ML12074A093

Initial Exam 2011-302 Final Simulator Scenarios

ML12074A093
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	04/29/2011
From:	Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch
To:	Tennessee Valley Authority
References
50-390/11-302
Download: ML12074A093 (268)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-I Facility: Watts Bar December 2011 Scenario No. I Op Test No.: 2 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Run Time: 98 minutes Initial Conditions: 100% power, BDL. RCS boron is 1031 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. FINAL SUBMITTAL Turnover: Train A/Channel I Work Week. lA-A RHR Pump is out-of-service for motor winding inspection. LCD 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 10 hours ago. IA-A RHR pump is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours. Protected equipment signs have been posted for 1 B-B RHR pump. Event MaIf. No. Event Type* Event Description No. 1 rx26g C- BOP 1-PT-i -27A, SG 4 STM PRESS fails low. TS-SRD 2 rx07a I-RD 1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high. TS-SRO 3 cvO9 C-RD 1 -LT-62-1 30 VCT LEVEL fails high. 4 rx24 l-BDP 1-PT-3-i #1 HTR INLET PRESS fails low. 5 fwl6b C- BOP Intermediate Feedwater Heater B-4 develops a leak, causing the fw67b heater string to isolate. R-RD RD takes actions to support the rapid load reduction. N-BDP/SRD BOP manipulates Turbine controls in support of the rapid plant shutdown. 6 fw23d M-ALL Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. rpo2b C-RD Automatic safety injection fails to actuate. edOl C-RD After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. iA DG ego2a trips when started and the 1 B DG fails to automatically start. si08j ms06a 100 M-ALL MSIVs fail in the open position. Requires transition from E-2, mso6b 100 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled ms06c 100 Depressurization of All Steam Generators. ms06d 100 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NOTE: DO NOT RUN WITH SCENARIO 2 Appendix D Watts Bar Examination December 2011 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario I - Summary I. Initial Condition 100% power, BOL. RCS boron is 1031 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. 1 Turnover Train A/Channel I Work Week. IA-A RHR Pump is out-of-service for motor winding inspection. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 10 hours ago. lA-A RHR pump is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours. Protected equipment signs have been posted for 1 B-B RHR pump. Event 1 1-PT-i -27A, SG 4 STM PRESS fails low over 10 seconds. Requires manual control of SG 4 main feedwater regulating valve. Requires entry into AOl-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.5, Main FW Reg or Bypass Reg Valve Control Failure.Requires Tech Spec evaluation and entry into LCD 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. Event 2 1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high. Requires the RD to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place 1 -PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL in MANUAL and restore pressure to normal. Requires entry into Aol-i 8, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Section 3.1, Pressure Transient Due to Instrument or Controller Malfunction. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into LCD 3.3.1, 3.3.2 for multiple Actions. Event 3 i-LT-62-130 VCT LEVEL fails high. Requires entry into ARI 109-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO. Requires the RD to place i-LCV-62-1 18, LETDOWN DIVERT TO HUT in the VC TK position. RD uses ICS terminal to assist in the diagnosis of the VCT level transmitter failure. Event 4 1-PT-3-1 #1 HTR INLET PRESS fails low. Requires the BOP to place 1-PC 20, MFPT A&B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL to restore MFP zP to program. Requires entry into AOl-i 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.6, Failure Of MEW Pump Control. Requires manual operation for the duration of the scenario. Event 5 Intermediate Eeedwater Heater B-4 develops a leak, causing the heater string to isolate. Requires entry into AOI-47, Heater Drains Malfunction. Requires a rapid load reduction using AOl-47 steps. RD conducts boration to support the load reduction. BOP manipulates Turbine controls in support of the rapid plant shutdown. Event 6 Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%, causing a reactor trip to occur and an automatic safety injection signal to be generated. Automatic safety injection fails to actuate. RO must manually actuate using i-HS 63-i 33B SI ACTUATE TRA & B on panel i-M-4 or i-HS-63-i33A SI ACTUATE TR A & B on panel 1 -M-6. After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. 1A DG trips when started and the lB DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the 1 B DG by the RO during the performance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSIVs fail in the open position. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators. Appendix D Watts Bar Examination December 2011 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario I - Critical Task Summary Critical Task 1 Energize at least one AC emergency bus before placing safeguards equipment handswitches in the stop, pull-to-lock position. Critical Task 2 Manually actuate at least one train of safety injection before transition from E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Appendix D Watts Bar Examination December2011 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2011-12 NRC Examination Scenario I Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION ENSURE Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 300 by performing the following actions:

a. Select lCManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate IC# 300.

c. Right click on IC# 300.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC# 300.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen:

Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value ] rhl2 fail cnt sump to rhr pmp a fcv-63-72 to any position M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 0 rhOla rhrpumpatrip M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active rp02b auto si initiation signal failure M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active hs-74-1 0a hs-74-1 Oa rhr pump a-a motor sw 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 ptlock ptlock hs-63-72a-1 01170 rhr pmp aa suct fr cnt smp(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0ff Off hs-74-lOa-1 01230 hr pump a-a motor switch(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off hs-74-03a-1 01110 hr pump a-a suction(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off hs-74-03a hs-74-03a rhr pump a-a suction sw 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 close close Page 1 of 5

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2011-12 NRC Examination Scenario I Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value f ms06a msiv fails to close fcv-1-4 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active ms06b msiv fails to close fcv-l-l 1 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active ms06c msiv fails to close fcv-l-29 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active ms06d msiv fails to close fcv-1-22 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active ego2a diesel generator trip dg la-a M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active si08j failure of auto si and blackout signals dg 1 b-b M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active rx26g stmgen prestransmitterfailure, chnl i pt-1-27a M 1 00:00:00 00:00:10 0 77.6592 edOl total loss of offsite power M 19 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive rx07a pzr pressure transmitter fails to position chnl 1 68-340 M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 66.8742

• cvO9 vct level transmitterfails to position; 130-a M 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 31.0205 rx24 feed water header pressure transmitter pt-3-1 fail to position M 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 75.539 fwl 6b intermediate pressure heater tube failure b-4 M 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 0 M67b 1W htr isolation on htr b2 hi IvI switch 1-ls-6-43d failure M 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 0 IW23d main feed water break inside containment sg-4 M 6 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 0

5. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

6. ENSURE 1-HS-74-74-IOA RHR PMP A (ECCS) is in the STOP, PULL-TO-LOCK position with a RED Hold Order tag. RED Hold order tags are placed on I-HS-74-3A, RHR PMP A SUCTION and 1-HS-63-72A, CNTMT SUMP TO RHR PMP A SUCT. A Pink PROTECTED EQUIPMENT TAG is hung on the lB RHR pump handswitch.

ENSURE the Train A Week Channel I sign is placed on 1-M-30. B. Place simulator in FREEZE.

9. ENSURE Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit I Reactivity Briefing Book BOL (Beginning Of Life) is provided to the crew as part of the Turnover Package, and that the BOL placards are on I-M-6, below the Boric Acid and Primary Water Integrators.

10. WHEN prompted by the Chief Examiner, place the Simulator in RUN.

Page 2 of 5

Wafts Bar Nuclear Plant 2011-12 NRC Examination Scenario I Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No. No. I I 1-PT-i -27A, SG 4 STM PRESS fails low. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will acknowledge the request for a repair package for I-PT-i-2TA SG 4 STM PRESS. 2 2 1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, repeat back request for removing i-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS channel from service. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, repeat back request for troubleshooting and repair package for i-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS. 3 3 1-LT-62-130 VCT LEVEL fails high. ROLE PLAY: When dispatched to observe level on local i-LT-62-130 VCT LEVEL, state that level is off-scale high. ROLE PLAY: If/when dispatched to observe level in the Auxiliary Control Room go to THUNDER WEW cvi screen and report VCT level. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will acknowledge the request for a repair package for i-LT-62-130, VCT LEVEL. ROLE PLAY: When dispatched to observe RCP Filter ziP, wait 5 minutes and report that ziP is indicating normally at 5 psid. 4 4 1-PT-3-1 #1 HTR INLET PRESS fails low. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Contro4 acknowledge the request for a repair package for i-PT-3-i, #1 HTR INLET PRESS. ROLE PLAY: If/when dispatched as the TB AUO, repeat back request to inspect i-PT-3-i for leaks. ______ Report back that there are no leaks visible. Page 3 of 5

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2011-12 NRC Examination Scenario I Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event Description/Role Play LLNo. No. 5 5 Intermediate Feedwater Heater B-4 develops a leak, causing the heater string to isolate. ROLE PLAY: When dispatched to monitor heater levels, ensure that INSIGHT heater levels is OPEN to monitor levels in the feedwater heaters. Report heater levels as displayed. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Chemistry, repeat back request to perform power change sampling. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Load Coordinator, repeat back the information provided. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the AUO to open 1-lB V-5-501 HTR B4 EXTR STM INLET 1-FCV 62, the Console Operator will repeat back the request. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control to request a troubleshooting and repair package for the intermediate feedwater heaters, repeat back the information. 6 n/a Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG, and MSIVs fail to close ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO to place the MSlVhandswitches in the AUX position in the Aux Control Room, the console operator will enter remote function msr26. These actions are contained in E-2, Attachment 1. ROLE PLAY: ECA-2. I Appendix A will be requested later which contains the same actions. After entering msr26, contact the BOP and state that the switches have been transferred. The BOP may then request that fuses for the MSIVs be pulled. Repeat back request to pull fuses, wait 2 minutes and report back that fuses have been pulled. ROLE PLAY: If AUO dispatch to close #1 FW Htr outlet valves, Console operator will acknowledge the request. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO to perform Attachment I of E-O, wait 5 minutes and report back that power has been removed from all Ice Condenser Air Handling units. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO to perform shutdown Upper and LOwer CNTMT rad monitors in E-O, wait 5 minutes and report back that Upper and Lower CNTMT rad monitors have been shutdown. Page4of5

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2011-12 NRC Examination Scenario I Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No. No. U ROLE PLAY: If contacted as an AUO to perform Attachment 4 of E-0, wait 10 minutes and report back that Attachment 4 is complete. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Shift Manager to evaluate EPIP-1, repeat back the information. ROLE PLAY: If contacted as Chemistry, repeat back the request to sample SGs for activity. Wait 10 minutes, then report back that activity is normal. ROLE PLAY: If contacted as Rad Protection, repeat back the request to perform surveys of the secondary plant. Wait 10 minutes and report back that there are no indications of abnormal radiation levels. ROLE PLAY: When dispatched as an AUO to perform Appendix B of ECA-2.1, CLA Breaker Operation, input remote sirOl and report back that Appendix B of ECA-2. I is complete. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an A UO, repeat back request to inspect the IA DG since it failed to start. Report back that the IA DG (generator) has been damaged. There is smoke in the building, but no fire. Page 5 of 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # I Event # I Page 1 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-I -27A, SG 4 STM PRESS fails low over 10 seconds. Requires manual control of 1-FCV-3-103 SG 4 MEW REG VLV. Requires entry into Aol-I 6, Loss of FINAL Normal Feedwater, Section 3.5, Main FW Reg or Bypass Reg Valve Control Failure. SUBMITTAL Requires Tech Spec evaluation. TimeD Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The Chief Examiner cues the Console Operator to enter Event 1. Indications: 58-B SG FEEDWATER FLOW HI 63-C SG 4 STM-FW FLOW MISMATCH 63-F SG LEVEL DEVIATION 123-A SG 4 PRESS NEG RATE 11 9-A SG PRESS LO 1-FCV-3-103 SG 4 MEW REG VLV indicates valve is closing Diagnoses and announces the failure of 1-PT-1-27A, SG 4 STM BOP PRESS low. May place 1-FIC-3-103 SG 4- MEW REG VLV in MANUAL to BOP stabilize SG level. May place 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in BOP MANUAL to stabilize MEW pump speed. Enters and directs actions of AOl-i 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.5, Main FW Reg or Bypass Reg Valve Control Eailure. The following actions are taken from AOl-I 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.5, Main FW Reg or Bypass Reg Valve Control Failure.

1. CONTROL failed MEW reg or bypass reg valve in MANUAL to maintain SIG level.

BOP places 1-FIC-3-103 SG4 MFWREG VLV1n MANUAL by BOP lifting the toggle switch up from the AUTO position to the MANUAL position. BOP matches steam and feedwater flow to SG 4 by moving the toggle switch to the right. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event# 1 Page 2 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-I -27A, SG 4 STM PRESS fails low over 10 seconds. Requires manual control of 1-FCV-3-103 SG 4 MEW REG VLV. Requires entry into AOl-i 6, Loss of FINAL Normal Feedwater, Section 3.5, Main EW Reg or Bypass Reg Valve Control Failure. SUBMITTAL Requires Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. EVALUATE placing control rods in MANUAL.

SRO SRO may direct RO to place 1-RBSS ROD BANK SELECT in MANUAL.

3. CHECK MEW pumps recirc valves CLOSED.

BOP BOP checks 1-FIC-3-70 MFWP A RECIRC CONTROL and 1-FIC-3-84 MFWP B RECIRC CONTROL CLOSED by observing valve position demand indications on 1-M-3. NOTES

• Bypass reg. valve may be manually positioned up to 0.85 x 106 lb/hr flow to dampen oscillations in feedwater flow in loop of affected main reg valve.
• A power tilt in the affected core quadrant may occur due to arise in bypass flow. Flows above 84,500 Ibm/hr in the bypass line will invalidate the value of computer point Ui 118.

4. CHECK SG levels on bypass reg valve control.

GO TO Step 6. BOP BOP determines that the bypass valves are in MANUAL and that this step is N/A.

6. CHECK S/G levels returning to PROGRAM.

BOP BOP determines that SG levels are returning to program by observing trend on 1-FR-3-103, SG 4. BOP 7. MONITOR TDMFW Pump speed normal for current power level.

7. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PLACE TDMEW Pump Master Speed Control to MANUAL, THEN ADJUST speed as necessary. BOP BOP places 1-PC-46-20, MFPTA & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL by lifting the toggle switch from the AUTO position, and then moving to the right to raise MFP IA and lB speed. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 3 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-i -27A, SG 4 STM PRESS fails low over 10 seconds. Requires manual control of 1 -FCV-3-i 03 SG 4 MEW REG VLV. Requires entry into Aol-i 6, Loss of FINAL Normal Eeedwater, Section 3.5, Main EW Reg or Bypass Reg Valve Control Failure. SUBMITTAL Requires Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE A LO FW FLOW WTR HAMMER annunciation [59-C] will be received when any main feedwater flow drops to less than 0.75 x 106 lb/hr. BOP 8. CHECK ALL S/G MFW flows greater than 0.55 x 106 lb/hr. CAUTION Power range N41 controls SIG I and SIG 4 MFW reg valves. Power range N42 controls SIG 2 and SIG 3 MFW reg valves. NOTE All power range monitors input to auctioneered high anticipatory circuit for bypass FW reg valves.

9. CHECK power range N4i through N44 NORMAL.

RO observes NIS Power Range channels on panel 1-M-4 and RO determines from 1-NI-41B, PR FLUX % POWER, 1-NI-42B, PR FLUX % POWER, 1-Nl-43B, PR FLUX % POWERI-Nl-44B, PR FLUX % POWER that NIS power range all indicate the same power and are normal. NOTE Steps 10 & 11 should end up having the same channel (A or B) selected for steam flow and feed flow on each SIG to ensure a loss of voltage to any one channel will have minimal effect on the affected SIG level.

10. CHECK controlling steam flow Channels NORMAL.

BOP BOP observes that 1-Fl-1-28A SG 4 STEAM FLOW is indicating off-scale low. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: 2 Scenario# I Event # 1 Page 4 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-1-27A, SG 4 STM PRESS fails low over 10 seconds. Requires manual control of 1 -FCV-3-1 03 SG 4 MEW REG VLV. Requires entry into AOl-i 6, Loss of FINAL Normal Feedwater, Section 3.5, Main FW Reg or Bypass Reg Valve Control Failure. SUBMITTAL Requires Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a. SELECT operable channel.

BOP rotates 1-XS-1-28D, SG 4 STM FLOW CONTROL CHANNEL SELECT from Fl-1-28A position to the right to the 1-Fl-1-28B position.

b. EVALUATE effect of the failed channel on the MFPs Speed BOP Control and ADJUST in MANUAL as necessary while continuing this section.

BOP determines a steam flow input to the MFP speed control circuit is failed and that both MFPs are reducing speed. The BOP may. have already placed the 1-PC-46-20, TDMFW Pump Master Speed Controller in MANUAL and may make adjustments to raise speed.

11. CHECK controlling FW flow channels NORMAL.

BOP BOP observes that FW flow channels are normal.

12. CHECK press compensation channel(s) NORMAL.

BOP BOP observes that 1-Pl-1-27A SG 4 PRESS is indicating off scale low. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: 2 Scenario# 1 Event# I Page 5 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-I -27A, SG 4 STM PRESS fails low over 10 seconds. Requires manual control of 1-FCV-3-103 SG 4 MFW REG VLV. Requires entry into AOI-16, Loss of FINAL Normal Feedwater, Section 3.5, Main FW Reg or Bypass Reg Valve Control Failure. SUBMITTAL Requires Tech Spec evaluation. Time I Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

REFER TO Tech Specs:

• 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation. Function 1.e, Safety Injection Steam Line Pressure Low, - Condition D, With one channel inoperable, place the channel in trip within 72 hours OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours AND be in Mode 4 in 84 hours. SRO Function 4.d.1, Steamline Isolation, Condition D, With one channel inoperable, place the channel in trip within 72 hours OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours AND be in Mode 4 in 84 hours.

• 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.

Function 24, SG Pressure, Condition A. With one or more Functions with one required channel inoperable, restore the required channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

• 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System. Not applicable.

13. ENSURE same channel (A or B) selected for steam flow and feed flow on each SIG.

BOP BOP ensures that the B channel for steam flow and feedwater flow inputs to the SGWLC circuits are selected.

14. IF affected SIG controlling channel and level NORMAL, THEN

a. RETURN MEW reg valve to AUTO.

Returns 1-FIC-3-103, SG 4- REG VLV to AUTO after balancing input signals. Automatic is selected by lowering the toggle switch from the MANUAL position to the AUTO position. BOP

b. RETURN TDMFWP Speed Control to AUTO (if in MANUAL).

If placed in MANUAL, the BOP returns 1-PC-46-20, TDMFW Pump Master Speed Controller to AUTO after balancing input signals. Automatic is selected by lowering the toggle switch from the MANUAL position to the AUTO position. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 6 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-i -27A, SG 4 STM PRESS fails low over 10 seconds. Requires manual control of 1-FCV-3-i03 SG 4 MEW REG VLV. Requires entry into AOl-16, Loss of FINAL Normal Eeedwater, Section 3.5, Main EW Reg or Bypass Reg Valve Control Failure. SUBMITTAL Requires Tech Spec evaluation. Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

15. WHEN conditions allow auto rod control, THEN

a. (p) ENSURE T-avg and T-ref within 1 F.

b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication SRO [1-M-4].

c. PLACE rods in AUTO.

After adjusting control rods to match Tavg and Tref within 1°F, RO places 1-RBSS ROD BANK SELECT in AUTO.

16. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will acknowledge the request for a repair package for 1-PT-1-27A, SG 4 STM PRESS. SRO 17. RETURN TO Instruction in effect. EXAMINER: ENTER EVENT 2 AFTER FEEDWATER CONTROLS (MFP AND MFW REG VALVES) HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO AUTOMATIC. Chief Examiner will cue the Console Operator to enter Event 2. EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 2, may be entered prior to the brief at the discretion of the Chief Examiner. Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event. Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief. Operations Management Typically Shift Manager. SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager). 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 7 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-i -27A, SG 4 STM PRESS fails low over 10 seconds. Requires manual control of I -FCV-3-1 03 SG 4 MEW REG VLV. Requires entry into AOl-i 6, Loss of FINAL Normal Feedwater, Section 3.5, Main EW Reg or Bypass Reg Valve Control Failure. SUBMITTAL Requires Tech Spec evaluation. Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 2. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: 2 Scenano# I Event# 2 Page 8 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL in MANUAL and restore pressure to normal. Requires entry into AOl-iS, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Sub section 3.1, Pressure FINAL Transient Due to Instrument or Controller Malfunction. Requires a Tech Spec SUBMITTAL evaluation. Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications: 90-A, PZR PRESS HI 1 24-B PZR PRESS HI Will perform IMMEDIATE ACTION step of AOl-i 8, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Section 3.1, Pressure RO transient due to Instrument or Controller Malfunction. to PLACE PZR master controller i-PIC-68-340A in MANUAL and RESTORE press to normal. Enters and direct actions of AOl-I 8, Malfunction of Pressurizer SRO Pressure Control System, Section 3.1, Pressure transient due to Instrument or Controller Malfunction. The following actions are taken from AOl-i 8, Malfunction of AOI-18 Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Section 3.1, Pressure transient due to Instrument or Controller Malfunction. NOTE Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step.

1. CHECK PZR pressure STABLE or TRENDING to desired pressure:

RO 1-Pl-68-340A pressure indicator will be indicating 2500 psig, and the remaining pressure indicators will indicate pressure dropping. 2011-12 Wafts Bar NRC Examination

LAppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 9 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL in MANUAL and restore pressure to normal. Requires entry into AOl-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Sub section 3.1, Pressure FINAL Transient Due to Instrument or Controller Malfunction. Requires a Tech Spec SUBMITTAL evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PLACE PZR master controller 1-PIC-68-340A in MANUAL and RESTORE press to normal. These actions may have already been taken by the RO to stabilize PZR pressure. Places 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL in RD MANUAL by lifting the toggle switch up from the AUTO position to the MANUAL position. Since the failure caused the controller output to lower in AUTO, the output must be raised by moving the toggle switch to the left and observing pressure response. IF PZR pressure drop due failed PORV/Safety or Spray valve, THEN **GO TO Section 3.2.

2. ENSURE 1-XS-68-340D selected to OPERABLE channels for control and backup:

• PT-68-340 & 334 OR
• PT-68-334 & 323 RD OR
• PT-68-340 & 322 RO determines that 1-XS-68-340D is selected to the PT-68-340 &

334 position, and that 1-PT-68-340 has failed. RO selects PT-68-334 B323 position on 1-XS-68-340D, PZR PRESS CONTROL CHANNEL SELECT.

3. CHECK PZR press STABLE or RISING.

RO RO checks PZR press STABLE or RISING. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event# 2 Page 10 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL in MANUAL and restore pressure to normal. Requires entry into AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Sub section 3.1, Pressure FINAL Transient Due to Instrument or Controller Malfunction. Requires a Tech Spec SUBMITTAL evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. DETERMINE if PZR heaters and sprays are operating properly:

RO a. CHECK master control controlling sprays and heaters.

b. CHECK PZR press greater than 2250 psig.

4.b. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED: RD WHEN PZR press is greater than 2250 psig, THEN PERFORM Step 4.c.

c. ENSURE all PZR heaters OFF

d. ENSURE PZR sprays maintain RCS press on program.

RD RO verifies PZR heaters and sprays responding properly to manual control of PZR press master controller.

5. ENSURE operable channel selected for recording with RD 1 -XS-68-340B.

Selector switch 1-XS-68-340B does not have to be repositioned.

6. ENSURE TR-68-2A placed to operable channel using 1-XS-68-2B, T RCDR TR-68-2A LOOP SELECT [1-M-5].

RD Selector switch 1-XS-68-2B must be moved from the Loop I position to any other Loop position.

7. CHECK PZR level at or trending to PROGRAM.

RD RO CHECKS PZR level is on program.

8. NOTIFY Work Control to remove any failed channel from service and repair any failed controllers.

SRD SRO contacts Work Control and Console Operator repeats back request for removing I-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS channel from service. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # I Event# 2 Page 11 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL in MANUAL and restore pressure to normal. Requires entry into AOl18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Sub section 3.1, Pressure FINAL Transient Due to Instrument or Controller Malfunction. Requires a Tech Spec SUBMITTAL evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. WHEN pressurizer pressure stable and equipment status supports returned to normal, THEN ENSURE the following in AUTO:

• PZR Master controller
• PZR spray controllers
• All heater groups RD RO will stabilize RCS pressure, then request permission to return 1-PIC-68-340A to AUTO.

Returns 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL to AUTO. Automatic is selected by lowering the toggle switch from the MANUAL position to the AUTO position.

10. REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

a. 3.3.1, RTS Instrumentation.

Function 6, OTAT, Condition W, With one channel inoperable, place the channel in trip within 72 hours OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours. SRO Function 8.a, Low Pressure, Condition X, With one channel inoperable, place the channel in trip within 72 hours OR reduce THERMAL POWER to <P-7 within 78 hours. Function 8.b, High Pressure, Condition W, With one channel inoperable, place the channel in trip within 72 hours OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event# 2 Page 12 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL in MANUAL and restore pressure to normal. Requires entry into AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Sub section 3.1, Pressure FINAL Transient Due to Instrument or Controller Malfunction. Requires a Tech Spec SUBMITTAL evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. REFER TO the following Tech Specs: (Continued.)

b. 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation. Function 1.d, Pressurizer Pressure Low, CondItion D, With one channel inoperable, place the channel in trip within 72 hours OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours AND be in Mode 4 in 84 hours. Function 8.b, P-Il, (1) Unblock (Auto Reset of SI Block) (2) Enable Manual Block of SI Condition L, With one P-Il interlock channel inoperable, verify the interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions OR SRO be in Mode 3 in 7 hours AND be in Mode 4 in 13 hours.

c. 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System. Not Applicable

d. 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Applicable if the initial transient caused a pressure drop to less than 2214 p51g.

e. 3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits. Not Applicable

f. 3.4.9, Pressurizer. Not Applicable

g. 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves. Not Applicable

h. 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves. Not Applicable 1 1. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

SRO When contacted as Work Contro4 the Console Operator will repeat back request to prepare a package to troubleshoot and repair 1-PT-68-340A. SRO 12. RETURN TO Instruction in effect. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 13 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL in MANUAL and restore pressure to normal. Requires entry into AOl-is, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Sub section 3.1, Pressure FINAL Transient Due to Instrument or Controller Malfunction. Requires a Tech Spec SUBMITTAL evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 3, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner. Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event. Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief. SRO Operations Management Typically Shift Manager. Maintenance Personnel Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager). If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 3. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 14 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LT-62-130 VCT LEVEL fails high. Requires entry into ARI 109-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO. Requires the RD to place 1-LCV-62-1 18, LETDOWN DIVERT TO HUT in FINAL the VC TK position. SUBMITTAL Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications: 109-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO 1-HS-62-1 18A, LETDOWN DIVERT TO HUT RED indicating light below the HUT label LIT 1-LI-62-129, VCT LEVEL indication slowly dropping. RD Diagnoses and announces failure of 1 -LT-62-1 30, VCT LEVEL. May place I -HS-62-1 1 8A in the VC TK position to stop VCT level RO from dropping. RD Performs actions of ARI 1 09-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO. SRO May enter and direct actions of ARI 109-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO. The following actions are taken from ARI 109-A, VCT LEVEL ARI 109-A HIILO. CAUTIONS

1) If either VCT level transmitter fails high, then auto swap over to RWST on low level is disabled.

2) 1 -LT-62-1 29A failing high will divert letdown flow but will NOT prevent auto makeup. 1 -Ll 129 will indicate offscale high: however computer point LOl 1 2A will indicate actual level.

3) 1 -LT-62-1 30A failing high will divert letdown and prevent auto makeup, however, 1 -Ll-62-1 29 will indicate actual level.

