ML12194A416
| ML12194A416 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/2012 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Progress Energy Co |
| References | |
| 50-400/12-301 | |
| Download: ML12194A416 (271) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 05000400/2012301 Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: 10-27, MOL, 4% power
. Plant startup to full power on HOLD
. A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan under clearance for motor replacement
. PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13, SHUT due to PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage
- GP-005, Power Operation, step 95, MODE 2 Turnover:
. Power ascension is on hold for the next 12 hours due to steam generator chemistry limits exceeding the 5% power chemistry hold point requirements.
. Start the standby Cooling Tower Makeup Pump for vibration checks and secure the running Cooling Tower Makeup Pump.
Critical Tasks:
. Manually actuate Safety Injection prior to an automatic SI actuation signal from low Pressurizer pressure (1850 psig)
. Isolate the C SG prior to commencing max rate cooldown
. Isolate the A SG prior to commencing max rate cooldown Event No. Maif. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N/A N BOP/SRO Start the Standby Cooling Tower Makeup (CTMU) Pump and secure the running CTMU pump 2 RCS1O C RO/SRO Reactor Vessel Flange Leak TS SRO-3 JFB7579 C-BOP/SRO AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan trip with back up auto start Z2715TIC TS SRO- failure (C RCP cooling fan) 4 TT:144 I RO/SRO Letdown Temperature Controller fails LO/Diversion Valve fails to JTB1 436 bypass demineralizers 5 LT:496 C BOP/SRO Controlling C Steam Generator Level Transmitter, LT-496, fails low TS SRO-6 RCSO9C C RO/SRO RCP C rising vibration requires pump trip TS SRO-7 LT:495 Leading to Second SG C Level Transmitter fails low causing Reactor Trip w/o SI Major 8 SGNO5C M ALL SG C SGTR on entry to EPP-004 9 JPB445D C RO/SRO A and B SI Train failure to actuate Automatically (SI manual JPB446D actuation Switch 1 is not available) xcliO36 10 DSGO4A C BOP/SRO
- B Sequencer skips load block 3 starting of B ESW 11 SGNO5A C BOP SG A SGTR prior to initiation of RCS cooldown (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 1 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 1
SUMMARY
The A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan is under clearance for motor replacement. PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13, SHUT due to PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage. Radiation monitor MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB has failed low and thunderstorms are in the area. The crew will assume the watch while the Startup crew is attending a briefing by Reactor Engineering to discuss changes to the Reactivity Plan. The candidates are to maintain current plant conditions with Reactor Power 3-4%. Event 1: Upon taking the shift the crew will start the standby Cooling Tower Makeup pump lAW OP-i 41 section 8.2, complete the valve alignment and secure the running pump. Event 2: Reactor Vessel Flange leak of 5 gpm. Annunciator ALB-10-5-5, Reactor vessel flange leakoff high temp will alarm when MCB temperature indicator Tl-401 reaches 140°F (approximately 1 minute after leak starts). The crew may also notice Pressurizer level slowly decreasing or an increase in Charging flow. Responding to the annunciator will direct the operator to shut 1 RC-46, Head Flange Seal leakoff Line Isolation to stop leakage from the inner Reactor head seal. With the condition clear the crew may not enter AOP-0i 6. If AOP-01 6 were entered, the actions for AOP-01 6 are included for the response. The SRO should evaluate the following Tech Spec for the time the leak exceeded 10 gpm: T.S. 3.4.6.2: Reactor Coolant System operational leakage shall be limited to:
- d. 10 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System (Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4)
Action:
- b. With any Reactor Coolant System operational leakage greater than anyone of the above limits, excluding primary-to-secondary leakage, PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE and leakage from Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
Event 3: Trip of AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan with back up auto start failure. The failure will cause annunciator ALB-029 4-5 Containment Fan Coolers AH-39 Low Flow-O/L to alarm. The crew should identify that the standby fan did not auto start and start the standby fan. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 2 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 1
SUMMARY
(continued) Event 4: Letdown Temperature Controller failure. This failure will cause temperature controller TK-144 output to decrease to zero. Without cooling to the letdown heat exchanger, temperatures observed on TI-i 43 will increase. At 135°F annunciator ALB 07-3-2, Demin Flow Diversion High Temp will alarm. The crew should respond lAW the alarm procedure. The RO should identify that the divert valve to the VCT has failed to respond. The RO should report the failure to the SRO and should manually bypass the CVCS Demineralizers. The SRO should provide directions to the RO to restore letdown temperature to normal utilizing MANUAL control. The SRO should provide a temperature band to the RO lAW OMM-001, Conduct of Operations, for operation of components in manual. The SRO can find this temperature band guidance in OP-i 07. With TK-i44 controller not in auto the temperature band should be from 110 120°F. The CVCS Demineralizers will remain bypassed pending an evaluation for continued resin use. Event 5: Controlling Steam Generator Level Channel on SG C, LT-496, failing low. The BOP should respond to multiple C Steam Generator alarms on ALB-0i4 and take manual control of the C FRV Bypass valve in accordance with the alarm response procedures and 0MM-aOl, Conduct of Operations. The SRO should evaluate the following Tech Specs for failure of LT-496: T.S. 3.3.1: As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-i shall be OPERABLE Total No. Channels Minimum Functional Unit of Channels Channels Mode Acdon 13 Steam Generator Water 3/stm. gen. 2lstm. gen. in 2lstm. gen. each 1, 2 6 Level . . Low-low any operating operating stm. gen. stm. gen.
- 14. Steam Generator Water Level -Low
- 2 stm. gen. 1 stm. gen. 1 stm. gen. level 1,2 6 Coincident With Steam! level and level coincident and 2 stm./teed Feedwater Flow Mismatch 2 stm./feed- with 1 water flow water flow stm./feedwater mismatch in same mismatch in flow mismatch in stm. gen. or 2 each stm. gen. same stm. gen. stm. gen. level and 1 stm./feedwater flow mismatch in same stm. gen.
ACTION 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1 .1 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 3 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 T.S. 3.3.2: The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4. Total No. Channels Minimum Functional unit of Channels Channels Mode Action
- 5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation
- b. Steam Generator Water 4/stm. gen. 2lstm. gen. 3fstm. gen. 1,2 19 Level - - High-High (P-14) in any stm. gen. in each stm. gen.
- 6. Auxiliary Feedwater
- c. Steam Generator Water Level - - Low-Low
- 1) Start Motor 3lstm. gen. 2lstm. gen. 2lstm. gen. 1,2,3 19 in any stm. in each stm.
Driven Pumps gen. gen. 3/stm. gen. 2lstm. gen. 2fstm. gen. 1,2,3 19
- 2) Start Turbine in any stm. gen. in each stm. gen.
Driven Pump Action 19 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up t o 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.
The OWP is not required to be implemented in order to continue with the scenario. If the crew allows SG levels to decrease to < 30% they will be required to perform a manual Reactor Trip. Event 6: RCP C vibration will begin and continue to increase. The crew will respond to ALB-010-3-5, RCP-C Trouble and identify the C RCP vibration probe readings are increasing and in alarm. The crew should enter AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions and perform the immediate actions. Vibrations will continue to increase and exceed AOP-01 8 RCP trip criteria. Since power is <P-8, the crew should secure the C RCP and shut 1 RC-1 03, PZR Spray valve, without performing a manual Reactor trip. The SRO should evaluate the following Tech Spec for securing the C RCP: T.S. 3.4.1 .1: All Reactor Coolant loops must be in operation (Modes 1 and 2) ACTION: With less than the above required reactor coolant loops in operation, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 4 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-i HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 1
SUMMARY
(continued) Event 7: Second SG C level transmitter failure low causes Reactor Trip. Crew will enter PATH-i perform the immediate actions then transition to EPP-004, Reactor Trip Response (Safety Injection will not be required at this time.) Event 8: Major SGTR. When the crew enters EOP-EPP-004, Reactor Trip Recovery, a 420 gpm SGTR on the C SG will be ramped in over a 2 minute period. The crew should identify decreasing Pressurizer level and pressure. They should identify that C SG level is increasing in an uncontrolled manner. Event 9: A and B SI Train failure to actuate automatically (SI manual actuation Switch 1 is not available). The crew will soon be faced with RCS pressure reaching the ESFAS setpoint of < 1850 psig or determine that Pressurizer level cannot be maintained >5% (EPP-004 fold out criteria for SI activation). The automatic SI actuation relays are failed. When the crew attempts to manually actuate a Safety Injection using switch 1 (at the center console) it will not function requiring the crew to use the second switch for manual actuation. When SI is activated the crew will transition back to PATH-i. PATH-i action: The crew will stop feed flow by shutting the C SG isolation valves based on foldout criteria for Rupture SG AFW isolation. C SG level will be increasing in an uncontrolled manner or Narrow range level may have increased to >25%. When the crew reaches PATH-i step i 3, stabilize and maintain temperature between 555°F and 559°F using Table 1, a second SG rupture will occur. The A SG rupture will be another 420 gpm break with a 2 minute ramp. This will allow the crew to reach step 16 and transition to PATH-2. Event iO: B Sequencer skips load block 3 starting of B ESW. During SI actuation the EDG sequencers will run. The B sequencer will skip loading the B ESW pump. The BOP should identify that the B ESW pump is not operating while monitoring the B Emergency Sequencer operation. The RO should NOT start the B ESW pump prior to the sequencer reaching manual load block 9. Before the crew starts the B ESW pump an autostart signal will be generated on low pressure and the pump will autostart. This autostart will cause multiple Service Water alarms. A follow-up question to the RO and SRO about what happened to the ESW system during the event may be warranted if the crew does not identify what happened during the event. Event ii: Second SGTR. When the crew transitions to PATH-2 the A SGTR will become apparent. The crew should identify the A SG level increasing in an uncontrolled manner. Once identified PATH-2 foldout C for multiple tube rupture criteria has the CRS return to step 1. PATH-2 step 10 will require the crew to identify the lowest ruptured steam generator pressure to find the required target core exit temperature then initiate a rapid cooldown. The crew should identify the lowest ruptured SG pressure then initiate the cooldown. The scenario ends when the crew has determined the target temperature and has been reached and the plant is being stabilized (at step i 2.c). Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. i Page 5 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:
- 1. Manually actuate Safety Injection prior to an automatic SI actuation signal from low Pressurizer pressure (1850 psig)
Pressurizer pressure and level will be lowering to where an automatic SI should occur at 1850 psig. The crew will have to respond to these conditions soon after implementing EPP-004. The crew should actuate a manual SI based on OPS NGGC-1 000 Section 9.2 Conservative Decision Making, Expectations #2: If degrading plant conditions are recognized in sufficient time, crews are expected to take manual actions prior to reaching the automatic setpoint for prescribed ESF and RPS actuations. The determination of whether to manually initiate an anticipated automatic action would include consideration of parameter trends and applicable plant parameter values approaching the setpoint. Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is Pressurizer Pressure < 1850 psig without a Manual SI actuation.
- 2. Isolation of ruptured C Steam Generator feed water flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG, prior to commencing max rate cool down In this scenario the C Steam Generator is ruptured and must be isolated to minimize radiological releases and to maintain pressure in the ruptured steam generator greater than the pressure in at least one intact steam generator following cooldown of the RCS in subsequent steps. Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is isolation must be completed prior to the crew opening the Steam dumps or SG PORVs to pertorm a max rate cool down.
- 3. Isolation of ruptured A Steam Generator feed water flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG, prior to commencing max rate cool down In this scenario the A steam generator also ruptures following actions to isolate the C steam generator and must be isolated to minimize radiological releases and to maintain pressure in the ruptured steam generator greater than the pressure in at least one intact steam generator following cooldown of the RCS in subsequent steps. Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is isolation must be completed prior to the crew opening the Steam dumps or SG PORVs to perform a max rate cool down.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 6 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 SIMULATOR SETUP For the 2012 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario # 1 Reset to IC-161 password sandwich Goto RUN Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. Set ERFIS screens (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Post conditions for status board from IC-27 Mode 2 <5% Reactor power Startup on HOLD for briefing Provide a marked up copy of GP-005 Rev 70 through Step 95 Control Bank D at 97 steps RCS boron 1594 ppm RCS press 2220 2250 all PZR heaters ON SG level maintained with A MFW pump and FW Reg Bypass Vlvs in Auto RCS temp 558.8° F, stable on Steam Dumps RCS temp band from step 52 is 555°F 561°F Main Turbine at 1800 rpm Hang CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan Place a copy of OWP-RM-09 for failure of MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB in OWP book Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates Hang STAR placard on Rod Control In/Out Switch Hang STAR placard on Steam Dump controller M/A station Set CRT screen 3 to QP POAH Update the status board: PZR PORV 444B, TS 3.4.4, actions met block valve shut. Rad Monitor MSL C RM-O1MS-3593SB TS 3.3.6.a OOS at 0800 on 2-12-2012 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 7 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 Scenario #1 CAEP file Description of 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Initial conditions were established from lC-27 Mode 2 <5% Reactor power Startup on HOLD for briefing GP-005 Rev 70 Step 95 IC-27 initial conditions for status board information RCS boron 1594 ppm RCS press 2220 2250 all PZR heaters ON SG level maintained with A MEW pump and FW Reg Bypass Vlvs in Auto RCS temp 558.8°F, stable on Steam Dumps RCS temp band from step 52 is 555°F 561°F - Main Turbine at 1800 rpm Simulator Setup Instructions PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage Hang Off-Normal placard on 1 RC-1 13, PORV Block valve Hang CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan Hang STAR placard on Rod Control In/Out switch Hang STAR placard on Steam Dump controller M/A station Place a copy of OWP-RM-09 for failure of MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB in OWP book Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates Set CRT screen 3 to QP POAH SCENARIO 1 CAEP PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage, PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13, SHUT Place CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan idi xb2i072 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) ASIS ilo xb20072g (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OFF ilo xb20072r (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OFF Rad Monitor MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB failed low Place a copy of OWP-RM-09 in OWP book Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 8 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 EVENTS !Event 1: Start the Standby Cooling Tower Makeup (CTMU) Pump and secure the running CTMU Pump Normal BOP/SRO !Event 2: Trigger 2 Reactor Vessel Flange Leak 5gpm, RO shuts 1 RC-46 Component RO / SRO Tech Spec 3.4.6.2 SRO Tech Spec SRO - imf rcsl0 (200:00:0000:00:00) 500:02:00 Event 3: AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan trip on low flow with back up auto start failure NOTE: This low flow trip will not be actuated for 15 seconds after the trigger is put in I NOTE: This malfunction is deleted after the standby fan is manually started with conditional trigger 13 If the malfunction is not deleted the standby fan will trip on low flow in 15 seconds Component- BOP/SRO Tech Spec 3.6.1.5 SRO-imf jfb7579 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAlL_SET, FAIL_R imf z27l5tic (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS !Event 4: Trigger 4 Letdown Temp Controller fails LOW & Divert valve fails to bypass demins Instrument RO I SRO imf tt:144 (400:00:00 00:00:00) 0.0 00:00:00 imf jtbl43b (4 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS
!Event 5: Trigger 5 SG C Level Channel LT-496 fails LOW, OWP-RP-06 Instrument BOP I SRO Tech Specs 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3.6 SRO-imf lt:496 (5 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0.0 00:00:30 !Event 6: Trigger 6- RCP C Rising vibration requires pump trip lAW AOP-018 Vibrations go to 30 mils with a 3 minute ramp Component RO / SRO Tech Spec 3.4.1.1 SRO imf rcs09c (6 00:00:00 00:00:00) 30.0 00:03:00 !Event 7: Trigger 7 Second SG C Level Channel LT-495 fails LOW, Reactor Trip imf lt:495 (700:00:00 00:00:00) 0.0 00:00:00 !Event 8: Trigger 8 SG C SGTR on entry to EPP-004 Major-ROIBOPISRO imf sgno5c (8 00:00:00 00:00:00) 420 00:02:00 0 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 9of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIO 1 !Event 9: Preloaded, no trigger A and B SI Train Auto failure to actuate (SI manual actuation switch 1 is not available) Tech Spec SRO-imf JPB445D (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAILURE_TO_INIT imf JPB446D (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAILURE_TO_INIT idi xci i036 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) ASIS !Event 10: Preloaded, no trigger B Sequencer skips load block 3 for starting B ESW Component RO / SRO imf dsgo4a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) 4 2 !Event ii: Trigger 11 SG A SGTR while checking for RCS Temp control in PATH-i Component RO / SRO imf sgno5a (11 00:00:00 00:00:00) 420 00:02:00 0 Trigger 13 is a Conditional trigger that deletes the malfunction to prevent AH-39B tripping in 15 seconds trg 13 AH 398 start Trg= 13 dmf jfb7579 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 10 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 11 of 63 Event
Description:
Start CTMU Pump 1&2X Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the crew has completed their board walk down and are ready to take the shift inform the Simulator Operator to p1 ace the Simulator in Run. When the Simulator is in run Lead Evaluator: announce: CREW UPDATE (SROs Name) Your crew has the shift. END OF UPDATE When directed by the Lead Evaluator, ensure that the Simulator Operator: annunciator horns are on and place the Simulator in RUN. After the crew has taken the shift the BOP will place CTMU Lead Evaluator: pump 1&2X in service and secure CTMU Pump lx. Before inserting the first failure wait for the CTMU pump alignment to be completed AND the BOP to return to the at Evaluator Note: the controls area. A copy of OP-141 Section 8.2 is on the next page. Obtains a copy of OP-141 Reviews Section 8.2, Placing the Standby CTMU Pump in Service
. Contacts Outside AO for Attachment 6 actions BOP o CTMU Pumps Seal Bearing PreLube Tank Filled to within normal range.
o Lube oil level on the upper bearing of the CTMU Pump 1 &2X greater than 1/3 the height of the associated gauge glass. I printed out a copy of OP-141 and have the procedure in hand. Attachment 6 is complete. Communicator: CTMU Pumps Seal Bearing PreLube Tank is filled to normal range and the lube oil level on the upper bearing of the CTMU Pump 1&2X is filled to >2/3 full. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 11 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRO Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page j of Event
Description:
Start CTMU Pump 1&2X Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior L2 Placing the Standby CTMU Pump in Service
&2t Initial Conditions Operations desires to switch the running and standby pumps, or to run both CTMU pumps &22. Procedural Steps NOTE: The following steps describe starting Cooling Tower Makeup (CTMIJ)
Punici i&2X and securing CTMU Pump 1X, To start 1X and secure 1&2X, use the component and valve numbers in parentheses I PERFORM Attachment 6.
- 2. PLACE CTMU Pump I&2X (IX) control switch to START AND OBSERVE the following:
- a. 3MP-36 (iMP29) Prelubricating Water Supply vaive 1&2X (1 X) opens and Seal and Lube Pump 182X(IX) staits.
b, GTMLJ Pump 1&2X (IX) starts after sufficient seal water flow has been provided for 60 seconds. NOTE: 3MP-36 (llvlP-29) Pr&ubrcating Water Supply Valve l&2X (IX) may siut before the 3MP-38 (I MP-28) Lube Water Supply Valve l&2X (1 X) opens, due to design interlocks.. This allows the Seal and Lube Pump I &2X (IX) to mn without a suction source and the CTMU Pump I&2X ( 1X) to run without seal ow for a few seconds. Tlvs is an expected condiion and wdl not harm the Seal and Lube Pump or CTMU Pump.
- c. 3MP-3$ (1 MP-.28) Lube Water Supply Valve I &2X (1 X) opens and 3MP-36 (iMP29) Pelubricatinq Water Supply I&2X (IX) shuts.
- 3. IF necessary.
THEN RESET the CTMU pump Vibration switch. jCP14i Rv. 38 Paé 25 of iT Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 12 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page i of Event
Description:
Start CTMU Pump 1&2X Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 8.12 Procedural Steps (continued)
- 3. VENT the discharge pressure gauge LPI-1960 or P1-1961) for the pump just placed in seniice by UNCAPPING an CYCLING open then shut the apolicable valve: (valve cot opened can be marked N/A) a For P1-1960 (lx CTMU pump. IMP-4-OV-l
- b. For P1-1961 (l&2X CTMU pump), 3MP-7-DVI
- c. Install the cap that was removed
- 5. IF the Seal Water Booster Pump 1&2X (iX) has been drained for maintenance, THEN PERFORM the following. Other,ise, this step is N/A.
- a. OPEN 3MP-43 (IMP-34), Booster 182X(IX) Cyclone Separator Irain Valve, until Seal Water Booster Pump pressure is steady or a solid stream of water is observed.
- h. RETURN 3MP-43 (1 MP-$) open until approx I gpm flew is observed.
- 6. WHEN o pump operaton is no longer desired, THEN PLACE CTMU Pump IX (i&2X) control switch to STOP and observe the following:
- a. CTMU Pump IX (l&2X) stops.
Ii Seal and Lube Pump 1X (l&2X) stops. c, Lube Water Supply Valve tX (1 &2X) shuts. I. IF necessary, THEN ADJUST lMP6I (LCV-1931), CTMIJ Level Control Valve, to maintain desired Cooling Tower basin level and Cooling Tower blowdown flow.
- 8. IF necessary, THEN UNLOCK AM) THROTTLE IMP-73, C.T. Make-up and CT.
8ldov.n Cross lie Valve, to maintain desired GTMUiSiewdown Crosstie fiow
- 9. LOCK I MP-73 in throttled position when desired flow is established.
- 0. PLACE CTMU Pump 1X (1 82X) control switch to AUTO.
OP-141 Rev.3 I Pae26oui1 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 13 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 14 of Event
Description:
Start CTMU Pump 1&2X Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Informs AC that they are about to start CTMU Pump 1&2X and to observe the actions of Section 8.2.2 step 2 (page 25)
. 3MP-36 Prelubricating Water Supply valve 1 &2X opens and Seal and Lube Pump 1&2X starts.
BOP
. CTMU Pump 1 &2X starts after sufficient seal water flow has been provided for 60 seconds.
. 3MP-38 Lube Water Supply Valve 1 &2X opens and 3MP-36 Prelubricating Water Supply 1&2X shuts.
Communicator: Acknowledge directions CTMU Panel alarms: Transient Annunciators CTMP-1-1 CHAN A CLG TWR MU BYP FLOW LO / HI associated with CTMU pump start: CTMP-2-1 CHAN B CLG TWR MU BYP FLOW LO / HI CTMP-3-3 CLG TWR MU PUMP 1 & 2 DISCH PRESS HIGH Makes plant PA announcement prior to starting the 1 &2X CTMU pump. BOP Takes MCB CTMU 1&2X switch to START (starts the pump) Acknowledges transient annunciators / resets when clear Communicator: Report good start of CTMU Pump Directs AC to perform step 4 VENT the discharge pressure gauge (P1-1960 or P1-1961) for the pump just placed in service by UNCAPPING and CYCLING BOP open then shut the applicable valve: (valve not opened can be marked N/A)
- a. For P1-1961 (1&2X CTMU pump), 3MP-7-DV1
- b. Install the cap that was removed Communicator: Acknowledge request and report back in 1 minute that step 4 is complete Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 14 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: !J Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page j. of 63 Event
Description:
Start CTMU Pump 1&2X Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior WHEN two pump operation is no longer desired, THEN PLACE CTMU Pump 1X control switch to STOP and observe the following: Stops CTMU Pump 1 X and observes
- a. CTMU Pump 1X stops.
BOP b. Seal and Lube Pump 1X stops.
- c. Lube Water Supply Valve 1 X shuts (1 MP-28).
Contacts AC to ensure steps b and c have occurred. Communicator: Seal and Lube Pump 1X has stopped. Lube Water Supply Valve 1X (1MP-28) has shut. Checks that adjusting 1 MP-61, CTMU Level Control Valve is BOP not needed then places CTMU Pump 1X control switch to AUTO. Informs CRS and Contacts System Engineer. When the BOP has completed the pump start, returns to the MCB at the controls area and informs the CRS that the 1&2X CTMU Pump is running and 1X is secured continue with the scenario. Evaluator Cue: Cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 2: Event 2 Reactor Vessel Flange Leak. NOTE: The high temperature alarm will take 1 minute after inserting the trigger. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 15 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jjQ Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page j. of 63 Event
Description:
Reactor Vessel Flange Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 2: Simulator Operator: Reactor Vessel Flange Leak
. ALB-1 0-5-5, Reactor Vessel Flange Leakoff High Temp Indications Available:
. Tl-401, Reactor Vessel Flange Leakoff Temp increasing Responding to the annunciator will direct the operator to shut 1 RC-46, Head Flange Seal leakoff Line Isolation to Evaluator Note:
stop leakage from the inner Reactor head seal. With the condition clear the crew may not enter AOP-01 6. APP RO Responds to alarm and evaluates APP-ALB-O1O-5-5 ALB-OIO
- CONFIRM alarm using:
o Tl-401 o Reports Tl-401 96 reading or trending high.
. VERIFY Automatic Functions: None PERFORM Corrective Actions:
o CHECK containment temperature trend for high containment temperature resulting from a nearby steam/RCS leak (NONE) o Shut 1 RC-46, Head Flange Seal Leakoff Line Isolation to stop leakage from inner Reactor head seal o Monitors Tl-401 indications and identifies temperature is decreasing RO Informs SRO Reactor Vessel Flange leakage is isolated
. Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist
- Contacts WCC to coordinate Containment entry per AP-545 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 16 of 63
Arxendix D ODerator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 17 of 63 Event
Description:
Reactor Vessel Flange Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Any Tech Spec evaluation can be conducted with a follow Evaluator Note: up question after the scenario. Enters Reactor Coolant System TS 3.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System operational leakage shall be limited to:
- d. 10 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System.
ACTION B. With any Reactor Coolant System operational leakage greater than anyone of the above SRO limits, excluding primary-to-secondary leakage, PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE and leakage from Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 17 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fç Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 18 of 63 Event
Description:
Reactor Vessel Flange Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following write up is if AOP-O1 6 is used for the Evaluator Note: response to the Reactor Vessel Flange Leak. Identifies entry conditions met for AOP-O1 6, Excessive Primary Crew Plant Leakage NOTE- AOP-016 contains NO Immediate Actions Enters AOP-O1 6 AOP-O1 6 SRO Makes a plant PA announcement for AOP entry CHECK RHR in operation (NO) CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability (YES) MAINTAIN VCT level GREATER THAN 5% (YES) SRO CHECK Containment Ventilation monitors clear (YES) Radiation monitors normal (YES) Evacuate personnel from area (NO) NOTIFY Chemistry to stop any primary sampling activities BOP (Calls Chemistry) Communicator: Acknowledge request to stop primary sampling activities. PERFORM a qualitative RCS flow balance ESTIMATE leak rate considering the following parameters:
. PRZ level rate of change (-.55 gal/% at 683°F)
- Charging flow RO
- Total seal injection flow
- Letdown flow
. Total seal return flow (Estimate = 3-5 gpm flow to RCDT)
Operate Letdown as necessary to maintain Charging on scale (NO changes required) Determines it is not necessary to more accurately quantify SRO leakage_using_either OST-1026 or OST-1226 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 18 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page i of Event
Description:
Reactor Vessel Flange Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Any Tech Spec evaluation can be conducted with a follow Evaluator Note up question after the scenario. Enters Reactor Coolant System TS 3.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System operational leakage shall be limited to:
- d. 10 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System.
ACTION B. With any Reactor Coolant System SRO operational leakage greater than anyone of the above limits, excluding primary-to-secondary leakage, PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE and leakage from Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Leak location identified from MCB indications SRO
. From RV Flange BOP NOTIFY HP of reactor vessel flange leakage Communicator: Acknowledge RCs leakage is coming from reactor vessel flange.
Transitions to Attachment 6: Leakage From RV Flange
. Consult with Operation Management to determine leak isolation and recovery actions SRO Exit AOP-016 Contacts WCC to coordinate Containment entry per AP-545 Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist After Tech Spec is identified and a request for support has Evaluator Cue: been completed, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 3 Event 3 AH-39 Containment Fan trip Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 19 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page of Event Description. AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan trip With back up auto start failure (C RCP cooling fan) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 3: Simulator Operator: AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit Fan trip Indications Available . ALB-029-4-5 CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS AH-39 LOW FLOW O/L -
. Increasing C RCP stator winding temperatures BOP RESPONDS to alarms and ENTERS APP-ALB-029-4-5
. CONFIRM alarm using:
o AH-39 fans running indication (NO) o Damper position indication (YES)
. VERIFY Automatic Functions:
o Running fan trips (YES) o Backup fan starts (NO) (BOP starts the standby fan, may BOP utilize OP-i 69 section 5.2) PERFORM Corrective Actions: o CHECK standby fan STARTS AND lead fan STOPS. o DISPATCH an operator to check status of the following breakers:
- iDi-1A, AH-39 (1A-NNS) CNMT Fan Cooler
- iEl-7C, AH-39 (iB-NNS) CNMT Fan Cooler Three minutes after being dispatched to check the breaker for 1D1-1A, AH-39 (1A-NNS) CNMT Fan cooler breaker,
. report that:
Communicator: The indications on the Static Tnp Unit show that an Overload Condition occurred for AH-39 A fan. There are no abnormalities on the AH-39B breaker. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 20 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: j4flQ Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page i of Event
Description:
AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan trip With back up auto start failure (C RCP cooling fan) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior o IF any breaker has tripped on OVERLOAD or SHORT CIRCUIT as indicated on the Static Trip Unit, THEN PERFORM the following: (Directs AO to perform based on report from communicator) BOP DEPRESS the breaker Alarm Reset. RACK OUT the breaker using OP-i 56.02, AC Electrical Distribution.
- VERIFY cause of the over current trip is determined prior to returning the breaker to service.
Acknowledge request to perform directed actions Communicator: at 101-lA Simulator Operator: Rack out breaker 1 Dl -1 A for AH-39 Run AMS file AH39ARackedOut This will override the switch to STOP and turn off the RED and GREEN MCB switch lights. Have communicator report back after running file. RO Monitors RCP C parameters on ERFIS and or OSI P1 Reviews/prepares OMM-00i, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist for the failure of AH-39. Contacts support personnel for repairs. When breaker racking is completed, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 4 Evaluator Cue: Event 4 Letdown Temperature Controller fails LO/Diversion Valve fails to bypass demineralizers Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 21 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fQ Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page of 63 Event
Description:
Letdown Temperature Control Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When directed by the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 4: Simulator Operator: Letdown Temperature Controller fails LO/Diversion Valve fails to bypass demineralizers
. ALB-007-3-2, DEMIN FLOW DIVERSION HIGH TEMP
. ALB-007-5-5, COMPUTER ALARM CHEM & VOL SYSTEMS Indications Available:
. TK-144 output decreases to 0
. TI-144.i HX Out Temp decreases to 0
- TI-i 43 temperature increasing Changes in Letdown temperature can have an affect the demineralizers resins. During high input temperature a boron Evaluator Note: release can occur (effects similar to a boration) and during low input temperatures a boron absorption can occur (effects similar to a dilution).
RO Responds to alarm and enters APP-ALB-007-3-2.
. CONFIRM alarm using:
RO o TI-143, LP Letdown Temperature. a Reports TI-i 43 reading or trending high.
. VERIFY Automatic Functions:
o Manually positions 1CS-50, Letdown to VCT/Demin, to divert flow to the VCT. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 22 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 23 of 3 Event
Description:
Letdown Temperature Control Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PERFORM Corrective actions: o VERIFY that 1CS-50 diverts flow to the VCT, bypassing the BTRS and Purification Demineralizers. a PERFORM the following as needed to lower letdown temperature: RO
- VERIFY proper charging flow is established. (YES)
- LOWER letdown flow. (N/A CCW Problem) a IF CCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger appears low, THEN:
- TAKE manual control of TK-144.
OPEN 1 CC-337, to raise CCW flow.
. Provide a temperature band lAW OMM-001 for operation of components in manual. OP-107 page 31 with TK-144 controller in auto directions is to maintain temperature from 110 120°F. (NOTE this is not the only procedure that provides temperature guidance)
SRO . The CVCS Demineralizers will remain bypassed pending an evaluation.
. Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist
. Contacts Work Control and/or System Engineer for assistance.
If contacted as WCC, System Engineer or Chemistry: Communicator: Maintain flow bypassing the demineralizers until a resin damage assessment is compIeted After crew has restored CCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 5. Evaluator Cue: Event 5 Controlling C Steam Generator Level Transmitter, LT-496, fails low Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 23 of 63
Aooendix D Ooerator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 4 of Event
Description:
SG C Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 5: Simulator Operator: SG C Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low)
. ALB-01 4-3-1 B SG C NR LEVEL! SP HI I LO DEV Indications Available: . ALB-014-6-4B SG C LOW LOW LEVEL
. ALB-017-1-1 SG LEVEL ATWS PANEL TROUBLE RO RESPONDS to multiple C SG alarms The APP-ALB-014-3-1B and 14-6-48 actions are similar.
Evaluator Note: lAW OPS-NGGC-1 000, the operator may take MANUAL control of a malfunctioning controller before being directed by a procedure or the SRO.
. CONFIRM alarm using:
o Ll-494 SA, LI-495 SB, or Ll-496 SA, Steam Generator C BOP level indicators. o Reports Ll-496 reading or failed low.
. VERIFY Automatic Functions: NONE
- PERFORM Corrective Actions:
o CHECK Steam Flow (FI-494, Fl-495) AND Feed Flow (Fl 496, 497) for deviation. (YES) o IF FCV-498, SG C auto level controller, is NOT sufficiently correcting level, THEN: (YES)
- SWITCH to MANUAL.
- RESTORE level to normal (57% NR).
- Provides level band and trip guidance for C SG level while in manual control lAW OMM-OO1, Attachment 13 o SG Level Control Band 52% to 62%
SRO o Trip limit Low 30% Trip limit High 73%
. Refer to OWP-RP-07 to remove channel from service.
. Dispatch AO to investigate Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 24 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fj. Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page of Event
Description:
SG C Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OWP-RP-07 has been included as Attachment 1 at the end of this scenario Evaluator Note: Failed channel does NOT have to be removed from service to continue the scenario. Enters Instrumentation TS 3.3.1 Functional Unit 13, 14 ACTION 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing SRO of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1 3.3.2 Functional Unit 5.b, 6.c Action 19 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up t o 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 25 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 26 of 63 Event
Description:
SG C Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- Requests extra operator for dedicated feedwater operation
. Direct operator and l&C to perform OWP-RP-07 SRO . Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist.
. Contacts WCC for assistance / generation of Work Request
. Contacts support personnel for repairs.
Acknowledge request and reports from SRO. IF an extra operator is requested, state that no one is
. available right now and someone will be sent when Communicator:
available. IF asked to report to MCR to perform OWP-RP-07 state that you will report as soon as possible. It is not required to implement the OWP prior to continuing Simulator Operator: with the scenario. After Tech Spec evaluation is performed, cue the Simulator Evaluator Cue: Operator to insert Trigger 6. Event 6 C RCP high vibration Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 26 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NB Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 27 of 63 Event
Description:
C RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: On cue from the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 6: C RCP high vibration
. ALB-O1O-3-5, RCP-C TROUBLE Indications Available: . C RCP vibration monitors increasing and red high vibration lights lit RO Responds to alarm ALB-O1O-3-5.
Crew may review ALB-O1O-3-5 but will likely go directly to Evaluator Note: AOP-018 when high vibration is recognized. ENTERS and directs actions of AOP-O1 8, Reactor Coolant AOP-O1 8 SRO Pump Abnormal Operations. Makes PA announcement for AOP entry. RO Perform AOP-018 Immediate Action Immediate Action Check any CSIP running. (YES) SRO Inform SM to refer to PEP-i 10 and enter the EAL Matrix. SRO Proceeds to Section 3.2, RCP High Vibration. The answer to the following question may be YES at this time but the limit will be exceeded in short order. This is a continuous action step that should be implemented when Evaluator Note: the limit is exceeded. The scenario guide is therefore written as if the limit is exceeded when the step is read. Attachment 1 is on next 2 pages for evaluator use. SRO Check all RCPs operating within limits of Att 1. (NO) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 27 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 48Q Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 28 of Event
Description:
C RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDONS I Attachment I Sheet I of 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Limits NOTE False indications such as step changes or spikes on both the upper and lower thrust bearings are signs that the instrumentation transient may not be valid. Validation of the temperatures should be performed by observing positive indications Of any of the following
- Simultaneous temperature increases in upper and lower thrust bearing and upper guide bearing (may indicate loss of CCW cooling or o vscosty problems common to the upper resetvolr)
- Vibrabon levels increasing along with increasnlg bearing tempefatures.
High or low RCP oil level alarms along with increasing bearing temperatures.
- 1. ANY of the following Motor Beafing temperatures exceeaFng igOF: tAil ERFIS Points RCPA RCPB RCPC Mtr Upper Thrust Brg Temp TRCO4I7A TRCO427A TRCQ437A Mtr Lower Thrust Brg Temp TRCO4 178 TRC04278 TRCO43IB Mtr Upper Radial Brg Temp TRCO4 ISA TRCO428A TRCO43BA Mtr Lower Radial Brg Temp TRCO4I 9 TRC0429 TRCO43S
- 2. ANY of the following Pump temperatures exceeding 230F: [Al]
- ERFIS Points RCPA RCPB RCPC Pump Radial Brg Temp TRCOI3I TRCO 128 rco 125 Seal Water Inlet Temp TRCOI32 TRCQI29 TRCO126 D. ROP Stator Winding temperature exceeding 300F:
ERFIS Points RCPA RCPB RCPC Motoc Staler Windg Temp TRCO4 188 TRC04288 TRCO43BB AOP-018 Rev 40 Page27otS9 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 28 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page of 63 Event
Description:
C RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS Attachment 1 Sheet 2 of 2 Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Limits NOTE
- ALB-511-2B, RCP THERM BAR HDR LOW FLOW, indicates loss of 0GW to all RCP thermal barriers.
- The ASI System will actuate in 2 minutes and 45 seconds from timer initiation. If 2 minutes and 45 seconds have not elapsed WAIT for initiation.
