ML12275A348

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Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Related to Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8, Nuclear Service Water System
ML12275A348
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  
Issue date: 10/09/2012
From: Jacqueline Thompson
Plant Licensing Branch II
To: Henderson K
Duke Energy Carolinas
Thompson J
References
TAC ME7659, TAC ME7660
Download: ML12275A348 (4)


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 October 9,2012 Mr. Kelvin Henderson Site Vice President Catawba Nuclear Station Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745

SUBJECT:

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING LICENSE AMENDMENT RELATED TO REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.8, NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (TAC NOS. ME7659 AND ME7660)

Dear Mr. Henderson:

By letter dated November 22, 2011, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (the licensee), submitted a proposed license amendment to change the Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TSs). The proposed change would revise TS 3.7.8 to allow single discharge header operation of the Nuclear Service Water System for a time period of 14 days.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal and determined that additional information is needed in order to complete our review. The enclosed document describes this request for additional information. A written response should be provided to the NRC staff within 30 days of the issuance of this letter in order to support our timely review of this application. Please inform me if you are unable to support this response timeframe.

If you have any questions, please call me at 301-415-1345.

Sincerely, Jon Thompson, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION REGARDING LICENSE AMENDMENT RELATED TO REVISION OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.8 TO ALLOW SINGLE DISCHARGE HEADER OPERATION OF THE NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FOR A TIME PERIOD OF 14 DAYS CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-413 AND 50-414 By letter dated November 22, 2011, (Agencywide Document Access and Management System Accession No. ML11327A149), Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy, the licensee),

submitted a proposed license amendment request (LAR) in the form of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2. The proposed LAR would revise TS 3.7.8 to allow Single discharge header operation of the Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS) (Duke Energy designation URN") for a time period of 14 days.

To complete its review, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff requests the following additional information:

1.

In the response to request for additional information (RAI) question 7, the licensee stated that in the event of a failure of the common discharge line, the return to Lake Wylie can be realigned from the Control Room. The licensee did not address what they would do to the supply side to NSWS if this event occurred.

2.

The licensee is not consistent and clear as to which motor operated valves will have power removed.

a.

The description on Attachment 1, page 3, is not consistent with the figures and notes on Attachment 1, pages 5 and 6.

b.

The description for general design criterion (GDC) 44 on Attachment 1, page 11, does not define which valves have power removed.

c., pages 18, 19, and 21 have only the crossover valves with power removed, whereas the associated figures on Attachment 1, pages 20 and 22, have additional valves with power removed, i.e. return isolation valves.

Enclosure

- 2

d.

The conclusion section in Attachment 1, page 23, is equally unclear by not stating any specific valves will have power removed.

e., page 30, in the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) section, is unclear regarding which valves have power removed.
f.

The licensee response to RAI question 7b states that the crossover valves, the discharge isolation valve for the out of service NSWS train, and the discharge valve for the in-service NSWS train all will have the power removed.

3.

In the licensee's response to RAI question 10, it stated that any passive leakage on valves 1 RN63A or 1 RN58B will be addressed depending on the amount of leakage. When each valve is closed for the planned maintenance described in the submittal, discuss the effects of complete valve failure or an operator error which opens the valves. What equipment in the Auxiliary Building could get splashed by incoming water and discuss the effects loss of the wetted equipment?

4.

In the licensee's response to RAI question 10, they stated that valves 1RNP19 and 1 RPN20 have redundant isolation valves that could be repositioned to isolate valve failure and mitigate flooding. Describe what valves could be repositioned and discuss the effects of flooding that could occur until the redundant valves are closed. How long would it take to shut the redundant valve(s)?

5.

The RAI question 12 discussed inconsistencies in the licensee's submittal. In its response, the licensee still appears to have inconsistencies. The licensee states that both trains of NSWS are OPERABLE [conflicts with the table on, page 17]. That would mean that the limiting condition of operation (LCO) forTS 3.7.8 is met and that a new Condition C would not be applicable.

You cannot be in a TS Condition and meet the LCO at the same time. You cannot have the NSWS discharge header inoperable with the corresponding NSWS train OPERABLE. Note the update final safety analysis report in Section 9.2.1.2.4 "ensures two independent, redundant supplies and returns, satisfying the Single failure criteria."

6.

Discuss why notes [similar to NOTES 1 and 2 of Required Action A.1] are not provided for Required Action C.1.

7.

For the case when NSWS Train A or Train B is out of service, the licensee should prove by calculation that NSWS pump 1A provides sufficient flow to safety related components in Train 1A conSidering that the flow combines with the flow from NSWS pumps 1 Band 2B in the discharge header and returns to the SNSWP through the B loop (for Train A through 1 RN58B) or through the A loop (for Train B through 1 RN63A).

ML12275A348

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