[1] IF high level, THEN: [1 .1] ENSURE 1-LCV-62-1 18 diverted to HUT and OPEN. RO [1.2) ENSURE NO VCT makeup in progress. RO determines from the RED indicating light for the HUT is LIT on 1-HS-62-118A, LETDOWN DIVERT TO HUT that letdown is diverted to the HUT. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 15 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LT-62-130 VCT LEVEL fails high. Requires entry into ARI 109-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO. Requires the ROto place 1-LCV-62-118, LETDOWN DIVERT TO HUT in FINAL the VC TK position. SUBMITTAL j Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior [2] IF low level, THEN:

• ENSURE 1-LCV-62-118 aligned to VCT.
• INITIATE makeup in accordance with SOI-62.02, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL.
• ENSURE suction to the Centrifugal Charging Pump swaps over RO to the RWST at 7% VCT level.

If/When dispatched to observe level on local i-LT-62-130 VCT LEVEL, state that level is off-scale high. If/when dispatched to observe level in the Auxiliary Control Room, go to THUNDER VIEW cvi screen and report VCT level. [3] VERIFY letdown and charging in service and that Reactor RO Coolant Filter is NOT clogged. [4] IF 1 -LCV-62-1 18 diverted to HUT due to instrument failure, THEN: [4.1] PLACE 1-HS-62-118 in VCT position until repairs complete. RO rotates i-HS-62-118, LETDOWN DIVERT TO HUT to the left to the VC TK position, and observes the RED indicating light RO for the VCT is LIT and the RED indicating for the HUT is DARK. [4.2] PLACE 1-HS-62-1 18 in P-AUTO position once repairs completed. i-HS-62-118, LETDOWN DIVERT TO HUT will be maintained in the VCT position for the duration of the scenario. [5] IF RCS leakage is suspected, THEN GO TO AOI-6, SMALL RO REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK. Leakage is not indicated, so this step is N/A. May contact Work Control to INITIATE repairs to failed equipment. SRO When contacted as Work Contro4 the Console Operator will repeat back request to prepare a package to troubleshoot and repair 1-L T-62-130. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 16 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LT-62-130 VCT LEVEL fails high. Requires entry into ARI 109-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO. Requires the RO to place 1-LCV-62-118, LETDOWN DIVERT TO HUT in FINAL the VC TK position. SUBMITTAL Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 4, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner. Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event. Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief. Operations Management Typically Shift Manager. SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager). If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 4. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 17 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-3-1 #1 HTR INLET PRESS fails low. Requires the BOP to place 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A&B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL to restore MFP AP to program. Requires entry into AOl-I 6, Requires entry into AOl-FINAL 16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.6, MEW pump speed control SUBMITTAL circuit failure. Requires manual operation for the duration of the scenario N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications: 57-B #1 FW HTR INLET SUPPLY PRESS HI 63-F SG LEVEL DEVIATION 1-PI-3-1 #1 HTR INLET PRESS dropping 1-Sl-46-20A MFPT A SPEED rising 1-SI-46-20B MEPT B SPEED rising ALL Main Feedwater Reg valves closing Diagnoses and announces the failure of 1 -PT-3-1, #1 HTR INLET BOP PRESS low. BOP may place 1-PC-46-20, MEPT A & B MASTER SPEED BOP CONTROL, in MANUAL and lower MFPT speed. Enters and directs actions of AOl-i 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, SRO Section 3.6, MEW pump speed control circuit failure. The following actions are taken from AOl-I 6, Loss of Normal AOI-16 Feedwater, Section 3.6, MFW pump speed control circuit failure.

1. CONTROL MFP speed using MANUAL control of master controller or individual controller(s) as required.

BOP BOP places 1-PC-46-20, MFPTA & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL by lifting the toggle switch from the AUTO position, and then move to the left to lower MFP IA and lB speed

2. PLACE control rods in MANUAL.

RO SRO directs the RO to place l-RBSS ROD BANK SELECT in MANUAL. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 18 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-3-1 #1 HTR INLET PRESS fails low. Requires the BOP to place 1-P0-46-20, MFPT A&B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL to restore MFP iP to program. Requires entry into AOl-i 6, Requires entry into AOl-FINAL 16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.6, MFW pump speed control SUBMITTAL circuit failure. Requires manual operation for the duration of the scenario Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. CHECK MFW pumps recirc valves CLOSED.

BOP BOP checks 1-FIC-3-70 MFWP A RECIRC CONTROL and 1-FIC-3-84 MFWP B RECIRC CONTROL CLOSED by observing valve position demand indications.

4. (p) ENSURE T-avg and T-ref within 30*

RO RO observes Tref-Auct Tavg on 1-TR-68-2B and determines that Auct T-avg and T-ref are within 3°F.

5. MAINTAIN MFWP discharge press on PROGRAM.

BOP BOP may adjust 1-PC-46-20, MFPTA & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL to return MFWP discharge pressure to program (1-FC-46-20 provides program.)

6. ENSURE SIG levels return to PROGRAM.

BOP BOP observes SG I through SG 4 levels on I-M-4 instruments and determines that levels are returning to normal.

7. CHECK steam dump mode in TAVG position.

BOP BOP determines that 1-HS-I-103D STEAM DUMP MODE is in the T A VG position.

8. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will acknowledge the request for a repair package for I-PT-3-I,

                                #1 HTR INLET PRESS.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

I Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event# 4 Page 19 of 43 Event

Description:

1-PT-3-1 #1 HTR INLET PRESS fails low. Requires the BOP to place 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A&B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL to restore MFP zP to program. Requires entry into AOl-i 6, Requires entry into AOl-FINAL 16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.6, MEW pump speed control SUBMITTAL circuit failure. Requires manual operation for the duration of the scenario Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. WHEN conditions allow auto rod control, THEN

a. (p) ENSURE T-avg and T-ref within 1°E.

RO observes T-avg and T-ref within I F on I-TR-68-2B, TREF & AUCT TAVG °F. -

b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication

[1-M-4]. RO RO observes that there is a zero demand indicated on the PASSIVE SUMMER ROD DEMAND on both CERPI displays.

c. PLACE rods in AUTO.

RO rotates I-RBSS from the MANUAL position to the right to the AUTO position.

10. WHEN MEP pump control repairs completed, THEN PLACE MEP speed control in AUTO.

SRO SRO determines that I-PC-46-20, MFPTA & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL must remain in MANUAL. 1 1. RETURN TO Instruction in effect. SRO SRO determines that the procedure section will remain open until repairs are complete. EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 5, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner. Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event# 4 Page 20 of 43 Event

Description:

I -PT-3-1 #1 HTR INLET PRESS fails low. Requires the BOP to place 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A&B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL to restore MFP AP to program. Requires entry into AOl-i 6, Requires entry into AOl-FINAL 16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.6, MEW pump speed control SUBMITTAL circuit failure. Requires manual operation for the duration of the scenario Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief. SRO Operations Management Typically Shift Manager. Maintenance Personnel Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager). If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 5. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: 2 Scenario# 1 Event# 5 Page 21 of 43 Event

Description:

Intermediate Feedwater Heater B4 develops a leak, causing the heater string to isolate. Requires entry into AOl-47, Heater Drains Malfunction. Requires a rapid FINAL load reduction using AOl-47 steps. SUBMITTAL Time D Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications: 36-B HEATER A2 LEVEL HIILO 37-A HP HEATER BI LEVEL HI/LO 37-C HEATER B-4 LEVEL HI/LO 38-B HEATER C2 LEVEL HI/LO 63-F SG LEVEL DEVIATION BOP Diagnoses and announces B4 heater level high. Diagnoses and announces the isolation of the B string of BOP intermediate pressure heaters. BOP May dispatch AUO to investigate B4 heater level. Enters and directs actions of AOI-47, Heater Drains Malfunctions, S RO Section 3.2, Intermediate Heater String Isolation Above 76% Power. The following actions are taken from ARI 37-C HEATER B-4 ARI 37-C LEVEL HIILO. CAUTION Intermediate Heater String Isolation above 76% power may result in unit trip if actions of AOI-47 are not performed promptly. NOTE Heater B2, B3 and B4 isolation will occur if level reaches 34 above normal for 5 seconds, as seen by 1 -LS-6-1 47D. If this occurs, Condensate inlet to B4 heater and outlet from B2 will close, extraction steam isolation valves to B2, B3 and B4 heaters will close and the extraction steam non-return valve to all #2, all #3 and B4 heaters will unload. Level control valve from Bi heater to B2 will close and #3 heater drain pumps discharge valve to B2 heater will close. [1] IF heater string isolation occurs above 76% power, THEN SRO IMMEDIATELY GO TO AOl-47, Heater Drain Malfunction. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 22 of 43 Event

Description:

Intermediate Feedwater Heater B4 develops a leak, causing the heater string to isolate. Requires entry into AOl-47, Heater Drains Malfunction. Requires a rapid FINAL load reduction using AOl47 steps. SUBMITTAL Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from AOl-47, Heater Drains AOI-47 Malfunction, Section 3.2, Intermediate Heater String Isolation Above 76% Power. CAUTION

• The Standby Main Feed Pump (SBMFP) should be removed from service as soon as practicable to preclude MFP suction pressure dropping below 250 psig (with no operator action this could occur in as little as 1.5 minutes).
• Unit load should be lowered without delay due to the potential loss of all normal feedwater upon automatic isolation of the remaining heater strings.

1. ENSURE affected heater string isolation complete.

• Condensate inlet isolation valve CLOSED BOP observes that 1-HS-2-130A B4 HEATER INLET is CLOSED by RED indicating light DARK and GREEN indicating light is LIT.
• Condensate outlet isolation valve CLOSED BOP observes that 1-HS-2-147A B2 HEATER OUTLET is BOP CLOSED by RED indicating light DARK and GREEN indicating light is LIT.
• Extraction steam isolation valve CLOSED.

BOP observes that 1-HS-5-32A HEATER B2 EXTRACTION STM, 1-HS-5-42A B3 HEATER EXTRACTION STM, and 1-HS-5-62A, B4 HEATER EXTRACTION STM are CLOSED by RED indicating lights DARK and GREEN indicating lights is LIT.

2. MONITOR that ONLY ONE heater string isolation, has been initiated.

BO BOP observes that the A and C intermediate heater strings remain in service.

3. CHECK both MFPs in operation.

BOP BOP observes that both MFPs are in service. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event# 5 Page 23 of 43 Event

Description:

Intermediate Feedwater Heater 34 develops a leak, causing the heater string to isolate. Requires entry into AOl-47, Heater Drains Malfunction. Requires a rapid FINAL load reduction using AOl-47 steps. SUBMITTAL Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. VERIFY SBMFP shutdown.

BOP BOP observes that the SBMFP was not in service. NOTE Condenser Backpressure limits may be displayed on ICS, turn-on code AOl1 1.

5. ESTABLISH a turbine load reduction, to less than or equal to 76%

power, at a rate greater than or equal to 2%/rn in, and less than 5%/mm:

a. PLACE turbine in IMP IN.

BOP depresses the IMP IN pushbutton and observes the transfer from IMP OUT to IMP IN control complete.

b. SET a desired load in the SETTER with the REFERENCE CONTROL.

BOP depresses the reference control V (down) button to BOP reduce the setter display to less than 76% load as directed by the SRO.

c. SET the LOAD RATE at greater than or equal to 2%/rn in, and less than 5%/rn in.

BOP selects the load reduction rate directed by the SRO using the LOAD RATE % PER MIN thumbwheel selector. It is expected that a load reduction rate of 2-4%/minute will be used.

d. DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

BOP depresses the REFERENCE CONTROL GO button. EXAMINER: A copy of the Reactivity Briefing Sheet which addresses the boration flow rate and volume is contained in Attachment 1. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 24 of 43 Event

Description:

Intermediate Feedwater Heater B4 develops a leak, causing the heater string to isolate. Requires entry into AOl-47, Heater Drains Malfunction. Requires a rapid FINAL load reduction using AOI-47 steps. SUBMITTAL Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. INITIATE a manual boration:

a. DETERMINE recommended boration flow rate and volume from Reactivity Briefing Sheet:

RO determines the recommended boration flow rate to be 40 gpm and the volume to add to be 369 gallons of boron.

b. INITIATE normal boration:

1) ADJUST BA flow controller, 1 -FC-62-1 39, to desired flow rate.

RO adjusts 1-FC-62-139 to the value corresponding to the flow rate for the selected load reduction rate.

2) ADJUST BA batch counter 1 -FQ-62-1 39 to required quantity.

RO adjusts 1-FQ-62-139 BA BATCH COUNTER as follows:

1. Depresses and holds the black pushbutton.

RO 2. While holding the pushbutton, the applicant raises the red translucent cover.

3. WhIle still holding the pushbutton, the applicant enters 000369 in the display.

4. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant lowers the red translucent cover, and then releases the pushbutton.

3) PLACE mode selector 1-HS-62-140B to BOR.

RO rotates 1-HS-62-140B VCT MAKEUP MODE from AUTO to the right to BOR position.

4) (p) PLACE VCT makeup control 1-HS-62-140A, to START.

RO rotates 1-HS-62-140A,VCT MAKEUP CONTROL to the right to the START position.

5) VERIFY desired boric acid flow indicated on 1-FI-62-139.

RO observes the appropriate flow rate on 1-Fl-62-139, BA TO BLENDER FLOW. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event# 5 Page 25 of 43 Event

Description:

Intermediate Feedwater Heater B4 develops a leak, causing the heater string to isolate. Requires entry into AOI-47, Heater Drains Malfunction. Requires a rapid FINAL load reduction using AOl47 steps. SUBMITTAL Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. DISPATCH personnel to monitor levels for #1, #2, and #4 FWHTs, and #3 HDT.

BOP When the BOP dispatches AUOs to monitor heater and heater drain tank levels, the Console Operator will use INSIGHT file heaters and THUNDERVIEW page fw6 to observe levels.