- 4. Loss of all RCP seal injection (including ASI) when ANY of the following conditions exist:
- CCW flow is lost to the associated RCP Thermal Barrier HX
- RCS temperature is greater than or equal to 400°F AND COW HX outlet temperature is greater than 105°F
- RCS temperature is less than 400°F AND CCW HX outlet temperature is greater than 125F D5. RCP vibration in excess of the following: tAil
- 20 mils shaft
- 15 mils shaft and increasing greater than I milihr
- 5 mils frame
- For A and C RCPs ONLY: 3 mils frame and increasing greater than 0.2 mu/hr
- For B RCP ONLY: 3.5 mils frame and increasing greater than 0.2 mils/br
- 6. RCP Motor current fluctuations of 40 amps peak-to-peak:
ERRS Points RCPA RCPB RCPC Motor Current IRGO1 60 IRCO1 61 IRCOI 62 D7. Loss of COW to an RCP or RCP Motor when: a An RCP has operated for 10 minutes without CCW flow to either motor oil cooler [A.2]
- Isolation of COW to an RCP is necessary to stop excessive CCW System leakage END OF ATTACHMENT 1 --
AOP-018 Rev. 40 Page 28 of 59 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 29 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 30 of 63 Event
Description:
C RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Check reactor power> P-8. (NO) RO Check more than one RCP affected. (NO) The SRO may conduct a brief on Attachment 7 before the Evaluator Note: RCP is stopped. RNO Actions: RO Perform the following:
. STOP the affected RCP. (RCP C)
SRO . REFER TO Attachment 7, Operation With Two RCPs.
- GOTOStep11.
RO CHECK all RCPs RUNNING. (NO) RNO Actions: (N/A) PERFORM the following:
- a. IF RCP A is secured, then shut 1RC-107, PRZ Spray Loop A (N/A)
- b. IF RCP B is secured, then shut 1RC-103, PRZ Spray Loop B (N/A)
- c. VERIFY SG levels being maintained between 52%
BOP and 62%.
- d. MONITOR rod insertion limits (Refer to Section F curve RO from Curve Book)
- e. INITIATE a plant shutdown using ONE of the following:
- GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown from Power SRO Operation to Hot Standby
*__AOP-038,_Rapid_Downpower Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 30 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 4Q Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 31 of 63 Event
Description:
C RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CONFIRM the vibration alarm VAUD by checking BOTH of the following:
- a. The Green vibration monitor OK light is LIT. (YES)
- b. Either of the following conditions exist:
RO
- Shaft AND frame vibration are proportionally rising (YES)
. Vertical AND Horizontal vibration are proportionally rising (YES)
CHECK the following parameters normal for the affected RCP (reference OSI P1 for AOP-O1 8):
. All parameters listed in Attachment 6, ERFIS Points for Reactor Coolant Pumps RO
- Seal AP Upper
. Oil Reservoir level
. Lower Oil Reservoir level
- RCS Loop Flow
- CONSULT with the Responsible Engineer for recommended follow-up actions.
SRO
. Contacts WCC for assistance / generation of Work Request
. Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist REFER TO the following Tech Specs 3.4.1.1 All Reactor Coolant Loops shall be in operation MODES 1 and 2 SRO
. With less than the above required reactor coolant loops in operation, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
Note: The SRO may not be checking Tech Specs after the Evaluator Cue: RCP trip due to the concerns of plant control and shutting the plant down. If required, ask a follow up question about Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 31 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jQ Scenario # Event# 6 Page of 63 Event
Description:
C RCP High Vibrations Time [osition L Applicants Actions or Behavior the RCP Tech Spec after the scenario ends. After the SRO has evaluated Tech Specs, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 7. Event 7 Second C SG Level Transmitter Failure I Reactor Trip. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 32 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page of Event
Description:
2 C SG Level Transmitter Failure I Reactor Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 7: Simulator Operator: 2 C SG level transmitter fails low (LT-495) causing an automatic Reactor !Turbine Trip
. ALB-012-5-2 REACTOR TRIP STEAM GEN-C Indications Available:
- Multiple System Annunciators RO RESPONDS to automatic Reactor Trip PATH-i SRO ENTERS and directs actions of PATH-i RO/BO P PERFORM immediate actions of PATH-i VERIFY Reactor Trip:
- AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:
- CHECK for any of the following:
Immediate Actions RO o Trip breakers RTA and BYA OPEN (YES) o Trip breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES) ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES) a NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES) VERIFY Turbine Trip: Immediate
- CHECK for any of the following:
Actions BOP o ALL turbine throttle valves SHUT (YES) o ALL turbine governor valves SHUT (YES) VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses Immediate Actions BOP
- 1A-SA and lB-SB Buses energized by off-site power or EDGs (YES, off-site power)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 33 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 4 of 63 Event
Description:
2 C SG Level Transmitter Failure I Reactor Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK SI Actuation:
. CHECK for any of the following LIT:
o SI Actuated bypass permissive light (NO) Immediate Actions RO ALB-1 1 2 ALB-11-5-1
- ALB-1 1 3
- ALB-12-1-4 Immediate . SI actuation REQUIRED (NO)
Actions RO
- GO TO EPP-004, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, step 1 Obtains PATH-i and verifies completion of RO and BOP SRO immediate actions then transitions to EOP-004 After the CRS completes the immediate action review using the path board and transitions to EPP-004 cue the Evaluator Cue:
Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 8 C SG Tube Rupture Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 34 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jfl Scenario # 1 Event # Page of 63 Event
Description:
C SGTR on entry into EPP-004 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 8: Simulator Operator: 420 gpm C SG Tube Rupture Ramped in over 2 minutes EPP-004 SRO EPP-004, Reactor Trip Response Foldout Applies designates foldout items to the RO and BOP SRO Implement FRPs as required (None apply) Evaluate EAL Matrix (informs SM) Check RCS Temperature SRO Check RCPs ANY RUNNING (YES A and B RCP)) Check SG blowdown isolation valves SHUT (BOP-YES) Stabilize AND Maintain Temperature Between 555°F AND 559° F using Table 1. (NOTE: Must secure MSIVs) TARLE 1: RCS ThNPERATURE COW1ROL GUIDELINES FOLLOWING RE TRIP
. Gnid*ce is applicable until antther procedra directs otherwie.
. no RCPs running, lJ use wide range cold leg temperature.
ECS TQERATUR3 TREND LESS TIW( ATER ThAN STAELE AT OR 557 AND 557P AND TRENDING TO DECREASING INCREASING
- Stop dunping
- LE condenser
- Control feed steam availabl, flow and steen transier tunp BOr
- Ciroj feed steen dunp to e*tablinb and flow SThM REESSURE naintain RCS node using tenperacure
- N4intain total O?-126. between 555°F feed fløw Section 5.1 AND 559F OPERATOR greater than AND dunp atean ACTION 110 KPPE to condenser until level greater than - OR 25% 4G%) in at least one
- Dtip eteen on intact SG using intact SG PORTs
. cooldown continues.
- Control feed Th. shut flow to NSIVs AND maintain SG 3YPASS alves levels Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 35 of 63
ADoendix D Orerator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: J! Scenario # 1 Event # Page 36 of Event
Description:
C SGTR on entry into EPP-004 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior C SG Tube Rupture will become apparent with Pressurizer Level and Pressure decreasing and Charging flow rapidly increasing. The crew will determine that EPP Evaluator Note: 004 Safety Injection foldout criteria based on Pressurizer level cannot be maintained > 5% is met and perform a Manual Safety Injection and transition BACK to PATH-i step 1. Identifies that plant parameters have changed and performs a crew update. Per foldout criteria Pressurizer Level will not be RO able to be maintained >5% and recommends a manual Safety Injection. EPP-004 FOLDOUT SI ACTUATION CRITERIA IF any of the following occurs, THEN actuate SI AND GO TO PATH-i:
- RCS subcooling LESS THAN 10°F C 20°F M
. PRZ level CAN NOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER RO THAN 5%
AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA
- IF CST level decreases to less than 10%, THEN switch the AFW water supply to the ESW system using OP 137, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM, Section 8.1.
SRO Directs a MANUAL SI in accordance with Foldout criteria. Initiates a MANUAL SI.
- Actuation switch above Rod Control Fails Critical o Ensures CRS is aware of problem Task RO
- Attempts SI Actuation from second switch o SI actuates (critical to actuate SI prior to Pressurizer pressure_reducing_to < 1850_psig.)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 36 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N.Q Scenario # 1 Event # 9 Page 37 of
. A and B SI Train failure to actuate Automatically Event
Description:
(SI manual actuation Switch 1 is not available) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Transitions back to PATH-i. Reviews immediate actions with crew Reactor Trip (YES) Turbine Trip (YES) PATH-i SRO Power to AC Emergency buses (YES) SI Actuated
. Both Trains Actuated (YES)
Initiate monitoring of the CSFS Trees (Yellow on Heat Sink and SRO I nventroy) Evaluate the EAL Matrix Foldout A Applies. SRO
- Delegates foldout items to RO and BOP The crew should identify that the C SG is ruptured and when Narrow range level is> 25% they should isolate AFW to the ruptured generator based on Foldout A criteria.
Evaluator Note: The RO should be monitoring SI flow and RCS pressure and when RCP trip criteria is met he/she should secure the running RCPs PATH-i Guide Foldout A RCP Trip Criteria RO . SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM
. RCS pressure LESS THAN 1400 PSIG When conditions are met RO should inform the SRO that trip criteria is met SRO Directs RO to secure all RCPs when RCP Trip Criteria is met Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 37 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: iJQ Scenario # 1 Event # 9 Page of A and B SI Train failure to actuate Automatically Event
Description:
(SI manual actuation Switch 1 is not available) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PATH-i Guide Foldout A Ruptured SG AFW Isolation Criteria BOP . CHECK any SG level INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES C and A)
. Narrow range level > 25% [40%] (YES)
SRO Directs BOP to isolate Feed flow to Ruptured SG(s) Isolate Feed flow by shutting the MDAFW AND TDAFW isolation valves to rupture SG(s). Critical. BOP (*Critical to isolate Feedwater flow AND Steam Flow to Task ruptured SGs prior to opening either the Steam Dumps or SG PORVs to commence a max rate cool down) RO Verify All CSIPs AND RHR pumps RUNNING (YES) RO Check SI Flow: SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES) RO RCS pressure - < 230 PSIG (NO) BOTH RHR HX HEADER FLOWS >1000 GPM (NO) RO RNO Verify RHR Valves properly aligned (YES) Locally unlock AND turn ON the breakers for the CSIP suction BOP AND discharge cross-connect valves: (Refer to Attachment 1 1.) Acknowledge request to unlock and turn on the breakers Communicator: for the CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves per PATH-i Guide Attachment 11 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 38 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 9 Page 39 of 63 A and B SI Train failure to actuate Automatically Event
Description:
(SI manual actuation Switch 1 is not available) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Run APPcvcPath-l Att. 6 CSIP suction valve power Simulator Operator: when the APP has completed running inform MCR that PATH-i Attachment 11 is comilete. Check Main Steam Isolation: BOP Main steam isolation ACTUATED (NO not required) Check CNMT Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 RO PSIG (YES) Check AFW Status: Verity AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH BOP ESTABLISHED (YES) BOP LEVEL IN AT LEAST ONE SG > 25% (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 39 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jQ Scenario # 1 Event # 10 Page 4Q of Event
Description:
Sequencer fails to start the B ESW pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The Sequencer fails to start B ESW Pump. The RO may Evaluator Note: identify this failure before the BOP is directed to check sequencer operation. The B ESW pump will auto start on low system pressure Evaluator Note: prior to the sequencer reaching Load Block 9 (LB9). Verify Sequencer Operations AND Alignment Of Components: BOP Check sequencer manual loading permissive (L8-9) ACTUATED (YES identifies B ESWpumo has not started) Energize AC buses 1 Al AND 1 Bi BOP Emergency Bus A-SA to XFMR Al Breaker Al A-SA (SHUTS) Emergency Bus B-SB to XFMR Bl Breaker Bl A-SB (SHUTS) The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes PATH-i Guide Attachment 6. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment without SRO approval. The Scenario Guide still identifies both operator Evaluator Note: positions because the time frame for completion of PATH-i Guide Attachment 6 is not predictable. To follow the BOP actions PATH-i Guide Attachment 6 is included as Attachment 2 at the end of this scenario. Verify alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS BOP Signals using Path-l Guide Attachment 6, Safeguards Actuation Verification, while continuinci with this procedure. Directs AO to place 1 A and 1 B Air Compressor in the local BOP control mode per PATH-l Attachment 6 step 22 Acknowledge the request to place 1 A and 1 B Air Communicator Compressor in the local control mode. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 40 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 4flQ Scenario # 1 Event # 10 Page 41 of Event
Description:
Sequencer fails to start the B ESW pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When directed to place the 1 A and 1 B Air Compressor in Simulator Operator the local control mode: Run APP\air\acs_toJocal When the APP for 1 A and 1 B Air Compressor has Communicator completed running call the MCR and inform them that the air compressors are running in local control. Verify alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS RO signals using PATH-i Guide, Attachment 6 When step 13 is reached (Control RCS Temperature) Evaluator Note: contact Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 11. Event 11, SG A SGTR prior to initiation of RCS cooldown. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 41 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 4 of Event
Description:
SG A SGTR (2 Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 11: Simulator Operator: A SGTR 420 gpm ramped over 2 minutes. RO/BOP Control RCS Temperature: Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559° F using Table 1. tuL 1 RA I sAruRa OEctRm 1WEXZNS$ toLwwDta RZ ?flP
. Gadenoc ia appi bla u*tfl tc pe.a dracta ot1evino,
. - no RF ti wd tena o14 1g topartitc RCS tEWEUIuRZ NZN LESS THAN GRIA? NAN S?AN1.Z A? OR SSIF AND F ANI) TRDfl# TO DKcUASXNG 5S7 F
. Stop dunpin
- 1! d*net
- Coettol feed t* **milabla 1o ai4 t*ase tEEN trnnifer duop to
. Cotro1 f.m4 duop to eabi.sb od flow STEAN PP.ZSSUR *fnt*it RCS nod. u,inS
- Maint*i totaL OP 125. btw..a 55P fead flow Sat1o .3 AND 559F OPERATOR 2Ut,r ttan AND duop ateia GTZON 210 KP?N to odi,jet uotU .evel t.*t*c t1*a OR 2% tORi fa at 1a*ø na
- Dp *taa on intact SG uai intact s#
- R eooldo*n cootimac
- Cootcol ae4 but flow to flSXRA MW **al*t*in SG mass a3.ves 1*vaTh Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize temperature between 555 °F AND 559 °F RO CHECK PRZ PORVs SHUT. (YES)
RO CHECK block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 42 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenano # 1 Event # 11 Page 4 of 63 1d 2 ( Event
Description:
SG A SGTR Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO PRZ spray valves SHUT. (YES) BOP IDENTIFY any faulted SG:
- CHECK for any of the following:
o ANY SG pressures DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO) o ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO) BOP IDENTIFY any Ruptured SG:
- CHECK for any of the following
- Secondary Radiation Normal:
o Condenser vacuum pump effluent radiation NORMAL (NO) o SG blowdown radiation NORMAL (NO) o Main steamline radiation NORMAL (YES/NO) The crew may not recognize that A SG is also increasing in an uncontrolled manner, It this is the case then they will Evaluator Note: enter PATH-2 due to C and will then use the Multiple Tube Rupture Foldout Criteria to isolate the A SG. Check any SG level increasing in an uncontrolled manner BOP (YES C and also A) Check feed flow to ruptured SG(s) isolated (YES/NO) if BOP identified may need to isolate A SG. SRO GO TO PATH-2 Guide, Step 1. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 43 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: iiEQ Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 44 of 2 d 2 ( Event
Description:
SG A SGTR Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior FOLDOUT C applies. Assigns foldout items FOLDOUT C
- IF RCS pressire d creases to tess than 100 PSIG sotebon Rrntoflow btot valves SHUT rn ademate mnalaw
- RCS presswe ncrenees to çreatet than 2200 PS, flf venty teniate n1tohO*
notatIon MQ ,mnrflo* bIoc vatvt* OPEN jf any of the totowtn
- RCS su ooltnp LESS THAN l0 F 40 9 C 20F ISF1M
- PRZ level CAN CE MAtNTAINEO GREATER THAN 1t% f30%I I!1Ift perform the lotIowmtj:
a, CSIP auctIon abgned to VCT, 3Jjj, teabçn to RWST.
- b. Shut chargto Irne nntabon valves AN(opan BIT valves.
c Venfy onnaI mkabow sotobon valves SHUT
- 4. f necessaty to restore condthons. jjrest*d standby C SIP.
iF reeift,ahon occw, alter entry pomt S (Step 20), Ji GO TO EPP020, DATI- S RO GTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT: SUI3COOLED RECOVERr, Step I IF any o4 the totlowrng occurs, iGO TO EPPQ14, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR IOLAflON, Step I (unleras faulted SO ta needed for RCS cootd*n)
- Any SQ pressure DECREASES IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER AND THAT SQ HAS NOT BEEN ISOLATED
- Any SQ.. COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED flQ THAT SQ HAS NQX BEEN ISOI.ATED
- COLD LEG PECIRCUIATION SWITCfiOVER CRITESnA IF RWST level decreases to less than 24 (214 Low1ow alarm) flIFN GO TO LPP-Vi0, TRAM5FER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, Slap 1.
- AEW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CR11ER IF C5T level decreases to less than 10%, TN N swdd the AEW water supply to e ESW system usmq OP-13T, AUXIUA V F EDWATER SYSTEM, SectIon 81.
RCS pressure decreases to less than 230 P510 to an uncontml(ed manner, jjj4 restart RHR pumps to supply water to the ((CS.
- MULTIPLE TUBE RUPTURE CRITERIA IF any Intact SQ level aicreases In an uncontrelled manner R any totct SO ha abnormal radbnon levels, THEN stop RCS de ressurlzation and cooldown NO GO RETURN TO Step 1.
If A SG has not yet been identified by the crew as ruptured then Foldout C Multiple Tube Rupture Criteria Evaluator Note: should be used to isolate that SG. When A SG is identified, the SRO will return to the beginning of Path-2. IMPLEMENT Function Restoration Procedures as required. SRO (None required at this time) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 44 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 45 of 63 Event
Description:
SG A SGTR (2 Generator with SGTR) Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior The RCP Trip Criteria is in effect until an RCS cooldown is Procedure Note: initiated RO CHECK RCP Trip Criteria: ANY RCPs RUNNING (YES A and B) Check all of the following
. SI flow > 200 GPM (YES)
. RCS pressure < 1400 psig (NO)
Stop all RCPs (RO should not secure A and B RCP) BOP IDENTIFY any ruptured SG:
- CHECK for any of the following:
o SG level INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES C & A)
. At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.
Procedure Caution: . If the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, one steam supply valve from an intact SG must be maintained open. BOP ISOLATE Flow From Ruptured SG: ADJUST ruptured SG PORV controller setpoint to 88% (1145 PSIG) AND place in auo. (Adjusts controller to 88%)
. CHECK ruptured SG PORV SHUT. (YES)
SHUT ruptured SG steam supply valve to TDAFW pump Critical (Shuts MS-72) (*Critical to shut prior to opening either the Task BOP Steam Dumps or SG PORVs to commence a max rate cool down)
. VERIFY blowdown isolation valves from ruptured SG SHUT (YES)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 45 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 4 of Event
Description:
SG A SGTR (2 Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- SHUT ruptured SG main steam drain isolation before MSIV:
o SG A: 1 MS-231 (Shuts 1 MS-231) (*Critical to shut prior Critical to opening either the Steam Dumps or SG PORVs to Task BOP commence a max rate cool down) o SG C: 1 MS-301 (Shuts 1 MS-301) (*Critical to shut prior to opening either the Steam Dumps or SC PORVs to commence a max rate cool down)
- SHUT ruptured SG MSIV and BYPASS valve.
BOP (MSIV for SG C & A Bypass valve already shut) SRO Observe CAUTION prior to Step 7 AND GO TO Step 7. If ruptured SG is faulted AND is NOT needed for RCS Procedure Caution: cooldown, THEN feed flow to that SG should remain isolated. MONITOR Ruptured SG Level:
- RUPTUREDSGFAULTED(NO)
BO
- Level GREATER THAN 25% (YES)
- Check feed flow to ruptured SG(s) ISOLATED (YES)
SRO Observe Caution prior to Step 8 and go to Step 8 The steam supply valve from the ruptured SG to the Procedure Caution: TDAFW pump should be shut OR isolated before continuing (unless this prevents feeding SGs to be used for cooldown). CHECK Ruptured SG(s) Pressure GREATER THAN 260 BOP PSIG [350 PSIG] (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 46 of 63
Aooendix D Oøerator Action . Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jQ Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 47 of Event
Description:
SG A SGTR (2 Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Block Low Steam Pressure SI:
. Pressure LESS THAN 2000 PSIG (YES)
. Block low steam pressure SI After the low steam pressure SI signal is blocked, main Procedure Note: steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.
SRO Prepare For RCS Cooldown:
. At least one intact SG AVAILABLE FOR RCS COOLDOWN (YES B) -
. GOTOSteplO.e.
Determine required core exit temperature based on lowest ruptured SG pressure Lowest ruptured SG pressure: Required CET Temperature: IF RCPs are NOT running, an invalid RED or ORANGE condition for RCS INTEGRITY CSF-4 may occur during the Procedure Caution: following steps. Disregard ruptured SG wide range cold leg temperature until Step 40 completed. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 47 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 4 of 63 Event
Description:
SG A SGTR (2 Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Initiate RCS Cooldown: Check all of the following to determine if steam can be dumped to condenser: NOTE: IF the MSIVs are OPEN then use Steam Dumps IF MSIVs are closed the crew will use SG PORVs
. Check any intact SG MSIV OPEN (YES B MSIV)
- Check condenser available (C-9) light (BPLB 3-3) LIT (YES)
- Steam dump control system AVAILABLE (YES)
. Place steam dump pressure controller in manual AND decrease output to 0% (places controller in manual and output to 0%)
. Place steam dump mode select switch to STEAM PRESS (places switch to STEAM PRESS)
- Check RCS temp -
553° F (YES/NO) o NO Dump steam from intact SGs to condenser to decrease RCS temperature to 553°F (Dumps steam) o YES Momentarily place both steam dump interlock bypass switches to INTLK BYP. (Places switches to INTLK BYP) BOP . Verify LOW-LOW STEAM DUMP (P-12) BYPASSED status light ILLUMINTATED (YES) Dump steam from intact SGs at maximum rate to condenser at BOP maximum rate. IF intact SG MSIV is NOT (may auto shut) THEN to initiate a maximum rate RCS cooldown: BOP OPEN B SG PORV or Locally operate SG PORV or use the TDAFW pump Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 48 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fiQ Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 4 of 63 Event
Description:
SG A SGTR (2 Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO . GOTOStep12. The crew will continue with the procedure while the CD is Evaluator Note: in progress. When the CET temperature is < the target then the crew should terminate the CD and continue Monitor Core Exit TCs While Continuing With This Procedure:
- Core exit TCs LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE (NO)
RO . WHEN core exit TCs less REQUIRED TEMPERATURE THEN do Steps 12.b AND c. o 12.b Stop RCS cooldown. o 12.c Maintain core exit TCs less than required temperature. Maintain RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM And 13 RO GPM.
. If an AFW isolation to an intact SG occurs, the signal may be reset to allow restoration of AFW. (An AFW isolation will occur if a main steam line isolation signal is present AND one SG pressure decreases 100 PSIG below the other two SGs.)
Procedure Caution:
. If the steam supply valve from the ruptured SG to TDAFW pump reopens due to decreasing SG level, it must be restored to the shut position. (Two out of three SG levels decreasing below 25% will open both steam supply vales to the TDAFW pump.)
RO Any intact SG level > 25% (YES) BOP AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH Available (YES) c,-, Control feed flow to maintain intact SG levels between 25% L)\JP and 50% Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 49 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 4flQ Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 50 of 63 Event
Description:
SG A SGTR (2 Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Any intact SG level INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED BOP MANNER (NO) Check PRZ PORV AND Block Valves: Verify power to PORV block valves AVAILABLE (YES) RD Check PRZ PORVs SHUT (YES) Check block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES) Reset SI (Takes manual SI reset switch to reset and verifies SI RO lights indicate that SI is reset) Informs SRO that SI has been reset Acknowledges SI reset SRO Informs crew that they will need to manually realign Safeguards Equipment following a Loss Of Offsite Power. Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals. RD (Resets Phase A ONLY Phase B is not actuated) Establish Instrument Air AND Nitrogen To CNMT: Open the following valves: RD 1 IA-81 9 (locates valve controls and OPENS valve) 1S1-287 (locates valve controls and OPENS valve) Check RHR Pump Status: Check RHR pump suction ALIGNED TO RWST (YES) RD - RCS pressure >230 psig (YES) Stop RHR pumps (locates switches for both RHR pumps and takes them to Stop) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 50 of 63
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fjç. Scenario # 1 Event # 11 Page 51 of 63 nd 2 ( Event
Description:
SG A SGTR Generator with SGTR) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check If RCS cooldown Should Be Stopped: Core exit TCs < REQUIRED TEMPERATURE SRO Stop RCS cooldown Maintain core exit TCs < required temperature. Terminate Scenario when Core exit TC are at required temperature (or to the extent desired by the Lead Evaluator). Lead Evaluator: Announce Crew Update End of Evaluation Have crew remain in the Simulator without discussing the exam. Examiners will formulate any follow-up questions. When directed by the Lead Examiner place the Simulator Simulator Operator. in FREEZE. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 51 of 63
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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
- HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 1 Attachment 1 OWP-RP-07 ti
.4 .
. I fiev. I ..... Pae 44 ct 1041 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 56 of 63
PATH-I GUIDE Attachment 6 Sheet 1 of 7 Safeguards Actuation Verificalion NOTE General guidance for verification of safeguards eqnpment is contained in Attachment 8 of thIs procedure. El 1 Verify Two CSIPs RUNNING El 2 Verify Two RHR Pumps RUNNING El 3. Verify Two CCW Pumps RUNNING-El & Verify All ESW ESW Booster Pumps RUNNING - El 5. Verify SI Valves PROPERLY ALIGNED (Refer to Attachment t) El & Verify CNMT Phase A Isdation Valves SHUT - (Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIPJSAFEGUARDS REVIEW, Attachment 4) EOP-GUIDE-1 I Rev. 33 I Paae 79 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 57 of 63
Altchment l Sheet 2 of 7 Safeguards Actuation Veritkation Li 7. Verily SG Bbwdown SG Sample lsoblion VaIvs In Table I SHUT Table l SC ELesdown Aad Isolation Vulvu roeega Outaide NNT Inaie CNNT Lire (NLTh1ASA) (MLSi!$B) SC A Sap1e 1SP 217 lSP214I21 SC B Stp1e 1SP222 lS?2l9I2fl SC C Sample lSP 227 lSP224I2Z6 SC A 3lodown 1D-ll 1BDl SC B Blowdown 1D2O SC C Blowdewa IED-49
& IF Main Steam Line Isdation Actuated OR Is Required By My Of The FolIeá,
jj4 Verify MSIVs JjQ MSIV Bypass Valves SHUT Li
- Steam line pressure LESS THAN 601 PSIG Li
- CNMT ptesslare GREATER THAN 3(2 PSIG 9 IF CNMT Spray Actuation Signal Actuated OR Is Required, THEN Verify The Fdlowing:
(Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIPISAFEGUARDS REVIEW, Attachment 9) El
- CNMT spray pumps RUNNING Li
- CNMT spray valves PROPERLY ALIGNED Li
- Phase I) isolation valves - SHUT Li
- AIRCPsSTOPPED EOP-GUIDEi I Rev. 33 Paqe l0 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 58 of 63
Attachment 6 Sheet3of7 Satequards Actuation Ven&ation Li lo. Verify t3rh Main FW Pumps TRIPPED Li 1. Verify FW Isolation Valves SHUT (Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIP1SAFEGUAPDS REVIEW, Attachment %) [112. Venfy both MDAFW pumps RUNNING -
- 13. janyof the following cond?tions exist. THEN verify the TDAFW pump-RUNNING C]
- Undervottage on either 6.9 KY emergency bus C]
- LOtwoSSs-LESSTHAN25%
C]
- Manual acba1ion to control SC level
- 14. Verify AFW Valves PROPERLY ALIGNED Li
- IF no AFW Isolation Signal, j)jf verify isolatoa and flow control valves -
OPEN NOTE An AFW Isolation signal signal requires a Maui Steam Line Isolation concident with one SG pressure 100 PSIG below the other two SG& C]
- j! AFW Isolation Signal present, EN verify MDAFW and TOAFW isolation and flow control valves to affected SC SHUT C] I & Verify Both EDGs RUNNING Li i& Verify CNMT Fan Coolers ONE FAN PER UNIT RUNNING IN SLOW SPEED FOP-GUIDE-I 1 Rev. 33 Pane 131 p197 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 59 of 63
Attachment S Sheet 4 of 7 Safeguards Actuation Verilication LI 17 Verify CNMT Ventilation Isolation Valves SHUT (Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIP!SAFEGLJARDS REViEW, Attachment 7) LI 18. Verify Control Room Ventilation ALIGNED FOR EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION (Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIPJSAFEGUARDS REVIEW, Attachment &) 1(1 Verify Essential Service Chilled Water System Operation: LI
- Verify both WC-2 chillers RUNNING LI
- Verify both P4 pumps RUNNING LI (Refer to AOP-026, lOSS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE CHILLED WATER SYSTEM for kss of any WC-2 chiller.)
2(1 Verify CSIP Fan Coolers RUNNING LI AH-9ASA LI AH-9 13 513 LI AH-IOASA LI AH-IOBSB NOTE Security systems are normally powered by bus 1A1 Backup power will be available for approximately 30 MINUTES after bus 1A1 is de-energized. LI 21. VerifyACbuses1A1D1B1-ENERGIZED LI 22. Place ar compressor IA AND lB in the LOCAL CONTROL Mode (Refer to Attachment &) EOP-GUIDE-1 I Rev. 33 I Page 82 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 60 of 63
Attachment El SheetSofl Safeguards Actuation Verification CAUTION The maximum calculated dose rate n the vicinity of MCC 1A35-SA and MCC 1835-SB is between UI MREMIHR and 150 MREMJHR. D 23. Dispatch An Operator To Unlock AND Turn ON The 8reakers For The CSP Suction AND Discharge Cross-Conned Valves: (Refer toAttachment It) KCG lA35SA KCC 1B35SB VALVZ CTIBICLE VALVK etlaluLK 1CS-11D irA 1CSt71 4D ICS-169 4K ICS-168 7D ZCS-218 14t ICS-220 91 ICS-219 14K 1C5217 1W
- 24. Check If C CSIP Should Be Placed In Service; C]
- two tharqmg pumps can NQJ be verifed to be mnning. AND C CSIP is available, THEN place C CSIP in service in pLace of the nc-runn1ng CSIP usnq OP-107, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM, Section 85 1
or8 EOP-GLJIDE-1 I Rev. 33 PaQe 83 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 61 of 63
Aftachment 6 SheetS of 7 Safeguards Actuation Verification NOTE
- AND temperatures should be monitored approinmataty eveiy Ito ThOR
- Folhmg the initial check of fuel pod levels and temperature, momtoring respoasibddies may be assumed by the plant operations staff (including the TSC or STA)
- Only fuel pods contauung fuel are required to be rnodtored.
- 25. Check Status Of Fuel Pools:
C] a. Start the spent fuel pump room ventilation system using OP-i 70. FUEL HANULING BUILDING HVAC, Section 5.3. [1 b Operate spent fuel coating pumps to maintain fuel pod temperature Using OP.1 16, FUEL POOL COOLING, Section 5.0.
- c. Monster fuel pool levels AND temperatures:
C] a Refer toAOP-041, SPENT FUEL POOL EVENT Attachments 7, , 3.10 and 11 fcc SEP parameter monitonng methods. C]
- Refer to Cu.ves HX-24, HX-25 and I4X26 for SEP time to 200 F.
C]. Levels GREATER THAN LO ALARM (2k34 FT. 0 IN) C]
- ieniperatures LESS THAN HI TEMP ALARM (10& F)
Ec-(3ulo1 . 1.. Rev 33 .1 . Pape4ot9i Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 62 of 63
Attachment 6 Sheet7of7 Safeguards Actuation Verification rWa_. ._u.r- a 11 NOTE j[ control room ventilation was previously aligned to an emergency outside air intake for post-accident operations, THEN follow-up actions will be required to restore the alignment
- 26. Consult Plant Operations Staff Regarding Alignment Of The Control Room Ventilation System:
D
- Site Emergency Co-ordinator- Control Room
[]
- Site Emergency Co-ordinator Technical Support Center (Refer to PEP-230, CONTROL ROOM OPERATIONS)
- END -
EOP-GUIDE-I I Rev 33 I Page 85 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 1 Rev. 1 Page 63 of 63
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS2O12 NRC SCENARIO2 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 05000400/201 2301 Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: IC-5: 50% Power, BOL
. A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan under clearance for motor replacement
. TDAFW Pump Out of Service due to damaged over speed trip device, due back in 24 hours, awaiting parts from vendor
. PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13, SHUT due to PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage Turnover:
. The previous shift started MFW Pump A following replacement of a bearing and has completed GP-005, Step 136.e. Resume raising power at 4 DEH units/minute.
Critical Tasks:
- Insert negative reactivity via rod insertion or emergency boration prior to the Reactor Trip breakers being manually opened.
- Manually Start at least one high head ECCS pump before the Function Restoration Procedures are implemented
- During a Small Break LOCA, Trip the RCPs prior to the RCS pressure stabilizing at 1100 psig.
Event No. MaIf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N/A N BOP/SRO Raise power R RO/SRO 2 SWSO7A C RO/SRO Normal Service Water Pump A shaft shear 3 PT:475 I - BOP/SRO A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 fails to 0% TS SRO 4 NISO8D I RO/SRO PRNIS Channel N-44 fails hi TS SRO 5 XD1I121 C BOP, SRO MCC 1A34 Feeder Breaker trips (both fans on AH-3) TSSRO 6 TUR24A C BOP/SRO EHC pump shaft shear with standby auto start failure jmsehpas 7 RCSO1A M ALL Small Break LOCA requiring a Reactor Trip 8 RPSO1 B M ALL ATWS Reactor Trip breakers fail to open auto or manual CVCO5A When Reactor Trip Breakers open the A CSIP trips 9 DSGO4A C RO/SRO During the Safety Injection the B Sequencer skips load block 1 which starts B CSIP (no CSIPs are running) 10 ZRPK63OA C BOP/SRO Phase A Isolation Valvesi SP-948/1 SP-949, RCS LOOPS B&C ZRPK63OB HOT LEG CNMT ISOL and 1 ED-9411 ED-95, CNMT SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE fail to close (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 1 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2
SUMMARY
The plant is operating at 50.5% power at the BOL. The A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan is under clearance for motor replacement. The TDAFW Pump under clearance due to a damaged overspeed trip device for 6 hours and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours. LCO 3.7.1 .2 action a has been entered. PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13, SHUT due to PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage. Radiation monitor MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB has failed low and thunderstorms are in the area. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to a power change of >10% (YELLOW risk is a qualitative risk assessment per WCM-001). Event 1: Raise Power The crew has been directed to raise power lAW GP-005, step 1 36.e at 4 DEH units/minute. Once the up power has been observed to the extent desired then Event 2 can be initiated. Event 2: Normal Service Water Pump A has a shaft shear. This will result in multiple NSW alarms and the crew should enter AOP-022. Once immediate actions are complete the crew should use the AOP to start up the standby NSW pump and verify proper system operation. Event 3: Failure of A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%. Requires the BOP to place the A SG level control to manual and control level. The SRO should provide level band and trip guidance lAW OMM-001. The crew will take the channel out of service using OWP-ESF-02, SG Steam Pressure Loop 1 (it is possible that some may use OWP-RP-08, SF/FE LOOP 1, to accomplish the Steam Flow channel swap. However OWP-ESF-02 is more appropriate, and should be used to remove the steam pressure channel from service). The SRO should evaluate T.S. 3.3.2 action 19, T.S. 3.3.1 Action 6 and T.S. 3.3.3.6 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Action a. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 2 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2
SUMMARY
(continued) T.S. 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE. Total No. Channels Minimum Functional Unit of Channels Channels Mode Action
- 14. Steam Generator Water Level--Low 2 stm. gen. 1 stm. gen. 1 stm. gen. level 1, 2 6 Coincident With Steam/ level and level coincident and 2 stm.Ifeed Feedwater Flow Mismatch 2 stm./feed- with 1 water flow water flow stm./feedwater mismatch in same mismatch in flow mismatch in atm. gen. or 2 each atm. gen. same stm. gen. stm. gen. level and 1 stmifeedwater flow mismatch in same atm. gen.
Action 6: With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 3 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2
SUMMARY
(continued) TS 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4. MIN IMUM TOTAL NO, CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FIJNCIIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPEBLE MODES ACTION
- 1. Safety Injection (Reactor Trip.
