ML120970603
| ML120970603 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 04/02/2012 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Chawla M, NRR/DORL, 415-8371 | |
| References | |
| NRC-1539, 2.206 | |
| Download: ML120970603 (51) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
10 CFR 2.206 Petition RE Palisades Nuclear Power Plant Docket Number: (n/a)
Location:
Teleconference Date:
Monday, April 2, 2012 Work Order No.:
NRC-1539 Pages 1-49 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
+ + + + +
3 10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB) 4
+ + + + +
5 PETITION FOR PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 6
+ + + + +
7 MONDAY 8
APRIL 2, 2012 9
+ + + + +
10 The conference call was held at 2:00 p.m., Allen 11
- Howe, Chairman of the Petition Review
- Board, 12 presiding.
13 14 PETITIONER: THOMAS SAPORITO 15 16 PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS 17 ALLEN HOWE, Petition Review Board Chairman, 18 Deputy Director, Division of Operating 19 Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 20 Reactor Regulation, NRC 21 MAHESH "MAC" CHAWLA, Project Manager for 22 Palisades Nuclear Plant 23 24 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 2
NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF 1
DAVID ALLEY, Office of Nuclear Reactor 2
Regulation's Piping and NDE Branch 3
MERRILEE BANIC, Petition Coordinator, NRR 4
VIJAY GOEL, Office of Nuclear Reactor 5
Regulation's Electrical Engineering 6
Branch 7
KIM MORGANBUTLER, Acting Branch Chief, 8
Generic Communications Branch, NRC 9
JEFF POEHLER, Office of Nuclear Reactor 10 Regulation's Vessels and Internals 11 Integrity Branch 12 ADDITIONAL NRC PARTICIPANTS 13 JACK GIESSNER, Branch Chief, Branch 4, from 14 Region 3, Division of Reactor Projects 15 MAURIE LEMONCELLI, Office of General Counsel 16 ROBERT LERCH, Project Engineer, Branch 4, from 17 Region 3, Division of Reactor Projects 18 ANTONIO ZOULIS, from the Office of Nuclear 19 Reactor Regulation's PRA Operational 20 Support Branch 21 ALSO PRESENT 22 JIM KUEMIN, Entergy Nuclear Operations 23 JOHN STEVE'S 24 25
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1
Opening Statement, Mahesh "Mac" Chawla, 2
Project Manager for Palisades Nuclear 3
Plant 4
4
Introductions
5 5
Background, Allen Howe, Petition Review Board 6
Chairman 7
7 Presentation by Thomas SAPORITO, Petitioner 13 8
Petitioner's Exhibit 1 Marked 17 9
Petitioner's Exhibit 2 Marked 20 10 Petitioner's Exhibit 3 Marked 21 11 Petitioner's Exhibit 4 Marked 25 12 Petitioner's Exhibit 4 Marked 29 13 Adjourn 49 14 15
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P R O C E E D I N G S 1
2:01 P.M.
2 MR. CHAWLA: Okay, folks. Good afternoon.
3 We'll get started here. I would like to thank 4
everybody for attending this meeting. My name is Mac 5
Chawla and I'm the NRC Project Manager for the 6
Palisades Nuclear Plant.
7 We are here today to allow Petitioner 8
Thomas Saporito to address the Petition Review Board 9
regarding the 2.26 petition dated March 1, 2012.
10 I'm also the Petition Manager for the 11 petition. The Petition Review Board Chairman is Allen 12 Howe.
13 As part of the Petition Review Board or 14 PRB's review of this petition, Thomas Saporito has 15 requested this opportunity to address the PRB.
16 This meeting is scheduled from 2 to 3 p.m.
17 Eastern Time. The meeting is being recorded by the 18 NRC Operations Center and will be transcribed by a 19 court reporter. The transcript will become a 20 supplement to the petition. The transcript will also 21 be made publicly available.
22 I would like to open this meeting with 23 introductions. As we go around the room, please be 24 sure to clearly state your name, your position, and 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 5
the office that you work for within the NRC for the 1
record.
2 I'll start off. Again, my name is Mac 3
Chawla. I'm the Petition Manager for this petition.
4 We'll go around the room here.
5 MS.
BANIC:
Lee
- Banic, Petition 6
Coordinator, NRR.
7 MS. MORGANBUTLER: Kim MorganButler, the 8
Acting Branch Chief for the Generic Communications 9
Branch, NRR.
10 MR. GOEL: Vijay Goel, Electrical Engineer 11 from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
12 MR.
POEHLER:
Jeff
- Poehler, Senior 13 Materials Engineer's Vessels and Internals 14 Integrity Branch in NRR, Division of Engineering, 15 representing Simon Sheng who couldn't be here today.
16 MR. ALLEY: Dave Alley, Senior Materials 17 Engineer, Acting Branch Chief for the Piping and NDE 18 Branch, NRR.
19 CHAIRMAN HOWE:
Allen
- Howe, Deputy 20 Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, 21 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and I'm also the 22 PRB chair.
23 MR.
CHAWLA:
We have completed 24 introductions at NRC headquarters, at this time are 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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there any other parties on the phone?
1 MS. LEMONCELLI: Yes, good afternoon.
2 This is Maurie Lemoncelli, NRC, Office of the General 3
Counsel.
4 MR.
CHAWLA:
Are there any NRC 5
participants from the Regional Office on the phone?
6 MR. LERCH: This is Robert Lerch calling 7
from Region 3.
8 MR. GIESSNER: Jack Giessner, Branch 9
Chief, responsible for Palisades, Region 3.
10 MR. ZOULIS: Antonio Zoulis, Headquarters, 11 on the phone, also, Division of Risk Assessment.
12 MR. CHAWLA: Okay, anybody else from 13 headquarters or region? Hearing none, are there any 14 representatives for the licensee on the phone?
15 MR. KUEMIN: Jim Kuemin from Palisades, 16 Entergy Nuclear Operations.
17 MR. CHAWLA: Mr. Saporito, would you 18 please introduce yourself for the record?
19 MR. SAPORITO: My name is Thomas SAPORITO.
20 I'm the senior consultant with Saprodani Associates, 21 Jupiter, Florida.
22 MR. CHAWLA: It is not required for 23 members of the public to introduce themselves for this 24 call. However, if there are any members of the public 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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on the phone that wish to do so at this time, please 1
state your name for the record. Any members of the 2
public on the phone? Hearing none, I would say there 3
are no members of the public other than Mr. Saporito 4
himself.
5 I would like to emphasize that we need to 6
speak clearly and loudly to make sure that the court 7
reporter can accurately transcribe this meeting. If 8
you do have something that you would like to say 9
please first state your name for the record.
