E's communication links.

2. Refer to Appendix B, Table 4.1.6, for information on the power supplies of the PG&E communications links.

3. Refer to Appendices C and D for further background information on the applicable communications systems.

Enhancements

1. Refer to Section 4.1.4 above for information on the hand held radios.

2. Refer to Section 4.1.4 above for information on OSC radio console improvements.

3. Refer to Section 4.1.1 above for information on the communications trailers.

Commitment 6:

PG~E will procure additional spare radio batteries and chargers to ensure that adequate supplies exist to support extended operations. These batteries and chargers will be stored in locations identified as FLEX storage locations. This commitment will be implemented as part of Phase 2, which is scheduled for October 27, 2015.

Commitment 7:

PG&E will procure portable generators and equipment to ensure that adequate power will exist to support extended operations. These generators and associated equipment will be stored in locations identified as FLEX storage locations. This equipment will be

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Page 12 of 15 placed in service with approved procedures as part of Phase 2, which is scheduled for October 27, 2015.

Objective 2: Evaluate DCPP's Public Address (PA) System availability.

Results

1. Refer to Appendix A, Table 4.2, for information on DCPP's PA System.

2. Refer to Appendices C and 0 for further background information on the applicable communications systems.

Commitment 8:

PG&E will relocate the SmartMsg and Zetron pager systems from their current location, which is not considered to be seismically robust per NEI 12-01, Revision 0, guidance to an existing structure that is seismically robust. This commitment will be implemented as part of Phase 2, which is scheduled for October 27, 2015.

Objective 3: Evaluate emergency communications equipment at offsite response organization (ORO) facilities.

Results

1. Refer to Appendix A, Table 4.3, for information on equipment at ORO facilities.

2. Refer to Appendices C and 0 for further background information on the applicable communications systems.

Communications capabilities available at the ORO facilities that normally receive DCPP notifications of an emergency declaration or a Protective Action Recommendation are provided through a dedicated offsite agency telephone system. This telephone system for San Luis Obispo County is assumed to be unavailable since the telephone infrastructure is within 25 miles of DCPP. The State of California Warning Center is outside of the 25-mile radius of DCPP.

PG&E and San Luis Obispo County have a jointly located EOF. The County resides on the first floor and PG&E on the second floor of the EOF. Initial notifications to the County (NEI 12-01, Section 4.1.1) are made from the Control Room to the Sheriff Watch Commander until the County Emergency Operations Center is activated. Once activated, the EOF is able to communicate face-to-face with County responders. The Control Room, TSC, and EOF each have at least one satellite phone that is expected to be available post event.

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-12-110 Page 13 of 15 Commitment 9:

PG&E will install a fixed mount satellite phone with an externally mounted antenna in the Sheriff Watch Commander's office. This commitment will be placed in service as part of Phase 2, which is scheduled for October 27, 2015.

Commitment 10:

PG&E will procure additional hand held satellite phones for the Control Room, TSC, and EOF to ensure that a dedicated line will be available to perform State and County notifications. This commitment will be placed in service with approved procedures as part of Phase 1, which is scheduled for December 31,2013.

Objective 4: Evaluate DCPP's ability to notify Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel of an emergency.

Results This area was previously assessed. Information for DCPP was provided to the NRC in PG&E Letter DCL-12-061, dated June 7, 2012.

Previous Commitment PG&E made the following commitment in PG&E Letter DCL-12-061 with respect to capability to augment emergency response staff given degraded communications capabilities:

"PG&E will revise procedures to include degraded communications capabilities, such that Emergency Response Organization members will automatically respond to their assigned facilities or a designated staging area when made aware of an area-wide disaster (e.g., loss-of grid, natural or man-made disaster, etc.). These procedures will be revised by December 31,2012."

Objective 5: Evaluate DCPP's systems and equipment to support communications.

Results This assessment was performed utilizing no reliance upon "multi-use" equipment. All credited lines of communications are dedicated to perform the required function. The credited equipment includes plant private branch exchange (PBX) lines, portable satellite phones, fixed satellite phones, and plant radios. The DCPP PBX lines and plant radios are daily-use systems and are therefore proven to function, as required, to provide adequate communications capabilities. Use of these systems during drills and exercises also demonstrates the functional capability to perform as required.

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-12-110 Page 14 of 15 The ERO demonstrates system functionality of the satellite phones during all drills and exercises where field-monitoring teams participate. The Control Room, TSC, and EOF fixed satellite phones are tested on a quarterly basis for system functionality in accordance with established maintenance and test procedures.

Objective 6: Evaluate DCPP's quality and maintenance requirements of the communications equipment.

Results This assessment confirmed that programmatic controls are applied to communications equipment to ensure availability and reliability, including the performance of periodic inventory checks and operability testing. DCPP procedure OM1 0.DC3, "Emergency Response Facilities, Equipment, and Resources" provides for these programmatic controls. OM1 0.DC3 was developed in accordance with the guidance contained in INPO 10-007, "Equipment Important to Emergency Response."

The DCPP Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures provide the controls and specific requirements for implementing the programmatic controls.

Current DCPP maintenance and test procedures provide reasonable assurance that credited communications equipment is inventoried and tested periodically.

Periodic verification of supporting contracts, specific to supporting communications equipment and power supplies, are conducted annually.

Objective 7: Evaluate DCPP's participation in emergency services provided by the national communications system (NCS) and other communications vendors.

Results All of the EOF Emergency directors, the security director, the security manager, and the emergency planning manager have governme~t emergency telecommunications service (GETS) cards and wireless priority service (WPS) set up.

Commitment 11:

PG&E will obtain additional access for personnel to use the GETS and WPS services.

This commitment will be implemented as part of Phase 2, which is scheduled for October 27,2015.

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Page 15 of 15 Objective 8: Verify that DCPP has arrangements to utilize emergency services by communications providers.

Results PG&E has contracts in place to utilize emergency services by communications providers. These contracts are verified annually.

Objective 9: Evaluate training that response personnel receive on the location and use of communications systems.

Results Response personnel have received and/or will receive periodic training, as applicable, on the location and use of communications systems and equipment. The training program provides guidance on communications systems for response personnel through drills and exercises.

The majority of the communications equipment, listed in this assessment, is common business use equipment that is used on a daily basis. The satellite phones (both portable and fixed) are used during drills and exercises to provide opportunities for training and proficiency to the ERG. Training issues identified during drills and exercises are either remediated on the spot, or entered into the corrective action program to determine appropriate actions.

Appendix A PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.1 4.1.1 Notifications to, and communications with, OROs [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E./V.D and E.g.a]

Emergency Minimum Primary Method Primary Backup Backup Planned or Response Communications Described in Method Method(s) Method(s) Potential Facility Links site E-Plan Available Described in site Available Improvement following E-Plan following Identified?

Assumed Assumed LSEE(a)? LSEE(a)?

Control Room 1 for Unit 1 CR Shift Private Branch No Fixed satellite Yes Yes (CR) Communicator Exchange (PBX) phone line 1 for Unit 2 CR Shift PBX line No No No Yes Communicator Technical Support 1 for Key TSC PBX line No Fixed satellite Yes Yes Center (TSC) Communicator phone Emergency 1 for Key EOF PBX line No Fixed satellite Yes Yes Operations Communicator phone Facility (E9F) ,

Notes:

(a) Large Scale External Event (LSEE)

Refer to Objective 1, Section 4.1.1, for additional information.