8. WHEN reactor power less than or equal to less than or equal to SRO 910 MWe (76%), THEN STOP load reduction.

9. WHEN rated thermal power change exceeds 15% in one hour, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate 1-SI-68-28.

SRO When the SRO contacts Chemistry, the Console Operator will repeat back the request.

10. NOTIFY the Load Coordinator of the required load reduction and expected ramp rate.

SRO When the SRO contacts Load Coordinator, the Console Operator will repeat back the information provided. SRO may contact the Shift Manager to make notifications. 1 1. MONITOR rod position: Rods above Lo-Lo insertion limit AFD RD within Target Band

12. MONITOR Tavg and Tref:

RD Tavg trending to Tref. Mismatch less than 5°F.

13. MAINTAIN SG levels on program or trending toward program BOP levels.

NOTE The bypass around the extraction steam isolation valve is opened to prevent water hammer caused by condensate accumulating in the line above it. However, it is not opened if the #4 FWHT has a high level. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # I Event # 5 Page 26 of 43 Event

Description:

Intermediate Feedwater Heater B4 develops a leak, causing the heater string to isolate. Requires entry into AOl-47, Heater Drains Malfunction. Requires a rapid FINAL load reduction using AOl-47 steps. SUBMITTAL Time 1 Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

14. CHECK affected isolated #4 FWHT level stable or trending to less than 15 inches on local sightgauge.

BOP When the BOP contacts the AUO for #4 feedwater heater level, the Console Operator will report current level displayed on the INSIGHT file.

15. LOCALLY OPEN the bypass around the extraction isolation valve for the affected isolated #4 FWHT:

• 1-IBV-5-500, CNDS HTR A4 EXTR STM INLET 1-FCV-5-54 BYP [Ti Ff729]
• 1-IBV-5-501, CNDS HTR B4 EXTR STM INLET 1-FCV-5-62 BOP BYP [T2G1729]
• 1-IBV-5.-502, CNDS HTR C4 EXTR STM INLET 1-FCV-5-70 BYP [T2Ff729]

When the BOP contacts the AUO to locally open 1-lB V-5-501, HTR B4 EXTR STM INLET 1-FCV-5-62, the Console Operator will repeat back the request.

16. EVALUATE use of normal level control valves bypass valves (X)

BOP operation to assist in maintaining #2 FWHT levels (refer to SQl 5&6.Oi as necessary).

17. IF SBMFP was stopped in this AOl, THEN PERFORM applicable section and steps SOl-2&3.O1, to ensure SBMFP is returned to SRO standby.

Since the SBMFP was not stopped, the SRO determines the step is not applicable and continues.

18. INITIATE repairs.

When the SRO contacts Work Control to request a SRO troubleshooting and repair package for the intermediate feedwater heaters, the Console Operator will repeat back the information. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event# 5 Page 27 of 43 Event

Description:

Intermediate Feedwater Heater B4 develops a leak, causing the heater string to isolate. Requires entry into AOl-47, Heater Drains Malfunction. Requires a rapid FINAL load reduction using AOl-47 steps. SUBMITfAL Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

19. PERFORM either:

• Applicable steps of SOI-5&6.01, section for Removing Intermediate Pressure Heater String from Service at Power, for SRO the affected string.

OR

• SOl-5.01, Returning Intermediate String Feedwater Heaters to Service Following High Level Isolation.

SRO 20. RETURN TO Instruction in effect. Inform the Chief Examiner when 76% power has been reached. EXAMINER: The Chief Examiner will cue Console Operator to enter Event 6 after the power reduction. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event# 6 Page 28 of 43 Event

Description:

Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. Auto safety injection fails to occur. After the reactor trip a total loss of ofisite power occurs. lA DG trips when started and the lB DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the I B DG by the RO during the performance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSIVs fail to close. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted FINAL Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SUBMITTAL Steam Generators. Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications: 95-F RCS LOOSE PARTS ALARM 144-A ICE COND INLET DOOR OPEN 58-B SG FEEDWATER FLOW HI Diagnoses and announces the feedwater line break inside BOP containment. May direct the RO to perform a manual reactor trip and safety SRO injection. Enters and directs the actions of E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The following actions are taken from E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. NOTE

 . Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS.
 . Status Trees I SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event# 6 Page 29 of 43 Event

Description:

Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. Auto safety injection fails to occur. After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. 1A DG trips when started and the lB DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the 1 B DG by the RO during the perFormance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSIVs fail to close. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted FINAL Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SUBMITTAL Steam Generators. Time 0 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO checks 1-52RTB, R)( TRIP BKR A GREEN indicating light LIT on panel 1-M-4. RO checks 1-52RTB, RC TRIP BKR B GREEN indicating light LIT on panel 1-M-4 RO checks 1-52BYA, BYPASS BKR A lights DARK RO checks 1-52BYB, BYPASS BKR B lights DARK RO

• RPls at bottom of scale.

RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor I and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 for indication that all SHUTDOWN and CONTROL bank rods are inserted.

• Neutron flux DROPPING.

RO observes neutron flux trending down on 1-NR-92-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER. May also observe levels decreasing on 1-NI-92-135A, CH I NEUTRON MON % PWR, and 1-Nl-92-136A, CH II NEUTRON MON % PWR.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

RO RO observes that indicating lights on 1-XX-47-1000 EHC CONTROL for individual throttle and governor valves are GREEN.

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

RO CSST (offsite), OR D/G (blackout). 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 30 of 43 Event

Description:

Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. Auto safety injection fails to occur. After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. 1A DG trips when started and the lB DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the lB DG by the RO during the performance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSIVs fail to close. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted FINAL Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.l, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SUBMITTAL Steam Generators. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task I Energize at least one AC emergency bus before placing safeguards equipment handswitches in the stop, pull-to-lock position. Critical 3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED: Task I RESTORE power to at least one train of shutdown boards:

1) EMERGENCY START D/G [1-M-1].

RO or BOP rotates I-HS-82-15, DG EMERG START IA-A 2A-A lB-B 2B-B to the right to the EMER START position OR depresses 1-HS-82-46A, EMERGENCY START pushbutton at RO Panel O-M-26.

2) IF both trains shutdown boards remain de-energized, THEN PLACE 6.9kV SD Bd transfer switch in MAN [1-M-1], and CLOSE supply breaker from energized source. IF power can NOT be restored to at least one train of shutdown boards, THEN GO TO ECA-O.O, Loss of Shutdown Power.

After the IA-A DG is started the SRO determines that a transition to ECA-O.O is not warranted.

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RO b. Both trains SI ACTUATED.

• I -XX-55-6C
• I -XX-55-6D 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # I Event # 6 Page 31 of 43 Event

Description:

Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. Auto safety injection fails to occur. After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. IA DG trips when started and the lB DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the 1 B DG by the RO during the performance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSIVs fail to close. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted FINAL Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SUBMITTAL Steam Generators. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 2 Manually actuate at least one train of safety injection before transition from E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Critical 4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED: Task2 DETERMINE if SI required:

a. IF ANY of the following exists:

• SIG press less than 675 psig, OR
• RCS press less than 1870 psig, RO OR
• Cntmt press greater than 1 .5 psig THEN ACTUATE SI manually.

RO rotates 1-HS-63-133B SIACTUATE TR A&B (1-M-4) or 1-HS 133a SI ACTUATE TR A&B (1-M-6) to the right to the ACTUATE position. EXAMINER: E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendixes A and B are included as Attachment 2.

5. PERFORM Appendixes A and B, E-0, pages 1 6-30.

BOP BOP is assigned to perform actions contained in the Appendices. A separate copy of the Appendices is contained in this package for Examiner use. SRO 6. ANNOUNCE reactor trip and safety injection over PA system. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 32 of 43 Event

Description:

Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. Auto safety injection fails to occur. After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. 1A DG trips when started and the lB DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the lB DG by the RO during the performance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSIVs fail to close. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted FINAL Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SUBMITTAL Steam Generators. Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. ENSURE secondary heat sink available with either:

• Total AFW flow greater than 410 gpm, OR RO It is expected that Adverse Containment (>2.81 psig) conditions will exist soon after the entry into E-O. When announced the crew will use the bracketed parameter values.
• At least one SIG NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

EXAMINER: The feedwater line break may cause RCS temperature to rise. The applicants may not implement Step 8 RNO actions at this time.

8. MONITOR RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F using:

• RCS Loop T-avg with any RCP running, RO OR
• RCS Loop T-cold with RCPs out-of-service.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # I Event# 6 Page 33 of 43 Event

Description:

Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. Auto safety injection fails to occur. After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. 1A DG trips when started and the I B DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the 1 B DG by the RO during the performance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSIVs fail to close. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted FINAL Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SUBMITTAL Steam Generators. Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IF temp less than 557°F, THEN ENSURE steam dumps and SIG PORVs CLOSED.

IF cooldown continues, THEN CONTROL total AFW flow to maintain greater than 410 gpm UNTIL NR level in at least one SIG greater than 29% [39% ADVJ. BOP takes manual control of AFW LCVs and reduces AFW flow. IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN

• PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

RO BOP rotates 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSVA, and 1-HS-103B STEAM DUMP FSVB to the left to the OFF RESET position.

• CLOSE MSIVs.

Recognizes failure of AUTO closure and attempts to MANUALLY close MSIVs from the MCR handswitches. May dispatch an AUO to the Aux Control Room to place the MS1V handswitches to the AUX position.

• ENSURE MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

IF RCS temp greater than 564°F, THEN ENSURE either steam dumps or SIG PORVs OPEN.

9. ENSURE excess letdown valves CLOSED:

• 1 -FCV-62.-54 RO
• 1 -FCV-62-55 RO observes GREEN indicating lights LIT on handswitches 1-HS-62-54A, EXCESS LTDN ISOL, and 1-HS-62-55A, EXCESS LTDN.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: 2 Scenano# 1 Event # 6 Page 34 of 43 Event

Description:

Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. Auto safety injection fails to occur. After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. 1A DG trips when started and the lB DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the 1 B DG by the RO during the performance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSIVs fail to close. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted FINAL Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.l, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SUBMITTAL Steam Generators. Time j Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. CHECK pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

RO observes 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV34OA, CLOSED, GREEN indicating light is LIT RED indicating light is DARK. RO observes 1-HS-68-334A, PZR PORV 334, CLOSED, GREEN RO indicating light is Lfl, RED indicating light is DARK. RO observes 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV34OA, OPEN, GREEN indicating light is DARK, RED indicating light is DARK, due to power loss. RO observes 1-HS-68-332A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 334, GREEN indicating light is DARK, RED indicating light is DARK due to loss of power.

11. CHECK pzr safety valves CLOSED:

• EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitors.

RO observes response of 1-Tl-68-330, SAFETY 68-563 TAILPIPE RO TEMP. 1-Tl-68-329, SAFETY 68-564 TAILPIPE TEMP and 1-TI 328, SAFETY 68-565, stable at approximately 110 F. BOP may observe 1-Xl-68-363, PZR VALVES ACOUSTIC MONITOR indicating lights are DARK for 1-XI-68-363 (68-563), 1-Xl-68-364 (68-564) and 1-Xl-68-365 (68-565).

12. CHECK pzr sprays CLOSED.

RO RO observes the pzr spray valves closed by GREEN indicating lights LIT for 1-Xl-68-340B, PZR SPRAY LOOP 2 and 1-Xl 340D, PZR SPRAY LOOP 1. NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario# 1 Event# 6 Page 35 of 43 Event

Description:

Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. Auto safety injection fails to occur. After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. IA DG trips when started and the lB DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the 1 B DG by the RO during the performance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSlVs fail to close. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted FINAL Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2. 1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SUBMITTAL Steam Generators. Time { Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

13. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

The RCPs tripped due to the loss of offsite power. RO

a. Phase B signals DARK [MISSP].

b. RCS pressure greater than 1500 psig.

14. CHECK SIG pressures:

• All SIG pressures controlled or rising.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG I through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressures are dropping. May also RO observe trends on 1-PR-1-2, SG I & 2 PRESS PSIG, and 1-PR-I-23, SG 3 & 4 PRESS PSIG to assess this step.

• All SIG pressures greater than 120 psig.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG I through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressures are greater than 120 psig.

14. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO IF SIG pressure low OR dropping uncontrolled, THEN GO TO E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event# 6 Page 36 of 43 Event

Description:

Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. Auto safety injection fails to occur. After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. 1 A DG trips when started and the 1 B DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the 1 B DG by the RD during the performance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSIVs fail to close. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted FINAL Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SUBMITTAL Steam Generators. Time N*, Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following steps are taken from E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. CAUTION If a faulted 5/G is NOT needed for RCS cooldown, it should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions. BOP 1. ENSURE all MSIVs and MSIV bypasses CLOSED. EXAMINER: E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Attachment I is included as Attachment 3.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Manually CLOSE valves.

IF valves can NOT be closed, THEN Locally REMOVE power to valves: BOP

• DISPATCH NAUD to perform Attachment 1 (E-2).

When contacted as the Control Building AUO to perform Attachment 1, the Console operator will enter msr26a, msr26b, msr26c, and msr26d to place the MSIV switches in the Aux Control Room in the AUX position. The Console Operator will report back that this has been done. NOTE If it is known that a steam leak exists in the Turbine building, the following step should not be performed until the affected steam header is depressurized.

2. PLACE steam dump controls OFF:

• 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSVA.

BOP

• 1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSVB.

Step already performed as part of E-O. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event# 6 Page 37 of 43 Event

Description:

Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. Auto safety injection fails to occur. After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. 1 A DG trips when started and the I B DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the 1 B DG by the RD during the performance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSIVs fail to close. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted FINAL Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SUBMITTAL Steam Generators. Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. CHECK for at least one Intact SIG:

• Any SIG pressure controlled or rising, RD OR
• Any SIG pressure greater than P-sat for RCS incore tern perature.

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED SRO IF pressure in all four S/Gs dropping uncontrolled, THEN GO TO ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Lppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 38 of 43 Event

Description:

Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. Auto safety injection fails to occur. After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. 1A DG trips when started and the lB DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the 1 B DG by the RO during the performance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSIVs fail to close. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted FINAL Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SUBMITTAL Steam Generators. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following steps are taken from ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled ECA-2.1 Depressurization of All Steam Generators. CAUTION If, at anytime, except during SI termination steps 14 through 24, any Intact SIG can be isolated from the break and re-pressurized, then recovery actions should continue with E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. SRO 1. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart. CAUTION If the TD AFW pump is the only available source of feed flow to ANY S/G, the steam supply must be maintained available.

2. ENSURE secondary pressure boundary isolated:

• ENSURE all MSIVs and MSIV bypasses CLOSED.
• PLACE steam dump controls OFF.
• ENSURE MEW reg and bypass reg valves CLOSED.
• ENSURE MFW isolation and bypass isolation valves CLOSED.

RO SIG I and 3 MFW Iso! valves will not be closed due to power loss.

• IF both MD AEW pumps available, THEN ENSURE steam supply valves to TD AEW pump CLOSED.
• ENSURE SIG PORVs CLOSED.
• ENSURE SIG blowdown ISOLATED.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event# 6 Page 39 of 43 Event

Description:

Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. Auto safety injection fails to occur. After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. 1A DG trips when started and the 18 DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the 18 DG by the RO during the performance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSIVs fail to close. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted FINAL Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SUBMITTAL Steam Generators. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Manually CLOSE valves to restore pressure boundary on at least one S/G.

IF valves can NOT be closed, THEN DISPATCH personnel to close valves locally, one loop at a time: CLOSE MSIV and bypass valve as necessary USING Appendix A (ECA-2.1). E-2, Attachment I has been implemented, and contains the SRO same actions as ECA-2. I Appendix A. The MSIVs will NOT be closed during the scenario.

• ISOLATE S/G atmospheric relief valve as necessary.
• CLOSE additional feedwater or condensate MOVs as necessary.

BOP may dispatch personnel to close #1 FW Htr outlet valves, Console operator will acknowledge the request.

• ISOLATE blowdown locally as necessary.

CAUTION If total feed flow CAPABILITY of 410 gpm is available, FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, should NOT be implemented. NOTE Minimum detectable flow is assured by observing flow indicator response to valve movement.

3. CONTROL feed flow to minimize RCS cooldown and prevent SIG dryout:

BOP

a. CHECK T-cold cooldown rate less than 100°F in the last one hour.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 40 of 43 Event

Description:

Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. Auto safety injection fails to occur. After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. 1A DG trips when started and the lB DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the lB DG by the RO during the performance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSIVs fail to close. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted FINAL Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SUBMITTAL Steam Generators. Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: Step 3 RNO may not be required depending upon the progression of the scenario when this step is performed. If the RCS cooldown is less than 100°F, then the scenario continues to Step 13. At the Chief Examiners discretion, the scenario may be terminated after minimum detectable flow has been established.

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

a. REDUCE feed flow to each SIG to minimum detectable to minimize cooldown.

BOP ** GO TO Substep 3c. BOP will take manual control of all AFW level control valves and adjust flow to all S/Gs until the related flow indicator deflects off the bottom scale.

c. IF any SIG NR level drops to 29% [39% ADVj, THEN RO MAINTAIN at least minimum detectable flow to each SIG with low level.

4. MONITOR shutdown margin during RCS cooldown:

• REFER TO 1-Sl-0-1O, Shutdown Margin OR REACTINW SRO Computer Program.

SRO requests performance of 1-Sl-O-1O by the Surrogate STA. SRO 5. MONITOR T-hot stable or dropping. CAUTION The 1500 psig RCP trip criteria is NOT applicable if the pressure drop is caused by SIG depressurization as indicated by RCS temperature at T-sat for SIG pressure. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event# 6 Page 41 of 43 Event

Description:

Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. Auto safety injection fails to occur. After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. 1 A DG trips when started and the 1 B DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the lB DG by the RD during the perforrnance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSIVs fail to close. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted FINAL Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SUBMITTAL Steam Generators. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

6. MONITOR if RCPs should remain in service:

a. Phase B DARK [MISSPJ.

SRO

b. RCS pressure greater than 1 500 psig.

RCPs tripped during the loss of offsite power event.

7. MONITOR pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

SRO

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

Actions previously performed.

8. CHECK secondary side activity levels:

• S/G discharge rad monitors NORMAL.
• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitors NORMAL.
• SIG blowdown rad monitor recorders NORMAL trend prior to SRO isolation,
• S/G sample results by Chemistry NORMAL.

BOP reports primary and secondary radiation during the performance of E-O, Appendix A. SRO may direct the BOP to recheck secondary radiation at this point, and call Chemistry to have SGs sampled for activity. CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action will be required to restart the SI pumps and RHR pumps due to loss of SI start signal. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event# 6 Page 42 of 43 Event

Description:

Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. Auto safety injection fails to occur. After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. IA DG trips when started and the 1 B DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the lB DG by the RO during the performance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSlVs fail to close. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted FINAL Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SUBMITTAL Steam Generators. Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. DETERMINE if RHR pumps should be stopped:

a. CHECK RHR suction aligned to RWST.

b. CHECK RCS pressure greater than 150 psig.

c. CHECK RCS pressure stable or rising.

d. RESET SI, AND CHECK the following:

RO

• SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.
• AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT.

e. STOP RHR pumps, AND PLACE in A-AUTO.

f. MONITOR RCS pressure greater than 150 psig.

RO will place IA-A RHR pump hand switch to stop and allow it to spring return to A-AUTO.

10. DETERMINE if cntmt spray should be stopped:

RO

a. MONITOR cntmt pressure less than 2.0 psig.

10.a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED: RO WHEN cntmt pressure is less than 2.0 psig, THEN PERFORM Substeps 1 Ob thru e. ** GO TO Step 1 1.

b. CHECK at least one cntmt spray pump RUNNING.

c. RESET cntmt spray signal.

RO d. STOP cntmt spray pumps, AND PLACE in A-AUTO.

e. CLOSE cntmt spray discharge valves 1-FCV-72-2 and 1-FCV-72-39.

RO 11. MONITOR RWST level greater than 34%. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 43 of 43 Event

Description:

Feedwater line break inside containment on #4 SG fails to 100%. Auto safety injection fails to occur. After the reactor trip a total loss of offsite power occurs. 1A DG trips when started and the lB DG fails to automatically start. Requires emergency start of the lB DG by the RO during the performance of IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. MSIVs fail to close. Requires transition from E-2, Faulted FINAL Steam Generator Isolation, to ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All SUBMITTAL Steam Generators. Time Position Aoolicants Actions or Behavior

12. DETERMINE if cold leg accumulators should be isolated:

a. ENSURE power to isolation valves restored USING Appendix RO B (ECA-2.1), CLA Breaker Operation.

b. CHECK RCS pressure less than 250 psig.

12.b RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RO WHEN RCS pressure is less than 250 psig, THEN ** PERFORM Substeps 12c and 12d.

13. MONITOR modified SI termination criteria:

a. RCS subcooling greater than 65°F [85°F ADV].

RO

b. RCS pressure stable or rising.

c. Pzr level greater than 15% [33% ADV].

EXAMINER: When the modified SI termination criteria have been checked in step 13, scenario may be terminated. END OF SCENARIO 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Scenario I FINAL SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 0 SM US/MCR Unit 1 0 UO Unit Off-going Name Q AUO Station 0 STA (STA Function) On-coming Name Part 1 Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb 1031 ppm

• Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

IA-A RHR Pump is out-of-service for motor winding inspection. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were enteredlO hours ago. lA-A RHR pump is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours. Protected equipment signs have been posted for lB-B RHR pump.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)
• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Train A/Channel I Work Week. 100% power, RCS boron concentration 1031 ppm, Control Bank D is at 220 steps. Maintain current plant conditions.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Q Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only) Q Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items) 0 Current qualification status 0 Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs) Q Review current TS/TRMJODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUO5) Q Wallcdown MCR Control Boanis with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs) 0 SRJPER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA) Relief Time: Relief Date: Part 3 Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties: O Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station) O Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week) O Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked) 0 Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUO5) 0 Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week) (N/A for AUOs) 0 Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs) TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-l-l [01-14-20111

Scenario I FINAL SHIFT TURNOVER CRECKLIST Page 1 of2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of I Q SM Q US/MCR Unit I UO Unit Off-going - Name Q AUO Station 1 STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb = 1031 ppm Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions: IA-A RHR Pump is out-of-service for motor winding inspection. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were enteredlO hours ago. lA-A RJ-{R pump is expected to be returned to service in 6 hours. Protected equipment signs have been posted for lB-B RHR pump.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)
• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Train AiChannel I Work Week. 100% power, RCS boron concentration 1031 ppm, Control Bank D is at 220 steps. Maintain current plant conditions.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Q Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only) U Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items) U Current qualification status Q Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs) D Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs) U Wallcdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs) U SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA) Relief Time: Relief Date: Part 3 Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be

        -                                                      reviewed after assuming duties:

U Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station) Q Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week) U Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked) U Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs) Q Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs) Q Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs) TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [01-14-2011]

Scenario I Attachment I Reactivity Briefing Sheet for Runback to 75% Power 1

WBN Administration Of The TI-7.012 I Reactivity Briefing Sheets And Rev. 0004 Reactivity Control Plans Page 21 of 23 Appendix A (Page 1 of 1) Reactivity Control Plan (Example Form) Station: WBN Unit: 1 Cycle: 10 Burnup: 150 MWD/MTU Revision: 0 Preparer: I Reviewer: /

                                   -      Date                           RXE         I     Date App rover:                                          Authorizer:                        I RXES or designee    I     Date                          ops           I    Date RXE support required Onsite? LTYes DNo Describe:             Call out for Ramp Up plan Title of Reactivity Control Plan:     900 MW (7 5%)         Runback Assumptions:       1. Reactor stable at full power prior to runback

2. Calculated volumes below assume Tavg maintained on Tref Major Steps: 1. Runback to 85.

2. Rapid Load Reduction to 75 Detailed

Description:

NOTE: See attached plots.

1. BORATE -369 gal of BA.

2. EXPECT the RIL Lo annunciator to alarm.

3. WHEN the runback is complete and as Tavg allows, THEN WITHDRAW CBD to 189 steps.

4. PLACE control rods in MANUAL for AFD control.

5. DILUTE -1018 gal PW during the Xenon build-in for the first -5 hours following the runback to maintain Tavg near Tref.

6. BORATE the RCS as necessary to maintain Tavg near Tref as Xenon decays to an equilibrium value (732 gal BA).

Critical Parameter Limit Required Action Control Rod Height > RIL Lo If rods < RIL Lo, then ENSURE RCS borated amount specified in Step 1 and WITHDRAW rods. Activated: I Terminated: I SM or US I Date SM or US I Date

Scenario I Attachment 2 E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Appendix A and B Attachments I through 5

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-O

• Uniti Rev.0030 Appendix A (Page 1 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step _Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

1. ENSURE PCBs OPEN: OPEN manually.

• PCB 5084.
• PCB 5088.

2. ENSURE AFW pump operation: ESTABLISH at leastone

• Both MD AFW pumps train AEW operation.

RUNNING.

• TDAFWpump RUNNING.
• LCVs1nAUTO,OR controlled in MANUAL.

3. ENSURE MFW isolation: Manually CLOSE valves AND

• MEW isolation and bypass isolation valves CLOSED. STOP pumps, as necessary.
• MEW reg and bypass reg valves CLOSED. IF any valves can NOT be closed, THEN
• MEP A and B TRIPPED.
• Standby MEP STOPPED. CLOSE #1 heater outlet valves.
• Cond demin pumps TRIPPED.

o Cond booster pumps TRIPPED.

        *    #3 HDT Pumps TRIPPED.
        *    #7 HDT Pumps TRIPPED.

Page 16 of 31

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix A (Page 2 of 9) Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response 1 Response Not Obtained

4. MONITOR ECCS operation:

a. Charging pumps RUNNING. a. Manually START charging pumps.

b. Charging pump alignment: b. ENSURE at least one valve in each set aligned.

e RWST outlets 1-LCV-62-135 and 1-LCV-62-136 OPEN.

• VCT outlets 1-LCV-62-132 and 1-LCV-62-133 CLOSED.
• Charging 1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV-62-91 CLOSED.

c. RHR pumps RUNNING. c. Manually START RHR pumps.

d. SI pumps RUNNING. d. Manually START SI pumps.

e. BIT alignment: e. ENSURE at least one valve aligned, and flow thru BIT.

• Outlets 1-FCV-63-25 and 1-FCV-63-26 OPEN.
• Flow thru BIT.

f. RCS pressure greater f. ENSURE SI pump flow.

than 1650 psig. IF RCS press drops to less than 150 psig, THEN ENSURE RHR pump flow. Page 17 of 31

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix A (Page 3 of 9) Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

5. CHECK cntmt isolation: ACTUATE Phase A and

a. Phase A isolation: Cntmt Vent Isolation signal,

• Train A GREEN. OR
• Train B GREEN.

Manually CLOSE valves and

b. Cntmt vent isolation: dampers as necessary.

• Train A GREEN.
• Train B GREEN.

Page 18 of 31

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix A (Page 4 of 9) Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

6. CHECK cntmt pressure: PERFORM the following:

• Phase B DARK [MISSP]. 1) ENSURE Phase B actuated.
• CntmtSpray DARK [MISSP]. 2) ENSURE Cntmt Spray actuated.
• Cntmt press less than 2.8 psig. 3) ENSURE cntmt spray pumps running.

4) ENSURE cntmt spray flow.

5) ENSURE Phase B isolation:

• Train AGREEN.
• Train B GREEN
• Manually CLOSE valves and dampers as necessary.

6) STOP all RCPs.

7) ENSURE MSIVs and bypasses CLOSED.

8) PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

9) WHEN 10 minutes has elapsed since Phase B actuated, THEN ENSURE air return fans start.

10) USE adverse cntmt [ADV} setpoints where provided.