10 For those dialing into the meeting, please 11 remember to mute your phones to minimize any 12 background noise or distractions. If you do not have 13 a mute button, it can be done by pressing the *6. To 14 unmute press the *6 keys again. Thank you.
15 At this time, I'll turn it over to the PRB 16 Chairman, Allen Howe.
17 CHAIRMAN HOWE: Mac, thank you, and as Mac 18 said, if you could mute your phones if you're not 19 speaking that would be appreciated.
20 Good afternoon andI want to welcome 21 everybody to this meeting regarding the 2.206 petition 22 submitted by Mr. Saporito.
23 I'd like to share a little bit of 24 background on our process. Section 2.206 -- excuse 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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me, could you please mute your phone if you're not 1
speaking? Thank you.
2 Section 2.206 of Title X of the Code of 3
Federal Regulations describes the petition process, 4
the primary mechanism for the public to request 5
enforcement action taken by the NRC in a public 6
process. The process permits anyone to petition NRC 7
to take enforcement-type action related to NRC 8
licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the 9
results of this evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend, 10 or revoke any NRC issued license or take any other 11 appropriate enforcement action to resolve the problem.
12 The NRC staff's guidance for the 13 disposition of a 2.206 petition request is in 14 Management Directive 8.11 which is publicly available.
15 The purpose of today's meeting is to give 16 the Petitioner an opportunity to provide any 17 additional explanation or support for the petition 18 before the Petition Review
- Board, initial 19 consideration, and recommendation.
20 A couple points I want to mention here.
21 The meeting is not a hearing, nor is it an opportunity 22 for the Petitioner to question or examine the PRB on 23 the merits or the issues presented in the petition 24 request. Nodecisions regarding the merits of this 25
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petition will be made at this meeting.
1 Following this
- meeting, the Petition 2
Review Board will conduct its internal deliberations.
3 The outcome of this internal meeting will be discussed 4
with the Petitioner.
5 The Petition Review Board typically 6
consists of a chairman, usually a manager at the 7
Senior Executive Service level at the NRC. It has a 8
Petition Manager and a
Petition Review Board 9
Coordinator.
Other members of the Board are 10 determined by the NRC staff based on the content of 11 the information of the petition request.
12 At this time I'd like to introduce the 13 members of the Board. As I said earlier, I'm Allen 14 Howe, I am the Petition Review Board Chairman. Mac 15 Chawla is the Petition Manager for the petition under 16 discussion today. Merrilee Banic is the Office's 17 Petition Review Board Coordinator. Technical staff 18 representation includes Vijay Goel from the Office of 19 Nuclear Reactor Regulation's Electrical Engineering 20 Branch; Simon Sheng from the Office of Nuclear Reactor 21 Regulation Vessel Internals Integrity Branch. Sitting 22 in for Simon today is Jeff Poehler. Antonio Zuelis 23 from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, PRA 24 Operational Support Branch. David Mueller from the 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 10 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Licensing and 1
Training Branch. Molly Keefe from the Office of 2
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Health Physics and Human 3
Performance Branch. Kim Morgan Butler from the Office 4
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's Generic Communication 5
Branch. David Alley from the Office of Nuclear 6
Reactor Regulation's Piping and NDE Branch. Jack 7
Geissner, Branch Chief, Branch 4 from Region 3, 8
Division of Reactor Projects. Robert Lerch, Project 9
Engineer, Branch 4 from Region 3, Division of Reactor 10 Projects. We also obtain advice from our Office of 11 the General Counsel represented by Maurie Lemoncelli.
12 As described in our process, the NRC staff 13 may ask clarifying questions in order to better 14 understand the Petitioner's representation and to 15 reach a reasoned decision whether to accept or reject 16 the Petitioner's request for review under the 2.206 17 process.
18 I'd like to summarize the scope of the 19 petition under consideration and the NRC activities to 20 date. On March 1, 2012, Mr. Saporito submitted to the 21 NRC a petition under 2.206 regarding Palisades Nuclear 22 Plant. In this petition request, Mr. Saporito is 23 requesting the following actions:
escalated 24 enforcement action against Palisades Nuclear Plant, 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 11 PNP for short, to suspend or revoke the NRC license 1
granted to the licensee for operation of the PNP.
2 The second item is for NRC to issue a 3
Notice of Violation with a proposed civil penalty 4
against the licensee in the total amount of $1 5
million. And the third item is NRC to issue a 6
confirmatory order requiring the licensee to take 7
specific actions and bring PNP down to a cold shutdown 8
mode of operation until a number of requested actions 9
specified the petition take place.
10 I want to provide to you a little bit of 11 background on the NRC activities to date. On March 12 12,
- 2012, the Petition Manager contacted the 13 Petitioner via email to describe the petition process 14 under Section 2.206 of Title X of the Code of Federal 15 Regulations and requested confirmation for processing 16 your request under the 2.206 process.
The 17 Petitioner was also provided the opportunity to 18 address the Petition Review Board.
19 On March 15, 2012, the Petitioner provided 20 the Petition Manager an acknowledgment via email and 21 also requested the teleconference details to enable 22 him to address the Petition Review Board.
23 On March 16, 2012, the Petition Review 24 Board met internally to discuss the request for 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 12 immediate action. The Petition Review Board denied 1
the petition request for immediate action on the basis 2
that there was no immediate safety concern to the 3
plant or to the health and safety of the public. The 4
Petitioner did not provide any additional information 5
beyond reference to these events which have been the 6
subject of previous NRC inspection activities for 7
which a resolution has been achieved.
8 The amount of penalty was also determined 9
by the enforcement process which is based on 10 inspection findings and the violations given to the 11 licensee. In general, all requested actions in the 12 petition do not have sufficient basis for the NRC to 13 take escalated enforcement. Therefore the request to 14 require the escalated enforcement action to shut down 15 PNP and the requested civil penalty were denied.
16 On March
- 20th, the Petition Manager 17 contacted the Petitioner via email to inform him about 18 the PRB decision for the immediate action. He also 19 confirmed the date of the teleconference to address 20 the PRB by phone and provided the necessary details.
21 Today, April 2, 2012, the Petitioner sent 22 via email five exhibits to be provided to the Petition 23 Review Board members prior to the meeting, submitted 24 as a supplement to the original enforcement petition, 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 13 dated March 1, 2012 and to be referenced during the 1
context of the meeting.
2 As a reminder for the phone participants, 3
please identify yourself if you make any remarks as 4
this will help us in the preparation of the meeting 5
transcript that will be made publicly.
6 Mr. Saporito, I'd like to turn the meeting 7
over to you to allow you the opportunity to provide 8
any information you believe the Board should consider 9
regarding this petition.
10 MR. SAPORITO: All right, thank you very 11 much for this opportunity. For the record, my name is 12 Thomas Saporito and I am the Petitioner in this matter 13 and Senior Consultant for Saprodani Associates located 14 in Jupiter, Tequesta area, South Florida.
15 I filed an enforcement petition on March 16 1, 2012 under 10 CFR 2.206 with the Executive Director 17 for Operations with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 18 Commission, or NRC, seeking certain and specific 19 escalated enforcement actions against Palisades 20 Nuclear Plant in connection with Licensed Operations 21 at that facility which appeared to jeopardize public 22 health and safety in violation of NRC safety 23 regulations and requirements under 10 CFR Part 50 and 24 under other NRC authority.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 14 The entirety of my presentation today on 1
the record, along with several exhibits to the 2
petition that I will enter into the record today, are 3
to be considered by the NRC Petition Review Board in 4
their entirety, just the same as if I provided them to 5
the NRC at the time of the filing of the instant 6
petition in this matter on March 1, 2012.
7 For the record, I provided a copy of all 8
exhibits presented here today to NRC employee, Mahesh 9
Chawla via email and requested the exhibits be made 10 available to the members of the NRC Petition Review 11 Board.
12 Before I continue, I have to comment on 13 some of the remarks the NRC put on its public record 14 today. To the extent that the NRC made public on this 15 record that certain NRC enforcement actions to date 16 have addressed and resolved serious nuclear safety 17 violations at the Palisades Nuclear Plant, I take 18 exception to that statement because it's simply not 19 true and it's false and it's misleading to the public 20 at large.
21 The history, and I'll get into the history 22 throughout this presentation, the history of 23 violations, serious safety violations at the Palisades 24 Nuclear Plant is well documented by the NRC and in 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 15 each case, the NRC makes that very same statement that 1
the enforcement actions taken as a result of certain 2
violations were addressed and resolved. And of 3
course, they're not because if they were in each of 4
those cases, the plant wouldn't have degraded as the 5
NRC has acknowledged and documented over the years and 6
we wouldn't be discussing these serious safety 7
violations today. So those statements are certainly 8
misleading and they're not true and they're, in fact, 9
false that these serious safety violations continue 10 today and the plant is being operated very dangerously 11 despite what the NRC has told the public.
12 Another point I want to make before I get 13 into this presentation is that I have researched and 14 have found that the NRC has not properly noticed this 15 meeting to the public. The public has a right to 16 participate at the end of this meeting to engage the 17 NRC or engage myself with respect to the issues 18 presented in this petition, yet, there doesn't appear 19 to be any news releases by the NRC. There doesn't 20 appear to be any publication in any newspaper. There 21 doesn't appear to be any notice provided on the NRC's 22 website where they advertise public meetings. And I 23 am very concerned about that.
24 And continuing here, to the extent that 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 16 the actions on the part of the NRC to date do not 1
appear sufficient to protect public health and safety 2
in connection with Licensed Operations at the 3
Palisades Nuclear Plant, I request that a copy of the 4
record transcripts, along with any exhibits identified 5
on the record today, be provided to the NRC Office of 6
Inspector General to enable that agency to make an 7
informed decision about whether to conduct an 8
investigation of the NRC and these circumstances.
9 It is important that I briefly explain for 10 the public's benefit the NRC's reactor oversight 11 process as follows. The NRC's regulatory framework 12 for reactor oversight consists of three key strategic 13 performance areas: reactor safety, radiation safety, 14 and safeguards. Within each strategic performance 15 area are cornerstones that reflect the essential 16 safety aspects of facility operation. The seven 17 cornerstones include initiating events, mitigating 18 systems, barrier integrity, emergency preparedness, 19 public radiation
- safety, occupational radiation 20 safety, and physical protection.
21 Satisfactory licensee performance in the 22 cornerstones provides reasonable assurance of safe 23 facility operation and that the NRC safety mission is 24 being accomplished. That's according to the NRC.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 17 As can be readily
- seen, the NRC's 1
regulatory framework for reactor oversight is 2
essentially an after-the-fact process or a reactive 3
process, rather than a proactive process. As such, 4
the NRC's regulatory framework for reactor oversight 5
jeopardizes public health and safety and fails to 6
accomplish the Agency's mission which can lead to a 7
Fukushima-type nuclear accident here in the United 8
States if left unchecked.
9 Although the purpose and intent of the 10 instant petition before the NRC Petition Review Board 11 today centers around serious nuclear safety concerns 12 in connection with licensed activities at the 13 Palisades Nuclear Plant, it is imperative that serious 14 problems with the NRC's regulatory framework for 15 reactor oversight be identified in relation to the 16 root cause of the nuclear safety violations at the 17 Palisades Nuclear Plant.
Indeed, it was the 18 failure of the NRC's regulatory framework for reactor 19 oversight which resulted at least in part to the 20 serious nuclear safety violations at the Palisades 21 Nuclear Plant.
22 (Whereupon, the above-referred to document was marked 23 as Petitioner's Exhibit 1
for 24 identification.)
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 18 For the record, I would like to identify 1
Petitioner's Exhibit 1 which is a March 25, 2012 news 2
article by Fritz Klug, a reporter for the Kalamazoo 3
Gazette. The news article is entitled "Inside 4
Palisades NRC Inspectors Give Glimpse into Power 5
Plant." At page two of the news article, it talks 6
about the role of the on-site NRC inspectors and 7
states that "a work day starts around 6:15 a.m. with 8
the review of the plant logs from an Entergy computer 9
in the NRC's office located in the heart of the plant.
10 Every day, the inspectors go through Condition Reports 11 to see what employees identified as concerns the 12 previous day."
13 Taylor, the Senior NRC Resident Inspector 14 at the Palisades Nuclear Plant, was quoted as stating 15 that "We make a point to see what problems employees 16 are flagging and we tailor our inspection activities 17 for the day based on what we see. With two personnel 18 on site, there is no way we can watch every single 19 person, every single activity, every single day. So 20 we use the available resources and information we have 21 and look what appears to be the most significant."
22 Ellegood, the second Resident Inspector at 23 the Palisades Nuclear Plant was quoted by the news 24 reporter as stating, "We know there were some 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 19 procedure weaknesses, but I can't go out and point to 1
this piece of equipment and know the procedure was 2
weak. You want to get to things early when you can, 3
but we don't have a crystal ball."
4 Ellegood, the NRC Resident Inspector, he 5
likened it to a police officer looking for drunk 6
drivers. The officer knows that drunken driving is a 7
problem, but he cannot stop a man walking into the bar 8
at 5 o'clock and arrest him as identified in the news 9
article at page three. Well, you know, as a member of 10 the public I see that a little different. The police 11 officer can certainly monitor the individual's 12 drinking activity inside the bar and the police 13 officer can certainly monitor the bartender and how 14 many drinks he is serving to the public in that bar.
15 The officer can ascertain, you know, who has consumed 16 too much alcohol and the officer can certainly engage 17 the individual before the individual gets into a motor 18 vehicle and injures a member of the public.
19 In kind, the NRC can certainly monitor the 20 licensee's activities and the NRC could have 21 intervened on these events, these nuclear safety 22 violations which the Agency cited at the Palisades 23 Nuclear Plant are involving the loss of a DC 24 electrical bus and one of the others involving a 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 20 material change in the coupling of a water pump, but 1
they didn't. It's an after-the-fact type of agency.
2 Let them do the violation and then we'll cite them for 3
it.
4 At this point in time I would like to 5
identify for the record Petitioner's Exhibit 2 which 6
is a February 29, 2012 news article by Matthew L. Wald 7
for the newyorktimes.com news agency.
8 (Whereupon, the above-referred to document was marked 9
as Petitioner's Exhibit 2
for 10 identification.)
11 The news article is entitled "The Nuclear 12 Ups and Downs of 2011." At the top of page one is 13 states that "The Nuclear Regulatory Commission spotted 14 a few problems in American reactors last year and 15 directed plant owners to fix them before they can 16 cause accidents. But it also let a lot of problems 17 slide and it failed to follow up and there were other 18 indications of deeper troubles." That's a conclusion 19 of a review from nuclear plant safety in 2011 by David 20 Lochbaum, an expert at the Union of Concerned 21 Scientists.
22 At the bottom of page one it states that 23 "None of the missteps resulted in any injuries or 24 release of radiation." But Mr. Lochbaum said that 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 21 "human error played a significant role and that the 1
Commission's safety philosophy relies on operators to 2
do the right thing in an emergency."
3 The news article continues at page three 4
stating that "Mr. Lochbaum characterized the incidents 5
as near misses, but Mr. McIntyre" -- M-C-I-N-T-Y-R-E 6
-- "of the Commission said "the NRC's oversight 7
program is designed to catch and correct problems well 8
before they become anything approaching a near miss."
9 It is imperative that the NRC Petition 10 Review Board and the NRC Office of Inspector General 11 make a special note of Mr. McIntyre's comment as I 12 discuss the specifics of the instant petition a little 13 bit later in this presentation in connection with 14 license activities at the Palisades Nuclear Plant.
15 At this time I would like to identify for 16 the record Petitioner's Exhibit 3 which is an August 17 10, 2010 NRC news release entitled "Focus on 18 Regulation, Prepared Remarks for the Honorable Gregory 19 B.
- Jaczko, Chairman, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory 20 Commission" at the Goizueta Directors Institute, 21 Atlanta, Georgia.
22 (Whereupon, the above-referred to document was marked 23 as Petitioner's Exhibit 3
for 24 identification.)
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 22 At page one of the exhibit, the Chairman 1
states that "The challenge for you, the leaders of the 2
utilities and in many of the nation's nuclear plants, 3
is to ensure that our nation never again experience an 4
accident like Three Mile Island, that no iconic image 5
like its cooling towers ever again enters a public 6
consciousness. With that in mind, I would like to 7
discuss three areas in which I think your leadership 8
can make a significant difference in promoting nuclear 9
safety and security."
10 The Chairman identified the three areas as 11 knowledge management, safety culture, and public 12 outreach. The most important area identified by the 13 Chairman in my view is safety culture. The Chairman 14 stated in relevant part that "Safety culture is not a 15 simple issue, but it is an important one. I'll share 16 with you a story from a few years ago to illustrate 17 this point. At a to remain nameless nuclear power 18 plant, an employee raised a safety concern through an 19 anonymous channel. The site vice president at this 20 plant took these concerns very seriously. He 21 desperately wanted to hear from the employee to find 22 out more about the safety issue to ensure that it was 23 resolved. So he called the plant's employees together 24 as a group and asked the anonymous tipster to come 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 23 forward to identify him or herself. Now there is a 1
couple of different ways to look at this situation.
2 If there was really a strong safety culture at this 3
plant, the concerned employee would have good reason 4
to come forward so that he or she could be 5
congratulated for identifying an issue that if left 6
unchecked could potentially lead to an unsafe working 7
environment.
8 On the other hand, if the safety culture 9
at this plant was not so strong, the site VP's actions 10 could in and of themselves be seen as intimidating and 11 retaliatory. And if we focus for a quick moment on 12 the fact that the concern had been raised anonymously, 13 I think we have our answer to the situation in this 14 particular instance.
15 The Chairman continued, "First and 16 foremost, this story demonstrates how important it is 17 to have a strong safety culture. Here you have a real 18 safety issue in question and the employee who 19 identifies it only feels comfortable in alerting the 20 plant managers anonymously. This situation isn't even 21 the worst case scenario where an employee doesn't even 22 feel comfortable raising it anonymously. The NRC has 23 sound rules and strong oversight programs in place, 24 but the simple fact of the matter is the Agency can't 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 24 be everywhere. The licensees that we regulate always 1
will have the primary day-to-day responsibility for 2
ensuring that their facility operates safely. That is 3
why it's crucial that our licensees focus on 4
cultivating the type of
- open, collaborative 5
organizational culture where employees feel 6
comfortable raising questions and issues.
7 "The second point that the story 8
highlights is that for an organization to develop a 9
strong safety culture, managers and employees at all 10 levels of the organization must demonstrate consistent 11 focus on safety and security. This isn't just about 12 the engineer on the ground who is responsible for 13 spotting the issue in the first place, or even his or 14 her supervisor who should be encouraging employees to 15 come forward with possible concerns. The very top 16 ranks of an organization have to make clear that their 17 primary focus remains on safety and security. And 18 when I refer to the top ranks, I don't mean just the 19 Chief Nuclear Officer, CNO, of the plant or even the 20 Chief Executive Officer, CEO of the utility. The tone 21 for a strong safety culture has to begin with the 22 Board of Directors, the people in this room whom the 23 CNO and the CEO ultimately answer." And his comments 24 are identified at page two of that exhibit.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 25 I would ask that the Petition Review Board 1
please keep in mind the Chairman's comments about the 2
safety culture as I continue to discuss the instant 3
petition in this matter.
4 At this time I would like to identify for 5
the record Petitioner's Exhibit 4 which is a four-part 6
exhibit as described as follows.
7 (Whereupon, the above-referred to document was marked 8
as Petitioner's Exhibit 4
for 9
identification.)
10 Part 1 is entitled "AP" which stands for 11 Associated Press. "AP Aging Nukes" dated 6/20/2011 12 and authored by Jeff Donn of the Associate Press.
13 Part 2 is entitled "AP Aging Nukes" dated 6/21/2011 14 authored by Jeff Donn of the Associated Press. Part 3 15 is entitled "AP Aging Nukes" dated 6/27/2011 16 authorized by Jeff Donn of the Associated Press. And 17 Part 4 is entitled "AP Aging Nukes" dated 6/28/2011 18 authored by Jeff Donn of the Associate Press.
19 The four parts of this exhibit illustrate 20 the failure of the NRC's reactor oversight program in 21 connection with licensed operations at 104 nuclear 22 reactors in the United States. Although these 23 documents speak for themselves, it is important that 24 specific information relevant to the instant petition 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 26 be identified for the NRC Petition Review Board's 1
consideration in this matter as follows.
2 Petitioner's Exhibit 4, Part 1 at page 3 3
states in relevant part that "the AP found proof that 4
aging reactors have been allowed to run less safely to 5
prolong operations as equipment has approached or 6
violated safety limits. Regulators and reactor 7
operators have loosened or bent the rules. The NRC 8
weakened the safety margin for acceptable radiation 9
damage to reactor vessels for a second time. The 10 standard is based on a measurement known as a reactor 11 vessel's reference temperature which predicts when it 12 will become dangerously brittle and vulnerable to 13 failure. Over the years, many plants have violated or 14 come close to violating the standard. As a result, 15 the minimum standard was relaxed first by raising the 16 reference temperature 50 percent and then 78 percent 17 above the original even though a broken vessel could 18 spill its radioactive contents into the environment.
19
'We have seen the pattern,' said nuclear safety 20 scientist Dana Powers who works for Sandia National 21 Laboratories and also sits on an NRC Advisory 22 Committee. 'They're just trying to get more and more 23 out of these plants.'"
24 Petitioner's Exhibit 4, Part 4 states in 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 27 relevant part that "Regulators in industry now contend 1
that the 40-year limit was chosen for economic reasons 2
and to satisfy anti-trust concerns, not for safety 3
issues. They contend that a nuclear plant has no 4
technical limit on its life. But an AP review of the 5
historical records, along with interviews of engineers 6
who helped develop nuclear power shows just the 7
opposite. Reactors were made to last only 40 years 8
period."
9 The record also shows that a design 10 limitation on operating life was an accepted truism.
11 In 1982, D. Clarke Gibbs, chairman of the Licensing 12 and Safety Committee of an early industry group wrote 13 to the NRC that "most nuclear power plants, including 14 those operating under construction or plans for the 15 future are designed for a duty cycle which corresponds 16 to a 40-year life."
17 And three years later when Illinois' power 18 company sought a license for its Clinton Station, 19 utility official D.W. Wilson told the NRC on behalf of 20 his company's nuclear licensing department that "all 21 safety margins were established with the understanding 22 of the limitations that are imposed by a 40-year 23 design life." When he was a member of the Joint 24 Committee on Atomic Energy in the late 1960s, U.S.
25
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(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 28 Representative Craig Hosmer declared that "power 1
companies expect nuclear generating stations to last 2
30 years." Nuclear physicist, Ralph Lapp, an advocate 3
of atomic power put it at the 25-year life span.
4 One person who should know the real story 5
is engineering professor Richard T. Lahey, Jr., at the 6
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York.
7 Lahey once served in the nuclear Navy and later in the 8
1970s he helped design reactors for General Electric 9
Company. He oversaw safety research and development.
10 Lahey dismisses claims that reactors remain with no 11 particular life span. "These reactors were really 12 designed for a certain lifetime," he said.
13 Nuclear engineer Bill Corcoran who worked 14 for plant designer Combustion Engineering said 15 "certain features were specifically created with 40 16 years in mind, like the reactor vessel which holds the 17 radioactive fuel." He said, "Metals are calculated 18 to hold up against fatigue for that long." And those 19 comments are identified at page one and two of the 20 exhibit.
21 I would ask the Petition Review Board here 22 today to keep these comments in mind as we discuss 23 reactor embrittlement which is part of the instant 24 petition filed in this matter.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 29 At this time, I would like to identify for 1
the record Petitioner's Exhibit 5 which is a news 2
article dated March 3,
2012 entitled "Japan 3
Acknowledges Nuclear Failings" by the Belfast 4
Telegraph World News Agency.
5 (Whereupon, the above-referred to document was marked 6
as Petitioner's Exhibit 5
for 7
identification.)
8 Japan's Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda 9
acknowledged in a news article that "the government 10 failed in its response to the earthquake and tsunami 11 related to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident."
12 And was quoted referring to the "myth of safety about 13 nuclear power." He stated, "We can no longer make the 14 excuse that was unpredictable and outside our 15 imagination has happened. Crisis management requires 16 us to imagine what may be outside of our imagination.
17 We can say in hindsight that the government, business, 18 and scholars had all been seeped in a myth of safety."
19 I would ask the PRB, Petition Review Board 20 here today to keep these comments in mind as we talk 21 later on about the embrittlement issue related to the 22 Palisades nuclear power plant.
23 Before I speak about the nuclear safety 24 issues in the instant petition, it is of paramount 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 30 importance for the NRC Petition Review Board to 1
realize just how pervasive the nuclear safety issues 2
are at the Palisades Nuclear Plant and that a very 3
poor safety culture has spread throughout the nuclear 4
plant which contributed to the violations cited by the 5
NRC. Indeed, leading up to the serious nuclear safety 6
violations described in the petition, the NRC found 7
that on January 25, 2012 and immediately effective 8
confirmatory order issued to Entergy Nuclear 9
Operations or Entergy to conform commitments made as a 10 result of an alternate dispute resolution, ADR 11 mediation session, held on December 12, 2011. This 12 enforcement action is based on a
technical 13 specification apparent violation.
14 At the controls, the reactor operator left 15 the active control area of the control room without 16 providing a turnover to a qualified individual and 17 without obtaining permission from the control room 18 supervisor. On January 3, 2012, the NRC issued a 19 Notice of Violation to Entergy Nuclear Operations, 20 Inc. for a violation of Title X of the Code of Federal 21 Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B,
criterion 5,
22 instructions, procedures, and drawings associated with 23 a White significance of determination process findings 24 involving Entergy's failure to prescribe maintenance 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 31 on the safety-related turbine driven auxiliary 1
feedwater pump, an activity affecting quality by 2
documenting instructions of a type appropriate to the 3
circumstances as well as a failure to accomplish the 4
maintenance in accordance with their procedure.
5 Specifically, on October 17, 2010, Procedure FWS-M-6 6
auxiliary feedwater turbine maintenance failed to 7
prescribe instructions on wear conditions of the knife 8
edge and latch plate or to replace the trip spring, 9
although these inspections and replacements had been 10 identified as necessary by the turbine vendor.
11 Palisades personnel also failed to perform 12 a step in the surveillance procedure which required 13 lubricating a pin and inspect grease on the knife's 14 edge of the mechanical overspeed/manual trip 15 mechanism.
These deficiencies resulted in the 16 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump being 17 inoperable from October 29, 2010 to May 11, 2011. Now 18 mind you, that violation was cited in October of 2010 19 and it involves human error failure, failure to follow 20 procedures, violation of NRC regulations and 21 requirements, the very same violations cited recently 22 and as identified in the instant petition.
23 On January 20, 2010, a Notice of Violation 24 was issued to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for a 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 32 violation associated with a
White significance 1
determination finding as a result of inspections at 2
the Palisades Nuclear Plant. This White finding 3
involved a licensee's failure to meet the requirements 4
of technical specification, TS, for fuel storage in 5
the spent fuel pool, SFP. Specifically, Region 1 6
spent fuel storage rack neutron absorber had 7
deteriorated over the life of the plant and was less 8
than required by technical specifications. Corrective 9
actions are currently in place for additional controls 10 of the spent fuel.
11 On January 30, 2009, a Notice of Violation 12 was issued for a violation associated with a White 13 significance determination finding involving a
14 violation of 10 CFR 20.1501 which requires the 15 performance of surveys' evaluations necessary for the 16 licensee to comply with regulations in Part 20. The 17 violation involved a failure to evaluate radiological 18 hazards and to assess those to workers that handle 19 tools used for reconstituting failed fuel during work 20 on refueling -- on the refueling floor in October 2007 21 as required by 10 CFR 20.1501 to demonstrate 22 compliance with dose limits of 20.1201.
As 23 can be seen, each of the prior cited nuclear safety 24 violations by the NRC against the Palisades Nuclear 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 33 Plant involved human error and a failed overall safety 1
culture at the facility.
2 With respect to the recent violations 3
described in the instant petition, the NRC held a 4
regulatory conference with the licensee on January 11, 5
2012 to discuss the views of the licensee on each of 6
the cited violations. During the conference, the 7
licensee attributed the root cause of the loss of DC 8
bus to an organizational issue which senior Entergy 9
management had not established a
sufficiently 10 sensitive culture of risk recognition and management 11 which resulted in Palisades' employees not recognizing 12 the industrial safety and plant operational risk 13 involved with ED-11-2 breaker maintenance. The 14 licensee attributed the root cause of the failure of 15 the service water pump, P-7C, coupling, to be a design 16 failure in that the licensee failure to recognize the 17 pump coupling procurement specification did not ensure 18 all critical material test requirements for use in the 19 service water operating environment. The licensee 20 communicated that the NRC's risk assessment was overly 21 conservative in assessing the risk significance of 22 both issues.
23 The licensee concluded that the loss of DC 24 bus issue was best characterized as having a low to 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 34 moderate risk and that the service water coupling 1
issue was of very low safety significance. The 2
licensee stated that the operator action for 3
preventing challenge of the pressurized safety relief 4
valves was a simple trip of the operating charging 5
pumps and that the time available allowed for recovery 6
of failed attempts. The licensee stated that the 7
pressurizer's major relief valves were satisfactorily 8
tested for steam, transition and water relief as part 9
of actions taken following the 1979 Three Mile Island 10 event and that these tests supported the use of 11 generic failure rates.
12 The licensee stated that actions to 13 restore direct current DC power were simple and 14 straightforward, once the fouled condition was cleared 15 and there were two options to restore DC power and 16 that the total effective human error probability is 17 1E-2. The licensee stated that the auxiliary 18 feedwater pump, P-8A, remained available for manual 19 start from the control room. The licensee stated the 20 coupling failure events of the P-7C service water pump 21 were considered repeated independent failures of a 22 single component and that the events occurred too far 23 apart in time to have more than a negligible impact on 24 a common cause failure probability.
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 35 The licensee stated that the as found 1
condition of the service water pump, P-7A and P-7B 2
couplings, along with assumptions about the crack 3
growth in the service water pump couplings were used 4
to conclude that the failure probability of the P-7A 5
and P-7B pumps during the P-7C allowed outage time was 6
small and that the common cause term applied in the 7
IFE calculation was conservative. In a sense, the 8
licensee essentially is negating all of the NRC's 9
findings in the hopes of eliminating the enforcement 10 action.
11 The NRC responded to each of the 12 licensee's allegations as follows. The NRC did not 13 agree that the operator action to control pressurizer 14 level was a simple trip of the charging pumps. After 15 this specific event, the pressurizer level increased 16 to approximately 98 percent before the operators took 17 control and reduced charging flow. The NRC considered 18 the action of the control room level to be complex 19 because of the difficulty controlling primary 20 temperatures, difficulty controlling secondary 21 pressure and the operator workload in performing 22 multiple concurrent tasks during the event, including 23 performing steps of emergency operating procedure, EOP 24 9.0. The time available to take effective mitigation 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 36 action was dependent on several parameters including 1
charging pump flow and auxiliary feed water flow and 2
the time to complete boration requirements specified 3
in the EOPs. The NRC staff concluded that the time 4
available would provide little additional margin for 5
recovery of failed attempts.
6 The NRC investigated the safety release 7
valve test conducted as part of the Three Mile Island 8
action plan and determined that the test did not 9
present sufficient data to establish the reliability 10 of the valve under water relief conditions.
11 Specifically, of 31 tests, only 5 water tests were 12 conducted for the model of the valve used by Palisades 13 and that one of these 5 tests was not successful.
14 The NRC agreed that the coupling failure events 15 occurred far apart in time, but determined that the 16 aspect was not enough to rule out potential common 17 cause failures for its performance deficiency.
18 When performing event or condition 19 analysis, NRC assesses the risk incurred not only in 20 the as-found conditions of the observed failure or 21 failures, but also more importantly the contribution 22 of potential events associated with the performance 23 efficiency that did not occur, but still represent a 24 risk to public health and safety. In other words, 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 37 when performing an STP event assessment, the NRC 1
assessment considers not only what actually happened, 2
but also what could have happened with respect to the 3
performance deficiency.
4 The NRC concluded that the finding for the 5
loss of DC bus was appropriately characterized as 6
Yellow finding having substantial safety significance.
7 The NRC concluded that the findings for the service 8
water pump, P-7C, was appropriately characterized as 9
- White, a
finding of low to moderate safety 10 significance.
The NRC's review of Palisades 11 performance assessed the plant to be in a degraded 12 cornerstone column three of the NRC's action matrix as 13 of the fourth quarter of 2011.
14 The NRC informed the licensee that the 15 Agency planned to conduct supplemental inspections 16 using inspection procedure 95002 to provide assurance 17 that the root cause and contributing causes of risk 18 significant performance issues are understood, the 19 extent of condition and the extent of cause are 20 identified and the corrective actions are sufficient 21 to prevent recurrence.
22 In addition, the NRC communicated to the 23 licensee that the procedure conducted to provide an 24 independent determination of whether safety culture 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 38 components caused or significantly contributed to the 1
risk-significant performance issues. And for the 2
record, I reference NRC February 14, 2012 letter to 3
Mr. Anthony Vitale, Vice President of Operations, 4
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Palisades Nuclear 5
Plant.
6 In review of the licensee's actions and 7
conduct during the enforcement conference, it is 8
patently clear that the licensee lacks the requisite 9
knowledge and skills about the operations of the 10 Palisades Nuclear Plant required to safely operate the 11 nuclear plant in full compliance with NRC regulations 12 and requirements under 10 CFR Part 50 and under other 13 NRC authority. As stated in the instant petition, the 14 NRC safety culture policy statement defines nuclear 15 safety culture as the core values and behaviors 16 resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and 17 individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals 18 to ensure protection of people and the environment.
19 The NRC safety culture policy statement, 20 including the definition and traits of a positive 21 safety culture, provides the NRC's expectation that 22 individuals and organizations performing regulated 23 activities establish and maintain a positive safety 24 culture commensurate with safety and security 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 39 significance of their activities in the nature and 1
complexity of organizations and functions.
2 Notably, during the D11-2 panel electrical 3
fault, an on-duty senior reactor operator recognized a 4
potential risk in the loss of the ED-11-2, but the 5
required risk assessment model was not run for the 6
loss of the ED-11-2 bus. During emergency actions 7
taken by the licensee operations personnel, the 8
reactor operators encountered additional complications 9
including one, a rise in containment sump level with 10 an increasing unidentified primary coolant system leak 11 rate of less than ten gallons per minute that was 12 later determined to be from the actuation of a 13 chemical and volume control system relief valve in 14 containment. And two, increasing PCS level in the 15 pressurizer had reached a maximum of 98 percent 16 meaning that the PCS was approximately 9 minutes from 17 being placed in a solid condition. And three, 18 increasing steam generator A level which reached 19 approximately 98 percent. And four, the actuation of 20 suction and discharge pressure relief valves were the 21 charging pumps which displaced volume control tanks 22 water into the charging pump cubicles located in the 23 auxiliary building. This particular event could have 24 resulted in a breach of the primary reactor coolant 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 40 system, commonly known as a loss of coolant accident 1
or LOCA, either by a break in one of the RCS hot legs 2
or cold legs or an outright failure of the very 3
brittle reactor vessel.
A loss of coolant 4
action through any of these scenarios would result in 5
a Fukushima Daiichi-type meltdown of the nuclear fuel 6
inside the reactor vessel.
7 As with the Fukushima nuclear accident, 8
huge amounts of hydrogen would have been released from 9
the primary water in the reactor vessel and cause a 10 significant explosion of the entire containment 11 building, similar to the Fukushima nuclear plant 12 explosions. Here, the NRC must properly review the 13 entirety of the licensee's history of violations over 14 the years, significant and serious violations of NRC 15 regulations and requirements during licensed 16 operations at the Palisades Nuclear Plant.
17 In the Petition Review Board's 18 consideration of the escalated enforcement action 19 sought in the instant petition, notably the licensee 20 has been cited over the years dating back to 2009 and 21 beyond for serious violations of NRC safety 22 regulations and requirements in connection with 23 license operations at the Palisades Nuclear Plant.
24 However, since 2009, the NRC has failed to levy even 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 41 one monetary fine against the plant operator.
1 Instead, the Agency simply issued written notices of 2
violations without monetary penalties attached. Such 3
enforcement action on the part of the NRC has failed 4
to deter the licensee from correcting cited 5
performance issues and has resulted in further 6
degraded performance on the part of the licensee at 7
the Palisades Nuclear Plant as acknowledged by the NRC 8
earlier this year.
9 The NRC has full authority under the 10 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and under 10 CFR Part 50, 11 and under other NRC authority to levy stiff and 12 meaningful monetary fines to licensees like Palisades 13 Nuclear Plant for repeatedly violating NRC safety 14 regulations and requirements during licensed 15 operations. The NRC was given the authority to levy 16 such monetary fines by the United States Congress to 17 provide the NRC with means to accomplish its mission 18 to protect public health and safety.
19 Notably, the NRC has acted swiftly and 20 decisively in levying stiff monetary fines and 21 penalties to other nuclear plant operators for similar 22 safety violations, but not in the case of the 23 Palisades Nuclear Plant.
24 The instant petition requests that the NRC 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 42 take escalated enforcement action against the licensee 1
by issuing a civil monetary penalty to the licensee in 2
the total amount of $1 million to ensure for the 3
protection of the public health and safety in these 4
circumstances. The amount of the requested civil 5
penalty is appropriate and required to dissuade the 6
licensee from continuing licensed activities at the 7
Palisades Nuclear Plant which are in violation of NRC 8
regulations and requirements under 10 CFR Part 50.
9 In addition to the other enforcement 10 actions described at page three of the instant 11 petition, the NRC is requested to require the licensee 12 to have an independent entity conduct a human 13 performance profile on each licensee employee 14 including all levels of management to enable the 15 licensee and the NRC to ascertain and/or predict 16 problem areas in need of attention before they result 17 in further violations of NRC regulations and 18 requirements under 10 CFR Part 50. Such profiles are 19 a common and regular practice by the Federal Bureau of 20 Investigation, FBI, in the regular course of criminal 21 investigations to protect public health and safety.
22 In the case of the Palisades Nuclear 23 Plant, every serious nuclear safety violation cited by 24 the NRC can be directly linked to a human performance 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 43 issue and to a failed safety culture by requiring the 1
licensee to have every employee profiled. The NRC 2
will have better oversight and regulation of the 3
Palisades Nuclear Plant because the collective profile 4
will clearly illustrate a pattern of problems related 5
to safety culture, performance, attitudes, training, 6
skills, job knowledge, etcetera.
7 Over the years, the NRC Reactor Oversight 8
Program has dubiously failed to prevent continuing 9
degraded performance of the Palisades Nuclear Plant 10 because the reactor oversight process is an after the 11 fact, passive program that addresses nuclear safety 12 violations after they have already occurred. Thus, 13 requiring the licensee to profile its employees will 14 greatly assist the NRC in its mission to protect 15 public health and safety by identifying problems 16 before they become nuclear safety violations which 17 could jeopardize public health and safety.
18 Lastly, I want to address the serious 19 nuclear safety issue of the very brittle nuclear 20 reactor vessel at the Palisades Nuclear Plant.
21 CHAIRMAN HOWE: Mr. SAPORITO?
22 MR. SAPORITO: Yes.
23 CHAIRMAN HOWE: I just wanted to do a time 24 check with you. It's close to 3 o'clock. About how 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 44 much longer will your comments be?
1 MR. SAPORITO: Probably about ten minutes.
2 I understood through my communications with the NRC 3
that I would be given an hour for my presentation.
4 CHAIRMAN HOWE: Okay, all right. Is 5
everybody here available until 10 after 3 today?
6 MR. GIESSNER: This is the region, we're 7
good.
8 MR. CHAWLA: Okay, continue, please.
9 CHAIRMAN HOWE: Please continue.
10 MR. SAPORITO: Okay. Lastly, I want to 11 address the serious nuclear safety issue of the very 12 brittle nuclear reactor vessel of Palisades Nuclear 13 Plant related to pressurized thermal shock.
14 Pressurized thermal shock or PTS events are system 15 transients in a pressurized water reactor or PWR in 16 which severe over cooling occurs coincident with high 17 pressure. The thermal stresses are caused by rapid 18 cooling of the reactor vessel inside surface combined 19 with the stresses caused by high pressure. The 20 aggregate effect of these stresses is an increase and 21 a potential for fracture if a pre-existing flaw is 22 present in a material susceptible to brittle failure.
23 The ferric low alloy steel of the reactor vessel belt 24 line adjacent to the core where neutron radiation 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 45 gradually embrittles the material over the lifetime of 1
the plant can be susceptible to brittle fracture.
2 The NRC and the licensee are fully aware 3
that the metal comprising the nuclear reactor vessel 4
has become very brittle over the operating life of the 5
Palisades Nuclear Plant and in fact, it's the most 6
brittle nuclear reactor vessel in the United States.
7 As stated earlier, the NRC has relaxed nuclear safety 8
margins with respect to reactor vessel embrittlement 9
over the years allowing very old nuclear reactors to 10 continue operating well beyond their 40-year safety 11 design basis.
12 Based on information and
- belief, it 13 appears that the Palisades Nuclear Plant vessel has 14 sustained radiation damage through neutron bombardment 15 over the life of the nuclear reactor to date beyond 16 the safety margins allowed by the NRC under 10 CFR 17 Part 50. And that the nuclear reactor vessel is 18 dangerously brittle and would likely crack and/or 19 shatter during emergency core cooling operations in 20 connection with pressurized thermal shock during such 21 an event.
22 The resultant loss of cooling accident 23 would cause a complete and uncontrolled core meltdown 24 and a significant release of high level radioactive 25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 46 particles into the environment endangering people and 1
the environment. Although the licensee has alleged to 2
the NRC that the metal in the nuclear reactor vessel 3
is not brittle beyond NRC regulations and 4
requirements, under 10 CFR Part 50, the licensee's 5
allegations appear to be based solely on alleged non-6 destructive testing, representative samples of metal 7
used in the construction of the Palisades Nuclear 8
Plant vessel.
9
- However, the licensee's use of 10 nondestructive testing procedures is not sufficient to 11 properly ascertain the degree of embrittlement of the 12 Palisades Nuclear Plant vessel. The NRC should 13 require the licensee to conduct destructive testing of 14 the actual metal of the reactor vessel. Notably, the 15 alleged representative metal samples tested by the 16 licensee are not exposed to the same stresses as the 17 actual metal comprising the Palisades Nuclear Plant 18 vessel because the alleged representative metal 19 samples are not actually part of the reactor vessel, 20 but merely placed within a nuclear reactor vessel.
21 Therefore, under a pressurized thermal shock scenario, 22 the metal in a nuclear reactor vessel at the Palisades 23 Nuclear Plant may not be able to withstand such a 24 challenge because of the high degree of embrittlement 25
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date.
2 To the extent that the NRC has 3
acknowledged the Palisades Nuclear Plant has the most 4
embrittled nuclear reactor vessel in the United 5
States, the NRC should require the licensee to conduct 6
destructive testing of the actual metal comprising the 7
nuclear reactor vessel to establish a proper and 8
accurate baseline of embrittlement to protect the 9
public health and safety. And before I conclude, I 10 want to repeat for the benefit of the Petition Review 11 Board the comments of Japan's Prime Minister that was 12 identified in Petitioner's Exhibit 5 when he was 13 quoted as saying "We can no longer make the excuse 14 that what was unpredictable and outside our 15 imagination has happened. Crisis management requires 16 us to imagine what may be outside our imagination."
17 And here is what the NRC must think 18 outside the box. You have to imagine what you would 19 not have imagined after the reactor vessel at 20 Palisades Nuclear Plant under pressurized thermal 21 shock scenario during emergency core cooling 22 procedures would crack and/or shatter and result in a 23 LOCA and a
significant release of radioactive 24 particles into the environment which harms the public 25
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1 This concludes my presentation to the NRC 2
Petition Review Board. I will remain on the phone to 3
answer any questions from the NRC or the licensee at 4
this time.
5 CHAIRMAN HOWE: Okay, thank you. At this 6
time I want to open it up and see if there's any 7
questions from the staff here at headquarters for Mr.
8 Saporito.
9 What about the region?
10 MR. GIESSNER: This is Jack Giessner from 11 the region. I have no clarifying questions.
12 CHAIRMAN HOWE: Any questions from the 13 licensee?
14 MR. KUEMIN: I have no questions. This is 15 Jim Kuemin, Palisades.
16 CHAIRMAN HOWE: Thank you. All right, I 17 think when we checked in we didn't have any members of 18 the public identified. Let me just check again. Are 19 there any members of the public that have any 20 questions at this point in time?
21 MR. STEVES: This is John Steves. I am a 22 member of the public, but I have no questions.
23 CHAIRMAN HOWE: John, do you have any 24 comments?
25
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 49 MR. STEVES: Living ten miles south of the 1
Palisades plant that situation is very scary to me.
2 And I certainly hope that the NRC addresses the issues 3
that this man has brought up today.
4 MR. CHAWLA: Could you spell your name for 5
the court reporter to document it properly?
6 MR. STEVE'S: Sure. It's John, J-O-H-N, 7
Steve's, S-T-E V as in Victor E-S.
8 CHAIRMAN HOWE: Okay, any other comments 9
or questions from anyone on the phone?
10 (Pause.)
11 All right, Mr. Saporito, I want to thank 12 you for taking time to provide the NRC staff with 13 clarifying information on the petition that you have 14 submitted.
15 I'd like to before I do close I would like 16 to check with the court reporter, do you need any 17 information for the meeting transcript at this time?
18 COURT REPORTER: This is the court 19 reporter. I do not need any information at this time.
20 CHAIRMAN HOWE: Okay, thank you. And I 21 want to thank everybody for their time and with that 22 we'll conclude this meeting.
23 (Whereupon, at 3:06 p.m., the meeting was 24 concluded.)
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