ML121080306

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2012-03-FINAL-Written-Exam
ML121080306
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 03/16/2012
From: Apger G
Operations Branch IV
To:
Arizona Public Service Co
laura hurley
References
50-528/12-03, 50-529/12-03, 50-530/12-03, ES-401, ES-401-5 50-528/OL-12, 50-529/OL-12, 50-530/OL-12
Download: ML121080306 (215)


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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 2.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 RO EXAM 2005 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A # 4.2 008 AK2.01 Importance 2.7 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 RCS pressure is at 2000 psia.

x A Pressurizer safety/relief valve is leaking to the RDT.

x The RDT is at 10 psig.

Which ONE of the following describes the temperature of the fluid downstream of the relief valve?

A. 215°F B. 230°F C. 240°F D. 280°F Answer: C Reference Id: 4083 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 4 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (14) Principles of heat transfer thermodynamics (14) and fluid mechanics.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: Steam Tables Technical

Reference:

Steam Tables, 40EP-9EO03. (LOCA)

K&A: Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident and the following:

Valves Learning Objective: Given PZR Safety Valve tailpipe temperatures and the steam tables, analyze the data to determine the status of the PZR safety valve in accordance with 40EP-9EO03.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/02/21

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

Directions on how to use Mollier Diagram and Steam Tables to determine tailpipe temperature of a leaking PSV.

1. Find the enthalpy of the saturated vapor using Mollier diagram or Table 2.
2. Plot this on the Saturation Line.
3. Draw a horizontal (constant h) line to the pressure that corresponds to where the device is relieving to.
4. If this point lies below the saturation line, follow the pressure line up the saturation line to determine the temperature. If above, compare the point to the Constant Temperature lines.

Any choice is plausible if the examinee does not obtain the specific enthalpy for 2000 psia or is off on drawing the lines to the correct values.

A. Incorrect: 215 0F corresponds to a RDT pressure of 15 psig if you go down on the curve.

B. Incorrect: 230 0F corresponds to a RDT pressure of 20 psig if you don't move on the curve.

C. Correct: Steam Tables diagram for a RCS press of 2000 psia and a RDT pressure at 10 psig is 240 0F.

D. Incorrect: 280 0F corresponds to a RDT pressure of 50 psig.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/02/21

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 3.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A # 4.1 009 EK3.28 Importance Rating: 4.5 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 has tripped from 100% power.

x Sub-Cooled Margin is 36°F and lowering slowly.

x Containment Pressure is 2.7 psig and rising slowly.

x Pressurizer level is 20% and lowering slowly.

x RCS Pressure is 1780 psia and lowering slowly.

x SG #1 level is 28% WR and rising slowly.

x SG #2 level is 30% WR and rising slowly.

x SPTAs are in progress.

x NO ESFAS Actuations have occurred.

Which ONE of the following describes the ESFAS Actuations the RO must manually initiate?

A. SIAS and CIAS ONLY due to exceeding the low pressurizer pressure setpoint.

B. SIAS and CIAS ONLY due to exceeding the high containment pressure setpoint C. SIAS, CIAS and MSIS ONLY due to exceeding the low pressurizer pressure setpoint.

D. SIAS, CIAS and MSIS ONLY due to exceeding the high containment pressure setpoint.

Answer: A Reference Id: Q43924 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

EOP Setpoint Document and LOIT Lesson Plan K&A: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the small break LOCA:

Manual ESFAS initiation requirements Learning Objective: List the parameters and setpoints that will cause PPS actuation.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 REV 1 Larry 2012/02/21

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Correct: SIAS, CIAS and MSIS setpoint is > 3.0 psig in CTMT. SIAS and CIAS setpoint < 1837 psia PZR Pressure.

B. Incorrect: SIAS/ CIAS setpoint is > 3.0 psig in CTMT.

C. Incorrect: SIAS and CIAS setpoint < 1837 psia PZR Pressure. MSIS is on High Cntmt pressure or Low SG pressure.

D. Incorrect: SIAS/CIAS and MSIS setpoint is > 3.0 psig in CTMT.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 REV 1 Larry 2012/02/21

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 4.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2010 RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A # 4.1 011 EK2.02 Importance Rating: 2.6 Given the following conditions:

x A LOCA event results in a Reactor trip.

x Containment Pressure is 3.5 psig and rising.

x The SPTAs are in progress.

x RCS Subcooling indicates 20 °F.

Which ONE of the following describes the guidance regarding the operation of the RCPs?

A. Trip Two RCPs now (in SPTAs).

B. Trip Four RCPs now (in SPTAs).

C. The CRS shall not direct tripping of RCPs until an ORP is entered.

D. The running RCPs shall remain operating until saturation conditions exist (0 oF subcooling).

Answer: B Reference Id: Q6331 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (10) 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE TECHNICAL

REFERENCE:

40EP-9EO01 SPTAs KA STATEMENT: 4.1 011EK2.02 Knowledge of the interrelations between the pumps and the following:

Large break LOCA: Pumps.

Learning Objective:

JUSTIFICATION:

A. Incorrect - All RCPs are to be secured with subcooling < 24 0F. Candidate may confuse the trip 2 leave 2 strategy with RCS pressure remaining below the SIAS setpoint.

B. Correct - This is the SPTA contingency for loss of subcooling. RCPs should not be operated without adequate subcooling.

C. Incorrect - The expectation is that these pumps will be secured prior to exiting the SPTAs.

Candidate may think that this is an early step of the LOCA EOP.

D. Incorrect - This does not meet the standards set by the EOP Technical Guideline. Candidate may understand loss of subcooling as < 0 0F subcooling, not the procedurally directed < 24 0F.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/22

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 5.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Group 1 Tier 1 K/A # 4.2 077 AA1.05 Importance Rating: 3.9 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

x East and West switchyard voltage dropped to 516 kV.

x East and West Bus switchyard Low-Low voltage alarms are locked in.

Which ONE of the following auto/manual action(s) is taken at this time to protect Engineered Safety Function (ESF) equipment from a "double sequencing" event?

A. Water Reclamation Facility supply breakers will trip open.

B. Start both DGs and maintain them paralleled with offsite power C. Block the NAN-S01/S02 to NAN-S03/S04 fast bus transfer capability.

D. Ensure that the Main Generator's gross MVAR output is greater than zero.

Answer: C Reference Id: Q44017 Difficulty: 0.00 Time to complete: 0 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and (10) emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: None Technical

Reference:

41ST-1ZZ02, Inoperable Power Sources K&A: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: Engineered safety features Learning Objective: Explain the operation of Switchgear NAN-S05 and NAN-S06 under normal operating conditions.

Justification:

A. Incorrect. WRF breakers will auto trip with a low voltage and SIAS actuation B. Incorrect. An option is to start load DG and isolate class buses from offsite power.

C. Correct. actions directed by 41ST-1ZZ02, appendix G D. Incorrect. ST directs that gross MVAR be less than 0 such that PVNGS is not supporting switchyard voltage.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 1 Rev 1 Larry 2012/02/24

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 6.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2007 RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A # 4.2 022 AK3.02 Importance Rating: 3.5 Given the following conditions:

Initial Conditions:

x Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

x Charging has been secured due to a leak downstream of the Charging Pumps.

x 40AO-9ZZ04, RCP Emergencies, has been entered.

Subsequently:

x The Unit trips due to a LOCA.

x Pressurizer pressure is currently 1500 psia and stable.

x Containment pressure is 2.1 psig and slowly increasing.

x Pressurizer level is 20% and stable.

x RCS T-cold is 560°F.

x RCS T-hot is 563°F.

x RCP 1A seal 2 outlet temperature is 260°F.

x RCP 2A seal 2 outlet temperature is 252°F.

x Safety Injection flow is adequate.

x RCPs 1A/2A have been secured.

Which ONE of the following actions is procedurally required?

A. Trip the 1B/2B RCPs to prevent pump cavitation.

B. Initiate CIAS, containment pressure is greater than setpoint.

C. Isolate Seal bleedoff to the 1A/2A RCPs to prevent seal damage.

D. Override and energize the class pressurizer heaters to restore pressurizer pressure.

Answer: C Reference Id: Q10375 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and (10) emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/22

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: Steam tables and Appendix 2 pump curves Technical

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ04 (RCP emergences)

K&A: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Actions contained in SOPs and EOPs for RCPs, loss of makeup, loss of charging, and abnormal charging Learning Objective: Given RCP motor amps and Upper Thrust Bearing Temperature determine the appropriate action to take based on RCP motor amps and thrust bearing temperature in accordance with 40AO-9ZZ04.

Justification:

A. Incorrect: subcooled margin and NPSH requirements are met B. Incorrect: containment pressure is less than setpoint of 3.0 psig C. Correct: RCP in stby with no seal injection requires that the Bleed Off valve be closed prior to exceeding 250 degrees on Seal 2 outlet temperature D. Incorrect: PZR level is less than 25%, heater cutout OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/22

RCS Press Temp Limits Normal CTMT Conditions 2500 100 °F/hr Cooldown 200 °F Subcooled 2000 RCP NPSH 1500 STANDARD APPENDICES Appendix 2, PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 1000 Figures 350 psia transition line RCS Pressure (psia)

QSPDS no longer useful Minimum Subcooled 500 Appendix 2 40EP-9EO10 Revision: 65 SDC Region 0

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 RCS Temperature (Th °F)

Page 1 of 3 Page 18 of 1280 Forced Circulation - Th indication used Natural Circulation - REP CET used

RCS Press Temp Limits Harsh CTMT Conditions 2500 200 °F Subcooled 100 °F/hr Cooldown 2000 RCP NPSH 1500 STANDARD APPENDICES PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 350 psia transition line 1000 QSPDS no longer useful RCS Pressure (psia)

Minimum Subcooled 500 Appendix 2 40EP-9EO10 Revision: 65 SDC Region 0

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 RCS Temperature (Th °F)

Page 2 of 3 Page 19 of 1280 Forced Circulation - Th indication used Natural Circulation - REP CET used

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 7.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2007 RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A # 42 025 AA2.07 Importance Rating: 3.4 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 is in Mode 4.

x LPSI pump "B" is providing SDC flow.

x RCS temperature 325°F.

Auxiliary Spray valve "B" fails open and the following conditions are observed.

x LPSI pump "B" amps and flow are oscillating.

x Window 2B06A, SDC TRAIN A/B FLOW LO is alarming.

This is an indication of...

A. LPSI pump B "cavitating".

B. LPSI pump B in a "runout" condition.

C. CHB-HV-530 (RWT to Train B SI Pumps) closing.

D. an inadvertant B train Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS).

Answer: A Reference Id: Q10357 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and (10) emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40EP-9EO11 40AL-9RK2B K&A: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Pump cavitation Learning Objective: Given the LMFRP HR-2 is being performed, and SDC is in service describe how adequate SDC flow is determined and what actions may be taken if adequate flow cannot be maintained in accordance with 40EP-9EO11.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/22

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam JUSTIFICATION:

A. Correct: these are classic cavitation indications with lowering PZR pressure and stable temperature B. Incorrect: run out would be high amps and high flow C. Incorrect: SDC suction is thru SI-HV-655 and LPSI suction valve SI-HV-692 is closed isolating SDC flow from RWT D. Incorrect: RAS would trip the LPSI pump OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/22

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 8.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A # 4.2 026 AK3.03 Importance 4.0 Rating:

Given the following initial conditions:

x Unit 1 has tripped from 100% power.

x SIAS/CIAS have automatically initiated.

x Pressurizer pressure is 1800 psia and stable.

x RCS T-cold is 562 degrees and stable.

x Containment pressure is 0.5 psig and stable.

x Containment temperature is 115 degrees and stable.

x RU-6, Nuclear Cooling Water Radiation Monitor is alarming.

Subsequently the CRS enters 40EP-9EO03, LOCA and directs the following actions.

x Stop all RCPs.

x Close the Nuclear Cooling Water Containment Isolation valves.

Why were the RCPs secured?

A. Loss of Seal Injection B. Loss of RCS subcooling.

C. Harsh containment conditions.

D. Loss of cooling water to the RCPs.

Answer: D Reference Id: Q44018 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (10) 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: Steam Tables Technical

Reference:

40EP-9EO03, LOCA K&A: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: Guidance actions contained in EOP for Loss of CCW Learning Objective: Given RCS pressure and temperature during performance of an EOP analyze these conditions to decide if the RCPs can be operated.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/02/21

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam JUSTIFICATION:

A. Incorrect. Seal Injection has an automatic isolation on low temperature, examinee may also believe that it isolates due to a SIAS/CIAS as numerous other CVCS valves.

B. Incorrect. Examinee will have to verify the status of subcooling with the reduced RCS pressure. 564 degrees + 24 = 588 = 1409 psi C. Incorrect. Examinee will have to verify containment conditions D. Correct. Examinee will have to know the cooling source of the RCPs and the requirement to secure them.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/02/21

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam



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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam





   

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam





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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 11.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A # 038 2.2.44 Importance 4.2 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

x Unit 2 was tripped due to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

x RCS pressure is 895 psia.

x RCS subcooling is 55°F.

x Steam Generator #1 pressure is 890 psia.

x RU-4 in high alarm.

x Steam generator #1 is isolated.

x Steam generator #1 level is 78% NR and rising slowly.

x Steam generator #2 level is 50% NR and steady.

Which ONE of the following is the preferred method to control level in the isolated steam generator with a ruptured tube?

A. Steam the #1 steam generator to atmosphere via the ADVs.

B. Bypass the MSIV and steam the #1 steam generator to the condenser.

C. Line-up high rate blowdown to the condenser from #1 steam generator.

D. Lower RCS pressure below #1 steam generator pressure and allow backflow to the RCS.

Answer: D Reference Id: Q44015 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (10) 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE.

Technical

Reference:

40EP-9EO04 (SGTR) 40DP-9AP09 (SGTR Tech Guide)

K&A: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. SGTR Learning Objective: L11218 Given that the SGTR EOP is being implemented describe the SGTR EOP mitigation strategy in accordance with 40EP-9EO04.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev.1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect: This will lower SG pressure to further below RCS pressure which will increase SG level and spread more contamination.

B. Incorrect: This will lower SG pressure to further below RCS pressure which will increase SG level, steaming to the condenser would minimize the chance of release to the environment, but still spread the contamination to the secondary.

C. Incorrect: Blowdown will lower level, but spread contamination to the secondary.

D. Correct: This will lower RCS pressure and reduce level of the SG by moving water into the RCS.

Contamination will be limited by putting the contaminated water back in the RCS.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev.1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 12.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2009 RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A # 4.1 055 EK3.01 Importance Rating: 2.7 If there is a station "Blackout" the class (PK) batteries are designed to maintain rated voltage for UP TO A. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to provide continuous DC during a Design Basis Event.

B. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to provide continuous DC during a Design Basis Event.

C. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to provide sufficient power for the protection and control of transformers and switchgear.

D. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to provide sufficient power for the protection and control of transformers and switchgear.

Answer: A Reference Id: Q22493 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (5) 55.41 (5) Facility operating characteristics during steady state and transient conditions, including coolant chemistry, causes and effects of temperature, pressure and reactivity changes, effects of load changes, and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE PRA SIGNIFICANT QUESTION Technical

Reference:

FSAR, LOIT Lesson plans K&A: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the Station Blackout: Length of time for which battery capacity is designed Learning Objective: Discuss the purpose and conditions under which the 125 VDC Class IE Power System is designed to function.

Justification:

A. Correct: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and concurrent DBE-LOCA concurrent with BO as found in FSAR B. Incorrect: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is the old rating for the non-lass NK batteries C. Incorrect: power for the protection and control of transformers is for the non-class NK batteries, examinee may choose this believing that the ESF transformers use class power D. Incorrect: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is the old rating for the non-lass NK batteries OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 1 Rev 1. Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 13.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A # 4.2 056 AA2.17 Importance 3.4 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 has tripped from 100% power due to a LOOP.

x EDG 'A' Tripped on Low Lube Oil Pressure.

Which ONE of the following describes the operational status the the PZR Backup Heaters?

________ Backup Heater Banks(s) is/are available.

A. ZERO (0)

B. ONE (1)

C. TWO (2)

D. FOUR (4)

Answer: B Reference Id: Q43929 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

LOIT lesson plan K&A: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power:

Operational status of PZR backup heaters Learning Objective: Describe the interrelationship between the Pressurizer Pressure Control System and the following systems: 480 VAC Class IE Power

  • 480 VAC Non-Class IE Power OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification: Non-class heaters (prop and backup) NGN-L11 & 12, Class backups PGA-L33 & 34 A. Incorrect: NBN-S01/S02 and PBA-S04 are de-energized due to the LOOP and the 'A' EDG tripped.

These provide power to all other Backup and Proportional Heaters. B class heaters powered from DG "B" are still available.

B. Correct: Non class heaters come from NGN-L11/12 which are lost on the LOOP. PBB-S04 is the only energized 4160V bus. There are only two banks of class backup heaters. "A" train lost power with the DG tripping. The B Class Backup Heater bank is the only bank with power.

C. Incorrect: NBN-S01/S02 and PBA-S04 are de-energized due to the LOOP and the 'A' EDG tripped.

These provide power to all other Backup and Proportional Heaters.

D. Incorrect: NBN-S01/S02 and PBA-S04 are de-energized due to the LOOP and the 'A' EDG tripped.

These provide power to all other Backup and Proportional Heaters.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 14.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A # 057 2.4.50 Importance Rating: 4.2 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

x 120VAC IE PNL D27 Inverter C Trouble Alarm was received in the Control Room.

x The area operator reports that DC power to 120VAC Class IE Inverter PNC-N13 has been lost.

Which ONE of the following describes the restoration of power to PNC?

PNC 120VAC power is restored by...

A. an auto shift to the battery.

B. a manual shift to the battery.

C. an auto shift to the voltage regulator.

D. a manual shift to the voltage regulator.

Answer: D Reference Id: Q43931 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan, 41AL-9RK1A (Unit 1 B01A ARP)

PRA SIGNIFICANT QUESTION UNIT DIFFERENCES QUESTION K&A: Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.Loss of Vital AC instrument bus (00057)

Learning Objective: Describe the conditions required to generate the following annunciators:

  • 120VAC IE PNL D25 INV A
  • 120VAC IE PNL D26 INV B
  • 120VAC IE PNL D27 INV C
  • 120VAC IE PNL D28 INV D OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/03/01

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect: The battery is the normal supply to the inverter. Unit 1 is not equipped with a static transfer switch.

B. Incorrect: The battery is the normal supply to the inverter. If the normal power supply was the voltage regulator, a manual transfer to the battery would be required.

C. Incorrect: This would be correct in Unit 2 or 3 which is equipped with a Static Transfer switch that would automatically transfer to the voltage regulator.

D. Correct: Unit 1 is NOT supplied with a Static Transfer switch as in Unit 2 and Unit 3. Therefore on a loss of Power to the Inverter the operator must manually transfer the power supply from the inverter to the voltage regulator.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/03/01

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 15.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A # 4.2 058 AK1.01 Importance Rating: 2.8 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 tripped from 100% power due to a Loss of Offsite Power, LOOP.

x No ESFAS actuations have been initiated.

x AFN-P01 (Essential Steam Driven AFW pump) is supplying feed to the SGs.

x The Control Power Transfer Switch (PBA-U01) is selected to it's alternate feed source from PKA-H11.

x SG pressure is being controlled with ADVs SGA-HV-179/184.

x Both DGs are supplying their respective buses.

With no other Operator actions, what is the immediate operational implications of a loss of the "A" battery charger, PKA-H11?

A. ADVs (SGA-HV-179/184) will fail closed.

B. DG "A" output breaker (PBA-S03B) can not be tripped from the control room.

C. Downcomer containment isolation valves SGA-UV-172 and SGA-UV-175 fail closed.

D. AFN-P01 (Non Essential Motor Driven Aux Feed Pump) can not be tripped from the control room.

Answer: D Reference Id: Q44020 Difficulty: 3.50 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ13 (Loss of Class Instrument and Control Power), 40EP-9EO05 (LOCA)

PRA SIGNIFICANT QUESTION K&A: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of DC Power: Battery charger equipment and instrumentation.

Learning Objective: Given a loss of PN or PK describe the availability of Auxiliary Feedwater in accordance with 40AO-9ZZ13.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev.0 Larry 2012/02/08

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. ADV will lose their permissive as the "A" battery dies and fail closed, NOT IMMEDIATELY B. DG "A" output breaker can not be tripped on a loss of PKA-M41/D21. NOT IMMEDIATELY C. Downcomer Isolation fail open on a loss of power. The economizer isolations would close immediately if aligned to their alternate source PKA-M41.

D. The alternate supply for AFN-P01 is directly from the battery charger.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev.0 Larry 2012/02/08

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 16.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A # 4.4 E05 EK2.2 Importance 3.7 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

Initial Conditions:

x Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power.

x SG #1 is 1000 psia and lowering.

x SG #1 is 40% WR and lowering.

x SG #2 is 800 psia and lowering.

x SG #2 is 10% WR and lowering.

x PZR level is at 30% and slowly lowering.

x Containment Pressure is 1 psig and rising.

At the time that the ORP is entered the conditions are as follows:

x Containment pressure peaked and is stable at 9.8 psig.

x Containment temperature is 185°F.

x PZR level is 18% and rising.

x RVUH level is 67%.

x RCS subcooling is 98°F.

x SG #1 is at 34% WR (rising) and being fed from AFW at 500 gpm.

x SG #2 is below the indicated level.

x Both HPSI pumps are injecting into the RCS.

Based on these conditions, you should obtain CRS concurrence and throttle HPSI...

A. immediately.

B. when PZR level reaches 33%.

C. when RVUH is equal to 100%.

D. when SG #1 Level is 45%-60% NR.

Answer: A Reference Id: Q43934 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and (10) emergency operating procedures for the facility.

10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and (10)CFR emergency operating procedures for the facility.55.41 55.41 (8) (8) Components, capacity, and functions of emergency systems.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: Modified PV Bank OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40EP-9EO05, Excess Steam Demand, 40EP-9EO10 Appendix 2 SI Throttle Criteria K&A: Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Excess Steam Demand) and the following: Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

Learning Objective: Given conditions of an ESD describe the mitigating strategy outlined in the ESD EOP in accordance with 40EP-9EO05.

Justification:

A. Correct - PZR level requirement is > 15% for Harsh CTMT conditions.

B. Incorrect - PZR level requirement for throttling HPSI is > 15% level when in Harsh CTMT conditions. 33% is the normal PZR Level Band per SPTAs C. Incorrect - RVUH level must be greater than 16% to throttle HPSI, which it is. Candidate may not understand RVUH and Plenum relationship.

D. Incorrect - The SG requirement is RESTORING to 45-60% NR level. Candidate may believe that SG levels must be in the band.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam



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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 18.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A # 4.2 065 AA1.03 Importance Rating: 2.9 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 has experienced a Loss of Instrument Air (IA) to the Containment.

x The CRS is implementing 40AO-9ZZ06 (Loss of Instrument Air).

Which ONE of the following valve handswitches must be taken to CLOSE prior to restoring IA to Containment per 40AO-9ZZ06?

A. CHA-HV-507 (RCP Bleedoff Isolation to RDT)

B. CHA-UV-516 (Letdown to Regen Hx Isolation)

C. WCB-UV-61 (CHW Return HDR Inside CNTMT Isol VLV)

D. NCB-UV-403 (NCW CNTMT Downstream Return Isol VLV)

Answer: B Reference Id: Q43990 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ06 (Loss of Instrument Air)

PVNGS OPERATING EXPERIENCE K&A: Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air:

Restoration of systems served by instrument air when pressure is regained Learning Objective: Determine the mitigating strategies of the Loss of Instrument air AOP.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect: This is an IA operated valve inside the CTMT that fails open to allow Seal Bleed Off to the RDT, it is not to be closed.

B. Correct: Per step 4 of section 3.0, this valve will fail closed but if the handswitch is not taken to close the valve will open upon restoration of IA and possibly lead to damage of the letdown IXs.

C. Incorrect: This valve is a Motor Operated Valve that will not be affected by the loss of IA, it is the inside CTMT isolation valve for WC.

D. Incorrect: This valve is a Motor Operated Valve that will not be affected by the loss of IA, it is the inside CTMT isolation valve for NC.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 19.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2008 RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A # 4.2 001 AA1.07 Importance Rating: 3.3 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 3 is operating at 80%.

x Group 5 CEAs at 120 inches withdrawn.

x All others CEAs at UEL.

x Selected CEA is # 14.

x Selected CEA Group is # 5.

x A malfunction causes CEA 15 to move 12 steps out before STANDBY is selected and motion stops.

Based on this event the pulse counter selected Group position reads...

A. 120 inches.

B. 122.25 inches.

C. 124.5 inches.

D. 129 inches.

Answer: B Reference Id: Q43936 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 4 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

LOIT lesson plan K&A: Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal:

RPI Learning Objective: Describe the required actions addressing a continuous rod motion accident.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification: 12 steps times 3/4 inch equals 129 inches withdrawn A. Incorrect: examinee may believe that that the pulse counter uses lowest CEA position (CPCs)

B. Correct: group position is the average position. 129 + 120 + 120 + 120 = 489/4 = 122.25 C. Incorrect: examinee may believe that the pulse counter uses average of high/low D. Incorrect: examinee may believe that pulse counter uses highest cea position (CPCs)

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 20.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A # 4.2 005 AK3.06 Importance 3.9 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

x Multiple channels of CPCs (Lo DNBR) have trip lights illuminated on B05.

x The reactor failed to automatically trip.

x The CRS has directed the RO to open the supply breakers for L03 and L10 for a minimum of 5 seconds.

Which ONE of the following describes the reason for this action?

The 5 seconds allows time for the...

A. motor generator stop contacts to close.

B. CEAs to drop to the bottom of the core.

C. trip coils to actuate to open L03 and L10 breakers.

D. effects of the motor generator flywheel to taper off interrupting power to the CEAs.

Answer: D Reference Id: Q43938 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (6) 55.41 (6) Design, components, and functions of reactivity control mechanisms and instrumentation.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

EOP OPERATIONS EXPECTATIONS K&A: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod: Actions contained in EOP for inoperable/stuck control rod.

Learning Objective: Given plant conditions following a reactor trip analyze whether the Reactivity Control Safety Function is met and what contingency actions are required if it is not in accordance with 40EP-9EO01.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect: MG stop contact does not get a signal to actuate, these actions remove power from the MG set input, therefore no output.

B. Incorrect: CEAs do require to be inserted within 4 seconds per Tech Specs, but this is not the reason for the 5 second wait.

C. Incorrect: Trip coils inside the breaker have no time delay associated with them, they open instantaneously.

D. Correct: As the Load Center supplying power to the MG sets is de-energized, the MG set flywheels will maintain the MG set output as inertial energy is dissipated.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 21.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A # 4.2 028 AK1.01 Importance 2.8 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

x Unit 3 operating at 100% power.

x RCN-LIC-110 (Pressurizer Level Master Controller) is in "REMOTE-AUTO".

x RCN-HS-110 (Level Control Selector Channel X/Y) is selected to channel 'Y'.

x RCN-HS-100-3 (Pressurizer Heater Control Selector Level Trip Channel) is selected to 'X'.

x A leak develops on the reference leg of RCN-LT-110Y (Level Transmitter 110Y). This leak exceeds the capacity of the condensing chamber's ability to keep the reference leg full.

Assuming NO operator action, which ONE of the following describes the plant response?

Pressurizer level indicates ....

A. low, presssurizer heaters will cut-out.

B. low, the standby charging pump will start.

C. high, letdown flow will be lost.

D. high, letdown flow will lower and stabilize at approximately 30 gpm.

Answer: C Reference Id: Q43992 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan K&A: AK1.01 PZR reference leak abnormalities. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: PZR reference leak abnormalities Learning Objective: Describe the response of the Pressurizer Level Control System to a failure of a Pressurizer Level Transmitter.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect: PLCS senses a high level, the heaters cut out at 27% indicated level.

B. Incorrect:PLCS senses a high level, charging pumps will stop not start on deviation from setpoint.

C. Correct: The level control system will sense a high level. Letdown flow increases to maximum.

"Normally running" charging pump stops. Letdown will isolate due to the automatic closure of CHB-UV-0515 upon receipt of a hi-hi regenerative heat exchanger outlet temperature.

D. Incorrect: The level control system will sense a high level. Letdown flow decrease initially to 30 gpm, but not stabilize.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 22.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A # 4.2 060 AK2.01 Importance Rating: 2.6 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

x A waste gas system discharge is in progress.

x RU-12 (Waste Gas Decay Tank Discharge) readings are stable.

x RU-14 (Radwaste Building Ventilation Exhaust Filter Inlet) is in ALERT.

x RU-15 (Waste Gas Area Combined Ventilation Exhaust) is in ALERT.

x RU-143 (Plant Vent) readings are rising.

Which ONE of the following describes the event that is occurring?

A. Gas system discharge is exceeding limits, GRN-UV34A/B will auto CLOSE.

B. Gas system discharge is exceeding limits, GRN-UV34A/B will remain OPEN.

C. Waste Gas Decay Tank Leak is in progress, GRN-UV34A/B will auto CLOSE.

D. Waste Gas Decay Tank Leak is in progress, GRN-UV34A/B will remain OPEN.

Answer: D Reference Id: Q44021 Difficulty: 4.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (11) Purpose and operation of radiation (11) monitoring systems, including alarms and survey equipment.

10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (11) Purpose and operation of radiation (11)CFR monitoring systems, including alarms and survey 55.41 (7) equipment.55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

74RM-9EF41, Rad Monitoring ARP K&A: Knowledge of the interrelations between the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release and the following: ARM system, including the normal radiation-level indications and the operability status.

Learning Objective: Explain the operation of the Area Radiation Monitors under normal operating conditions.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 2012/02/08

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

a. Incorrect. RU-12 and RU-143 would both be rising or in alarm if a discharge was exceeding limits.

GRN-UV-34A/B auto close on RU-12 high alarm only.

b. Incorrect. RU-12 and RU-143 would both be rising or in alarm if a discharge was exceeding limits.

GRN-UV-34A/B auto close on RU-12 high alarm only.

c. Incorrect. ARM RU-14/15 and RU-143 would be rising or in alarm for GR system leak. GRN-UV-34A/B auto close on RU-12 high alarm only.
d. Correct. ARM RU-14/15 and RU-143 would be rising or in alarm for GR system leak. GRN-UV-34A/B auto close on RU-12 high alarm only.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 2012/02/08

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam



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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam



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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 24.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A # 4.2 069 AA2.01 Importance 3.7 Rating:

Which of the following combination of valves failing OPEN would cause a loss of Containment Integrity per Technical Specifications?

x CHB-UV-515 (LETDOWN TO REGEN HX ISOL VLV UV-515) x CHA-UV-516 (LETDOWN TO REGEN HX ISOL VLV UV-516) x CHB-UV-523 (REGEN HX OUTLET ISOLATION VLV UV-523) x CHA-HV-524 (CHARGING PUMPS DSCH HDR TO REGEN HX VLV HV-524)

A. CHB-UV-515 and CHB-UV-523.

B. CHB-UV-515 and CHA-HV-524.

C. CHA-UV-516 and CHB-UV-523.

D. CHA-UV-516 and CHA-HV-524.

Answer: C Reference Id: Q43942 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (10) 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan, Tech Specs/TRM K&A: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Containment Integrity:

Loss of containment integrity Learning Objective: Explain the operation of the following Letdown Isolation Valves, including their Control Room controls, under normal operating conditions:

  • Letdown Line to Regen Heat Exch Vlv (CHB-UV-515)
  • Letdown Line to Regen Heat Exch Vlv Containment Isolation Vlv (CHA-UV-516)
  • Regen Heat Exch to Letdown Heat Exch Containment Isolation Vlv (CHB-UV-523)

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/02/21

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification: It requires 2 valves in a penetration to have a loss of Containment Integrity. As long as one valve in a penetration is closed CI is maintained.

a) Incorrect: CHB-UV-515 does not receive a close signal on CIAS and is not listed in the TRM T7.0.300 table .

b) Incorrect: CHB-UV-515 does not receive a close signal on CIAS and CHA-HV-524 and is not listed in the TRM T7.0.300 table c) Correct: CHA-UV-516 and CHB-UV-523 are the Only Tech Spec Isolation valves in the letdown system. These valves receive a close signal on CTMT ISOL CIAS) and are listed in the TRM T7.0.300 table.

d) Incorrect: CHB-UV-516 is a TS CTMT ISOL VLV, CHA-HV-524 and is not listed in the TRM T7.0.300 table OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/02/21

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 25.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2008 RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A # 4.4 A16 AK3.3 Importance Rating: 3.3 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

x Pressurizer level is slowly lowering.

x RCS temperature is stable.

x The in-service letdown control valve CHN-110P is slowly closing.

x The CRS implements 40AO-9ZZ02, Excessive RCS Leakrate.

x All available charging pumps are running.

x Pressurizer level continues to lower.

40AO-9ZZ02 (Excessive RCS Leakrate) now directs...

A. isolating letdown to quantify leakage for E-plan classification.

B. an immediate reactor trip to minimize dose rates at the site boundary.

C. an immediate reactor trip due to leakage is excess of Tech Spec limits.

D. isolating letdown to determine if leakage exceeds CVCS makeup capacity.

Answer: D Reference Id: Q22453 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 4 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and (10) emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ02, Excessive RCS Leakrate K&A: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Excess RCS Leakage)

Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

Learning Objective: Given indications of RCS or a Steam Generator Tube Leak, describe the basic procedure methodology, including Reactor Trip is thresholds, in accordance with 40AO-9ZZ02.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect: The E-plan numbers are determined by performing appendix A/B of 40AO-9ZZ02.

B. Incorrect: Tripping the Reactor is determined as thresholds are exceeded after completing the next step to isolate letdown then trip if Pzr level continues to lower.

C. Incorrect: TS limits are defined and if not met to be in mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, not to trip immediately. Candidate may think the TS limits are trip thresholds. The next step is to isolate letdown then trip if Pzr level continues to lower.

D. Correct: Isolating letdown eliminates the Letdown system as a possible location of the leak, Plant operation is allowed if the leak is isolated as exhibited by the restoration of Pzr Level. The step of the procedure is to isolate letdown and determine if CVCS makeup capability is exceeded if so then trip reactor OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 26.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A # 4.4 A13 AK1.2 Importance 3.2 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 has been in a Blackout condition for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.

x The crew is performing actions of 40EP-9EO08 (Blackout).

x PBA-S03 has been energized by ONE Station Blackout Generator (SBOG) per Standard Appendix 80.

x Attempts to restore power from other sources have been unsuccessful.

x Natural circulation flow CAN NOT be verified.

In accordance with the Blackout procedure, which ONE of the following describes the action(s) that will be taken by the crew?

A. Use Auxiliary Spray to lower RCS pressure.

B. Commence a cooldown to shutdown cooling entry conditions.

C. ENSURE Train "A" ADVs are throttled adequately to maintain RCS subcooling.

D. OVERRIDE and ENERGIZE Train "A" class backup heater to stabilize RCS pressure.

Answer: C Reference Id: Q43811 Difficulty: 4.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and (10) emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: Steam Tables Technical

Reference:

40EP-9EO08, BLACKOUT / 40DP-9AP13. BO Tech Guideline K&A: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Operations) Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Natural Circulation Operations).

Learning Objective: Given conditions of a Blackout state the action necessary to maintain subcooling margin in accordance with 40EP-9EO08.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/21

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect - Lowering RCS pressure will cause subcooled margin to lower, which will not promote natural circulation conditions.

B. Incorrect - This step is not required be performed unless AC power is not restored. PBA-S03 has been energized with a SBOG.

C. Correct - Per Step 21 Blackout EOP, if the conditions are met, ENSURE proper control of steam generator steaming and feeding.

D. Incorrect - Raising pressure would improve subcooling and promote natural circulation conditions.

But Pressurizer Level is below the heater cutout setpoint, therefore Heaters are not available.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/21

         

  

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 28.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2008 RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 3.4 003 A1.05 Importance Rating: 3.4 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

x RCP 1A experiences a failure causing it to slow down at 1% per minute.

Assuming that all other input parameters remained the same, the CPC calculated value of DNBR will ...

A. not change until RCP speed reaches 95% of rated speed, then a DNBR trip will occur.

B. not change until RCP speed reaches 95% of rated speed, then an Auxiliary trip will occur.

C. gradually lower until RCP speed reaches 95% of rated speed, then a DNBR trip will occur.

D. gradually lower until RCP speed reaches 95% of rated speed, then an Auxiliary trip will occur.

Answer: C Reference Id: Q44016 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

LOIT lesson plan K&A: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCPs controls including: RCS flow Learning Objective: L77427 Describe the function of the Reactor Coolant Pump Speed inputs to the Core Protection Calculators.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 0

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect: Pump Speed is input to the Flow calculation which is used in the DNBR calculation. DNBR will reduce as speed drops. A DNBR trip will be generated when RCP speed reaches 95%.

B. Incorrect: Pump Speed is input to the Flow calculation which is used in the DNBR calculation. DNBR will reduce as speed drops. The auxiliary trip monitoring RCPs is generated when less than 2 RCPs are running.

C. Pump Speed is input to the Flow calculation which is used in the DNBR calculation. DNBR will reduce as speed drops. A DNBR trip will be generated when RCP speed reaches 95%.

D. Incorrect: DNBR will reduce as speed drops then generate a DNBR trip.The auxiliary trip monitoring RCPs is generated when less than 2 RCPs are running.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 0

         

  

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SDC and Coolant Circulation High Water Level 3.9.4 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.4 Shutdown Cooling (SDC) and Coolant Circulation High Water Level LCO 3.9.4 One SDC loop shall be OPERABLE and in operation.


NOTE----------------------------

The required SDC loop may be removed from operation for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period, provided no operations are permitted that would cause reduction of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6 with the water level 23 ft above the top of reactor vessel flange.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. SDC loop requirements A.1 Suspend operations Immediately not met. involving a reduction in reactor coolant boron concentration.

AND A.2 Suspend loading Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the core.

AND A.3 Initiate action to Immediately satisfy SDC loop requirements.

AND (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 3.9.4-1 AMENDMENT NO. 117

SDC and Coolant Circulation High Water Level 3.9.4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.4 Close all containment 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> penetrations providing direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.4.1 Verify one SDC loop is operable and in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> operation.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 3.9.4-2 AMENDMENT NO. 117

         

  

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 33.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 3.5 007 A2.05 Importance 3.2 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

x Unit 2 is at 100% power.

x PSV-203 (PZR safety valve) has seat leakage.

x Reactor Drain Tank (RDT) level is rising.

x RDT pressure is 7.5 psig and rising slowly.

x Window 3A07A (REAC DRN LOOP TRBL) is alarming.

x Window 3A07B (REAC DRN TK PRESS HI) is alarming.

Which one of the following conditions is correct?

The Alarm Response procedure (40AL-9RK3A) directs the crew to vent the RDT to ....

A. containment before it isolates at 10 psig.

B. containment before it ruptures at 10 psig.

C. the gas surge header before it isolates at 10 psig.

D. the gas surge header before it ruptures at 10 psig.

Answer: C Reference Id: Q43950 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 52 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (3) 55.41 (3) Mechanical components and design features of the reactor primary system.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40AL-9RK4A (B04 ARP)

K&A: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRTS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Exceeding PRT high-pressure Learning Objective: Describe automatic functions associated with the following Reactor Drain Tank Valves:* CHA-UV-560 (Reactor Drain Tank Outlet Isolation Valve)* CHB-UV-561 (Reactor Drain Tank Outlet Isolation Valve)* CHN-UV-540 (Reactor Drain Tank Vent Valve)* CHA-UV-580 (Reactor Drain Tank Makeup Supply Isolation Valve).

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 2012/02/21

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect: Between 5 and 10 psig the ARP directs venting to the Gas Surge header, the RDT does isolate at 10 psig.

B. Incorrect: Between 5 and 10 psig the ARP directs venting to the Gas Surge header, and the RDT isolates at 10 psig not ruptures.

C. Correct: Between 5 and 10 psig the ARP directs venting to the Gas Surge header, and the RDT isolates at 10 psig. CHN-UV-540 (Gas Surge Header) and CHA-UV-560 (containment isolation) both close.

D. Incorrect: Between 5 and 10 psig the ARP directs venting to the Gas Surge header, but the RDT isolates at 10 psig not ruptures.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 2012/02/21

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 34.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2007 RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 3.8 008 K2.02 Importance Rating: 3.0 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

x NCN-P01A (NCW PUMP A) is in operation with NCN-P01B (NCW PUMP B) in standby.

x The A Emergency Diesel Generator is under permit for maintenance.

x NBN-X03 ESF Service Transformer fails.

x This loss does NOT result in a Reactor Trip.

Based on these conditions, the Nuclear Cooling Water system will...

A. have no pumps running.

B. be unaffected (no change in pump operation).

C. remain in operation, NCN-P01B running and NCN-P01A off.

D. remain in operation, with both NCN-P01A and NCN-P01B running.

Answer: B Reference Id: Q5794 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan K&A: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: CCW Pump, including emergency backup.

Learning Objective: Explain the operation of the NC Pumps under normal operating conditions.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect: Candidate may think that the NCW pumps are powered from PB buses and may think this situation has resulted in a loss of power to both.

B. Correct: NCW pumps are powered from non-class 4160v busses NBN-S01 and NBN-S02. Losing transformer NBN-X03 with the A Diesel Generator tagged out will result in a loss of Class 4160v power on the A train, but will not affect power to the NCW pumps.

C. Incorrect: May think that PBA has lost power and NCW A with it, NCW B would start on low header pressure.

D. Incorrect: May think that the power transfer from off site to the EDG would result in both pumps running.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

         

  

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 41.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 3.4 039 K3.03 Importance Rating: 3.2 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power.

x S/G #1 level is 23% WR and lowering rapidly.

x S/G #1 pressure is 900 psia and lowering rapidly.

x S/G #2 level is 45% WR and lowering slowly.

x S/G #2 pressure is 1050 psia and stable.

Subsequently x S/G #1 level is 19% WR and lowering rapidly.

x S/G #1 pressure is 780 psia and lowering rapidly.

x S/G #2 level is 43% WR and lowering slowly.

x S/G #2 pressure is 1050 psia and stable.

Assuming NO operator action, AFA-P01 (Essential Turbine Driven Aux Feed Pump) is...

A. still in standby.

B. operating and aligned to receive steam from BOTH SGs.

C. operating and aligned to receive steam from SG #1 ONLY.

D. operating and aligned to receive steam from SG #2 ONLY.

Answer: B Reference Id: Q43957 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (4) 55.41 (4) Secondary coolant and auxiliary systems that affect the facility.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan K&A: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MRSS will have on the following: AFW pumps.

Learning Objective: Explain the operation of the AFW Pump Turbine Main Steam Supply Valves (SGA-UV-134 and -138) under normal operating conditions.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/02/28

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

a. Incorrect: Both MOVs will open on the AFAS signal that was received at 25.8% WR on the #1 SG.

Candidate may not know the AFAS setpoint. Also, Candidate may think the D/P lockout of 185 psid will not allow the lower pressure SG to supply steam to AFA-P01.

b. Correct: Both Main Steam Supply valves AUTO open on an AFAS actuation, regardless of which SG has experienced the low level. In addition, the D/P lockout does NOT impact the operation of the steam supply valves.
c. Incorrect: Candidate may think only the SG that is below the AFAS setpoint will supply steam to AFA-P01.
d. Incorrect: Candidate may think only the SG that is INTACT will supply steam to AFA-P01 due to the D/P lockout.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/02/28

         

  

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 43.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 RO EXAM 2005 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 3.4 005 K5.03 Importance Rating: 2.9 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 2 is in Mode 5 following refueling.

x Shutdown Cooling in service using LPSI 'A'.

x It is desired to place SDC Train B in a "standby" SDC lineup.

Which ONE of the following describes what must be done prior to placing SDC train B in a standby lineup?

Recirculate SDC train B from the ....

A. RCS thru only SIB-UV-668 (LPSI Pump B Recirc valve).

B. RWT thru only SIB-UV-668 (LPSI Pump B Recirc valve).

C. RCS thru SIB-HV-690 (S/D Cooling Warmup Bypass valve) and SIB-UV-668 (LPSI Pump B Recirc valve).

D. RWT thru SIB-HV-690 (S/D Cooling Warmup Bypass valve) and SIB-UV-668 (LPSI Pump B Recirc valve).

Answer: D Reference Id: Q10202 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and (10) emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40OP-9SI01 (Shutdown Cooling Initiation)

K&A: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply the RHRS:

Reactivity effects of RHR fill water.

Learning Objective: L79915 Discuss the concerns with boron concentration associated with the Shutdown Cooling System.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification: per the SI01 procedure prior to placing a SDC loop in standby it must first be recirculated with the RWT to equalize boron concentration and not cause SDM concern a) Incorrect: This would recirculate the SDC loop with the RWT thru the miniflow. This is a valid alignment that is used to maintain RCS level during reduced inventory operations. This alignment is only used to maintain an already established level such as midloop.

b) Incorrect: This would recirculate the SDC loop with the RWT thru the miniflow but would not equalize the entire train and is not directed by the procedure.

c) Incorrect: This is a valid alignment for temperature control using the LP injection valves. This alignment is used prior to placing the SDC train in service NOT placing it in a standby alignment.

d) Correct: The Precautions and Limitations of the OP describe the fact that an Idle SDC loop may have a different boron concentration. This lineup is directed by the procedure to equalize boron concentration.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

         

  

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 46.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 3.6 062 A3.01 Importance Rating: 3.0 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power.

x NAN-X01 (S/U XFMR #1) has faulted.

x SIAS has actuated.

x EDG 'A' is at 60.1 Hz and 4200 VAC.

x No 86 Lockouts on PBA-S03.

x Normal/Alternate Supply Breakers to PBA-S03 have operated as designed.

Which ONE of the following describes the status of the...

(1) EDG 'A' output breaker?

(2) NHN-M71 Energized/Not Energized?

A. (1) OPEN (2) ENERGIZED B. (1) CLOSED (2) ENERGIZED C. (1) CLOSED (2) NOT ENERGIZED D. (1) OPEN (2) NOT ENERGIZED Answer: C Reference Id: Q43962 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan, Electrical Distribution Drawing K&A: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ac distribution system, including: Vital ac bus amperage Learning Objective: Describe the Local and Control Room indications associated with the Class IE AC Electrical Distribution System.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

NAN-X01 (Startup Transformer #1) is the normal supply to NAN-S05 which supplies PBA-S03 thru its associated ESF Transformer. This fault will cause an undervoltage condition on PBA-S03.

Candidate may not know the S/U XFMR arrangement and believe that PBA-S03 is still being powered from off site power. EDG 'A' meets the requirements to automatically close in on PBA-S03 and power the bus. These requirements are Frequency between 59.9 and 60.5 Hz. Voltage between 4080 and 4300 Volts. No lockouts on the bus. Normal and Alternate supply breakers are open. Due to the EDG 'A' supplying PBA-S03 Amps will be indicated. NHN-M71 is a SIAS Load Shed Panel that will be de-energized due to the SIAS.

A. Incorrect: (1) EDG 'A' meets the requirements to automatically close in on PBA-S03 and power the bus. (2) Due to the EDG 'A' supplying PBA-S03 Amps will be indicated. (3) NHN-M71 is a SIAS Load Shed Panel that will be de-energized due to the SIAS.

B. Incorrect: (1) EDG 'A' meets the requirements to automatically close in on PBA-S03 and power the bus. (2) Due to the EDG 'A' supplying PBA-S03 Amps will be indicated. (3) NHN-M71 is a SIAS Load Shed Panel that will be de-energized due to the SIAS.

C. Correct: These are all correct.

D. Incorrect: (1) EDG 'A' meets the requirements to automatically close in on PBA-S03 and power the bus. (2) Due to the EDG 'A' supplying PBA-S03 Amps will be indicated. (3) NHN-M71 is a SIAS Load Shed Panel that will be de-energized due to the SIAS.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 47.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 3.6 063 K2.01 Importance 2.9 Rating:

Which ONE of the following valves are powered from a vital 125 VDC control center?

A. SIA-UV-644, SIT Isolation B. SID-UV-654, Shutdown Cooling Isolation C. SIE-HV-661, Combined SIT Drain to RDT D. SIB-HV-690, Shutdown Cooling Loop 1 Warm-up Bypass Answer: B Reference Id: Q43972 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan K&A: Knowledge of bus power supplies to major DC loads.

Learning Objective: Knowledge of major DC loads Justification:

A. Incorrect: The SIT Isolation valves are powered by class 480v MCCs.

B. Correct: Class DC electrical distribution trains "C" and "D" provide power to the Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valves through inverters PKC-N43 and PKD-N44.

C. Incorrect:The SIT Drains are air operated.

D. Incorrect: The Shutdown Cooling Loop Warm-up Bypasses are powered class 480 v MCCs.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 1 Rev.1 Larry 2012/02/23

         

  

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 49.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 3.6 064 K6.07 Importance Rating: 2.7 Given the following list of conditions:

x Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

x The DG A right bank Starting Air Receiver is tagged out.

x There was an Inadvertent Containment Spray System Actuation.

The remaining left bank receiver and starting air subsystem will apply air to ____(1)____ diesel cylinder bank(s) and the diesel starts in the ____(2)_____ mode.

A. (1) both (2) Test Run B. (1) both (2) Emergency C. (1) only the left (2) Test Run D. (1) only the left (2) Emergency Answer: A Reference Id: Q43971 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan PRA SIGNIFICANT QUESTION K&A: K6.07 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ED/G system: Air receivers Learning Objective: Describe the operation of the Diesel Generator Air Starting Sub-system under normal conditions.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Correct: Crossover piping allows starting air to to be supplied to both banks of diesel cylinders. The diesel starts in the test run mode of operation on an inadvertent Containment Spray System actuation.

B. Incorrect:Crossover piping allows starting air to to be supplied to both banks of diesel cylinders.

The diesel does not start in the Emergency run mode of operation on an inadvertent Containment Spray System actuation.

C. Incorrect:Crossover piping allows starting air to to be supplied to both banks of diesel cylinders.

The diesel starts in the test run mode of operation on an inadvertent Containment Spray System actuation.

D. Incorrect:Crossover piping allows starting air to to be supplied to both banks of diesel cylinders.

The diesel does not start in the Emergency run mode of operation on an inadvertent Containment Spray System actuation.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 50.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 3.6 064 A1.08 Importance Rating: 3.1 While setting up a Diesel Generator to be paralleled with off-site power the following parameters are noted just before the output breaker is closed; x The synchroscope is moving slowly in the fast direction.

x Grid frequency 59.9 Hz x Diesel RPM 600 x Bus Voltage 4160v x Generator Voltage 4150v Upon closure of the Diesel Generator output breaker the operator must immediately raise ____(1)____ to avoid a ____(2)____ trip.

A. (1) speed (2) over current B. (1) speed (2) reverse power C. (1) voltage (2) over current D. (1) voltage (2) reverse power Answer: B Reference Id: Q43968 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan, 40OP-9DG01 Emergency Diesel Generator PVNGS OPERATING EXPERIENCE K&A: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters(to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ED/G systems controls including: Maintaining minimum load on ED/G (to prevent reverse power)

Learning Objective: Manually start, load, and unload the 'A' Diesel Generator OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect: Going to raise on the speed controller with the generator output breaker closed will raise load and is directed by procedure however, this will also raise output current.

B. Correct: Going to raise on the speed controller with the generator output breaker closed will raise load and is directed by procedure. The basis for this step is to avoid a reverse power trip.

C. Incorrect: Raising voltage setpoint will change reactive loading however, under the conditions stated an overcurrent condition will not be approached.

D. Incorrect: Raising voltage setpoint will change reactive loading however, raising voltage will not mitigate a reverse power condition.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 51.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 073 2.2.39 Importance Rating: 3.9 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 is in Mode 6.

x Fuel movement is in progress.

x It is discovered that both channels of CREFAS (RU-29 and RU-30) are INOPERABLE.

Which of the following is the MINIMUM actions required to comply with Tech Spec 3.3.9, Control Room Essential Filtration Actuation Signal?

A. Immediately place one train of CREFS in operation OR suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, positive reactivity additions and core alterations.

B. Immediately place one train of CREFS in operation AND suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, positive reactivity additions and core alterations.

C. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> place one train of CREFS in operation OR suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, positive reactivity additions and core alterations.

D. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> place one train of CREFS in operation AND suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, positive reactivity additions and core alterations.

Answer: A 66739 Describe the administrative requirements associated with system Radiation Monitors Reference Id: Q43960 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and (10) emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

Tech Specs PVNGS OPERATING EXPERIENCE K&A: Knowledge of less than or equal to one hour Technical Specification action statements for systems:

PRMS Learning Objective:

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev 0 LDB 2012/02/09

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

Tech Spec 3.3.9 condition C states that the requirement during movement of irradiated fuel is to Immediately either place a train of CREFAS in operation OR suspend movement of, positive reactivity additions and Core Alterations A. Correct - Immediately and OR meet the minimum requirements.

B. Incorrect - Immediately is right but AND is not required to meet the action.

C. Incorrect - 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is wrong Mode 1 action w/o movement of irradiated fuel.

D. Incorrect - 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is wrong Mode 1 action w/o movement of irradiated fuel.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev 0 LDB 2012/02/09

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 5.

This Exam Level: RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A #: 3.4 076 A2.01 Importance Rating: 3.5 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

x The Plant Cooling Water System develops a large unisolable leak in the common pump discharge header.

x Plant Cooling Water Header Pressure Low Alarm Annunciates in the Control Room.

x Essential Cooling Water train "A" is crosstied and supplying Nuclear Cooling Water priority loads.

x 40AO-9ZZ03 Loss Of Cooling Water has been entered.

Which ONE of the following systems are affected and what actions should the crew take?

A. Turbine Cooling Water System, Trip the Reactor.

B. Essential Cooling Water System, Trip the Reactor.

C. Turbine Cooling Water System, Trip the Main Turbine.

D. Essential Cooling Water System, Trip the Main Turbine.

Answer: A Reference Id: Q43961 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and (10) emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water K&A: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of SWS.

Learning Objective: Given plant conditions determine if the Loss of Cooling Water AOP should be executed in accordance with 40AO-9ZZ03.

Justification:

A. Correct: Plant Cooling Water System cools the Turbine Cooling Water Heat Exchanger and, 40AO-9ZZ03 Loss of Cooling Water requires a Reactor Trip.

B. Incorrect: The loss of Essential Cooling Water System in this case would require a Reactor Trip however, the loss of Plant Cooling Water will not affect Essential Cooling Water.

C. Incorrect: It is true that the Plant Cooling Water System cools the Turbine Cooling Water Heat Exchanger however, 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water requires a Reactor Trip.

D. Incorrect: The loss of Essential Cooling Water System in this case would require a Reactor Trip however, the loss of Plant Cooling Water will not affect Essential Cooling Water. 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water requires a Reactor Trip.

REV 0

         

  

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 54.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2007 RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 3.8 078 K3.02 Importance Rating: 3.6 Which of the following is true regarding an Instrument Air pipe rupture in the Main Steam Support Structure (MSSS)?

A. Service Air will supply all loads.

B. Accumulator will provide ADV operation.

C. Low Pressure Nitrogen will supply all loads.

D. Economizer Feedwater Isolation valves fast closure and slow mode of operation are available via the accumulator.

Answer: B Reference Id: Q44003 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ06 (Loss of Instrument Air)

K&A: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the IAS will have on the following:

Systems having pneumatic valves and controls.

Learning Objective: Determine the major effects on plant operation as instrument air pressure degrades.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

MSSS is mentioned because the ADVs and Economizer valves are located within.

A. Incorrect:The break will prevent backup sources supplying loads, Service Air no longer is a backup.

B. Correct: Accumulator will allow ADV operation for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

C. Incorrect: Nitrogen backup may open on low pressure but the pipe break makes this useless.

D. Incorrect: Accumulator provides fast closure but not slow mode of operation.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

         

  

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 56.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2008 RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A # 3.1 001 A4.03 Importance Rating: 4.0 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 3 is operating at 55% power following a Large Load Reject event.

x The CRS has implemented 40AO-9ZZ08 (Load Rejection).

x CEDMCS has been placed in standby.

x Reg. Group 3 CEAs are at 135 inches withdrawn.

x Reg. Group 4 CEAs are fully inserted.

In accordance with 40AO-9ZZ08, proper CEA group overlap will be restored by ...

A. withdrawing Reg group 4 CEAs in manual group mode.

B. withdrawing Reg group 4 CEAs in manual sequential mode.

C. withdrawing Reg. group 4 CEAs in manual individual mode while maintaining CEAs within 6.6 inches.

D. lowering the load limit pot until the "Load Limiting" light illuminates then allow the Reg group 4 CEAs to withdraw in auto sequential mode.

Answer: A Reference Id: Q22484 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ08 (Large Load reject), 40OP-9SF01 (CEDMCS operations)

K&A: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CRDS mode control Learning Objective: Describe the CEDMCS Remote Operator Module located in the Control Room to include all switches and the meaning of each switch position.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Correct: RPCB LLR procedure directs withdraw in manual group.

B. Incorrect: Manual Sequential would cause group 3 to withdraw to UGS while moving group 4 C. Incorrect: this would work but not directed by procedure, 6.6 inches is the CWP/CEDMCS Alarm limit.

D. Incorrect: Lowering the pot is procedurally directed but to clear the RPCB signal not to withdraw CEAs.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 57.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A # 3.2 002 K3.03 Importance Rating: 4.2 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 has tripped due to a Large Break LOCA.

Which ONE of the following correctly identifies the threshold values for HARSH containment conditions?

CTMT Temperature >____(1)____ 0F OR CTMT Radiation level > ____(2)____ mR/hr.

A. (1) 170 (2) 105 B. (1) 170 (2) 108 C. (1) 235 (2) 105 D. (1) 235 (2) 108 Answer: B Reference Id: Q43966 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and (10) emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40EP-9EO03 (LOCA), 40DP-9AP08 (Tech Guide)

K&A: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RCS will have on the following:

Containment Learning Objective: Given conditions of LOCA analyze Containment Temperature and Pressure Control to determine if the SFSC acceptance criteria is satisfied in accordance with 40EP-9EO03.

Justification:

A. Incorrect: 170 0F is correct but 10 5 is the Rem value, the procedure specifically state mR/hr.

B. Correct: 170 0F is correct and 10 8 is correct.

C. Incorrect: 235 0F is the temperature that the CSAS pressure corresponds to. 10 5 is the Rem value, the procedure specifically state mR/hr.

D. Incorrect: 235 0F is the temperature that the CSAS pressure corresponds to. 10 8 is correct.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 1 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

         

  

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 59.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2010 RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A # 3.7 017 K1.01 Importance Rating: 3.2 Core Exit Thermocouples (CETs) provide a DIRECT input to which ONE of the following?

A. COLSS.

B. QSPDS.

C. ERFDADS.

D. B02 Post Accident Meters.

Answer: B Reference Id: Q43753 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan K&A: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the ITM system and the following systems: Plant computer.

Learning Objective: Explain the operation of the Core Exit Thermocouples (CETs) associated with the Incore Instrumentation System.

Justification:

A. Incorrect: COLSS receives inputs from the Incore detectors which are on the same instrument string as the CETs.

B. Correct: CET detectors are connected to the QSPDS cabinet by a chromel aluminum lead which removes the need for a temperature controlled environment junction box.

C. Incorrect: ERFDADS receives CET data from QSPDS.

D. Incorrect: B02 Post Accident Monitors receive data from QSPDS to display Core Exit Temps and Saturation Margins.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 1 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 60.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A # 3.5 028 A1.02 Importance Rating: 3.4 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 2 has experienced a small LOCA resulting in a containment pressure of 2 psig.

x PZR pressure is steady at 2100 psia.

x The Hydrogen Recombiners are in operation.

x Containment hydrogen concentration is 3.5%.

x The break suddenly propagates resulting in dropping PZR pressure and containment pressure rising to 7 psig.

Which ONE of the following describes the impact on the Hydrogen Recombiners?

The Hydrogen Recombiners...

A. will still be aligned and may remain so.

B. must be isolated to prevent exceeding their design pressure.

C. must be isolated to prevent exceeding their design hydrogen concentration.

D. have isolated and can be realigned from the control room using its override feature.

Answer: D Reference Id: Q44009 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

System Technical Manual, LOCA Procedure Technical Guide K&A: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameter (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the HRPS controls including: Containment pressure.

Learning Objective: Describe the automatic functions associated with the Hydrogen Control System Containment Isolation Valves.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev.1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect: The containment isolation valves for the hydrogen control system close on a Containment Isolation Signal actuated at 3.0 psig.

B. Incorrect: The Hydrogen Recombiners can withstand maximum design containment pressure. In the LOCA procedure there is a limit imposed to ensure containment pressure is less than < 8.5 psig before aligning the hydrogen recombiners. The Hydrogen Control operating procedure has a maximum containment pressure of 10 psig.

C. There is a hydrogen concentration lower limit of operation for the PURGE Units of at least 2.8%.

The hydrogen control procedure does not have an upper limit on hydrogen concentration however, there is a caution to assume an explosive mixture is present when placing the hydrogen control system in operation.

D. The containment isolation valves for the hydrogen control system close on a Containment Isolation Signal actuated at 3.0 psig and will be overriden and opened to re-establish hydrogen control.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev.1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 61.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A # 3.8 029 A1.03 Importance Rating: 3.0 Which ONE of the following describes the interlock associated with Power Access Purge Containment Inlet Isolation valves.

Containment ____(1)____ must be ____(2)____ the setpoint before the dampers will OPEN.

A. (1) pressure (2) above B. (1) pressure (2) below C. (1) temperature (2) above D. (1) temperature (2) below Answer: B Reference Id: Q43969 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan K&A: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Containment Purge System controls including: Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity.

Learning Objective: Describe the automatic functions and interlocks associated with the Power Access Purge Containment Isolation Dampers (CPA-UV-4A & 4B, and CPB-UV-5A & 5B).

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect: Candidate may confuse the inlet isolation valve with the vent valve CPN-PV-43 which has an interlock to remain closed so that flow will be directed through the vent orifice when pressure is above .5 psig B. Correct: The Power Access Purge Containment Inlet Isolation Valves are interlocked such that Containment Pressure must be below 0.03 psig as measured by HC-PT-493, before the dampers will open.

C. Incorrect: Temperature provides interlocks to the CTMT Purge AHUs to determine if the Heaters or Chill Water will be used to adjust the temperature. CTMT Temperature is a Tech Spec monitored parameter. Candidate may confuse the inlet isolation valve with the vent valve CPN-PV-43 which has an interlock to remain closed so that flow will be directed through the vent orifice when pressure is above .5 psig D. Incorrect: Temperature provides interlocks to the CTMT Purge AHUs to determine if the Heaters or Chill Water will be used to adjust the temperature. CTMT Temperature is a Tech Spec monitored parameter.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

         

  

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 63.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A # 3.4 041 K6.03 Importance Rating: 2.7 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

x 120 VAC NNN-D11 loses power.

x Two minutes later, power is restored using 40AO-9ZZ14, Loss Of Non-Class Control Power.

x Prior to any further operator actions the Main Turbine trips.

The Steam Bypass Control System will respond to the Turbine Trip with ____(1)____, ____(2)____.

A. (1) a Quick Open (2) and Modulation B. (1) a Quick Open (2) but NO Modulation C. (1) NO Quick Open (2) but will Modulate D. (1) NO Quick Open (2) and NO Modulation Answer: D Reference Id: Q43973 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (7) 55.41 (7) Design, components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ14, Loss Of Class Instrument Or Control Power K&A: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the SDS: Controller and positioners, including ICS, S/G, CRDS Learning Objective: Steam Bypass Control System controller/logic loss of power Justification:

A. Incorrect: SBCS in auto and remote is a Quick Open interlock B. Incorrect: SBCS in auto and remote is a Quick Open interlock C. Incorrect:When energized, SBCS will come back in manual with zero output.

D. Correct: On a loss of NNN-D11 SBCS loses logic power. The bypass valves fail closed and cannot be operated in manual or auto. When energized, SBCS will come back in manual with zero output.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 1 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

         

  

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 65.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A # 3.8 075 K2.03 Importance 2.6 Rating:

EWB-P01, Essential Cooling Water Pump 'B' is powered by which ONE of the following sources?

A. PBB-S04 B. PGB-L32 C. PHB-M32 D. PKD-N44 Answer: A Reference Id: Q43976 Difficulty: 2 Time to complete: 1 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 (4) 55.41 (4) Secondary coolant and auxiliary systems that affect the facility.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ12, Degraded Electrical K&A:.Emergency/essential SWS pumps Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

Emergency/essential SWS pumps.

Learning Objective: Describe how the Essential Cooling Water system is supported.

Justification:

A. Correct: EW is as system required for safe shutdown. The 4160V pump motor is powered by class switchgear.

B. Incorrect:PGB-L32 is a class 480V load center.

C. Incorrect:PHB-M32 is a 480V MCC.

D. Incorrect:PKD-N44 is the inverter for SDC isolation valve SIB-UV-654 OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 1 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/21

         

  

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 67.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 3 K/A # 2.1.37 Importance Rating: 4.3 Which ONE of the following describes the control room personnel that MUST attend a reactivity brief for a normal shiftly dilution per ODP-1 (Operations Principles and Standards)?

The CRS, RO...

A. and CO.

B. and STA.

C. CO and SM.

D. STA and SM.

Answer: A Reference Id: Q43988 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and (10) emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

ODP-1 (Operations Principles and Standards)

K&A: Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of procedures, guidelines or limitations associated with Reactivity Management Learning Objective: ODP-1 Reactivity Management Justification:

A. Correct: Per ODP-1 The CRS, RO and CO WIll attend the Reactivity Brief. The SM and STA(s) should attend but are not required per the ODP-1 guidance.

B. Incorrect: SM should attend but is not required.

C. Incorrect: SM and STA should attend but are not required.

D. Incorrect: CO is required to attend but the SM is not.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 1 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

         

  

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 70.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 3 K/A # 2.2.12 Importance 3.0 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

x A Surviellance Test (ST) is being performed on numerous valves.

x The ST is being performed at the 90% due date.

x The CO strokes one particular valve several times prior to beginning the ST due to his experience with this valve sticking.

x Upon completion of the ST several pages have no other entries than an N/A.

x One valve had to be re-tested due to a failure of M&TE.

x The CRS recognizes the pre-conditioning condition during his administrative review of the ST.

x The STA is NOT licensed.

Which one of the following statements is correct concerning this situation?

A. The ST pages whose only entry is an N/A shall be discarded.

B. The acceptance review should be completed by the STA prior to the end of the shift.

C. Replacement pages may be added to complete testing on the valve with the failed M&TE.

D. The pre-conditioned valve must be declared inoperable at the time of CRS recognition.

Answer: C Reference Id: Q44022 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and (10) emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

73DP-9ZZ14, Surveillance Testing K&A: Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

Learning Objective: Given that an ST is being performed and ST fails a step or data is out of tolerance describes what must be done if an ST fails.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev.1 Larry 2012/02/21

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect. per step 3.8.1 any pages with entries including N/A shall be retained.

B. Incorrect. per step 3.8.1 acceptance reviewer must be qualified to perform the test.

C. Correct. per step 3.7.1 re-performance may occur and replacement pages are allowed.

D. Incorrect. the valve has not an ST nor exceeded any required dates.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev.1 Larry 2012/02/21

         

  

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 72.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 3 K/A # 2.3.5 Importance Rating: 2.9 Given the following conditions:

x You are preparing to enter the RCA on an approved Radiological Exposure Permit (REP).

x Electronic Personnel Dosimeter (EPD) dose alarm setting is 500 mrem.

x Electronic Personnel Dosimeter (EPD) dose rate alarm setting is 1000 mrem/hr.

x The expected RP work area dose rate is 200 mr/hr.

x The actual work area dose rate is 1000 mr/hr.

Based on the conditions above, which ONE of the following describes when you would be required to exit the Radiological Control Area (RCA)?

A. Immediately due to an EPD dose alarm.

B. In 30 minutes due to an EPD dose alarm.

C. Immediately due to an EPD dose rate alarm.

D. In 30 minutes due to an EPD dose rate alarm.

Answer: C 72284 Radiological questions Reference Id: Q43985 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (11) Purpose and operation of radiation (11) monitoring systems, including alarms and survey equipment.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: Industry Bank Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

Radworker Training Handout K&A: Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

Learning Objective:

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 2012/02/09

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect. A dose alarm would be received in 30 minutes. Dose = 500 mrem/1000 mr/hr.

B. Incorrect. A dose rate alarm would be received immediately since the work area dose rate is 1000 mr/hr; which is equal to the rate alarm setting.

C. Correct. A dose rate alarm would be received immediately since the work area dose rate is 1000 mr/hr; which is equal to the rate alarm setting. You are required by the ALARA program to exit the RCA upon receiving an ED alarm.

D. Incorrect. A dose rate alarm would be received immediately since the work area dose rate is 1000 mr/hr; which is equal to the rate alarm setting.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 2012/02/09

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 73.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 3 K/A # 2.4.16 Importance Rating: 3.5 Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 has tripped from 100% power due to an RCS leak.

x A Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) occurred on the trip.

x Standard Post Trip Actions (SPTAs) are in progress.

x Bus Plus criteria is not currently being met.

In accordance with the EOP Users guide (40DP-9AP16) which ONE of the following actions is appropriate?

A. The Functional Recovery Procedure may be entered directly if the Entry Conditions are met.

B. The use of AOPs is NOT allowed in conjunction with the EOPs, the Standard Appendices shall be implemented as required.

C. Upon completion of the Reactivity Safety Function the CRS may direct actions in an AOP that would recover the required electrical bus(s).

D. If the CRS determines that the MVAC safety function is not met during the SPTAs he may immediately implement the Functional Recovery Procedure.

Answer: C Reference Id: Q44023 Difficulty: 2.50 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and (10) emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40DP-9AP18 (AOP Users Guide) / 40DP-9AP16 (EOP Users Guide)

K&A: Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures or guidelines such as, operating procedures, abnormal operating procedures, and severe accident management guidelines.

Learning Objective: Given indications for entry into an Abnormal Operating Procedure define the required actions for the conditions given in accordance with the applicable Abnormal Operating Procedure.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/03/06

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

a. Incorrect. This may be done if the event initiates in Mode 3 or 4, not Mode 1.
b. Incorrect. The use of AOPs is allowed with CRS concurrence.
c. Correct. Once the Reactivity SF is completed then an AOP may be implemented. (section 17 of 9AP18).
d. Incorrect. SPTAs must be completed prior to entering the FRP.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/03/06

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's 2nd Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Reactor Operator NRC Exam 74.

This Exam Level RO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 3 K/A # 2.4.31 Importance 4.2 Rating:

GIven the following conditions:

x Unit 3 has tripped.

x SPTAs are in progress.

Which ONE of the following describes the use of Alarm Response Procedures during the EOPs?

Use of Alarm Response Procedures should...

A. resume only after the EOPs are exited.

B. resume only after the SPTAs are exited.

C. be used concurrently with the SPTAs at all times.

D. resume only after the plant stabilizes and when directed by the CRS.

Answer: D Reference Id: Q43987 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.41 55.41 (10) Administrative, normal, abnormal, and (10) emergency operating procedures for the facility.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: None Technical

Reference:

40DP-9AP16 (EOP users guide)

K&A: Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures Learning Objective: Given that an ORP is being implemented describe the use of an AL when the reactor trips or when performing an EOP in accordance with 40DP-9AP16.

Justification:

A. Incorrect: There is no requirement to resume Alarm Response based on procedure entry or exit.

Candidate may assume that changing procedures may mean stable plant conditions.

B. Incorrect: There is no requirement to resume Alarm Response based on procedure entry or exit.

Candidate may assume that changing procedures may mean stable plant conditions.

C. Incorrect: The CRS may direct using ARPs as practical, they are not required to be used at all times.

D. Correct: This is described in 40DP-9AP16 (EOP users guide) step 28.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 1 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/21

         

  

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam 1.

This Exam Level SRO Appears on: SRO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 1 K/A # 011 2.4.41 Importance 4.6 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

x Unit 3 has tripped from 100% power.

x Containment hydrogen concentration per HPA-AI-9 indicates 3.8%.

x Containment hydrogen concentration per HPB-AI-10 indicates 4.2%.

x Estimated reactor coolant system leakage is 500 gpm.

x Highest Rep CET reading is 587°F.

x RCS chemistry sample dose equivalent Iodine 131 indicates 308 uCi/gm.

x Containment pressure - 37 psig and slowly lowering.

x Pressurizer pressure - 610 psia.

x RVLMS - upper head level - 16%.

x All equipment has properly actuated.

Which ONE of the following describes the appropriate classification and code for this event?

A. Unusual Event B. Alert C. Site Area Emergency D. General Emergency Answer: C Reference Id: Q43902 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.43 (5) 55.43 (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NEI 99-01 HOT/COLD EAL CHART Technical

Reference:

NEI99-01 HOT EAL CHART K&A: Large Break LOCA; Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.

Learning Objective: use the EAL tables and basis document to determine the emergency plan classification OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect: NUE is met but it is not the highest EAL classification of the event. Candidate may confuse any of the indications and not properly apply them to the EAL chart.

B. Incorrect: Alert is met but it is not the highest EAL classification of the event. Candidate may confuse any of the indications and not properly apply them to the EAL chart.

C. Correct: SAE is met and is the highest EAL classification of the event.

D. Incorrect: GE is not met. Candidate may confuse any of the indications and not properly apply them to the EAL chart.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

RADIOLOGICAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS HAZARDS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS EFFLUENTS RX and CORE AC/DC POWER ALARMS / COMMUNICATIONS NATURAL / DESTRUCTIVE FIRE / EXPLOSION TOXIC / FLAMMABLE SECURITY CR EVACUATION EC DISCRETION RG1 - Off-site dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous MG2 - Automatic Trip and all manual actions HG1 - HOSTILE ACTION resulting in HG2 - Other conditions exist which in the radioactivity greater than 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual fail to shutdown the reactor and indication of MG1 - Prolonged loss of all Off-site and all loss of physical control of the facility. judgment of the EC warrant declaration of a or projected duration of the release using actual meteorology. POTENTIAL POTENTIAL POTENTIAL an extreme challenge to the ability to cool the On-Site AC power to emergency busses. General Emergency.

LOSS LOSS LOSS core exists. Modes 1 & 2 LOSS LOSS LOSS Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the 1. A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred such FUEL CLAD RCS CONTAINMENT 1. Other conditions exist which in the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. If that plant personnel are unable, either 1.a. Plant Protection System failed to 1.a. Loss of all off-site and all on-site judgment of the EC indicate that events are dose assessment results are available, declaration should be based on dose assessment instead remotely or locally, to operate equipment shutdown the reactor. AC power to PBA-S03 and PBB-S04. in progress or have occurred which involve of radiation monitor values. Do not delay declaration awaiting dose assessment results. required to maintain safety functions.

AND OR actual or IMMINENT substantial core AND

b. All Manual actions do NOT shutdown 2. A HOSTILE ACTION has caused failure of degradation or melting with potential for
1. VALID reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the value for 15 the reactor as indicated by: b. EITHER of the following: loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and minutes or longer: Reactor power is NOT dropping to ACTION that results in an actual loss of 3/3 less than 5% power Restoration of at least one emergency bus IMMINENT fuel damage is likely for a Plant Vent RU-144 CH-1 >1.04E+00 uCi/cc in less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is not likely. physical control of the facility. Releases can All full strength CEAs are NOT freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool.

Fuel Building RU-146 CH-2 >3.50E+01 uCi/cc Loss of at least 2 FG1 - Loss of ANY Two Barriers AND Loss or Potential inserted RCS and Core Heat Removal Safety be reasonably expected to exceed EPA OR -- YES -- Protective Action Guideline exposure levels Barriers? Loss of the Third Barrier AND Function Acceptance Criteria NOT

2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 1000 mrem TEDE c. Rep CET greater than 1200 oF. Satisfied per 40EP-9EO08, BLACKOUT. off-site for more than the immediate site GENERAL EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY OR 5000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundary. area.

OR

3. Field survey results indicate closed window dose rates greater than 1000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer; or analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 5000 mrem for one hour of inhalation, at or beyond site boundary.

RS1 - Off-site dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous radioactivity POTENTIAL POTENTIAL POTENTIAL MS2 - Automatic Trip fails to shutdown the HS2 - Control room evacuation has been HS3 - Other conditions exist which in the LOSS LOSS LOSS MS1 - Loss of all Off-site and all On-Site AC HS4 - HOSTILE ACTION within the greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of LOSS LOSS LOSS reactor and manual actions taken at the reactor MS6 - Inability to monitor a significant initiated and plant control cannot be judgment of the EC warrant declaration of a power to emergency busses for 15 minutes or PROTECTED AREA.

the release. control console are not successful in shutting transient in Progress. established. Site Area Emergency.

FUEL CLAD RCS CONTAINMENT longer.

down the reactor.

1.a. Control Room evacuation has been Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the Modes 1 & 2 Note: The EC should not wait until the Note: The EC should not wait until the initiated.

event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. If 1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has 1. Other conditions exist which in the applicable time has elapsed, but should applicable time has elapsed, but should occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as AND dose assessment results are available, declaration should be based on dose assessment instead judgment of the EC indicate that events are declare the event as soon as it is determined declare the event as soon as it is determined reported by the Security Team. b. Control of the plant cannot be established of radiation monitor values. Do not delay declaration awaiting dose assessment results. 1.a. Plant Protection System failed to in progress or have occurred which involve that the condition has exceeded, or will likely that the condition has exceeded, or will likely at the Remote Shutdown Panel

-- NO -- shutdown the reactor. actual or likely major failures of plant exceed, the applicable time exceed, the applicable time within 15 minutes.

AND functions needed for protection of the public 2/3

b. Manual actions taken on Panels B05 and 1. a. Loss of annunciators on ANY 4 of the or HOSTILE ACTION that results in
1. VALID reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the value for 15 FS1 - Loss or Potential Loss of ANY Two Barriers B01 do NOT shut down the reactor as 1. Loss of all Off-Site and all On-Site AC following B01, B02, B04, B05, B06 intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) minutes or longer: indicated by: power to PBA-S03 and PBB-S04 or toward site personnel or equipment that could Plant Vent RU-144 CH-1 >1.04E-01 uCi/cc Reactor power is NOT dropping to for 15 minutes or longer. SESS for 15 minutes or longer.

OR lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent Fuel Building RU-146 CH-1 >3.50E+00 uCi/cc less than 5% power Loss of either PNA-D25 or PNB-D26 effective access to equipment needed for the OR POTENTIAL POTENTIAL All full strength CEAs are NOT inserted LOSS LOSS MS3 - Loss of all Vital DC Power for 15 for 15 minutes or longer. protection of the public. Any releases are not

2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 100 mrem TEDE OR LOSS LOSS minutes or longer. AND expected to result in exposure levels which 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundary.

exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline OR FUEL CLAD RCS b. ANY of the following:

Note: The EC should not wait until the exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY

3. Field survey results indicate closed window dose rates greater than 100 mR/hr expected to SITE AREA EMERGENCY applicable time has elapsed, but should Automatic turbine setback/runback continue for 60 minutes or longer; or analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 25% thermal reactor declare the event as soon as it is determined greater than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation, at or beyond the site boundary power that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. Reactor Trip VALID ESFAS Actuation
1. Less than 112 VDC on all PKA-M41, AND 1/2 PKB-M42, PKC-M43, and PKD-M44 for 15 minutes or longer. c. Plant computer indications are unavailable.

FA1 - ANY Loss or ANY Potential Loss of EITHER Fuel Clad OR RCS MA2 - Automatic Trip fails to shutdown the MA4 - UNPLANNED Loss of safety system HA2 - FIRE or EXPLOSION affecting the HA3 - Access to a VITAL AREA is HA6 - Other conditions exist which in the EFFLUENTS RAD LEVELS MA5 - AC power capability to emergency HA1 - Natural or destructive phenomena HA4 - HOSTILE ACTION within the Owner HA5 - Control Room evacuation has been reactor and the manual actions taken from the annunciation or indication in the Control operability of plant safety systems required to prohibited due to release of toxic, corrosive, judgment of the EC warrant declaration of an POTENTIAL busses reduced to a single power source for 15 affecting VITAL AREAS. Controlled Area or airborne attack threat initiated.

LOSS reactor control console are successful in Room with EITHER (1) a significant transient establish or maintain safe shutdown. asphyxiant or flammable gases which Alert.

LOSS minutes or longer such that ANY additional RA2 - Damage to irradiated fuel or loss of shutting down the reactor. Modes 1 and 2 in progress, or (2) compensatory indicators are jeopardize operation of systems required to 1. Control Room evacuation is required by: 1. Other conditions exist which in the RA1 - ANY release of gaseous radioactivity single failure would result in station blackout. maintain safe operations or safely shutdown water level that has resulted or will result in CONTAINMENT unavailable. 1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has 40AO-9ZZ18, Shutdown Outside Control judgment of the EC indicate that events are to the environment greater than 20 times the the uncovering of irradiated fuel outside the 1.a. Plant Protection System failed to 1.a. Seismic event greater than 1. FIRE or EXPLOSION resulting in VISIBLE the reactor. occurred within the Owner Controlled Area in progress or have occurred which involve ODCM for 15 minutes or longer. Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) DAMAGE to ANY POWER BLOCK Room reactor vessel. shutdown the reactor. Note: The EC should not wait until the Note: The EC should not wait until the as reported by the Security Team. an actual or potential substantial as indicated by ANY Force Balance structure or Control Room indication of Note: If the equipment in the stated area was OR AND applicable time has elapsed, but should applicable time has elapsed, but should degraded performance of safety systems. OR degradation of the level of safety of the Note: This EAL does not apply to the cask Accelerometer reading greater than 0.10g. already inoperable, or out of service, before 40AO-9ZZ19, Control Room Fire.

Note: The EC should not wait until the b. Manual shutdown actions taken on declare the event as soon as it is determined declare the event as soon as it is determined AND 2. A validated notification from NRC of an plant or a security event that involves loading pit during cask loading operations. that the condition has exceeded, or will likely that the condition has exceeded, or will likely the event occurred, then this EAL should not applicable time has elapsed, but should 1/1 Panels B05 or B01 are successful as b. Earthquake confirmed by ANY of the airliner attack threat within 30 minutes of probable life threatening risk to site exceed, the applicable time. exceed, the applicable time. following: be declared as it will have no adverse impact declare the event as soon as it is determined 1. A water level drop in the reactor refueling indicated by all of the following: the site. personnel or damage to site equipment Earthquake felt in plant on the ability of the plant to safely operate or that the release duration has exceeded, or will cavity, spent fuel pool, cask loading pit, or Reactor Power is dropping to OR because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any FU1 - ANY Loss OR ANY Potential Loss of 1.a. AC power capability to 1. a. UNPLANNED Loss of annunciators on National Earthquake Center safely shutdown beyond that already allowed likely exceed, the applicable time. In the fuel transfer canal that will result in less than 5% power ANY 4 of the following 3. A HOSTILE ACTION directed toward the releases are expected to be limited to small Containment PBA-S03 and PBB-S04 reduced to a Control Room indication of degraded by Technical Specifications at the time of the absence of data to the contrary, assume that uncovering irradiated fuel. Negative Startup rate B01, B02, B04, B05, B06 or SESS ISFSI. fractions of the EPA Protective Action single power source for 15 minutes or performance of systems required for the event.

the release duration has exceeded the OR All full strength CEAs are inserted for 15 minutes or longer Guideline exposure levels.

or Boration in progress longer. OR safe shutdown of the plant.

applicable time if an ongoing release is 2. A VALID High Alarm on ANY of the 1. Access to a VITAL AREA is prohibited due Note: Multiple events could occur which result in the conclusion that exceeding the loss or The Containment Barrier should not be declared lost or potentially lost based on AND UNPLANNED Loss of either OR detected and the release start time is unknown. following due to damage to irradiated fuel 2. Tornado touching down or high winds to toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable potential loss thresholds is IMMINENT. exceeding Technical Specification action statement criteria, unless there is an b. Any additional single power source PNA-D25 or PNB-D26 gases which jeopardize operation of systems ALERT or loss of water level: event in progress requiring mitigation by the Containment barrier. When no for 15 minutes or longer. reaching 100 mph resulting in ALERT In this IMMINENT loss situation use judgment and failure will result in station blackout.

RU-16 Containment Operating Level Area event is in progress (Loss or Potential Loss of either Fuel Clad and/or RCS) the VISIBLE DAMAGE to ANY required to maintain safe operations or classify as if the thresholds are exceeded. AND POWER BLOCK structure OR safely shutdown the reactor.

1. VALID reading on ANY of the following RU-17 Incore Instrument Area Containment Barrier status is addressed by Technical Specifications.

RU-19 New Fuel Area b. ANY of the following: Control Room indication of degraded radiation monitors greater than the value performance of safety systems.

for 15 minutes or longer: RU-31 Spent Fuel Pool Area Automatic turbine setback/runback OR RU-33 Refueling Machine Area Fuel Clad Barrier RCS Barrier Containment Barrier greater than 25% thermal reactor 3. Internal flooding in ANY POWER BLOCK Plant Vent RU-143 CH-1 > 1.22E-02 uCi/cc RU-143 Plant Vent power structure resulting in an electrical shock Fuel Bldg RU-146 CH-1 >1.13E-01 uCi/cc Reactor Trip hazard that precludes access to operate or RU-145 Fuel Building Vent Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss VALID ESFAS Actuation monitor safety equipment OR OR Control Room indication of degraded

2. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous RA3 - Rise in radiation levels within the Plant computer unavailable
1. A. Coolant activity 1. A. RCS leak rate greater 1. A. RCS leak rate greater 1. A. A containment 1. A. Containment pressure performance of those safety systems.

releases indicates concentrations or release facility that impedes operation of systems greater than 300 Ci/gm than charging capacity pressure rise followed by greater than 60 psig OR than available makeup rates greater than 20 times the ODCM required to maintain plant safety functions. Dose Equivalent I-131. capacity as indicated by with Letdown isolated. a rapid unexplained drop and rising. 4. Vehicle crash resulting in Section 3.0 limits for 15 minutes or longer. a loss of RCS subcooling OR in containment pressure. OR VISIBLE DAMAGE to ANY to saturation (0 oF). OR B. 4.5% H2 inside POWER BLOCK structure OR

1. Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in the B. RCS Pressure Control Control Room indication of degraded Safety Function Status B. Containment pressure containment.

Control Room Area OR Secondary Alarm or sump level response OR performance of safety systems Station. Not Satisfied. not consistent with C. a. Pressure greater than OR LOCA or MSLB 8.5 psig.

C. RCS and Core Heat HU2 - FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA HU5 - Other conditions exist which in the conditions. AND MU2 - Inability to reach required shutdown MU1 - Loss of all Off-site AC power to MU3 - UNPLANNED loss of safety system HU1 - Natural or destructive phenomena HU3 - Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant, HU4 - Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION RU1 - ANY release of gaseous radioactivity RU2 - UNPLANNED rise in plant radiation Removal Safety Function b. Less than one full not extinguished within 15 minutes of judgment of the EC warrant declaration of a to the environment greater than 2 times the within Technical Specification limits. emergency busses for 15 minutes or longer. annunciation or indication in the Control affecting the PROTECTED AREA. or flammable gases deemed detrimental to or threat which indicates a potential ODCM for 60 minutes or longer. levels. Status Not Satisfied. train of Containment detection or EXPLOSION within the UE.

Room for 15 minutes or longer. NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS. degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

Spray operating. PROTECTED AREA.

Note: The EC should not wait until the 1. a. A VALID Alert Alarm on ANY of the 2. A. Rep CET reading 2. A. Rep CET reading 2. A. a. Rep CET greater Note: The EC should not wait until the 1. Seismic event identified by ANY 2 of the Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should currently or previously currently or previously than 1200ºF. 1. Plant is not brought to required operating applicable time has elapsed, but should Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should 1. Toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable 1. Other conditions exist which in the following: following: 1. A SECURITY CONDITION that does declare the event as soon as it is determined greater than 1200 oF greater than 700 oF AND mode within Technical Specifications declare the event as soon as it is determined applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined gases in amounts that have or could NOT involve a HOSTILE ACTION as judgment of the EC indicate that events are

b. Restoration not VALID Seismic Event alarm that the release duration has exceeded, or will RU-16 Containment Operating Level Area LCO Action Statement Time. that the condition has exceeded, or will likely declare the event as soon as it is determined that the duration has exceeded, or will likely adversely affect NORMAL PLANT reported by the Security Team. in progress or have occurred which indicate effective within Earthquake felt in plant likely exceed, the applicable time. In the RU-17 Incore Instrument Area exceed, the applicable time. that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed the applicable time. OPERATIONS. a potential degradation of the level of safety 15 minutes. National Earthquake Center OR absence of data to the contrary, assume that RU-19 New Fuel Area OR exceed, the applicable time. OR OR of the plant or indicate a security threat to RU-31 Spent Fuel Pool Area 2. A credible PVNGS security threat facility protection has been initiated. No the release duration has exceeded the B. a. Rep CET greater than MU5 - RCS Leakage. 1. Loss of all off-site AC power to 2. Tornado touching down within the 1. FIRE in the POWER BLOCK or Turbine 2. Report by local, county or state officials for notification.

RU-33 Refueling Machine Area 700 oF. PBA-S03 and PBB-S04 1. UNPLANNED Loss of annunciators on Building not extinguished within 15 minutes evacuation or sheltering of site personnel releases of radioactive material requiring applicable time if an ongoing release is ANY 4 of the following PROTECTED AREA or high winds AND for 15 minutes or longer. of a FIRE alarm or Control Room based on an off-site event. OR off-site response or monitoring are expected detected and the release start time is unknown. b. RVLMS less than 21% B01, B02, B04, B05, B06 or SESS reaching 100 mph.

AND OR notification. 3. A validated notification from NRC unless further degradation of safety systems

b. UNPLANNED water level drop in the plenum. 1. Unidentified or pressure boundary for 15 minutes or longer. providing information of an aircraft threat.
1. VALID reading on ANY of the following AND OR 3. Internal flooding in the POWER BLOCK OR occurs.

reactor refueling cavity, fuel transfer LEAKAGE greater than 10 gpm.

radiation monitors greater than the value for c. Restoration not OR UNPLANNED Loss of either canal, cask loading pit, or spent fuel pool that has the potential to affect safety related 2. EXPLOSION within the 60 minutes or longer: as indicated by ANY of the following: effective within PNA-D25 or PNB-D26 equipment required by Technical

2. Identified LEAKAGE greater than 25 gpm. PROTECTED AREA.

Plant Vent RU-143 CH-1 >1.22E-03 uCi/cc 15 minutes. for 15 minutes or longer.

Visual observation Specifications for the current operating Fuel Bldg RU-145 CH-1 >1.13E-02 uCi/cc SFP LEVEL HI - LOW (EO204A) 3. A. RUPTURED SG is mode.

3. A. RVLMS level 3. A. RUPTURED SG OR on PCN-E02 currently or previously results in an SIAS. also FAULTED outside MU4 - Fuel Clad Degradation. MU6 - Loss of all On-site or Off-site OR
2. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous RWLIS less than 21% plenum. of containment. communications capabilities 4. Main Turbine failure resulting in casing releases indicates concentrations or release OR penetration or damage to turbine or Pressurizer level B.a. Primary-to-Secondary rates greater than 2 times the ODCM Section 3 OR 1. RU-155D High Alarm Main Generator seals.

leakrate greater than 1. Loss of all of the following on-site limits for 60 minutes or longer. 10 gpm. OR

2. UNPLANNED VALID Area Radiation 2.a. DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 communication methods affecting the Monitor readings or survey results indicate AND greater than 1.0 Ci/gm for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. ability to perform routine operations.

a rise by a factor of 1000 over normal*

UNUSUAL EVENT UNUSUAL EVENT

b. UNISOLABLE steam PBX levels. release from the OR affected SG to the Plant Page System environment. b. Coolant Gross Specific Activity Two-Way Radio
  • Normal levels can be considered as the greater than 100/ Ci/gm. OR highest reading in the past twenty-four hours 4. A. a. Failure of all 2. Loss of all of the following off-site excluding the current peak value. valves in any one communication methods affecting the line to close MU8 - Inadvertent Criticality. Mode 3 or 4 AND ability to perform off-site notifications.
b. Direct downstream PBX pathway to the 1. UNPLANNED sustained source range FTS ISFSI environment exists Cellular Phones after containment count rise observed on nuclear isolation signal. instrumentation.
5. A. Containment radiation 5. A. Containment radiation 5. A. Containment radiation E-HU1 - Damage to a loaded cask monitor monitor monitor CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY RU-148 > 2.1E+05 mR/hr RU-148 > 5.0E+04 mR/hr RU-148 > 6.8E+06 mR/hr OR OR OR RU-149 > 2.4E+05 mR/hr RU-149 > 5.6E+04 mR/hr. RU-149 > 7.8E+06 mR/hr
1. Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT
6. A. Any condition in the opinion of the EC that indicates 6. A. Any condition in the opinion of the EC that indicates 6. A. Any condition in the opinion of the EC that indicates BOUNDARY.

Loss or Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. Loss or Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier. Loss or Potential Loss of the Containment Barrier.

CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined actions taken to secure containment and its associated IMMINENT: Mitigation actions have been ineffective, additional actions are not expected to be successful, and trended POWER BLOCK: Structures, systems or components listed below that contain equipment necessary for safe operation structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release in Mode 6. information indicates that the event or condition will occur. and/or shutdown of the reactor. UNISOLABLE: A breach or leak that cannot be isolated from the Control Room.

A. Containment CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: The dry storage cask barriers between areas containing radioactive substances and the LEAKAGE shall be: B. Auxiliary Building environment. UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or

a. Identified LEAKAGE C. Refueling Water Tank (RWT) mitigative actions.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or catastrophic failure of pressurized/energized equipment that 1. LEAKAGE, such as that from pump seals or valve packing (except reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal water D. Diesel Generator Building imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems, or components. injection or leakoff), that is captured and conducted to collection systems or a sump or collecting tank; E. Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks FAULTED: in a steam generator, the existence of secondary side leakage that results in an uncontrolled drop in steam 2. LEAKAGE into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not F. Fuel Building generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE; or G. Spray Pond VALID: An indication, report, or condition, is considered to be VALID when it is verified by (1) an instrument channel

3. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) LEAKAGE through a steam generator (SG) to the Secondary System (primary to H. Condensate Storage Tank (CST) check, (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical secondary LEAKAGE). I. Control Building related to the indicators operability, the conditions existence, or the reports accuracy is removed.

equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and b. Unidentified LEAKAGE J. Corridor Building heat are observed. All LEAKAGE that is not identified LEAKAGE; K. MSSS Definitions HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, c. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE Revision 0 take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, LEAKAGE (except primary to secondary LEAKAGE) through a nonisolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe PROTECTED AREA: The area which encompasses all controlled areas within the security PROTECTED AREA fence. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or 10/01/09 explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall wall, or vessel wall. analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of the affected structure, RUPTURED: in a steam generator, existence of primary-to-secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts cause a reactor trip and safety injection cracking, and paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.

that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS: Activities at the plant site, excluding the Water Reclamation Facility, associated this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). with routine testing, maintenance, or equipment operations, in accordance with normal operating or administrative SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and procedures. Entry into abnormal or emergency operating procedures, or deviation from normal security or radiological threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant.

controls posture, is a departure from NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS. VITAL AREAS: Areas, within the PROTECTED AREA, that contains equipment vital to the operations of the plant.

EP-0801 A deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.

         

  

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RCS Press Temp Limits Normal CTMT Conditions 2500 100 °F/hr Cooldown 200 °F Subcooled 2000 RCP NPSH 1500 STANDARD APPENDICES Appendix 2, PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 1000 Figures 350 psia transition line RCS Pressure (psia)

QSPDS no longer useful Minimum Subcooled 500 Appendix 2 40EP-9EO10 Revision: 65 SDC Region 0

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 RCS Temperature (Th °F)

Page 1 of 3 Page 18 of 1280 Forced Circulation - Th indication used Natural Circulation - REP CET used

RCS Press Temp Limits Harsh CTMT Conditions 2500 200 °F Subcooled 100 °F/hr Cooldown 2000 RCP NPSH 1500 STANDARD APPENDICES PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 350 psia transition line 1000 QSPDS no longer useful RCS Pressure (psia)

Minimum Subcooled 500 Appendix 2 40EP-9EO10 Revision: 65 SDC Region 0

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 RCS Temperature (Th °F)

Page 2 of 3 Page 19 of 1280 Forced Circulation - Th indication used Natural Circulation - REP CET used

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam 7.

This Exam Level SRO Appears on: SRO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A # 003 2.2.38 Importance 4.5 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

x Unit 2 is operating at 100% ARO.

x A Regulating Group 5 CEA has dropped completely into the core.

x All required actions are complete.

Which ONE of the following describes Technical Specification 3.1.5 (CEA Alignment)?

CEA alignment must be restored within a maximum of ______ hour(s).

A. 1 B. 2 C. 6 D. 12 Answer: B Reference Id: Q43907 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.43 (1) 55.43 (1) Conditions and limitations in the facility license.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

Technical Specification 3.1.5 K&A: Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license. Dropped Control Rod Learning Objective: Given plant conditions and Technical Specification action statements that are greater than one hour apply the action statements that are greater than one hour for T.S. 3.1 in accordance with Tech Spec 3.1.

Justification:

A. Incorrect: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> applies to reducing THERMAL POWER in accordance with the COLR.

B. Correct: TS 3.1.5 Condition A.2 requires CEA alignment to be restored within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

C. Incorrect: 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> applies to being in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> if the CEA alignment or Power limit if condition A can not be met.

D. Incorrect: 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> applies to the frequency that CEAs with inoperable position indicators be verified.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 1 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam 8.

This Exam Level SRO Appears on: SRO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A # 4.2 024 AA2.06 Importance 3.7 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

Initial Conditions:

x Unit 1 is operating at 100%.

x CEDMCS is in Automatic.

x A New Purification Letdown Ion Exchanger was just placed in service at the end of last shift.

Subsequently:

x Tavg is 5910F and rising slowly.

x A Low Rate CEA insertion demand exists.

x CEAs begin inserting.

Which ONE of the following would cause this condition and what procedure will be used to respond?

A. RWT to CVCS gravity feed isolation (CHE-HV-536) is leaking by, manually isolate per 40OP-9CH02 (Purification System).

B. New letdown IX not appropriately borated prior to placing in service, manually isolate per 40OP-9CH02 (Purification System).

C. New letdown IX not appropriately borated prior to placing in service, borate the RCS per 40OP-9CH01 (CVCS Normal Operations).

D. RWT to CVCS gravity feed isolation (CHE-HV-536) is leaking by, borate the RCS per 40OP-9CH01 (CVCS Normal Operations).

Answer: C Reference Id: Q43890 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.43 (5) 55.43 (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40OP-9CH01 (CVCS Normal Operations).

K&A: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration: When boron dilution is taking place.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/03/06

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam Learning Objective: Identify how the dilution will be mitigated Justification:

A. Incorrect: CHE-HV-536 is the RWT gravity feed isolation valve, the RWT is a borated source of water that if it were to leak by RCS Temperature would lower. 40OP-9CH02 is the procedure that provides direction to borate the IX prior to placing in service, but doesn't provide direction to isolate and borate the RCS to remedy to situation.

B. Incorrect: An IX that has not been appropriately borated will resulting in the RCS temperature rise and the CEA insertion, but 40OP-9CH02 is the procedure that provides direction to borate the IX prior to placing in service, but doesn't provide direction to isolate and borate the RCS to remedy to situation.

C. Correct: An IX that has not been appropriately borated will result in the RCS temperature rise and the CEA insertion. 40OP-9CH01 is the procedure that directs borating the RCS to maintain Tc on program.

D. Incorrect: CHE-HV-536 is the RWT gravity feed isolation valve, the RWT is a borated source of water that if it were to leak by RCS Temperature would lower. 40OP-9CH01 is the procedure that directs borating the RCS to maintain Tc on program.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/03/06

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam 9.

This Exam Level SRO Appears on: SRO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A # 2.4.4 Importance 4.7 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

x PZR level is 47% and trending down.

x PBA-S03 is de-energized.

x RCS T-cold is 557°F and stable.

x RCS T-hot is 612°F and stable.

x CHB-P01 is the only Charging Pump available and is operating.

x Letdown has been isolated.

x Containment temperature and humidity are rising.

Subsequently x The reactor is manually tripped.

x SPTAs are complete x Containment temperature and humidity are rising.

x PZR level is 28% and trending down.

x RCS T-cold is 564°F and stable.

x RCS T-hot is 567°F and stable.

The operating crew is required to trip the Reactor, perform SPTAs and implement ...

A. 40EP-9EO05 (ESD) and initiate an MSIS.

B. 40EP-9EO03 (LOCA) and initiate a SIAS/CIAS.

C. 40EP-9EO09 (FRP), CI-1 to restore safety functions.

D. 40EP-9EO09 (FRP), MVAC-1 to restore safety functions.

Answer: B Reference Id: Q6849 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 4 10CFR Category: CFR 55.43 (5) 55.43 (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/28

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40EP-9EO03 (LOCA)

K&A: Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures. Excess RCS Leakage Learning Objective: Determine if the Excessive Leakage AOP should be executed in accordance with 40AO-9ZZ02.

Justification: SRO level for this is a diagnostic of the plant post SPTAs which requires the candidate to assess plant conditions and then selecting a procedure to mitigate, recover or with which to proceed.

A. Incorrect: ESD is not the appropriate ORP due to RCS Tcold not lowering; the CTMT parameters and lowering PZR level are indication of a possible ESD. MSIS will not mitigate the event due to being inside the CTMT.

B. Correct: LOCA is correct with the indications provided. PZR level lowering with letdown isolated and one all available charging pumps running. SIAS/CIAS will be required due to the degrading conditions resulting from the LOCA into the CTMT.

C. Incorrect: FRP CI-1 Condition 2 is met; therefore the Safety Function is not jeopardized.

D. Incorrect: FRP MVAC-1 is met; therefore the Safety Function is not jeopardized.

NOTE: Same as Q44010 OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/28

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam 10.

This Exam Level SRO Appears on: SRO EXAM 2007 SRO EXAM 2012 Tier 1 Group 2 K/A # 4.4 E09 EA2.2 Importance 4.0 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

Radiation Monitor status just prior to Reactor trip is as follows:

x RU-139 (Main Steam Line SG 1) is in ALERT alarm.

x RU-140 (Main Steam Line SG 2) is in HIGH alarm.

x RU-142 (Main Steam Line N-16) channels 1/2 are ALERT alarm.

x RU-142 (Main Steam Line N-16) channels 3/4 are in HIGH alarm.

Current plant conditions:

x SG 1level is 51% WR and rising.

x SG 1 pressure is 1200 psi and stable.

x SG 2 level is 28% WR and lowering.

x SG 2 pressure 1070 psi and lowering.

x Containment temperature is 195°F.

x Containment pressure 9.0 psig.

x RCPs have been tripped.

x All expected ESFAS actuations have initiated.

x RU-16, Containment Operating Level Monitor, is in ALERT alarm.

Which ONE of the following mitigation strategies would the CRS direct?

A. Implement 40EP-9EO04 (SGTR), feed SG 1 to 45% NR, secure feed to SG 2.

B. Implement 40EP-9EO09 (FRP), feed SG 1 to 45% NR, secure feed to SG 2.

C. Implement 40EP-9EO04 (SGTR), maintain flow to SG 1 and feed SG 2 to 45% NR at 1360 - 1600 gpm.

D. Implement 40EP-9EO09 (FRP), maintain flow to SG 1 and feed SG 2 to 45% NR at 1360 - 1600 gpm.

Answer: B Reference Id: Q10294 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.43 (5) 55.43 (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/22

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40EP-9EO09 (FRP)

K&A: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Functional Recovery):

Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments Learning Objective: L90459 Diagnose FRP event in progress Justification: This is a dual event SGTR and ESD (inside contmt) implement the FRP. The strategy is to restore the good SG to 45% NR without overcooling the RCS.

A. Incorrect: SGTR is the wrong procedure, however the strategy is correct.

B. Correct: FRP directs these actions. SG 1 is not faulted so it should be restored to 45 -60% NR, we are not expected feed a faulted SG with another SG available for Heat Removal.

C. Incorrect: SGTR is the wrong procedure and 1360-1600 gpm is the strategy for a SGTR with steam releasing to atmosphere.

D. Incorrect: FRP is correct but the strategy is wrong for a SG ruptured to cntmt.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/22

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam 11.

This Exam Level SRO Appears on: SRO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 3.2 004 A2.26 Importance 3.0 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

x VCT Level is 40% and stable.

x The RO reports that VCT Pressure is 3 psig and lowering.

Which ONE of the following describes the impact of this condition on the CVCS system and what action will mitigate the event?

Primary Coolant (RCS) will have ....

A. increased Hydrogen concentrations, ISOLATE the VCT from gaseous radwaste per 40AO-9RK3A (B03 ARP).

B. increased Oxygen concentrations, ISOLATE the VCT from gaseous radwaste per 40AO-9RK3A (B03 ARP).

C. increased Hydrogen concentrations, VENT the VCT to gaseous radwaste per 40OP-9CH01 (CVCS Normal Operations).

D. increased Oxygen concentrations, VENT the VCT to gaseous radwaste per 40OP-9CH01 (CVCS Normal Operations).

Answer: B Reference Id: Q43909 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.43 (5) 55.43 (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40AL-9RK3A (B03A Alarm Response Procedure)

K&A:

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Low VCT pressure Learning Objective: Explain the operation of the Volume Control Tank under normal operating conditions.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 0 LDB 2012/02/10

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect - Excessive H2 concentrations are not a concern for this event, When Degassing the RCS, VCT pressure is lowered to promote gasses coming out of solution. VCT TRBL alarm actuates at 5 psig, the ARP for high pressure directs venting to the gaseous radwaste system.

B. Correct - With the lower VCT pressure the H2 will come out of solution which will eventually lead to higher than desired O2 concentrations. VCT TRBL alarm actuates at 5 psig, the ARP directs isolating the VCT from the gaseous radwaste system.

C. Incorrect - Excessive H2 concentrations are not a concern for this event, When Degassing the RCS, VCT pressure is lowered to promote gasses coming out of solution. 40OP-9CH01 is the procedure used to establish and maintain VCT H2 pressures during normal conditions, this is an alarm condition. VCT TRBL alarm actuates at 5 psig.

D. Incorrect - With the lower VCT pressure the H2 will come out of solution which will eventually lead to higher than desired O2 concentrations. 40OP-9CH01 is the procedure used to establish and maintain VCT H2 pressures during normal conditions, this is an alarm condition. VCT TRBL alarm actuates at 5 psig.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 0 LDB 2012/02/10

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam 12.

This Exam Level SRO Appears on: SRO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 3.2 006 A2.04 Importance 3.8 Rating:

Given the following initial conditions:

x Unit 1 automatically tripped from 100% power.

x SPTAs are in progress.

x The crew has manually initiated SIAS/CIAS.

x Adequate SI flow has been verified.

x 525 KV East and West Bus Voltage meters indicate 0 Vac.

x Pressurizer pressure is 1450 psia and lowering.

x Pressurizer level is 20% and lowering.

x SG 1 & 2 pressures being controlled at 1180 psia with ADVs.

x PBA-S03 is energized by DG "A".

x DG "B" has tripped on "overspeed".

Subsequently:

x HPSI pump "A" discharge pressure degrades to 1000 psig.

Which ONE of the following describes the impact on Safety Injection and the appropriate procedure required to mitigate these events?

HPSI flow lowers to ..

A. zero (0) gpm, utilize 40EP-9EO03 (LOCA).

B. half its original value, utilize 40EP-9EO03 (LOCA).

C. zero (0) gpm, utilize 40EP-9EO09 (FRP) MVAC-2 DGs.

D. half its original value, utilize 40EP-9EO09 (FRP) MVAC-2 DGs.

Answer: C Reference Id: Q44014 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.43 (5) 55.43 (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/02/22

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40OP-9EO09 (FRP)

K&A: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Improper discharge pressure.

Learning Objective: Describe how the FRP will maintain or recover the Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries.

Justification:

A. Incorrect: Per Standard Appendix 2, HPSI Pump Delivery Curves, 0 gpm does not meet the acceptable region of the curve, due to the Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and the HPSI A degraded condition, HPSI A is not available, the Loss of the EDG B results in HPSI B not being available.

The LOCA procedure does not provide direction to Crosstie PB busses to restore electrical power to the undamaged HPSI B.

B. Incorrect: HPSI Flow will drop to 0 not half. HPSI B is not available and HPSI A is operating below the pressure of the RCS. Due to the Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and the HPSI A degraded condition, HPSI A is not available, the Loss of the EDG B results in HPSI B not being available.

The LOCA procedure does not provide direction to Crosstie PB busses to restore electrical power to the undamaged HPSI B.

C. Correct: Due to the Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and the loss of PBA-S03 along with the HPSI A degraded condition HPSI A is not available, the Loss of the EDG B results in HPSI B not being available. FRP MVAC-2 will provide direction to restore electrical power to PBB-S04 and start HPSI B to restore adequate HPSI delivery.

D. Incorrect: HPSI Flow will drop to 0 not half. HPSI B is not available and HPSI A is operating below the pressure of the RCS Per Standard Appendix 2, HPSI Pump Delivery Curves, 0 gpm does not meet the acceptable region of the curve. FRP MVAC-2 is the correct procedure.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/02/22

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam 13.

This Exam Level SRO Appears on: SRO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 3.3 010 A2.02 Importance 3.9 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

x PZR pressure was reported as 2230 psia and lowering.

x Main spray valves 100E & 100F indicate full open.

x All attempts to close Main Spray valves have failed.

x Pressurizer pressure is 2050 psia and continuing to lower.

This will cause the RCN-PIC-100 (PPCS master controller) output to go to _____(1)____ and the CRS should trip the reactor, ____(2)_____.

A. (1) minimum, (2) close IAA-UV-2 and enter 40EP-9EO02 (Reactor Trip).

B. (1) maximum, (2) close IAA-UV-2 and enter 40EP-9EO02 (Reactor Trip).

C. (1) minimum, (2) stop all 4 RCPs and enter 40EP-9EO07 (LOOP/LOFC).

D. (1) maximum, (2) stop all 4 RCPs and enter 40EP-9EO07 (LOOP/LOFC).

Answer: C Reference Id: Q43920 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.43 (5) 55.43 (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

PVNGS Operating Experience Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40AL-9RK4A (Panel B04A ARP), 40EP-9EO07 (LOOP/LOFC)

K&A: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR PCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Spray valve failures Learning Objective: Describe the response of the Pressurizer Pressure Control System to a failure of an input transmitter.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev 1 LDB 2012/02/10

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect: The Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller is a reverse acting controller, minimum is correct. (OE) Shutting IAA-UV-2 was previously an option in the B04A Alarm Response procedure.

PVNGS experienced a plant event where IA was isolated to CTMT and IA pressure maintained Spray Valves open well past the expected response time. Reactor Trip is not the appropriate procedure.

B. Incorrect: The Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller is a reverse acting controller, maximum is wrong.(OE) Shutting IAA-UV-2 was previously an option in the B04A Alarm Response procedure.

PVNGS experienced a plant event where IA was isolated to CTMT and IA pressure maintained Spray Valves open well past the expected response time.

C. Correct:The Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller is a reverse acting controller. A decrease in controller output results in an increase in system pressure. The B04A Alarm Response procedure directs stopping all RCPs. The Crew must trip the reactor to stop all 4 RCPs. Tripping all 4 RCPs will result in a LOFC.

D. Incorrect: The Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller is a reverse acting controller, maximum is wrong. The Crew must trip the reactor to stop all 4 RCPs. Tripping all 4 RCPs will result in a LOFC.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev 1 LDB 2012/02/10

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam 14.

This Exam Level SRO Appears on: SRO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 059 2.4.11 Importance 4.2 Rating:

Given the following initial conditions:

x Unit 1 is operating at 48% power following a Reactor Power Cutback due to a trip of the B main feedwater pump.

x CEA Subgroups 4, 5, and 22 drop to the bottom of the core.

x CEA Reg group 3 CEAs are automatically inserting as expected to maintain RCS program temperature.

x Turbine Load is approximately 850 MW and stable.

During plant stabilization the following conditions are observed:

x The CRS has implemented 40AO-9ZZ09 (RPCB - Loss of Feedpump).

x CEDMCS has been placed in Manual Sequential (MS).

x CEA 42 (Regulating Group 3, 4 Finger CEA) is at 140 inches, the remaining CEAs in Gp 3 are at 132 inches.

x CPC Pt. ID 0187 (ASI) average value is minus (-) .38 and slowly trending to the top of the core.

Which ONE of the following actions and conditions are both correct?

A. Withdraw Gp 3 CEAs to control ASI per 40AO-9ZZ09 (RPCB).

B. Withdraw Gp 3 CEAs to within 6.6 inches of CEA 42 per 40AO-9ZZ09 (RPCB).

C. Trip the reactor, perform SPTAs and enter 40EP-9EO01 (Rx Trip) due to exceeding ASI limits.

D. Trip the reactor, perform SPTAs and enter 40EP-9EO01 (Rx Trip) due to the CEA mis-alignment.

Answer: D Reference Id: Q43913 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.43 (5) 55.43 (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ09,RPCB (loss of Feedpump)

K&A: Main Feedwater; Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

Learning Objective: Describe the contingency action(s) that the operator would be required to take if RPCB does not operate properly.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 2012/02/11

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect: ASI is negative and trending to to top (more Negative) withdrawing CEAs would drive ASI even more negative and possibly exceed limits.

B. Incorrect: Below insertion limits, a greater than 6.6 inch deviation requires a reactor trip. Examinees may confuse this with the CEA Technical Specification condition reguarding group deviation and not recognize the AOP requirement trip.

C. Incorrect: ASI limits are not currently being exceeded.

D. Correct:During a reactor power cutback an 8 inch deviation, no matter what direction, requires a reactor trip and entry into SPTAs.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 2012/02/11

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam 15.

This Exam Level SRO Appears on: RO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 3.8 078 A2.01 Importance 2.4 Rating:

Given the following initial conditions:

x Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

x Instrument Air compressor "A" is operating and maintaining IA pressure at 115 psig.

x Instrument Air Dryer IAN-M01C is in service.

Subsequently x Window 7B01A (INST AIR SYSTEM TROUBLE) is in alarm.

x Alarm point IAPDS238 (Instrument Air Filter After Filter "C" Differential Press Hi) is alarming.

x IA-PI-32 (IA Header Pressure) is 98 psig and dropping slowly.

x Instrument Air compressors "B and C" have started.

Which ONE of the following describes the impact to the IA system and the appropriate procedural action?

The IA header pressure will continue to LOWER ...

A. to approximately 85 psig, implement 40AO-9ZZ06 (Loss of Instrument Air), to perform leak isolation.

B. to approximately 85 psig, implement 40AO-9ZZ06 (Loss of Instrument Air), to valve in another air dryer.

C. requiring a reactor trip, implement 40EP-9EO01 (Reactor Trip) and maintain Heat Removal with Auxiliary Feedwater pumps and Atmospheric Dump Valves.

D. requiring a reactor trip, implement 40EP-9EO01 (Reactor Trip) and maintain Heat Removal with Main Feedwater pumps and the Steam Bypass Control Valves.

Answer: B Reference Id: Q44024 Difficulty: 0.00 Time to complete: 0 10CFR Category: CFR 55.43 (5) 55.43 (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/22

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ06 (Loss of Instrument Air) 40AL-9RK7B (B07B ARP)

K&A: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the IAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Air dryer and filter malfunction Learning Objective: Determine the mitigating strategies of the Loss of Instrument air AOP.

Justification: From the stem the examinee should be able to determine that the in-service dryer "C" has a high dp and is causing the low pressure in the IA header. The Nitrogen backup valve opens at 85 psig and will maintain IA header pressure until the standby dryer can be placed in service iaw 40AO-9ZZ06 (Loss of Instrument Air)

A. Incorrect: the lowering IA pressure and hi dp could be attributed to a large leak but from the indications given leak isolation is not required.

B. Correct: the automatic features associated with the IA system is the N2 Backup alignment and Stby IA comp starting. 40AO-9zz06 has actions to place the standby dryer in service.

C. Incorrect: N2 Backup valve automatically opens at 85 psig to maintain system pressure. A loss of IA would require the use of AFW and ADVs.

D. Incorrect: N2 Backup valve automatically opens at 85 psig to maintain system pressure. If pressure stayed at 85 psig then MFW and SBCVs would be available.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/22

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam 16.

This Exam Level SRO Appears on: SRO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 1 K/A # 002 2.2.40 Importance 4.7 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 is in Mode 4 during a refueling outage.

x RCS Pressure is 450 psia and stable.

x RCA-HV-106 (PZR/RV HEAD VENT TO CTMT) was declared INOPERABLE 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ago.

Given LCO 3.4.12 (Pressurizer Vents) and appendix C of 40OP-9RC04 (RV Head and Pressurizer Vent System) which ONE of the following describes the required action (if any)?

A. No action required due to only ONE (1) path is INOPERABLE.

B. Restore ONE (1) additional pressurizer vent path to OPERABLE within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

C. Restore TWO (2) additional pressurizer vent paths to OPERABLE status within 67 hrs.

D. Lower RCS pressure to < 385 psia within 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br />.

Answer: C Reference Id: Q43813 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: CFR 55.43 (2) 55.43 (2)Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: New Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: Tech Spec 3.4.12, Diagram of PZR Vents from 40OP-9RC04 (RCGVS)

Technical

Reference:

Tech Specs OPERATING EXPERIENCE QUESTION K&A: Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system: RCS Learning Objective: Given conditions when an LCO is not met, apply Tech Spec Section 3.4.12 (PZR Vents) in accordance with Tech Spec 3.4.12.

Justification:

A. Incorrect - Candidate may read the Tech Spec as No Action due to only one vent path INOPERABLE.

B. Incorrect - Incorrect because 2 paths are inoperable when RCA-106 is declared.

C. Correct - This will ensure that all 4 vent paths are INOPERABLE and the LCO can be exited.

D. Incorrect - This could be chosen if it is determined that conditions A and B can not be met.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 1 2012/02/23

Pressurizer Vents 3.4.12 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.12 Pressurizer Vents LCO 3.4.12 Four pressurizer vent paths shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

MODE 4 with RCS pressure 385 psia.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Two or three required A.1 Restore required 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> pressurizer vent paths pressurizer vent inoperable. paths to OPERABLE status.

B. All pressurizer vent B.1 Restore one 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> paths inoperable. pressurizer vent path to OPERABLE status.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A, AND or B not met.

C.2 Be in MODE 4 with RCS 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> pressure < 385 psia.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.12.1 Perform a complete cycle of each 18 months Pressurizer Vent Valve.

SR 3.4.12.2 Verify flow through each 18 months pressurizer vent path.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 3.4.12-1 AMENDMENT NO. 117

PVNGS NUCLEAR ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MANUAL Page 16 of 16 Revision Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System (RCGVS) 40OP-9RC04 11 Appendix C Page 1 of 1 Appendix C - RV Head and Pressurizer Vent System RCN-V392 RCB-HV-109 CONTAINMENT ATMOS S S RCA-HV-106 RCE-V006 VENT TO GAS SURGE HDR ATMOS RCB- S HV-102 S RCB-RCA- HV-108 RCB- S S HV-103 CHN- S HV-105 RCA-UV-540 HV-101 S RCN-RCN-V212 V090 CHN- RCE-V007 HV-923 Reactor Vessel Reactor Head Pressurizer Drain Tank This diagram is only a simplified likeness of system diagrams M-RCP-001 and M-CHP-003 End of Appendix C

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam 17.

This Exam Level SRO Appears on: SRO EXAM 2008 SRO EXAM 2012 Tier 2 Group 2 K/A # 3.4 041 A2.02 Importance 3.9 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 was operating at 100% power.

x SBCV #6 failed 100% open.

x A low SG pressure reactor trip and MSIS have both automatically initiated.

x T-avg dropped to 570°F on the reactor trip.

x T-cold dropped to 546°F before the MSIS was initiated.

Which ONE of the following describes the impact to the SBCS and the appropriate response?

A. SBCS group X valves "Quick Opened" on the trip, perform SPTAs and implement 40EP-9EO02 (Rx Trip).

B. "Quick Open" was blocked to all SBCS valves on the trip, perform SPTAs and implement 40EP-9EO02 (Rx Trip).

C. SBCS group X valves "Quick Opened" on the trip, perform SPTAs and implement 40EP-9EO05 (ESD).

D. "Quick Open" was blocked to all SBCS valves on the trip, perform SPTAs and implement 40EP-9EO05 (ESD).

Answer: D Reference Id: Q22473 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 4 10CFR Category: CFR 55.43 (5) 55.43 (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Cognitive Level: Comprehension / Anal Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40EP-9EO05 (ESD) Simplified drawings, LOIT lesson plan K&A: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SDS; and (b) based on those predictions or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Steam valve stuck open Learning Objective: L65641 Describe the interrelationship between the Steam Bypass Control System and the Main Steam System OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/02/28

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification A. Incorrect: Quick Open is blocked on Rx trip with T-avg < 573.5°F. Should stabilize Tcold at 546 due to the MSIS actuation and enter ESD.

B. Incorrect: Quick Open is blocked but Rx Trip is not appropriate due to the "ESD" causing the low temperature.

C. Incorrect: Quick Open is blocked. due to the low Tavg, Rx Trip is not the correct procedure. ESD will stabilize Tcold and Rx Trip will not.

D. Correct: Quick Open is blocked on Rx trip with T-avg < 573.5°F, OPS expectations requires that ESD be entered if T-cold goes below 560°F due to an ESD event.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/02/28

         

  

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ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam 19.

This Exam Level SRO Appears on: SRO EXAM 2010 SRO EXAM 2012 Tier 3 K/A # 2.1.14 Importance 3.1 Rating:

Which ONE of the following describes when a plant-wide announcement is required to be made?

A. Changing from Mode 3 to Mode 2.

B. Energizing PNA-D25 after a permit has been cleared.

C. Starting HCN-A01C (CTMT Normal ACU Fan) from the Control Room.

D. AFB-P01 (Essential Motor Driven Aux Feed Pump) started automatically on AFAS-1.

Answer: A Reference Id: Q43785 Difficulty: 2.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: CFR 55.43 (5) 55.43 (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

ODP-1, Operations Department Principles and Standards K&A:

Knowledge of criteria or conditions that require plant-wide announcements, such as pump starts, reactor trips, mode changes etc.

Justification: The announcement may not be made by the CRS but he will approve or direct it.

A. Correct - Plant-wide announcements shall be made when changing modes.

B. Incorrect - 120 Vac distribution panels are not required to be announced.

C. Incorrect - 480 Vac motor starts are not required to be announced.

D. Incorrect - Equipment that starts automatically is not required to be announced.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 1 Rev. 1 Larry 2012/02/23

         

  

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1 Page _____ 40 of _____

Manual Number SAOD Unit 1 Manual

Title:

SAOD 3990 MWt - Unit 1 Description of Change: This document supersedes revision 1 of the SAOD Unit 1 manual due to the implementation of the replacement steam generators and power uprate. Clarification was provided as requested by Operations (CRAI 2819297) for RCS loop check valve work restrictions. References were also updated. Change bars are not shown (copy of Unit 2 SAOD) due to extensive changes.

Revision 2 Dependent Engineer N/A Date Responsible Engineer Brian Date Blackmore C

R R Operations (STAs)

O E N/A Date S V S I E

D W Outage Mgmt N/A I Date S

C I NED P N/A Date L

I N

E Other (Ops Standards)

N/A Date Mentor N/A Date Independent Reviewer Ness Date Kilic Responsible Section Leader Craig Date Hasson Responsible Department Leader N/A Date NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT ANALYSES CONTROL, 05DP-0NF09

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 2 of 40 Table of Contents Section ........................................................................................................................... Page 1.0 OBJECTIVE ......................................................................................................................3 2.0 METHOD OF SOLUTION AND RESULTS..................................................................3 2.1 Decay Heat Constraints for Outages....................................................................3 2.2 Midloop Operation ................................................................................................5 2.3 RCS Drained to Reactor Vessel Flange with Reactor Head Removed ...........11 2.4 RCS Drained to Reactor Vessel Flange with Reactor Head Installed ............17 2.5 RCS Filled to 120 (Vessel Full) and Reactor Vessel Head Installed ..............23 2.6 RCS Filled to Refueling Level Operation ..........................................................29 2.7 Spent Fuel Pool Operation ..................................................................................33 2.8 Minimum Time to Reduced Flow SDC Operations..........................................34 2.9 RCS Forced Flow and RWT Temperature Requirements ..............................36 3.0 IMPACT REVIEW..........................................................................................................38

4.0 REFERENCES

.................................................................................................................38

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 3 of 40 1.0 OBJECTIVE The Safety Analysis Operational Data (SAOD) manual provides information to Operations and Outage Planning for certain outage shutdown activities. Specifically, this manual provides outage decay heat values, reactor coolant system expected heat up rates, outage time to boil values, outage time to core uncovery values, makeup flow for boiloff, minimum time to reduced flow shutdown cooling operations, and RCS forced flow and RWT temperature requirements to maintain sub-cooled conditions following a loss of shutdown cooling (HPSI once-through cooling).

This information is provided to clarify the time constraints needed for the refueling outage activi-ties that are adversely affected by decay heat following reactor shutdown. It is essential that these constraints be observed in order to ensure that the unit remains in an analyzed condition for postu-lated events involving a loss of shutdown cooling at reduced inventories.

Questions concerning SAOD Sections 1.0 through 2.7 should be referred to the Transient Analysis section leader. Questions regarding SAOD Sections 2.8 through 2.9 should be referred to the Design Mechanical NSSS section leader.

2.0 METHOD OF SOLUTION AND RESULTS The SAOD manual simply documents the results from various calculations and analysis packages in a convenient document readily accessible to Operations. No calculations are performed in this manual and no computer codes are used for this manual. The assumptions and input data are docu-mented in the source calculations which are referenced with each table provided.

2.1 Decay Heat Constraints for Outages The following constraints are required to support the assumptions in the Loss of Shutdown Cooling (LSDC) analyses. (Reference 2, 7, & 12)

  • The pressurizer manway may be removed to provide a hot leg vent path, when the reactor vessel is full (120 ft. elevation) and core decay heat rate is < 20 MW. At 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> post-shutdown, the decay heat rate is not expected to exceed 20.021 MW for a rated thermal power of 3990 MWt. A LSDC event with the pressurizer manway removed and Reactor Coolant System level at 131 ft. 5 inches (~ 50% pressurizer level) would not result in uncovering the reactor core for at least a 1-hour period.
  • RCS drain operations should not commence unless indicated RWT level is > 73% (>

50% for cold core post refueling conditions).

  • 1-hour after SDC is lost, it is assumed that operators will have reestablished either SDC or forced flow cooling of the RCS using High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI). The 1-hour period is based on the anticipated maximum time that it may take to place a Gas Turbine Generator (GTG) in service.
1. Even though 20.02 is slightly larger than 20 MW, the 0.1% difference is considered negligible in comparison to the analytical conservatisms described in reference 2.

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 4 of 40

  • The reactor vessel may be drained down (to the 1038 elevation), when the pressur-izer manway is removed and the core decay heat rate is < 20 MW. This occurs at a time > 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after shutdown. With the pressurizer manway removed and the RCS drained to the 1038 elevation (with water in the steam generator tubes), a LSDC event would not result in uncovering of the reactor core for at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, even if no credit was given for gravity feed or HPSI during that hour.
  • The reactor vessel may be drained down to midloop (1016 to 1031) when the pressurizer manway is removed and the core decay heat is < 16 MW. A decay heat of 16 MW occurs 87 hours0.00101 days <br />0.0242 hours <br />1.438492e-4 weeks <br />3.31035e-5 months <br /> after plant shutdown. With the Unit at midloop no credit can be given for liquid in the SG tubes. A LSDC event would not result in uncovering of the reactor core for at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period.
  • The steam generator manways may be removed and nozzle dams installed when the core decay heat is < 16 MW. This occurs at t > 87 hours0.00101 days <br />0.0242 hours <br />1.438492e-4 weeks <br />3.31035e-5 months <br /> after shutdown. If a LSDC event were to occur while the plant was in this configuration, then operator intervention would be critical to achieve a 1-hour coping period. For this level of decay heat the analysis assumes the following:

1 For hot core mid-loop the hot leg steam generator (SG) manways should be removed close to the same time without delay (minimizing the time reduces steam entrainment concerns) with the man-way for the hot leg used for gravity feed removed last.

2 The hot leg nozzle dams should be installed sequentially without delay (minimizing the time reduces potential steam entrainment inventory losses) with the nozzle dam on the leg used for gravity feed installed first.

3 Both cold leg nozzle dams should be installed on a SG before installation of the hot leg dam. Addi-tionally, the last nozzle dam installed should be on the hot leg opposite that to which RWT gravity feed is aligned. Installing cold leg dams prior to hot leg dams ensures a flow path for HPSI once through cooling.

  • After nozzle dam installation, the RCS may be reflooded as high as elevation 120 ft.

(approximately 20% pressurizer level). At a decay heat rate of 16 MW and nozzle dams installed, a LSDC event will not result in an RCS peak pressure that exceeds the nozzle dams rating of 50 psig (i.e., ASME B&PV Code Level D Service Limit), if RCS level is at or below the 120 ft. elevation. This conclusion is valid both for early initiation of cold leg HPSI flow (at 10 minutes), or for hot leg gravity feed for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> followed by cold leg HPSI.

  • If plant operators initiate gravity feed from the RWT to the RCS in response to a LSDC event, the DC-powered valve (J-SIC-UV-0653 or J-SID-UV0654, depending upon the train selected) should initially be throttled approximately 30% open and then throttled as needed so that RWT level decreases approximately 3% every 15 minutes.
  • No cold leg openings (e.g. RCP impeller work or shaft replacement, RCS cold leg check valves SIEV2x7) before decay heat rate is < 14 MW. This occurs around 118 hours0.00137 days <br />0.0328 hours <br />1.951058e-4 weeks <br />4.4899e-5 months <br /> after shutdown.
  • RCP seal work when RCS level is above the bottom of the hot leg is allowed only if main-tenance uses a shaft blocking device to prevent lifting the shaft and creating a large cold leg breach.

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 5 of 40 2.2 Midloop Operation NOTES 2.2.0 Key Reactor Core Parameters Following a Loss of SDC During Midloop Operation with A Large or Small Cold Leg Opening The key reactor core parameters following a loss of shutdown cooling (SDC) with a large (RCP impeller) or small (RCP seal) cold leg opening are based in part on a computer analysis using the RETRAN code.

Decay heat power is based on Branch Technical Position 9-2 utilizing a 550 EFPD cycle length at 100% power. (3990 MWt)(Reference TA-13-C00-1999-009)

Time to boil is based on the time for the water in the vessel to reach 210 0F. This is a function of decay heat, mass of water in vessel and initial RCS bulk temperature (inlet Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger temperature). It is determined by subtracting the RCS bulk temperature from 2100, and then dividing by the heatup rate.

Heatup rate is determined by dividing the decay heat by the specific heat capacity for water and by the mass of water available in the vessel at the start of the event.

Time to core uncovery is conservatively assumed to be the amount of time it takes to boil off the water volume below the bottom of the hot leg and above the top of the core. The time associated with the pressurization effects, which result in water lost out the cold leg opening, is neglected. The water lost out the cold leg opening is conservatively assumed to result in a water level at the bottom of the hot leg. Thus, time to core uncovery is a function of decay heat, this volume of water and the pressure over the water. Time to core uncovery does not include the time associated with reaching the boiling temperature.

Makeup rate is the amount of flow required to reach the core to compensate for water loss through boil off. Note that this is the volume that must be delivered to the core in order to maintain constant inventory. Flow diverted out any cold leg opening must be accounted for (i.e. flowrate indications may not be actual flowrates reaching the core).

NOTE: VALUES NOT EXPLICITLY FOUND IN THE TABLES SHALL BE DETERMINED VIA LINEAR INTERPOLATION PERFORMED BY THE SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 6 of 40 TABLE 2.2.1 Key Reactor Core Parameters Following a Loss of SDC During Midloop Operation with A Large or Small Cold Leg Opening Prior to Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Decay Heatup Makeup Time after Decay Heatup Makeup Reactor Heat Rate Flowrate Reactor Heat Rate Flowrate Shutdown Load (F/Min.) (gpm)** Shutdown Load (F/Min.) (gpm)

(days) (MW th) (days) (MW th) 1.0 24.44 8.97 173.5 10 10.42 3.82 74.0 2.0 20.02 7.35 142.1 11 10.05 3.69 71.4 3.0 17.25 6.33 122.5 12 9.72 3.57 69.0 3.5 16.19 5.94 114.9 13 9.43 3.46 67.0 4.0 15.30 5.62 108.6 14 9.16 3.36 65.0 4.5 14.54 5.34 103.2 15 8.92 3.27 63.3 5.0 13.88 5.09 98.5 16 8.70 3.19 61.8 5.5 13.31 4.88 94.5 17 8.48 3.11 60.2 6.0 12.83 4.71 91.1 18 8.29 3.04 58.9 6.5 12.39 4.55 88.0 19 8.10 2.97 57.5 7.0 12.01 4.41 85.3 20 7.93 2.91 56.3 7.5 11.67 4.28 82.9 25 7.15 2.62 50.8 8.0 11.37 4.17 80.7 30 6.53 2.40 46.4 8.5 11.10 4.07 78.8 40 5.59 2.05 39.7 9.0 10.85 3.98 77.0 50 4.92 1.81 34.9 9.5 10.62 3.90 75.4 80 3.76 1.38 26.7 Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

    • The makeup flowrate listed is to compensate for boil off (not required flow to prevent boiling)

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 7 of 40 TABLE 2.2.2 Key Reactor Core Parameters Following a Loss of SDC During Midloop Operation with A Large or Small Cold Leg Opening After Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Decay Heatup Makeup Time after Decay Heatup Makeup Reactor Heat Rate Flowrate Reactor Heat Rate Flowrate Shutdown Load (F/Min.) (gpm)** Shutdown Load (F/Min.) (gpm)

(days) (MWth) (days) (MWth) 1.0 19.06 7.00 135.3 10 8.13 2.98 57.7 2.0 15.62 5.73 110.9 11 7.84 2.88 55.7 3.0 13.46 4.94 95.5 12 7.58 2.78 53.8 3.5 12.63 4.63 89.7 13 7.36 2.70 52.2 4.0 11.93 4.38 84.7 14 7.14 2.62 50.7 4.5 11.34 4.16 80.5 15 6.96 2.55 49.4 5.0 10.83 3.97 76.9 16 6.79 2.49 48.2 5.5 10.38 3.81 73.7 17 6.61 2.43 47.0 6.0 10.01 3.67 71.1 18 6.47 2.37 45.9 6.5 9.66 3.55 68.6 19 6.32 2.32 44.9 7.0 9.37 3.44 66.5 20 6.19 2.27 43.9 7.5 9.10 3.34 64.6 25 5.58 2.05 39.6 8.0 8.87 3.25 63.0 30 5.09 1.87 36.2 8.5 8.66 3.18 61.5 40 4.36 1.60 31.0 9.0 8.46 3.11 60.1 50 3.84 1.41 27.2 9.5 8.28 3.04 58.8 80 2.93 1.08 20.8 Current outage schedules do not support reloads in less than 10 days.

Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

    • The makeup flowrate listed is to compensate for boil off (not required flow to prevent boiling)

By : B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev. 2 Reviewer Page 8 of 40 Ness Kilic TABLE 2.2.3 Time to Boil Following a Loss of SDC During Midloop Operation with A Large or Small Cold Leg Opening Prior to Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Time after Time to Boil (minutes) Time to Boil (minutes)

Reactor Reactor Shutdown Shutdown Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature (F) Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature (F)

(days) (days) 100 110 120 130 135 140 100 110 120 130 135 140 1.0 12.3 11.1 10.0 8.9 8.4 7.8 10 28.8 26.1 23.5 20.9 19.6 18.3 2.0 15.0 13.6 12.2 10.9 10.2 9.5 11 29.8 27.1 24.4 21.7 20.3 19.0 3.0 17.4 15.8 14.2 12.6 11.8 11.1 12 30.8 28.0 25.2 22.4 21.0 19.6 3.5 18.5 16.8 15.1 13.5 12.6 11.8 13 31.8 28.9 26.0 23.1 21.7 20.2 4.0 19.6 17.8 16.0 14.2 13.4 12.5 14 32.7 29.7 26.8 23.8 22.3 20.8 4.5 20.6 18.7 16.9 15.0 14.1 13.1 15 33.6 30.5 27.5 24.4 22.9 21.4 5.0 21.6 19.6 17.7 15.7 14.7 13.7 16 34.5 31.3 28.2 25.1 23.5 21.9 5.5 22.5 20.5 18.4 16.4 15.4 14.3 17 35.3 32.1 28.9 25.7 24.1 22.5 6.0 23.4 21.2 19.1 17.0 15.9 14.9 18 36.2 32.9 29.6 26.3 24.7 23.0 6.5 24.2 22.0 19.8 17.6 16.5 15.4 19 37.0 33.6 30.3 26.9 25.2 23.5 7.0 25.0 22.7 20.4 18.2 17.0 15.9 20 37.8 34.4 30.9 27.5 25.8 24.1 7.5 25.7 23.3 21.0 18.7 17.5 16.3 25 41.9 38.1 34.3 30.5 28.6 26.7 8.0 26.4 24.0 21.6 19.2 18.0 16.8 30 45.9 41.7 37.6 33.4 31.3 29.2 8.5 27.0 24.5 22.1 19.6 18.4 17.2 40 53.6 48.7 43.9 39.0 36.6 34.1 9.0 27.6 25.1 22.6 20.1 18.8 17.6 50 60.9 55.4 49.8 44.3 41.5 38.8 9.5 28.2 25.7 23.1 20.5 19.2 18.0 80 79.7 72.5 65.2 58.0 54.4 50.7 Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

By : B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev. 2 Reviewer Page 9 of 40 Ness Kilic TABLE 2.2.4 Time to Boil Following a Loss of SDC During Midloop Operation with A Large or Small Cold Leg Opening After Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Time after Time to Boil (minutes) Time to Boil (minutes)

Reactor Reactor Shutdown Shutdown Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature (F) Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature (F)

(days) (days) 100 110 120 130 135 140 100 110 120 130 135 140 1.0 15.7 14.3 12.9 11.4 10.7 10.0 10 36.9 33.5 30.2 26.8 25.1 23.5 2.0 19.2 17.4 15.7 14.0 13.1 12.2 11 38.2 34.8 31.3 27.8 26.1 24.3 3.0 22.3 20.3 18.2 16.2 15.2 14.2 12 39.5 35.9 32.3 28.8 27.0 25.2 3.5 23.7 21.6 19.4 17.3 16.2 15.1 13 40.7 37.0 33.3 29.6 27.8 25.9 4.0 25.1 22.8 20.5 18.3 17.1 16.0 14 42.0 38.1 34.3 30.5 28.6 26.7 4.5 26.4 24.0 21.6 19.2 18.0 16.8 15 43.1 39.2 35.2 31.3 29.4 27.4 5.0 27.7 25.2 22.7 20.1 18.9 17.6 16 44.2 40.2 36.1 32.1 30.1 28.1 5.5 28.9 26.2 23.6 21.0 19.7 18.4 17 45.3 41.2 37.1 33.0 30.9 28.8 6.0 30.0 27.2 24.5 21.8 20.4 19.1 18 46.4 42.1 37.9 33.7 31.6 29.5 6.5 31.0 28.2 25.4 22.6 21.1 19.7 19 47.4 43.1 38.8 34.5 32.3 30.2 7.0 32.0 29.1 26.2 23.3 21.8 20.4 20 48.5 44.1 39.6 35.2 33.0 30.8 7.5 32.9 29.9 26.9 23.9 22.5 21.0 25 53.7 48.9 44.0 39.1 36.6 34.2 8.0 33.8 30.7 27.7 24.6 23.0 21.5 30 58.8 53.5 48.1 42.8 40.1 37.4 8.5 34.6 31.5 28.3 25.2 23.6 22.0 40 68.7 62.5 56.2 50.0 46.9 43.7 9.0 35.4 32.2 29.0 25.8 24.1 22.5 50 78.1 71.0 63.9 56.8 53.3 49.7 9.5 36.2 32.9 29.6 26.3 24.7 23.0 80 102.2 92.9 83.6 74.3 69.7 65.0 Current outage schedules do not support reloads in less than 10 days. Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 10 of 40 TABLE 2.2.5 Time to Core Uncovery Following a Loss of SDC During Midloop Operation with A Large or Small Cold Leg Opening (3990 MW Core)

Notes: (1) Caution; No cold leg openings (i.e. RCP impeller work or shaft replacement) before 14 MW (Source TA-03-C09-2001-004)

(2) Table values can be used to estimate time to core uncovery after boiling begins assuming no leg openings. RCP seal replacement with the RCP shaft on the stop seal is allowed as long as a blocking device is installed on the shaft in the event LSDC occurs. This condition prevents a large cold leg breach.

(3) Times do not include time to boil.

Time to Core Time to Core Decay Heat Uncovery After Decay Heat Uncovery After (MW) Boiling Starts (MW) Boiling Starts (minutes) (minutes) 24.44 18 10.42 42 20.02 22 10.05 44 17.25 25 9.72 45 16.19 27 9.43 46 15.30 28 9.16 48 14.54 30 8.92 49 13.88 31 8.70 50 13.31 33 8.48 52 12.83 34 8.29 53 12.39 35 8.10 54 12.01 36 7.93 55 11.67 37 7.15 61 11.37 38 6.53 67 11.10 39 5.59 79 10.85 40 4.92 89 10.62 41 3.76 117 Source of Data: TA-13-C00-2001-006

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 11 of 40 2.3 RCS Drained to Reactor Vessel Flange with Reactor Head Removed NOTES 2.3.0 Key Reactor Core Parameters Following a Loss of SDC With The RCS Drained to the Reactor Vessel Flange Reactor Head and Upper Guide Structure Removed The key reactor core parameters following a loss of shutdown cooling (SDC) with the RCS drained to the 114 elevation and head or UGS off are for 550 EFPD at 100% RTP. These results are based in part on a computer analysis using the RETRAN code.

Decay heat power is based on Branch Technical Position 9-2 utilizing a 550 EFPD cycle length at 100% power. (3990 MWt)(Reference TA-13-C00-1999-009)

Time to boil is based on the time for the water in the vessel to reach 210 0F. This is a function of decay heat, mass of water in vessel and initial RCS bulk temperature (inlet Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger temperature). It is determined by subtracting the RCS bulk temperature from 2100, and then dividing by the heatup rate.

Heatup rate is determined by dividing the decay heat by the specific heat capacity for water and by the mass of water available in the vessel at the start of the event.

Time to core uncovery is based on the time it takes the water above the top of the core to drop to the top of the core. Time to core uncovery is the time for the mass above the core to boil off and does not include the time associated with reaching the boiling temperature. Time to core uncovery is a function of decay heat, this volume of water, and the pressure over the water.

Makeup rate is the amount of flow required to reach the core to compensate for water loss through boil off. Note that this is the volume that must be delivered to the core in order to maintain constant inventory. Flow diverted out any cold leg opening must be accounted for (i.e. flowrate indications may not be actual flowrates reaching the core).

NOTE: VALUES NOT EXPLICITLY FOUND IN THE TABLES SHALL BE DETERMINED VIA LINEAR INTERPOLATION PERFORMED BY THE SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 12 of 40 TABLE 2.3.1 Key Reactor Core Parameters Following a Loss of SDC With the RCS Drained to the Reactor Vessel Flange Reactor Head and Upper Guide Structure Removed Prior to Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Decay Heatup Makeup Time after Decay Heatup Makeup Reactor Heat Rate Flowrate Reactor Heat Rate Flowrate Shutdown Load (F/Min.) (gpm)** Shutdown Load (F/Min.) (gpm)

(days) (MW th) (days) (MW th) 1.0 24.44 5.67 173.5 10 10.42 2.42 74.0 2.0 20.02 4.64 142.1 11 10.05 2.33 71.4 3.0 17.25 4.00 122.5 12 9.72 2.26 69.0 3.5 16.19 3.76 114.9 13 9.43 2.19 67.0 4.0 15.30 3.55 108.6 14 9.16 2.13 65.0 4.5 14.54 3.37 103.2 15 8.92 2.07 63.3 5.0 13.88 3.22 98.5 16 8.70 2.02 61.8 5.5 13.31 3.09 94.5 17 8.48 1.97 60.2 6.0 12.83 2.98 91.1 18 8.29 1.92 58.9 6.5 12.39 2.87 88.0 19 8.10 1.88 57.5 7.0 12.01 2.79 85.3 20 7.93 1.84 56.3 7.5 11.67 2.71 82.9 25 7.15 1.66 50.8 8.0 11.37 2.64 80.7 30 6.53 1.51 46.4 8.5 11.10 2.58 78.8 40 5.59 1.30 39.7 9.0 10.85 2.52 77.0 50 4.92 1.14 34.9 9.5 10.62 2.46 75.4 80 3.76 0.87 26.7 Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

    • The makeup flowrate listed is to compensate for boil off (not required flow to prevent boiling)

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 13 of 40 TABLE 2.3.2 Key Reactor Core Parameters Following a Loss of SDC With the RCS Drained to the Reactor Vessel Flange Reactor Head and Upper Guide Structure Removed After Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Decay Heatup Makeup Time after Decay Heatup Makeup Reactor Heat Rate Flowrate Reactor Heat Rate Flowrate Shutdown Load (F/Min.) (gpm)** Shutdown Load (F/Min.) (gpm)

(days) (MWth) (days) (MWth) 1.0 19.06 4.42 135.3 10 8.13 1.89 57.7 2.0 15.62 3.62 110.9 11 7.84 1.82 55.7 3.0 13.46 3.12 95.5 12 7.58 1.76 53.8 3.5 12.63 2.93 89.7 13 7.36 1.71 52.2 4.0 11.93 2.77 84.7 14 7.14 1.66 50.7 4.5 11.34 2.63 80.5 15 6.96 1.61 49.4 5.0 10.83 2.51 76.9 16 6.79 1.57 48.2 5.5 10.38 2.41 73.7 17 6.61 1.53 47.0 6.0 10.01 2.32 71.1 18 6.47 1.50 45.9 6.5 9.66 2.24 68.6 19 6.32 1.47 44.9 7.0 9.37 2.17 66.5 20 6.19 1.44 43.9 7.5 9.10 2.11 64.6 25 5.58 1.29 39.6 8.0 8.87 2.06 63.0 30 5.09 1.18 36.2 8.5 8.66 2.01 61.5 40 4.36 1.01 31.0 9.0 8.46 1.96 60.1 50 3.84 0.89 27.2 9.5 8.28 1.92 58.8 80 2.93 0.68 20.8 Current outage schedules do not support reloads in less than 10 days.

    • The makeup flowrate listed is to compensate for boil off (not required flow to prevent boiling)

Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

By : B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev. 2 Reviewer Page 14 of 40 Ness Kilic TABLE 2.3.3 Time to Boil Following a Loss of SDC with the RCS Drained to the Reactor Vessel Flange Reactor Head and Upper Guide Structure Removed Prior to Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Time after Time to Boil (minutes) Time to Boil (minutes)

Reactor Reactor Shutdown Shutdown Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature (F) Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature (F)

(days) (days) 100 110 120 130 135 140 100 110 120 130 135 140 1.0 19.4 17.6 15.9 14.1 13.2 12.3 10 45.5 41.4 37.2 33.1 31.0 29.0 2.0 23.7 21.5 19.4 17.2 16.1 15.1 11 47.2 42.9 38.6 34.3 32.2 30.0 3.0 27.5 25.0 22.5 20.0 18.7 17.5 12 48.8 44.3 39.9 35.5 33.3 31.0 3.5 29.3 26.6 24.0 21.3 20.0 18.6 13 50.3 45.7 41.1 36.6 34.3 32.0 4.0 31.0 28.2 25.4 22.5 21.1 19.7 14 51.8 47.1 42.4 37.6 35.3 32.9 4.5 32.6 29.6 26.7 23.7 22.2 20.8 15 53.2 48.3 43.5 38.7 36.2 33.8 5.0 34.2 31.1 27.9 24.8 23.3 21.7 16 54.5 49.5 44.6 39.6 37.2 34.7 5.5 35.6 32.4 29.1 25.9 24.3 22.7 17 55.9 50.8 45.7 40.7 38.1 35.6 6.0 37.0 33.6 30.2 26.9 25.2 23.5 18 57.2 52.0 46.8 41.6 39.0 36.4 6.5 38.3 34.8 31.3 27.8 26.1 24.4 19 58.5 53.2 47.9 42.6 39.9 37.2 7.0 39.5 35.9 32.3 28.7 26.9 25.1 20 59.8 54.4 48.9 43.5 40.8 38.0 7.5 40.6 36.9 33.2 29.5 27.7 25.9 25 66.3 60.3 54.3 48.2 45.2 42.2 8.0 41.7 37.9 34.1 30.3 28.4 26.5 30 72.6 66.0 59.4 52.8 49.5 46.2 8.5 42.7 38.8 34.9 31.1 29.1 27.2 40 84.8 77.1 69.4 61.7 57.8 54.0 9.0 43.7 39.7 35.8 31.8 29.8 27.8 50 96.4 87.6 78.8 70.1 65.7 61.3 9.5 44.6 40.6 36.5 32.5 30.4 28.4 80 126.1 114.6 103.2 91.7 86.0 80.2 Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

By : B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev. 2 Reviewer Page 15 of 40 Ness Kilic TABLE 2.3.4 Time to Boil Following a Loss of SDC with the RCS Drained to the Reactor Vessel Flange Reactor Head and Upper Guide Structure Removed After Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Time after Time to Boil (minutes) Time to Boil (minutes)

Reactor Reactor Shutdown Shutdown Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature (F) Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature (F)

(days) (days) 100 110 120 130 135 140 100 110 120 130 135 140 1.0 24.9 22.6 20.3 18.1 17.0 15.8 10 58.3 53.0 47.7 42.4 39.8 37.1 2.0 30.4 27.6 24.8 22.1 20.7 19.3 11 60.5 55.0 49.5 44.0 41.2 38.5 3.0 35.2 32.0 28.8 25.6 24.0 22.4 12 62.5 56.9 51.2 45.5 42.6 39.8 3.5 37.5 34.1 30.7 27.3 25.6 23.9 13 64.5 58.6 52.7 46.9 44.0 41.0 4.0 39.7 36.1 32.5 28.9 27.1 25.3 14 66.4 60.3 54.3 48.3 45.2 42.2 4.5 41.8 38.0 34.2 30.4 28.5 26.6 15 68.1 62.0 55.8 49.6 46.5 43.4 5.0 43.8 39.8 35.8 31.9 29.9 27.9 16 69.9 63.5 57.2 50.8 47.6 44.5 5.5 45.7 41.5 37.4 33.2 31.1 29.1 17 71.7 65.2 58.6 52.1 48.9 45.6 6.0 47.4 43.1 38.8 34.5 32.3 30.2 18 73.3 66.7 60.0 53.3 50.0 46.7 6.5 49.1 44.6 40.1 35.7 33.5 31.2 19 75.0 68.2 61.4 54.6 51.2 47.8 7.0 50.6 46.0 41.4 36.8 34.5 32.2 20 76.7 69.7 62.7 55.7 52.3 48.8 7.5 52.1 47.4 42.6 37.9 35.5 33.1 25 85.0 77.3 69.6 61.8 58.0 54.1 8.0 53.5 48.6 43.7 38.9 36.5 34.0 30 93.1 84.6 76.2 67.7 63.5 59.2 8.5 54.8 49.8 44.8 39.8 37.3 34.8 40 108.7 98.9 89.0 79.1 74.1 69.2 9.0 56.0 50.9 45.8 40.7 38.2 35.7 50 123.6 112.3 101.1 89.9 84.2 78.6 9.5 57.2 52.0 46.8 41.6 39.0 36.4 80 161.7 147.0 132.3 117.6 110.2 102.9 Current outage schedules do not support reloads in less than 10 days. Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 16 of 40 TABLE 2.3.5 Time to Core Uncovery Following a Loss of SDC with the RCS Drained to the Reactor Vessel Flange, Reactor Head and Upper Guide Structure Removed (3990 MW Core)

Note: Times do not include time to boil.

Time to Core Time to Core Decay Heat Uncovery After Decay Heat Uncovery After (MW) Boiling Starts (MW) Boiling Starts (minutes) (minutes) 24.44 146 10.42 343 20.02 178 10.05 356 17.25 207 9.72 368 16.19 221 9.43 380 15.30 234 9.16 391 14.54 246 8.92 401 13.88 258 8.70 411 13.31 269 8.48 422 12.83 279 8.29 432 12.39 289 8.10 442 12.01 298 7.93 451 11.67 307 7.15 501 11.37 315 6.53 548 11.10 322 5.59 641 10.85 330 4.92 728 10.62 337 3.76 953 Source of Data: TA-13-C00-2001-006

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 17 of 40 2.4 RCS Drained to Reactor Vessel Flange with Reactor Head Installed NOTES 2.4.0 Key Reactor Core Parameters Following a Loss of SDC With The RCS Drained to the Reactor Vessel Flange Reactor Vessel Head On The key reactor core parameters following a loss of shutdown cooling (SDC) with the RCS drained to the 114 elevation and head or UGS in place are for 550 EFPD at 100% RTP. These results are based in part on a computer analysis using the RETRAN code.

Decay heat power is based on Branch Technical Position 9-2 utilizing a 550 EFPD cycle length at 100% power. (3990 MWt)(Reference TA-13-C00-1999-009)

Time to boil is based on the time for the water in the vessel to reach 210 0F. This is a function of decay heat, mass of water in vessel and initial RCS bulk temperature (inlet Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger temperature). It is determined by subtracting the RCS bulk temperature from 2100, and then dividing by the heatup rate.

Heatup rate is determined by dividing the decay heat by the specific heat capacity for water and by the mass of water available in the vessel at the start of the event.

Time to core uncovery is conservatively assumed to be the amount of time it takes to boil off the water volume below the bottom of the hot leg and above the top of the core. The time associated with the pressurization effects, steaming, entrainment, and surge line flooding are neglected. Thus, time to core uncovery is a function of decay heat, this volume of water and the pressure over the water.

Time to core uncovery does not include the time associated with reaching the boiling temperature.

Makeup rate is the amount of flow required to reach the core to compensate for water loss through boil off. Note that this is the volume that must be delivered to the core in order to maintain constant inventory. Flow diverted out any cold leg opening must be accounted for (i.e. flowrate indications may not be actual flowrates reaching the core).

NOTE: VALUES NOT EXPLICITLY FOUND IN THE TABLES SHALL BE DETERMINED VIA LINEAR INTERPOLATION PERFORMED BY THE SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 18 of 40 TABLE 2.4.1 Key Reactor Core Parameters Following a Loss of SDC With the RCS Drained to the Reactor Vessel Flange Reactor Vessel Head On Prior to Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Decay Heatup Makeup Time after Decay Heatup Makeup Reactor Heat Rate Flowrate Reactor Heat Rate Flowrate Shutdown Load (F/Min.) (gpm)** Shutdown Load (F/Min.) (gpm)

(days) (MW th) (days) (MW th) 1.0 24.44 5.67 173.5 10 10.42 2.42 74.0 2.0 20.02 4.64 142.1 11 10.05 2.33 71.4 3.0 17.25 4.00 122.5 12 9.72 2.26 69.0 3.5 16.19 3.76 114.9 13 9.43 2.19 67.0 4.0 15.30 3.55 108.6 14 9.16 2.13 65.0 4.5 14.54 3.37 103.2 15 8.92 2.07 63.3 5.0 13.88 3.22 98.5 16 8.70 2.02 61.8 5.5 13.31 3.09 94.5 17 8.48 1.97 60.2 6.0 12.83 2.98 91.1 18 8.29 1.92 58.9 6.5 12.39 2.87 88.0 19 8.10 1.88 57.5 7.0 12.01 2.79 85.3 20 7.93 1.84 56.3 7.5 11.67 2.71 82.9 25 7.15 1.66 50.8 8.0 11.37 2.64 80.7 30 6.53 1.51 46.4 8.5 11.10 2.58 78.8 40 5.59 1.30 39.7 9.0 10.85 2.52 77.0 50 4.92 1.14 34.9 9.5 10.62 2.46 75.4 80 3.76 0.87 26.7 Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

    • The makeup flowrate listed is to compensate for boil off (not required flow to prevent boiling)

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 19 of 40 TABLE 2.4.2 Key Reactor Core Parameters Following a Loss of SDC With the RCS Drained to the Reactor Vessel Flange Reactor Vessel Head On After Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Decay Heatup Makeup Time after Decay Heatup Makeup Reactor Heat Rate Flowrate Reactor Heat Rate Flowrate Shutdown Load (F/Min.) (gpm)** Shutdown Load (F/Min.) (gpm)

(days) (MWth) (days) (MWth) 1.0 19.06 4.42 135.3 10 8.13 1.89 57.7 2.0 15.62 3.62 110.9 11 7.84 1.82 55.7 3.0 13.46 3.12 95.5 12 7.58 1.76 53.8 3.5 12.63 2.93 89.7 13 7.36 1.71 52.2 4.0 11.93 2.77 84.7 14 7.14 1.66 50.7 4.5 11.34 2.63 80.5 15 6.96 1.61 49.4 5.0 10.83 2.51 76.9 16 6.79 1.57 48.2 5.5 10.38 2.41 73.7 17 6.61 1.53 47.0 6.0 10.01 2.32 71.1 18 6.47 1.50 45.9 6.5 9.66 2.24 68.6 19 6.32 1.47 44.9 7.0 9.37 2.17 66.5 20 6.19 1.44 43.9 7.5 9.10 2.11 64.6 25 5.58 1.29 39.6 8.0 8.87 2.06 63.0 30 5.09 1.18 36.2 8.5 8.66 2.01 61.5 40 4.36 1.01 31.0 9.0 8.46 1.96 60.1 50 3.84 0.89 27.2 9.5 8.28 1.92 58.8 80 2.93 0.68 20.8 Current outage schedules do not support reloads in less than 10 days.

Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

    • The makeup flowrate listed is to compensate for boil off (not required flow to prevent boiling)

By : B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev. 2 Reviewer Page 20 of 40 Ness Kilic TABLE 2.4.3 Time to Boil Following a Loss of SDC with the RCS Drained to the Reactor Vessel Flange Reactor Vessel Head On Prior to Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Time after Time to Boil (minutes) Time to Boil (minutes)

Reactor Reactor Shutdown Shutdown Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature (F) Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature (F)

(days) (days) 100 110 120 130 135 140 100 110 120 130 135 140 1.0 19.4 17.6 15.9 14.1 13.2 12.3 10 45.5 41.4 37.2 33.1 31.0 29.0 2.0 23.7 21.5 19.4 17.2 16.1 15.1 11 47.2 42.9 38.6 34.3 32.2 30.0 3.0 27.5 25.0 22.5 20.0 18.7 17.5 12 48.8 44.3 39.9 35.5 33.3 31.0 3.5 29.3 26.6 24.0 21.3 20.0 18.6 13 50.3 45.7 41.1 36.6 34.3 32.0 4.0 31.0 28.2 25.4 22.5 21.1 19.7 14 51.8 47.1 42.4 37.6 35.3 32.9 4.5 32.6 29.6 26.7 23.7 22.2 20.8 15 53.2 48.3 43.5 38.7 36.2 33.8 5.0 34.2 31.1 27.9 24.8 23.3 21.7 16 54.5 49.5 44.6 39.6 37.2 34.7 5.5 35.6 32.4 29.1 25.9 24.3 22.7 17 55.9 50.8 45.7 40.7 38.1 35.6 6.0 37.0 33.6 30.2 26.9 25.2 23.5 18 57.2 52.0 46.8 41.6 39.0 36.4 6.5 38.3 34.8 31.3 27.8 26.1 24.4 19 58.5 53.2 47.9 42.6 39.9 37.2 7.0 39.5 35.9 32.3 28.7 26.9 25.1 20 59.8 54.4 48.9 43.5 40.8 38.0 7.5 40.6 36.9 33.2 29.5 27.7 25.9 25 66.3 60.3 54.3 48.2 45.2 42.2 8.0 41.7 37.9 34.1 30.3 28.4 26.5 30 72.6 66.0 59.4 52.8 49.5 46.2 8.5 42.7 38.8 34.9 31.1 29.1 27.2 40 84.8 77.1 69.4 61.7 57.8 54.0 9.0 43.7 39.7 35.8 31.8 29.8 27.8 50 96.4 87.6 78.8 70.1 65.7 61.3 9.5 44.6 40.6 36.5 32.5 30.4 28.4 80 126.1 114.6 103.2 91.7 86.0 80.2 Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

By : B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev. 2 Reviewer Page 21 of 40 Ness Kilic TABLE 2.4.4 Time to Boil Following a Loss of SDC with the RCS Drained to the Reactor Vessel Flange Reactor Vessel Head On After Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Time after Time to Boil (minutes) Time to Boil (minutes)

Reactor Reactor Shutdown Shutdown Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature (F) Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature (F)

(days) (days) 100 110 120 130 135 140 100 110 120 130 135 140 1.0 24.9 22.6 20.3 18.1 17.0 15.8 10 58.3 53.0 47.7 42.4 39.8 37.1 2.0 30.4 27.6 24.8 22.1 20.7 19.3 11 60.5 55.0 49.5 44.0 41.2 38.5 3.0 35.2 32.0 28.8 25.6 24.0 22.4 12 62.5 56.9 51.2 45.5 42.6 39.8 3.5 37.5 34.1 30.7 27.3 25.6 23.9 13 64.5 58.6 52.7 46.9 44.0 41.0 4.0 39.7 36.1 32.5 28.9 27.1 25.3 14 66.4 60.3 54.3 48.3 45.2 42.2 4.5 41.8 38.0 34.2 30.4 28.5 26.6 15 68.1 62.0 55.8 49.6 46.5 43.4 5.0 43.8 39.8 35.8 31.9 29.9 27.9 16 69.9 63.5 57.2 50.8 47.6 44.5 5.5 45.7 41.5 37.4 33.2 31.1 29.1 17 71.7 65.2 58.6 52.1 48.9 45.6 6.0 47.4 43.1 38.8 34.5 32.3 30.2 18 73.3 66.7 60.0 53.3 50.0 46.7 6.5 49.1 44.6 40.1 35.7 33.5 31.2 19 75.0 68.2 61.4 54.6 51.2 47.8 7.0 50.6 46.0 41.4 36.8 34.5 32.2 20 76.7 69.7 62.7 55.7 52.3 48.8 7.5 52.1 47.4 42.6 37.9 35.5 33.1 25 85.0 77.3 69.6 61.8 58.0 54.1 8.0 53.5 48.6 43.7 38.9 36.5 34.0 30 93.1 84.6 76.2 67.7 63.5 59.2 8.5 54.8 49.8 44.8 39.8 37.3 34.8 40 108.7 98.9 89.0 79.1 74.1 69.2 9.0 56.0 50.9 45.8 40.7 38.2 35.7 50 123.6 112.3 101.1 89.9 84.2 78.6 9.5 57.2 52.0 46.8 41.6 39.0 36.4 80 161.7 147.0 132.3 117.6 110.2 102.9 Current outage schedules do not support reloads in less than 10 days. Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 22 of 40 TABLE 2.4.5 Time to Core Uncovery Following a Loss of SDC with the RCS Drained to the Reactor Vessel Flange, Reactor Vessel Head On (3990 MW Core)

Note: Times do not include time to boil and assume no cold leg openings.

Time to Core Time to Core Decay Heat Uncovery After Decay Heat Uncovery After (MW) Boiling Starts (MW) Boiling Starts (minutes) (minutes) 24.44 18 10.42 42 20.02 22 10.05 44 17.25 25 9.72 45 16.19 27 9.43 46 15.30 28 9.16 48 14.54 30 8.92 49 13.88 31 8.70 50 13.31 33 8.48 52 12.83 34 8.29 53 12.39 35 8.10 54 12.01 36 7.93 55 11.67 37 7.15 61 11.37 38 6.53 67 11.10 39 5.59 79 10.85 40 4.92 89 10.62 41 3.76 117 Source of Data: TA-13-C00-2001-006

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 23 of 40 2.5 RCS Filled to 120 (Vessel Full) and Reactor Vessel Head Installed NOTES 2.5.0 Key Reactor Core Parameters Following a Loss of SDC With The RCS Filled to 120 (Vessel Full) and Reactor Vessel Head On The key reactor core parameters following a loss of shutdown cooling (SDC) with the RCS drained to the 120 elevation (vessel full) and head on are for 550 EFPD at 100% RTP. These results are based in part on a computer analysis using the RETRAN code.

Decay heat power is based on Branch Technical Position 9-2 utilizing a 550 EFPD cycle length at 100% power. (3990 MWt)(Reference TA-13-C00-1999-009)

Time to boil is based on the time for the water in the vessel to reach 210 0F. This is a function of decay heat, mass of water in vessel and initial RCS bulk temperature (inlet Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger temperature). It is determined by subtracting the RCS bulk temperature from 2100, and then dividing by the heatup rate.

Heatup rate is determined by dividing the decay heat by the specific heat capacity for water and by the mass of water available in the vessel at the start of the event.

Time to core uncovery is based on the time it takes the water above the top of the core to drop to the top of the core. Total time to uncover is the summation of Time to Boil plus the time for the mass above the core to boil off. This also considers the pressurization effects, steaming, entrainment and surge line flooding.

Time to core uncovery is conservatively assumed to be the amount of time it takes to boil off the water volume below the bottom of the hot leg and above the top of the core. The time associated with the pressurization effects, steaming, entrainment, and surge line flooding are neglected. Thus, time to core uncovery is a function of decay heat, this volume of water and the pressure over the water.

Time to core uncovery does not include the time associated with reaching the boiling temperature.

Makeup rate is the amount of flow required to reach the core to compensate for water loss through boil off. Note that this is the volume that must be delivered to the core in order to maintain constant inventory. Flow diverted out any cold leg opening must be accounted for (i.e. flowrate indications may not be actual flowrates reaching the core).

NOTE: VALUES NOT EXPLICITLY FOUND IN THE TABLES SHALL BE DETERMINED VIA LINEAR INTERPOLATION PERFORMED BY THE SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 24 of 40 TABLE 2.5.1 Key Reactor Core Parameters Following a Loss of SDC With the RCS Filled to 120 (Vessel Full) and Reactor Vessel Head On Prior to Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Decay Heatup Makeup Time after Decay Heatup Makeup Reactor Heat Rate Flowrate Reactor Heat Rate Flowrate Shutdown Load (F/Min.) (gpm)** Shutdown Load (F/Min.) (gpm)

(days) (MW th) (days) (MW th) 1.0 24.44 4.99 173.5 10 10.42 2.13 74.0 2.0 20.02 4.08 142.1 11 10.05 2.05 71.4 3.0 17.25 3.52 122.5 12 9.72 1.98 69.0 3.5 16.19 3.30 114.9 13 9.43 1.92 67.0 4.0 15.30 3.12 108.6 14 9.16 1.87 65.0 4.5 14.54 2.97 103.2 15 8.92 1.82 63.3 5.0 13.88 2.83 98.5 16 8.70 1.77 61.8 5.5 13.31 2.72 94.5 17 8.48 1.73 60.2 6.0 12.83 2.62 91.1 18 8.29 1.69 58.9 6.5 12.39 2.53 88.0 19 8.10 1.65 57.5 7.0 12.01 2.45 85.3 20 7.93 1.62 56.3 7.5 11.67 2.38 82.9 25 7.15 1.46 50.8 8.0 11.37 2.32 80.7 30 6.53 1.33 46.4 8.5 11.10 2.26 78.8 40 5.59 1.14 39.7 9.0 10.85 2.21 77.0 50 4.92 1.00 34.9 9.5 10.62 2.17 75.4 80 3.76 0.77 26.7 Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

    • The makeup flowrate listed is to compensate for boil off (not required flow to prevent boiling)

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 25 of 40 TABLE 2.5.2 Key Reactor Core Parameters Following a Loss of SDC With the RCS Filled to 120 (Vessel Full) and Reactor Vessel Head On After Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Decay Heatup Makeup Time after Decay Heatup Makeup Reactor Heat Rate Flowrate Reactor Heat Rate Flowrate Shutdown Load (F/Min.) (gpm)** Shutdown Load (F/Min.) (gpm)

(days) (MWth) (days) (MWth) 1.0 19.06 3.89 135.3 10 8.13 1.66 57.7 2.0 15.62 3.19 110.9 11 7.84 1.60 55.7 3.0 13.46 2.74 95.5 12 7.58 1.55 53.8 3.5 12.63 2.58 89.7 13 7.36 1.50 52.2 4.0 11.93 2.43 84.7 14 7.14 1.46 50.7 4.5 11.34 2.31 80.5 15 6.96 1.42 49.4 5.0 10.83 2.21 76.9 16 6.79 1.38 48.2 5.5 10.38 2.12 73.7 17 6.61 1.35 47.0 6.0 10.01 2.04 71.1 18 6.47 1.32 45.9 6.5 9.66 1.97 68.6 19 6.32 1.29 44.9 7.0 9.37 1.91 66.5 20 6.19 1.26 43.9 7.5 9.10 1.86 64.6 25 5.58 1.14 39.6 8.0 8.87 1.81 63.0 30 5.09 1.04 36.2 8.5 8.66 1.77 61.5 40 4.36 0.89 31.0 9.0 8.46 1.73 60.1 50 3.84 0.78 27.2 9.5 8.28 1.69 58.8 80 2.93 0.60 20.8 Current outage schedules do not support reloads in less than 10 days.

Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

    • The makeup flowrate listed is to compensate for boil off (not required flow to prevent boiling)

By : B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev. 2 Reviewer Page 26 of 40 Ness Kilic TABLE 2.5.3 Time to Boil Following a Loss of SDC with the RCS Filled to 120 (Vessel Full) and Reactor Vessel Head On Prior to Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Time after Time to Boil (minutes) Time to Boil (minutes)

Reactor Reactor Shutdown Shutdown Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature (F) Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature (F)

(days) (days) 100 110 120 130 135 140 100 110 120 130 135 140 1.0 22.1 20.1 18.1 16.0 15.0 14.0 10 51.7 47.0 42.3 37.6 35.3 32.9 2.0 26.9 24.5 22.0 19.6 18.4 17.1 11 53.7 48.8 43.9 39.0 36.6 34.1 3.0 31.3 28.4 25.6 22.7 21.3 19.9 12 55.5 50.4 45.4 40.3 37.8 35.3 3.5 33.3 30.3 27.2 24.2 22.7 21.2 13 57.2 52.0 46.8 41.6 39.0 36.4 4.0 35.2 32.0 28.8 25.6 24.0 22.4 14 58.9 53.5 48.2 42.8 40.1 37.5 4.5 37.1 33.7 30.3 27.0 25.3 23.6 15 60.5 55.0 49.5 44.0 41.2 38.5 5.0 38.8 35.3 31.8 28.3 26.5 24.7 16 62.0 56.3 50.7 45.1 42.3 39.4 5.5 40.5 36.8 33.1 29.5 27.6 25.8 17 63.6 57.8 52.0 46.2 43.4 40.5 6.0 42.0 38.2 34.4 30.6 28.7 26.7 18 65.0 59.1 53.2 47.3 44.3 41.4 6.5 43.5 39.6 35.6 31.7 29.7 27.7 19 66.6 60.5 54.5 48.4 45.4 42.4 7.0 44.9 40.8 36.7 32.7 30.6 28.6 20 68.0 61.8 55.6 49.5 46.4 43.3 7.5 46.2 42.0 37.8 33.6 31.5 29.4 25 75.4 68.6 61.7 54.8 51.4 48.0 8.0 47.4 43.1 38.8 34.5 32.3 30.2 30 82.6 75.1 67.6 60.1 56.3 52.5 8.5 48.6 44.2 39.7 35.3 33.1 30.9 40 96.5 87.7 78.9 70.2 65.8 61.4 9.0 49.7 45.2 40.7 36.1 33.9 31.6 50 109.6 99.6 89.7 79.7 74.7 69.7 9.5 50.8 46.2 41.5 36.9 34.6 32.3 80 143.4 130.4 117.3 104.3 97.8 91.3 Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

By : B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev. 2 Reviewer Page 27 of 40 Ness Kilic TABLE 2.5.4 Time to Boil Following a Loss of SDC with the RCS Filled to 120 (Vessel Full) and Reactor Vessel Head On After Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Time after Time to Boil (minutes) Time to Boil (minutes)

Reactor Reactor Shutdown Shutdown Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature (F) Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature (F)

(days) (days) 100 110 120 130 135 140 100 110 120 130 135 140 1.0 28.3 25.7 23.1 20.6 19.3 18.0 10 66.3 60.3 54.3 48.3 45.2 42.2 2.0 34.5 31.4 28.3 25.1 23.5 22.0 11 68.8 62.5 56.3 50.0 46.9 43.8 3.0 40.1 36.4 32.8 29.1 27.3 25.5 12 71.1 64.7 58.2 51.7 48.5 45.3 3.5 42.7 38.8 34.9 31.1 29.1 27.2 13 73.3 66.6 60.0 53.3 50.0 46.7 4.0 45.2 41.1 37.0 32.9 30.8 28.8 14 75.5 68.6 61.7 54.9 51.5 48.0 4.5 47.5 43.2 38.9 34.6 32.4 30.3 15 77.5 70.5 63.4 56.4 52.8 49.3 5.0 49.8 45.3 40.8 36.2 34.0 31.7 16 79.5 72.2 65.0 57.8 54.2 50.6 5.5 51.9 47.2 42.5 37.8 35.4 33.1 17 81.5 74.1 66.7 59.3 55.6 51.9 6.0 53.9 49.0 44.1 39.2 36.7 34.3 18 83.4 75.8 68.2 60.6 56.9 53.1 6.5 55.8 50.7 45.7 40.6 38.0 35.5 19 85.3 77.6 69.8 62.1 58.2 54.3 7.0 57.6 52.3 47.1 41.9 39.2 36.6 20 87.2 79.3 71.3 63.4 59.4 55.5 7.5 59.2 53.9 48.5 43.1 40.4 37.7 25 96.7 87.9 79.1 70.3 65.9 61.5 8.0 60.8 55.3 49.7 44.2 41.5 38.7 30 105.9 96.2 86.6 77.0 72.2 67.4 8.5 62.3 56.6 51.0 45.3 42.5 39.6 40 123.7 112.4 101.2 89.9 84.3 78.7 9.0 63.7 57.9 52.1 46.3 43.4 40.5 50 140.5 127.7 115.0 102.2 95.8 89.4 9.5 65.1 59.2 53.3 47.3 44.4 41.4 80 183.9 167.1 150.4 133.7 125.4 117.0 Current outage schedules do not support reloads in less than 10 days. Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 28 of 40 TABLE 2.5.5 Time to Core Uncovery Following a Loss of SDC with the RCS Filled to 120 (Vessel Full) and Reactor Vessel Head On (3990 MW Core)

Note: Times do not include time to boil and assume no cold leg openings.

Time to Core Time to Core Decay Heat Uncovery After Decay Heat Uncovery After (MW) Boiling Starts (MW) Boiling Starts (minutes) (minutes) 24.44 18 10.42 42 20.02 22 10.05 44 17.25 25 9.72 45 16.19 27 9.43 46 15.30 28 9.16 48 14.54 30 8.92 49 13.88 31 8.70 50 13.31 33 8.48 52 12.83 34 8.29 53 12.39 35 8.10 54 12.01 36 7.93 55 11.67 37 7.15 61 11.37 38 6.53 67 11.10 39 5.59 79 10.85 40 4.92 89 10.62 41 3.76 117 Source of Data: TA-13-C00-2001-006

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 29 of 40 2.6 RCS Filled to Refueling Level Operation NOTES 2.6.0 Key Reactor Core Parameters Following a Loss of SDC With The RCS Filled to Refueling Level The key reactor core parameters following a loss of shutdown cooling (SDC) with the RCS filled to the refueling level are for 550 EFPD at 100% RTP. These results are based in part on a computer analysis using the RETRAN code.

Decay heat power is based on Branch Technical Position 9-2 utilizing a 550 EFPD cycle length at 100% power. (3990 MWt)(Reference TA-13-C00-1999-009)

Time to boil is based on the time for the water in the vessel to reach 210 0F. This is a function of decay heat, mass of water in vessel and initial RCS bulk temperature (inlet Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger temperature). It is determined by subtracting the RCS bulk temperature from 2100, and then dividing by the heatup rate. The only value of RCS bulk temperature provided is 135 degrees F, the maximum allowed temperature for Mode 6.

Heatup rate is determined by dividing the decay heat by the specific heat capacity for water and by the mass of water available in the vessel at the start of the event.

Time to core uncovery is based on the time it takes the water above the top of the core to drop to the top of the core. Time to core uncovery is the time for the mass above the core to boil off and does not include the time associated with reaching boiling temperature. Time to core uncovery is a function of decay heat, this volume of water and the pressure over the water.

Makeup rate is the amount of flow required to reach the core to compensate for water loss through boil off. Note that this is the volume that must be delivered to the core in order to maintain constant inventory. Flow diverted out any cold leg opening must be accounted for (i.e. flowrate indications may not be actual flowrates reaching the core).

NOTE: VALUES NOT EXPLICITLY FOUND IN THE TABLES SHALL BE DETERMINED VIA LINEAR INTERPOLATION PERFORMED BY THE SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 30 of 40 TABLE 2.6.1 Time to Boil and Heatup Rates Following a Loss of SDC With the RCS Filled to the Refueling Level Prior to Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Decay Heatup Time Time after Decay Heatup Time Reactor Heat Rate to Reactor Heat Rate to Shutdown Load (F/Min.) Boil Shutdown Load (F/Min.) Boil (days) (MW th) (hours) (days) (MW th) (hours) 1.0 24.44 0.42 3.0 10 10.42 0.18 7.0 2.0 20.02 0.34 3.6 11 10.05 0.17 7.2 3.0 17.25 0.30 4.2 12 9.72 0.17 7.5 3.5 16.19 0.28 4.5 13 9.43 0.16 7.7 4.0 15.30 0.26 4.7 14 9.16 0.16 7.9 4.5 14.54 0.25 5.0 15 8.92 0.15 8.1 5.0 13.88 0.24 5.2 16 8.70 0.15 8.4 5.5 13.31 0.23 5.5 17 8.48 0.15 8.6 6.0 12.83 0.22 5.7 18 8.29 0.14 8.8 6.5 12.39 0.21 5.9 19 8.10 0.14 9.0 7.0 12.01 0.21 6.1 20 7.93 0.14 9.2 7.5 11.67 0.20 6.2 25 7.15 0.12 10.2 8.0 11.37 0.20 6.4 30 6.53 0.11 11.1 8.5 11.10 0.19 6.5 40 5.59 0.10 13.0 9.0 10.85 0.19 6.7 50 4.92 0.08 14.8 9.5 10.62 0.18 6.8 80 3.76 0.06 19.3 Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 31 of 40 TABLE 2.6.2 Time to Boil and Heatup Rates Following a Loss of SDC With the RCS Filled to the Refueling Level After Core Reload (3990 MW Core)

Time after Decay Heatup Time Time after Decay Heatup Time Reactor Heat Rate to Reactor Heat Rate to Shutdown Load (F/Min.) Boil Shutdown Load (F/Min.) Boil (days) (MWth) (hours) (days) (MWth) (hours) 1.0 19.06 0.33 3.8 10 8.13 0.14 8.9 2.0 15.62 0.27 4.7 11 7.84 0.13 9.3 3.0 13.46 0.23 5.4 12 7.58 0.13 9.6 3.5 12.63 0.22 5.8 13 7.36 0.13 9.9 4.0 11.93 0.21 6.1 14 7.14 0.12 10.2 4.5 11.34 0.20 6.4 15 6.96 0.12 10.4 5.0 10.83 0.19 6.7 16 6.79 0.12 10.7 5.5 10.38 0.18 7.0 17 6.61 0.11 11.0 6.0 10.01 0.17 7.3 18 6.47 0.11 11.2 6.5 9.66 0.17 7.5 19 6.32 0.11 11.5 7.0 9.37 0.16 7.8 20 6.19 0.11 11.7 7.5 9.10 0.16 8.0 25 5.58 0.10 13.0 8.0 8.87 0.15 8.2 30 5.09 0.09 14.3 8.5 8.66 0.15 8.4 40 4.36 0.07 16.7 9.0 8.46 0.15 8.6 50 3.84 0.07 18.9 9.5 8.28 0.14 8.8 80 2.93 0.05 24.8 Current outage schedules do not support reloads in less than 10 days.

Source of Data: SA-13-C00-1996-004

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 32 of 40 TABLE 2.6.3 Time to Core Uncovery Following a Loss of SDC RCS at Refueling Level (3990 MW Core)

Note: Times do not include time to boil and assume no cold leg openings.

Time to Core Time to Core Decay Heat Uncovery After Decay Heat Uncovery After (MW) Boiling Starts (MW) Boiling Starts (hours) (hours) 24.44 34.9 10.42 81.8 20.02 42.6 10.05 84.8 17.25 49.4 9.72 87.7 16.19 52.6 9.43 90.4 15.30 55.7 9.16 93.0 14.54 58.6 8.92 95.5 13.88 61.4 8.70 98.0 13.31 64.0 8.48 100.5 12.83 66.4 8.29 102.8 12.39 68.8 8.10 105.2 12.01 71.0 7.93 107.5 11.67 73.0 7.15 119.2 11.37 75.0 6.53 130.5 11.10 76.8 5.59 152.5 10.85 78.5 4.92 173.2 10.62 80.2 3.76 226.7 Source of Data: TA-13-C00-2001-006

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 33 of 40 2.7 Spent Fuel Pool Operation NOTES 2.7.0 Spent Fuel Pool Parameters for a Loss of SDC Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) parameters will be determined on a cycle to cycle basis due to changing inven-tories in the SFP.

Information concerning the existing decay heat load currently in the SFP can be found in the unit specific As-Left Decay Heat Projection analysis maintained by Reactor Engineering. The decay heat loads for the reactor core (for periods of time during or after core offload) are included in SAOD sections 2.2 through 2.6.

Once the decay heat has been determined, the Heatup Rate (HUR) in 0F/hr can be calculated from:

kW ( BTU ) ( hr )

DH 1000 ----------- 3412 -------------------------------

MW t kW HUR = -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2, 114, 850lbm C p Time to Boil (TTB) in hours can be calculated from:

210 - T initial TTB = ------------------------------

HUR where:

DH: total SFP decay heat, current decay heat load + additional off-loaded fuel, in MWt 2,114,850 lbm is the assumed mass of water in the SFP, this is less than value based on these references (

References:

(1) NRC letter from M.B. Fields to G.R. Overbeck, March 2, 2000, addresses minimum SFP capacity of 320,000 gallons; (2) Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Table 9.1-2, Maximum SFP temperature of 167 0F)

Cp: 1.0 BTU/lbm 0F 210 0F assumed boiling point of SFP water Tinitial: SFP temperature at time of loss of cooling in 0F

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 34 of 40 2.8 Minimum Time to Reduced Flow SDC Operations NOTES 2.8.0 Minimum Time to Reduced Flow SDC Operations Following Reactor Shutdown to Maintain RCS Temperature at or Below 135 Deg. F Table 2.8.1 presents the EW cooling water temperature and post-shutdown time criteria prior to reducing SDC system total flow rate to 3780 gpm (indicated) to support reduced inventory conditions while providing sufficient cooling capacity to maintain the RCS temperature at or below 135 0F. Specifically, this table correlates the time after shutdown where the core decay heat is equal to or less than the cooling capacity of the SDC system at the corresponding EW cooling water temperature and with the RCS temperature at 135 0F.

The data presented in Table 2.8.1 is predicated on stable RCS temperature prior to reducing SDC flow rate. Upon reduction of SDC flow rate and prior to reducing RCS water level, Operations shall monitor RCS temperature to verify that sufficient cooling capacity exists to maintain RCS temperature at or below 135 0F. Engineering recommends that RCS temper-ature be monitored for a period of not less than one hour (reference letter 448-00525).

Data presented in Table 2.8.1 is based on the SDC performance analyses contained in PVNGS calculation 13-MC-SI-231 for a rated thermal power of 3990 MW. EW temperature instrument uncertainty included in Table 2.8.1 is based on total loop uncertainty for instru-ments 1,2,3JEWNTI083/84 as indicated on the ERFDADS display. Verification of actual EW temperature by alternative means using appropriate M&TE is considered acceptable.

Notes 2.8.0 and Table 2.8.1 are maintained by Design Mechanical Engineering, NSSS.

Questions concerning this information should be directed to the Design Mechanical NSSS section leader.

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 35 of 40 TABLE 2.8.1 Minimum Time to Reduced Flow SDC Operations Following Reactor Shutdown To Maintain RCS Temperature at or Below 135 Deg. F Note: Refer to Note 2.8.0 for information regarding the use of this table EW Inlet EW Inlet Decay Heat / Time After Temperature Temperature SDC capacity Shutdown (Actual - 0F) (Indicated - 0F) (MW) (Hrs)

(1,2,3JEWN083/84) 92 87 15.5 91 91 86 15.9 87 90 85 16.3 82 89 84 16.6 79 88 83 17.0 75 87 82 17.4 71 Source of Data: 13-MC-SI-231, Revision 4

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 36 of 40 2.9 RCS Forced Flow and RWT Temperature Requirements NOTES 2.9.0 RCS Forced Flow and RWT Temperature Requirements To Maintain Subcooled Conditions Following a Loss of Shutdown Cooling Table 2.9.1 presents the Refueling Water Tank fluid temperature and time requirements following reactor shutdown to be satisfied prior to reduced inventory conditions. These criteria must be satisfied prior to reducing RCS water level to ensure that sufficient cooling is available to maintain the core covered and subcooled by HPSI forced cooling in the event of a loss of shutdown cooling. The RWT temperature requirements in Table 2.9.1 ensure that the total heat dissipated by a single train of HPSI injection is equal to or greater than the corresponding core decay heat at the specified time after shutdown.

The data presented in Table 2.9.1 is based on the forced flow cooling analysis contained in PVNGS calculation 13-MC-SI-231 for a rated thermal power of 3990 MW. RWT temper-ature instrument uncertainty included in Table 2.9.1 is based on total loop uncertainty for instruments 1,2,3CHNTI200 as indicated on the ERFDADS display. Operations will establish the need to circulate the RWT volume to ensure that the tank is thermally well mixed.

Notes 2.9.0 and Table 2.9.1 are maintained by Design Mechanical Engineering, NSSS.

Questions concerning this information should be directed to the Design Mechanical NSSS section leader.

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 37 of 40 TABLE 2.9.1 RCS Forced Flow and RWT Temperature Requirements To Maintain Subcooled Conditions Following a Loss of Shutdown Cooling Note: Refer to Note 2.9.0 for information regarding the use of this table RWT Temperature RWT Temperature Decay Heat Time After (Actual - 0F) (Indicated - 0F) (MW) Shutdown (Hrs) 74 72 18.0 65 76 74 17.7 68 78 76 17.4 71 80 78 17.1 75 82 80 16.8 77 84 82 16.5 80 86 84 16.2 83 88 86 15.9 86 90 88 15.6 90 Source of Data: 13-MC-SI-231, Revision 4

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 38 of 40 3.0 IMPACT REVIEW The SAOD provides information to the operations staff and shift technical advisors should a loss of shutdown cooling occur, but does not affect any procedures they use.

This document satisfies the design control requirements but is not a QR analysis package. This doc-ument is a collection of data from QR analysis. Changes to these referenced analysis require the performance of the impact review and other analysis package requirements (i.e. AD documentation, etc.).

The SAOD revision will not effect any outside organization or procedure. The potential impact of revising this SWMS manual was determined by talking to personnel from: Operations, Outage Management, OPS standards, Design Engineering, System Engineering, and NFM. No SABD exists for the SAOD. No other design or configuration documents were identified as impacted.

4.0 REFERENCES

1) TA-13-C00-1999-009, Outage Decay Heats, Revision 3, 2/25/2003.

2 TA-13-C00-2001-005, Loss of Shutdown Cooling Analyses for RCS Drain Operations and Nozzle Dam Installation, Revision 1, 3/28/2003 3 TA-13-C00-2001-006, SAOD Input Data of Estimated Times to Vaporize RCS Inventory Above the Reactor Core, Revision 1, 5/7/2003.

4 SA-13-C00-1996-004, Stretch Power SAOD, Revision 4, 8/5/2003.

5 13-MC-SI-231, Calculation of Minimum Time to Reduced Flow Shutdown Cooling Oper-ation, Revision 4, 4/06/2005 6 Deleted.

7 Letter 162-09970-KCP dated March 5, 2002. (Note; this letter was supplemented by the let-ter in reference 12 below).

8 TA-03-C09-2001-004, Loss of Shutdown Cooling Analysis for RCP Removal During U3C9 SNOW Outage, Revision 1, 2/20/2001.

9 NRC letter from M.B. Fields to G.R. Overbeck, March 2, 2000.

10 UFSAR revision 13 dated June 2005.

11 Letter 448-00525-MAB/JAB dated August 17, 2001.

12 Letter 162-10794-CAH/DAM dated February 25, 2004 and CRDR 2686238

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 39 of 40 Design Review Checklist Results of Review Design Review Area (Refer to the instructions for each specific area that needs to be considered by the review) YES N/A1

1. Were the inputs correctly selected and properly documented? X
2. Are assumptions necessary to perform the analysis adequately described and reasonable?

X Where necessary, are they identified for subsequent re-verification (contingencies)?

3. Are the appropriate quality and quality assurance requirements specified? X
4. Are the applicable standards, acceptance criteria, and regulatory requirements properly X

identified? Are their requirements met?

5. Have applicable operating experience, conditions, issues, and plant configuration been X

considered?

6. Are the systems, structures, and components credited/used/considered/specified in the analysis X

allowed/suitable for the required application?

7. Was an appropriate design method used? Were the input and assumptions correctly X

incorporated in the design process?

8. Is the output reasonable compared to design inputs? Are the conclusions appropriately drawn? X
9. Have the design interface requirements been satisfied? Are the impacts on other design X

documents properly identified? Have change mechanisms been initiated?

10. If the analysis results need verification by further testing, are the criteria for verification that X

the design requirements have been satisfactorily accomplished identified?

11. Are the requirements for record preparation, review, approval, retention etc. adequately X

specified?

Comments/Explanations:

For Questions 2, 4, and 10: This document is a collection of data from several QR analyses. No new assumptions, acceptance criteria, or verification requirements are established by this document.

Review Performed By: A. N. Kilic Date:11/30/05 1.N/A (Not Applicable) - If marked, an explanation shall be provided in the Comments/Explanation Box.

By: B.S. Blackmore Safety Analysis Operational Data SAOD Unit 1 Manual 3990 MWt Rev 2 Reviewer: Ness Kilic Page 40 of 40 Design Verification Comment Sheet Comment Response Response Number Reviewers Comment Required? Preparers Response Accepted?

1 For consistency, state the time when 14 No Extrapolating from TA-13-C00-1999-009, Yes MW is reached on page 4. 14 MW is reached at 117.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after shutdown. 118 hours0.00137 days <br />0.0328 hours <br />1.951058e-4 weeks <br />4.4899e-5 months <br /> listed in SAOD.

2 Page 33, date for referenced NRC letter is No Corrected typo Yes wrong (typo, number should be 2 not 3) 3 Other misc editorial comments as dis- No Incorporated Yes cussed.

4 5

6 REVIEWER: A. N. Kilic DATE: 11/30/05 SCOPE OF REVIEW AND VERIFICATION: This document is a collection of data from sever-al QR analyses. Thus, the review consisted of verification that the information is correctly and completely extracted from the source documents and translated into SAOD for applicable unit.

TYPE OF VERIFICATION (check all that apply):

Design Review (attach Design Review Checklist) X Alternate Calculations (attach Design Review Checklist and alternate calculations)

Qualification Testing (attach Design Review Checklist and test results)

Other (specify and attach supporting documentation and Design Review Checklist)

VERIFICATION NOTES: (Attach relevant information)

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam 21.

This Exam Level SRO Appears on: SRO EXAM 2012 Tier 3 K/A # 2.2.11 Importance 3.3 Rating:

In accordance with 81DP-0DC17 (Temporary Modification Control), which ONE of the following installations require a Temporary Modification?

A. Alternate power supplied to NHN-M04 during a refueling outage.

B. Domestic service flush line aligned to NCN-P01A while it is under clearance.

C. Discharge pressure gauge on a LPSI pump while performing a surveillance test.

D. Jumpers installed in an PPS channel while performing a troubleshooting work order.

Answer: A Associated KA:

L57327 Identify those plant changes that are NOT considered Temporary Modifcations.

100866 Active Question Bank 2004 Reference Id: Q1363 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 2 10CFR Category: 55.43 (3) Facility licensee procedures required to obtain authority for design and operating changes in the facility Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

81DP-0DC17 (Temporary Modification Control)

K&A: Equipment Control Knowledge of the process for controlling temporary changes.

Learning Objective: Identify those plant changes that are NOT considered Temporary Modification.

Justification:

A. Correct: Per Appendix D of 81DP-0DC17, Temporary power installations connecting permanent plant equipment either bus, motor or valve, if the temporary power comes from one in-plant bus to another in-plant bus.

B. Incorrect: Flushing a system while under clearance is similar to air assisted draining and does not require a Tmod..

C. Incorrect: LPSI ST pressure gauge has a permanently installed plant adapter for the ST and does not require a Tmod.

D. Incorrect: This is controlled by the work control process and a Tmod is not required.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/03/01

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam 22.

This Exam Level SRO Appears on: SRO EXAM 2007SRO EXAM 2012 Tier 3 K/A # 2.2.18 Importance 3.9 Rating:

Given the following conditions:

x Unit 1 is in a Midloop condition x Maintenance requests permission to re-lug ESFAS jumper leads Prior to this Work Order being released to the field, who (by title) is responsible to verify the proper RCS perturbation code?

A. Releasing Organization and Outage Coordinator B. Releasing Organization and Operations Shift Manager C. Outage Coordinator and Midloop Operations Coordinator D. Midloop Operations Coordinator and Operations Shift Manager Answer: D Associated KA:

30222 process for managing maintenance activities while shutdown Reference Id: Q10380 Difficulty: 4.00 Time to complete: 3 10CFR Category: 55.43 (3) Facility licensee procedures required to obtain authority for design and operating changes in the facility Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: NONE Technical

Reference:

40OP-9ZZ16 (RCS Drain Ops) & 40OP-9ZZ20 (Reduced Inventory Ops)

K&A: Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations.

Learning Objective: 30222 process of managing maintenance activities while shutdown OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/03/01

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A. Incorrect: The releasing organization and outage coordinator control clearances and other activities (making them seem correct), but not work orders.

B. Incorrect:The releasing organization and outage coordinator control clearances and other activities (making them seem correct), but not work orders.

C. Incorrect:The releasing organization and outage coordinator control clearances and other activities (making them seem correct), but not work orders.

D. Correct: By procedure 40DP-9ZZ30 Appendix A, only these 2 control this activity.

OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/03/01

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam 23.

This Exam Level SRO Appears on: SRO EXAM 2008 SRO EXAM 2012 Tier 3 K/A # 2.3.11 Importance 4.3 Rating:

Given the following plant conditions:

x A large break LOCA has occurred.

x Due to emergency conditions a gaseous radioactive release from Containment must be performed to relieve pressure in the containment and bring the plant to a safer condition.

Who may authorize this release without a release permit?

A. Shift Manager B. Operations Department Leader C. Radiation Protection Supervisor D. Radiological Services Department Leader Answer: A Reference Id: Q832 Difficulty: 3.00 Time to complete: 4 10CFR Category: CFR 55.43 (4) 55.43 (4) Radiation hazards that may arise during normal and abnormal situations, including maintenance activities and various contamination conditions.

Cognitive Level: Memory Question Source: PV Bank Not Modified Comment:

Proposed reference to be provided to applicant during examination: None Technical

Reference:

1. LOIT lesson plan L57256 ( describe whose authority is needed to exceed requirements and what reporting is necessary )
2. 74RM-9EF20, GR release permits and offsite dose assessments K&A: Ability to control radiation releases OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 1 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/02/28

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES 401 - 5 Question Worksheet (Larry's Copy of) PVNGS 2012 Senior Reactor Operator NRC Exam Justification:

A is Correct - Only the Shift Manager or CRS is permitted to approve emergency release's to stabilize the plant during EOP performance B is Incorrect - review and Approval of releases that exceed >/= to 80% of limits.

C is Incorrect - Approves releases that are < 40% of the limit D is Incorrect - Review and Approval of releases that are > 40% but < 80% of limit OPTRNG_EXAM Page: 2 of 2 Rev 1 Larry 2012/02/28

         

  

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