Appendix A PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.2 4.1.2 Notifications to, and communications with, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Headquarters Incident Response Center and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E./V.D and E. 9. d]

Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Response Facility Communications Method Method Method(s) Method(s) Potential Links Described in Available Described in site Available Improvement site E-Plan following E-Plan following Identified?

Assumed Assumed LSEE(a)? LSEE(a)?

Control Room 1 for Unit 1 CR for Private No Fixed satellite Notb) Yes (CR) Emergency Branch phone Notification Exchange System (ENS) (PBX) line Communicator No Fixed satellite No(b) Yes phone 1 for Unit 2 CR for ENS PBX line Communicator Technical Support 1 for ENS PBX line No Fixed satellite No(b) Yes Center (TSC) Communicator phone Location(s) where 1 for Emergency PBX line No Portable satellite Yes Yes Health Physics Operations Facility phone Network (HPN) (EOF) HPN communications are Communicator performed Notes:

(a) Large Scale External Event (LSEE)

(b) The fixed satellite phones in the CR, TSC and EOF are assumed to be available post event. However, these devices are credited for performing required notifications to, and communications with, Off-Site Response Organizations (OROs) [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.IV.D and E.9.a] as noted in Table 4.1.1 and are therefore considered to be unavailable to perform the required communications listed in Table 4.1.2.

Refer to Objective 1, Section 4.1.2, for additional information.

Appendix A PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.3 Sheet 1 of 4 4.1.3 Communications between licensee emergency response facilities [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.g.c. Additional links that support performance of critical response functions are also specified.] The minimum communications links to support this function are listed below by facility. For example, if the normally used telephone system cannot be restored to service, these links could rely upon some combination of radio, sound-powered and satellite-based communications systems.

Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Method(s) Backup Planned or Response Communications Method Method Described in site Method(s) Potential Facility Links Described in Available E-Plan Available Improvement site E-Plan following following Identified?

Assumed Assumed LSEE(a)? LSEE(a)?

Control Room 1 for Unit 1 to TSC Private Branch Yes Fixed satellite phone No{O) Yes (CR) Exchange (PBX) Line(C) 1 for Unit 2 to TSC PBX Line(C) Yes Fixed satellite phone NO(b)

CR to offsite PBX Line No Fixed satellite phone NO(b) emergency response facilities Technical 1 each for:

Support Center

• Lead TSC Manager PBX Line(C) Yes Fixed satellite phone NO(b) Yes (TSC)

• Operations PBX Line(C) Yes Fixed satellite phone NO(b)

Coordination

• Maintenance PBX Line(c) Yes Fixed satellite phone NO(b)

Coordination

• Engineering PBX Line(c) Yes Fixed satellite phone NO(b)

Coordination

• Radiological Support PBX Line(C) Yes Fixed satellite phone NO(b) 1 for each position providing Unit

Response

Coordination.

• Unit 1 Support PBX Line(C) Yes Fixed satellite phone NO(b)

• Unit 2 Support PBX Line(C) Yes Fixed satellite phone NO(b)

TSC to offsite PBX Line No Fixed satellite phone NO(b) emergency response facilities

Appendix A PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.3 Sheet 2 of 4 Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Method(s) Backup Planned or Response Communications Method Method Described in site Method(s) Potential Facility Links Described in Available E-Plan Available Improvement site E-Plan following following Identified?

Assumed Assumed LSEE(a)? LSEE(a)?

Operational Private Branch Support Center 1 each for: Exchange Yes Radio / Face to Face Yes Yes (OSC)

• Senior/Lead OSC (PBX) Line(c)

Manager

• Radiological Support PBX Line(C) Yes Radio / Face to Face Yes 1 for each position providing Unit In-Plant Team Coordination.

• Operations PBX Line(c) Yes Radio / Face to Face Yes Coordinator

• Team Coordinator PBX Line(C) Yes Radio / Face to Face Yes OSC to offsite PBX Line No None No emergency response facilities

Appendix A PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.3 Sheet 3 of 4 Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Method(s) Backup Planned or Response Communications Method Method Described in site Method(s) Potential Facility Links Described in Available E-Plan Available Improvement site E-Plan following following Identified?

Assumed Assumed LSEE(a)? LSEE(a)?

Emergency 1 each for:

Operations

• Senior/Lead Manager PBX Line No Fixed satellite phone No(b) Yes Facility (EOF)

• Key Protective PBX Line No Fixed satellite phone No(b)

Measures

• Operations Support PBX Line No Fixed satellite phone No(b)

• Technical Support PBX Line No Fixed satellite phone No(b)

(as needed to support performance of dose projections, formulation of Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) and plant status updates to Off-Site Response Organizations (ORO) authorities).

EOF to onsite PBX Line No Fixed satellite phone No(a) emergency response facilities.

Appendix A PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.3 Sheet 4 of 4 Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Method(s) Backup Planned or Response Communications Method Method Described in site Method(s) Potential Facility Links Described in Available E-Plan Available Improvement site E-Plan following following Identified?

Assumed Assumed LSEE(a)? LSEE(a)?

Joint Information 1 for Sr Manager PSTN No Portable satellite phone Yes Yes Center (JIC)

JIC to onsite PSTN line No Portable satellite phone No Yes emergency response facilities Notes:

(a) Large Scale External Event (b)The fixed satellite phones in the Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) are assumed to be available post event. However, these devices are credited for performing required Notifications to, and communications with, Off-Site Response Organizations [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.lV.D and E.9.a] as noted in table 4.1.1 and are therefore considered to be unavailable to perform the required communications listed in Table 4.1.3.

(C)The Private Branch Exchange (PBX) lines credited above for the GR, TSC, and Operational Support Center (OSC) will only work onsite to facilitate coordination between the onsite facilities. Use of these PBX lines is not credited to be able to communicate with offsite emergency response facilities or agencies.

Refer to Objective 1, Section 4.1.3, for additional information.

Appendix A PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.4 4.1.4 Communications with offsite/field monitoring teams (FMT) [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c]

Emergency Minimum Primary Method Primary Backup Method(s) Backup Planned or Response Communications Described in site Method Described in site Method(s) Potential Facility Links E-Plan Available E-Plan Available Improvement following following Identified?

Assumed Assumed LSEE(a)? LSEE(a)?

Primary location 1 for offsite FMT Cell phone/ No Portable satellite phone Yes Yes where offsite coordination from Private Branch FMT the EOF. Exchange (PBX) coordination is line performed Primary location 1 for each offsite from which FMT.

offsite FMTs are

• Alpha Team Cell phone/Radio(C) No Portable satellite phone Yes Yes deployed (Offsite FMT)

• Bravo Team Cell phone/Radio No Portable satellite phone Yes (Offsite FMT)

• Charlie Team Cell phone/Radio No Portable satellite phone Yes (Offsite FMT

• FMT 1 (Onsite Cell phone/Radio No Portable satellite phone No FMT) (b)

• FMT 2 (Onsite Cell phone/Radio No Portable satellite phone No FMT) (b)

Notes:

(a) Large Scale External Event (LSEE)

(b) FMT-1 and FMT-2 onsite FMT kits are located in warehouse B. Warehouse B is not designed to the safe shutdown earthquake at DCPP and therefore the kits are not reasonably protected from seismic interactions.

(c) Radio links identified above for the FMT function are on a different radio system (County Brown Net) than the onsite DCPP system and are therefore not available due to reliance on infrastructure within 25 miles of the plant.

Refer to Objective 1, Section 4.1.4, for additional information.

Appendix A PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.5 4.1.5 Communications with other federal agencies as described in the site emergency plan (e.g., the US Coast Guard)

[per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.b]

Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Response Communications Method Method Method{s) Method{s) Potential Facility Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified?

Assumed Assumed LSEE(a)? LSEE(a)?

Primary location 1 for Technical Private Branch No Fixed satellite No(b) Yes where Support Center Exchange phone communication (TSC) Coordination (PBX) line with Federal with Federal agencies is agencies performed 1 for Emergency PBX line No Fixed satellite No(b)

Operations Facility phone (EOF) Coordination with Federal agencies Notes:

(a) Large Scale External Event (LSEE)

(b) The fixed satellite phones in the Control Room, TSC and EOF are assumed to be available post event. However, these devices are credited for performing required Notifications to, and communications with, Off-Site Response Organizations [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.IV.D and E.g.a] as noted in table 4.1.1 and are therefore considered to be un-available to perform the required communications listed in table 4.1.5.

Refer to Objective 1, Section 4.1.5, for additional information.

Appendix A PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.6 Sheet 1 of 2 4.1.6 Coordination and direction of onsite and in-plant response teams. This includes teams necessary to affect emergency repairs, firefighting, search and rescue, radiological monitoring, and implementation of Transition Phase coping and severe accident management strategies.

Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Response Communications Method Method Method(s) Method(s) Potential Facility Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified?

Assumed Assumed LSEE(a)? LSEE(a)?

On-shift staff Number necessary Private Branch Yes Radio Yes Yes I for on-shift staff to Exchange perform Initial (PBX) line I Phase coping Radio(b) actions Operational 1 each for:

Support Center

• On-site Radio Yes Portable No Yes (OSC) and other radiological satellite phone site-specific monitoring locations as 2 each for: Radio Yes Private Branch Yes necessary

• Firefighting (1 for Exchange brigade leader and (PBX) Line 1 for the brigade) 2 each per unit for: Radio Yes Yes

• In-plant PBX Line radiological monitoring Radio Yes Yes

• Search and PBX Line Rescue Radio Yes Yes

• Emergency repairs PBX Line Site-specific number needed to implement any 2 severe accident mitigation strategies

Appendix A PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.6 Sheet 2 of 2 Notes:

(a) Large Scale External Event (LSEE)

(b) The PBX lines credited above for the Control Room, Technical Support Center, and Operational Support Center will only work onsite to facilitate coordination between the onsite facilities. Use of these PBX lines is not credited to be able to communicate with offsite emergency response facilities or agencies.

Refer to Objective 1, Section 4.1.6.1, for additional information.

Appendix A PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.2 4.2 Plant Paging (Announcement) System Minimum Emergency Is this system available Communications Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?

Response Facility following assumed LSEE(a)?

Links N/A See assumptions No Yes and discussion in

, NEI 12-01.

Notes:

(a) Large Scale External Event (LSEE)

Refer to Objective 2 for additional information.

In the event that Diablo Canyon Power Plant's public address (PA) system is unavailable, security personnel perform sweeps to provide communications to plant personnel. This is in accordance with existing emergency plan implementing procedures and security plans.

Appendix A PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.3 4.3 Communications Equipment at ORO Facilities Emergency Minimum Primary Primary Backup Backup Planned or Response Facility Communications Method Method Method(s) Method(s) Potential Links Described in Available Described in Available Improvement site E-Plan following site E-Plan following Identified?

Assumed Assumed LSEE(a)? LSEE(a)?

Location where Off- San Luis Obispo Dedicated No Face to Face Yes(C) Yes Site Response County Offsite Agency communication Organizations Emergency Telephone (OROs) receive Operations Center System notifications of an (EOC) - inside 25 emergency miles declaration or a Protective Action Recommendation (as described in the State of California Dedicated No Satellite Yes Yes site emergency Emergency Offsite Agency telephone from plan) Management Telephone DCPP to Land-Agency Warning System Line Telephone Center - outside System at the 25 miles(b) State Notes:

(a) Large Scale External Event (LSEE)

(b) State of California Emergency Management Agency Warning Center is located more than 25 miles from the site and is therefore assumed to be unaffected by the event at DCPP. The ability to communicate with the state will be contingent upon Diablo Canyon Power Plant's (DCPP's) ability to access outside call infrastructure.

(c) DCPP and San Luis Obispo County have a jointly located emergency operations facility/center. The County resides on the first floor and DCPP on the second.

Refer to Objective 3 for additional information.

Appendix B PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.1 NEI 12-01 4.1.1 - Notifications to, and communications with, OROs [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.lV.D and E.9.a]

Emergency Minimum Equipment Primary Power Alternate Backup Equipment Response Communications Identified Supply Power Power protected Facility Links Supply Supply from:

-<C/) -<:!!

(I) 0 m m* U>-Co z3 o o*

z _.

o 0

s (Q

ii 1 for U1 Shift Communicator Fixed satellite phone PY-TSC N/A TSC can be cross-Control Room tied into a vital bus Y Y Y if needed.

1 for U2 Shift Communicator None None None Technical TSC can be cross- Y Y Y Support Center 1 for Key Communicator Fixed satellite phone PY-TSC N/A tied into a vital bus (TSC) if needed.

Emergency EOF: 6.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Y Y Y Operations 1 for Key Communicator Fixed satellite phone EOF N/A battery and Facility (EOF) 1OOkW diesel with 1000 gal tank capable of 120-hour full load run time.

Note:

Refer to Objective 1, Section 4.1.1, for additional information.

Appendix B PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.2 NEI 12-01 4.1.2 - Notifications to, and communications with, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Headquarters Incident Response Center and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center

[per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.lV.D and E.9.d]

Emergency Minimum Equipment Primary Alternate Backup Equipment Response Communications Links Identified Power Power Power protected Facility Supply Supply Supply from:

-(CJ'J -(::!!

m ~. CD 0 t/) 0

~~

t/) _.

z3 o n'

-0..

Z o

l (Q

-:::l

~o..

1 for Unit 1 CR for Emergency None NA NA NA NA NA NA Notification System (ENS)

Control Room Communicator (CR) 1 for Unit 2 CR for ENS None NA NA NA NA NA NA Communicator Technical Support Center (TSC) 1 for ENS Communicator None NA NA NA NA NA NA EOF: 6.6 Location(s) where hours battery Health Physics and 100kW Network (HPN) 1 for Emergency Operations Portable Sat Phone EOF N/A diesel with Y Y Y communications Facility (EOF) HPN Communicator 1000 gal tank are performed capable of 120 hour0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> full load run time.

Note:

Refer to Objective 1, Section 4.1.2, for additional information.

Appendix B PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.3 Sheet 1 of 2 NEI 12-01 4.1.3 - Communications between licensee emergency response facilities

[per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c. Additional links that support performance of critical response functions are also specified.] The minimum communications links to support this function are listed below by facility.

Emergency Minimum Equipment Primary Alternate Backup Equipment Response Communications Links Identified Power Power Power protected Facility Supply Supply Supply from:

_. en 0,""

t/) ('I) 0 - ~§ 1 for Unit 1 to TSC Private Branch U1 Comm. RM None U1 Comm. Y Y Y Exchange (PBX) RM(a): 24.55 Control Room Line(a) hours battery (CR) 1 for Unit 2 to TSC PBX Line(a) U1 Comm. RM None Y Y Y CR to offsite emergency response None None None None NA NA NA facilities 1 each for:

• Lead TSC Manager PBX Line(a) U1 Comm. RM None U1 Comm. Y Y Y Tecfmical Support

• Operations Coordination PBX Line(a) U1 Comm. RM None RM(a): 24.55 y Y Y Center (TSC)

• Maintenance Coordination PBX Line(a) U1 Comm. RM None hours battery Y Y Y

• Engineering Coordination PBX Line(a) U1 Comm. RM None Y Y Y

• Radiological Support PBX Line(a) U1 Comm. RM None Y Y Y 1 for each position providing Unit Response Coordination. U1 Comm.

• Unit 1 Support PBX Line(a) U1 Comm. RM None RM(a): 24.55 y Y Y

• Unit 2 Support PBX Line(a) U1 Comm. RM None hours battery Y Y Y TSC to offsite emergency None None None None NA NA NA response facilities 1 each for:

• Senior/Lead OSC Manager PBX Line(a) U1 Comm. RM None U1 Comm. Y Y Y Operational

• Radiological Support PBX Line(a) U1 Comm. RM None RM(a): 24.55 y Y Y Support Center hours battery (OSC) 1 for each position providing Unit In-Plant Team Coordination. U1 Comm.

• Operations Coordinator PBX Line(a) U1 Comm. RM None RM(a): 24.55 y Y Y

• Team Coordinator PBX Line(a) U1 Comm. RM None hours battery Y Y Y OSC to offsite emergency None None None None NA NA NA response facilities

Appendix B PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.3 Sheet 2 of 2 Emergency Minimum Equipment Primary Alternate Backup Equipment Response Communications Links Identified Power Power Power protected Facility Supply Supply Supply from:

_. CJJ en (I) 0" 0 - [~

Emergency 1 each for:

Operations

• Senior/Lead Manager None None None None NA NA NA Facility (EOF)

• Key Protective Measures None None None None NA NA NA

• Operations Support None None None None NA NA NA

• Technical Support None None None None NA NA NA (as needed to support performance of dose projections, formulation of Proactive Action Recommendations (PARs) and plant status updates to Off-Site Response Organization (ORO) authorities ).

None None None None NA NA NA EOF to onsite emergency response facilities JIC: 60kW Joint Information 1 for Sr Manager Portable Sat Phone JIC N/A diesel with Y Y Y Center (JIC) enough fuel to run for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> at full load before refueling is needed.

JIC to onsite emergency response None None None NA NA NA facilities None Notes:

(a) The Private Branch Exchange (PBX) lines credited above for the Control Room, Technical Support Center, and Operational Support Center will only work onsite to facilitate coordination between the onsite facilities. Use of these PBX lines is not credited to be able to communicate with offsite emergency response facilities (EOF and JIC).

Refer to Objective 1 Section, 4.1.3, for additional information.

Appendix B PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.4 NE112-01 4.1.4 - Communications with offsite/field monitoring teams (FMTs) [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c]

Emergency Minimum Equipment Primary Alternate Backup Equipment Response Communications Links Identified Power Power Power protected Facility Supply Supply Supply from:

-(en -(!!

m ~. (I) t/)

0 0 ~~

z3n*

o

-Co Z _.

s ~[

o (,Q EOF: 6.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> battery Primary location 1 for offsite FMT coordination and 100kW where offsite FMT from the Emergency Operations Portable Sat Phone EOF N/A diesel with Y Y Y coordination is Facility (EO F). 1000 gal tank performed capable of 120 hour0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> full load run time.

EOF: 6.6 Primary location 1 for each field/offsite monitoring hours battery from which offsite team. and 100kW FMTs are

• Alpha Team (Offsite FMT) Portable Sat Phone EOF N/A diesel with Y Y Y deployed

• Bravo Team (Offsite FMT) Portable Sat Phone EOF N/A 1000 gal tank Y Y Y

• Charlie Team (Offsite FMT) Portable Sat Phone EOF N/A capable of Y Y Y 120 hour0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> full load run time.

• FMT 1 (Onsite FMT) (a) Portable Sat Phone Warehouse B None None N Y Y

• FMT 2 (Onsite FMT) (a) Portable Sat Phone Warehouse B None None N Y Y Notes:

(a) FMT-1 and FMT-2 onsite FMT kits are located in warehouse B. Warehouse B is not designed to the safe shutdown earthquake at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, and therefore the kits are not reasonably protected from seismic interactions.

Refer to Objective 1, Section 4.1.4, for additional information.

Appendix B PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.5 NEI 12-01 4.1.5 - Communications with other Federal agencies as described in the Site Emergency Plan (e.g., the US Coast Guard) [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.b]

Emergency Minimum Equipment Primary Alternate Backup Equipment Response Communications Links Identified Power Power Power protected Facility Supply Supply Supply from:

m ~. ~~

-<en

~:E

<n _.

z3 o o* ~~

g=c.

Primary location(s) where 1 for Technical Support Center None None None None NA NA NA communication Coordination with Federal with federal agencies agencies is None None None None NA NA NA performed 1 for Emergency Operations Facility Coordination with federal agencies Note:

Refer to Objective 1, Section 4.1.5, for additional information.

Appendix 8 PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Table 4.1.6 NEI 12-01 4.1.6 - Coordination and direction of onsite and in-plant response teams. This includes teams necessary to affect emergency repairs, firefighting, search and rescue, radiological monitoring, and implementation of Transition Phase coping and severe accident management strategies.

Emergency Minimum Equipment Primary Alternate Backup Equipment Response Communications Links Identified Power Power Power protected Facility Supply Supply Supply from:

-<CJ) -<!!

m ~. ('I) 0 (fj 0 t~

z3 o (i'

-c.

Z _.

o co :::J ~~

On-shift staff Number necessary for on-shift Plant Radio U2 Comm. RM None U2 Comm.

staff to perform Initial Phase RM: 24.46 Y Y Y coping actions hours battery Operational 1 each for:

Support Center

• Onsite radiological monitoring(a) Plant Radio and U2 Comm. RM None U2 Comm. Y Y Y (OSC) and other portable sat phone Warehouse 8(a) None RM: 24.46 N N N site-specific hours battery locations as 2 each for:

necessary

• Firefighting (1 for brigade leader Plant Radio U2 Comm. RM None Y Y Y and 1 for the brigade) Plant Radio U2 Comm. RM None Y Y Y 2 each per unit for:

• In-plant radiological monitoring Plant Radio U2 Comm. RM None Y Y Y

• Search and Rescue Plant Radio U2 Comm. RM None Y Y Y

• Emergency repairs Plant Radio U2 Comm. RM None Y Y Y Site-specific number needed to Plant Radio U2 Comm. RM None Y Y Y implement any 2 severe accident

---

'Illti9§tionstrate:g ies Notes:

(a) Field Monitoring Team (FMT)-1 and FMT-2 onsite FMT kits are located in warehouse B. Warehouse B is not designed to the safe shutdown earthquake at Diablo Canyon Power Plant and therefore the kits are not reasonably protected from seismic interactions.

Refer to Objective 1, Section 4.1.6, for additional information.

Appendix C PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Sheet 1 of 4 Diablo Canyon Emergency Response Communications System Descriptions (Current Capabilities)

Communications Systems/Equipment Alternate methods System/Equipment Description Plant Public Address (PA) System

• 450/800 MHz radios For all emergency classifications, all onsite personnel are notified of the initial

• Plant PBX Telephone System classification or escalation of an emergency by recognizable alarms and/or verbal

• SmartMSG Paging System announcements over the plant Public Address (PA) System. Announcements include

• Company Intranet messages the emergency classification and response actions to be taken by personnel onsite (such as Emergency Response Organization (ERO), non-ERO, contractor personnel,

• Company e-mail and visitors). Provisions are made to alert personnel in high noise areas and

• Diablo News Announcements (DNA) outbuildings as applicable.

Plant Telephone Network (PTN) Private One-way Communication During an emergency, the PTN is the primary communication method for voice Branch Exchange (PBX). Includes

• Plant PA System communications between emergency response facilities. Plant telephones are located dedicated tie lines (ATls).

• Onsite Plant Pagers at various locations throughout the plant, including the Control Room (CR), Security

• SmartMSG Paging System Building, laboratories, shops, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and other work and equipment

• Electronic page operating areas. In addition, phone jacks are located in the CR and at other strategic Two-way Communication operating locations throughout the plant. Each phone jack is associated with a telephone number, and when used in conjunction with a portable telephone unit, can

• 450/800 MHz radios communicate with any other telephone in the power plant as well as the company

• Cell phones telephone network.

• Satellite phones Public Switch Telephone Network

• Cell phones The PSTN provides standard commercial telephone service through the public (PSTN)

• Plant PA System infrastructure, consisting of central offices and the wire line and microwave carrier. The commercial telephone system includes connections to Private Branch Exchange (PBX),

• Satellite Phones emergency telephone system, dedicated lines to emergency facilities, and lines to the Joint Information Center (JIC). The commercial vendor provides primary and secondary power for their lines at their central office.

Plant Pager System

• Cell phones The Plant Paging system provides pager services to all plant personnel, both onsite

• Plant PA System and off-site. The system consists of an onsite PG&E owned paging terminal, which

• Satellite Phones distributes pages via 2 onsite and 3 off-site paging radios that provide coverage to most of San luis County and the Northern part of Santa Barbara County. The paging

• 450/800 MHz radios system is used as one of the forms for notifying ERO personnel. It is also used as a

• Plant PBX Telephone System backup to the Plant Public Address System via the Smart Message server system

• PSTN Telephone System which can be accessed from the control room, Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and the TSC.

NRC Federal Telecommunications

• 450/800 MHz radios The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) installed a dedicated telephone system for System (FTS) ENS, HPN, RSCl, PMCl,

• Plant PBX Telephone System their use at Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). This system, the Federal ERDS, and MCl lines (Control and TSC)

• PSTN Telephone System Telecommunications System (FTS), provides a separate government network for all the essential communications functions anticipated during an emergency. These

• Cell phones essential functions are summarized as follows: Emergency Notification System (ENS),

• Satellite Phones Health PhYSics Network (HPN), Reactor Safety Counterpart Link (RSCl), Protective Measures Counterpart Link (PMCl), Management Counterpart Link (MCl), and local Area Network (lAN) Access.

Appendix C PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Sheet 2 of 4 Diablo Canyon Emergency Response Communications System Descriptions (Current Capabilities)

Communications Systems/Equipment Alternate methods System/Equipment Description Offsite Cellular Telephones

• PSTN ERO personnel are provided with cellular telephones which are used for ERO

• Onsite Plant Pagers notification/call-out during emergencies. Cell phones are also used by field monitoring

• Plant PBX Telephone System teams as a backup means of communications.

These phones are not expected to be used in the Control Room or Power Block due to interference with plant equipment and loss of signal to the phone.

Handheld and Fixed Mount Satellite

• 450/800 MHz radios Handheld satellite telephones enable communications to the EOF FMT Communicator.

Telephones

• Plant PBX Telephone System These satellite telephones are powered by the vehicles battery and are capable of

• PSTN calling any commercial or cellular telephone. These satellite telephones are for outdoor use only (clear view of Southwest sky).

• Cell phones DCPP has one fixed satellite telephone within the CR. This satellite phone is permanently installed using an externally mounted antenna and run off alternating current (AC) power.

DCPP has one fixed satellite telephone within the TSC. This satellite phone is permanently installed using an externally mounted antenna and run off AC power.

DCPP has one fixed satellite telephone within the EOF. This satellite phone is permanently installed using an externally mounted antenna and run off AC power.

ERO Notification System (VANS)

• Initiate an individual phone call-out of DCPP utilizes an automated ERO Notification System to rapidly notify members of the ER) personnel, using any functional ERO. The system is activated through any phone capable of dialing an outside line.

telephone system and telephone The call goes to the vendor's hosted servers and associated call centers. Once the numbers, Emergency Phone List chosen scenario is activated, the hosted call centers start to make calls to the ERO

• Satellite Phone utilizing a variety of devices including; pagers, cell phones, home phones, and work phones. Vendor hosting centers are geographically separated such that an event in one state would not likely impact the redundant call center. Implementing procedures specify the course of action to be taken if the ERO Notification System fails.

Plant Radio System (VHF / UHF)

• Plant PBX Telephone System The plant has several voice radio systems available for emergency response use in the

• Local Commercial Telephone System UHF (Ultrahigh Frequency) and the VHF (Very High Frequency) radio-frequency bands.

• Cell phones In the shorter range UHF band, the plant has voice channels available for Plant Operations and Security use, so that personnel from each department can

• Plant PA System simultaneously utilize radio communications to perform their duties without interfering

• Satellite telephones with or being interfered with by each other.

• SmartMSG paging system

• Electronic page The 450 and 800 MHz Radio System consists of hand-held and console radio

• Network communications, using a distributed antenna system operated by Operations, Maintenance, Security (only security currently has an 800 MHz frequency), Radiation Protection, Fire Protection, and Emergency Preparedness.

Appendix C PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Sheet 3 of 4 Diablo Canyon Emergency Response Communications System Descriptions (Current Capabilities)

Communications Systems/Equipment Alternate methods System/Equipment Description Field Monitoring Team (FMT)

• 450/800 MHz radios FMT communications employs a defense in depth approach utilizing a variety of Communications

• Satellite Phones communications methodologies. The primary form of communication is over the radio

• Network using the SLO County Brown Net system which has good coverage in the entire Emergency Planning Zone. Should radio coverage be unavailable, or spotty the FMT's

• Plant PBX Telephone System have the ability to switch to cell phones or satellite phones to maintain communications

• Electronic page with the Emergency Operations Facility (EO F).

• SmartMSG paging system FMT's may also be contacted via the DCPP pager system, which also includes the use of the SmatMSG functionality to send text pages.

Dedicated Dispatch Lines in Control

• Satellite These lines come off of the plant telephone network. They are one-way tie trunks to Room (CR) that link to General Office

• Cell phones the PBX in the San Francisco Corporate Headquarters. These trunks provide direct (GO)

• Network dial access to the corporate telephone exchange, bypassing the normal dial traffic, and can be accessed only by high priority telephones. The trunks ensure calls by high-

• Plant PBX Telephone System priority telephones can be made to selected Corporate Offices as well as providing an alternate access to the PSTN through San Francisco should the local PSTN Exchange in San Luis Obispo be congested.

Verizon Cell Site

• Plant PBX Telephone System The Verizon Cell Site provides wireless cell phone capability for plant personnel. The

• Satellite telephones cell site currently has 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of backup battery and no backup generator. Cell phone

• 450/800 MHz radios use is not permitted in the power block but this would not be an issue when the plant is shut down. The connection to the Verizon site is over fiber optic cable on overhead power lines and these cables are not expected to be functional following a beyond-design-basis accident.

Offsite Private Exchange (OPX) at the

• Satellite phone The EOF and County Emergency Operations Center EOF

• Public Switch Telephone Network (EOC) are co-located near the San Luis Obispo County Sheriffs Department. Included (PSTN) in the building is the County Sheriffs Dispatch Center, which has a dedicated tie line to

• Cell phones the Control Room and TSC. This circuit is a common circuit to all these locations and can be accessed from each end.

• Network

• SmartMSG paging system There is an OPX in the EOC Command Center. This extension provides unrestricted access to the power plant, via company owned microwave paths, should the local PSTN be congested.

Communication circuits for the EOF include telephone lines from the power plant exchange and additional unlisted telephone lines from the PSTN Network.

Offsite Base Station Radios

• Satellite phone Offsite base station radios are located at the EOF and the Energy Education Center

• PSTN (EEC). The base stations provide the capability to communicate directly with the plant

• Cell phones through the utilization of the local repeater sites and the plant radio system as described above.

• Network

• SmartMSG paging system

Appendix C PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Sheet 4 of 4 Diablo Canyon Emergency Response Communications System Descriptions (Current Capabilities)

Communications Systems/Equipment Alternate methods System/Equipment Description Early Warning Siren System (EWS)

• Backup route alerting Each PG&E EWS siren site, repeater site, and activation point is designed to be operable in the absence of AC supply power.

The EWS is designed to meet the requirements of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, and employs guidelines set forth in FEMA REP-10, "Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants." The EWS design objective, specified in Appendix 3 of NUREG-0654, is to provide an alert signal within 15 minutes. This signal is initiated in conjunction with broadcasts providing notification and informational or instructional messages to the population on an area-wide basis throughout the NRC minimum ten-mile radius EPZ.

The American Nuclear Society (ANS) design report states that, "The stored emergency electrical power supply (SEPSS) for each siren is designed to allow siren operation in standby mode (radio transceivers, testing circuits, sensors fully operational and providing polling data to the activation, control, monitoring) for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> without primary AC supply power from the PG&E electric distribution grid. The SEPSS then is designed to be capable, without recharge, of activating the sirens at full design capability for a period of at least 15 minutes."

Back-up Emergency Response

• Initiate an individual phone call-out of The backup ERO notification system effectively relies on the plant pager system and Organization (ERO) Notification System ERO personnel, using any functional the mountain top repeaters to send a group pager messages out.

(pager system) telephone system and telephone numbers, Emergency Phone List

• Satellite Phone Hot Shutdown Panel Phone and Radio

• Plant PBX Telephone System Each hot shutdown panel is a single control panel. The hot shutdown panel contains

• Satellite telephones the essential indicator and controls to maintain a unit in hot standby condition for an

• 450/800 MHz radios extended time period. The hot shutdown panel is primarily intended to be used for a situation in which smoke or toxic gas makes the Control Room temporarily uninhabitable. PG&E phone jacks are located near each panel. Portable, hand-held radio units may also be used for communications if required.

Intranet and Network Access

• Plant PBX Telephone System The Plant LANlWide Area Network (WAN) system is accessible to everyone on site.

• Satellite telephones This system is used by Operations to track all maintenance and project activity that

• 450/800 MHz radios could affect plant operations. The system also provides connectivity to the EOF for

• Cell phones support of critical plant events. Network access to PG&E corporate is provided by the Williams Fiber. Most of this system is not battery backed and much of the infrastructure is not in seismically rated buildings.

Appendix D PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Sheet 1 of 7 Existing Communications Equipment Configurations Current Primary System Equipment Primary Power Alternate Power Backup power availability (e.g., Comments Communication Location protected from(b): Supply Supply batteries, portable generators, Systems etc.) Will interim

-<CJ'J -<!! Yes/No actions be taken m ~. (I) 0 en 0 ~:E en _. to enhance the z3 o c;'

-co oZ (Q

I

-::::I g:c. power supplies?

Plant U 1 Comm. RM ,a) Y Y Y

• U1 Comm. RM(a)

• None

• U1 Comm. RM(a): 24.55 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br /> No planned Telephone battery interim actions.

Network (PTN) U2 Comm. RM Y Y Y

• U2 Comm. RM

• None

• U2 Comm. RM: 24.55 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br /> Private Branch battery Bldg 102(a) N Y Y Bldg 102(a)

Exchange *

• None

• Bldg 102: 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> battery Bldg 104 Y Y Y (PBX). Includes Bldg 109 N Y Y

• Bldg 104

• None

• Bldg 104: 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> battery dedicated tie 500kVYard N Y Y

• Bldg 109

• None

• Bldg 109: 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> battery lines (ATLs).

• 500kVYard

• None

• 500kV Yard: 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> battery Plant Radio U2 Comm. RM,a) Y Y Y

• U2 Comm. RM(a)

• None

• U2 Comm. RM(a): 24.46 hours5.324074e-4 days <br />0.0128 hours <br />7.60582e-5 weeks <br />1.7503e-5 months <br /> No planned System (VHF I battery interim actions.

UHF) Met Tower N Y Y

• Met Tower

• None

• Met Tower: 18.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> battery Avila Gate N Y Y

• Avila Gate

• Avila Gate: N/A

• Avila Gate: 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> battery Davis Peak N Y Y

• Davis Peak

• Davis Peak: N/A

• Davis Peak: 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> battery and 1000 gal propane generator (min 14 days)

SLO ECCO N Y Y

• SLO ECCO

• SLO ECCO: N/A

• SLO ECCO: 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> battery and diesel generator with 150-hour standby capability.

Public Address U1 Comm. RMla) Y Y Y

• U1 Comm. RM(a)

• None

• U1 Comm. RM(a): 24.55 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br /> No planned (PA) System 27 distributed battery interim actions.

racks N Y Y

• 27 distributed

• None

• 27 distributed racks: No

(-110 amps) racks

Appendix D PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Sheet 2 of 7 Existing Communications Equipment Configurations Current Primary System Equipment Primary Power Alternate Power Backup power availability (e.g., Comments Communication Location protected from(b): Supply Supply batteries, portable generators, Systems etc.) Will interim

-<CJ) -<!! Yes/No actions be taken m m*

C'D 0 (f) 0 ~~

(f) _. to enhance the z3 o n'

-c.

Z _.

o (Q  ::s

-::s

~c.

power supplies?

Bldg 102{a) y Y Bldg 102{a)

• Plant Pager N

• None

• Bldg 102{a): 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> battery No planned System Met Tower N Y Y

• Met Tower

• None

• Met Tower: 18.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> interim actions.

battery U2 Comm. RM Y Y Y

• U2 Comm. RM

• None

• U2 Comm. RM: 24.55 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br /> battery Black Butte N Y Y

• Black Butte

• Black Butte: N/A

• Black Butte: 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> battery and 500 gal propane generator (min 7 days)

Williams Hill N Y Y *

• Williams Hill Williams Hill: N/A

• Williams Hill: 20.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> battery and a hydrogen fuel cell generator (min 3 days)

Red Rock N Y Y

• Red Rock

• Red Rock: NIA

• Red Rock: 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> battery and 500 gal propane generator (min 7 days)

Fixed Satellite Control Room Y Y Y

• Control Room TSC(a)

• None

• Control Room TSC(a)

No planned Phones with Technical Y Y Y *

• None

• interim actions.

externally Support Center (TSC)(a) mounted Emergency N Y Y EOF(a) antennas *

• EOF: N/A

• EOF(a): 6.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> battery and Operations 1OOkW diesel with 1000 gal Facility (EOF)(a) tank capable of 120-hour full load run time.

Off-Site N Y Y

• OEL(a)

• OEL: N/A

• OEL(a): No battery and no Emer~ency Lab generator (OEL) a)

Bldg 104{a) y y y

• Bldg 104(a)

• Intranet and

• None Bldg 104{a): 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> of battery No planned Network SONET Ring N Y Y interim actions.

Access

Appendix D PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Sheet 3 of 7 Existing Communications Equipment Configurations Current Primary System Equipment Primary Power Alternate Power Backup power availability (e.g., Comments Communication Location protected from(b): Supply Supply batteries, portable generators, Systems etc.) Will interim

-<en -<!! Yes/No actions be taken m m*

('j) 0 (J) 0

~~ to enhance the z3 o c:;-

-0.

Z --

o (Q ::s (J)

-::s

~o.

power supplies?

NRC Federal Control Room N Y Y

• Met Tower

• None

• Met Tower: 18.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> No planned Telecom. and TSC coming battery interim actions_

System (FTS) in on SONET lines:

Emergency EOF lines are N Y Y

• Met Tower

• None

• Met Tower: 18.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> Notification coming in over battery System (ENS), microwave and Health PhYSics lease lines Network (HPN),

Reactor Safety Counterpart Link (RSCl),

Protective Measures Counterpart Link (PMCl),

Emergency Response Data System (EROS), and Management Counterpart Link (MCl) lines (Control Room, TSC, and EOF)

Appendix 0 PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Sheet 4 of 7 Existing Communications Equipment Configurations Current Primary System Equipment Primary Power Alternate Power Backup power availability (e.g., Comments Communication Location protected from(b): Supply Supply batteries, portable generators, Systems etc.} Will interim

-<en -<:!! Yes/No actions be taken m ~. (I) 0 t/) 0 ~~

t/) _. to enhance the z3 o ()'

-c.

Z _.

o (Q  :::s

-:::s

~c.

power supplies?

Dedicated SONET to PG&E N N N

• U1 Comm. RM

• None

• U1 Comm. RM: 24.46 hours5.324074e-4 days <br />0.0128 hours <br />7.60582e-5 weeks <br />1.7503e-5 months <br /> No planned Dispatch Lines cloud battery interim actions.

in Control Room that link to GO Verizon Cell Bldg 1091a) Y Y Y

• Bldg 109\a)

• None

• Bldg 109(a): 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of battery No planned Site interim actions.

Portable Warehouse B N Y Y

• Normal AC

• Warehouse B: N/A

• Warehouse B: N/A No planned Satellite interim actions.

Phones (Field Bldg 109 N Y Y

• Bldg 109

• None

• Bldg 109: 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> battery Monitoring EOF N Y Y

• EOF

• EOF: N/A

• EOF: 6.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> battery and Team (FMT)

Kits, Radiation 1OOkW diesel with 1000 gal tank capable of 120-hour full Protection (RP) load run time.

Access Control, Security, EOF)

EOF\a) y y y EOF\a)

Offsite Private *

• EOF: N/A

• EOF\a): 6.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> battery and No planned Exchange 1OOkW diesel with 1000 gal interim actions.

(OPX) at the tank capable of 120-hour full EOF load run time.

U1 Comm. RM(a) N y Y U1 Comm. RM(a)

• None

• U1 Comm. RM(a): 24.46 hours5.324074e-4 days <br />0.0128 hours <br />7.60582e-5 weeks <br />1.7503e-5 months <br /> battery Bldg 10ia) N y Y Bldg 102(a)

• None

• Bldg 102(a): 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> battery Tassajera N Y Y

• Tassajera

• Tassajera: N/A

• Tassajera: 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> battery and 500 gal propane generator (min 7 days)

Morro Bay N Y Y

• Morro Bay

• Morro Bay: N/A

• Morro Bay: 9.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> battery

Appendix D PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Sheet 5 of 7 Existing Communications Equipment Configurations Current Primary System Equipment Primary Power Alternate Power Backup power availability (e.g., Comments Communication Location protected from(b): Supply Supply batteries, portable generators, Systems etc.) Will interim

-<CJ) -<!! Yes/No actions be taken

(!)

en en

~. (!) 0 en 0

~:E en _. to enhance the z3 o n'

-Co oz-* :::s

(,Q

-:::s

~c.

power supplies?

Davis Peak N Y Y

• Davis Peak

• Davis Peak: NIA

• Davis Peak: 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> battery and 1000 gal propane generator (min 14 days) 500kV N Y Y

• 500kV

• 500kV: N/A

• 500kV: 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> battery Black Butte N Y Y

• Black Butte

• Black Butte: N/A

• Black Butte: 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> battery and 500 gal propane generator (min 7 days)

Offsite Base EOF N Y Y

• EOF

• EOF: N/A

• EOF: 6.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> battery and No planned Station Radios 1OOkW diesel with 1000 gal interim actions.

tank capable of 120-hour full load run time.

EEC N Y Y

• Energy

• EEC: N/A

• EEC: No battery and no Education Center generator (EEC)

Davis Peak N Y Y

• Davis Peak

• Davis Peak: NIA

• Davis Peak: 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> battery and 1000 gal propane generator (min 14 days)

Appendix 0 PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Sheet 6 of 7 Existing Communications Equipment Configurations Current Primary System Equipment Primary Power Alternate Power Backup power availability (e.g., Comments Communication Location protected from(b): Supply Supply batteries, portable generators, Systems etc.) Will interim

-<C/) -<!! Yes/No actions be taken m ~. <D 0 ~~ to enhance the z3 -c. g=c.

(J)

Z _.

0 (J)

-::l power supplies?

o (;' o  ::l

(,Q Early Warning EOF N Y Y

• EOF

• EOF: N/A

• EOF: 6.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> battery and Each PG&E EWS Siren System 1OOkW diesel with 1000 gal siren site, repeater tank c~pable of 120 hour0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> full site, and activation load run time. point is designed SLO ECCO N Y Y

• SLO ECCO

• SLO ECCO: N/A

• SLO ECCO: 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> battery to be operable in and diesel generator with 150 the absence of AC hour standby capability. supply power.

Tassajera N Y Y

• Tassajera

• Tassajera: N/A

• Tassajera: 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> battery and 500 gal propane generator No planned (min 7 days). interim actions.

Morro Bay N Y Y

• Morro Bay

• Morro Bay: N/A

• Morro Bay: 9.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> battery.

Davis Peak N Y Y

• Davis Peak

• Davis Peak: NIA

• Davis Peak: 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> battery and 1000 gal propane generator (min 14 days).

Black Butte N Y Y

• Black Butte

• Black Butte: N/A

• Black Butte: 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> battery and 500 gal propane generator (min 7 days).

Arroyo Grande N Y Y Hill

• Arroyo Grande

• Arroyo Grande

• Arroyo Grande Hill: 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> Hill Hill: N/A battery.

Rowland Peak N Y Y

• Rowland Ridge

• Rowland Ridge:

• Rowland Ridge: 5 days on N/A battery.

Emergency Hosted in Y Y Y

• N/A outside of 25

• N/A outside of 25

• N/A outside of 25 miles. No planned Response Tennessee and miles. miles. interim actions.

Organization Arizona (ERO)

Notification System (VANS)

U1 Comm. RM\a l y y y

• U1 Comm. RM(a)

• U1 Comm. RM\a l : 24.55 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br /> Hot Shutdown None

• No planned Panel Phone battery interim actions.

U2 Comm. RM Y Y Y

• U2 Comm. RM

• None

• U2 Comm. RM: 24.55 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br /> battery

Appendix D PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Sheet 7 of 7 Existing Communications Equipment Configurations Current Primary System Equipment Primary Power Alternate Power Backup power availability (e.g., Comments Communication Location protected from(b): Supply Supply batteries, portable generators, Systems etc.) Will interim

-<CJ) -<::!! Yes/No actions be taken (I) ~. (I) 0 tJ) 0

~~

tJ) _.

to enhance the z3 tJ) o o*

tJ)

Z 0_.

o (Q

: :s

-:::::s

~o.

power supplies?

Hot Shutdown U2 Comm. RM\a l y y y

• U2 Comm. RMl a)

• None

• U2 Comm. RM\a/: 24.46 hours5.324074e-4 days <br />0.0128 hours <br />7.60582e-5 weeks <br />1.7503e-5 months <br /> No planned Panel Radio battery interim actions.

Back-up ERO See plant pager N Y Y

• See plant pager

• See plant pager

• See plant pager system above. System relies on Notification system above system above. system above. the plant pager System system.

No planned interim actions.

Notes:

(a) Designates critical communications rooms associated with identified communications equipment. Loss of these communications rooms either renders the system inoperable or severely degrades system performance.

(b) Reasonably protected was determined using option 2 above as an existing safety-related structure designed for the safe shutdown earthquake.

Enclosure 2 PG&E Letter DCL-12-110 Results of the Evaluation of Existing Communications Systems Power Supplies In PG&E Letter DCL-12-061, dated June 7, 2012, PG&E committed to evaluate enhancements to existing communications systems power supplies and provide an implementation schedule as required by Communications Request 3 which will include the results of the evaluation of existing communications systems power supplies.

PG&E conducted a load shedding analysis to evaluate enhancements to existing communications systems power supplies. PG&E has concluded that a load shedding scheme is not a viable means to extend battery run time in a post natural disaster event that causes a loss of alternating current power to communication facilities. This conclusion was based on the minimal amount of load that could be shed from the existing communication systems and the amount of resources it would take to achieve a small gain in battery life. Based on the results of the evaluation, an implementation schedule is not applicable.

Enclosure 3 PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Page 1 of 3 Regulatory Commitments PG&E is making the following regulatory commitments (as defined by NEI 99-04) in this submittal:

Commitments Due Date

1. PG&E procured a satellite phone "football" for the Control Room. The "football" is self-contained in a December 31 2013 rugged case with a self-positioning satellite antenna and a 6-hour rechargeable power supply. The '

"football" has the capability to support a single phone line or single network connection through an external port. The "football" is capable of reaching active cell phones or functional land line phones beyond 25 miles and active satellite phones within 25 miles. Two additional "footballs" have been purchased for the TSC and EOF as shown in Objective 1 Section 4.1.5. This commitment will be placed in service with approved procedures as part of Phase 1, which is scheduled for December 31, 2013.

2. Three communications trailers have been procured to facilitate further communications. The trailers December 31,2013 will be outfitted with equipment such as radio repeaters (multiple frequencies), base station radios, satellite uplink, and Voice-Over-Internet Protocol phones. Two of the trailers will be staged onsite and one trailer will be staged offsite. These trailers will be equipped with an onboard diesel generator capable of supplying sufficient power to run all of the installed equipment. These trailers will have antennas at sufficient height such that the range of the radio repeaters and base stations will support onsite communications and emergency response efforts. This commitment will be placed in service with approved procedures as part of Phase 1, which is scheduled for December 31,2013.

3. The 80 dual band radios (450 MHz and 800 MHz) radios procured for operators and Industrial Fire December 31,2013 Officers, and the 75 single band (800MHz) radios procured for use by the in-plant emergency response teams and offsite responders will be placed in service with approved procedures as part of Phase 1, which is scheduled for December 31,2013.

Enclosure 3 PG&E Letter DCL-12-11 0 Page 2 of 3 Commitments Due Date

4. PG&E will improve the Operational Support Center (OSC) radio communications by installing a October 27,2015 radio console. Installation of the radio console will enable efficient radio communications with field teams. Radios, batteries, and chargers will be relocated to support continued radio communications. The equipment will be placed in service with approved procedures as part of Phase 2, which is scheduled for October 27,2015.

5. PG&E will relocate onsite Field Monitoring Team (FMT) satellite phones to the onsite FMT vehicle. October 27 , 2015 Currently, the onsite FMT satellite phones are not stored in a structure that is considered to be seismically robust in accordance with NEI 12-01 Revision O. Relocating the onsite FMT satellite phones to the onsite FMT vehicle will ensure the equipment is reasonably protected since these vehicles meet the guidance of NEI 12-01 Revision O. The onsite FMT vehicle is outfitted with a car charger. This commitment will be implemented as part of Phase 2, which is scheduled for October 27, 2015.

6. PG&E will procure additional spare radio batteries and chargers to ensure that adequate supplies exist October 27, 2015 to support extended operations. These batteries and chargers will be stored in locations identified as FLEX storage locations. This commitment will be implemented as part of Phase 2, which is scheduled for October 27,2015.

7. PG&E will procure portable generators and equipment to ensure that adequate power will exist to October 27, 2015 support extended operations. These generators and associated equipment will be stored in locations identified as FLEX storage locations. This equipment will be placed in service with approved procedures as part of Phase 2, which is scheduled for October 27, 2015.

8. PG&E will relocate the SmartMsg and Zetron pager systems from their current location, which is not October 27,2015 considered to be seismically robust per NEI 12-01 Revision 0 guidance, to an existing structure that is seismically robust. This commitment will be implemented as part of Phase 2, which is scheduled for October 27, 2015.

Enclosure 3 PG&E Letter DCL-12-110 Page 3 of 3 Commitments Due Date

9. PG&E will install a fixed mount satellite phone with an externally mounted antenna in the Sheriff Watch October 27 , 2015 Commander's office. This commitment will be placed in service as part of Phase 2, which is scheduled for October 27,2015.

10. PG&E will procure additional hand held satellite phones for the Control Room, TSC, and EOF to ensure December 31 2013 that a dedicated line will be available to perform State and County notifications. This commitment will '

be placed in service with approved procedures as part of Phase 1, which is scheduled for December 31,2013.

11. PG&E will obtain additional access for personnel to use the GETS and WPS services. This October 27 2015 commitment will be implemented as part of Phase 2, which is scheduled for October 27, 2015. '