Enedwater Isolation, Lontrol Room Isolation, Start Diesel Generators. Containment entilatijri Isolation. Phase A Ccintawinent Isolation. Start Anxlliary Feedwater System Mo:or-Ur iven Pumps Start Cuntoinment Fan Coolers, Start Emergency Service Water Pumps, start Emergency Servlce Water Ions ter Pumps)
- a. Manual Initiation 1 2. 3, 4 Ii. Automatic Actuation logic and 1 1, 2. 3, 4 Actuation Relays
- c. Containment PressureHigh1 3 2 2 1, 2. 3. 4 19
- d. Pressurier Pres.sure-Low 3 2 2 1, 2. 3# 19
- e. Steam tine PressureIow 3/steam 2/steam 2/steam line 1, 2. 3# 19 line line in any steani line ACTION 9 ,iith the nijniber of CPERAl3L channels one iC than trio lotal Nonber o Lhanneis, cpera t.l On nay proceed prey ded the loll OWi nçj conditions are satistie a The inoperable Ch9flnel s placed in th tripped COflditiQfl within 6 hours, and
- b. The $inrnuin Channels OPEPAl.E requirenient is niet however.
the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours far surveillance testinO of other Ch000els per Speciricat)on 4,32,1, TS 3.3.3.6 The Accident Monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE Action a. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels except In Core Thermocouples and Reactor Vessel Level less than the Total Required Number of Channels requirements shown in Table 3.3-10 restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. (Evaluate only, still have required number) The SRO should also prepare OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 4of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2
SUMMARY
(continued) Event 4: PRNIS Channel N-44 fails high. This will cause rods to start stepping in and the crew should enter AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System. The crew should perform the immediate actions of AOP-001 and place Rod Control in MANUAL. The SRO will evaluate Tech. Spec 3.3.1 for any impact due to the failed instrument. The crew will perform the follow up actions of AOP-001. T.S. 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE. 141N IMUN TOTAL NO. CHANNElS CHANNELS APPI ICABlE FUNCTiONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TQ TRIP OPERABLE __MODES ACTION I. Manual Reactor Trip 2 1 2 12 I 2 1 2 3,4,5 9
- 2. Power Range, Neutron Flux a, High Setpaint 4 2 3 1,2 2
- b. low Setpoint 4 2 3 1###, 2 2
- 3. Power Range, Neutron Flux 4 2 3 1, 2 High Positive Rate
- 4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, 4 2 3 1,2 2 High Negative Rate AC1I 2 With the lumber of OPER4BLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or PFMER OPERATION may proceed provided the foiioing conditions are satisfied:
a.. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours,
- b. ihe Minirmirn Channels OPERABLE requirenent is net; however, the inoperable cliarinel may be bypassed for uc to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3. Li, and
- c. Either, ThERMAL POWER is restricted to iC55 than or equal to 75 of RATED TfIER4AL ONER and the Power Ranye heutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85 of RATED THERMAl, PER within 4 hours; or. the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours per Specification 4.2.4,2, Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 5 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-i HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2
SUMMARY
(continued) Event 5: A trip of MCC 1A34 Feeder Breaker. This will cause a loss of both fans on AH-3. The crew will use the APPs and OPs to shift to B Train coolers (AH-1 and AH-4). The SRO should review Tech Spec 3.6.2.3, Containment Systems Containment Cooling System Action: a. T.S. 3.6.2.3 Four containment fan coolers (AH-i, AH-2, AH-3, and AH-4) shall be OPERABLE with one of two fans in each cooler capable of operation at low speed. Train SA consists of AH-2 and AH-3. Train SB consists of AH-i and AH-4. Action: a. With one train of the above required containment fan coolers inoperable and both Containment Spray Systems OPERABLE, restore the inoperable train of fan coolers to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Event 6: DEH pump shaft shear and auto start failure of the standby DEH pump. The running pump will continue to run until the crew identifies the shaft shear by responding to annunciator ALB-020-4-2B EH Fluid Low Press. With DEH pressure decreasing the crew should dispatch an Aux Operator to investigate and manually start the standby DEH pump. If DEH pressure decreases to < 1500 psig the standby pump should auto start but a relay failure will prevent the pump from auto starting. Event 7: Small Break LOCA Loop 1 Cold Leg break Major requiring a Reactor trip and either a Manual OR Automatic SI initiation. Following the Reactor Trip the A CSIP trips. Event 8: ATWS Reactor Trip breakers fail to open auto or manual. The crew should recognize that the Reactor has failed to trip and enter FRP-S.i, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. The Reactor Trip breakers will be opened locally one minute after a field operator has been dispatched to perform those actions. Once the crew has inserted negative reactivity via rod insertion (Auto or manual) or initiated the emergency Boration (Critical to insert negative reactivity) and have verified that the Reactor is tripped in FRP-S.1, they should exit FRP-S.i and return to PATH-i. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 6of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2
SUMMARY
(continued) Event 9: B Load Sequencer will skip starting the B CSIP in load block 1.
- The crew should manually start CSIP B to establish HHSI.
- While in PATH-i trip RCPs once RCP Trip Foldout Criteria is met.
Event 10: Phase A Isolation Valves 1 SP-94811 SP-949, RCS LOOPS B&C HOT LEG CNMT ISOL and 1 ED-94/1 ED-95, CNMT SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE fail to close. The BOP should close at least one isolation valve in any un-isolated Phase A line in the process of performing GUIDE-i, Attachment 6 and prior to the end of the scenario. The crew will continue in PATH-i until the transition to EPP-009, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, is made. The scenario ends in EPP-009 after the first RCS pressure reduction has been completed. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 7 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:
- 1. Insert negative reactivity via rod insertion or initiate emergency boration prior to the Reactor Trip breakers being manually opened.
Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods:
- Insert RCCAs
- De-energize the control rod drive MG sets
- Establish emergency boration flow to the RCS.
Failure to insert negative reactivity results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. This constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control. Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is negative reactivity addition prior to the Reactor Trip Breakers being opened locally.
- 2. Manually Start at least one high head ECCS pump before the Function Restoration Procedures are implemented.
In this scenario the A CSIP has tripped and the B CSIP has did not automatically start from sequencer actuation. The operator must manually start the B CSIP which was currently in standby. Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is starting the B CSIP before the Function Restoration Procedures are implemented.
- 3. During a Small Break LOCA Trip the RCPs prior to RCS pressure stabilizing at 1100 psig.
In this scenario PATH-i foldout A will apply following the completion of the immediate actions. The RCP trip criteria is BOTH of the following: SI flow> 200 gpm and RCS pressure < 1400 psig. These plant parameters are to be monitored continuously and when those conditions are met the operator must secure the operating RCPs. Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is SI flow> 200 gpm and RCS pressure < 1100 psig and stable. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 8 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-i HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 SIMULATOR SETUP For the 2012 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario # 2 Reset to IC-i 62 password sandwich Goto RUN Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. Set ERFIS screens (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Post conditions for status board from IC-5 Power has been ramped up to allow the starting of the 2 nd MFW Pump and BOTH Heater Drain Pumps then stabilized Mode 1 50% Reactor power Startup on HOLD for briefing Provide a marked up copy of GP-005 Rev 70 through Step 136.e Control Bank D at 154 steps RCS boron 1843 ppm RCS press 2220 2250 all PZR heaters ON RCS temp 573°F, stable Hang CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan Hang CIT on 1 MS-70 and 1 MS-72 Place protected train placard on A and B MDAFW pump MCB switch Place an off normal placard on 1 MS-T, TDAFW pump due to damaged overspeed trip device Place off normal placard on 1 RC-1 13, PZR PORV 444B block valve Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 9 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 Scenario # 2 CAEP file Description of 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Initial conditions were established from IC-5 !Raise power to 52.5% and start the 2 nd MEW Pump and both HD Pumps then stabilize I Mode 1 50.5% Reactor power Startup on HOLD for briefing GP-005 Rev 70 Step 136.e IC-5 initial conditions for status board information Control Bank D at 155 steps RCS boron 1851 ppm RCS press 2220 2250 all PZR heaters ON SG level maintained with A MEW pump and FW Reg Vlvs in Auto RCS temp 573°F, stable Main Turbine 398 MWe !Hang CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan IHang CIT on 1 MS-70 and 1 MS-72 IPlace protected train placard on A and B MDAEW pump MCB switch IPlace an off normal placard on 1 MS-T, TDAFW pump due to damaged overspeed trip device
!Place off normal placard on 1 RC-1 13, PZR PORV 444B block valve !Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates SCENARIO 2 CAEP PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage, PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13, SHUT I While in RUN, shut 1RC-113 TDAFW pump Out Of Service due to damaged overspeed trip device Place CIT on 1 MS-70 and 1 MS-72 MCB switch Place protected train placard on A and B MDAFW pump MCB switch in mssO34 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN in mssO3S (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN Trip the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle valve imf cfwolc (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true Place CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan idi xb2i072 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) ASIS ilo xb2oO72g (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OFF ilo xb2oO72r (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OFF Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 10 of 73
- Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
. HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 Events Event 1: No trigger Raise power Reactivity RO / SRO Normal-BOP/SRO Event 2: Trigger 2 Normal Service Water Pump A sheared shaft Component RO / SRO imf sws07a (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) TRUE Scenario # 2 CAEP file (continued) I Event 3: Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmiffer PT-475 to 0% Instrument BOP / SRO TSSRO imf Pt:475 (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0 00:00:30 Event 4: Trigger 4 PRNIS Channel N-44 fails HIGH Instrument RO / SRO imf niso8d (400:00:00 00:00:00) 200.0 00:00:00 - Event 5: Trigger 5 MCC 1 A34 Feeder Breaker trips (both fans on AH-3) Component- BOP/SRO Tech Spec 3.6.2.3 SRO idi xdlil2l (500:00:0000:00:00) TRIP, NORM Event 6: Trigger 6 A EHC Pump Shaft Shear Component BOP/SRO imt tur24a (600:00:00 00:00:00) TRUE imf jmsehpas (600:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS Event 7: Trigger 7 RCS Small Break LOCA Loop 1 Cold MajorRO/BOP/SRO imf rcs0la (7 00:00:00 00:00:00) .2 00:02:00 0 Event 8: Preload, NO Trigger ATWS Reactor Trip breakers fail to open auto or manual Crew enters FRP-S.1 I BOP trips Turbine and starts AFW pumps MajorRO/BOP/SRO imf rpsolb (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) 33 I Event 9: Preloaded, NO Trigger B Sequencer skips load block for starting B CSIP Component RO / SRO imf dsgo4a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2 2 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 11 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 2 Event 10: Preloaded, NO Trigger Failure of A & B train Phase A Isolation slave relays Component BOP / SRO imf zrpk63oa (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk63ob (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS Event 15, Remove Reactor Trip Breaker failure and clear AWlS condition When Reactor trips the A CSIP will also trip TRG= 15 dmf rpsol b 3 3 imf rpsOl a (15 00:00:05 00:00:00) BOTH_BREAKER Component RO / SRO imf cvco5a (15 00:00:00 00:00:00) true Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 12 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: flQ Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page i of Event
Description:
Power Increase Time Position Appticants Actions or Behavior When the crew has completed their board walk down and are ready to take the shift inform the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Run. When the Simulator is in run Lead Evaluator: announce CREW UPDATE (SROs Name) Your crew has the shift. END OF UPDATE When directed by the Lead Evaluator, ensure that the Simulator Operator: annunciator horns are on and place the Simulator in RUN. 1 Provides direction per GP-005, Step 136.e PROCEED with GP-005 SRO - the load increase by depressing the GO pushbutton. BOP Informs RO/SRO that turbine load increase is being initiated. BOP Depresses GO pushbutton. RO At 55 to 60% Reactor power, CHECK the following:
. ALB-13/5-3, POWER RANGE UPPER DETECTOR HIGH FLUX DEV OR AUTO DEFEAT, not illuminated.
. ALB-13/5-4, POWER RANGE LOWER DETECTOR HIGH FLUX DEV OR AUTO DEFEAT, not illuminated.
. IF either alarm is illuminated, THEN REFER to the APP for appropriate action.
VERIFY Main Feed Pump Recirculation Valves 1 FW-8 and BOP 1 FW-39 are shut when total Main Feed Pump flow is greater than 8600 KPPH. BOP Monitors turbine and feedwater system response. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page l3of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Q Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 14 of Event
Description:
Power Increase Time rPosition Applicants Actions or Behavior The crew may elect to starL a dilution before the power
,, change is initiated. OP-107.O1 is a Continuous Use Evaluator ote.
procedure. The dilution steps are provided for evaluator use. DETERMINE the volume of makeup water to be added. This RO may be done by experience or via the reactivity plan associated with the Simulator IC. SETS FIS-1 14, TOTAL MAKEUP WTR BATCH COUNTER, to RO obtain the desired quantity. SET total makeup flow as follows:
. IF performing DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1 CS-i 51, FK-i 14 RWMU FLOW, for less than or equal RO to 90 gpm.
. IF performing ALT DIL in Step 8, THEN SET controller 1CS-15i, FK-ii4 RWMU FLOW, for the desired flow rate.
VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the RO STOP position. RO VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit. PLACE the control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the DIL RO OR the ALT DIL position. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page l4of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 15 of 73 Event
Description:
Power Increase Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK-444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a P1 controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintai.n RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows: Procedure Note:
- PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected pressure.
- ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.
- Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.
The crew may elect to manually crack open a PRZ Spray Evaluator Note: Valve to establish PRZ Surge line flow and thereby maintain PRZ/RCS boron concentrations within limits. OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit RO the difference between the pressurizer and the RCS boron concentration to less than 10 ppm. RO START the makeup system as follows:
- TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.
- VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.
RO VERIFY Tavg and rod motion responds as desired. VERIFY dilution automatically terminates when the desired RO quantity has been added. RO PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch: RO
- Is in the STOP position.
- The green light is lit.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page l5of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page i of Event
Description:
Power Increase Time Position [ Applicants Actions or Behavior RO PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO. START the makeup system as follows:
- TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RO momentarily.
- VERIFY the red indicator light is lit.
CREW Continue Power Increase When the evaluators have completed their evaluation of the power change, cue Simulator Operator to insert Lead Evaluator: Trigger 2 Event 2 Normal Service Water Pump A sheared shaft Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 16 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 17 of 7 Event
Description:
NSW Pump A shaft shear Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 2: Simulator Operator: NSW Pump A sheared shaft (NSWO7A).
. ALB-02-5-5, SERV WTR HEADER A HIGH-LOW FLOW;
. ALB-02-5-6, SERV WTR HEADER B HIGH-LOW FLOW;
. ALB-02-6-1, SERV WTR SUPPLY HDR A LOW PRESS; Indications Available . ALB-02-7-1, SERV WTR SUPPLY HDR B LOW PRESS;
. ALB-02-7-2, SERV WTR PUMPS DISCHARGE LOW PRESS;
. P1-9302.1, NSW Pump DISCH HEADER PRESS reads 0 psig Responds to ALB-02 alarms reports low NSW header RO pressure with pump running indication. (Identities and reports to SRO that A NSW Pump shatt shear has occurred)
Evaluator Note: The ESW Pumps will auto start on low header pressure. AOP-022 SRO Enters AOP-022, LOSS OF SERVICE WATER. Immediate CHECK ESW flow lost to ANY RUNNING CSIP MORE THAN Action RO - 1-minute: (NO) SRO GO TO Step 2. Immediate CHECK ESW tiow lost to ANY RUNNING EDG MORE THAN Action SRO - 1-minute: (NO) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page l7of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: JBQ Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page j of 7 Event
Description:
NSW Pump A shaft shear Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior There are several points in the AOP where an AO may be dispatched to check for leaks and proper operation of equipment. Communicator: Report no leaks and no problems at the breaker. When dispatched to the pump, report that the shaft has sheared on the A NSW pump and then request that the SRO contact Maintenance for assistance. Step 3: GO TO the appropriate step as indicated by the parameter LOST: SRO . ESW Header (NO)
. NSW Header (YES) o NSW Pump failure (YES) go to Section 3.0 / Step 6 SRO Proceeds to Step 6 CHECK loss of NSW Header due to NSW Pump FAILED or RO LOSS OF FLOW (YES).-
- START standby NSW Pump as follows:
o VERIFY discharge valve for affected pump is CLOSING by placing affected pump control switch to STOP. (places A NSW pump control switch to STOP) o START standby NSW Pump in priming mode by momentarily placing standby NSW Pump control switch to START. (takes B NSW pump control switch to START) o WHEN discharge valve for affected pump is fully SHUT, THEN PLACE and HOLD control switch for running pump to START to fully OPEN pump discharge valve. (WHEN discharge valve on A NSW pump is fully shut places B NSW pump switch to START and waits for discharge valve to fully open) RO
- CHECK ANY NSW Pump RUNNING. (YES)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 18 of 73
Appendix D Ooerator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: tiQ Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page i of Event
Description:
NSW Pump A shaft shear Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO . GO TO Section 3.2 (page 30). SRO Proceeds to Section 3.2, Step 1. CHECK Turbine trip required by ANY of the following SRO conditions EXIST: (NO) o No NSW Pump can be operated o Non-isolable leak exists in the NSW system o Major isolable leak exists on the Turbine Building NSW Header AND time does not permit a controlled plant shutdown SRO OBSERVE Note prior to Step 13 AND GO TO Step 13. Steps 13 through 19 address leaks on NSW turbine building header. Leaks on individual components supplied Procedure Note: by the Turbine Building header are addressed by Steps 20 and 21. CHECK for minor isolable leak on Turbine Building header CREW ANY EXISTING. (NO) SRO GO TO Step 20. CHECK for leak in an individual component ANY EXISTING. CREW - (NO) SRO GO TO Step 22. CREW CHECK for leak on WPB header ANY EXISTING. (NO) SRO GO TO Step 24. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 19 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBQ Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page of Z Event
Description:
NSW Pump A shaft shear Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO CHECK that NSW Pump(s) MALFUNCTIONED. (YES) PERFORM the following for affected NSW Pump(s): SRO
- CHECK NSW Pump breaker(s) MALFUNCTIONED. (NO)
. GOTOStep25.b.
RO/BOP . CHECK adequate pump suction inventory EXISTS: (YES) o LI-9300.1, Service Water PMP A CHMBR LVL, GREATER THAN 51% (ERFIS LSW9300) o LI-9302, Service Water PMP B CHMBR LVL, GREATER THAN 51% (ERFIS LSW9302) o LI-1931, Cooling Tower Basin Level, GREATER THAN 31 inches
- Locally VERIFY the following for the affected NSW Pump per OP-139, Service Water System:
CREW a Proper cooling and seal water supply to NSW Pumps. a Proper operation of NSW strainer backwash. When contacted acknowledge request for verifications and Communicator: report back about 2 minutes later that cooling, seal water supply and strainer backwash are all normal.
. Locally CHECK NSW Pump(s) for signs of damage (shaft CREW shear or other obvious problems). (YES MCB indications and local AO report)
Dispatch AO to investigate Generator H2 and Seal Oil Trouble BOP Annunciator Acknowledge request. Report back in 2 minutes that the alarm Communicator: is due to High Hydrogen Pressure. Inform the BOP that you are going to acknowledge the annunciator. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 20 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fBQ Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page ?i of Z2 Event
Description:
NSW Pump A shaft shear Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: Clear the H2 panel alarm rf genOOl depressed SRO INITIATE appropriate corrective action for the loss of NSW.
. Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist for failure of the A NSW Pump e Contacts WCC for assistance / generation of Work Request After assistance is requested or when AOP-022 is exited, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 3 Lead Evaluator:
Event 3 Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 21 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N. Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page of 73 Event
Description:
Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 3: Simulator Operator: Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0%
. ALB-014-1-2, Loop A Hi Steam Line AP Low-Pi
. ALB-014-1-4, Loop A Hi Steam Line Press Rate Alert
. ALB-014-4-2A, Loop A Low Stm Line Press Alert Indications Available
. P1-475 SA failing to 0 psig
- SG FF/SF mismatch
- SG level lowering APP BOP/RO RESPONDS to alarms and evaluates APP-ALB-014.
ALB-O1 4 lAW OPS-NGGC-1 000, the operator may take MANUAL Evaluator Note: control of a malfunctioning controller before being directed by a procedure.
- CONFIRM alarm using:
o P1-474.1 SB, P1-484.1 SB, and P1-494 SB, Steam BOP Generator A pressure. o Reports P1-475 reading or failing low.
. VERIFY Automatic Functions: NONE o Takes manual control of FK-478 (1 FW-1 33) A SG Main FW Reg Valve and stabilizes A SG level PERFORM Corrective Actions:
o Dispatch an operator to investigate for feed line break and steam line rupture (NONE) o Check Containment press, temp, and humidity for evidence of a Containment leak (NO) o CHECK for failed instrument (YES) o IF failed instrument identified then remove the failed instrument from service
- Restores level to normal (57% NR).
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 22 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBQ Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page of Event
Description:
Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. Provides level band and trip guidance for A SG level while in manual control lAW 0MM-aOl, Attachment 13 o SG Level Control Band 52% to 62%
SRO o Trip limit Low 30% Trip limit High 73%
. Refer to OWP-ESF-02 to remove channel from service.
. Contacts I&C to have channel removed from service.
- Dispatch AO to investigate BOP Place Turbine in hold (maybe on hold from previous event)
OWP-ESF-02 has been included as Attachment 1 at the end of this scenario. Evaluator Note: Failed channel does NOT have to be removed from service to continue the scenario.
. Requests extra operator for dedicated Feedwater operation
. Directs operator and l&C to perform OWP-ESF-02 SRO
. Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure of A SG PT-475 BOP Performs OWP-ESF-02 (sheet 3 of 8) steps 1 and 2 OWP-ESF-02 Sheet3of8 Bistable /Status Lipht Lineup Position for Maintenance Restored Position Component ID or Number lnitialNerified Initial/Verified Steamline Pressure Channel lii NOTE: SG A level channels associated with Loop 1 SF/FF Mismatch RPS signals remain OPERABLE (LB/4746 & LP/475B not tripped) and SO A level must be maintained above low level setpoint to preclude a SF/FF Mismatch Reactor Trip.
(circle position selected) STM GEN A FW FLOW Ct-iAN 476 CONTROL AND RECORDER or SELECTOR CHAN 476 *1 CHAN 477 (circle position selected) STM GEN A STM FLOW CHAN 474 CONTROL AND RECORDER or SELECTOR CHAN 475 / Cl-IAN 475 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 23 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ffl Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page of Event
Description:
Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Any Tech Spec evaluation may be completed with a follow-Evaluator Note: up question after the scenario. Enters Instrumentation TS 3.3.1 Functional Unit 14 ACTION 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing SRO of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.
3.3.2 Functional Unit 1 .e and 4.d ACTION 19. With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels. operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.
Acknowledge request and reports from SRO. IF an extra operator is requested, state someone will be Communicator: sent when available. IF asked to report to MCR to perform OWP-ESF-02, state that you will report as soon as possible. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 24 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: f4 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page of Event
Description:
Failure of the A SG Pressure Transmitter PT-475 to 0% Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior It is not required to implement the OWP prior to continuing Simulator Operator: with the scenario. Note: I&C field activities are not required to be completed before continuing with the next event. Evaluator Note: After SG level as under control and the TS has been identified, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 4 Event 4 Power Range NIS Channel 44 fails HIGH Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 25 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NflQ Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 26 of 73 Event
Description:
PR NIS Channel 44 fails HIGH Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 4: Simulator Operator: Power Range NIS Channel 44 failure HIGH Indications Available . Uncontrolled rod motionlbistable trips. RO RESPONDS to alarms/uncontrolled rod motion. ENTERS and directs actions of AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod AOP-0O1 SRO Control and Indication System. Makes PA announcement for AOP entry RO PERFORMS AOP-001 Immediate Actions. Rods cannot be withdrawn until AOP-OO1 actions have been implement to clear the overpower rod stop. Evaluator Note: OWP-RP-26 provides the same actions as AOP-OO1 to clear the overpower rod stop. Immediate CHECK that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped. Action RO (YES) Immediate Action RO POSITION Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN. Immediate Action RO CHECK Control Bank motion STOPPED. (YES) SRO PROCEEDS to Section 3.2. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 26 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page of Z Event
Description:
PR NIS Channel 44 fails HIGH Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK that instrument channel failure has NOT OCCURRED by observing the following:
. RCS Tavg (YES)
RO
. RCS Tref (YES)
. POWER Range NI channels (NO, NI-44 Failed)
. TURBINE first stage pressure (YES)
RNO Actions: PERFORM the following:
. IF a power supply is lost, THEN GO TO AOP-024, Loss of Uninterruptible Power Supply. (NO)
SRO . IF an individual instrument failed, THEN MAINTAIN manual rod control until corrective action is complete. (YES)
. IF a Power Range NI Channel failed, THEN PLACE the affected NI Rod Stop Bypass switch to BYPASS at the Detector Current Comparator Drawer. (YES)
Proceeds to the Detector Current Comparator Drawer and BOP places NI-44 Rod Stop Bypass switch to BYPASS
- Reports completion of task to the SRO.
Manually OPERATE affected control bank to restore the following:
. Equilibrium power and temperature conditions RO
- Rods above the insertion limits of Tech Spec 3.1.3.6 and PLP-1 06, Technical Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report.
- Withdraws Control Bank D to restore Tave with Tref.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 27 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: tBQ Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page of 72 Event
Description:
PR NIS Channel 44 fails HIGH Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY proper operation of the following: (YES) o CVCS demineralizers RO o BTRS o Reactor Makeup Control System CHECK that this section was entered due to control banks SRO MOVING OUT. (NO) GO TO Step 6. CHECK that NEITHER of the following OCCURRED: (NO) SRO o Unexplained RCS Boration o Unplanned RCS dilution CHECK that an automatic Rod Control malfunction SRO OCCURRED. (NO) GOTO Step 9. SRO EXIT this procedure.
. Refer to OWP-RP-26 to remove channel from service.
. Direct operator and I&C to perform OWP-RP-26 SRO
- Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure of Nl-44
- Contacts WCC for assistance / generation of Work Request Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 28 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: flQ Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page of 73 Event
Description:
PR NIS Channel 44 fails HIGH Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Any Tech Spec evaluation may be completed with a Evaluator Note: follow-up question after the scenario. Enters Instrumentation TS 3.3.1 Functional Unit 2, 3, and 4 ACTION 2 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels. STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours.
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1. and
- c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than SRO or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours; or,. the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours per Specification 4.2.4.2.3.3.1 331 Functional Unit 19.b.1, .c, and d ACTION 7 With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.
Acknowledge request and reports from SRO. Communicator: IF asked to report to MCR to perform OWP-RP-26 state that you will report as soon as possible.
. It is not required to implement the OWP prior to continuing Simulator Operator: .
with the scenario. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 29 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ijQ Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 30 of 73 Event
Description:
PR NIS Channel 44 fails HIGH Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: Any Tech Spec evaluation may be completed with a follow-up question after the scenario. Note: l&C field activities are not required to be completed before continuing with the next event. Note: It is not required for Tave to match Tref or Rod Lead Evaluator: Control to be placed in Automatic before continuing with the next event. After Control Bank D have been withdrawn to restore Tave with Tref, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 5 Event 5 MCC 1 A34 Feeder Breaker trips both fans on AH-3 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 30 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page i of 73 Event
Description:
MCC 1 A34 Feeder Breaker trips (both fans on AH-3) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 5: Simulator Operator: MCC 1 A34 Feeder Breaker trip
. ALB-OO1 5, ENGINEERING SAFEGUARD FEATURES SYSTEM TRAIN A BYPASSED OR INOPERABLE Indications Available
. ALB-027-8-2, CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS AH-3 FLOW LOW O/L RO Responds to alarm ALB-0O1 5.
BOP Responds to alarm ALB-027-8-2. Enters APP-ALB-001 5 and APP-ESF-A-4-1. APP SRO (Note APP-ALB-001 5 will direct entry into APP-ESF-A-4-1. ALB-001 The ESF-A-4-1 light does not have an associated alarm.) Reports alarm condition(s) on Engineered Safeguard Feature RO Bypass Panel A. Refer to APP-ESF-A-4-1 for the window indicated in alarm on RO ESF Bypass Panel A. BOP Reports Containment Fan Cooler AH-3 tripped. BOP should evaluate the HNP Electrical Load list to determine it any additional components are affect by MCC Evaluator Note: 1A34. No other loads are powered form MCC 1A34, as shown on Attachment 2 at the end of this scenario. BOP Reports no power to 1A34. Dispatches AC to investigate. Requests AC to go to 480V Bus SRO A3 and investigate cause of MCC A34 SA supply breaker trip. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 31 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: tiQ Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 32 of 73 Event
Description:
MCC 1 A34 Feeder Breaker trips (both fans on AH-3) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Report 1 A34 feeder breaker is open the static display Communicator: unit is blank. The SRO should direct the BOP to shift to the Train B coolers (AH-1 and AH-4). The following steps should be Evaluator Note: completed for AH-1 and repeated for AH-4 (in either order) then AH-2 should be stopped. SRO Directs BOP to shift to Train B Fan Coolers. OP-169 BOP Enters OP-i 69, Section 5.1 BOP Verifies Initial Conditions. Evaluator Note: Procedure note indicates that placing the Containment Normal Purge Exhaust flow controller (FK-7624) in manual and shutting CP-B9, will enhance control on Containment pressure during fan starts. Places FK-7624, Norm Purge Exh Flow, in MANUAL, and BOP shuts CP-B9, Norm Cont Purge Modulating Valve to control containment pressure during air handler swap. BOP Places control switch for both fans in AH-1/AH-4 to LO-SPD. Procedure Note indicates the next two steps must be Evaluator Note: completed without delay to avoid coastdown. BOP Place control switches for AH-1/AH-4 to STOP. BOP Place control switches for AH-1/AH-4 to Hl-SPD. BOP Restores FK-7624, Norm Purge Exh Flow, to AUTO Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 32 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page of z Event
Description:
MCC 1 A34 Feeder Breaker trips (both fans on AH-3) Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP-i 69 BOP Transitions to OP-i 69, Section 7.1 BOP Places control switches for AH-2 fans in STOP
. Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Affachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist SRO
. Contacts WCC for assistance / generation of Work Request
. Contacts support personnel for repairs.
Evaluator Note: Any Tech Spec evaluation may be completed with a follow-up question after the scenario. Enters Containment TS 3.6.2.3 Action a. (Restore both trains to operable within 7 days or SRO be in HSB in the following 6 hours) TS 3.6.1.5 (NA until >120°F) Note: Annunicators associated with EHC A pump failure (Event 6) will not alarm until approximately 4 minutes have elapsed after initiating the trigger. Thus early cuing of this failure is recommended.
- After the actions to place the fan coolers are aligned in Lead Evaluator, accordance with SRO directions and the Fan Cooler TS has been evaluated, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 6 Event 6 EHC Pump A Shaft Shear I Standby Pump auto start failure Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 33 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 34 of 73 Event
Description:
EHC Pump A Shaft Shear I Standby Pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 6: Simulator Operator: EHC Pump A shaft shear with standby auto start failure.
. ALB-20-4-2B, EH FLUID LOW PRESS Indications Available
. P1-4221 decreasing Responds to ALB-20-4-2B or indication of degrading EHC BOP pressure on P1-4221.
APP BOP Enters APP-ALB-20-4-2B. ALB-020 CONFIRM alarm using: SOP
- P1-4221 VERIFY Automatic Functions:
BOP
- Standby DEH Pump starts at 1500 psig, as sensed by PS-01 TA-4223V The BOP may immediately start the standby pump or wait Evaluator Note:
until after reading the APP. Starts EHC Pump B and observes pressure returning to BOP normal on P1-4221. Dispatches AO to investigate failure of EHC Pump A. When dispatched to investigate, report there is a shaft Communicator: shear on the A EHC Pump Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 34 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page of Z2 Event
Description:
EHC Pump A Shaft Shear I Standby Pump auto start failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PERFORM Corrective Actions:
- a. IF the Reactor is tripped, THEN GO TO EOP-PATH-1.
(NO)
- b. START the standby DEH Pump. (Starts B DEH Pump)
- c. DISPATCH an operator to perform the following:
- 1) MONITOR DEH Pump and PCV operation.
BOP 2) VERIFY OPEN the following: a) 1 EH-1, A EH Pump Suction VIv b) 1 EH-8, B EH Pump Suction Vlv c) 1 EH-31, Main Hdr Press Switch Isol Vlv
- 3) INVESTIGATE system for leaks.
- 4) IF a leak is found, THEN ISOLATE the leak AND IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY Control Room.
. Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist SRO/RO
- Contacts WCC for assistance / generation of Work Request
. Contacts support personnel for repairs After the actions to place the standby DEH pump in service is completed, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 7 Lead Evaluator:
Event 7 - Small break LOCA I ATWS Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 35 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 36 of Event
Description:
RCS Small Break LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. On cue from the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 7:
Simulator Operator: (RCS Small Break LOCA)
. Lowering Pressurizer Level
. Increasing Charging flow
. ALB-009-2-2, PRESSURIZER CONTROL LOW LEVEL
. . . DEVIATION Indications Available:
- ALB-O1O-6-5A, 0/TEMP AT BLK ROD C-3 ALERT
- ALB-028-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM VENTILATION SYSTEM
- Rising pressure and temperature in Containment
. Rising Containment sump level Identifies changing plant conditions and provides crew update.
RO Recommends AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, entry. AOP-016 SRO Enters AOP-016 (No Immediate Actions) SRO Check RHR in operation (NO) REFER TO PEP-i 10, Emergency Classification And SRO Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix. The RCS leakage is being ramped and will increase to Examiner Note: beyond the VCT makeup capability (>120 gpm) SRO CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability. RO Identifies RCS leakage is exceeding VCT makeup capability Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 36 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fQ Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page of 73 Event
Description:
RCS Small Break LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RNO actions: SRO Perform the following:
- a. Trip the Reactor, AND GO TO EOP PATH-i If SI Actuation is required, the Reactor and Turbine Procedure Note: should be verified tripped in PATH-i before manually actuating SI.
- a. MANUALLY INITIATE Safety Injection.
SRO
- b. EXIT this procedure Directs manual Reactor Trip and after the Reactor and Turbine SRO are verified tripped actuate Safety Injection.
Attempts to initiate a MANUAL Reactor Trip from center RO section of the Main Control Board. Attempts to initiate a MANUAL Reactor Trip from left section of RO the Main Control Board. Manually Trips Main Turbine when both Rx Trip switches are BOP NOT successful When the Main Turbine is tripped RCS pressure will rapidly increase and one or more Pressurizer PORVs will lift. With RCS break flow occurring, the RCS pressure will steadily decrease. SG pressure will also rapidly increase Evaluator Note: and cause all SG PORVs to OPEN and most of the SG safety valves to lift. After the Reactor is locally tripped RCS pressure will rapidly decrease. Due to the speed of the event the crew may/may not have time to manually SI. Auto SI will occur at 1850 psig. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. i Page 37 of 73
Appendix D Ooerator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fjQ Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 38 of 73 Event
Description:
ATWS Reactor Trip Breakers Fail to Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior During the ATWS the crew makes a PA announcement for an operator to contact or report to the MCR for Communicator: instructions to locally trip the Reactor. CALL the MCR as the TB AO and get the instructions. After the TB AO has received instructions to locally trip the Reactor, wait 1 minute then run TRG-15. Trigger 15 Simulator Operator: will delete the ATWS malfunction (RPSO1 B) and trip the Reactor locally. After running TRG-15 call MCR and report that the Rx trip breakers were locally opened. Enters PATH-i, Rx WILL NOT trip from RPS or MCB PATH-i SRO switches. Transitions to FRP-S.i, Response to Nuclear Power FRP-S.1 SRO Generation / ATWS To maximize core cooling, RCPs should NOT be tripped with reactor power GREATER THAN 5%. (Normal support Procedure Caution: conditions for running RCPs are NOT required for these circumstances. The RCP TRIP CRITERIA for small break LOCA conditions is NOT applicable to this procedure.) Procedure Note: Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps. Verify Reactor Trip:
- Check for all of the following:
- Check for any of the following:
Immediate Trip breakers RTA AND BYA OPEN (NO) RO *
- Trip breakers RTB AND BYB OPEN (NO)
- Rod bottom lights LIT (NO)
- Neutron flux DECREASING (NO)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 38 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page of Event
Description:
ATWS Reactor Trip Breakers Fail to Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RNO actions: IF the reactor will NOT trip (automatically AND after using both manual trip switches), THEN verify negative reactivity inserted CRITICAL by any of the following while continuing with this procedure: TASK RO
. Manually insert control rods
- Verify control rods inserting in automatic (Critical to insert negative reactivity before the Reactor Trip Breakers are locally opened)
Verify Turbine Trip:
. Check for any of the following:
Immediate e All turbine throttle valves SHUT (NO) Action BOP . All turbine governor valves SHUT (NO)
. Manually trip turbine from MCB. (Locates MCB turbine trip switch and takes switch to TRIP)
Immediate Verify All AFW Pumps RUNNING (Starts ALL available AFW Action BOP pumps) Check Reactor Trip Status:
- Check Reactor TRIPPED (NO)
Immediate Action RO RNO Action: Direct an operator to contact OR report to the main control room (to receive instructions to locally trip the reactor). Perform the following: SRO
- Inform STA to initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees.
Inform SM to Evaluate EAL Matrix (Refer to PEP-i 10). Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 39 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: f5Q Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 4 of Event
Description:
ATWS Reactor Trip Breakers Fail to Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Actuation of the sequencer inhibits operation of the boric acid pumps. (If the sequencer runs on Program A, the pumps can be started manually after LB-9. Otherwise, the Procedure Note: sequencer must be reset to restore operation of the pumps) SI flow accomplishes emergency boration. After the reactor is tripped, RCS pressure will rapidly decrease to the Auto SI setpoint (1850 psig). The crew may/may not have time to manually actuate SI; as such, there is no problem with the crew NOT performing a Evaluator Note: manual SI. After the reactor is tripped, the A CSIP will trip on an electrical fault, and the Safeguards Sequencer will fail to start the B CSIP. Initiate Emergency Boration of RCS:
- Check SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (NO)
. Emergency borate from the BAT:
o Start a boric acid pump.