7. DISPATCH AUO to perform Attachment 1 (E-0), Ice Condenser AHU Breaker Operation.

Page 19 of 31

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix A (Page 5 of 9) Equipment Verification Step _Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

8. CHECK plant radiation NORMAL: NOTIFY Unit Supervisor IMMEDIATELY.

• S/G blowdown rad recorder 1-RR-90-120 NORMAL prior to isolation [M-12].

o Condenser vacuum exhaust rad recorder 1-RR-90-119 NORMAL prior to trip [M-12].

• 1-RR-90-106 and 1-RR-90-112 radiation recorders NORMAL prior to isolation [M-12].
• S/G main steamline discharge monitors NORMAL [M-30].
• Upper and Lower containment high range monitors NORMAL

[M-30].

• NOTIFY Unit Supervisor conditions NORMAL.

9. ENSURE all DIGs RUNNING. EMERGENCY START D/Gs

10. ENSURE ABGTS operation:

a. ABGTS fans RUNNING. a. Manually START fans.

b. ABGTS dampers OPEN: b. Locally OPEN dampers.

• FCO-30-146A.
• FCO-30-146B.
• FCO-30-1 57A.
• FCO-30-157B.

Page2Oof3l

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix A (Page 6 of 9) Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

11. ENSURE at least four ERCW pumps Manually START pumps as necessary.

RUNNING, one on each shutdown board preferred.

12. ENSURE ERCW supply valves IF ERCW can NOT be OPEN to running D/Gs. aligned to running DIG, THEN EMERGENCY STOP affected DIG.

13. ENSURE O-FCV.-67-152, CCS HX C Manually OPEN O-FCV-67-152 ALT DISCH TO HDR B, is open to to position A.

position A.

14. CLOSE O-FCV-67-144, CCS HX C DISCH TO HDR A.

15. MONITOR EGTS operation: Manually START fans

• EGTS fans RUNNING.

AND

• ENSURE dampers OPEN
• VERIFY filter bank dp between 5 OPEN dampers.

and .9 inches of water.

16. ENSURE CCS pumps RUNNING: Manually START pumps as necessary.

• 1A-ACCS pump.
• lB-B CCS pump.
• C-S or 2B-B CCS pump.

17. DISPATCH AUO to shutdown Upper and Lower CNTMT rad monitors USING SOI-90.02.Gaseous Process Radiation Monitors Page 21 of 31

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix A (Page 7 of 9) Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

18. WHEN Attachment 1 is complete (Ice Condenser AHU Breakers OPEN),

THEN ENERGIZE hydrogen igniters [1 -M-1 01:

• 1-HS-268-73 ON.
• 1-HS-268-74 ON.

NOTE The following equipment is located on 1-M-9.

19. CHECK CNTMT PURGE fans STOP fans AND STOPPED.

PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

20. CHECK FUEL HANDLING EXH fans STOP fans AND STOPPED, Fuel and Cask loading dampers CLOSED: PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK, THEN Manually CLOSE dampers.

21. ENSURE AB GEN SUPPLY and STOP fans AND EXH fans STOPPED.

PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK. NOTE Dampers 1-HS-30-158 and 2-HS-30-270 remain open during ABI.

22. ENSURE AB GEN SUP & EXH Manually CLOSE dampers.

dampers CLOSED. Page 22 of3l

• WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-O
• Uniti Rev.0030 Appendix A (Page 8 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step _Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

23. ENSURE MCR & SPREAD RM Manually CLOSE dampers.

FRESH AIR dampers CLOSED:

• FCV-31-3.
• FCV-31-4.

24. ENSURE at least one CB EMER CLEANUP fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• CB EMERG CLEANUP FAN A-A, Manually START fan.

OR

• Fan B-B RUNNING..
• FCO-31-8, OPEN. NOTIFY TSC if at least one damper NOT OPEN.

OR

• FCO-31-7, OPEN

25. ENSURE at least one CB EMER PRESS fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• CB EMERG PRESS FAN A-A, Manually START fan.

OR FAN B-B RUNNING.

• FCO-31-6,OPEN. NOTIFY TSC if at least one damper NOT OPEN.

OR

• FCO-31-5, OPEN.

Page23of3l

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix A (Page 9 of 9) Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

26. ENSURE Control Building fans STOPPED and dampers CLOSED:

• SPREADING ROOM SUPPLY Manually STOP fans AND and EXH FANS AND dampers.
• TOILET & LKR RM EXHAUST if any damper NOT CLOSED FAN AND dampers.

27. INITIATE Appendix B (E-O), Phase B Pipe Break Contingencies.

Page24of3l

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0

• Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix B (Page 1 ofl)

Phase B Pipe Break Contingencies Step _Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

1. CHECK PHASE B actuated. WHEN PHASE B actuation occurs,

[MISSP 1-XX-55-6C, -6D]

                  -                               THEN GO TO step 2.

2. ENSURE 1-FCV-32-11O CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP 1-XX-55-6E}

                -                                 Attachment 2 (E-O).

(A-train, window 13)

3. ENSURE 1-FCV-67-107 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP 1-XX-55-6E]

                -                                 Attachment 3 (E-O).

(A -train, window 43)

4. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-92 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP i-XX-55-6E]

                -                                 Attachment 4 (E-O)

(A -train, window 73)

5. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-140 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP 1-XX-55-6F]

                -                                 Attachment 5 (E-O).

(B -train, window 74) Page 25 of3l

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-O

• Uniti Rev0030 Attachment I (Page 1 ofl)

Ice Condenser AHU Breaker Operation OPEN the following to remove power from ice condenser air handling units AND REPORT completion to UD: BOARD COMPT NOMENCLATURE 480 V Reactor Vent 13D 1-BKR-232-A000/13D ICE COND Board 1 A-A I -AH U-61 -1/4/8/12/16/20/24/28 480 V Reactor Vent 14D 1-BKR-232-A000/14D ICE COND Board 1 A-A 1 -AH U-61 -3/7/11/15/19/23/27 480 V Reactor Vent 13D 1-BKR-232-B000/13D ICE COND Board I B-B 1-AHU-61-2/6/10/14/18/22/26/30 480 V Reactor Vent 14D 1-BKR-232-B000/14D ICE COND Board 1 B-B 1 -Ah U-61 -5/9/13/17/21/25/29 Page 26 of3l

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Attachment 2 (Page 1 ofl) Control Air Isolation A. CLOSE 0-ISV-32-1 013 CONTROL AIR EL 713 AB HDR ISOL [A6/S EL. 713] (chain operated behind Fuel and Waste Handling Bd. A). B. IF 0-ISV-32-1013 CANNOT BE CLOSED, THEN OPEN and DISCONNECT C&SS air compressor breakers:

1. 0-BKR-32-25 [480V SD BD 1A2-A, C/3D]

2. 0-BKR-32-26 [480V SD BD 1B1-B, C/3D]

3. 0-BKR-32-27 [480V AUX BLDG COM BD, C/6C]

4. 0-BKR-32-4900A [480V TURB BLDG COM BD, C/6C]

Page27of3l

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Attachment 3 (Page I of 1) ERCW Isolation UNLOCK AND CLOSE I -ISV-67-523B, LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR 1 B &1 D ERCW SUP ISOL [A2U/692] (U-I penetration room North of AB Pipe Chase Cooler lB-B in overhead) Page 28 of3l

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Attachment 4 (Page 1 ofl) CCS Return Isolation CLOSE 1-ISV-70-700, RCP OIL COOLER CCS RETURN ISOLATION [A4N EL. 710 U-i Penetration Room] (approximately i0ft. North of Penetration Room Cooler lB-B on mezzanine above RHR Sump Valve Room) Page 29 of 31

• WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Attachment 5 (Page 1 ofl)

CCS Supply Isolation CLOSE 1-ISV-70-516, REACTOR BUILDING CCS SUPPLY ISOLATION [A6IT EL. 737] (Behind Elevator approximately 2 ft. west on mezzanine above A CCS Heat Exchanger) Page300f3l

Scenario I Attachment 3 E2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation Attachment I, Isolation of MSIVs and MSIV Bypass Valves

WBN Faulted Steam Generator Isolation E-2

• Unit I Rev. 0012 Attachment I (Page 1 of 4)

Isolation of MSIVs and MSIV Bypass Valves 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS 1.1 Isolation of MSIVs and MSIV Bypass Valves A. IF any MSIV will NOT close, THEN GO TO Section 1.2 (Attachment 1). B. IF any MSIV bypass valve will NOT close, THEN GO TO Section 1.3 (Attachment 1). Page 9 of 12

• WBN Faulted Steam Generator Isolation E-2
• Unitl Rev.0012 Attachment I (Page 2 of 4)

Isolation of MSIVs and MSIV Bypass Valves 1.2 MSIV Isolation A. PLACE affected MSIV transfer control switch in AUX position: [Auxiliary Control Room, Panels 1-L-11A and 1-L-11B] SIG (Circle AUX TRANSFER EQUIPMENT POSmON affected SWITCH SIG) 1 MSIV Loop 1, Train A, 1-FCV-1-4 1-XS-1-4A EJ MSIV Loop 1, Train B, 1-FCV-1-4 l-XS-l-4B D 2 MSIV Loop 2, Train A, 1-FCV-1-1 1 1-XS-1-1 1A D MSIV Loop 2, Train B, 1 -FCV-1 -11 1 -XS-1 -11 B C 3 MSIV Loop 3, Train A, 1-FCV-1-22 1-XS-1-22A C MSIV Loop 3, Train B, 1-FCV-1-22 1-XS-1-22B C 4 MSIV Loop 4, Train A, 1-FCV-1-29 1-XS-1-29A C MSIV Loop 4, Train B, 1-FCV-1-29 1-XS-1 -298 C B. CONSULT UO to verify affected MSIV closed. Page 10 of 12

WBN Faulted Steam Generator Isolation E-2 Uniti Rev 0012 Attachment I (Page 3 of 4) Isolation of MSIVs and MSIV Bypass Valves 1.2 MSIV Isolation (continued) C. IF affected MSIV still open OR Control power fuse removal desired, THEN REMOVE MSIV fuses: (Circle FUSE LOCATION REMOVED affected EQUIPMENT (Two per circuit) SIG) MSIV Loop 1, Train A, 125V Vital Battery Bd 1FCV14 Circuit A-46 lJ B-46 D Circuit MSIV Loop 1, Train B, 125V Vital Battery Bd II 1 FCV1 4 Circuit A-46 D Circuit B-46 MSIV Loop 2, Train A, 125V Vital Battery Bd I 1FCV111 CircuitA-47 E1 Circuit B-47 2 MSIV Loop 2, Train B, 125V Vital Battery Bd II 1FCV111 CircuitA-47 D Circuit B-47 C MSIV Loop 3, Train A, 125V Vital Battery Bd I 1FCV122 Circuit A-48 C Circuit B-48 C 3 MSIV Loop 3, Train B, 125V Vital Battery Bd II 1FCV122 Circuit A-48 C Circuit B-48 C MSIV Loop 4, Train A, 125V Vital Battery Bd I 1FCV129 Circuit A-49 C Circuit B-49 C 4 MSIV Loop 4, Train B, 125V Vital Battery Bd II 1FCV129 Circuit A-49 C Circuit B-49 C D. NOTIFY UO upon completion. Page 11 of 12

WBN Faulted Steam Generator Isolation E-2 Unit I Rev. 0012 Attachment I (Page 4 of 4) Isolation of MSIVs and MSIV Bypass Valves 1.3 MSIV Bypass Isolation A. PLACE HS in OFF for MSIV bypass valves that will NOT close: SIG HS OFF NOMENCLATURE LOCATION POSITION UNID affected SIG) MAIN STEAM ISOL VLV 1 LOOP 1 BYP A3U/737 OFF 1-HS-1-147B WARMING VLV MAIN STEAM ISOL VLV 2 LOOP 2 BYP A4U/757 OFF 1-HS-1-148B LJ WARMING VLV MAIN STEAM ISOL VLV 3 LOOP 3 BYP A5U1757 OFF 1-HS-1-149B D WARMING VLV MAIN STEAM ISOL VLV 4 LOOP 4 BYP A3U1737 OFF 1-HS-1-150B WARMING VLV B. NOTIFY UO upon completion. Page 12 of 12

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-I Facility: Watts Bar December 2011 Scenario No. 2 Op Test No.: 2 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Run Time: 90 minutes Initial Conditions: 100% power, RCS boron concentration 1031 ppm. Control Bank D at 220 steps. FINAL SUBMITTAL Turnover: Train B/Channel II Work Week. I B-B RHR pump is out of service for motor winding inspection. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 1 hour ago. I B-B RHR pump is expected to be returned to service in 12 hours. Protected equipment signs have been posted for lA-A RHR pump. A power reduction to 95% at 2%/mm using AOl-39, Rapid Load Reduction, is required to be performed to remove the I B Condensate Booster pump from service due to an oil leak. Event MaIf. No. Event Type* Event Description No. 1 n/a N-BOP/SRO Reduce power to 95% at 2%/rn in using AOl-39, Rapid Load Reduction. R-RO RO performs power reduction. 2 rx02a 1-RO Loop 1 RCS Cold Leg RTD fails high. TS-SRO 3 rx2O 1-BOP 1-PT-I -33, MAIN STEAM PRESS fails high. 4 rco7a C-RO 1-PCV-68-334, PZR PORV fails open. TS-SRO 5 ccO4 C-BOP A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. rpolc M-ALL Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. sio8g C-BOP ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to si08h manually start each AFW pump. rp55c ms0la M-ALL Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NOTE: DO NOT RUN WITH SCENARIO 1 Appendix D Watts Bar Examination December 2011 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2 Summary [ Initial Condition Turnover 100% power, RCS boron concentration 1031 ppm. Control Bank D at 220 steps. Train B/Channel II Work Week. 1 B-B RHR pump is out of service for motor winding inspection. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 1 hour ago. 1 B-B RHR pump is expected to be returned to service in 12 hours. Protected equipment signs have been posted for lA-A RHR pump. A power reduction to 95% at 2%/mm using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, is required to be performed to remove the 1 B Condensate Booster pump from service due to an oil leak. Event 1 Reduce power to 95% at 2%/rn in using AOl-39, Rapid Load Reduction, to remove the 1 B Condensate Booster pump from service. Event 2 Loop I RCS Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place to place rod control to MANUAL to stop rod motion. Requires entry into AOl-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into multiple Actions of LCO 3.3.1. Event 3 1-PT-i -33, MAIN STEAM PRESS fails high causing 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL to raise MFP speed. Requires the BOP to place 1-PC-46-20 in MANUAL to control speed. Requires entry into AOl-i 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.6, MEW pump speed control circuit failure. Event 4 1-PCV-68-334, PZR PORV fails open. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to attempt to close 1-HS-68-334A and/or to close 1-HS 332A, BLOCK VALVE FOR PORV 334. Requires entry into AOl-i 8, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Section 3.2, PZR Pressure Drop Due to Failed PORV/Safety or Spray Valve. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into LCO 3.4.11. Event 5 A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service is required. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into ER-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Per ER-S.1, the RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AEW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-0, Reactor trip or Safety Injection, and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after ER-Si, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Appendix D Watts Bar Examination December 2011 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2 Critical Task Summary Critical Task I Insert negative reactivity into the core by inserting control rods. Critical Task 2 Isolate the faulted steam generator prior to exiting E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation Appendix D Watts Bar Examination December 2011 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2011-12 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION ENSURE Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 301 by performing the following actions:

a. Select lCManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate lC# 301.

c. Right click on IC# 301.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC 301.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen:

Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value rp55c failure of auto start on turbine driven aux feedpump M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active ]x x hs-74-21a-1 01170 rhrpmp bb suctfrctmtsm(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0ff Off x hs-63-73a-1 01240 hr pmp b-v motor switch(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0ff Off x si08h failure of auto si and blackout signals afwp 1 b-b M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active x hs-74-20a-1 01240 hr pmp b-b motor switch(green) 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0ff Off Page 1 of 4

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2011-12 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value L k rhOl b rhr pump b trip 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active x rpolc manual and automatic reactor trip signal failure (atws) M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active x sio8g failure of auto si and blackout signals afwp 1 a-a M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active k rx02a cold leg 1 rtd I failure M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 54.96 rx20 main steam header pressure transmitter fails to pos pt-I -33 M 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 76.55 ) rc07a przrporvpcv-68-334failtoanypositiion M 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 0 x ccO4 comp cool pipe break inside containment M 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 94.5 0 x ms0la main steam line break inside containment sg #1 M 7 00:00:15 00:02:00 6 0 I rp5lb reactor trip breaker rtb trip M 6 00:00:10 00:00:00 Active InActive ic rp5la reactor trip breaker rta trip M 6 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive

5. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

6. ENSURE 1-HS-74-20A, B RHR PMP (ECCS) is in Stop, Pull-to-Lock position and a Hold Notice (Red) Tag is placed on the handswitch. Place pink PROTECTED EQUIPMENT tag on 1-HS-74-IOA, RHR PMP A (ECCS.

8. -

ENSURE the Train B Week Channel II sign is placed on 1-M-30.

9. Place simulator in FREEZE.

10. ENSURE Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit I Reactivity Briefing Book (Simulator Copy) BOL (Beginning Of Life) is provided to the crew as part of the Turnover Package, and that the BOL placards are on 1-M-6, below the Boric Acid and Primary Water lntegrators.

11. WHEN prompted by the Chief Examiner, place the Simulator in RUN.

Page 2 of 4

Watts Bar NLlclear Plant 2011-12 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No. No. I nla Power reduction to 95% at 2%/mm using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Load Coordinator;, repeat back the information provided. (SRO may contact the SM to make notification.) ROLE PLAY: If contacted as Cnds Demin AUO for notification of pump shutdowns, acknowledge the request. ROLE PLAY: If Contacted as Shift Manager to refer to EPIP-1, acknowledge the request. 2 2 Loop 1 RTD failure ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Maintenance/Work Control, repeat back request for performance of IMI-160. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, repeat back request to have a troubleshooting and repair package made up for Loop I RCS Temperature instrument. 3 3 1-PT-i -33, MAIN STEAM PRESS fails High. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, repeat back request for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1-PT-I-33, MAIN STEAM PRESS. ROLE PLAY: If/when dispatched as the TB AUO, repeat back request to inspect I-PT-I-33 for leaks. Report back that there are no leaks visible. 4 4 1-PCV-68-334 PZR PORV fails open. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work ControI, repeat back request to have power removed from I-FCV-68-332 BLOCK VLV FOR PZR PORV 334 within one hour. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, repeat back request for a troubleshooting and repair package for I-PCV-68-334 PZR PORV. Page 3 of 4

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2011-12 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam SimuIato Event Event DescriptionlRole Play No. No. 5 5 CCS RCP Oil Cooler Leak/Reactor fails to trip (ATWS)/Loop I SLB Inside Containment. ROLE PLAY: If contacted as Aux Bldg AUO to check for leakage in the CCS, state that there is no leakage indicated in the Aux Building. ROLE PLAY: If contacted as Aux Bldg AUO to check lB CCP for start, state it checks Normal locally and is ready for start. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Control Building AUO, repeat back request to open the reactor trip breakers and MG set output breakers locally. AFTER 3 minutes, delete malfunction rpOlc, and enter Event 6, which will open the reactor trip breakers. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Turbine Building AUO, repeat back request to open breakers to the MG sets. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Shift Manager to refer to EPIP-l in FRS.1 at step 11, acknowledge the request and ENTER Simulator Event 7 (msOla, main steam line break inside containment sg #1). ROLE PLAY: When contacted as AUO to perform Attachment I of E-O, acknowledge the request and report complete. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, repeat back request to shutdown sample pumps for l-RM-90-106 and l-RMO-90-112. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Chemistry, repeat back request for SG samples for activity. Page4of4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # I Page 1 of 47 Event

Description:

Reduce power to 95% at 2%/mm using AOl-39, Rapid Load Reduction. FINAL SUBMITTAL Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior AOI-39 The following actions are taken from AOl-39, Rapid Load Reduction. CAUTION Over boration may result in excessive rod withdrawal, T-avg lower than desired, and AFD oscillations. NOTE

• Rod Control should remain in automatic for T-avg Control
• Reactivity Briefing Sheet, Thumb Rules (page 3), lists boration flows and volumes for different reduction rates.
• Effect of boration will lag behind turbine load reduction and can be compensated for by temporarily increasing boric acid flow rate above recommended rate.

1. INITIATE a manual boration:

a. DETERMINE recommended boration flow rate and volume from Reactivity Briefing Sheet:

b. INITIATE normal boration:

1) ADJUST BA flow controller, 1 -FC-62-1 39, to desired flow rate.

RO adjusts 1-Fl-62-139, BA TO BLENDER FCV-62-140 CONTROL to approximately 78%, which corresponds to RO approximately 31 gpm.

2) ADJUST BA batch counter 1-FQ-62-139 to required quantity.

RO sets the batch counter to 000160 to add 160 gallons of boron, based on the Reactivity Briefing Book, Thumb Rule values.

3) PLACE mode selector 1-HS-62-140B to BOR.

4) (p) PLACE VCT makeup control 1-HS-62-140A, to START.

5) VERIFY desired boric acid flow indicated on 1-Fl-62-139.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 2 of 47 Event

Description:

Reduce power to 95% at 2%/mm using AOl-39, Rapid Load Reduction. FINAL SUBMITTAL Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION

• Condenser Backpressure limits are on page 5.
• TURBINE MANUAL Operation requires continuous operator monitoring and control.
• LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM may be made worse if steam dumps are actuated. AOl 11 requires T-ave and T-ref be maintained within 3°F.

NOTE If the initiating condition is corrected, the power reduction may be terminated

2. ESTABLISH a turbine load reduction rate less than or equal to 5%/mm:

a. PLACE turbine in IMP IN BOP depressed the IMP IN pushbutton and observes the transfer from IMP OUT to IMP IN control complete.

b. SET a desired load in the SETTER with the REFERENCE CONTROL.

BOP depresses the reference control V (down) button to BOP reduce the setter display to less than 95% load as directed by the SRO.

c. SET the LOAD RATE at less than or equal to 5%/rn in.

BOP selects the load reduction rate directed by the SRO using the LOAD RATE % PER MIN thumbwheel selector. It is expected that a load reduction rate of 2%/minute will be used.

d. (p) DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

BOP depresses the REFERENCE CONTROL GO button. NOTE AFD green target band can be monitored using ICS Turn On code DOGHOUSE.

3. MONITOR rod position:

RO

• Rods above Lo-Lo insertion limit
• AFD within Target Band 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 3 of 47 Event

Description:

Reduce power to 95% at 2%/mm using AOl-39, Rapid Load Reduction. FINAL SUBMITTAL Time Position II Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart SRO SRO may request Shift Manager to Refer to EPIP-1 Console Operator will acknowledge the request.

5. NOTIFY the Load Coordinator of the required load reduction and expected ramp rate.

SRO When the SRO contacts Load Coordinator, the Console Operator will repeat back the information provided. SRO may contact the Shift Manager to make the notifications. NOTE If reactor power is stabilized at a lower level a drop in T-avg will occur due to Xenon build up. Dilution may be required to maintain power level.

6. MONITOR T-avg and T-ref:

RO

• T-ave trending to T-ref.
• Mismatch less than 5°F.

7. CHECK rate of power reduction is rapid enough for existing plant SRO conditions.

8. NOTIFY Cnds Demin AUO of impending pmp shutdowns.

BOP When Cnds Demin AUO is notified of impending pump shutdowns, Console Operator will acknowledge the request.

9. WHEN rated thermal power change exceeds 15% in one hour, SRO THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate 1-Sl-68-28.

EXAMINER: At the Chief Examiners discretion after power has been dropped to 95%, cue the Console Operator to enter Event 2. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 4 of 47 Event

Description:

Loop 1 RCS Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place to place rod control to MANUAL to stop rod motion. FINAL Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires a SUBMITTAL Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications: Loop 1 Tavg Indicator 1-TI-68-2E [M-5] indicates high. 93-A RCS LOOP iT DEVIATION 94-A TAVG-TREF DEVIATION 94-B TAVG-T AUCT DEVIATION 90-F EAGLE PROC PROT CHANNEL I RTD FAILURE 110-F PROT SET TROUBLE 123-C OVERTEMP T TRIP ALERT 123-D OVERTEMP tT TURB RUNBACK & C-3 ROD BLOCK Will perform IMMEDIATE ACTION step of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod Bank RO Movement, to PLACE control rods in MANUAL and to CHECK control rod movement has stopped. May enter and perform initial actions of ARI-94-A, TAVG-TREF RO DEVIATION, and refer to AC 1-2. Enters and directs actions of AOl-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control SRO System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod Bank Movement. The following steps are the first 4 steps from ARI 94-A, TAVG ARI 94-A TREF DEVIATION. RO [1] CHECK Loop Tavg on 1-Tl-68-2E, -25E, -44E, and -67E [1-M-5]. [2] IF Tavg is less than or equal to 561°F, THEN PERFORM 1-SI-RO 68-34 within 30 minutes. RO [3] CHECK Tref & Auct Tavg recorder 1 -TR-68-2B [1 -M-5]. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 5 of 47 Event

Description:

Loop 1 RCS Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place to place rod control to MANUAL to stop rod motion. FINAL Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires a SUBMITTAL Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior [4] IF control rods are in AUTO, THEN: [4.1] PLACE control rods in MANUAL AND RESTORE Tavg to RO Tref using rods OR ADJUST turbine load to match Tavg with Tref. [4.2] REFER TO AOl-2. The following actions are taken from AOI-2, Malfunction of AOI-2 Reactor Control System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod Bank Movement. NOTE Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step

1. STOP uncontrolled rod motion:

a. PLACE control rods in MAN.

RO b. CHECK control rod movement STOPPED. Since these are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps, the actions have already been taken. EXAMINER: AOl-2, Attachment I is included in the scenario as Attachment I.

2. MAINTAIN T-ave on PROGRAM. (Reference Attachment 1)

(p) USE control rods. RO OR

                                  * (p) ADJUST turbine load.

RO 3. CHECK loop T-ave channels NORMAL. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: 2 Scenano# 2 Event# 2 Page 6 of 47 Event

Description:

Loop 1 RCS Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place to place rod control to MANUAL to stop rod motion. FINAL Requires entry into AOl-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires a SUBMITTAL Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

DEFEAT failed channels: RD a. PLACE 1-XS-68-2D, T CHANNEL DEFEAT, to failed channel position, AND PULL. RO will rotate I-XS-68-2D to the LOOP I position and then pull out the selector switch. EXAMINER: The next switch manipulation will result in the following alarm sequence: 94-A TAVG-TREF DEVIATION Alarm Clears-94-B TAVG-T AUCT DEVIATION Alarm Clears and then reflashes

b. PLACE 1-XS-68-2M, TAVG CHANNEL DEFEAT, in failed channel position AND PULL.

RO will rotate 1-XS-68-2M to the LOOP I position and then pull out the selector switch. ENSURE TR-68-2A placed to a Loop with operable LiT/OTIiT/OPIiT channels using 1-XS-68-2B. RD Since I-XS-68-2B is selected to LOOP 1, the RO will select any other ioop as input to the recorder. NOTIFY Maintenance to implement lMI-160 for failed channel. SRO will contact Maintenance/Work Control and request performance of lMl-160. Console Operator will repeat back request. (Continued_Next_Page) 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 7 of 47 Event

Description:

Loop I RCS Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place to place rod control to MANUAL to stop rod motion. FINAL Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires a SUBMITTAL Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED: (Contd)

WHEN at least 5 minutes have elapsed since failed T-ave channel is defeated AND auto rod control desired, THEN

a. ENSURE T-ave and T-ref within 1°F.

RO observes T-avg and T-ref within I F on 1-TR-68-2B, TREF & AUCT TAVG °F. -

b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication RO

[1 -M-4j. RO observes that there is a zero demand indicated on the PASSIVE SUMMER ROD DEMAND on both CERPI displays.

c. PLACE rods in AUTO.

RO rotates I-RBSS from the MANUAL position to the right to the AUTO position.

4. CHECK Auct T-avg NORMAL on 1-TR-68-2B.

RO After Step 3 is performed and the failed channel is defeated Auct Tavg will indicate NORMAL on 1-TR-68-2B.

5. CHECK NIS power range channels NORMAL.

RO RO observes all NIS channels are indicating the same values and are NORMAL.

6. CHECK the following:

• Turbine impulse pressure channel 1-PI-1-73, NORMAL.

BOP observes that 1-Pl-I-73, % HP TURBINE POWER TR A is matched with I-P1-1-72, % HP TURBINE POWER TR B and both RO are NORMAL.

• T-ref and Auct T-avg NORMAL on 1 -TR-68-2B (Reference Attachment 1).

After failed loop AT and loop T-avg channels have been defeated in Step 3 RNO, Tref and Auct Tavg are NORMAL. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 8 of 47 Event

Description:

Loop 1 RCS Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place to place rod control to MANUAL to stop rod motion. FINAL Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires a SUBMITTAL Tech Spec evaluation. Time 0 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. MONITOR core power distribution parameters:

• Power range channels
• 1 Flux Indicators SRO *T-ave
• Loop liT
• Incore TCs
• Feed flow/Steam flow

8. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back request to have a troubleshooting and repair package made up for Loop I RCS Temperature instrument. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 9 of 47 Event

Description:

Loop 1 RCS Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place to place rod control to MANUAL to stop rod motion. FINAL Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires a SUBMITTAL Tech Spec evaluation. Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. REFER TO Tech Specs:

                                 . 3.1.1, Shutdown Margin Not applicable.
                                 . 3.1.5, Rod Group Alignment Limits Not applicable.
                                 . 3.1.6, Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits Not applicable.
                                 . 3.1 .7, Control Bank Insertion Limits Not applicable.
                                 . 3.2.1, Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor Not applicable.
                                 . 3.2.2, Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor Not      -

applicable.

                                 . 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio Not applicable.
                                  . 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference Not applicable.

• 3.3.1-1, Rx Trip System (RTS)

SRO Function 6. Overtemperature uT Condition W. Place channel in trip within 72 hours OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours. Function 7. Overpower uT Condition W. Place channel in trip within 72 hours OR reduce THERMAL POWER to <P-7. SG level trip LCO is not applicable, since Loop I does not input into the TTD circuitry.

• 3.3.2-1, ESFAS Instrumentation.

AFW pump start logic LCO is not applicable, since Loop I does not input into the TTD circuitry.

10. NOTIFY Chemistry of any reactor power changes greater than 15% in one hour.

SRO Power change has not exceeded 15%, so this step is not applicable. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 10 of 47 Event

Description:

Loop 1 RCS Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires the RD to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place to place rod control to MANUAL to stop rod motion. FINAL Requires entry into AOl-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires a SUBMITTAL Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

11. WHEN ready to restore repaired liT and loop T-avg channels, THEN:

• PUSH IN 1-XS-68-2D, liT CHANNEL DEFEAT and SELECT from all channels.

R AWAY

• PUSH IN 1-XS-68-2M, TAVG CHANNEL DEFEAT, and SELECT AWAY from all channels.

SRO determines that the conditions of this step are not met and continues to the next step. CAUTION Allowing at least 5 minutes between any rod control input change (i.e., T-ave, T-ref, or NIS) and placing rods in AUTO, will help prevent undesired control rod movement. EXAMINER: Step 12 actions are provided if the applicants did NOT return rods to automatic during the performance of Step 3 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED actions.

12. WHEN auto rod control desired, THEN:

a. ENSURE T-ave and T-ref within 1°F.

RO withdraws control rods in MANUAL to match T-avg and T-ref within I F.

b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication

[1 -M-4]. SRO RO observes that there is a zero demand indicated on the PASSIVE SUMMER ROD DEMAND on both CERPI displays.

c. PLACE rods in AUTO.

RO rotates I-RBSS from the MANUAL position to the right to the AUTO position. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: 2 Scenario# 2 Event# 2 Page 11 of 47 Event

Description:

Loop 1 RCS Cold Leg RTD fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place to place rod control to MANUAL to stop rod motion. FINAL Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Requires a SUBMITTAL Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

13. WHEN conditions allow auto PZR level control, THEN ENSURE PZR level returned to normal program, AND PLACE 1-FCV 93inAUTO.

SRO If action was taken earlier to take manual control of PZR level, the RO will place 1-HIC-62-93A in AUTO after verifying level has been returned to program. SRO 14. RETURN TO Instruction in effect. EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 3, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner. Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event. Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief. Operations Management Typically Shift Manager. SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager). If not already cued, Console Operator will check with Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 3. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 12 of 47 Event

Description:

1-PT-i -33, MAIN STEAM PRESS fails high causing i-PC-46-20, MFPT A & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL to raise MFP speed. Requires the BOP to place 1-FINAL PC-46-20 in MANUAL to control speed. Requires entry into AOl-16, Loss of SUBMITTAL Normal Feedwater, Sub section 3.6, MFW pump speed control circuit failure. j Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications: 57-B, #1 HEATERS FW SUPPLY PRESS HI 63-F SG LEVEL DEVIATION Diagnoses and announces the failure of 1-PT-i -33, MAIN STEAM BOP PRESS high. May enter and take actions of ARI 57-B, #1 HEATERS FW BOP SUPPLY PRESS HI. GOP May enter and take actions of ARI 63-F SG LEVEL DEVIATION. Enters and directs actions of AOl-i 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, SRO Section 3.6, MFW pump speed control circuit failure. The following actions are taken from AOl-I 6, Loss of Normal AOI-16 Feedwater, Section 3.6, MFW pump speed control circuit failure.

1. CONTROL MFP speed using MANUAL control of master controller or individual controller(s) as required.

BOP BOP places 1-PC-46-20, MFPTA & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL by lifting the toggle switch from the AUTO position, and then move to the left to lower MFP IA and lB speed

2. PLACE control rods in MANUAL.

RO SRO directs the RO to place 1-RBSS ROD BANK SELECT in MANUAL.

3. CHECK MFW pumps recirc valves CLOSED.

BOP BOP checks I-F1C-3-70 MFWP A RECIRC CONTROL and I-FIC 3-84 MFWP B RECIRC CONTROL CLOSED by observing valve position demand indications. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 13 of 47 Event

Description:

1-PT-I -33, MAIN STEAM PRESS fails high causing 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL to raise MFP speed. Requires the BOP to place 1-FINAL PC-46-20 in MANUAL to control speed. Requires entry into Aol-i 6, Loss of SUBMITTAL Normal Feedwater, Sub section 3.6, MFW pump speed control circuit failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. (p) ENSURE T-avg and T-ref within 3°.

RO RO observes Tref-Auct Tavg on 1-TR-68-2B and determines that Auct T-avg and T-ref are within 3°F.

5. MAINTAIN MFWP discharge press on PROGRAM.

BOP BOP may adjust 1-PC-46-20, MFPTA & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL in MANUAL to return MFWP discharge pressure to program (1-FC-46-20 provides program.)

6. ENSURE SIG levels return to PROGRAM.

BOP BOP observes SG I through SG 4 levels on I-M-4 instruments and determines that levels are returning to normal.

7. CHECK steam dump mode in TAVG position.

BOP BOP determines that 1-HS-103D STEAM DUMP MODE handswitch is in the TAVG position.

8. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

BOP When SRO contacts Work ControI the Console Operator repeats back the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1-PT-1-33, MAIN STEAM PRESS.

9. WHEN auto rod control desired, THEN:

a. ENSURE T-ave and T-ref within 1 °F.

RO observes T-avg and T-ref within I CF on I-TR-68-2B, TREF & AUCT TAVG °F. -

b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication [i-M-4].

RO RO observes that there is a zero demand indicated on the PASSIVE SUMMER ROD DEMAND on both CERPI displays.

c. PLACE rods in AUTO.

RO rotates I-RBSS from the MANUAL position to the right to the AUTO position. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 14 of 47 Event

Description:

1-PT-1-33, MAIN STEAM PRESS fails high causing 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A & B MASTER SPEED CONTROL to raise MFP speed. Requires the BOP to place 1-FINAL PC-46-20 in MANUAL to control speed. Requires entry into AOl-i 6, Loss of SUBMITTAL Normal Feedwater, Sub section 3.6, MFW pump speed control circuit failure. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior j

10. WHEN MFP pump control repairs completed, THEN PLACE MFP speed control in AUTO.

BOP SRO determines that repairs will not be completed and directs the BOP to maintain 1-PC-46-20 in MANUAL.

11. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

SRO SRO determines that the procedure section will remain open until repairs are complete. EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 4, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner. Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event.

                           . Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

Operations Management Typically Shift Manager. SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager). If not already cued, Console Operator will check with Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 4. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 15 of 47 Event

Description:

1-PCV-68-334, PZR PORV to open. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to attempt to close 1-HS-68-334A and/or to close 1-HS 332A, BLOCK VALVE FOR PORV 334. Requires entry into AOl-18, Malfunction FINAL of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Section 3.2, PZR Pressure Drop Due SUBMITTAL to Failed PORV/Safety or Spray Valve. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation. Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications: 91-A PZR PORV/SAFETY OPEN 90-B PZR PRESS LO DEVN BACKUP HTRS ON Diagnoses and announces the failure open of 1 -PCV-68-334, PZR RO PORV. Performs IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS of AOl-I 8, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Section 3.2, RO PZR pressure drop due to failed PORV/Safety or spray valve. RO CLOSES 1-HS-68-332A BLOCK VALVE FOR PORV 334. Enters and directs actions of AOl-I 8, Malfunction of Pressurizer SRO Pressure Control System, Sub section 3.2, PZR pressure drop due to failed PORV/Safety or spray valve. The following actions are taken from AOl-I 8, Malfunction Of AOI-18 Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Section 3.2, PZR pressure drop due to failed PORV/Safety or spray valve. NOTE Step 1 and 2 are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps

1. CHECK PZR spray valves CLOSED:

• Green indicating lights LIT RO observes GREEN light LIT on 1-XI-68-340D. PZR SPRAY LOOP I and I-XI-68-334B, PZR SPRAY LOOP 2.

RO

• Pzr spray demand meters, 1-PIC-68-334B and 1 -PIC-68-334D indicating ZERO [1 -M-4j RO observes position indications for I-PIC-68-334D, PZR SPRAY LOOP 1, and I-PIC-68-334B, PZR SPRAYLOOP 2.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 16 of 47 Event

Description:

1-PCV-68-334, PZR PORV to open. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to attempt to close 1 -HS-68-334A and/or to close 1 -HS 332A, BLOCK VALVE FOR PORV 334. Requires entry into AOI-18, Malfunction FINAL of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Section 3.2, PZR Pressure Drop Due SUBMITTAL to Failed PORV/Safety or Spray Valve. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

• PORV indicating lights RO observes 1-HS-68-334A RED indicating light is LIT, GREEN indicating light is DARK.
• tailpipe temperature RO RO observes elevated temperature on 1-Tl-68-331, PORV 340A &

334 TAILPIPE TEMP. acoustic monitoring BOP.may be sent to observe 1-XI-68-363, PZR VALVES ACOUSTIC MONITOR. If dispatched the BOP observes 1-XI 334 indicating lights are LIT.

2. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF PZR press is less than 2335, THEN CLOSE PORV OR CLOSE associated block valve. RO Since this is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step, it is expected that 1-HS-68-334A may be in the CLOSE position AND 1-HS-68-332A will be in the CLOSED position.

3. VERIFY actions taken in Steps 1 and 2 have STOPPED press drop.

RO RO observes RCS pressure on 1-PI-68-340A, 1-PI-68-334, 1-PI-68-323, 1-P1-68-322, PZR PRESS rising.

4. CHECK PZR Safeties CLOSED:

tailpipe temperatures RO RO observes elevated temperature on 1-TI-68-331, PORV34OA & 334 TAILPIPE TEMP.

• acoustic monitor BOP BOP may be sent to observe 1-Xl-68-363, PZR VALVES ACOUSTIC MONITOR. If dispatched, the BOP observes 1-XI 334 indicating lights are LIT.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 17 of 47 Event

Description:

1-PCV-68-334, PZR PORV to open. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to attempt to close 1 -HS-68-334A and/or to close 1 -HS 332A, BLOCK VALVE FOR PORV 334. Requires entry into Aol-i 8, Malfunction FINAL of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Section 3.2, PZR Pressure Drop Due SUBMITTAL to Failed PORV/Safety or Spray Valve. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. ENSURE PZR heaters on as required:

RD

• Control Group on at 2220 psig
• Backup Groups on at 2210 psig

6. CHECK aux spray, 1.-FCV-62-84, CLOSED.

RD RO observes handswitch 1-HS-62-84, AUX SPRAY TO PZR, in the CLOSED position with the RED indicating light DARK and the GREEN indicating light LIT.

7. CHECK PZR press STABLE or RISING.

RD RO observes RCS pressure on 1-Pl-68-340A, 1-Pl-68-334, 1-PI-68-323, 1-Pl-68-322, PZR PRESS rising.

8. WHEN pressurizer pressure stable and equipment status supports returned to normal, THEN ENSURE the following in AUTO:

RD

• PZR Master controller
• PZR spray controllers
• All heater groups 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: 2 Scenario# 2 Event# 4 Page 18 of 47 Event

Description:

i-PCV-68-334, PZR PORV to open. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to attempt to close 1 -HS-68-334A and/or to close I -HS 332A, BLOCK VALVE FOR PORV 334. Requires entry into Aol-i 8, