ML12115A136

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Enclosure 1 to ULNRC-05855, Response to NRC Request for Information 10 CFR 50.55a Request for Proposed Alternative to ASME on Code Replacement Interval for Main Steam Isolation Valve Actuator Rupture Disks
ML12115A136
Person / Time
Site: Callaway Ameren icon.png
Issue date: 04/19/2012
From:
Ameren Missouri, Union Electric Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML121150347 List:
References
ULNRC-05855
Download: ML12115A136 (22)
v • d • e


Text

Enclosure 1 to ULNRC-05855 ABHV0011V15A s&

NOTE 11 ABHV0011 NOTES:

1. UPC... upper piston chamber LPC...

I ower pi stan chamber

2. ABHV0011V13A, ABHV0011V15A, ABHV0011V13B, and ABHV0011V15B normally energized
3. ABHV0011 V13C ond ABHV0011 V15C norma I I y de-energized
4. ABHV0011V13A. B. & C el. power supply train A
5. ABHV0011V15A. B. & C el. power supply train B
6. Nitrogen
7. Nitrogen connection is 1/2 11 quick connect
8. F I ex i b I e hose connected on I y when system pressure is not sufficient to open va I ve
9. This drawing shows nuni:Jer i ng scheme for ABHV0011, and is generic to ABHV0014, ABHV0017, and ABHV0020.
10. Rupture disc component nos. for ABHV0014. ABHV0017. and ABHV0020 are ABPSE0002. ABPSE0003 and ABPSE0004, respective I y.
11. Lines noted are within the actuator body and are not pipe/tubing runs.

TO DRAIN NOTE 1 0 ABHV0011V7 MSIV PPS - Actuator Proj. Ca I I away

((JAL, O+-ll404 1/inhrthcr REV.

DATE 0

060407 DAAWNCHKO.

APPO.

RLW EWM TWS INITIAL ISSUE PER MP 00-10098 REV.

DATE 1

OS1810 OAAWNCHKO.

APPD.

MAL TJC TWS INCORP.

CAR 201003741 AS-BUILT System rned i urn operated actuator for quick c I os i ng va I ve I ayout diagram NG NORMAL OPERATION I keep open I to ULNRC-05855 MVZ 8

sys em medium pressure pressureless( a* age pressure)

Au *,cry medium UPC... upper p* to chamber l PC... lower pis o c mber MVI-4 nOI'ma energized MVS+MV6 normollyde-energ* ed MVHMV3 el. powe supp.'y t ai I MV2+MV4 el. powe supply tro:n 2 t-plug con eel ion for aux. medium I_

to ULNRC-05855 MVZ system medium Pfessure Pfessureless(cta* age pressure)

C Auxifrary med. m MY l-4 de-energized V5+MV6 de*energized

[ -

plug cannec ion toe aux. rneo1 m de-energizecr energized System medium operated actuator for quick closi g valve

~------1 Layout d11gram Callaway s*""

  • CLOSING I (keep closed short lime 0 A3 103.224.185 2*8 b

to ULNRC-05855 system mecr m press e pressureless( drainage pressure Aux}iary me<f m MV l-4 de-energized MV5+MV6 energrzed plug connec ion or aux. mea* m de-energized energ* ed System medium operated actuator

.,_P_P_s_. A-ctu

- at_or _

_, for quick closing valve Layout d agram Callaway 3-8 b

to ULNRC-05855 Component Function Failure Modes Failure Causes Failure Effects Failure Detection Comments The rupture disk has been fatigued Minor amounts of steam will The temperature at the Rupture disk is leaking and is cracking along the edges due be leaking into the equipment drain outlet can be taken to drain. The disk may rupture ensure integrity is to cycling.

at lower pressure.

maintained.

Modes 1, 2, and 3 - For main steam isolation signal generated by low The temperature of the steam lines pressure, high steam line The rupture disk has been degraded negative pressure rate, or High-2 Rupture disk bursts at lower after being exposed to high Upon Main Steam Isolation leakage through the leak off Signal, the MSIV closes faster lines can be monitored. The containment pressure, MSIVs close pressure temperat~res and differential than required.

disc can be tested after it is and rupture disk is credited to burst.

pressure (90% of burst pressure).

removed.

Rupture disk bursts at higher Temperatures during the accident The valve may fail to close if scenario are lower than the design Not Applicable.

pressure temperatures.

the disc is not ruptured.

ABPSE0001, ABPSE0002, ABPSE0003, ABPSE0004 (1" The rupture disk has been fatigued Minor amounts of steam will The temperature at the Rupture Disks) be leaking into the equipment drain outlet can be taken to Rupture disk is leaking and is cracking along the edges due drain. The disk may rupture ensure integrity is to cycling.

at lower pressure.

maintained.

Modes 1, 2, and ? - For loss of The temperature of the actuation power, the MSIVs fail The rupture disk has been degraded closed and rupture disk is credited to Rupture disk bursts at lower after being exposed to high Upon Main Steam Isolation leakage through the leak off Signal, the MSIV closes faster lines can be monitored. The burst.

pressure temperatures and differential than required.

disc can be tested after it is pressure (90% of burst pressure).

removed.

Rupture disk bursts at higher Temperatures during the accident The valve may fail to close if scenario are lower than the design Not Applicable.

pressure temperatures.

the disc is not ruptured.

Modes 1, 2, and 3-For loss of control None. The rupture is not signal, the MSIVs fail as is and rupture Not Applicable.

Not Applicable.

Not Applicable.

disk has no function.

required to function.

to ULNRC-05855 to ULNRC-05855

~'t

--wAmeren MISSOURI MSM-ZZ-QV004 Callaway Energy Center RUPTURE DISC REPLACEMENT FOR FWIV AND MSIV MINOR Revision 002 Page 1 of 11 REFERENCE USE to ULNRC-05855 MSM-ZZ-QV004 Rev. 002 RUPTURE DISC REPLACEMENT FOR FWIV AND MSIV TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Number 1.0 PURPOSE...................................................................................................................................... 3 2.0 SCOPE........................................................................................................................................... 3 3.0 ACCEPTANCE I FUNCTIONAL CRITERIA..........**............**.............................................*.... 3 4.0 RESPONSffiiLITIES..........................................................................................................**........ 3 5.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.....*................................*.**........*.*.................................. 3 6.0 PREREQUISITES......................................................................................................................... 4 7.0 PROCEDURE INSTRUCTIONS................................................................................................. 5 8.0 RESTORATION......................................................................................................................... 10

9.0 REFERENCES

............................................................................................................................ 10 9.1.

Implementing..................................................................................................................... 10 9.2.

Developmental................................................................................................................... 10 9.3.

Operating Experience......................................................................................................... lO 10.0 RECORDS................................................................................................................................... 11 11.0 DEFINITIONS............................................................................................**.............................. 11 12.0

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES....................................................................................................... 11 Page 2 of 11 REFERENCE USE to ULNRC-05855 MSM-ZZ-QV004 Rev. 002 RUPTURE DISC REPLACEMENT FOR FWIV AND MSIV 1.0 PURPOSE Provides information to replace the rupture disc on the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) and Feedwater isolation Valves (FWIV).

2.0 SCOPE This procedure affects the following components:

Component Director ID Location Description ABPSEOOOl ABPSEOOOl AB-2042-RM1508 RUPTURE DISC FOR ABHVOOll ABPSE0002 ABPSE0002 AB-2042-RM1508 RUPTURE DISC FOR ABHV0014 ABPSE0003 ABPSE0003 AB-2042-RM1509 RUPTURE DISC FOR ABHV0017 ABPSE0004 ABPSE0004 AB-2042-RM1509 RUPTURE DISC FOR ABHV0020 AEPSEOOOl AEPSEOOOl AB-2026-RM-1411 RUPTURE DISC FOR AEFV0039 AEPSE0002 AEPSE0002 AB-2026-RM-1412 RUPTURE DISC FOR AEFV0040 AEPSE0003 AEPSE0003 AB-2026-RM-1412 RUPTURE DISC FOR AEFV0041 AEPSE0004 AEPSE0004 AB-2026-RM-1411 RUPTURE DISC FOR AEFV0042 3.0 ACCEPTANCE I FUNCTIONAL CRITERIA Acceptance Criteria are contained within procedure steps and attachments.

4.0 RESPONSffiiLITIES Maintenance Mechanical Department is responsible for the content and designated performance of this procedure.

5.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 5.1.

Establish FME 2 controls in accordance with APA-ZZ-00801. Specific FME requirements may need to be altered during the course of work based on the job and work area conditions.

5.2.

ENSURE WPA placement to provide adequate isolation for the work.

Page 3 of 11 REFERENCE USE to ULNRC-05855 MSM-ZZ-QV004 Rev. 002 5.3.

Rupture disc replacement is NOT an ASME SECTION XI REPLACEMENT. IF any other work than described in the work instructions is required, ASME SECTION XI planning may be required.

5.4.

Work Management Planning may add additional Notes and Precautions within the Job/Task.

5.5.

Steps may proceed in any logical order to facilitate the work.

6.0 PREREQUISITES 6.1.

Test Equipment Standard issue hand tools Torque wrench to 65ft/lbs Rupture disc, MIN 7634709 Garlock 3000 safety related gasket material, 1/64th thick, MIN 6362836 Never-Seez, MIN 6364092 6.2.

Initial Conditions 6.2.1.

System isolated or depressurized and drained prior to start of work.

-END OF SECTION-Page 4 of 11 REFERENCE USE to ULNRC-05855 MSM-ZZ-QV004 Rev. 002 7.0 PROCEDURE INSTRUCTIONS 7.1.

Gasket Pre-Fabrication QC INSPECTION POINT OQCM Code M.l.2(B)

Safety Related (Q) (Prior To Replacement/Installation)

QC INSPECTION POINT OQCM Code M.1.4 Fabrications/Machining of a part (Non Welded Items)

(Q, FP, D+, and SBO) (After Fabrication) 7.1.1.

PRE-FABRICATE two replacement gaskets from Safety Related Garlock 3000, 1164 inch thick, gasket material. Gasket size 2-3/4" OD x 1-5116" ID.

7.2.

Rupture Disc Replacement 7.2.1.

DISASSEMBLE companion flanges holding the rupture disc/holder assembly.

a.

INSTALL FME covers, remove and replace FME covers as required to complete the activity.

b.

DISASSEMBLE the holder by loosening the pre-assembly screws or by removing the pre-assembly cap screws on the holder outlet. Refer to Fig C.

HOLDER OUTLET RUPTURE DISC OBLONG PIN PRE*

ASSEMBLY CLIP HOLDER INLET FLOW DIRECTION FIGUREC Page 5 of 11 RUPTURE DISC TAG REFERENCE USE to ULNRC-05855 MSM-ZZ-QV004 Rev. 002 QC INSPECTION POINT OQCM Code M.S. I Equipment General Inspection (Q) (Prior to reassembly)

QC INSPECTION POINT OQCM Code M.5.3(B)

Internal Cleanliness (Q Equipment System Side) (Prior to reassembly) 7.2.2.

CLEAN and INSPECT the seating surfaces and holder assembly. Use of solvents, steel wool, or fine emery cloth is permissible. Do NOTre-machine or use scraper or abrasives.

a.

REMOVE any adhered gasket material.

b.

INSPECT the rupture disc sealing area for the following:

Nicks Scratches Pitting NOTE

  • This work document does NOT authorize the repair or replacement of any code parts. IF the repair or replacement of additional code parts is necessary, CONTACT planning to generate a ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement Plan to perform the repair or replacement needed.
  • Replacing The Rupture Disc is exempt from the ASME Section XI Repair Replacement Program (Reference AP A-ZZ-00662, Appendix A, ASME Section XI Replacement Program Mandatory Requirements.

QC INSPECTION POINT OQCM Code M.1.2(B)

Safety Related (Q) (Prior To Replacement/Installation) 7.2.3.

ASSEMBLE the rupture disc and holder as follows. Refer to Fig C.

Page 6 of 11 REFERENCE USE to ULNRC-05855 Step 7.2.3 Cont'd MSM-ZZ-QV004 Rev. 002

a.

Carefully REMOVE and DISCARD any shipping protectors furnished with rupture disc.

b.

PLACE the holder inlet on a flat surface with the alignment pins pointing up.

c.

MATCH the notches in the rupture disc with the shape of the pins.

d.

PLACE the rupture disc over the pins with the dome side down.

e.

MATCH the holes in the holder outlet with the shape of the pins in the holder inlet.

f.

POSITION the holder outlet carefully onto the alignment pins as shown; ENSURE that the rupture disc is NOT damaged.

g.

FASTEN the assembly together by tightening the pre-assembly screws or by replacing and tightening the pre-assembly cap screws.

Page 7 of 11 REFERENCE USE to ULNRC-05855 Step 7.2.3 Cont'd MSM-ZZ-QV004 Rev. 002

h.

Refer to Figure D for installation of the rupture disc assembly.

FLOW DIRECTION FIGURED Page 8 of 11 REFERENCE USE to ULNRC-05855 Step 7.2.3 Cont'd MSM-ZZ-QV004 Rev. 002

1.

Before placing the assembly into the system, ENSURE that the companion flange gasket surfaces are clean and free of all rust, corrosion and foreign material.

NOTE A machined flat or J-hook is provided in the holder inlet to ENSURE correct installation of the assembly relative to flow direction.

QC INSPECTION POINT OQCM Code M.5.3(B)

Internal Cleanliness (Q Equipment System Side) (Prior to reassembly)

J.

INSTALL the rupture disc assembly and gaskets with all flow arrows pointing in the proper flow direction, and the positive orientation device is inserted into the machined flat on the holder inlet or J hook inserted into the drill companion flange.

OUTlET COMPANION FLANGE HOLDER ASSEMBLY INLET-COMPANION FLANGE Page 9 of 11 PL.OW DIRECTION RUPTURE DISC TAG

/

POSITIVE ORIENTATION DEVICE BREAK-OFF SCREW REFERENCE USE to ULNRC-05855 MSM-ZZ-QV004 Rev. 002 Step 7.2.3 Cont'd

__ / __

k.

Lightly LUBRICATE the flange bolting with Never-seez.

QC INSPECTION POINT OQCM Code M.5.6(B)

Fastener Torque/Tightening (Q Equipment) (Prior to torque/tightening)

1.

Using a cross torquing pattern, TORQUE each nut with a calibrated torque wrench at 20% increments. Repeat 20% increments and cross torquing pattern until final torque of 65ft/lbs is achieved.

m. REPEAT Final Torque of all nuts in rotational sequence at 65ft/lbs.

8.0 RESTORATION 8.1.1.

NOTIFY Operations to perform In-Service Leak Check by separate job task. (This is to verify that no vacuum leaks at the rupture disc or the tail pipe exist as the Post Maintenance Test).

8.1.2.

CLEAN the work area.

9.0 REFERENCES

9.1.

Implementing 9.1.1.

M-630-00095, FWIV System Medium Actuator Layout Drawing 9.1.2.

M-628-00094, MSIV System Medium Actuator Layout Drawing 9.1.3.

AP A-ZZ-00662, Appendix A, ASME Section XI Replacement Program Mandatory Requirements 9.2.

Developmental 9.2.1.

MP 00-1009A-FWIV Actuator Replacement 9.2.2.

MP 00-1009B-MSIV Actuator Replacement 9.2.3.

CAR 201107918, QC verification of safety related gaskets 9.3.

Operating Experience 9.3.1.

CARS 200002398, Indication That Blown Rupture Disk May Have Been Installed Backwards 9.3.2.

CARS 200404773, AEFV0040 Rupture Disc Blown Page 10 of11 REFERENCE USE to ULNRC-05855 10.0 RECORDS Retain applicable portions of this procedure with the Job!fask.

11.0 DEFINITIONS None 12.0

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES p

Section or age(s) Step Number Description 5

7.1.1 Added QC point M.1.4.

10 9.2.3 Added new Reference.

Page 11 of 11 MSM-ZZ-QV004 Rev. 002 REFERENCE USE to ULNRC-05855 The safety mode of the SRVs 1s to open when system pressure exceeds the valve's setpoint pressure *All 11 SRVs operate in the safety mode, providing the safety function of over-pressure protection_ The staff finds that the OM Code requirement to perform in situ stroke testing of the SRVs may contribute to undesirable SRV leakage and could result in spurious actuation of the valves during power operation, failure to reseal, increased use of RHR for suppression pool cooling, decreased generating capacity, and increased radiation hazard.

Although leakage from the SRVs is considered within the plant's design basis, the failure to reseal during reactor start-up would cause unnecessary heating of the suppression pool, and could result in a decrease in plant performance and a plant shutdown to repair the leaking SRV The alternative testing method proposed by the licensee provides periodic verification of all of the individual SRV components that are currently bemg tested_ However, some tests. including closure testing. would be performed at a test facility instead of 1n situ with reactor steam The NRC staff finds that the proposed testing of the SRVs and associated components provide reasonable assurance of adequate valve operation and readiness. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the proposed alternative testing method is acceptable 3 *14 6 Conclusion Based on the above evaluat1on. the NRC staff concludes that the l1censee's proposed alternative described in Section 3_ 14.4 is authorized for the components listed in Section 3 14 2 pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 55a(a)(3)(ii) on the basis that compliance with the OM Code requirements results in hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety. The licensee's proposed alternative provides reasonable assurance of the operational readiness of the identified valves_ The proposed alternative is authorized for Hatch *1 and 2's fourth 1 0-year 1ST Interval.

1f' 3.15 Valve Relief Request RR-\\J-5 3 *15.1 OM Code Requirements The licensee requested relief from Appendix I. paragraph 1360, which requ1res that Ciass 2 and 3 non-reclosing pressure relief devices (rupture discs) be replaced every 5 years unless histoncal data indicates a requirement for more frequent replacement.

3.15.2 Component Identification Rel1ef was requested for the following HPCI system rllplure discs 1E41-0003, 1E41-0004 2E41-0003. 2E41-0004 3.15.3 Licensee's Basis for Requesting Relief The subject rupture d1scs are supplied by Continental Disc Corporation and cyclic testing to destruction of a disc that had previously been installed in the HPCI system at Hatch 1 and 2 was performed by the supplier_ The test d1sc was installed in an appropriate disc holder and flange assembly, which simulated the installed configuration. The rupture disc assembly was cycled from full vacuum to 70 percent of the ambient burst pressure The test disc completed 2.788 cycles before failure occurred.

to ULNRC-05855 The HPCI system is tested monthly at a maximum. Monthly testing results in approximately 72 tests during three operating cycles. To meet the code replacement frequency, the disc must be replaced every second refueling outage, or after approximately 48 system tests. Therefore, a change from replacement every 48 months to every 72 months is insignificant when compared to the expected life of the disc, as proven by the number of cycles required for disc rupture demonstrated by vendor testing.

Hatch 1 and 2 operate on 24 month fuel cycles. Replacement every 6 years results in replacement every third refueling outage, whereas a 5-year replacement results in replacement every second refueling outage. As proven by the vendor testing, the subject rupture discs have adequate margin for operation well beyond the requested 6-year replacement frequency.

3.15.4 Licensee's Proposed Alternative Testing The rupture discs will be replaced at least once every third refueling outage 3.15.5 [valuation of Relref Request RR-V-5 The licensee requests relief from the requirements of i\\ppendix I. which requires that Class 2 and 3 ruptur*e discs tJe replaced every 5 years unless historical data rndicates a requrrement for more frequent replacement. This corresponds to the licensee replacing the drscs every second refueling outage. The licensee proposes an alternatrve in whrch the ruptur*e discs would be replaced every G years resulting in their replacement every third refueling outage.

Cyclrc testing of a previously installed rupture disc was performed by the licensee by Continental Disc Corporation During testing, the rupture disc was cycled from full vacur11n to 70 percent of the ambrent burst pressure Failure occurred after the disc was cycled 2.788 lrmes The cyclic testing performed was a conservative simulation of the pressure drfferentral experrenced by tire rupture discs during monthly testing of the HPCI system During monthly testing, the normal pressure exerted on the rupture disc is 50 psrg. which corresponds to approximately 25 percent of the ambient burst pressure.

The licensee proposes a 6-year replacement frequency for these rupture discs. At this frequency, the discs would be exposed to approximately 72 HPCI system tests or cycles This rs signrficantly less than the 2J88 cycles needed for failure of the test disc to occur. The licensee's proposed alternative provides reasonable assurance of the operational readiness of the HPCI rupture discs. Therefore, the proposed alternative provides an acceptable level of quality and safety 3.15.6 Conclusion Based on the above evaluation, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's alternative decribed in Section 3.15.4 is authorized for the components listed in Section 315.2 pursuant to 10 CFR 50 55a(a)(3)(i) on the basis that the proposed alternative provides an acceptable level of quality and safety. The alternative is authorized for Hatch 1 and 2 fourth 1 0-year 1ST Interval.

to ULNRC-05855 Callaway Action Request System Action Request Cars Number Cars Typ__e S_@J!JS Discover Date Due_ Date 201110875 Adverse Condition In Process 12/25/2011 04/27/2012 Originator Dep_grtment Bonvillian, David (619) 0 Lead Department Covey, Mark (8213) 0 SS Notified NMR True False Summa!}' De~cripJio_f1 MSIV Rupture Discs scheduled to work on line vs refuel Description Condition Description Phone 314/225-1568 Phone 573/676-8517 False False False Jobs 08507401/2/3/4 to replace the rupture disks for MISV's were originally scheduled to work in the RF18 window( object). These jobs were scrubbed from the RF18 window and placed in the online schedule (deviation). This work places the plant in an 8 hr shutdown T/S (impact).

Details of the Condition Jobs 08507401/2/3/4 to replace the rupture disks for MISV's were created in July 2008 based on being added to 1ST Program as corrective action for CAR 200801705. Jobs 08507401/2/3/4 were originally scheduled to be performed in the RF18 window as an R3 frequency. In Aug 2008 the jobs were moved from the RF18 window to just prior to RF18 and in Oct 2009 the jobs were moved to just after RF18. Through the PCMR process, in Sept 2011 the frequency was changed to 54 months with justification being that this work could be done on line. These jobs are now scheduled to execute in Jan and Feb 2012.

These are safety related rupture discs which function to ensure that if the non-safety condenser is unavailable as a vent path, the medium holding the valve open can be vented to area 5 via the rupture disc-important function to ensure valve closes when required. Isolating the rupture discs makes the MSIV inoperable-T/S 3.7.2.F, 8 hrs to restore or hot standby in the next 6 hrs.

Hanging/IV'ing WPA, craft verifying and signing on WPA, performing work, clearing WPA and performing PMT would get us real close to 4 hrs into an 8 hr spec, if no issues were encountered.

This is an unacceptable on line risk. This work needs to be scheduled in a refuel.

MFIV's allow 72 hrs OOS time perT /T 3.7.3.A-OK for online work.

Recommended Actions to Resolve this Issue Extend PM due date until RF19, ensure this work is added to RF19 scope. Change the frequency back to R3 and add notes to reference the short duration Tech Spec.

Does the Originator need to be contacted AFTER the analysis is complete and Corrective Actions are developed?

(If you do NOT state that you need to be contacted, you will NOT be contacted.)

Document Immediate Actions Taken in the Immediate Actions Box below Immediate Actions Contacted Work Week Manager, generated CAR.

Lead Response Problem Statement:

PM jobs to replace rupture discs for the Main Steam Isolation Valves were removed from the refuel 18 scope and scheduled to be done on line even though the out of service time indicated by the planned jobs would take approximately 75% of the allowed out of service time. This exceeds the standard to not schedule maintenance taking greater than 50% of the Tech Spec http://cars2-prd/Reports/CarPrint.asp?CarsNumber=20111 0875 False False Page 1 of3 False 04111/2012 to ULNRC-05855 allowed out of service time with the potential impact being unplanned plant shutdown if delays or emergent issues extended the work duration.

Remedial Actions Taken:

No remedial actions are required. Work has been deferred at this time.

Extent of Condition:

The extent of condition applies to work that has historically been done during a refuel, but which can be done on line under a Tech Spec action statement time limit.

Corrective Actions:

The PM jobs to replace rupture discs for the Main Steam Isolation Valves were removed from the refuel 18 scope following the approved process. However, the job durations based on planned EMPRV infonnation would be 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> duration in an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> allowed TSO. By adjusting the planned WPA request and reevaluating the work duration the total planned out of service time can be r-educed to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. It was identified that this should have been done prior to the decision to move the work to on-line to ensure an informed decision was made.

CAl-Outage Leadership Team to establish an allowable standard for planned duration of work to be done in TSO when moving work from refuel to online.

Closure Statement:

Describe specific completion of all Corrective Actions which resolved the concern. Corrective Actions closed to other processes should be well-documented and appropriate cross-references made. (Sections 4.7.4 & 4.7.8)

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DUE DATE EXTENSION are NOT to be Deleted.

Justification for due date extension from 2012-01-18 to 2012-02-01: Setting initial date for evaluation after change in Significance at Leadership Review meeting Justification for due date extension from 2012-02-01 to 2012-04-27: Due date extension associated with taking CAR to InProcess Screening Worksheet Performance Code Significance Committee:

ORC SAFE PARC CARB MREP SI 4

False False False False False Evaluations:

MER MCR 9MR Closures:

Noted Admin Close False False False False False Dispositions: MR MSPI MRA1 Repo Trans NMR Oper ASME OOTR PHPE EPE CCE RWRK PROC False False False False False False False False False False False False False False Screening Comments More information action assigned to Brian Price. tlw-01/03/12 Per the 1/4/12 CARS Screening, a meeting was held on 1/3/12 where it was decided to do the work on line. (bib)

This is a Sig 5, Trend Only CAR. You have been designated as the Lead for your department. Per APA-ZZ-00500, please assign the Keywords and the Activity, Event, and Cause Codes. Click on the ADMIN CLOSE box in the Screening Worksheet. Reassign the CAR, if appropriate, by changing the lead name. Close the CAR by hitting the SAVE button on the left. No other action is necessary. If you can't click on the "Admin Close" button, you should close the CAR by hitting "In process" and then hitting "Complete".

The screening committee has reviewed this CAR and concluded that the Actions taken, as described above, are sufficient to resolve the concern. The Performance Improvement Department appreciates the identification and documentation of this concern.

(1/5/12,m kd) Per discussion at the Leadership Review Meeting, this CAR is changed from a Sig 5 to a Sig 4.

~ords Keyword Description http://cars2-prd/Reports/CarPrint.asp?CarsNumber=20111 0875 Page 2 of3 04/1112012 to ULNRC-05855 MORE INFO SCRN OUTAGE More Info needed - screening responsible for lacking info.

OUTAGE-Outage Trend_ Codes Trend Type Event Type Activity Trend Code WPOOlJPD WM0020LS MW004SCH Description JOB PULLED FROM THE SCHEDULE ONLINE SCHEDULING Cause JOB NOT PROPERLY SCHEDULED Hi~my Type Description H

H H

H H

H H

OPS Worksheet created by Bonvillian, David (619) on Dec 28 2011 9:31PM Car Status changed from Initiate to Screening by Bonvillian, David (619) on Dec 28 2011 9:32PM Shift Manager changed from to Bonvillian, David (619) by Bonvillian, David (619) on Dec 28 2011 9:32PM RISDEGR created by Lancaster, Jeffrey (9147) on Dec 29 2011 8:45AM Car Lead changed from to Price, Brian (8343) by Bennett, Brenda (451) on Jan 4 2012

!0:31AM Initial Action Release by Bennett, Brenda (451) on Jan 4 2012 !0:31AM Car Status changed from Screening to Evaluate by Bennett, Brenda (451) on Jan 4 2012

!0:31AM User Pin 619 619 619 9147 451 451 451 H

Car Lead changed from Price, Brian (8343) to Bianco, Frederick (502) by Daly, Mary (1386) on 1386 Jan 5 2012 !0:55AM H

Car Due Date changed from Jan 18 2012 !2:00AM to Feb 1 2012 !2:00AM by Daly, Mary (1386) 1386 on Jan 5 2012 !0:55AM H

H H

H Sig changed from 5 to 4 by Daly, Mary (1386) on Jan 5 2012 !0:55AM Car Lead changed from Bianco, Frederick (502) to Covey, Mark (8213) by Bianco, Frederick (502) on Jan 5 2012 !0:57AM Car Due Date changed from Feb 1 2012 !2:00AM to Apr 27 2012 !2:00AM by Covey, Mark (8213) on Feb 1 2012 4:27PM Car Status changed from Evaluate to InProcess by Covey, Mark (8213) on Feb 1 2012 4:27PM

.A._illons 1386 502 8213 8213

'

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