. Perform any of the following (listed in order of preference):
o Open Emergency Boric Acid Addition valve: Critical
- 10S-278 RO Task o Open normal boration valvs:
- FCV-113A
- FCV-113B
. Verify boric acid flow to CSIP suction AT LEAST 30 GPM
. Verify CSIP flow to RCS AT LEAST 30 GPM (Critical to insert negative reactivity before the Reactor Trip Breakers are locally opened)
RO Check PRZ Pressure LESS THAN 2335 PSIG. (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 40 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 41 of 73 Event
Description:
ATWS Reactor Trip Breakers Fail to Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Isolate CNMT Ventilation:
- Stop the following fans: (If running) o AH-82A NORMAL PURGE SUPPLY FAN BOP o AH-82B NORMAL PURGE SUPPLY FAN o E-5A CNMT PRE-ENTRY PURGE EXHAUST FAN o E-5B CNMT PRE-ENTRY PURGE EXHAUST FAN Verify the valves and dampers listed in the table SHUT.
(YES)
?AX A C*pta RAIR 1GB-i SA VAGIJUK RLIS? ICB-6 S VAGI!UN LIF CD5 SA VACUtfl( RRLIF G3-D52 VACUUN REUEY BOP ICP- A ORKAL ?NGZ INLrr IC?- 53 NORiAL PURGE flL1 IGE-5 A )ORKAL PUG IISGR ICP-3 S 1IOR1AL PURGE DISCE 1GP-IO A ?RK-EKThT ?3RB INLET IC? -7 53 PRE- E)t1RT EtJRGK IHL?
IGP-4 S* R EtTY PtIRG D1Sc IC?-1 5) PRa-1HrRy PURG DISCR Check Trip Status: RO Check Reactor TRIPPED (YES) BOP Check turbine TRIPPED (YES) Check Reactor Subcritical:
. Check for both of the following:
RO
- Power range channels LESS THAN 5% (YES)
. Intermediate range startup rate channels NEGATIVE (YES)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 41 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 8 Page 4 of 73 Event
Description:
ATWS Reactor Trip Breakers Fail to Open Time H Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Boration should continue to obtain adequate shutdown Procedure Caution: margin during subsequent recovery actions.
. Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required.
SRO
. RETURNTOPATH-1.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 42 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fQ Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page 43 of 73 Event
Description:
Sequencer B skips load block 1 start of B CSIP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PATH-i SRO Transitions to PATH-i SRO VERIFY Reactor Trip: (YES) SRO Verify Turbine Trip: (YES) SRO Verify Power to AC Emergency Buses: (YES, Off-Site Power) After the reactor is tripped, RCS pressure will rapidly decrease, to the Auto SI setpoint (1850 psig). The crew may/may not have time to manually actuate SI; as such, there is no problem with the crew NOT performing a Evaluator Note: manual SI. After the reactor is tripped, the A CSIP will trip on an electrical fault, and the Safeguards Sequencer will fail to start the B CSIP. SRO Check SI Actuation (YES) Perform The Following:
- Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status SRO Trees
- Directs SM to evaluate EAL Matrix (Refer to PEP-i 10)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 43 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event# 9 Page 44 of Z3 Event
Description:
Sequencer B skips load block 1 start of B CSIP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Informs Crew Foldout A applies FOLDOUT A
. RCP TRIP CRITERIA BOTH OF THE FOLLOWING OCCUR ThEN STOP ALL RCPS:
. SI FLOW GREATER THAN 200 GPM
. RCS PRESSURE LESS ThAN 1400 PS1G
. AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA CST LEVEL DECREASES TO LESS THAN 10%, THEN SWITCH THE AFW WATER SUPPLY TO THE ESW SYSTEM USING OP-137, SECTION 8 1.
- RHR RESTART CRiTERIA RCS PRESSURE DECREASES IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER TO LESS THAN SRO 230 P51G. THEN RESTART RHR PUMPS TO SUPPLY WATER TO THE RCS
- ALTERNATE MINIFLOW OPENISHUT CRITERIA
. RCS PRESSURE DECREASES TO LESS THAN 1800 PSIG, THEN VERIFY ALTERNATE MINIFLOW ISOLATION VALVES OR MIN1FLOW BLOCK VALVES SHUT
. IF RCS PRESSURE INCREASES TO GREATER THAN 2200 PSIG, THEN VERIFY ALTERNATE MINIFLOW ISOLATION VALVES AND MINIFLOW BLOCK VALVES OPEN
. RUPTURED SG AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA BOTH OF THE FOLLOWING OCCUR TO ANY SG, THEN STOP FEED FLOW BY SHUTT1NG ISOLATION VALVES (PREFERRED> OR FLOW CONTROL VALVES TO AFFECTED SG:
. ANY SG LEVEL INCREASES IN UNCONTROLLED MANNER Q5 HAS ABNORMAL SECONDARY RADIATION
. NARROW RANGE LEVEL GREATER THAN 25% 140%1 The following actions should be taken lAW PATH-i Foldout A criteria during the scenario:
. When RCP trip criteria is met per Foldout A the crew should have the B CSIP running, identify the Evaluator Note:
condition and then trip all running RCPs
. Verify Alternate Miniflow Isolation Valves or Miniflow Block Valves CLOSE when RCS Pressure lowers to less than 1800 PSIG.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 44 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: BQ Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page 4. of 7 Event
Description:
Sequencer B skips load block 1 start of B CSIP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify ALL CSIPs AND RHR pumps RUNNING. (NO) (Manually start B CSIP prior to implementation of the Function Restoration Procedures) Checks Safeguards Sequencer has reached Load Block 9 Critical (Manual Load Permissive) RD Starts B CSIP Reports to SRO (at appropriate time) B CSIP was manually started Reports RHR Pumps running (YES) Check SI Flow: RO SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM. (YES) RD RCS pressure GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES) The crew may manually initiate Main Steam Isolation because Containment Pressure is rising towards the automatic setpoint. Evaluator Note: MSLI will be required when Cnmt Pressure increases to >3 psig. The SRO should direct either the RO or BOP to actuate MSLI prior to reaching 3 psig. Check Main Steam Isolation: RO/BOP Main Steam Line Isolation (MSLI) ACTUATED. (NO) Main Steam Line Isolation (MSLI) REQUIRED. (NO) SRO Directs Main Steam Isolation Actuates Main Steam Isolation and verifies MSIV and MSIV BOP Bypass valves are shut Check CNMT Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 RD PSIG. (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 45 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: tiQ Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page 46 of 73 Event
Description:
Sequencer B skips load block 1 start of B CSIP Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check AFW Status: RO/BOP AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE. (YES) Identifies Foldout A RCP Trip Criteria is MET SI flow> 200 GPM RCS pressure < 1400 psig Critical RO Informs SRO that RCP trip criteria is met Task Secures ALL RCPs (Critical to secure all RCPs with SI flow > 200 gpm and before RCS pressure stabilizes at 1 100 psig) Verify Sequencer Operations AND Alignment Of Components: BOP Check sequencer manual loading permissive (LB-9) ACTUATED (YES) BOP Energize AC buses 1 Al AND 1 B1 The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 6. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment lAW PATH-i Attachment 6 without SRO approval. Evaluator Note: The Scenario Guide still identifies tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 6 is not predictable. Attachment 6, Safeguards Actuation Verification has been included as Attachment 3 at the end of this scenario. Verify Alignment of Components From Actuation of ESFAS BOP Signals Using Attachment 6, Safeguards Actuation Verification,_While_Continuing_with_this Procedure. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 46 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 47 of 73
. Phase A isolation Valves 1SP-9481949 and 1ED-94/1ED-95, Event
Description:
Fail to close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Per PATH-i Attachment 6 step 6: Identifies valves mis-positioned and closes at least one of the valves in each of the following combinations
. iSP-94811SP-949, RCS LOOPS B&C HOT LEG CNMT BOP ISOL (Att. 6)
- 1 ED-94/i ED-95, CNMT SUMP PUMP DISCHARGE AND closes at least one set of the following:
- isp-i 6/i SP-939, RCS LEAK DET SAMPLE ISOL
. 1SP-916/1SP-9i8, RCS LEAK DET SAMPLE ISOL Control RCS Temperature:
Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize RCS temperature between 555° F AND 559° F using Table 1. TADLE 1 RCS TENPERATUER COTR4)L (1IDK1JNES 1OLWVIN RI TRIP
. Guianc is applicable ntfl another pocedur. directg oth,rwiaq.
- IX no RCVs rurning, iee vSde rstge cold leg temperature, RC5 TENPERATURE TREND LESS THAN GREATER T1M4 STADLE AT OR 557 P AND 557 AND TRUDING TO DECREASING INC ING 557!
e Stop duping
- IX condenser
- Control fees BOPIRO tlO a4 transfer duap to fl STZA PRESSURE .aaiutaüi RCS
*oe uin
- Maintain total O-12 between S55F feed I* SectIon 53 AND 55r1 ERATOR greater than AND dup gtea AGTXON 2W EPPE to cden.t until laval gxeet.t tban 25% t4G%I in at Isat one
- Doep etes on intact SG using intact SO ?ORVs
- IX cooldosa continu#C.
- Control eed ahat tiny to MSIVa AND maintain SO 3YPA53 values Iaveli Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 47 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jflQ Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 4 of 73 Phase A isolation Valves 1 SP-9481949 and 1 ED-9411 ED-95, Event
Description:
Fail to close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Identifies RCS cooldown continues and shuts MSIVs CREW NOTE: MSIVs may have been shut from MSLI If PRZ pressure is below 2260 PSIG AND increasing, PRZ spray valves may be OPEN due to controller demand. (With the spray valve controllers and master PRZ pressure Procedure Note: controller in AUTOMATIC, this response is the result of the PRZ master controller being a proportional-integral controller.) Check PRZ PORVs AND Spray Valves: Check PRZ PORVs SHUT (YES) RO Check PZR PORV block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES) PRZ spray valves SHUT. (YES) Identify any faulted SG: Check for any of the following: RO/BOP . Any SG pressures DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)
. Any SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. (NO)
Per PATH-i Attachment 6 step 22: BOP Directs AC to place iA and 1 B Air Compressor in the local (Att. 6) control mode, referring to Path-i Guide Attachment 5 Acknowledge the request to place 1 A and 1 B Air Communicator Compressor in the local control mode per PATH-i Guide Attachment 5. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 48 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: fQ Scenario# 2 Event# 10 Page 4 of Phase A isolation Valves 1 SP-9481949 and 1 ED-94/1 ED-95, Event
Description:
Fail to close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When directed to place the 1A and lB Air Compressor in the local control mode: Run APP\air\acs_to_Iocal Simulator Operator When the APP for 1 A and 1 B Air Compressor has completed running call the MCR and inform them that the air compressors are running in local control. Per PATH-i Attachment 6 step 23: BOP Directs AO to locally unlock AND turn ON the breakers for the (Att. 6) CSIP suction AND discharge cross-connect valves, referring to PATH-i Guide Attachment 11. Acknowledge request to unlock and turn on the breakers Communicator: for the CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves per PATH-i Guide Attachment ii When requested to unlock and turn on CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves: Run APP\cvc\Path-1 Att. 6 Simulator Operator: When the APP has completed running inform MCR that PATH-i Attachment 11 is complete. Identify any ruptured SG: Check for all of the following:
- Condenser Vacuum Pump Effluent radiation CREW NORMAL. (YES)
. SG Blowdown radiation NORMAL. (YES)
. Main Steamline radiation NORMAL. (YES)
RO/BOP Any SG with an uncontrolled level increase (NO) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 49 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page of Event
Description:
Phase A isolation Valves 1 SP-9481949 and 1 ED-94/1 ED-95, Fail to close Time Position [ Applicants Actions or Behavior Check RCS Intact Check for all of the following:
- CNMT pressure NORMAL (NO)
SRO
. CNMT wide range sump level NORMAL (NO)
- CNMT area radiation monitors NORMAL (NO)
GO TO Step 44 [Entry Point C] Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required. SRO (None required) SRO Foldouts A and B Apply The crew should review foldout criteria. Foldout A actions should be complete. No Foldout B actions apply. Evaluator Note: The crew identify and use Adverse Values identified in brackets in the EOP procedures [] when Containment Pressure exceeds 3 PSIG Maintain RCP Seal Injection flow between S GPM AND RO 13 GPM. Check Intact SG Levels: Any level GREATER THAN 25% [40%]. (YES) dependant on timing same results BOP Control feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 25% AND 50% [40% AND 50%]. BOP Verify AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 ENERGIZED. (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 50 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 51 of 73 Event
Description:
Phase A isolation Valves 1 SP-9481949 and 1 ED-9411 ED-95, Fail to close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check PZR PORV block valves: Verify AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 Energized (YES) no Check PORVs Shut (YES) Check block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN. (YES) IF a PRZ PORV opens on high pressure, THEN verify it shuts SRO after pressure decreases to less than opening setpoint. Check SI Termination Criteria: RCS subcooling GREATER THAN (YES/NO) RO dependant on timing same results
. 10°F[40°FjC
- 20°F{50°F]M IF Subcooling > 10°F then the check is performed, Evaluator Note:
otherwise the following is N/A) Check secondary heat sink by observing any of the following
- Level in at least one intact SG GREATER THAN 25%
BOP [40%] (YES)
. Total feed flow to intact SGs GREATER THAN 210 KPPH (YES)
WHEN the SI termination criteria are met, THEN GO TO SRO EPP-008, SI TERMINATION, Step 1. Check CNMT Spray Status: Check any CNMT Spray Pump RUNNING. (NO) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 51 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: f4Q Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page of Event
Description:
Phase A isolation Valves 1 SP-9481949 and 1 ED-94/1 ED-95, Fail to close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check Source Range Detector Status:
. Intermediate range flux LESS THAN 5x10 11 AMPS RO
. Verify source range detectors ENERGIZED
. Transfer nuclear recorder to source range scale Check RHR Pump status:
- Check RHR pump suction ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)
RO . RCS Pressure greater than 230 PSIG (YES)
. RCS pressure STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES/NO)
- Yes Stop RHR pumps, NO leave RHR pumps on.
Dependant on timing The evaluation/trend of RCS pressure in the next several steps is dependent on how long it took the crew to reach Evaluators Note: these steps (Decay Heat/Break FIow/ECCS flow). Pressure should be considered stable or decreasing at this point. Check RCS And SG Pressures: Check for both of the following: RO
. All SG Pressures STABLE OR INCREASING. (YES)
. RCS pressure STABLE OR DECREASING. (YES)
Establish CCW Flow To The RHR Heat Exchangers: Verify both CCW Pumps running (YES) Open the following valves: (CCW Return From RHR HX RO Trains A and B)
. 1CC-147 (locates MCB switch and opens valve)
. 1 CC-i 67 (locates MCB switch and opens valve)
RO Verify CCW flow to the RHR Heat Exchangers (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 52 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 53 of 73 Phase A isolation Valves 1SP-9481949 and 1 ED-9411 ED-95, Event
Description:
Fail to close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Perform one of the following to establish two independent CCW systems: (SHUTS one Train of valves listed below) Shut train A CCW non-essential supply AND return valves: RO
- 1CC-99
- 1CC-128 Shut train B CCW non-essential supply AND return valves:
- 1CC-113
. 1CC-127 Check EDG status:
Check AC emergency buses 1 A-SA AND 1 B-SB BOP/RO ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER (YES)
- Check Bus voltages (Normal)
. Verify breakers 105 and 125 closed (YES)
BOP/RO Check any EDG running unloaded (YES) Reset SI (takes both SI reset switches to RESET and RO observes status light change from SI active to SI reset) Shutdown any unloaded EDGs using OP-i 55, Diesel BOP Generator Emergency Power System, Section 7.0 Evaluator Note: See next page for copy of PATH-i Attachment 3 Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status: RHR system CAPABLE OF COLD LEG SRO RECIRCULATION (Path-i Guide Attachment 3) (YES) Check Auxiliary AND Radwaste Processing Building radiation NORMAL (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. i Page 53 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: flQ Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 4 of
. . Phase A isolation Valves 1SP-9481949 and 1ED-94/1ED-95, Event
Description:
Fail to close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior GUIDE PATH-t Attachment 3 Sheetlotl MANUAL NJGNMNT FOR COLt) LEG RECRCULAflON _..C_A NOTE Component coating water to the RHR beat exchangers is Q[ required to be ava[e In order to establish flow from the recirculation sumps.
- 1. At Ieat one train of the dkwlnç cotnponents must be capable of establlsh1n flow from the recirculabon surnps, Each component must satis the cnditions in the associated table Mi must NQ] otherithse be knowii to be failert D TraInk oaditiuns fo Conponent Recircultion A1ignnt RUR PUN? A Power Aveflable iRE-i IRa-i (RCS loop A o R. pp A) !ithet vaLve - SW)?
ISI-IGO (CNWt sp to RER pp A) fewer Avaiilabia ISt-310 (CNl zp to RER pcp A) Power Available ISI-121 (SWST to RER pump A) Power Available I$Z-340 (Low lea St train
- to cole leg) Valve 0 Tram B:
Coidjtiona fo* Coiponent Recirculatioa Alignzent RER fIlM? Power Iwaiiable IRli- 140 (R.CS loop to RR pap RI itbar valve - 1SI3Ol (CNWr anap to RER purnp ) Power Available iSt-l1 (CNT aip to RRR ) Pa-wet AvOilable lSI-32a (RWST to RRR pimp ) Power Available 151-141 (tow tlead St train to cold leg) Valve - 0Pfl END - I FOP-GIJIDF-1 I Rev 3 I Pn TA
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jj.Q Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 55 of 73 Phase A isolation Valves 1 SP-9481949 and 1 ED-9411 ED-95, Event
Description:
Fail to close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check RCS Status Check for both of the following: RO . RCS pressure LESS THAN 230 PSIG (NO)
. Any RHR HX header flow GREATER THAN 1000 GPM (NO)
GO TO EPP-009, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND SRO DEPRESSURIZATION, Step 1 EPP009 SRO EPP-009, Post LOCA 000ldown and Depressurization PROCEDURE NOTE: Foldout applies SRO Reviews FOLDOUT Criteria (None will require action) RO Reset SI (already performed) Manually realign safeguards equipment if a loss of off-site SRO power occurs. Reset Phase A and Phase B Isolation signals RO Locates MCB Phase A switch and resets Phase A (no need to reset Phase B it was not actuated) Establish Instrument Air and Nitrogen to CNMT Open the following valves: RO
. 1 IA-81 9 (locates MCB switches and opens valve)
. 1 Sl-287ocates MCB switches and opens valve)
Monitor AC Buses: Check AC emergency buses 1 A-SA AND 1 B-SB BOP/RO ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER:
- Check bus voltages
- Check breakers 105 AND 125 CLOSED (YES)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 55 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: f4Q Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 56 of 73 Event
Description:
Phase A isolation Valves 1 SP-9481949 and 1 ED-94/1 ED-95, Fail to close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO GO TO Step 5e BOP/RO Check all non-emergency AC buses ENERGIZED (YES) PRZ heaters should NOT be energized until PRZ water Procedure Caution: level indicates greater than minimum recommended by plant operations staff to ensure heaters are covered. Secure PRZ Heaters:
- Place backup heaters in the OFF position
. Verify control heaters OFF RO . Consult plant operations staff for a recommended minimum indicated PRZ water level that will ensure heaters are covered. (Refer to ERG Executive Volume, Generic Issue: Evaluations by the Plant Engineering Staff.)
Check if RHR Pumps should be stopped:
- Check RHR pumps ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION RO ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)
- RCS pressure GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)
- RCS pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (NO)
Check Intact SG Levels:
- Any level GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (YES)
BOP
- Control feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 25% and 50% [40% and 50%].
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 56 of 73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: f4Q Scenario # 2 Event # 10 Page 57 of 73 Event
Description:
Phase A isolation Valves 1 SP-9481949 and 1 ED-9411 ED-95, Fail to close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior After the low steam pressure SI signal is blocked, main Procedure Note: steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded. Check PRZ Pressure:
- Pressure less than 2000 PSIG (YES)
RO . Block low steam pressure SI Locates Low Steam Line Pressure SI MCB block switch and places switch to block verifies block on status lights Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown: SRO Maintain Cooldown rate in RCS cold legs <100F/HR Check RHR system OPERATING IN SHUTDOWN RO COOLING MODE (NO) SRO GO TO Step lOf Check all of the following to determine if steam can be dumped to condenser: Check any intact SG MSIV OPEN (NO) BOP Dump steam from intact SGs using any of the following (listed in order of preference):
. SG PORVs NOTE: Must recouple RCS with SGs which means PORVs must be opened and SG pressure reduced.
The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when the crew demonstrates the ability to establish a cooldown rate. Lead Evaluator: Announce Crew Update End of Evaluation Have crew remain in the Simulator without discussing the exam. Examiners will formulate any follow-up questions. Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner place the Simulator in FREEZE. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 57 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
- KARR[8 2011 NRCSCENAR1O 2 Attachment 1 OWP-ESF-02 OWP-ESF-02 Sheet 1 018 EIR Number:
W/O Number: 1_ OWP-ESF-02 Clearance Number 2 System: ESFAS
- 3. Component: SG Steam Pressure Loop I
- 4. Scope: LCO Action required due to inoperable SG A Pressure Protection ChanneLs A, ill, or IV (PT-474, PT-475, or PT-476)
- 5. Applicable Requirements: 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3.5a and 3.3.3.6
- 6. Precautions: (I) Ensure only one channel is in TEST at a time. (2) See NOTE on Sheets 3 and 5. (3) The ERFIS Contmuous calorimetric may be inoperable.
- 7. Component ilneups completed per attached sheet (s) /
Signature Date
- 8. Testing required on redundant equipment while component is inoperable:
None
- 9. TestingiAction required to restore operability. (N/A it tracked on EIR)
MST-10007 for Channel II I MST-10008 for Channel Ill MST-10009 for Channel IV Signature Date
- 10. Component lineups restored per attached sheet (5) 1 Signature Date I -1, Remarics:
- 12. Reviewed by:
Supeflntendent- Shift Operations Date After receiving the final review signature, this OWP becomes a QA Record and should be submitted to Document Services. OWPESF Rev. 21 Page9of5l Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 58 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form. ES-D-1 HARRIS 2(M t NRC SCENARIO 2 - Attachment 1 OW P-ESF-02 OWP-ESF-02 Sfleet2otE Bistable iStatus Liaht Linetrn PosHon For Maintenance Restored Posrtlon Component ID or Number 1ntiaINerifled lnrtialNerrtled Steam lIne Pressure CtanneI II PlC Cabinet 2 on Card 02-846 NOTE: Concurrent venflcation s preferred wtde tripping bsIabIes 851 (P61474A Lo Steamhne Pressure MSIS & SIAS) TEST I NORMAL 8S2 (P6/4740 Hi Stearnhine Pressure Rate MSIS) TEST NORMAL / 653 (P6147461 P1 > P2 for AEW Isolahon) TEST I NORMAL 1 654 (P6147462 P2> P1 for AFW Isolation) TEST I NORMAL I PlC abinet 2 on Card C2-848 553 (P6/49481 P1 > P3 for AFW Isolation) TEST I NORMAL 654 (P6/49462 P3> P1 For AFW isolation) TEST / NORMAL I j3iPX-1 STMLN A LO PRESS PB 474A (Window 1 -2) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED I STMLN A HP RATE PB 474C (Window 42) ENERGIZED I DE-ENERGIZED / STMLN B HI 01FF P847461 (Window 7-2) ENERGIZED I DE-ENERGIZED / STMLN CHI 01FF P849461 (Window 9-2) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED STMLN Al-il 01FF P647462 (WindOw 10-2) ENERG1ZED / DE-ENERG1ZED STMLN AHI DIFF P639462 (Window 12-2) ENERGIZED DE-ENERGIZED 1 On ERFIS Computer (UsingR Function) PMS0474 Deleted from Restored to Processing I Processing rOWP-ESF Rev. 21 Page ioT1 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 59 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
- HARR[S 2011 NRC SCENARIO 2 Attachment 1 OWP-ESF-02 OWP-ESF-02 Sfleet 3 of 8 Bistabie /Status Lioht Lineup Position for Maintenance Restored Position Component ID or Number Initial/Verified Initial/Verified Steamlirie Pressure Channel Ill NOTE: SO A level channels associated with Loop 1 SFIFF Mismatch RPS signals must remain OPERABLE (LBI4748 & LP/475B not tripped) and SG A level must be maintained above low level setpoint to preclude a SFJFF Mismatch Reactor Trip.
(circle position selected) STM SEN A FW FLOW CHAN 476 CONTROL AND RECORDER or SELECTOR CHAN 476 / Cl-tAN 477 (circle position selected) STM SEN A STM FLOW CHAN 474 CONTROL AND RECORDER or SELECTOR CHAN 475 / CHAN 475 PIG CabinetS on Card C3-864 NOTE: This switch may be re-positioned for troubleshooting. It is not required to be in TEST to meet Tech Specs Operating this switch first aids in troubleshooting by maintaining system conditions the same as they were when the trouble occurred. SW3 (P-Q475 Master Test Switch) TEST / NORMAL PlC Cabinet 3 on Card C3-851 Ii NOTE.: Concurrent verification is preferred while tripping bistables. I 651 (PB/475A La Steamline Pressure MSIS & SIAS) TEST I NORMAL I 652 (PBJ$75C Hi Steamline Pressure Rate MSIS) TEST / NORMAL I BS3 (P6/47561 P1 > P2 for AFW Isolation) TEST / NORMAL / 654 (P6/47562 P2> P1 for AFW isolation) TEST 1 NORMAL I OWP-ESF I Rev. 21 Page 11 of 51 I Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 60 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outhne Form ES-D-1
- HARRIS2O-11NPGSCENAR1O2 Attachment 1 OWP-ESF-02 OWP-ESF-02 Sheet 4 01 S Bistable IStatus Light Lineup Position for Y1awitenance Restored Position Component ID or Number InitialNeriflect Initial/Verified Steamline Pressure Channel III (continued)
PlC Cabinet 3 on Card C3-855 BS3 (PBJ4S5BI PT > P3 for AFW Isolation) TEST I NORMAL / 654 (PB1495B2 P3> P1 for AFW Isolation) TEST I NORMAL I PlC Cabinet 3 on Card C3-845 BSI (FB/478B SFIFF Mismatch RxTrip) TEST I NORMAL / PlC Cabinet 3 on Card C3-848 651 (FB/478C SF/iT Alarm) TEST I NORMAL I Trip Status Light Box-I STMLN A LO PRESS PB 475A (Nindow 1-3) ENERGIZED I DE-ENERGIZED I STMLN A HP RATE PB 475C (Window 4-3) ENERGIZED I DE-ENERGIZED I STMLN B HI DIFF PB 47581 (Window 7-3) ENERGIZED I DE-ENERGIZED I STMLN C HI 01FF PB 495B1
çWindow 9-3) ENERGIZED I DE-ENERGIZED /
STMLN A HI DIFF PB 47582 (Window 10-3) ENERGIZED DE-ENERGIZED I STMLN A HI DIFF PB 495B2 (Window 12-3) ENERGIZED I DE-ENERGIZED / Trip Status Light Box-2 SG A FW < STM FB 4788 (Window 1-3) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED I On ERF1S Computer (Using DR Function) Deleted from Restored to PM50475 Processing Processing I OWP-ESF Rev. 21 Page 12 of Si Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 61 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 F4ARRIS 2011 F4RC SGENAR[O 2 Attachment 1 OWP-ESF-02 OWPESFO2 Sheet 5 of 8 Liaci121tLJit42LLJnLw Poslion for Maintenance Restored Posiben Component ID or Number lnitialNerified lnitiaIIVeried Steamline Pressure Channel V NOTE: SG A level channels associated wiTh Loop I SF/FF Mismatch RPS signs must remain OPER.BLE (1S1474B & LP/4756 not tripped) and SG A level must be maintained above low level setpolnt to predude a SFJFF Mismatch Reactor Trip. (cirde position selected) STM GEN A FW FLOW CHAN 476 CONTROL AND RECORDER or SELECTOR CHAN 477 / CHAN 477 (circle position selected) STM GEN A STM Row CHAN 474 CONTROL AND RECORDER or SELECTOR CF-fAN 474 1 Cl-iAN 475 PLC Cabinet 4 on Card c4-863 NdtE This switch may be re-xisftioned for trOubleshooting Itis not required to be n TEST to meet Tech Spec& Operating thls switch first aids in troubleshooting by maintaining system conditions the same as they were when the trouble occurred. 5W3 (P-0476 Master Test Switch) TEST / NORMAL [ESF Rev21 Page 13ot51 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 62 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
- HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 2 Attachment 1 OW P-ESF-02 OWP-ESF-02 Sheet S of a Bistable /Status Lght Uneup Steamline Pressure Channel IV (continued)
Position tor Maintenance Restored Position Component ID or Number nttiaiNerifled lniiialiVerifiad [NOTE: Concurrent verification is preferred while tripping bisbbles. S1 (P13/$76A Lo SteamHne 1 Pressure MSIS & SIAS) TEST I NORMAL I BS2 (P8147CC Hi StCamIine Pressure Rate MS1S) TEST I NORMAL / CAUTION If 853 (P8147681) or BS.4 (PS/47662) are being placed to TEST (tripped condition) to satisfy TCch Spec Table 333, Action 19, removal of any ONE of the following cards will remove the channel from the tnpped condition: thus no longer meeting the action statement to be in the tripped condition; (Reference NCR 350586)
- PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C454S
- PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C4834
- PlC Cabinet 4 on Oard O4$48 653 (P6147681 P1 > P2 for AFW Isolation) TEST NORMAL 584 (P5147662 P2> P1 for AFW Isolation) TEST NORMAL INSTRUCTION
- 1. DIRECT l&C to perform continuity testing of 883 and 884 above using the Restoration section of MSTl00Q9;
- 653 continuity check complete
- 534 continuity check complete OWP-ESF Rev, 21 Page 14 of Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 63 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
- HARRIS2011- NRC SCENARIO 2 Attachment 1 OWP-ESF-02 OWPESF02 Sheet 7 of 8 Bstabte iStatus Laflt Uneup Position for Maintenance Restored Position Component ID or Number InittalNerified ntiaI/Venfied PlC Cabinet 4 on Card, C4-833 CAUTION It 853 (P6/49661) of 85-4 (P5149662) are beng placed to TEST (bipped condition) to atlfV Tech Spec Table 333, Achon 19, removal of any ONE of the following cards wilt remove the channel From the tripped condmon thus no longer meeting tile action statement to be n the tnpped coridttlon (Reference NCR 350586)
- PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C4-549
- PlC Cabinet 4 on Card 04-843
- PIG Cabnet 4 on Card 03-838 PlC Cabinet 4 on Card C4-843 683 (P6/49681 P1 > P3 for AFW Isolation) TEST NORMAL 884 (P6/49682 P3> P1 for AFW Isolation) TEST / NORMAL /
IN RUCTION
- 2. DIRECT l&C to perform continwty testing of 683 and 684 above using the Restoration section of MST-1OOO9
- 883 continuity check complete
- 884 continwtv check complete rowP-ESF Rev21 - Pageifof5ij Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 64 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
. HARRIS2O1INRCSCENARIO2 Attachment 1 OWP-ESF-02 OWRESF-02 Sheet 8018 Bistable IStatus Light Lneup Position for Maintenance - Restored Position Component ID or Number Initial/VerifIed - InitaINerited Stearnne Pressure Channel IV (continued)
PlC Cabtnet4 on Card C4-82 851 (F81478A SFfFF Mismatch Rx Trip) TEST I NORMAL PlC Cabinet 4 on Card 4831 851 (F6/d780 SFFF Alarm) TEST / NORMAL Trip Status Light Box-I STMLN A LO PRESS PB 476A (Window 1-4) ENERGIZED / DE-ENERGIZED / STMLN A HP RATE PB 376C (WhIdow 4-4) ENERGIZED DE-ENERGIZED STMLN 8 HI 01FF P847681 (Window 7-4) ENERGiZED I DE-ENERGIZED / STMLN C HI 01FF PB 49651 (Window 9-4) ENERGIZED I DE-ENERGIZED STMLN A HI 01FF PB 37652 (Window 10-4) ENERGIZED / CE-ENERGIZED I STMLN A HI DIFF PB 39682 (Window 12-4) ENERGIZED I DE-ENERGIZED. / Trip Status Light Box-2 SGAFW <STh1 F8478A (Window 1-4) ENERGIZED I DE-ENERGIZED I On ERFIS Computer (Usnq OR Function) DMQ476 Deleted from Rsto1ed to Processing I Processing / OWP-ESF Rev21 Pge16of51 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 65 of 73
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GUIDE PATh-I Attachment 6 Sheeti of7 Safeguards Actuation Verificaliori NOTE General guidance for verification of safeguards equipment is contained in Attachment 8 of this procedure LI 1. Verity Two CSIPs RUNNING LI 1 Verify Two RHR Pumps RUNNING-LI 3 Verify Two CCW Pumps RUNNING-LI & Verify All ESWM ESW Booster Pumps RUNNING - LI 5 Verify SI Valves PROPERLY ALIGNED (Refer to Attachment 1.) LI 6 Verify CNMT Phase A Isolation Valves SHUT (Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIPISAFEGUARDS REVIEW, Attachment 4.) EOP-GUIDE-1 I Rev. 33 I Page 79 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 67 of 73
Attachment 6 Sheet2of7 Safeguards Actuation Verdicalion Li 7. Verify SG 8bwdmit SG Samp4e soktion Valves In Table 1- SHUT Table b SC Blowdesn And Sample IE.elation Valves Pees Outsi&e CN Inside CNXT Line OU.-1A-SA) (MLZ8SB) SO A Sp1e 1SPfl7 lS?2l4/216 SO Sap].e 1SZ22 S?2t9I22l SO C Sa*ple SP 227 tSR22/226 SQ A 81odown 10,ll SQ 8 8lovdown 18D30 IED2O SQ C 81odown iBD-4 1!D39
- 8. iF Main Steam Line Isation Actuated Is Required Dy Arty Of The Folling, TiIEJ4 Vetify MSIVs MSIV Bypass Valves SHUT C
- Sfeam line pressure LESS ThAN 01 P51(3 El
- CNMr pressure GREATER THAN 30 PSIG
- 9. IF CNMT Spray Actuation Signal Actuated OR Is Required, 11-lEN Verify The Fobwing (Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIPISAFEGUARDS REVIEW, Attachment 9.)
C
- CNMT spray pumps RUNNING C
- CNMT spray valves PROPERLY ALIGNED C
- Phase B isdation valves SHUT C
- A RCPs STOPPED EOP-CtJ IDE-I I Rev 33 Paoe 80 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 68 of 73
Altathrnent 6 Sheet 3 of 7 Safeguards Actuaon Veri&alion Li 10.. Verify I3oth Main FW Pumps TRiPPED Li 11. Verify FWlsolalionValves-SIIUT (Refer to OMM-004. POST TRPISAFEGUAROS REVIEW, Attachment 6.) Li 11 Veny both MDAFW pumps RUNNING
- 13. jf any of the friuIos*ig condii5ors exist. THEN verify the TDAFW pirnp RUNNING Li
- Undervoltage on either &9 KV emergency bus
[]* Level in to SGs LESS ThAN 25% Li
- Manual adualion to control SG levol 14, Verify AFW Valves PROPERLY AUGNED LI
- I[ no AFW leolation Signal, THEN verify isolation arid flow control valves -
OPEN LI
- if AFW Isolation Signal present, jJjjff verify MDAFW and 1IJAFW isolation and flow control vaNes to affected SG SHUT Li 15, Verify Both EOGs RUNNING Li 16. Verify CNMT Fan Coolers ONE FAN PER UNIT RUNNING IN SLOW SPEED EOP-G1JIDE-1 Rev. 33 Pane 81 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 69 of 73
Attachment 6 Sheet4 of 7 Safeguards Actuation Verification LI 17. Verify CNMT Ventilation Isolation Valves SHUT (Refer to OMM-004, POST TR1P1SAFEGIJARDS REVIEW, Attachment 7.) LI 18. Verify Controi Room Ventilation ALIGNED FOR EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION (Refer to OMM-004, POST TRIPISAFEGUARDS REVlEW, Attachment 5)
- 19. Verify Essential Service Chilled Water System Operation:
LI
- Verify both WC-2 chillers RUNNING LI
- Verify both P-4 pumps RUNNING LI (Refer to AOP-026, lOSS OF ESSENTiAL. SERVICE CHILLED WATER SYSTEM for loss of any WC-2 chiller.)
- 20. VerIfy CSIP Fan Coolers RUNNING LI AH-9ASA LI AH-9 B SB LI Al-1-1OASA LI AH-1OBSB NOTE Security systems are normally powered by bus 1A1. Backup power will be available for approximately 30 MINUTES after bus iAl is de-energized.
LI 21 Verify AC buses IA1 N[ 181 - ENERGIZED LI 22. Place air compressor IA AND lB in the LOCAL CONTROL Mode. (Refer to Attachment 5.) EOP-GUIDE-I I Rev. 33 I Page 82 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 70 of 73
AttachmentS Sheet Sot I Safeguards Aduation Venficanon CAUTION The maximum caiculated dose rate n the vicinity of MCC 1A3SSA and MCC 1835-S8 is between 10 MREMIHR and 150 MREM1HR, []23, Dispatch An Operator To Unlock AND Turn ON The 6reakers For The CSII Suctton AND Discharge Cmss-Conned Valve& (Refer to Attachment I 1) MCC 1A3-SA CG 1E35-SE VALVE CtJEICLE VALVE CUBICLE iCS-flO 4k ICSl7i 4D 1CS 159 48 iCS1M ID 1CS-218 14D 1CS-220 9D ICS-219 148 1CSZ17 12C
- 24. Check f C CSIP Should e Placed n Service:
[:]
- IF ro charging pumps cart 4ff be vented to be running, AND C CSIP is avadaNe THEN place C CSIP in service in place of the non-running CSP usrng OP-107, CHEMICAI. AND VOLUME CONTROl SYSTEM, Section 8.5 o8.7.
EOP-GUIDE-1 Rev 33 1 Paae 83 of 7 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 71 of 73
Athmerit 6 Sheet 6 of 7 Safeguards Actuation VeriticaUon NOTE
- Fuel pxl levels AND temperatures shoiJd be rnonthwed pproximatet every I to 2 HOURS.
- FoHcg the initial check of fuel pool levels and temperature, aMorwg responsibilities may be assumed by the plant operations staff (inctuding the TSC or STA).
- Only fuel pools c nlathing fuel are required to be monitored.
25, Check Status Of Fuel Pools: El a Start the spent fuel pump room ventilation system using OP-Ill], FUEL HANDUNG BUILDING HVAC, Section 6,3. C]b. Operate spent fuel cooling pumps to mitrdain fuel pod temperature Using OP-I 16, FUEL POOL COOLING, Section 6.0. c Monitor fuel pod levels AND temperatures: El Refer to AOP-041, SPENT FUEL POOL EVENT Attachments 7,8,9,10 and lIfer SEP parameter monitoring methods. C]
- Refer to Curves HX-24, HX25 and H.X-26 for SFP tIme to 2O0 F,
[1
- Levels GREATER ThAN LO ALARM (284 Fl, 0 1N)
C] a Te peratures LESS THAN HI TEMP ALARM (105 F) EOP-GUIDE-1 Rev. 33 1 Paae 84 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 72 of 73
Attachment 6 Sheet7of7 Safeguards Actuation Verification NOTE IF control roam ventilation was. previously aligned to an emergency outside air intake for post-accident operations, THEN follow-up actions will be required to restore the alignment
- 26. Consuft Plant Operations Staff Regarding Alignment Of The Control Room Ventilation System:
El
- Site Emergency Co-ordinator Control Room El
- Site Emergency Co-ordinator Technical Support Center (Refer to PEP-230. CONTROL ROOM OPERATlONS)
-END EOP-GIJIDE-I I Rev.. 33 I Page 85 of 97 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 2 Rev. 1 Page 73 of 73
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS2O12 NRC SCENARIO 3 - Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 0500040012012301 Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: IC-19, MOL, 100% power TDAFW Pump Out of Service due to damaged over speed trip device, due back in 24 hours, awaiting parts from vendor A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan under clearance for motor replacement PORV Block valve 1 AC-i 13, SHUT due to PZR PORV 4448 Seat Leakage Turnover: The crew is being directed to shut down the plant lAW with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown section 5.2, step 4. The desired load rate of change is 4 DEH units per minute. Critical Tasks:
. Trip the main turbine prior to receiving Safety Injection
. Establish feedwater flow into at least one SG before RCS feed and bleed is required Event MaIf. No. Event Type Event Description No 1 N/A N BOP/SRO Power reduction A RO/SRO 2 FT:415 RCS Loop A Flow Indication fails low (Turbine ramp secured)
TS SRO 3 SISO3C C RO/SRO C Accumulator nitrogen leak TS SRO Loss of Both Heater Drain Pumps (auto Turbine runback) 4 CFW12A C Note: Since the Turbine runback does not fail a Component failure is CFW12B not credited to the BOP for this event. 5 PPIO8 C BOP/SRO
- Grid frequency degradation TS SRO 6 ZDSQ52ATB C BOP/SRO
- B EDG Load Block 9 Manual Permissive failure PP108 Grid frequency further degrades requiring Reactor Trip per AOP-028, RO/SRO enter PATH-i 8 TURO5A Turbine Auto Trip fails one GV and one SV fail to shut, PATH-i C - BOP/SRO TURO5F step 2 ANO implemented to manually trip the Turbine Loss of Main Feed Water (MFP A trips 30 secs after Ax trip, MFP B CWF16A trips 2 mins later) 9 CWF16B C BOP/SRO o A MDAFW pump does not auto start (and trips 2 minutes after CFWO1A starting)
- Loss of both AFW pumps (AFW Pump B 5 minutes after Ax trip).
10 CFWO1 B M ALL
-
- Entry into FAP H.1, success path utilizing condensate pumps to establish heat sink.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 1 of 61
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARR1-S 2012 NR SCNAR[O 3 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nsrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 3
SUMMARY
The plant is at 100% power in the middle of life. The TDAFW Pump has been out of service due to damaged overspeed trip device for 64 hours and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 24 hours. LCO 3.7.1 .2 action a has been entered. A Normal shutdown has been directed by plant management, at 4 DEH Units I minute. The A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan is out of service for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours. PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13, SHUT due to PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage. Radiation monitor MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB has failed low and thunderstorms are in the area. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to a power reduction of >10% (YELLOW risk is a qualitative risk assessment per WCM-001). GP-006 is currently in progress with step 3 completed. Event 1: Power reduction the crew performs a power reduction lAW GP-006. For this reactivity manipulation it is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will borate per the reactivity plan and the BOP operator will operate the DEH Controls as necessary to lower power. Event 2: RCS A Loop Flow indicator Fl-415 fails low, resulting in Annunciator RCS Loop A Low Flow Alert and the crew will respond lAW ALB 010-6-1, RCS Loop A Low Flow Alert. The crew may utilize OWP-RP-04, Loop Low Flow to remove the faulty channel from service. The SRO will evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.1, Function 12, and will require action statement 6 to be entered. T.S. 3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE. Action 6: With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 2 of 61
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRL2O121RCSCNARlO-3 - HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 3
SUMMARY
(continued) Event 3: C, Accumulator nitrogen leak causes pressure to decrease until annunciator ALB 01-9-1 alarms. The crew should respond to the low pressure condition and restore the Accumulator pressure to normal. The SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.5.1 for Accumulator pressure if pressure gets below Tech Spec operability limit. T.S. 3.5.1 Each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:
- a. The isolation valve open with power supply circuit breaker open,
- b. A contained borated water volume of between 66 and 96% indicated level,
- c. A boron concentration of between 2400 and 2600 ppm, and
- d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 585 and 665 psig Action: a. With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve or boron concentration not within limits, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours.
Event 4: Trip of BOTH running Heater Drain Pumps (occurs with power >90%). The A HD pump will trip during the power reduction followed two minutes later by the B HD pump tripping. The crew should respond to the event lAW AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions. They will periorm the immediate actions associated with AOP-010. Prior to the second HD pump tripping the crew will have placed the Turbine ramp on hold. When the second HD pump trips and with power above 90% an automatic Turbine Runback will occur. After plant stabilization the crew will dispatch AOs to investigate the problems with the HD pumps and exit AOP-01 0. The SRO will contact the Work Control Center and Manager of Operations for assistance. Event 5: Degradation in grid frequency The failure will cause Frequency to degrade and stabilize at 59.2 Hz, requiring entry into AOP-028, Grid Instability. Conditions will require that the crew implement AOP-028 Attachment 2 to energize the Safety Busses from the Emergency Diesel Generators. The crew will be allowed power the B Emergency Bus with the B EDG. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 3 of 61
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRLS2012NRCSCENARIQ HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 3
SUMMARY
(continued) Event 5: Continued The SRO should review Tech Spec 3.6.1 .4, Containment Systems Internal Pressure, Tech Spec 3.8.1.1, A.C. Sources Operating Tech Spec 3.6.5, Containment Systems Vacuum Relief System, and Tech Spec 3.0.3. T.S. 3.6.1.4, Primary containment internal pressure shall be maintained between
-1 .0 inches water gauge and 1.6 psig.
Action: With the containment internal pressure outside of the limits above, restore the internal pressure to within the limits within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. T.S. 3.8.1.1, As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE: Action: a. With one off-site circuit inoperable:
- 1. Perform surveillance 4.8.1 .1 .1 .a within 1 hour (every 8 hrs thereafter):
and
- 2. Restore the off-site circuit within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN w/in the following 30 hours: and
- 3. Verify required feature(s) powered from the OPERABLE offsite AC source are OPERABLE.
T.S. 3.6.5, The containment vacuum relief system shall be OPERABLE with an Actuation Setpoint of equal to or less negative than -2.5 inches water gauge differential pressure (containment pressure less atmospheric pressure) Action: CVIS causes both CNMT vacuum relief valves to become inoperable, therefore T.S. 3.0.3 applies due to no action requirement provided to met the Limiting condition for Operation. (1 hr Action) Event 6: B EDG Load Block 9 Manual Permissive failure AOP-028 directs the crew to check that the sequencer Load Block 9 auto actuation complete has occurred. This will fail requiring the BOP to wait for the 150 second time delay to elapse and then select the manual loading switch to Manual Permissive. Event 7: Grid Frequenceny continues to degrade Once the B Safety Bus is being supplied by the B EDG and the B EDG Load Block Manual permissive is met the grid will degrade further (58.2 Hz). This low frequency will require the crew initiate a manual Reactor trip and enter PATH-i. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 4 of 61
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l l-{ARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 3 - HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 3
SUMMARY
(continued) Event 8: Turbine Trip failure An automatic Turbine Trip will fail based on one Turbine Governor valve and one Turbine Stop valve failing to shut on the Turbine trip signal. This will require the BOP to implement PATH-i step 2 RNO and manually trip the Turbine. Event 9: Loss of Main Feed Water while the crew is implementing PATH-i, both Main Feed Pumps will trip. The A MDAFW pump should auto start when the last running Main Feedwater pump trips but does not auto start. The crew should manually start the pump since the MDAFW pump has received an auto start signal. After starting the A MDAFW pump it will trip 2 minutes later on an overload condition. Event 10: Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Major After the crew transitions to EPP-004, Reactor Trip Response, and is starting recovery actions the B MDAFW pump will trip on overload. Based on implementation of Function Restoration procedures at step 1 of EOP-004 the SRO should transition to FRP-H.i, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The AFW pumps and the MFPs will not be available, requiring the crew to secure the RCPs and depressurize one SG in order to establish feedwater flow using the condensate pumps. Once the crew has established feed flow and at least one SG NR levei is increasing (to 25% NR level), the scenario may be terminated. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 5 of 61
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-i HARRIS2OI2 NRC SCENARIO 3 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:
- 1. Trip the Main Turbine prior to receiving Safety Injection Failure to trip the main turbine results in an uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and in uncontrolled cool down of the RCS and places the plant in an emergency response condition that is unnecessary. PATH-i immediate actions RNO will direct the BOP to trip the turbine and should be performed during the initial stages of the major event. Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is preventing an actuation of automatic Safety Injection.
- 2. Establish feed water flow into at least one SG before RCS bleed and feed is required Failure to establish feed water flow to any SG results in the crews having to rely upon the lower priority action of establishing bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery following the loss of primary to secondary heat transfer. This constitutes incorrect performance that leads to further degradation of any barrier to fission product release by forcing open the pressurizer PORV and inducing a small break LOCA. Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is maintaining SG Wide Range levels in two or more SGs greater than 15% (>30% for adverse Containment conditions which at HNP is >3 psig).
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 6of 61
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS2O12 NRC SCENARIO 3 SIMULATOR SETUP For the 2012 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario # 3 Reset to IC-i 63 password sandwich Goto RUN Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. Set ERFIS screens (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Post conditions for status board from IC-19 Mode 1, 100% Reactor power Steady state Provide a marked up copy of GP-006 Rev 57 through section 5.2 step 4 Provide a Reactivity Plan to candidates for shutting down the plant Control Bank D at 218 steps RCS boron 1593 ppm RCS press 2220 2250 all PZR heaters ON SG level maintained with A MFW pump and FW Reg Bypass VIvs in Auto RCS temp 560° F, stable on Steam Dumps RCS temp band from step 52 is 555°F 561°F Main Turbine at 1800 rpm TDAFW pump under clearance due to damaged overspeed trip device Hang ClTs on 1 MS-70, 1 MS-72 and Trip Place an Off normal placard on Throttle Valve 1 MS-T Place protected train placard on A and B MDAFW pump MCB switch Hang CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan Place a copy of OWP-RM-09 for failure of MSL C RM-Oi MS-3593SB in OWP book Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates Update the status board: PZR PORV 444B, TS 3.4.4, actions met block valve shut. Rad Monitor MSL C RM-O1MS-3593SB TS 3.3.6.a OOS at 0800 on 2-12-2012 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 7 of 61
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
. HARRIS2cL12NRCSCENAR[03 Scenario # 3 CAEP file Description of 2012 NRC Scenario 3 I Initial conditions were established from IC-19 Mode 1100% Reactor power Steady state IC-i 9 initial conditions for status board information Control Bank D at 218 steps RCS boron 1038 ppm RCS temp 588.8° F, stable Main Turbine 967 MWe Simulator Setup Instructions PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage, PORV Block valve 1 RC-i 13 is shut I Hang CIT on 1 RC-1 13, PORV Block valve TDAFW pump under clearance Hang CIT on TDAFW pump Under clearance due to damaged overspeed trip device Place protected train placard on A and B MDAFW pump MCB switch Place off normal placard on 1 MS-T Rad Monitor MSL C RM-0i MS-3593S8 failed low Place a copy of OWP-RM-09 in OWP book Status board update for TDAFW pump TS 3.7.1.2, PORV PORV 444B TS 3.4.4, Rad Monitor MSL C RM-0i MS-3593SB TS 3.3.3.6 Hang CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan I Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates SCENARIO 3 CAEP TDAFW pump Out Of Service due to damaged overspeed trip device Place CIT on 1 MS-70 and 1 MS-72 MCB switch Place protected train placard on A and B MDAFW pump MOB switch irf mssO34 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN irf mssO35 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN Trip the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle valve imf cfw0lc (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true I Place CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan idi xb2i072 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) ASIS ilo xb20072g (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OFF ilo xb2oO72r (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OFF MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB failed low lrf rmsl7l (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0 00:00:00 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 8 of 61
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-i
- HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIOS -
I EVENTS Event 1: No trigger Lower power Reactivity RO / SRO Normal-BOP/SRO Event 2: Trigger 2 RCS Loop A Flow Indication fails low (Turbine Ramp secured) Instrument RO / SRO imf ft:415 (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) 0.0 00:00:30 Event 3: Trigger 3 C Accumulator nitrogen leak respond with APP-01 1 and OP 110 Annunciator 01-9-1 comes in approximately 7 minutes after executing trigger Component RO / SRO-Tech Spec 3.5.1 SRO 1 hour action imf sis03c (3 00:00:00 00:00:00) 600:00:00 0 Event 4: Trigger 4 Loss of both Heater Drain Pumps, A trips immediately, B trips with 2 minute delay Causes Turbine Runback to 90% AOP-010 Entery Component- BOP/SRO imf cfwl2a (4 00:00:00 00:00:00) true imf cfwl2b (4 00:02:00 00:00:00) true Event 5: Grid Frequency lowers to 59.2 Hz w/ramp of 2 minutes AOP-028 entry and power to Emerg. Buses w/EDGs Component BOP I SRO Tech Spec SRO - in ppio8 (5 00:00:00 00:00:00) 59.2 00:02:00 - Event 6: B EDG Load Block 9 Manual Permissive failure Preloaded no trigger Component BOP I SRO imf zdsq52atb (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAlL_AS IS Event 7: Grid Frequency decrease drops to <58.4 Hz and remains low requiring Rx Trip and PATH-i entry Major ALL TRG= 7 mrt ppio8 58.2 00:02:00 Restoration of grid frequency grid frequency returned to 60 Hertz in 3 minutes set to trigger 12 TRG= 12 mrt ppio8 60.0 00:03:00 Event 8: Turbine trip fails NOTE: NO TRIGGER (preloaded) GV1 and SV2 fail open when Reactor Trips Component BOP I SRO imf tur05a (40 00:00:00 00:00:00) 100.0 00:00:00 - imf tur05f (40 00:00:00 00:00:00) 100.0 00:00:00 - Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 9 of 61
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARR1S2l2 NRC SCNARlQ3 Event 9: Both MEW Pumps trip after Rx Trip (tied to trigger 40 after Rx trip) MajorALL imf CFW1 6A (40 00:00:30 00:00:00) true imf CFW1 6B (40 00:02:00 00:00:00) true Event 10: Loss of Heat Sink AFW Pump A does not auto start, can be manually started. Trips 4 minutes after the Reactor trip. AFW Pp B trips 5 minutes after the Reactor Trips, Loss of Heat Sink FRP-H.1 entry I Component BOP/SRO imf zr2l 1113 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAILASIS imf zrpk5l5a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAILASIS imf cfw0l a (40 00:04:00 00:00:00) true imf cfw0l b (40 00:05:00 00:00:00) true Conditional trigger runs when Turbine Trip switch is taken to TRIP to allow the open GV1 and SV2 to close from event 8 TRG 15 TURB TRIP Switch to Trip TRG= 15 dmf turo5a TRG= 15 dmf tur05f I Conditional trigger runs when Reactor Trip Breakers open. Used for MEW and AFW pump trip timer. TRG 40 JPPLP4.DSS Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 10 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N9 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 11 of .i Event
Description:
Power Decrease Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the crew has completed their board walk down and are ready to take the shift inform the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Run. When the Simulator is in run Lead Evaluator: announce: CREW UPDATE (SROs Name) Your crew has the shift. END OF UPDATE When directed by the Lead Evaluator, ensure that the Simulator Operator: annunciator horns are on and place the Simulator in RUN. DO NOT let the crew reduce power to < 90% prior to Event 2. A loss of both HD pumps will cause an auto Turbine Runback to 90% later in this scenario. If power is reduced to < 90% then the loss of HD will not cause a Lead Evaluator: Runback. When the evaluating team has completed their evaluation of the power change Cue Event 2 RCS Loop A Flow Channel failure low. The crew should place the Turbine on HOLD. The crew has been directed to shutdown the unit using Evaluator Note: GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown, due to the TD AFW TS LCO action statement expiring. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 11 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 12 of 1 Event
Description:
Power Decrease [ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior GP-006 SRO GP-006, Section 5.2 Step 4. When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a P1 controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:
. PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected Procedure Note: pressure.
. ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.
. Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.
Evaluator Note: Crew may refer to OP-i 00 P&L 4.0.31 or Section 8.15 ENERGIZE all available Pressurizer Backup Heaters. OP-100, Reactor Coolant System, Precaution and Limitations: 4.0.31. When energizing the Pressurizer Backup Heaters RO Groups A or B, the following sequence should minimize the pressure increase and subsequent power transient. Place PK 444A in manual and raise the output to between 40% and 45% and then place PK-444A back in AUTO. Then promptly turn on the backup heaters. Rx power may increase >100% if the Turbine ramp is not started after energizing all Pressurizer Heaters. Evaluator Note: . The crew may elect to begin boration prior to lowering turbine load. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 12 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page of 61 Event
Description:
Power Decrease Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Routine load changes should be coordinated with the Load Procedure Note: Dispatcher to meet system load demands. OP-i 07.01 RO OP-107.01, Section 5.2 and then 5.1
. DETERMINE the reactor coolant boron concentration from chemistry OR the Main Control Room status board.
. DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration RO increase required.
. DETERMINE the volume of boric acid to be added using the reactivity plan associated with the IC.
FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, has a tenths Procedure Note: position. If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, Procedure Caution: located on the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value. SET FIS-1 13, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the RO desired quantity. SRO Directs boration Boration of the RCS will be dependent on charging and letdown flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in Procedure Note: service will increase the boric acid delivery rate to the RCS. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 13 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fifl Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 14 of 61 Event
Description:
Power Decrease [ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- SET controller 1CS-283, FK-1 13 BORIC ACID FLOW, for the desired flow rate.
. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in RO the STOP position.
. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.
. PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR position.
When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a P1 controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:
. PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected Procedure Note: pressure.
. ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.
. Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.
- OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron RO concentration to less than 10 ppm.
o MAKE boron concentration adjustments as dictated from sample results. Boration may be manually stopped at any time by turning Procedure Note: control switch RMW CONTROL to STOPS Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 14 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fj Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page i of i Event
Description:
Power Decrease Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. START the makeup system as follows:
o TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RO momentarily. o VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.
- Verifies proper valve and pump alignment The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated Procedure Caution: reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.
. VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.
. IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are responding correctly.
RO . VERIFY boration automatically terminates when the desired quantity of boron has been added.
. PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.
Additional steps are included in section 5.1 but not all will be applicable since the system just came out of Automatic. Evaluator Note: The only steps included here are the ones associated with switch manipulations. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 15 of 61
Appendix D. Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jQ Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page i of i Event
Description:
Power Decrease Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:
o Is in the STOP position. o The GREEN light is LIT.
. PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.
RO
- START the makeup system as follows:
o TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily. o VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.
- Reports to CRS that boration is complete and Makeup is back in AUTO The following steps wilt initiate turbine load reduction lAW Evaluator Note:
GP-006. INFORMS Load Dispatcher that a load reduction to 90% will SRO begin. (N/A, per Initial Conditions) A failure of the Vidar in the DEH computer has resulted in a plant trip in the past. This failure would affect operation in Operator Auto, and can be detected in either of the following ways:
- If OSI-PI is available, the process book PLANTSTATUS.PIW, DEH Trends function of the
. Plant Process Computer: DEH (menu) contains a Procedure Caution:
point for DEH MEGAWATTS. With a failure of the Vidar, this point will not be updating.
- If OSI-PI is NOT available, accessing the ANALOG INPUTS screen on the Graphics display computer (in the Termination Cabinet room near the ATNS panel) wilt show several points, most of which should be updating if the Vidar is functioning properly.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 16 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fjQ Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page of i Event
Description:
Power Decrease Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior There is no procedural guidance directing when the Evaluator Note: boration to lower power is required. The crew may elect to perform the boration prior to placing the Turbine in GO. DIRECTS BOP to start power reduction at 4 DEH Units/Mm. SRO May direct initiation of a boration before the power reduction begins. BOP Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of DEH Control
. DEPRESS the LOAD RATE MW/MIN push-button.
. ENTER the desired rate, NOT to exceed 5 MW/MIN, in the DEMAND display. (4 DEH Units/minute)
. DEPRESS the ENTER push-button.
BOP . DEPRESS the REF push-button.
. ENTER the desired load (120 MW per CRS) in the DEMAND display.
- DEPRESS the ENTER push-button. The HOLD push-button should illuminate.
The unloading of the unit can be stopped at any time by depressing the HOLD push-button. The HOLD lamp will illuminate and the GO lamp will extinguish. The load Procedure Note: reduction can be resumed by depressing the GO push button. The HOLD lamp will extinguish and the GO lamp will illuminate. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 17 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 18 of 61 Event
Description:
Power Decrease Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the load reduction and inform crew through Crew Update Turbine in GO.
. VERIFY the number in the REFERENCE display BOP decreases.
. VERIFY Generator load is decreasing.
. WHEN Turbine load is less than 95%, THEN VERIFY the 3A and 38 Feedwater Vents have been opened per OP 136, Section 7.2
. Acknowledge direction. No simulator response actions Communicator:
are required. A good initiation point for Event 2 is following the return of Makeup to AUTO. PRIOR to the crew reaching 90% power and once satisfied Lead Evaluator: . with observation of the power reduction, cue the Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 2 Event 2 - RCS Loop A Flow Channel failure low Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 18 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 19 of 61 Event
Description:
RCS Loop A Flow Channel Failure Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 2 Simulator Operator: RCS Loop A Flow Channel Failure Low ALB-0l 0-6-1, RCS LOOP A LOW FLOW ALERT Indications Available: Fl-415 reads 0. RO RESPONDS to alarm ALB-10-6-1 SRO ENTERS and directs actions of APP-ALB-10-6-1 RO CONFIRM alarm using:
. Flow indication on Fl-414, Fl-415, Fl-416 RO VERIFY Automatic Functions. (None)
RO PERFORM Corrective Actions:
. IF the alarm is due to instrument failure, THEN
. DETERMINE which Loop 1 flow indication is low.
[Reports Channel 2 (Fl-415)]
. REFERS to OWP-RP-04 to remove channel from service.
OWP-RP-04 is not required to be implemented during this Evaluator Note: scenario. Contacts WCC for support SRO Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page l9of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fi Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page of .i Event
Description:
RCS Loop A Flow Channel Failure Low Time [ Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Any Tech Spec evaluation can be conducted with a follow up Evaluator Note: question after the scenario. Enters TS 3.3.1 Action 6. Action 6: With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied: SRO a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and
- b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1 .1.
The C Accumulator leak size selected in Event 3 will take approximately six (6) minutes for the Accumulator pressure to reach the low pressure alarm setpoint. This leak size will ensure that the pressure decreases to < the TS limit prior to pressurization. Lead Evaluator: . . Since it will take 6 minutes to cause an alarm cue the Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 3 when the SRO starts the Tech Spec evaluation. After the TS evaluation is complete direct the Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 3, C Accumulator nitrogen leak. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 20 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: iiBQ Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 21 of j Event
Description:
C Accumulator nitrogen leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When directed by Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 3 Simulator Operator: C Accumulator nitrogen leak Alarm ALB-O1-9-1, ACCUMULATOR TANK C HIGH-LOW Indications Available PRESSURE P1-929 and P1-931 decreasing trend. Responds to alarm ALB-1 1, ACCUMULATOR TANK C RO HIGH-LOW PRESSURE. RO Enters APP-ALB-O1 1 CONFIRM alarm using SI Accumulator pressure indicators RO P1-929 and P1-931
. No automatic actions associated with this alarm PERFORM Corrective Actions:
RO . IF SI Accumulator pressure has risen AND NO rise in level has occurred, THEN . . . (N/A) N2 through 1SI-287 is the primary source of motive power to the PRZ PORV5, with Instrument Air as backup. If Procedure Note: 1SI-287 is shut in a mode where LTOPS is required operable, and Instrument Air is not available to PORV accumulators, LTOPS must be declared inoperable. IF SI Accumulator pressure has risen AND is accompanied by RO a rise in level, THEN. (N/A) SRO Direct BOP to place the Turbine in hold Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 21 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 22 of 61 Event
Description:
C Accumulator nitrogen leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Places Turbine to hold and reports to SRO IF SI Accumulator pressure has dropped, THEN: (YES)
. IF pressure drop is accompanied by a drop in level, THEN: (N/A)
. STOP any accumulator draining in progress RO
- MONITOR leakage into CNMT Sump.
- DISPATCH an operator to CNMT to locate and isolate leakage as soon as possible.
- REFER TO OP-i 10, Safety Injection AND Raise Accumulator pressure.
Directs RO to pressurize C Accumulator lAW OP-i 10, Safety Injection to maintain pressure within Tech Spec range SRO Reviews/prepares OMM-OOi, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist. Contacts support personnel for repairs. The following TS must be entered if Accumulator pressure Evaluator Note: lowers to less than 585 PSIG and/or when it is connected to the N2 System. Refer to Technical Specification 3.5.1 .d Action a With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve or boron concentration not within SRO limits, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 22 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NEQ Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page of i Event
Description:
C Accumulator nitrogen leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters OP-hO, Section 8.2 Pressurizing the SI OP-lb RO Accumulators. Verifies Initial Conditions
. The Nitrogen System is available per OP-i 52.01
. Accumulator level is greater than 66%
RO
. If the Accumulators are depressurized, the Accumulator metal temperature must be greater than 70°F before pressurization. (Contact pyrometer can be used or containment ambient tern ierature) [N/Al To minimize any potential sluicing between Accumulators through leaking valves, Accumulator pressures should be Procedure Note: approximately equal (within 4 psid between lowest and highest ERFIS indications) at the completion of this Section.
Perform the following Steps on only one Accumulator at a time.
. At the MCB, verify open 1SI-287, ACCUMULATORS &
PRZ PORV N2 SUPPLY. RO Declare the associated Accumulator inoperable per Tech Spec 3.5.1, due to being connected to Non-Safety piping (a one hour action statement in Modes 1 through 3 above 1000 psig). To prevent exceeding the capacity of the N2 System and Procedure Note: maintain train separation for the Accumulators, only one Accumulator should be pressurized at a time. At the MCB, open the ACCUM N2 SUPPLYNENT for the RO Accumulator to be pressurized: 1 SI-297 for ACCUMULATOR C N2 Supply & Vent. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 23 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jj Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 4 of Event
Description:
C Accumulator nitrogen leak Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior The Accumulator should not be pressurized to the upper Procedure Note: Technical Specification limit (665 psig) to allow for thermal expansion of the Accumulator gas during plant heatup. Pressurize the Accumulator to the desired pressure indicated RO by the associated pressure indicators: P1-929, 931, ACCUMULATOR TK C PRESS. At the MCB, shut the ACCUMULATOR N2 SUPPLY & VENT RO valve for the Accumulator that was pressurized: 1S1-297 for ACCUMULATOR C N2 Supply & Vent. RO Complete Attachment 6. (see next 2 pages) IF the Accumulator parameters are within the Tech Spec requirements, THEN DECLARE the Accumulator that was pressurized operable. RO Informs SRO that the C Accumulator pressure is within Tech Spec requirements and the C Accumulator can be considered operable. SRO Acknowledges RO information Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 24 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page of 61 Event
Description:
C Accumulator nitrogen leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Attachment Accumulator PressurizationNendng Restoration Checklist Sheet 1 of 2 Pesons) Performing Checklist Tntiais Narrie {Print) Initials Name iPiint) Remarks Indicate any component not n the presaibed position. Checkist Started Time Date Checkst Competed Time Date Approed by Date CR8 After receivmg the finaf review signature. thre OP Attachment becomes a GA RECORD I °° I Rev. 38 I Page 99 of 112 I Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 25 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: iJQ Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 26 of i Event
Description:
C Accumulator nitrogen leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior tchmt i4cumuI Prs uriI iInting Rntion ChckJIs4 2 coMoENT tNNT DESOR PTION OSfl CN 2HEt VERIFY ACcUL?TO r4SPPLY & V4T ACCJWULTOR9 NSPPLY 3 vg $uT CWULTOR D !i3UPPLY & VE4T ACCJtULATOS 3. Z ORV N 3LPPtY 2PEN AOC VENT PRESS CNL C-2&S POT DEMJD 1opi Pe3 After C Accumulator is restored to operable then cue Simulator Operator to actuate Trigger 4 Evaluator Note: Loss of Both Heater Drain Pumps AOP-O1O. A HO Pump trips followed 2 minutes later by B HD Pump trip causing an automatic Turbine Runback to 90% power. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 26 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page Z of 61 Event
Description:
Loss of Both Heater Drain Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 4 Loss of Both Heater Drain Pumps Simulator Operator: A HD pump immediate trip, B HD pump trips 2 minutes later causing an auto Turbine Runback to 90% power. Indications Available: . ALB-019-2-2A, HTR DRN PUMP A 0/C TRIP-GND Responds to annunciator and announces A HD pump has AOP-O1 0 BOP tripped. Identifies AOP-O1O, Feedwater Malfunction entry conditions Immediate Action BOP Check ANY Main Feedwater Pump TRIPPED (NO) Procedure Note: Steps 1 through 3 are immediate actions. SRO CHECK ANY Main Feedwater Pump TRIPPED. (NO) GOTOSter5. BOP CHECK DEH controlling Turbine Valves PROPERLY. (YES) Goto step 7. MAINTAIN ALL of the following: BOP
- At least ONE Main Feedwater Pump RUNNING (YES)
- Main Feedwater flow to ALL Steam Generators (YES)
- ALL Steam Generator levels areater than 30% (YES Evaluator Note: B HD Pump will trip 2 minutes after the A HD Pump causing an automatic Turbine runback
. ALB-019-3-2A, HTR DRN PUMP B 0/C TRIP-GND Indications Available:
- ALB-020-2-2, TURBINE RUNBACK OPERATIVE
*__Turbine_DEH_panel_indications_lowering Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 27 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBQ Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 28 of 61 Event
Description:
Loss of Both Heater Drain Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Crew Identifies B HD Pump trip and Turbine runback occurring RO Monitors primary plant conditions including Control Rod insertion during runback Runback Setpoint: Runback will continue until PS-01 MS Evaluator Note: 1006 indicates 553.0 psig (nominal 90% load) with both HO pump breakers open. SRO Returns to step 1 of AOP-O1O, Immediate actions BOP CHECK ANY Main Feedwater Pump TRIPPED. (NO) BOP CHECK DEH controlling Turbine Valves PROPERLY. (YES) MAINTAIN ALL of the following: BOP . At least ONE Main Feedwater Pump RUNNING (YES)
. Main Feedwater flow to ALL Steam Generators (YES)
. ALL Steam Generator levels areater than 30% (YES)
CHECK Feedwater Regulator Valves operating properly in AUTO: (YES) BOP
- Response to SG levels
- Valve position indication
. Response to feed flow/steam flow mismatch Loss of Main Control Room annunciators concurrent with Procedure Note: a turbine runback of> 25%, requires a change of event classification per the HNP Emergency Plan.
Crew CHECK Main Control Room annunciators AVAILABLE. (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 28 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: jQ Event
Description:
Time Position Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page Loss of Both Heater Drain Pumps Applicants Actions or Behavior of 61 CHECK the following Pump status: SRO . ALL Feedwater Train Pumps RUNNING (YES)
- BOTH Heater Drain Pumps RUNNING (NO)
Go to step 11 which directs cioinci to Section 3.2. Target load for loss of a running pump is as follows:
. No Heater Drain Pumps running target is 90% turbine load. (YES)
- Single Feedwater Train operating is 5.5 mpph Total FW Procedure Note: Flow. (N/A)
. Single Feedwater Train with both Heater Drain Pumps operating is 7.0 mpph Total FW Flow. (N/A)
- Single Main Feedwater Pump operating with both Condensate Pumps and both Condensate Booster Pumps running is 7.0 mpph Total FW Flow. (N/A)
MAINTAIN ALL of the following: SRO
. At least ONE Main Feedwater Pump RUNNING (YES)
. Main Feedwater flow to ALL Steam Generators (YES)
. ALL Steam Generator levels Qreater than 30% (YES)
RO CHECK control rods INSERTING to reduce Tavg Tref - mismatch. (YES) BOP CHECK Main Steam pressure less than PORV controller setpoint. (nominally 1106 psiq). (YES) Improper operation of the Steam Dumps while in manual Procedure Caution: control can lead to excessive SG swell or overcooling of the RCS. BOP CHECK proper Steam Dump Valve operation. (YES) BOP CHECK SG levels TRENDING to 52% to 62%. (YES) RO CHECK PZR PORVs SHUT. (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 29 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jQ Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page Q of i Event
Description:
Loss of Both Heater Drain Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO CHECK PZR pressure TRENDING to 2235 psig. (YES) RO CHECK PZR Level TRENDING to reference level. (YES) BOP ALIGN Main Feedwater Pump control switches, as applicable: (NA no problem with MFW Pumps) BOP CHECK BOTH Heater Drain Pumps TRIPPED. (YES) CHECK the following high-high level alarms CLEAR:
- ALB-21-1-1A (HP HTR 5A) (YES)
. ALB-21-1-2A (LP HTR 4A) (YES)
BOP . ALB-21 lA (HP HTR 5B) (YES)
. ALB-21 2A (LP HTR 4B) (YES)
. ALB-20-l-5A (MSDT A) (YES)
. ALB-20-2-5A (MSDT B) (YES)
Procedure Note: A feedwater train consists of a Condensate Pump, Condensate Booster PumD and Main Feedwater Pump. CHECK load less than or equal to target based on final condition. (YES) TARGET Condition Load BOP No HDPs Running 90% Turbine Load One MFP Running 7.0 mpph Total FW Flow Single FW Train 7.0 mpph Total FW Flow both HDPs Running Single FW Train 5.5 mpph Total FW Flow Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 30 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page j of i Event
Description:
Loss of Both Heater Drain Pumps Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DISPATCH an operator to check the following seated, observing tailpipes: BOP
. MSR Relief Valves
*__SG_Safety_Valves Acknowledge communications and report back in 1-2 minutes that both the MSR Relief Valves and SG Safety Communicator: Valves are seated.
If dispatched to investigate cause of HD Pump tripping report back that the breakers are tripped on Overcurrent. BOP CHECK Hotwell level trending to between 71 % and 76%. (YES) BOP RESET Loss of Load interlocks C7A and C7B (N/A not active) SRO NOTIFY Load Dispatcher of ANY load limitations. (N/A) SRO CHECK Reactor thermal power changed by less than 15% in any one hour period. (NO) RO Within 1 .5 hours of load rejection, CHECK control rods above insertion limits. EXIT this procedure SRO Contacts Work Control for support OMM-OO1 Att 5. Eauioment Problem Checklist. After crew exits AOP-O1O continue with Event 5 Evaluators Note: Cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 5 Grid Frequency Degradation. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 31 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fQ Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page of i Event
Description:
Grid Frequency Degradation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior This event will have grid frequency degrade to the point where vital busses will be transferred to the EDGs. During Evaluators Note: the transfer the B EDG Load Block 9 Manual Permissive will not occur. On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 5 Simulator Operator: Grid Frequency Degradation
. EI-525 lowering (indicated frequency)
- SG levels decrease slightly Indications Available: . Turbine speed decreasing
. ALB 19-5-5, Computer Alarm Condensate Evaluator Note: If grid frequency is not observed by the crew, have the Communicator call in as the Load Dispatcher to inform the crew that the grid is experiencing frequency problems.
There are no low frequency alarms. AOP-028 Enters AOP-028, GRID INSTABILITY. SRO Makes PA announcement for AOP entry.
. The loss of Off-Site power may require the initiation PROCEDURE NOTE: of the Emergency Plan
. This procedure contains no immediate actions.
REFER TO PEP-i 10, Emergency Classification and Protective SRO Action Recommendations, AND enter EAL Matrix. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 32 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jfl3 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page ot 61 Event
Description:
Grid Frequency Degradation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. If frequency drops suddenly and power is> P-7, the Reactor will trip automatically when RCP frequency decreases to 57.5 Hz, resulting in a Turbine trip.
- Operation of electrical motors with voltage below Procedure Note: the normal band will increase stator current and change torque loading. Component trips, insulation and/or bearing damage, shorts, grounds, or blown fuses may result. The probability of damage is increased with lowering voltage and increased operating time.
. Operation of the unit between 59.0 and 58.4 Hz should be limited to 5 minutes, after which time the Procedure Caution: generator must be taken off-line.
- Operation below 58.4 Hz is not allowed and the generator must be taken off line immediately CHECK Main Generator indications for ANY of the following conditions:
. Generator frequency less than 59 Hz for greater than or BOP equal to 5 minutes (NO)
. Generator frequency less than 58.4 Hz (NO)
. Turbine speed less than or equal to 1752 RPM (NO)
SRO GO TO Step 3. BOP CHECK BOTH Emergency Buses ENERGIZED. (YES) SECURE unnecessary equipment to minimize component SRO damage. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 33 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 4 of i Event
Description:
Grid Frequency Degradation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK with the Senior Dispatcher that BOTH of the following SRO conditions exist:
. The system grid is able to provide adequate voltage support in the event of a LOCA. (YES)
. Adequate system frequency can be maintained during performance of this procedure. (YES)
If Load Dispatcher is contacted, provide information to crew that the grid can support adequate voltage and Communicator: frequency control in the event of a LOCA. Grid frequency appears to be stabilizing and we are continuing actions to raise grid frequency. CHECK the Main Generator ONLINE by observing the following for adverse trends: (YES)
- Turbine Speed
. EI-526, SWYD North Bus Voltage (normally 232.5kV)
BOP
- EI-527, SWYD South Bus Voltage (normally 232.5kV)
- El-520, Generator Phase Volts (normally 22kV)
. EI-525, Generator Frequency (normally 60 Hz)
- El-567, MegaVars (normally 75 to 175 MVAR5 out)
NOTIFY the Load Dispatcher of any observed adverse trends. SRO (contacted earlier for load reduction)
. TREND plant electrical parameters per Attachment 1 until the grid is determined to be STABLE.
CREW
- CHECK for indications of a load rejection during performance of this procedure. (NO)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 34 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 35 of Event
Description:
Grid Frequency Degradation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO OBSERVE Caution before Step 10 AND GO TO Step 10. e With off-site voltage or system frequency unstable, EDGs must NOT be paralleled with off-site power since severe load swings may occur and overload Procedure Caution: the EDGs.
. Loss of Service Water flow to an EDG requires the affected EDG be stopped.
CHECK ANY EDG operating paralleled to the Grid. (NO) CHECK ALL of the following parameters WITHIN the limits of the indicated range: BOP
- 6.9 kV Emergency Buses 6550 to 7250 volts:
o El-6956A1 SA, EMER BUS A VOLTS (YES) o EI-695681 SB, EMER BUS B VOLTS (YES)
. Frequency 59.5 to 60.5 Hz (NO)
ENERGIZE the Emergency Buses with the associated EDG per SRO Attachment 2.
- Provide direction to BOP to utilize Attachment 2 BOP Attachment 2 actions DETERMINE which Emergency Bus is supplying power to the RO operating CSIP. (1A-SA)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 35 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N.Q Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 36 of 61 Event
Description:
Grid Frequency Degradation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. MDAFW FCVs will get an auto open signal (unless an AFW isolation signal is present) when either breaker 105 or 125 opens.
- On a loss of power to an emergency bus the Procedure Note: associated steam supply valve to the Turbine Driven AFW Pump will open.
. This step will cause CVIS isolation and render both Containment Vacuum Reliefs inoperable (Tech Spec 3.0.3)
. OPEN the supply breaker to the Emergency Bus NOT supplying power to the operating CSIP:
o Emergency Bus B-SB to Aux Bus E Tie Breaker 125 BOP SB
. VERIFY the associated EDG STARTS AND ENERGIZES the associated Emergency Bus.
. T/S 3.0.3/3.6.1.4, CVIS causes both CNMT vacuum relief valves to become inoperable. (1 hr Action)
. T/S 3.8.1.1, Action a: With one off-site circuit inoperable, perform surveillance 4.8.1 .1 .1 .a within 1 hour (every 8 hrs SRO thereafter); and Restore the off-site circuit within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN w/in the following 30 hours; and Verify required feature(s) powered from the OPERABLE offsite AC source are OPERABLE.
T/S 3.8.1.1 is applicable based on BKR 125 being open, which Evaluators Note: no longer satisfies T/S surveillance requirement 4.8.1.1 .a. (OST-1 023) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 36 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 37 of i Event
Description:
B EDG Load Block 9 Manual Permissive failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY proper load sequencing for the Emergency Bus being CREW ENERGIZED per OMM-004, Post-Trip/Safeguards Review, Attachment 12. Must wait for 150 second timer to complete in order to get the Evaluator Note: manual load permissive light to be lit.
. CHECK the following for the Emergency Bus being ENERGIZED:
o B Sequencer Load Block 9 AUTO ACT COMPLETE MAN LOAD PERMITTED light is LIT. (NO) BOP o RNO action: PLACE the applicable Emer Load Sequencer Manual Loading switches to PERM AND CHECK the following: Load_Sequencer_B_MAN_PERM_light_is_LIT_(YES)
- Any TDAFW Pump steam supply valve shut in the following step will not automatically re-open if an AFW actuation is received. TDAFW FCVs do not receive auto-open signals.
Procedure Caution:
- Stopping a MDAFW Pump powered by the EDG or shutting a MDAFW FCV will block further automatic actuations until the original condition for pump start is cleared.
CONTROL AFW as necessary to maintain reactor power AND S/G levels for plant conditions.
- Stops TDAFW Pump (already under clearance)
- Stops MDAFW pump B or closes all AFW flow control valves Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 37 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 38 of j. Event
Description:
B EDG Load Block 9 Manual Permissive failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Energizing 480V Emergency Buses will restore power to the following:
. PZR Heater Banks Procedure Note:
. PZR PORV Block Valves
. Air Compressors (Compressors will not auto start)
. 125 VDC Battery Chargers This scenario is not intended to have the crew swap charging pumps. Do NOT wait for the BOP to continue with AOP-028 and start the A EDG.
Evaluators Note: Direct Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 7, resulting in degradation of frequency requiring a Reactor trip. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 38 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 39 of 61 Event
Description:
Grid Frequency Further Degrades, requires Reactor Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 7 Grid Frequency degrades requiring Reactor Trip If the crew does not immediately notice that the grid frequency has started to degrade call as the Load Dispatcher and inform the crew that the grid has once Communicator: again become unstable. (This should prompt the crew to check for frequency and perform the actions of AOP-028) Event 7 will initiate the following sequence of events:
- Grid frequency further degrades to 58.2 Hz requiring Rx Trip per AOP-028, into PATH-i
. Turbine Auto Trip failure Evaluator Note:
- LOSS OF HEAT SINK Loss of both feed pumps (MFP A 30 secs after Rx trip, MFP B 2 minutes later). Loss of both AFW pumps (AFW Pump A 4 mm. after Reactor trip, AFW Pump B 5 mm. after Reactor trip).
Entry into FRP H.1, success path utilizing condensate pumps to establish heat sink.
.
- ALB-022-4-3, GENERATOR VOLTAGEIFREQ Indications Available:
RATIO/HIGH OR UNDER FREQ Responds to alarm and identifies frequency conditions CREW requiring a trip of the Reactor. Directs RO to perform a MANUAL Reactor trip lAW AOP-028. SRO Transitions to PATH-i. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 39 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N..Q Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page +/-1Q of i Event
Description:
Reactor Trip with Turbine Auto Trip Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PATH-i SRO Enters PATH-i RO Initiates a MANUAL reactor trip. RO/BOP Performs PATH-i immediate actions. VERIFY Reactor Trip:
. AUTO or MANUAL Reactor Trip successful:
Immediate
. CHECK for any of the following:
RO . TRIP breakers RTA and BYA OPEN (YES) Actions
. TRIP breakers RTB and BYB OPEN (YES)
. ROD Bottom lights LIT (YES)
. NEUTRON flux decreasing (YES)
VERIFY Turbine Trip: Critical . CHECK for any of the following: Task . ALL turbine throttle valves SHUT (NO) BOP Immediate . ALL turbine governor valves SHUT (NO) Actions o Manually trip the turbine from the MCB (Standard: Trip the Main Turbine prior to receiving SI) VERIFY power to AC Emergency Buses: Immediate BOP . 1 A-SA and 1 B-SB Buses energized by Off-site power or Actions EDGs (YES, 1 A-SA by Off-site, 1 B-SB by EDG B) Immediate CHECK SI Actuation (NO) RO Actions SI Required (NO) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 40 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 9 Page 41 of 61 Event Descnption: Loss Of Both Main FW Pumps AND A MDAFW pump does not auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EPP-004 SRO GO TO EPP-004, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1. Procedure Note: Foldout applies. Evaluator Note: No EPP-004 Foldout criteria apply in this scenario. At this point the crew should identify that both MEW pumps have tripped. An auto start signal should have been generated CREW to START both MDAFW pumps (trip of last running MEW Pump). Starts the A MDAFW Pump (and B MDAEW pump it may - BOP have been left running) then controls flow to SGs with flow control valves. SRO Implement FRP5 as required. SRO Informs Shift Manager to evaluate EAL Matrix. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 41 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 9 Page 4 of i Event
Description:
Loss Of Both Main FW Pumps AND A MDAFW pump does not auto start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check RCS Temperature:
. Check RCPs running. (YES)
. Check SG blowdown isolation valves SHUT (YES)
Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1. rz.t i cs c1I an
- t$ Øta U8t* iod*t Ut* otwL**
- it f*i tou* tU E_*
$ThKI BO P
*4! tt!O
#*s fl#
C#toi f.. tna to 4 to a1ip, flov 3Tj o4* A*eO* taI b.t. Wt
+/-4 S*t $.3 A $WW OIUA *t.#
&Cflf o sn i% #.t .i.it
.a a*at
- iup *tj.
C O4Ct fiø ii pG14o Cte4 t$ dIV.
- SC OESM$ t.v.m aT
. Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize temperature between 555°F AND 559°F Check Feed System Status:
. RCS Temperature LESS THAN 564°F (YES)
BOP
- Verify feed reg valves SHUT (YES)
- Check feed flow to SGs GREATER THAN 210 KPPH (currently YES time dependant)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 42 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: j3 Scenario # 3 Event # Page 43 of 61 Event
Description:
Loss Of Heat Sink Both AFW pumps Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Identifies A MDAFW Pump trip and soon after the B MDAFW Pump trip. CREW Contacts AO to investigate loss of MDAFW Pumps as they are recognized. Contacts Work Control Center for help to restore Feedwater. If dispatched to investigate cause of loss of MFW and the MDAFW pumps, wait 1-2 minutes then report that Communicator: overcurrent flags are tripped for all breakers. There are no adverse indications locally at the pumps. Check Control Rod Status:
- Check DRPI AVAILABLE (YES)
RO . Verify all control rods FULLY INSERTED (YES)
. Pressurizer level> 17% (YES)
When 210 KPPI-I AFW flow cannot be established and ALL Evaluator Note: SG level is < 25% a RED PATH for FRP-H.1 will occur. (ERFIS indicates Red Path) Transitions to FRP-H.1 following trip of last running MDAFW Pump (This pump tripping will immediately cause a RED on SRO HEAT SINK.) Contacts WCC (if not already done) to obtain assistance to restore AFW or MFW oumøs to service.
. WCC reports that they are working restoration of any feed Communicator:
source and will call as soon as any is available. The crews success path for this scenario is to Evaluator Note: depressurize a SG and establish feed using the Condensate System. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 43 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # i Page 44 of i Event
Description:
Loss Of Heat Sink Both AFW pumps Trip Time Position [ Applicants Actions or Behavior FRP-H.1 SRO Implement FRP-H.1 As soon as FRP-H.1 is entered, direct the Simulator Evaluator Note: Operator to actuate Trigger 12 Restore bus frequency to 60 Hz (ramped in over 3 minutes). When directed by the Lead Examiner activate Trigger 12 Simulator Operator: Restore bus frequency to 60 Hz Monitor bus frequency and immediately notify the MCR as the Load Dispatcher when frequency returns to 60 Hz. Communicator: Inform crew that the grid frequency has been restored and the grid is now stabile. PERFORM the following:
- IMPLEMENT function restoration procedures as required.
SRO
- Informs Shift Manager to EVALUATE EAL Matrix.
(Refer to PEP-hO) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 44 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jQ Scenario # 3 Event # 1Q Page 45 of .i Event
Description:
Loss Of Heat Sink Both AFW pumps Trip Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK Secondary Heat Sink Requirements:
. RCS pressure GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED SG PRESSURE. (YES)
RO
. RCS temperature GREATER THAN 350° F [330° F].
(YES)
. STOP any running RHR pumps. (N/A)
RO Check RCS Bleed and Feed required. (NO) Go to Step 4. Foldout applies: (Only the first and third one) FOLDOUT
. RCS BLEED JIJfl IIflT1kflflM fDITTZDI*
!E any tMi SGwide range fevels deaease fe less than 15% 130%1, flIEN perfoim the fotIowtn:
. Stop l RCPs.
ObserveCAtJTlON rxioc to Step 16 AND GO TO Step 16. SRO rI fl i r RSfIPCIII nnJ wITrllnVcr rrrrm RWST level decreases to toss than 23A% (2/4 L&4uw alarm), THEN GO TO EPP-U10, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRGULAIION, Step t AFW Si IPPI y p... S t_I Il_tV L_1S (ffffl LIf1ItT IF CST Tevel decreases to less than 10%, THEN switch the iw water suppty to the 55W system usmj OP137, AUXlLiVFEEDWATER SYSTEM, Section 81. QLIØ PTAU1 IF RCS pressxe decreases to Less than 23) PSIG in an tcontrofled mannec, fl restart RHR to suppiy water to the RCS, CHECK SG Blowdown and SG Sample Valves shut (YES) BOP (COMPLETED IN EPP-004) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 45 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 1Q Page 46 of 61 Event
Description:
Loss Of Heat Sink Both AFW pumps Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ESTABLISH AFW Flow to at least ONE SG:
- OBSERVE MOB indications to determine cause of AFW failure:
o CST level (NO) o MDAFW pump power supplies (NO) o TDAFW pump steam supply valves (Under Clearance) o TDAFW pump speed controller (NO) o TDAFW pump control power (NO) BOP/SRO o AFW valve alignment (NO)
- TRY to restore AFW flow at the MOB. (Refer to Affachment 1 for guidance of rate of feed flow.)
(Refer to OP-i 37, Auxiliary Feedwater System, for guidance regarding AFW pump operations, precautions and limitations and valve operation.)
- Step 6, Check j. any AFW flow established
- TOTAL feed flow to SGs GREATER THAN 210 KPPH.
(NO)
- Check AFW flow- established to any S/G (NO)
PERFORM the following: BOP/SRO
- CONTINUE attempts to restore AFW flow at the MOB.
- Try to restore AFW flow locally.
SRO OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 7 AND continue with Step 7. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 46 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: JiQ Scenario # 3 Event # 1Q Page 4Z of J. Event
Description:
Loss Of Heat Sink Both AFW pumps Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior After stopping all RCPs and placing steam dump in the steam pressure mode, RCS pressure and temperature will increase as natural circulation is established. A large loop Procedure Note: AT prior to PRZ PORV opening confirms natural circulation. This must be considered while evaluating bleed and feed criteria. Stop Heat Input From RCP Operations: RO
- Secures ALL RCP.
CHECK all of the following to determine if steam can be dumped to condenser:
- CHECK any intact SG MSIV OPEN. (YES)
BOP
. CHECK condenser available (C-9) light (BPLB 3-3) LIT.
(YES)
. STEAM dump control system AVAILABLE. (YES)
The following three substeps may VERIFY actions that Evaluator Note: were completed in EPP-004. The crew must control steam demand after stopping the RCPs.
. PLACE steam dump pressure controller in manual AND decrease output to 0%.
. PLACE steam dump mode select switch in STEAM BOP PRESS.
- ADJUST steam dump controller setpoint tb 84% (1092 PSIG) AND place in auto.
. Check SI actuated (NO) Go to step 1 1 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 47 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # 3 Event # 10 Page 48 of 61 Event
Description:
Loss Of Heat Sink Both AFW pumps Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP ESTABLISH Main FW Flow to at least ONE SG:
. CHECK condensate system IN SERVICE. (YES)
. SUPPORT condition for FW startup AVAILABLE. (NO, both pumps are tripped on overcurrent and unavailable)
. POWER to at least ONE Main FW pump AVAILABLE. (NO)
. PP-1D212ENERGIZED. (YES)
WHEN support conditions met, THEN do Steps 10 AND d. SRO Observe CAUTION prior to Step 12 AND GO TO Step 12. Following block of automatic SI actuation, manual SI actuation may be required if conditions degrade. Procedure Caution: (Examples of degraded conditions are the inability to maintain or restore PRZ level, RVLIS indication or RCS subcooling.) After the low steam pressure SI signal is blocked, main Procedure Note: steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 48 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N Scenario # 3 Event # 1Q Page 49 of Event
Description:
Loss Of Heat Sink Both AFW pumps Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DEPRESSURIZE RCS AND BLOCK Low Steam Pressure SI:
- CHECK SI IN SERVICE (NO)
- GOTOStepl2.
DEPRESSURIZE RCS to between 1900 PSIG AND 1950 PSIG
- CHECK letdown IN SERVICE (YES)
RO
. DEPRESSURIZE using auxiliary spray.
BLOCK SI Signals:
. LowPRZpressure
- Low steam pressure MAINTAIN pressure less than 1950 PSIG.
RCS pressure will need to be monitored or it will continue to decrease with AUX spray until noticed. This may also Evaluator Note: . result in letdown isolation. If VCT level drops <5%, CSIP suction will swap the RWST. Depressurizing only one SG minimizes the likelihood of reaching the bleed and feed criteria (due to lowering SG level) AND the likelihood of the appearance of degraded plant conditions that might require manual SI actuation. Procedure Note: . . . The preferred SG to depressurize is the intact SG with the highest indicated wide range level. A second SG may be depressurized if condensate flow cannot be established to the first SG depressurized. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 49 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fjQ Scenario # 3 Event # 10 Page Q of 61 Event
Description:
Loss Of Heat Sink Both AFW pumps Trip [ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DEPRESSURIZE One SG To Less Than 500 PSIG AND ESTABLISH Condensate Flow:
. IDENTIFY the SG to be depressurized.
- SHUT the following valves for the SGs that are NOT to be depressurized.
- MSIVs (2of 3)
BOP
- MSIV bypass valves
- SG main Steam drain isolation before MSIV (2 of 3)
DUMP steam at maximum rate to depressurize identified to SG to 500 PSIG using any of the following (listed in order of preference):
- Condenser steam dump ESTABLISH condensate flow using Attachment 3.
BOP FRP-H.1 Affachment 3
- This attachment provides instructions for establishing condensate flow to one SG to restore secondary heat sink. It may also be used as a reference for establishing condensate flow to SGs while implementing other EOPs.
- The low steam pressure SI blocked, main steam line Procedure Note: . . .
isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.
- If an action or its contingency in this attachment can NOT be accomplished, the operator should return to the step in effect, while continuing efforts to establish condensate flow.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 50 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 4jç Scenario # 3 Event # 10 Page 51 of 61 Event
Description:
Loss Of Heat Sink Both AFW pumps Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior FRP-H.1 Attachment 3 is attached on the end of this Evaluator Note: scenario guide for use if desired. CHECK Primary and Secondary Conditions To Allow Establishing Condensate Flow:
. CHECK low steam SG pressure SI BLOCKED (YES)
BOP
. CHECK SG pressure for SG to which condensate flow is to be established LESS THAN 500 (NO)
- GOToStep2.
The preferred SG to depressurize is the intact SG with the Procedure Note: highest indicated wide range level. While depressurizing SGs with steam dumps, the MSIVs Evaluator Note: may close automatically requiring use of SG PORVs. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 51 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event # 12 Page 52 of Event
Description:
Loss Of Heat Sink Both AFW pumps Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Depressurize One SG To Less Than 500 PSIG:
. Identify the SG to be depressurized.
- Shut the following valves for the SGs that are NOT to be depressurized.
o MSIVs o MSIV bypass valves o SG main steam drain isolations before MSIV:
- SG A: 1 MS-231 SG B: 1 MS-266 s SG C: 1 MS-301
. Dump steam at maximum rate to depressurize identified SG BOP to 500 PSIG using any of the following (listed in order of preference):
o Condenser steam dump o SG PORVs o Locally operate SG PORVs using OP-126, MAIN STEAM, EXTRACTION STEAM, AND STEAM DUMP SYSTEMS, Section 8.2. o TDAFW pump CHECK Condensate System Status:
. At least one condensate RUNNING (YES)
. At least one condensate booster pump RUNNING (YES)
The main FW pump discharge valve control switches must Procedure Note: be held in the OPEN position to open the valves with the main FW pumps stopped. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 52 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NflQ Scenario # 3 Event # 10 Page 53 of 61 Event
Description:
Loss Of Heat Sink Both AFW pumps Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OPEN The Following Valves:
. Low pressure FW heater bypass valves: (1 CE-330/1 CE-BOP 359)
. High pressure FW heater bypass valves: (1 FW-i 10)
. Main FW pump discharge valves: (1 FW-2911 FW-60)
RO RESET SI. (Not active) Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of CREW Offsite Power. (Refer to PATH-i GUIDE, Attachment 2.) (NA) RESET FW Isolation. (NOT ACTIVE) PLACE Feed Reg Bypass Controllers In Manual AND Set Output To Zero. RESET AND open main FW isolation valve(s): (All open al ready)
. 1FW-159(ASG)
BOP
- 1FW-277(BSG)
- 1FW-2i7(CSG)
SHUT Main FW Pump Recirc Valves: (1 FW-8/1 FW-39) (Already SHUT) PLACE Condensate Booster Pump Controllers In Manual AND Control Discharge Pressure At 600 PSIG. Local checks for flow noise may be used to confirm the Procedure Note: presence of flow. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 53 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Q Scenario # 3 Event # 1Q Page 4 of J. Event
Description:
Loss Of Heat Sink Both AFW pumps Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When directed to go to desired FRV Bypass valve, wait 2 minutes, then report that you are standing by as requested. Monitor for flow on simulator. In order to monitor for flow, open the monitored parameter Communicator: file Plant Status Monitor CFW. The following parameters can be utilized to identify when flow starts
. Line 21: wcfwsgnb(1) Feed flow to/from SG Bottom
. Line 22: wcfwsgnb(2) Feed flow to/from SG Bottom
. Line 23: wcfwsgnb(3) Feed flow to/from SG Bottom ESTABLISH Feed Flow To SG(s):
BOP (Refer to Attachment 1 while performing actions that restore feed flow.) When restoring heatsink using Condensate flow before RCS Bleed And Feed: IF wide range RCS Tcold is stable at Evaluator Note: OR trending to the saturation temperature corresponding to the depressurized SG pressure, THEN feed the depressurized SG without restriction on rate. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 54 of 61
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fQ Scenario # 3 Event # 1Q Page 55 of .i Event
Description:
Loss Of Heat Sink Both AFW pumps Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ESTABLISH feed flow using a. Locally establish feed flow using the feed reg bypass valves from the MCB. Critical BOP Feed flow to at least one SG ESTABLISHED Task (Standard: Establish Feedwater flow before 2 of 3 SG wide range levels decrease to < 15%) Terminate the scenario once feed flow has been established and at least one SG level is increasing (trending to 25% NR). Evaluator Note: Announce Crew Update End of Evaluation Have crew remain in the Simulator without discussing the exam. Examiners will formulate any follow-up questions. Simulator Operator: When directed by Lead Evaluator place the Simulator in FREEZE. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 55 of 61 FRP-H.1 Attachment 3 Form ES-D-2 I RESPONSE TO LOSS :Q SECONDARY HEAT SINK I Attachment 3 Sheet I of 5 ESTABtJSHNG CONOENSATE FUYN TO SGs NSTRUTKNS I RESPONSE NOT OBTIdNEI) I NOTE TNs attachment pro$des ins*ncIions for establishinq condensate flow to one 5(3 to restore secondary heat strik. It may aisu be used ererice for estaiUshinq condensate lkwi to SGS while imØementinç other EOPs, The ibw steam pressire S btocked, main steam ir isolaflon wffl occur W the hiçh steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded
- If an action or its contingency in this attachment can be acconIishe the operator shouki return to the step in effect. while contthuin efforts to establish condensate flow t Check Primary and Secondafy Condttfons To Mow Esishmq Cendensafe Ao C a checktowsteamsGpressuiesf a M4EN RCS pressure is less than 3LOCKED 27i0PStGJbtock SI slgna
- 0. Low PRZ pressure U
- Low steam pressure U b. Check 56 pressure for SO to 0 b, GO R Step 2, which condensate flow is to be established LESS ThAN SOG P516 Cc, OOTOStep3, nv rrtvnr, lw,t si 66 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 56 of 61 FRP-H.1 Attachment 3 Form ES-D-2 I RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SiNK I
Attachment 3 Sheet 2 of 5 ESTABliSHING CONDENSATE FLOW TO SGs T I I RESPONSE NOT OI3TAINED NOTE The preferred SO to depressunze is the intact SO with the highest indicated Mde range ieveI
- 2. Depresswize One SG To Less Than 500 P510:
I Ela. ldenttfytheSGtobe depressurized
- b. Shut the fdkwing valves for the b. Shut the following valves for the SOS that are NOT to be SO to be depressurized.
depressurized. El.MS1v El
- MSIVs El
- MSLV bypass valve El
- MSIV bypass valves SO main steam drain isolation SO main steam drain isolations before MSIV:
before MSW: El SGk 1MS-231 El SGA: IMS-231 El 3GB: IMS-266 El SGB: 1MS-266 El SOC: 1MS-301 o SGC: 1MS-301
- c. Dump steam at maximum rate to depressurize identified SO to 500 P510 using any of the following (listed in order of preference):
El 1) Condenser steam dump El 2> SGPORVs El 3) Locally operate SG PQRVs using OP-i 26, MAiN STEAM, EXTRAC11ON STEAM, AND STEAM DUMP SYSTEMS, Section 82. El 4) 11JPFW pump EOP-FRP-H.1 I Rev. 28 I Page 62 of 66 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 57 of 61 FRP-H.1 Attachment 3 Form ES-D-2 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY I1EAT SINK Attachment 3 Sheet 3 of 5 ESTABlISHING CONDENSATE FlOW TO SGs I INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINEO
- 3. Check Condensate System Status:
o a. Atleastecondensate pump U a. Place cee aindensate pump in RUNNING service. (Refbt to OP134, CONDENSATE SYSTEM, Section 5.3.) O b, At least one condensate booster U b. Place one condensate booster puma RUNNING PP in service. (Reler to 0P134, CONDENSATE SYSTEM, SectionS 5.) NOTE The main FW pump d1schare vaNe control switches nust be held in the OPEN position to open the vaNes with the rnaln FW pumps stopped,
- 4. Open The Fdkwin Valves:
Low pressure FW heater bypass vaNes: O ICE-330 O ICE-359
- High pressure FIN heater bypass valves:
U 1FW11O
- MaIn PM ptrn discharpe valves:
J 1PN29 0 IPN-SG EOPFRP4i,i I Rev .[ Paoe63qf6 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 58 of 61 FRP-H.1 Attachment 3 Form ES-D-2 I RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK I Attachment 3 Sheet 4 of 5 EST.ABIJSHING CONDENSATE ftOW TO SGS I INSTRUCTIONS I f RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED C 5. Reset Si C 5. l any train of SI wI NOT reset at MCB. THEN reset at using PATH-i GUIDE. Attachment 12. C 6. Manually ReaIii Safeguds. Equipment Foflowinq A Lass 01 OfIsite Ptme (Reter to PAll-H GUIDE. Attachment 2,) [17. Reset FW Isolation. C 8. Place Feed Req Bjpass Contrdlers In [18. Verify feed req bass valves SHUT Manual AM) Set Output To Zero, c Reset ANt) open maui FW isolation valve(s): U 1FW-15 (A SG C 1FW-271(BSG) C] 1FW-217(CSG)
- 10. Shut Math PN Pump Re&c Valves: 10. Locally shut main FW pump circ manual isolation valve(s):
C1FW-8 C 1FW39 C IFW-5 (FWpumpA) C IPW-36 (FW pump B) C It Place Condenaie Booster Pump Contrners In Manual AN!) Control Dschare Pressure At 600 P51G. EOP-FRP-H1 I Rev. 28 I Paqe 64 cit 136 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 59 of 61 FRP-H.1 Attachment 3 Form ES-D-2 I RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK Attachment 3 SheetS of 5 ESTABLISHING CONDENSATE FLOW TO SOs I I I INSTRUCTIONS RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
- 12. Estabhsh Feed FIowTo 5(3(s):
(Refer to Attachment 1 whde perforrninq actions that restore feed 0 a. Establish feed flow using the feed 0 a Locally establish feed flow using req bypass valves from the MCB. the feed req bypass valves. (Refer to OP-I 3401, flV SYSTEM, Section BA.) 0 b. FeedllowtoSo(s) b. Perform the following: ESTAB1JSHED
- 1) Verify mn RN block vve(s)
OPEN: 0 IFW-130(ASG) o IFW-246(BSG) 0 1FW-188(CSG) El 2) Locally establish feed flow using the feed req valve(s). (Referto OP-134.O1, m FW SYSTEM, Section 8.3.)
- END -
EOP-FRP-R1 I Rev. 28 I Paoe 65 of 66 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 60 of 61
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARR[S 2012 NRC Exam SCENARIG3 Revision Summary Rev. 0 Initial development of 2012 NRC Exam Scenario 3
- 1. Modified 2009B NRC Exam Scenario 2 by changing the following:
- 2. Turnover under clearance equipment
- 3. Replaced events 2 and 3 with different malfunctions
- 4. Added new malfunctions for events 4, and 6
- 5. Changed time periods for when Main FW and Aux FW is lost
- 6. Removed failure of Phase A isolation valves
- 7. Updated procedure references to current revisions
- 8. Updated scenario CAEP data Archie Lucky Rev. 1
- 1. Events 2 and 4 do not require the RO or BOP to perform MOB actions other than silencing annunciators and reporting the event to the SRO. Therefore credit for an instrument or component failure cannot be given for these events.
- 2. Incorporated Operations validation comments into the scenario guide. Most comments were updates to procedures used as evaluator references in the guide.
- 3. Based on feedback from the 75 day Outline submittal to the NRC all scenarios will have the critical tasks changed to address specific plant parameters that could be observed for grading criteria.
- 4. Additionally, based on feedback from the 75 day Outline submittal to the NRC all scenario turnovers will have the C SG steam line radiation monitor failed and a thunderstorm in the area.
Archie Lucky Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 3 Rev. 1 Page 61 of 61
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 05000400/201 2301 Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: IC-26, MOL, 88% power The TDAFW Pump is under clearance due to over speed trip device damage. The pump has been out of service for 64 hours and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 20 hours. LCO 3.7.1 .2 action a has been entered
. A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan under clearance for motor replacement
. PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13, SHUT due to PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage Turnover:
. A Normal shutdown has been directed by plant management, at 4 DEH Units / minute to support being in Mode 3 within the next 6 hours Critical Tasks:
. Manually actuate main steamline isolation prior to all SGs depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner to 100 psig
. Align Containment Spray System for operation prior to Containment pressure exceeding 35 psig Event No. MaIf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N/A R RO/SRO Lower Power at 4 DEH Units / mm N__BOP/SRO 2 CFW17A C BOP/SRO Main Feedwater Pump 1A Recirculation Valve (1 FW-8) fails OPEN 3 N/A R RO/SRO Re-commence power reduction at 4 DEH Units / mm N BOP/SRO 4 EPSO2 C ALL Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill. Crew performs Immediate Actions and TS SRO enters AOP-024.
5 CVCO1 C RO/SRO 1 CS-i 1 fails closed. Letdown relief opens TSSRO 6 N/A N RO/SRO Place excess letdown in service 7 CRFO3A C RO/SRO One Control rods drops TS_- SRO 8 CRFO3B C RO/SRO Second Control rod drops / manual Rx Trip required 9 MSSO1A M ALL A S/G develops a large Steam Line break inside Containment with auto (or manual) Safety Injection. 10 ZRPK627A C BOP/SRO Main Steam Line actuation fails to automatically isolate (manually ZRPK627B isolate MSIVs) 11 ZRPK644b C RO/SRO 1A Containment Spray pump starts and trips on 0/C, 1 B Containment Spray pump does not auto start and MOV 1 CT-88 ZRPK645B does not open. (FRP-J.1 Orange Path entry is not required if the crew CNSO2A manually starts the 1 B CT pump and opens the associated valves from the MCB.) 12 MSSO5A C BOP/SRO 1A MSIV does not auto close. BOP will have to direct local manual closure of the 1A MSIV per RNO actions (EPP-014). (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page lof 74
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4
SUMMARY
Power level is approximately 88%. The TDAFW Pump has been out of service for 64 hours and is not expected to be back in service for an additional 20 hours. LCO 3.7.1.2 action a has been entered. A Normal shutdown has been directed by plant management, at 4 DEH Units I minute to support being in Mode 3 within the next 6 hours. The A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan is out of service for motor replacement and is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours. PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13, SHUT due to PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage. Radiation monitor MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB has failed low and thunderstorms are in the area. Plant risk condition is YELLOW due to a power reduction of >10% (YELLOW risk is a qualitative risk assessment per WCM-001). GP-006 is currently in progress with step 8 completed. Event 1: Power Reduction the first evolution for the crew is to commence a power reduction at 4 DEH Units / mm. It is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will borate as necessary to lower power, and the BOP will operate the DEH Main Turbine controls as necessary to reduce turbine load. Once the power decrease has been observed to the extent desired by the Lead Evaluator Event 2 can be inserted. Event 2: Main Feedwater Pump 1A Recirculation Valve (1 FW-8) fails OPEN If the valve position change is not observed visually Feed Reg valve response will cause SG levels to slowly lower and return to normal in response to the level deviations. Alarms may not actuate for this event (power dependant). The crew should diagnose that the A FW recirc valve has failed OPEN based on Feedwater discharge pressure and plant response. The BOP may close the valve when the incorrect position is observed. The SRO should enter AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions, and work through to manually close or verify the valve closed from the control room. Event 3: Re-commence power reduction. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 2 of 74
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4
SUMMARY
(continued) Event 4: The Lead Evaluator will direct when to insert an overcurrent problem of Instrument Bus S-Ill which will result in the loss of the 7.5kVA Inverter. This will require entry into AOP-024, Loss of Uninterruptible Power Supply. This procedure has immediate actions that must be carried out by the RD. The loss of the Inverter will also cause an auto start of the A ESW pump due to a loss of PT-9101A and a loss of the running ESCWS Chiller due to loss of FT 9209A. After the AD is sent for inspection of bus the report will be that the problem is isolated to the Inverter and that the bus does not have a problem. The Instrument Bus can be restored by transferring to the alternate power supply. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs. The crew may or may not start the standby Chiller per OP-i 48. The Chiller start will be dependent on how quickly the crew moves through AOP-024. Auto rod control should be re-established. Tech Specs that should be evaluated for the loss of the Instrument Bus:
- T.S. 3.7.4, At least two independent emergency service water loops shall be OPERABLE.
- T.S. 3.7.13 At least two independent Essential Services Chilled Water System loops shall be OPERABLE.
- T.S. 3.8.1 .1 AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE
- T.S. 3.8.3.1 Electrical buses shall be energized in the specified manner with tie breakers open between redundant buses within the unit.
Event 5: 1 CS-i 1 fails closed. Letdown relief opens after alternate power is restored to Instrument Bus IV and rod control is restored to AUTO a failure of an instrument air line to 1 CS ii will occur causing the valve to fail closed. This common CVCS letdown isolation valve closure will cause letdown to isolate. With letdown isolated the crew will need to place Excess Letdown in service. Event 6: Establish Excess Letdown the crew will be required to re-establish inventory control by initiating Excess Letdown as directed by APP-ALB-07, 3-i lAW OP-107 section 8.2. Event 7: Control Rod Drop with Rod Control in AUTO, one control rod will drop requiring entry into AOP-00i. The crew will perform the immediate actions associated with one dropped rod and place Rod Control to Manual. The SRO will contact the Manager of Operations and Reactor Engineering. Surveillance requirement 4.1.1.1 .1 .a requires performing a shutdown margin calculation upon detecting an inoperable control rod. The SRO will review the associated Tech Specs for the dropped rod. After the crew resets the negative rate trip alarms OR at the direction of the Lead Examiner event 8 can be initiated. Tech Specs associated with a dropped rod: 3.1.1 .1, Boration Control Shutdown Margin Modes 1 & 2 3.1.3.1, Movable Control Assemblies Group Height 3.1 .3.5, Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit 3.1.3.6, Control Rod Insertion Limits 3.2.1, Axial Flux Difference 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page3of74
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-i HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4
SUMMARY
(continued) Event 8: Second Control Rod drops. The second control rod dropping will require re-entry into AOP-00i requiring implementation of a manual Reactor Trip and entry into PATH-i. Event 9: A S/G Steam Line break inside Containment requiring Safety Injection. After completing the immediate actions of PATH-i the crew will to EPP-004, Reactor Trip Response. While implementing EPP-004 a large steam break in the A SG inside containment will occur. This will require a Safety Injection (either manual or auto). The Safety Injection will require the crew to transition out of EPP-004 and re-enter PATH-i. Event 10: Automatic Main Steamline Isolation failure requires the crew to identify the failure and take actions to manually isolate the MSIVs. Event ii: A Containment Spray (CT) pump trip and the B CT pump start failure and discharge valve (1 CT-88) failure to auto open. If the B CT pump is not started prior to Containment reaching the High 3 setpoint of 10 psig an Orange Path condition will exist. When the Orange Path condition occurs the crew would be required to transition to FRP- J.i, Response to High Containment Pressure. Event 12: A MSIV failure to close Automatic or Manual Main Steamline Isolation does not occur on the A SG. The crew should identify that the A MSIV did not close when attempting manual isolation during event 10. Since the MSIV did not close and a steam break accident is occurring the SRO will transition from PATH-i to EPP-0i4, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The BOP will direct the RAB AO to locally close the MSIV by isolating and venting Instrument Air lAW EPP-0i4 step 2 RNO directions. The attempts to shut the valve locally will fail. The scenario terminates after the crew completes EPP-Oi 4 and transitions to EOP-EPP-008, SI Termination. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 4of74
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
, HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:
- 1. Manually actuate main steamline isolation prior to all SGs depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner to <100 psig.
Manually actuate main steamline isolation to prevent an uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and in uncontrolled cool down of the RCS. Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is preventing all SG pressures from degrading to 100 psig.
- 2. Align Containment Spray System for operation prior to containment pressure exceeding 35 psig Manually start and align one Containment Spray pump before an extreme (red path) challenge develops to the Containment CSF (45 psig in Containment). Failure to manually actuate Containment Spray under the postulated conditions constitutes a demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failure/incorrect auto actuation of an ESF system or component. In this scenario the A Containment Spray pump trips due to an over current and the B Containment Spray pump fails to auto start on the Hi-3 containment pressure (>10 psig in Containment). In addition the B train discharge valve 1CT-88 must be repositioned to align the system flow path.
Plant parameter grading criteria for the task is preventing Containment pressure from exceeding 35 psig. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 5 of 74
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 SIMULATOR SETUP For the 2012 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario # 4 Reset to IC-164 password sandwich Goto RUN Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner. Set ERFIS screens (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Post conditions for status board from IC-26 Mode 1, 88% Reactor power, power reduction in progress Provide a marked up copy of GP-006 Rev 57 through section 5.2 step 8 Provide a Reactivity Plan to candidates for shutting down the plant Control Bank D at 195 steps RCS boron 1067 ppm RCS press 2220 2250 all PZR heaters ON SG level maintained with A and B MFW pump and FW Reg Vlvs in Auto RCS temp 585.4° F, stable Main Turbine 847 MWe, 104 MVars Simulator Setup Instructions TDAFW pump under clearance due to damaged overspeed trip device Hang CITs on 1 MS-70, 1 MS-72 and Trip Place an Off normal placard on Throttle Valve 1 MS-T Place protected train placard on A and B MDAFW pump MCB switch Hang CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan Place a copy of OWP-RM-09 for failure of MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB in OWP book Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates Update the status board: PZR PORV 444B, TS 3.4.4, actions met block valve shut. Rad Monitor MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB TS 3.3.6.a OOS at 0800 on 2-12-2012 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 6of74
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 Scenario # 4 CAEP file Description of 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Initial Conditions were established from 10-26 Mode 1 88% power steady state conditions Provide a marked up copy of GP-006 Rev 57 through section 5.2 step 8 Provide a Reactivity Plan to candidates for shutting down the plant Control Bank D at 195 steps RCS boron 1067 ppm RCS press 2220 2250 all PZR heaters ON RCS temp 585.4°F, stable Main Turbine 847 MWe, 104 MVars Simulator Setup Instructions I PZR PORV 444B Seat Leakage, PORV Block valve 1 RC-1 13 is shut I Hang CIT on 1 RC-1 13, PORV Block valve TDAFW pump under clearance Hang CIT on TDAFW pump Under clearance due to damaged overspeed trip device I Place protected train placard on A and B MDAFW pump MOB switch Place off normal placard on 1 MS-T Rad Monitor MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB failed low Place a copy of OWP-RM-09 in OWP book Status board update for TDAFW pump TS 3.7.1.2, PORV PORV 444B TS 3.4.4, Rad Monitor MSL C RM-01 MS-3593SB TS 3.3.3.6 Hang CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan I Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates SCENARIO 4 CAEP TDAFW pump Out Of Service due to damaged overspeed trip device Place CIT on 1 MS-70 and 1 MS-72 MOB switch Place protected train placard on A and B MDAFW pump MOB switch irf mssO34 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN irf mssO35 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OPEN Trip the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle valve imf cfwolc (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true Place CIT on A Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Fan idi xb2i072 (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) ASIS ilo xb20072g (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OFF ilo xb2oO72r (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) OFF Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 7 of 74
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 EVENTS Event 1: No trigger Lower power lAW GP-006 from 89% power until Lead Examiners stops Reactivity RO / SRO Normal BOP / SRO Event 2: MFW Pump A Recirc valve opens Entry conditions for AOP-01 0 Component BOP I SRO imf cfwi7a (2 00:00:00 00:00:00) 100 00:00:00 0 Deletes MEW Pump A recirc valve failed open when switch taken to shut This is a conditional trigger and does not need to be ran trg 14 1FW-8 shut trg= 14 dmf cfwi7a Event 3: Re-commence power reduction at 4 DEH Units I mm Event 4: Trigger 4 Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill. Crew performs Immediate Actions and enters AC P-024 Component RD I BOP / SRO Tech Spec SRO - imf eps02 (400:00:00 00:00:00) iA-SIll Event 5: 1 CS-i 1 fails closed and letdown relief opens requires crew to place Excess Letdown in service Component RO I SRO Tech Spec SRO - imf cvc0i (5 00:00:00 00:00:00) CLOSED Event 6: Establish Excess Letdown Normal RD I SRO Event 7: One control rod drops P6 Crew performs immediate actions of AOP-OOi place rod control in manual Component RO / SRO imt crf03a (7 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2 24 I Event 8: Second control rod drops N5 I Crew performs immediate actions of AOP-OOi which is to actuate a manual Rx Trip after second rod drops imf crf03b (8 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2 20 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 8 of 74
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2012 NRC SCENARIO 4 Event 9: A Steam Generator develops a large Steam Break inside Containment requires Safety Injection Major ALL imf mss0la (9 00:00:00 00:00:00) 4.2e+006 00:09:00 0 Event 10: Main Steam Line actuation fails to automatically isolate must manually shut MSIVs (preloaded no trigger) Component BOP / SRO imf ZRPK627A (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf ZRPK627B (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS I Event 11: A Containment Spray pump starts and trips on overcurrent (preloaded no trigger) B Containment Spray pump fails to auto start and the discharge valve MOV 1 CT-88 fails to open NOTE: Crew determines they meet entry conditions of FRP-J.1 (Orange Path) FRP-J.1 met after implementation of FRPs and When Containment Pressure increases to > 10 psig and neither CT pumps are running Component RO I SRO imf cns02a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) true imf zrpk643b (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk644b (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS imf zrpk645b (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) FAIL_ASIS Event 12: A MSIV fails to shut (preloaded no trigger) I Component BOP I SRO imf msso5a (n 00:00:00 00:00:00) 2 3600.0 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 9 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nfl Scenario # Event # j -
- Page 10 of 74 Event
Description:
Continue Power reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the crew has completed their board walk down and are ready to take the shift inform the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Run. When the Simulator is in run Lead Evaluator: announce: CREW UPDATE (SROs Name) Your crew has the shift. END OF UPDATE When directed by the Lead Evaluator, ensure that the Simulator Operator: annunciator horns are on and place the Simulator in RUN. Performs a crew alignment brief and proceeds with the plant SRO shutdown. GP-006 SRO GP-006, Section 5.2 Step 9 WHEN Turbine load is less than 75%, THEN VERIFY the SGBD Regenerative Heat Exchanger Condensate Outlet is BOP aligned to the CPD effluent per CR127, Section 7.1.
- Contacts RW (or CPD) operator Acknowledge request and report back 3 minutes later Communicator:
that the CPD effluent is aligned per OP-i 27, Section 7.1 Routine load changes should be coordinated with the Load Procedure Note: Dispatcher to meet system load demands. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 10 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.E NH Scenario# ._ Event # 1 Page 11 of 74 Event
Description:
Continue Power reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. DIRECTS BOP (or may perform) to contact the Load Dispatcher that the load reduction is about to commence.
SRO . DIRECTS BOP to start power reduction at 4 DEH Units I mm. (May direct initiation of a boration before the power reduction begins.)
. Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of DEH Control BOP
- DEPRESS the LOAD RATE MW/MIN push-button.
- Verifies all available Pressurizer Backup Heaters are energized.
There is no procedural guidance directing when the Evaluator Note: boration to lower power is required. The crew may elect to perform the boration prior to placing the Turbine in GO.
- Verifies the desired rate, NOT to exceed 5 MWIMIN, in the DEMAND display. (4 DEH Units/minute)
. DEPRESS the ENTER push-button.
BOP . DEPRESS the REF push-button.
. Verifies the desired load (120 MW per step 5.2.5.e) in the DEMAND display.
. DEPRESS the ENTER push-button. The HOLD push button should illuminate.
The unloading of the unit can be stopped at any time by depressing the HOLD push-button. The HOLD lamp will Procedure Note illuminate and the GO lamp will extinguish. The load reduction can be resumed by depressing the GO push button. The HOLD lamp will extinguish and the GO lamp will illuminate. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 11 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NB Scenario # Event # 1 Page 12 of 74 Event
Description:
Continue Power reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the load reduction and inform crew through Shift Update Turbine in GO.
. VERIFY the number in the REFERENCE display BOP decreases.
. VERIFY Generator load is decreasing.
. MONITORS primary systems response.
INITIATES boration, as necessary (with SRO concurrence) per RO OP-i 07.01. When crew starts boration for downpower cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 2 (MFW Pump A recirc valve 1 FW-8 fails OPEN). Lead Evaluator: Event 2 The BOP should identify SG level trends and respond to the SG level changes. The BOP should be able to identify 1 FW-8 is OPEN and report to the SRO. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 12 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Tht No.: N Scenario # ent # Page 13 of 74 Event
Description:
Main FW Pump 1A Recirc Valve (1FW-8) fails OPEN Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate Trigger 2 1 FW-8, MFW Pump A Recirculation Valve, fails OPEN Simulator Operator: NOTE: VERIFY that when 1 FW-8 switch is taken to shut malfunction 1CFW17A deletes. IF IT DOES NOT IMMEDIATELY DELETE THE MALFUNCTION.
. All SG NR levels decrease, then start to return to program level as FRVs respond to level deviation Indications Available: The following alarms may come in:
. ALB-014-1(2)(3)-1 B SG A(B)(C) NR LEVELJ SP HI I LO DEV
. ALB-014-8-5 COMPUTER ALARM SG
. RESPONDS to changing SG NR levels and identifies BOP 1 FW-8 is open
. Notifies SRO THE BOP may take MANUAL control of 1 FW-8 and close it Evaluators Note: prior to entering AOP-010. Actions would be acceptable based on OPS-NGGC-1 000 controllers not responding correctly in Auto.
CREW Identifies AOP-O10 entry condtions CHECK ANY Main Feedwater Pump TRIPPED. (NO) immediate BOP RNO-GO TO Step 5. Action Announces immediate actions complete Enters AOP-O1 0 AOP-O1O SRO Makes PA announcement Steps 1 3 are immediate actions (completed) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 13 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fi scenario # - Evént # Page of 74 Event
Description:
Main FW Pump 1A Recirc Valve (1 FW-8) fails OPEN Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Establish Control Bands and Trip limits lAW OMM-001 Attachment 13 as described below: SRO SG Level Control Band 52% to 62% Trip limit Low 30% Trip limit High 73% Dispatch AO to investigate CHECK DEH controlling Turbine SRO Valves PROPERLY. (YES) GOTO Step 7. MAINTAIN ALL of the following:
. At least ONE Main Feedwater Pump RUNNING (YES)
BOP . Main Feedwater flow to ALL Steam Generators (YES)
. ALL Steam Generator levels greater than 30% (YES)
CHECK Feedwater Regulator Valves operating properly in AUTO: BOP . Response to SG levels (YES)
. Valve position indication (YES)
- Response to feed flow/steam flow mismatch (YES)
Loss of Main Control Room annunciators concurrent with a Procedure Note: turbine runback of greater than 25%, requires a change of event classification per the HNP Emergency Plan. SRO CHECK Main Control Room annunciators AVAILABLE. (YES) CHECK the following Pump status: BOP . ALL Feedwater Train Pumps RUNNING (YES)
. BOTH Heater Drain Pumos RUNNING (YES)
SRO GO TO the applicable section: All Condensate/Feedwater flow malfunctions (other than pump trips) Section 3.1 BOP CHECK the following Recirc and Dump Valves operating properly in MODU: Main Feedwater Pumps (NO) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 14 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.* N8. Scenario # - vent # Page - i Event
Description:
Main FW Pump 1 A Recirc Valve (1 FW-8) fails OPEN Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF ANY valve has failed OPEN OR is NOT controlling properly, THEN: ATTEMPT to control the valve from the MCB, if BOP available. (when valve is placed to shut the valve will close) Reports to SRO that 1 FW-8 has shut BOP Notifies TB AC to investigate 1 FW-8 failure 2 mm after being called to investigate 1 FW-8 report back Cornmunicator: that valve is shut and locally you can see nothing wrong Contacts WCC for Work Request and EIR. SRO Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist Following stabilization of the plant, if the SRO asks for direction from Ops Management direct the SRO to continue with plant power reduction at 4 DEH Units/mm. Lead Evaluator: Ensure power is reduced below 83% to prevent a Reactor Trip during Event 7, one control rod drops. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 15 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NB Scenario # Event # Page i t Z Event
Description:
Re-commence power reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP-i 07.01 RO OP-i 07.01, Section 5.2 and then 5.1
. DETERMINE the Reactor Coolant Boron concentration from Chemistry OR the Main Control Room status board.
- DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration RO increase required.
. DETERMINE the volume of boric acid to be added using the reactivity plan associated with the IC.
FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, has a tenths Evaluator Note: position. If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid
. and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, Procedure Caution:
located on the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value. SET FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the RO desired quantity. Boration of the RCS will be dependent on charging and letdown flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in Procedure Note: . . . . . service will increase the boric acid delivery rate to the RCS. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 16 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 JTestNo.: fiB Scenario # Event # Page Ji 2! Z4 Event
Description:
Re-commence power reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- SET controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, for the desired flow rate.
. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in RO the STOP position.
. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.
- PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR position.
When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a P1 controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint. The result is as follows:
. PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected Procedure Note: pressure.
. ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.
. Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.
OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron RO concentration to less than 10 ppm.
. MAKE boron concentration adjustments as dictated from sample results.
Boration may be manually stopped at any time by turning Procedure Note: control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 17 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: iS Scenario # Event # Page i i Zi Event
Description:
Re-commence power reduction Time Position [ Applicants Actions or Behavior START the makeup system as follows:
. TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RO momentarily.
. VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.
The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated Procedure Caution: reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.
. VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.
o IF rod control is in AUTO,
- THEN VERIFY the control rods are RO responding properly.
. VERIFY boration automatically terminates when the desired quantity of boron has been added.
. PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.
Additional steps are included in section 5.1 but none will be applicable since the system just came out of Automatic. Evaluator Note: The only steps included here are the ones with verifiable action.
. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:
o Is in the STOP position. o The GREEN light is LIT.
- PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.
RO
- START the makeup system as follows:
o TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily. o VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 18 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 cDp iest No.: h1 Scenario # Event # j Page j Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Lead Evaluator: When Reactor power is < 83% cue Simulator Operator to actuate Trigger 4 (Loss of Instrument Bus Ill). Evaluator Note: A Reactor Trip could occur from complications during the loss of the Instrument Bus. The scenario has been validated assuming the Instrument Bus alternate power is restored. if a Trip occurs, allow the crew to restore power to the bus ASAP.
. When directed by the Lead Evaluator: Actuate Trigger-4 Simulator Operator:
Loss of Uninterruptible Power Supply S-Ill Multiple alarms associated with Loss of Inst Bus S-Ill Indications Available:
. Key Indicator is Row 3 of Trip Status Light Box LIT ENTERS AOP-024, LOSS OF UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER AOP-024 SRO SUPPLY Makes PA announcement for AOP entry Immediate
- CHECK Instrument Bus Sill ENERGIZED. (NO)
RO Action PLACE Rod Control in MANUAL. PERFORM the following:
- PLACE Main FW Regulator Valves in MANUAL.
Immediate
- VERIFY Main FW Regulator Bypass Valves in Action BOP MANUAL.
- CONTROL SG levels between 52% and 62%
(OMM-001 Att. 13 trip limits 30% and 73%) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 19 of 74
Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OptestN&: NaQscenario# .2_ Event# 4 Page 20 of 74 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CREW Dispatch operator to investigate Inverter S-Ill When dispatched to investigate UPS Panel Sill, wait 1-2 minutes and then report that you dont see any physical Communicator: damage to the inverter. There isnt any smell or smoke from the cabinets. The only thing to report is that the Red OVERCURRENT I-IL light is LIT. Loss of electrical power may require initiation of the Procedure Note: SHNPP Emergency Plan.
. REFER TO PEP-i 10, Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL SRO Network at entry point X.
. DETERMINE the affected bus (S-Ill) and GO TO appropriate section (Section 3.1)
- PLACE the affected Ni Rod Stop Bypass switch to RO BYPASS at the Detector Current Comparator Drawer.
. RESTORE Tavg as necessary (using manual rod control)
SRO CHECK the plant in Modes 1 through 4. (YES) Procedure Note: SG PORVs may be controlled locally if needed Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 20 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event# Page 21 of 74 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Manually CONTROL the following based on the Instrument Bus lost: (for S-Ill)
- Rod Control CREW
- C SG PORV
. Main FW Reg Valves
. Main FW Reg Bypass Valves GO TO the applicable step based on the Instrument Bus lost.
SRO (step 7) VERIFY PRZ Level Controller Selector Switch in CHAN RO 459/460. (YES) If power is lost to instrument bus Sill (A Train), the associated ESW header pressure instrument will read low and the ESW pump will start on sensed low pressure. ESW Procedure Note: Screen Wash will be inoperable due to loss of the ESW Screen Wash Pump discharge header pressure permissive for starting the screen, causing the associated EDG to be inoperable. Tech Specs 3J.4 and 3.8.1.1 will apply. This event will also cause an ESW Pump to start. This start will increase the cooling to Containment and will Evaluator Note: cause an alarm ALB-028 5-1 CONTAINMENT AIR HIGH VACUUM due to low pressure in Containment. The BOP should report a 1 hour TS action based on BOP Containment Pressure TS 3.6.1.4 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 21 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N Scenario # vént # 4 page 22 of 14 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledge report and establishes Containment vacuum control band (0 to -1 is typical) Tech Spec 3.L14 Pruy c@ntai.nt lntarnal Dressure sa11 ha aalnt*ined b.t.e.n
*L 1hhS wat*r and 1.5 SRO APPUCAtLfl: MCOES 1, 2, 3 and 4 With the nta1nant Internal pressra utslde of the 1fIts abova restore the rterna1 pressure to ithn the 1 ¶elts withIn 1 hour or ha In at I east NCt STh$CS within the next S hours and In C& STOW witMn the followIng 30 hours.
Any Tech Spec evaluation may be completed with a follow Evaluator Note up question after the scenario. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page22of74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OptestNo.: NBScenario# _ Event # Page 14 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior REFER TO the following Tech Specs: 37.t At least two independent enwrqency service water loops shall be CPEBLE 8fJ1UiY: MODES L 2. 3. and 4, ACTION: Wnh only cue en.erency service water loop OPERABLE, restore at east tw iops to OPEPABII status wth1n 12 hours or be in at least OT STANDBY within the next hours and in CDD S4I3TDOWN within tOe folla.ving 3D hours.
- 3.8.1.1, AC Sources Operating LCO Requires performing OST-1 023 within 1 hour a iith oie ftste c-rut t 30.1 1,a ir;erable:
fom 1 r ow qu1rcont $ 1 1.1 *v w1flin I lr ard nce r 8 hours tlrevflr, and
- 3.8.3.1 action b and c, Onsite Power Distribution 2 hour SRO LCO 3.8.3.1 The fol wing electrical busas shall be anerglze4 in t2t* speclfe4 sann.r with tie briakers open bet.een redundant buses vi thin the unit:
.. ua-lt A.C. Vital us 10P13Stt ane1Zed froe Its aIs4ciatld ap_m_sa*
Inverter conn*Ctd ta UvoE . . Action b and c b With one lkolt A.C. ivital bus aot ,nerid from it* uscc1aad 1 esenerize the US-walt A,C. tl bus witMn 2 hcur 1n.rta o he In at lent IOT STAsCY within the nat $ in L3 HuT0m within the fallowing 30 haur$
. With an USvolt LC. vital bus act enirized fo Its assocated I nrt canftec.ad ta Its assocIated 0. . bus, reeneri za the US-volt A. C. vi tel bus thrugn Its auacl ata4 itwartrn nnct*d to its associated 0,C. bus within Z4 hauri o. be in at last LOT STASY within the aet 6 hours and in COLO 5$JTXWII within thi fallowlnç 30 hours
* (optional) 3.6.5, Vacuum Relief System 72 hour LCO PERFORM OST-1 023, Offsite Power Availability Verification CREW Weekly Interval Modes 1 6. -
- Dispatch Outside and RAB AOs.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 23 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NBQ Scenario# 2 Event# 4 Page 24 of 74 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledge request to perform OST-i 023. Report back Communicator: -20 minutes after being directed that both portions of OST-1 023 have been completed. SRO GO TO Step 10.
. CHECK Letdown in service. (YES)
P0
. CHECK ALL PAZ heaters in service. (YES)
BOP CHECK ANY WC-2 Essential Chiller RUNNING. (NO) Because the crew does not initially know the extent of the problem to the Inverter they may elect to start the standby Chiller. If they have knowledge that the Inverter will be restored to alternate power in short order they may decide Evaluator Note: to NOT start the standby Chiller. The Chiller will automatically start when Inverter power is restored. If the crew elects to start the B chiller OP-i 48 section 5.1 and 5.2 are included in the back pages of this guide. The guide is written as if the crew WILL start the Chiller. START the standby chiller per OP-148, Essential Services BOP Chilled Water System. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 24 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N Scenario # 2 Event # Page 25 of 74 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CONTACT Maintenance to perform the following:
. CHECK the inverter and vital bus for indications of grounds or other faults.
- CORRECT ANY problems found.
DISPATCH an operator to perform the following: CREW
- CHECK the affected instrument inverter (7.5 KVA UPS PANEL Sill for ANY of the following:
o Red OVERCURRENT I-IL light LIT (NOTE: I-IL stands for Current indicating light) o Obvious signs of damage o (May dispatch shift I&C also) Since the report of the Red Overcurrently I-IL light should have been reported by now the MCR may not call the AO again at this step. Communicator: Call the MCR and report that I&C has also investigated the Inverter and the problem is isolated to ONLY the lnverter - the Bus is OK and alternate power can be applied. Direct the TRANSFER of Instrument Bus to the alternate power CREW supply per OP-156.02, Section 8.7, AC Electrical Distribution. If requested to go to the MCR for instructions report to the SRO and after given instructions to place the inverter on alternate power have the Simulator Operator carry out the transfer Instrument Bus Ill to its alternate power supply. Communicator: Prior to establishing Alternate power, Ensure that the ATWS panel Bypass switch is placed in BYPASS per OP-i 56.02 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 25 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario 4f . Event # Pági26f 74 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior A copy of OP-i 56.02 Section 8.7, Aligning (UPS) Instrument Bus to Alternate Power Supply is on the next pages. The only actions in the MCR Are to place the ATWS panel Bypass switch to BYPASS and then return it to Evaluator Note: normal after alternate power is restored. The MCR must also evaluate bistables prior to re-energizing the Instrument Bus and monitor plant conditions while the bus power is being restored. Run APP eps INSTR_BUS_UPSJ Il_ALT. Simulator Operator: NOTE: This APP takes approximately 3 minutes to complete. Once the APP is complete, call the MCR as the AO to Communicator: report that the transfer to alternate power has been completed. Once the transfer to the alternate power supply is Evaluator Note: performed the tripped WC-2 Essential Chiller will automatically restart. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 26 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBQ Scenario # 2_. Event # Page ZZ ci! Z4 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 8.7. Aligning (UPS) Instrument Bus to Alternate Power Supply 8.7.1. Initial Condition I. A reed exists to align 7.5 KVA UPS Instrument Bus to Alternate Power Supply.
- 2. Aiternate Power Supply is available for the respective instrument Distribution Panels, 8.72 Procedural Steps EVALUATE bistable status pnor to he-energizing an instrument bus to determine if a thp or actuation signal will be generated by this procedure. MOP.
(uiibfl The instrument bus to be transferred to its alternate power supply must first be dc-energized. A thorough network analysis of plant impact should be perfdrmed before de-eneryization. 2, REFER to AOP-024. Attachment I throuØi 4 for a hst of equipment affected when the associated instrument bus. is he-energized and subsequently energized. Attachment 10 of thus procedure also gives some nfomiation. Mt P. R Cc,AuTor) Before an Instrument Bus Train (both SI and SIll or both 511 and SW) is he-energized. both trains of Solid State Ionic Output Mode Selector Switch should have been placed in TEST per OP- 103 to prevent an inadvertent safeguard actuation, This requires the plant to be in MODE S or defueled..
- 3. VERIFY Manager-Operations has approied dc-energizing the nizrunient bus(es) Inot applicable for planned bus outages that have followed the normal scheduling process). Reference P&L 4.0.19. 14/A 3, VERIFY SO LVI. ATWS PANEL BYPASS StArch is in BYPASS. MOP.
- 5. IF an lnstrumen.t Bus Train will be dc-energized, THEN VERIFY that both trains of SSPS are in TEST per OP-I 03.
iPeference 2,6.1) Nc A OP-156.02 I Rev. 97 °age 135 of Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 27 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op lest No.: Scenario # vent Page 28 74 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 8.72 Procedural Steps (continued) iNhe Secondary Power Supply should NOT be deenergzed for PlC 17 and PIC 1$ n the foltoMng Stet Tbese PIC have Secondary Po.vec Supplies from the Acpenchx R Interters and shcuid continue to function
- 3. 4t the ap*rocnate PlC, VERIFY the Primary Power Supply (Upper Power Supply) Off:
Ptocess Instrument CabInet i0P4ASl PICCab17 N/A PlC Cab 18 N/A 10, At designated Instrument Disinbution Panel, INSERT AND ROTATE Kirk sey n Alternate Power Supply Breaker (rower Panel Supply). II. PtACE the appropriate Alternate Power Supply Breaker n the ON pos1ion.
- IDP-SL Alten ate Suppv From PP-1A211-SA
- IDP-Sll. AeemateSuppli From PP-18211--SB N/A
- DP-SllL Alternate Suoply From PP-1A311-SA
- IDP-S{V. Mernate Supply From PP-18311-SB N/A j OP-i56.C2 Rev. 7 °ae 137 of 347 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 28 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NB Scenario # _. Event # Page 29 of 74 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 8.7.2 Procedural Steps (continued) N4l)TEThe PC Primary Supply s the Upper Power Supply and the PlC Secondary Power SLPply s the Lower Power Supply Hi the center bay of each PlC, 11$any of the PIG. power supphes have two breakers and must be sweched ON, the AC INPUT breaker is operated first and then the DC OUTPUT breaker operated.
- 12. PLACE the Primary and Secondary Power Supplies in ON in the center bays of the appropriate P1Cs, nstninient Bus Process Instrument Cabnet DP-1 A-SI I LlA DP-IB-Sl 2/A rj fl/A DP-1A-SIlI 3YE DPlB-SIV 4 WA 14 N/A Ii_
4TThe Seco dary Power Supply is enecçrized for PlC 17 and PlC l& These jj_-PtCs have Secondary Power Supplies from the Appendix R Inverters and should be functioning.
- 13. At the appropriate PIG, PLACE the Prwnary Power Supply (Upper Power Supply) in ON Instrunient Process Instrument Cabinet DP-iA-SI PlC Cab 17 IT/A IDPIB-SLl PlC Cab 18 N/A j CP-15EO2 Rev 7 Daoe 135 of 347 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 29 of 74 y@
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nfl Scenario # __ Event # 4 Page 30 of 74 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 832 Procedural Steps (contInued) 14, At ite pproprinte PIG, CHECX cards to ensure Power Supply LEDs top LED on each card) are lit, instrument Bus Process Instrument Cabinet lDP1A-Sl I N/A 17 lDP1BSil 2 18 lDPiASill 3f!f,,. 13 IDP-IB-SIV 4N/A 14 ( Et any SC (short circut) Trip LED is lit, a Work Order should be initiated hr MaIntenance to remove and reinsed the associated cards.
- 15. At the appropriate PlC Bays I and 3, CHECK the NAL cards to ensure I
SC Trip LEDs are NOT lit. Instrument 8us Process Instrument Cabinet IDP1ASl I 17 N/A IDP-1B-SH 2 N/A 10 18 N/A iDP1ASlll 3 9 13 lDPIBSlV 4!. 14 OP-156.02 ev 97 page 139 o1347J Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 30 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NEQ Scenario # _..... Event # 4 Page 31 of 74 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 8.7,2 Procedural Steps (continued) jjOTE: orne new reptacerrent power supplies have a pushbutton next to the DC OK light that may need to be pushed to restore power after the power supply has been de-energized.
- 16. For each Instrument Bus that was energized in this section, VERIFY the associated SSPS and ESFAS power supply remained energized as ndicated by the respective Input Channel POWER light (both trains) and the 15 VDC and 48 VDC power supply lights (on respective train Logic Cabinet) being lit.
instrument Bus Power Supply lOP-lA-SI Bus No. 1 Power trains A and B N/A 15 and 48V Power Supply #1 Trtin A N/A IOP I B-SIl Bus No. 2 Power trains A and B N/A IS and 48V Power Supply #1 Train B N/A lOP-iA-Sill Bus No. 3 Power trains A and B YES 15 and 48V Power Supply #2 Train A lOP-lB-Sly Bus No. 4 Power traths A and B N/A IS and 48V Power Supply #2 Train B N/A After the Instrument Bus has been energized, the affected Trains MCB Block Switches for Low Pressurizer Pressure and Main Steam Line Pressure must be taken to BLOCK before placing the Solid State Logic Output Switch to OPERATE. This is accomplished in OP-103. (Reference 2.6:1)
- 17. IF SSPS was required to be verified in test in Step 8.7.2.5 (an entire Train of Instrument Busses is affected),
AND IF desired, THEN RESTORE both trains of SSPS from TEST per OP-I 03. (Reference 2.6.1) U, A
- 18. IF conditions allow, THEN PLACE SC LVL AWvS PANEL BYPASS Switch in NORMAL. i4R OP-i 5&G2 Rev. 97 Pane 140 of 347 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 31 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NHQ Scenario # Event # 4 Page 2 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 8J2 Procedural Steps (continued) 19 VERIFY h ERFS MUX power is 3bbe ting ERFIS MUX PWR
- 20. PERFORM pp1icthe portions of Attthment 4 & 5, norma AC EIectnca Uneup CheckNst for Emergency Bus 1ASA & lB-SB.
L21 56O2 RV 97 39C 141 ot 3j Harris ZU12 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 32 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NE. Scenario # Event # Page ! Z4 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Loss of power to PlC CAB-4 (fed from Instrument Bus SIV) will result in bistables P-476B, P-486B and P-496B (differential pressure bistables used in AFW isolation logic) being inoperable. Tech Spec Table 3.3-3, Action 19, Procedure Note: requires the associated channels to be placed in a tripped conditions within six hours. These bistables are energized to trip. If power is not restored within six hours, Action 19 cannot be carried out and Tech Spec 3.0.3 will be applicable. IF desired: If the SRO did not evaluate Tech Specs have the COMMUNICATOR call as the MSO and ask for a brief of plant status and what Tech Spec the plant is currently in. Lead Evaluator: OR As with all Tech Spec evaluations to decrease the amount of time the scenario will run a follow up question can be asked at the end of the scenario. RO CHECK the affected Instrument Bus ENERGIZED. (YES) WHEN power is restored to the Instrument Bus, THEN PERFORM the following: BOP VERIFY the Reactor Trip Power Range High Flux Rate alarm at the NIS panel RESET. (NO)
- Resets rate trips on Nl-43 panel (ALB 1 3-4-2 clears)
RETURN the affected NI Rod Stop Bypass switch to OPERATE at the Detector Current Comparator Drawer. BOP
. Places the NI-43 NI Rod Stop Bypass switch to the Operate position (ALB 13-5-1 clears)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 33 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: J!EQ Scenario # 2_. Event # Page 4 st Z4 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK AFW flow control valve controllers reading 100%. (NO) BOP
. Restores AFW flow control valve controllers to 100%
CHECK Steam Dump bypass permissive lights (C7A or 078) RO indicate the Steam Dumps ARMED. (NO)
. PRZ sprays should be placed in AUTO before returning the PRZ Master Pressure Controller to AUTO.
Procedure Note: . Before restoring the following components to automatic, controller setpoints should be verified at the correct setting to prevent undesired component cycling. RETURN the following to normal control for plant conditions based on the affected Instrument Bus:
. Rod Control (YES)
RO/BOP
- C SG PORV (YES)
. Main FW Reg Valves (YES)
. Main FW Reg Bypass Valves (N/A)
PERFORM a channel check of any RPS and ESF RO instrumentation affected by the loss of power. CHECK RVLIS Train A Plasma Display UPDATING. (YES) SRO CHECK RVLIS Train B Plasma Display UPDATING. (YES) SRO CHECK that power was LOST to SI or Sly. (NO) DISPATCH an operator to RESET WC-2, Essential Service BOP Chiller Power Loss relay. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 34 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Dp Test No.: Nflc. Scenario # Event # Page 35 of 74 Event
Description:
Loss of Instrument Bus S-Ill Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledge request wait 1 minute and report that the WC-2, Communicator: Essential Service Chiller Power Loss relay has been reset. CHECK power to the Instrument Bus is being supplied by the SRO NORMAL power supply. (NO alternate source, must wait until normal supply is returned to exit AOP-024) Allow the crew enough time to restore all of the effected plant components that were placed in manual. IF Tavg and Tref are within 1°F the crew will place rod control back into automatic. IF the Tavg and Tref A is >1°F You DO NOT HAVE TO WAIT for Rod Control to be placed back to Evaluator Note: Automatic to continue with Event 5. When ready initiate Event 5, cue the Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 5. 1CS-li fails closed and letdown relief opens. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 35 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NH Scenario # Event # 5 /6 Page 36 of 74 Event
Description:
1 cs-il fails closed, relief opens, place Excess LtDn in service. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate Trigger 5 Simulator Operator: 1CS-il Fails CLOSED and letdown relief lifts Annunciator: Indications: APP-ALB-007-3-i, LP LETDOWN RELIEF LINE HIGH TEMP APP-ALB-007-5-5, COMPUTER ALARM CVCS Announces alarm on ALB-007 (3-i or 5-5) RO
- Dispatches AC to investigate 1 CS-i 1 Wait 2 minutes after being dispatched to investigate Communicator: 1 CS-il failure, report that there is an air leak from the line supplying 1CS-li.
OPERATOR AC11ONS:
- 1. CONFRIM alarm usmç Tht4. Relief Lna Temf
- 2. VERIFY Automsd Funcons: None
- 3. PFRFflRM r eflve I
NOTE Due to the physical lx tthrt of the temperabire sensor this alarm tra been luiown to be actuated RO becaus,e of Hh Letdown or Containment temperature. PRT parametare ebobId be carefulty t the abysa te acttraN cJr.e to 105-10 mwa.
- a. VALIDATE tire alarm by eakraupe PRT parameters to determine tI ICS-lO s atually
;ftiritj,
- b. IF ICS-It, Letdown Isotabor is shift.
THEN: (1) SHUT letdown orifice rotation valves I C&7, 10$-B and 105-9, (2) REFER TO CR107, Chemical and Volume Conad System. (3) PLACE tettiown ft service.
. Directs placing Turbine in HOLD
- Contacts WOO for Work Request and EIR. Contacts Maintenance to investigate and fills out an Equipment SRO Problem Checklist.
. With CS-i 1 failed closed, direct Excess Letdown to be placed in service lAW OP-i 07 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 36 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: !iE& Scenario # _ Event # 5/6 Page Z ! Z4 Event
Description:
1CS-li fails closed, relief opens, place Excess LtDn in service. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Place Turbine in HOLD and informs SRO Reviews Operator Procedure Experience information for placing Excess Letdown in Service RO Determines it will take about 20 30 minutes to get Excess Letdown into service OP-i 07, Chemical and Volume Control, Section 8.2 Excess OP-107 RO Letdown. RO Verifies Initial Conditions:
. CCW is being supplied to the excess letdown heat exchanger per OP-i45.
. RCP Seal Return is in service per Section 5.2.
Normally Excess Letdown will go to the VCT. However, it plant conditions warrant, the RCDT may be selected. When the Excess Letdown line has been flushed, the VCT position can then be re-selected. Procedure Notes: If Excess Letdown is to remain in service for sufficient time for dilution or boration to be necessary then VCT level should be lowered to accommodate the expected level increase before placing Excess Letdown in service Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 37 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NHQ Scenario # Event # 5/6 Page 38 of 74 Event
Description:
1CS-li fails closed, relief opens, place Excess LtDn in service. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Excess Letdown operation during times of BTRS operation may result in damage to the RCP seals (due to increased
. contaminants and higher pH water). This should not Procedure Caution:
prevent any AOP or EOP actions. The Responsible Engineer for RCP or CVCS may provide additional guidance if needed.
- INFORM Radwaste Control Room to monitor Seal Water Filter liP while Excess Letdown is in service.
- PLACE the excess letdown heat exchanger in operation as follows:
o VERIFY 1CC-i 88, CCW TO EXCESS LETDOWN RO HEAT EXCHANGER, is open. (OPENS) o VERIFY 1CC-202 SB, CCW FM EXCESS LTDN & RCDT HEAT EXCHANGERS, is open. (OPENS) o VERIFY 1CC-i 76, CCW TO EXCESS LTDN & RCDT HEAT EXCHANGERS, is open. (OPENS) Flushing the excess letdown line to the RCDT is required if the boron concentration in the excess letdown line from the RCS isolation valves to 1 CS-466 is unknown or differs Procedure Note: from RCS concentration. The volume of this line is 74 gallons. Two volumes (148 gallons) should be adequate to prevent unexpected reactivity changes in the RCS when flow is aligned to the VCT. Evaluator Note: The flush will take 5 minutes to perform 1CS-464, HC-137 EXCESS LTDN FLOW is rated for 1500 Procedure Caution: psid. Anytime that 1 CS-464 is exposed to greater than 1500 psid, leakby should be expected. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page38of74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fiQ Scenario # 2_ Event # 5 /6 Page ! Z4 Event
Description:
1CS-il fails closed, relief opens, place Excess LtDn in service. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF excess letdown flow is to be aligned to the RCDT, THEN PERFORM the following: RD . NOTIFY Radwaste Control Room of expected RCDT level change.
- PLACE 1 CS-461, Excess Letdown to OPEN. (OPENS)
- PLACE 1 CS-460, Excess Letdown to OPEN. (OPENS)
Communicator: Acknowledge some expected RCDT level change will occur. VERIFY 1CS-464, HC-137 EXCESS LTDN FLOW is shut RD (potentiometer to zero). (Verifies) PLACE 1 CS-466, Excess Letdown to VCT/RCDT, to the RCDT RD position. (takes switch and positions to RCDT) RD PLACE 1CS-461, Excess Letdown to OPEN. (OPENS) RD PLACE 1CS-460, Excess Letdown to OPEN. (OPENS) Do NOT exceed i74°F outlet temp as indicated on TI-i 39. Procedure Caution: Do NOT exceed 150 psig as indicated on P1-i 38. ADJUST 1 CS-464, HC-i 37 EXCESS LTDN FLOW as necessary to establish excess letdown flow, and not exceed the RD following parameters: 174°F outlet temperature as indicated on TI-i 39. 150 psiq as indicated on P1-i 38. Monitors outlet temp as indicated on TI-i 39 and pressure as RO indicated on P1-138 to not exceed limits. Completes flush. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 39 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: iB Scenario # _. Event # 5 /6 Page 40 of 74 Event
Description:
1CS-li fails closed, relief opens, place Excess LtDn in service. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF excess letdown flow is to be aligned to the VCT, THEN PERFORM the following: VERIFY 1CS-464, HC-137 EXCESS LTDN FLOW is shut RO (potentiometer to zero). (Verifies position as 0) PLACE 1 CS-466, Excess Letdown TO VCT/RCDT, to the VCT position. (Places switch to VCT position) Seal Water Flow should be observed on FR-i 54A and FR 154B when adjusting 1CS-464, HC-137 EXCESS LTDN FLOW for the following reasons: Procedure Note:
- RCP No 1 seal leakoff flow wiN be affected, and
- The possibility exists of lifting the 150 psi safety on the excess letdown/No. 1 seal return line.
. Do NOT exceed 174°F outlet temp as indicated on TI-i 39.
Procedure Caution: Do NOT exceed 150 psig as indicated on P1-i 38. ADJUST 1CS-464, HC-i37 EXCESS LTDN FLOW as necessary to establish excess letdown flow and not exceed the RO following parameters: 174°F outlet temperature as indicated on TI-i 39. 150 psig as indicated on P1-138. Monitors outlet temp as indicated on TI-i 39 and pressure as RO indicated on P1-i 38 to not exceed limits. Informs SRO that Excess Letdown is in service. After Excess Letdown is placed in service cue the Lead Evaluator: Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 7 Event 7 - One Control Rod Drops Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 40 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fi Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 41 of 74 Event
Description:
One Control Rod Drops Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate Trigger 7 Control Rod P6 drops
. ALB-13-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM ROD DEV/SEQ NIS Indications PWR RANGE TILTS Available:
. Multiple Rod Control Alarms ALB-13-4-2, 4-5, 7-4, 8-5 RO Recognizes indications of a dropped control rod Perform AOP-OO1 Immediate Actions.
- CHECK that < TWO control rods are dropped (YES) immediate RO Actions
- Position Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN
- Check Control Bank motion STOPPED (YES)
Enters AOP-OO1, MALFUNCTION OF ROD CONTROL AND AOP-OO1 SRO INDICATION SYSTEM. Makes PA announcement SRO GO TO Section 3.1, Dropped Control Rod Record the time at which the rod dropped SRO Time Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page4lof74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBQ Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 42 of 74 Event
Description:
One Control Rod Drops Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ADJUST ONE of the following to equalize Tavg with Tref: RO/BO P
- Turbine load a Boron concentration CHECK ALL Rod Control Power and Logic Cabinets for normal operation, as follows:
. NO blown fuses a NO other visible malfunctions Sac Contacts AO to investigate Rod Control Power and Logic Cabinets Contacts WCC Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist Acknowledge request to investigate Rod Control Power and Logic Cabinets looking for blown fuses or other Communicator: visible malfunctions.
NOTE: There is no need to provide a report. DETERMINE if the Westinghouse Rod Control System SRO Troubleshooting Guidelines should be initiated. (Priority E Work Request is required) If ALB-13-7-1, ROD CONTROL URGENT ALARM, is alarming
. due to a logic error, resetting the alarm before correcting the Procedure Caution: .
cause could result in dropping rods supplied from the affected power cabinet. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 42 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: JiBQ Scenario # Event # Page 21 Event
Description:
One Control Rod Drops Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK that ALB-13-7-1, ROD CONTROL URGENT ALARM, RO is CLEARED.
- Surveillance requirement 4.1.1.1.1 .a requires performing a shutdown margin calculation upon detecting an inoperable control rod. [C.lj
- a. Within I hour after detecttonof an inoperable control rod(s) ad at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is iprable. If the Inoperable control rod is irmovable or untrippable, the above required SHLJTDQVN HARGIN shall be verifd acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the imovable or untrippable control red(s);
- Technical Specification 3.1 .3.1 Action d.3.d will be limiting it there is any chance that the dropped rod cannot be recovered within 6 hours of event initiation.
This Acfion Statement also requires a power reduction to 75% within two hours of event initiation. TRrqL FTTwER 1cel doctd to lec Lhio or oisa to of RTELl iRt4 POLfR siThfl tto rot hior dod wtbi foilrwsno hours tho Hiqo Noutrjo Fw T 0 Procedure Note: t ouw
- It is acceptable to use incore detectors or ERFIS Point from DRPI (or other methods if developed) to meet 4.1.3.1.1 and the Rod Insertion Limit SRs 4.1.3.5 and 4.1.3.6.
4 11 : The oston pf ph rp maN or rsnod to or thrn ir rrard tit by esyr te indaral ro oomitioi at least eeoc per :2 smurs eacrot durseq tam Sn tOe YYJ pos:icn 1eNatsca sontOr is e, then er ty oe roup posit ions at I east cosce per t hours 5 roperab
- If ALB 13-7-1, ROD CONTROL URGENT ALARM, is causing multiple control rods to be inoperable, Tech Spec 3.1.3.1 Action c is applicable.
d;h rrnrg than cre rod naperable. due to a rod cntrl drmpt Nor irr or tvou e1omtrael prohlsc *o tite rod Nriroi syst.cni existirl9 for qrreter then 6 hor, be in NOl S1$NUFf thIrs the loNuwing hours. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page43of74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NB Scenario # Event # Page 44 t Z4 Event
Description:
One Control Rod Drops Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior REVIEW the following Technical Specifications:
- 3.1.1.1, Boration Control Shutdown Margin Modes 1 & 2
- 3.1.3.1, Movable Control Assemblies Group Height SRO
- 3.1.3.5, Shutdown Rod Insertion Limit
*3.1.3.6, Control Rod Insertion Limits
- 3.2.1, Axial Flux Difference
- 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio NOTIFY the following:
SRO
- Manager Operations
- Reactor Engineering Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 44 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NEQ Scenario # ._ Event # Page 4 t Z4 Event
Description:
One Control Rod Drops Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledge any calls from the SRO concerning the dropped Communicator: control rod. RO CHECK Reactor Power AT OR ABOVE P-1O (10%). (YES) CHECK ALL negative rate trip alarms at the NlS cabinets RO CLEARED. (NO) Perform RNO Actions Turns over At the Controls to BOP RESET the negative rate trip alarm at the NIS cabinets. BOP (Resets negative rate trip on Nl-41 at the NIS cabinet)
. Annunciator ALB-13-4-2 clears After the negative rate trip is reset and the BOP returns to the At The Controls position cue Simulator Operator to Lead Evaluator:
insert Trigger 8 Event 8 Second rod drop requiring manual Reactor Trip Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 45 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NB Scenario # Event # 8 Page 46 of 74 Event
Description:
Second Control rod drops I manual Rx Trip required Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- On cue from Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 8 Simulator Operator:
Second Dropped Control Rod
. . . . ALB-0i3-7-3, TWO OR MORE RODS AT BOTTOM Indications Available
. ALB-013-7-4, ONE ROD AT BOTTOM RO Recognizes indications of Dropped Rod
,.. Enters AOP-OOi, MALFUNCTION OF ROD CONTROL AND AOP-OOi SR INDICATION SYSTEM.
Immediate RO CHECK that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped (NO) Immediate TRIP the Reactor AND GO TO EOP PATH-i. Action RO Actuates manual Reactor Trip Enters PATH-i PATH-i SRO Makes PA announcement for EOP entry Immediate EOP PATH-i Immediate Actions Action RO
- Verify Reactor Trip: (YES)
Immediate BOP
- Verify Turbine Trip: (YES)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 46 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No: f Scenario # Event # Page 47 of 74 Event
Description:
Second Control rod drops I manual Rx Trip required Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses:
Immediate Action BOP o Check AC emergency buses 1A-SA AND 1 B-SB ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER OR EDGs (YES) Check SI Actuation:
. Any status lights lit: (NO)
Immediate RO . Check SI atuation criteria: (NO) Action
- SI actuation required: (NO)
SRO GO TO EPP-004 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 47 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: tiQ Scenario # _. Event # Page 4 t Z4 Event
Description:
Second Control rod drops / manual Rx Trip required Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Prior to Event 9 allow crew a few minutes to stabilize the plant and work through several steps of EPP-004 then Evaluator Note: introduce Event 9. Event 9 is a SG Steam Line Break inside Containment ramped in over 9 minutes. EPP-004 SRO EPP-004, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE SRO Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required. Evaluate EAL Network Usina Entry Point X Check RCS Temperature: Check SQ blowdown isolation valves SHUT (YES) SQ (MLB-1A-SA) (MLB-1 B-SB) BOP A 1BD-11 1BD-1 B 1 BD-30 1 BD-20 C 1 BD-49 1 BD-39 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 48 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: iiEiQ Scenario # Event # _j Page 49 of 74 Event
Description:
Second Control rod drops I manual Rx Trip required Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1 TABLK 1 ECS EPEHATURE CONUOL CUTHELflES ROLLOWING HA rRIP o Cuidaice in plirable until anoehet procedure directs ethine, 0 no RCPn flj use wide reng cold le tempeature PCS ilb4PERATURE TREND LESS THAN CREATER THAN STARLE AT OR St7E AND 2R AND TRENDINC TO DECREASING iNCREASING a Stop donpia a j conder set o Control feed etene available flaw and areas BOP o Control feed iEM taunter Juup to areas duap to eetabltsh and flow STEM PRESSURE aiurain RCS aode using taspe tore o t4eintain total OPl2d hetwen 5F feed flow Section 53 AND t5E OPERATOR greater than AND duap steas ACTION 210 TEPII to condenser until level greater than OR 2Tt. at Iceet one tutact o Duarp areas SO usiu intact SC PaRVe o j cooldowu coutirrnee o Control feed iilM shtt flow to AND intain SC bYPASS valves levels After the BOP has adjusted the AFW flows to control RCS temperature then cue the Simulator Operator to insert Lead Evaluator: Trigger 9 Event 9 Steam Line Break Inside Containment Check Feed System Status:
- a. RCS Temperature LESS THAN 564°F (YES)
BOP b. Verify feed reg valves SHUT (YES)
- c. Check feed flow to SGs > 210 KPPH (YES)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 49 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fiE Scenario # 2 Event # 9 I 10 / 11 Page t Z4 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Event 9, A SG Main Steam Line Break inside CNMT, ramped in over 9 minutes. The crew should identify the leak and initiate a manual Safety Injection. The SRO may also direct a manual Steam Line Isolation. The SRO should transition back to PATH-i. The crew should diagnose that there is NOT a LOCA in progress and transition from PATH-i to EPP-014, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
. When Containment pressure exceeds 10 psig a Phase B will cause the CNMT Spray pumps to auto Evaluator Note: start.
o A Containment Spray Pump starts and immediately trips. o B Containment Spray pump will fail to auto start and associated valves will NOT auto align. The pump and valves can be manually started and aligned.
. Main Steam Isolation occurs, but the MSIV on A SG does not close and remains open for the remainder of the scenario.
When directed by the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 9 Simulator Operator: . Steamline Break Inside Containment
. ALB-028-5-1 CONTAINMENT AIR HIGH VACUUM will unexpectedly clear (in due to earlier ESW Pump start)
. ALB-028-8-5 COMPUTER ALARM VENTILATION Indications Available:
SYSTEM
. Rising pressure in containment
. Rising temperature in containment
. Increased SG steam flow Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 50 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: !iHQ Scenario # _. Event # 9/10 / 11 Page 51 of 74 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Identifies an ESF actuation setpoint will be exceeded (RCS low Pressure < 1850 psig) and EPP-004 foldout for SI Actuation RO Criteria will be met: PZR Level Can Not be maintained > 5% Informs SRO and then actuates a Manual Safety Injection SRO When SI is initiated, transition back to PATH 1 PATH-i SRO Steps through immediate actions with crew RO Verifies Reactor is Tripped (YES) BOP Verifies Turbine is Tripped (YES) BOP Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses (YES) RO Check SI Actuation (YES) Perform The Following: SRO
- Initiate monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees.
.__Evaluate_EAL_Matrix.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 51 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NB Scenario # 2 Event # 9 / 10 I 1 1 Page 2 ct 74 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Foldout A Applies: Assigns RO and BOP Foldout A tasks FOLDOUT A
. RCP TRIP CRITERIA W both of the Iow occur, fl4 stop a RCPa St flow GREATER ThAN 200 GPtt
. RCS pressure LESS TItAN 1400 PSIG
. AFW SUPPLY SWIICIfOVER CRITERIA IF CST level decreases to less then 10% THEN swdcti the AFW water supply to ffi ESW system uemq OPr1ET, AUXf1IARYTEE0WATER SYS1EM, Section El.
RH5IARLCR S RO F RCS pressure decreases to less than 2l0 PSIG n an uncontroted nanner, i4 restart RHR pumps to supply water to the RCS
. ALTERNATE MINWLOW OPENISHUT CRITERIA
- W RCS pressure decreases to less than 1800 PSIG, verify artemate rnfmflow sotalion OR miniflow tock valves SHUT
. IFRCS pressure increases to greater than 2200 PSIG. ThEN verify alternate miniflow solation AND rninrftow block valves OPEN
. RUPTURED SG AFW iSOLATION CRITERIA If all of the fotiowing occur to any SG, IlfENstop feed flow by sbotftn9 the isolation v&es (prelerred) OR flow control valves to that SG:
. Any SG level increases si uncontrolled manner OR has abnormal secondafy radiation
. Narrow range level GREATER ThAN 25% 140%)
RO . Verify All CSIPs AND RHR pumps - RUNNING (YES)
- Check SI Flow:
RO o SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES) o RCS pressure > 230 PSIG (YES) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 52 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nfl Scenario # ....._ Event # 9 I 10 I 11 Page 74 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. Check Main Steam Isolation:
o Main Steam Isolation ACTUATED (NO)
- MSL Isolation Required (YES)
- Actuation fails Critical
- SHUTS all MSIVs BOP Task
- Identifies A MSIV will not shut o Verify all MSIVs and bypass valves SHUT (NO A MSIV remains OPEN) (Critical to shut B and C MSIV prior to all MSIVs pressure decreasing to 100 psig)
CREW Identifies Containment Adverse Conditions Check CNMT Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG (Maybe NO time dependent due to the size of the steam RO break pressure will exceed 10 psig. This is a continuous action step. When pressure exceeds 10 psig then the next step applies.) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page53of74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NB Scenario # Event # 9 I 10 I 11 Page 4 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: Crew may set an early manual actuation setpoint and manually align spray prior to an auto actuation set point being reached. Verify Containment Spray actuated (NO failed)-
. Attempts manual actuation with switches (NO) o Starts A CS pump (immediately trips on Critical Overcurrent) Reports to SRO RO o Starts 8 CS pump and opens CT-88 Task (discharge) and CT-i 1 (spray additive tank)
(Critical Task to start one Containment Spray pump and align the discharge valve prior to Containment pressure exceeding 35 psig not critical to align CT-il a LOCA is NOT in progress) STOP ALL RCPs (Secures all 3 RCPs)
- Check AFW Status:
BOP o AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE (YES) Verify Sequencer Operations AND Alignment Of Components:
. Check sequencer manual loading permissive (LB-9)
ACTUATED (YES) BOP
- Energize AC buses 1 Al AND 1 Bi.
(shuts breakers for 1 Al and 1 Bi)
- Verify alignment of components from actuation of ESFAS Signals using Attachment 6, Safeguards Actuation Verification,_while_continuing_with_this_procedure.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 54 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: £tBQ Scenario # Event # 9 I 10 I 11 Page Z4 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When contacted to place A/B air compressors in Local Control mode, run CAEP :\air\ACs_to_locaLtxt. When CAEP is complete, report that the air compressors are running in local control mode. Communicator: When contacted to Unlock and Turn ON the breakers for the CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves, run CAEP
- \cvc\path-1 att 6 csip suction valves power.txt. When the CAEP is complete, report completion to the MCR.
- Control RCS Temperature:
o Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559° F using Table 1. IAEII I CS T!HPENATURE CONTROL OUDELINES HOLLOWING RE TRIP o Guidance is aplieab1e until auothr procedure directs otherwise. o no RCPs running flf ue lde range cold leg teeature. RCS TENPERATURE TRZii) LESS lEAN GREATER ThAN STABLE AT OR 557 AND S.B AND tRENDING TO DECREAS:NG INCREASING o Stop dupin o cendeuser o Control feed RO/BOP steam evailable flow and stern lili transfer Owap to o Gontrol feed etea dunp to establish end flow STJtAN PRESSURE naintain RCS rode using terperatura a intair total OPl2, between 555F feed flow Section 5.3 AND 559F OPERATOR greater than AND dwsp tea ACTION 210 KPPE to ccndeuer until leval greater than OR 1 25% (Q%] j at Ieat one o Dunp stee on fntrct SC using Intact z SC PORia o j cooldown continues. o Control fed shut floe o 11SiV AND raintain SC BYPASS valves levels Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 55 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBQ Scenario # _. Event # 9 I 10 / 11 Page 56 of 74 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If PRZ pressure is below 2260 PSIG AND increasing, PAZ spray valves may be OPEN due to controller demand. (With the Procedure Note: spray valve controllers and master PRZ pressure controller in AUTOMATIC, this response is the result of the PRZ master controller being a proportional-integral controller.) Check PAZ PORVs AND Spray Valves: o Check PAZ PORVs SHUT (YES) RO o Check block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES) o PAZ spray valves SHUT (YES) Identify Any Faulted SG:
. Check for any of the following:
RO/BOP o Any SG with uncontrolled depressurization (YES A SG) o Any SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO) GO TO EPP-014, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR SRO ISOLATION, Step 1 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 56 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBQ Scenario # ._. Event # 9 I 10 / 11 Page 57 of 74 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EPP-014 SRO EPP-014, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION
. At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.
Procedure Caution:
- Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.
SRO Step 1 - Implement FRPs As Required. IF the B CNMT Spray pump is NOT started prior to CNMT Pressure reaching 10 psig an ORANGE PATH condition will exist. IF the crew successfully starts the B CNMT Spray pump they do NOT need to implement FRP-J.1, Response to High Containment Pressure. Based on the Users Guide section 5.2.3 FRP implementation is not required if the condition of the associated Status Tree exists momentarily, clears and is Evaluator Note: improving in response to EOP instructions in effect or actuation of safeguards equipment. IF the crew implements FRP-J.1 they will remain in the FRP until step 1 1 then return to procedure and step in effect (EPP-014). IF the crew implements FRP-J.1 then follow the steps in this guide on next page or skip the FRP-J.1 section and continue with the EPP-014 action section. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 57 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NEQ Scenario # Event # 9 I 10 / 11 Page of 74 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior FRP-J. 1 SRO FRP-J.i, Response To High Containment Pressure BOP Check Phase A Isolation Valves SHUT - BOP Verify CNMT Ventilation Isolation Valves SHUT-Check If CNMT Spray Is Required (YES)
- a. Check CNMT pressure HAS INCREASED TO> 10 PSIG
- b. Check EPP-012 IN EFFECT (NO) GO TO Step e
- e. Verify CNMT spray pumps RUNNING (YES B only)
- f. Verify CNMT spray system valves aligned for injection:
RO
- Verify the following valves OPEN o 1 CT-26 (N/A) o 1 CT-7i (Already Open) o 1 CT-50 (N/A) o 1 CT-88 (should have been opened) o 1 CT-i 1 (should have been opened) o 1CT-12(N/A)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 58 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NEQ Scenario # Event # 9 I 10 I 11 Page of 74 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
- g. Verify Phase B isolation valves SHUT
. 1 CC-207 (YES) e 1 CC-208 (YES) o 1 CC-297 (YES)
RO
. 1 CC-299 (YES)
. 1 CC-249 (YES)
. 1 CC-251 (YES)
- h. Stop all RCPs (ALL OFF)
Verify CNMT Fan Coolers ONE FAN PER UNIT RUNNING IN SLOW SPEED (YES) Check MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:
- a. Verify all MSIVs SHUT (NO A MSIV OPEN)
. Perform the following:
BOP 1) Locally shut instrument air supply to RAB 261: llA-814
- 2) Locally remove cap AND open drain valve:
llA-1 876
- b. Verify all MSIV bypass valves SHUT (YES)
Dispatches RAB AO to locally shut IA and drain header Acknowledge request to isolate IA and drain header Communicator: NOTE: Do not perform any actions on the Simulator Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 59 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: tiB Scenario # Event # 9 I 10 I 11 Page t 14 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray P Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
. At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS Procedure Caution:
cooldown. Check if Feed Flow Should Be Isolated To Any SG:
- a. Any SG pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)
- b. Check for any of the following:
o Any SG pressure Decreasing in an BOP uncontrolled manner (YES) o Any SG Completely depressurized (NO) o Isolate feed flow to faulted SGs:
. MFW (Verifies shut)
. AFW (Verifies shut OR shuts)
Check CNMT Spray Pump Status
- a. Check CNMT spray pumps BOTH RUNNING RO (NO) GO TO STEP c
- c. Check CNMT spray pumps ONE RUNNING (YES)
Check ESW Booster Pump Status:
- a. Check all of the following:
- b. ESW booster pump A SA Running (YES)
RO
- Orifice bypass isol valve 1 Sw-i i 6 SHUT (YES)
- c. Check all of the following:
- ESW booster pump B-SB - Running (YES)
- Orifice bypass isol valve 1 SW-i 18 SHUT (YES)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page6Oof74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fiEQ Scenario # _ Event # 9 / 10 / 11 Page J. i 14 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The Containment Status Tree may continue to display a non-satisfied condition after completion of the procedure. Procedure Note: If this is the case, the appropriate Function Restoration Procedure does not need to be implemented again since all necessary actions have already been performed. SRO RETURN TO Procedure and Step n Effect. EPP-014 SRO EPP-014 (Continued)
- Step 2 Check MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:
o Verify all MSIVs SHUT (NO)
- MSIV A 1 MS-80 (NO)
- MSIV B 1 MS-82
- MSIV C 1 MS-84 Direct RAB AO BOP/RO o Locally shut instrument air supply to RAB 261: 1 IA-814 (north of AH-19 1A-SA) o Locally remove cap AND open drain valve: 1 lA-i 876 (located in corridor outside VCT valve gallery)
- Verify all MSIV bypass valves SHUT (YES) o MSIVA 1 MS-81 o MSIV B 1 MS-83 o MSIV C 1 MS-85 Acknowledge request to locally shut IA-814 and remove cap Communicator: and open drain valve llA-1876.
DO NOT PERFORM THESE ACTIONS ON THE SIMULATOR Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 61 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ti Scenario # Event # 9 / 10 / 11 Page Z i Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray P Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Step 3 Check Any SG NOT Faulted: BOP/RO
. Any SG pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)
Identify Any Faulted SG:
. Check for any of the following:
BOP/RO o Any SG pressure DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES A SG) o Any SG - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO) Isolate Faulted SG(s): o Verify faulted SG(s) PORV SHUT (YES) o Verify main FW isolation valves SHUT (YES) o Verify MDAFW AND TDAFW pump isolation valves to faulted SG(s) SHUT
. MDAFW 1 AF-55 SB (YES)
BOP/RO . TDAFW 1 AF-1 37 SA (YES) o Shut faulted SG(s) steam supply valve to TDAFW pump SHUT (N/A Stm Supply is not from A SG) o Verity MS drain isolation(s) before MSIVs - SHUT:
- SG A: 1 MS-231 (YES) o Verify SG blowdown isolation valves SHUT (YES) o Verify main steam analyzer isolation valves SHUT (YES)
BOP/RO Check CST Level - GREATER THAN 10% (YES) A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out Procedure Note: following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 62 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NE Scenario # Event # 9 I 10 / 11 Page 63 of 74 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray P Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check Secondary Radiation:
. Check for all of the following:
BOP/RO o SG blowdown radiation NORMAL o Main steamline radiation - NORMAL Check SG Levels: BOP/RO . Any level INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO) Check If SI Has Been Terminated: Check for all of the following:
. Check BIT outlet valves SHUT OR ISOLATED (NO) o 1SI-3 o 1SI-4 BOP/RO
. Check cold leg AND hot leg injection valves SHUT o 1SI-52 o lSl-86 o 1SI-107 RNO GO TO STEP 12 Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 63 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: iiB. Scenario # Event # 9 I 10 I 11 Page 64 of 74 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT SiDray P Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check SI Termination Criteria:
- Check Subcooling GREATER THAN 10°F [40°F] C 20°F [50°F] M (YES)
(Note the C and M above refers to how subcooling is calculated. C is by the Computer, M is Manual)
. Check secondary heat sink by observing any of the BOP/RO following:
o Level in at least one intact SG GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (YES) o Total feed flow to SGs - GREATER THAN 210 KPPH (YES)
. RCS pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)
. PRZ level - GREATER THAN 10% [30%] (YES)
Reset SI. RO . Takes SI reset switches to RESET and verifies SI activated light is off Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of CREW Offsite Power. (Refer to PATH-i GUIDE, Attachment 2.) Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals. RO (RESETS BOTH Phase A and Phase B) Reports to SRO reset complete Establish Instrument Air AND Nitrogen To CNMT: o Open the following valves: RO
- 1IA-819 (OPENS valve)
- 1 SI-287(OPENS valve)
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 64 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NHQ Scenario # Event # 9/ 10 / 11 Page j 74 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pp Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Stop All But One CSIP. RO
- Secures 1 CSIP RO Check RCS Pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)
Isolate High Head SI Flow: Check CSIP suction ALIGNED TO RWST (YES) Open normal minif low isolation valves
. 1CS-182(OPENS)
. 1CS-196(OPENS)
- 1CS-210 (OPENS)
. 1CS-214 (OPENS)
RO Shut BIT outlet valves:
. 1 SI-3 (SHUTS)
. 1SI-4(SHUTS)
Verify cold leg AND hot leg injection vlvs SHUT (YES)
. 1 Sl-52 (YES)
- 1SI-86 (YES)
. 1SI-107(YES)
Procedure Caution: High head SI flow should be isolated before continuing. Establish Charging Lineup:
- a. Shut charging flow control valve o FK-122.1 (takes to manual and SHUTS)
- b. Open charging line isolation valves:
o 1CS-235 (OPENS) o 1CS-238 (OPENS) Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 65 of 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N Scenario # Event # 9! 10! 11 Page 66 of 74 Event
Description:
MS Line Break in CNMT, CNMT Spray Pr Start failure, A MSIV failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Procedure Note: RCS temperature must be stabilized to allow evaluation of PRZ level trend. When 1 RCS cold leg is stable the crew can consider that RCS Evaluator Note: temperature is stable. Monitor RCS HL Temperature STABLE (YES / maybe NO time dependent) RO IF NO then: Manually dump steam and control feed flow to stabilize RCS temperature while continuing with procedure. Charging flow should NOT exceed 150 GPM to prevent Procedure Caution: damage to the regenerative heat exchanger. Control Charging Flow To Maintain PRZ Level:
- a. Control charging using charging flow control valve RO FK-1 22.1
- b. Maintain charging flow < 150 gpm
- c. PRZ Level Can be maintained stable or increasing (YES)
EPP-008 SRO GO TO EPP-008, SI TERMINATION, Step 1. Terminate the scenario when the crew transitions to EPP-008. Lead Evaluator: Announce Crew Update End of Evaluation Have crew remain in the Simulator without discussing the exam. Examiners will formulate any follow-up questions. [ Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner place the Simulator in FREEZE. Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 66 of 74
I a) a) 0 I a) 01 a) t UI a) 4 E Lii I-0 ci a a) N di ra 0 o Ci N a) r bi)
- a) 4-.
0 t4 6u C) a) 4, H t a, 0 E i. g 4!i 0 a) (-I l I-).) u rS rJ tli -I 0 rJ z Li, I Cu I
- 2. Pr d4r,I Steps NOTh: verever n A Tr t oorroonel is re-fered o in cf th is B ar r rterpit w 1i.rie:ia:e1y ollcw nsco :
NOTE: 3R -OC142 as eu.aed ano eIe-ed that ng-em :re :f t-e ac -ciu 93 -II- r ree bll j Cl t h r wem. Ihe rxt twc steo i-il igr e NS A-i
..ni:s cwever, f is ed :c Iran:irL e 1S $tcn es :hert eps I &1 11 ISO LAtE the upy nd eurn ict o the NdS A.H i.rnrs from th tra n
- a w- not be placed ri erce b dub- she follodng w&s:
B £ DtLEC WATER FRGM NESSR FAN LR [SQL I3A CH17 Sj Z-flLED WATER FROM NSSR AN LRS SQL SA C14 C) iLE WATER O %ESR FANS CR SaL 1 iLLD AT c ss FArI CLiS
- 2. ALIGN ke s*ly erd -sw s:o t-e NNS AH sIs sscciaed h Lf 3t serice y çg Ihe C!4-1c UEATER FROM NSSR FAN LRS O1 3A C417 *D4LLE tATER FROM NESR AN C.LRS 30L SA :CR-14 3: LLD MTEq O SS FANS t Cd4S3 C-M4SSAi OLLED WATER O %ES2R FAN CLPS SQL Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page68of74
1 .3 Procduri Steps NOTE e i ci r w wiL Icçk n nraI.y .et a: :h WC-:c1rc piI. 3, STARr iC ?A i; ChiiEe wer 4
- h edgaerfoig,
- 4. At the Lri vrc! pa, RESET lh Lcw CiUed Water cw aLr the CN LL WAThR \O FLOW TRIP O CAC RST F rt ch1! r the ?r1t tii £allewing traean:e ere th
,hi 4f 04 cW04 J!Idf Ierirce, THEN PERFORM the o[cwirg:
caLy START the o c he 1A3A -5 ciirpror ty akirig the ccco eu the !c: pare1 ire MAN posci.
. RUN ro rr 5 ni.te.
STOP :he 04 pump ASA -i8 esc
- aking te csc: tc or the c:aL penel o ire AUTO pcst rt
- 5. Al tre Crrc Par eL CHECK at I aim ighe are LOT t
- 7. Wy rm i.
THEN PERFORM the olwirg:
. IF :he Lcci S&e: wt:h s in :e LOCAL psitn, THEN cay CEPRESS ire EDP ust-btcrL
. IF the Lcc Seie evuh s in the MCa hVAC P4EN poe he tA-S A cr presot cmr oh i AEP-l ISTOP, IF ry aari ght e .
TH?4 PRFOM th IIwn OECLARE th i, r nopee ITIATE corrctv at.on& Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 69 of 74
0) j 6 5 a) I
- i; F n
Tj>
ç d
t t C i g n
;H V
N C a) 0 . qC C N 4I ci) bO I 0 1 p *i m 5 j: jq
- 4 *j)C a) 0 14 j C ci) hA Lt U
. w 4: z rJ I W w C U, Q
5.2. Placng Standby Train In Operation NOTE: ft a necessary to ahit ocatea raina of IVAC units when sifting trains of Essena 2e ices Ched Waler. NOTE: s Secton written for swapp cm ain B ESCW to Tran A EECW. eh omonents for si.aping frcr. Train A ESCW o in 3 ESCW in parentheses. 5.2.t Initial Conditions
- t. Scribe water s being suppled the non-cerating chiller WO-2 1AS.A WC2 1 3SBi.
- 2. One train of ESCW s alreay in operaton.
- 3. Fe: ne erneec starts the prestsrt zecks of Atachment 5 aie been erforrn ed and an operate! should be peset to ebsee start of chi!!e.
- 4. ecder 2.12, Mawal C 10cr Reset performed inee5sarj for on-cperatn di er.
- 5. The LO. heaters have bees i service for &e hcus.. See Precauton and Liirltaiicn 4O3 for appicai1itof this niial Ccrtditon) 5.21. Procedural Steps NOTE: ke a: alarn indcaion brow chilled water aw and cw chil ed water ten1peratre wiL leek in uni r nuaLy reset at the WC-2 ccn.tr& panel.
NOTE: If starting the chiller corrpressor s delayec follcwing the star: of the P4 Purrp in the ne:t Steps ire compressor oil Id ccc down to the p&nt that the corrpressorwLi trip on Iow c pressure.
. At AEP-1. START the non-operatg Ohi er WC2 .A-SA B-SBt Chilled Water Pump P4 A-.SA 3-SB}to esabllsh chilled water flow : the tan-cperatng tra ri.
- 2. At the Local Ocmrc panel. RESET the Low Chilled Water Flew alarm sing the CHILLED WATER NO FDW TRIP ND CATION RESET us-butcr.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 71 of 74
5.2.2 Procedural Steps ntnued
.3. IF strtrg the chiller or the irt f-ne f.olloving rr ain:enane vhere the
.er.be ol a:erci:utwa under clearance, THEN PERFORM the ftlIcwin
- a. cally START the c. puii c the ancy ciller crri:ressc b
- aking te ccrro sv ch the oaI panei :o te MA ptci.
.. RUN pric br 5 iindes, STOP the stii dby chiVer compressor il crrp cy ta the onuI wit:h on tre ocat oanel to the AUTO position.
4 te LoaI Cornrc PaneL CHECK that .O alarm ighs ae IOT L
- 5. IF , c,. Iignis is. lit, THEN PERFORM the ollcwing
- a. IF :he Lcc S&e vitch is n the LQrAL positn, THEN ca y DEPRESS te DP sPbu:tcn.
. IF the Lcc S&e.2t wiIh is n the MOB hVAO :stci ThEN c4ace the siancby chifler corvpressor :cmrc q AEPt 3OP.
IF any alarm Iigh sii1 ii. THEN PERFORM the ollcwing:
) DECLARE the di icr roperable.
- 2 INITIATE correotve actcrs.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page72of74
5,2 2 Produr SL io:ct n NQT: :)PT-ii2 ro: Tptw :rQ PinE p tr1rc ç Ewtce& Wh e O-i2 rstc th? Dotct rirretar o rigai p lion.
- t U pctoretr have oha uffcnt Ic ruwe a arni 1peratre adjtrn.t pr S:on i4 c4 i Th wl b. d rnin by ortorrg trirature tar in START the c er ty pe-ftrrm O4E c the llrwirg:
- a. At A?-. PLACE Viaei C er Dorc es C2 A-GA ich t RT AN RELEASE OEPRESS SART p uttc t ca1 ct anI wh th .lcoa sw the LOCAL psiLo.
- 7. PLACE ad iona safety ebed air ar2d ers n seriice pcr :o sw coter rrta cfrr.
NOTE E3 n td dtlnifrd ih Iem wie uri4y aid otun aies : te NS AH w-ts i not af1ec cab1 af the Stce h .t ien. Th .i n M45 nis hcweer f it is css :c rnaina te NNS cat:n 1 a es Ehjt :hei an ty b ppd. 3 ISOLATE h% ppy ar c h NN5 hr th that as airescy caL- y shurtrg the l: zwrg aes: CH1 SB CH-l25 SB) CHiLLED WATER FFcJhI E3R FAN LS SOL C17 A CHf A) Z LLt AAR FROM NSS CH15 M HLLEC WT C SR FANS OLR 1301
- Crf-14 SA iCH-ld S3*i CiiLLEC AE9 C \ESS FAN LRS SCL Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 73 of 74
52.2 Prcecfir1 S:ep ortued ALII3N \NS H iir :rn ta will rrain :pt b op- rg TR FROM NESSR FN LS SOL. tc ;M FçM FAN RS SQL. A !? [JD PATER O SSSP FANS DIR ISDL CH+/-ED WATER O E3SR FAN DL3 SCL L IF hi h er uipr stdbysty equ trn TNE. PERFORM Atiadvnem NOTE er ; ; r ;cerr iO r4 .ife ciiIr has Dpç, SW FRCM WC2 B-Se :4SA Cr4DE4SER lSW-SZ6 SB 1Si-.1C5 SA:.
- 1. StOP !h illt b t ASPi. PLACE Cr Cres; WC E fl!YC 3fl 10 SCP d0L ease.
OR
, DEPRESS 5TO p.sh-ytton heiI ;ineI *ih te sIecs1th n th .OAL p4iion.
, 41 AEP, $TQP
- C BE SA CP*Q W* Pp P4 S-SB iA-SA n ie train ust .eawedi.
Harris 2012 NRC Scenario 4 Rev. 1 Page 74 of 74}}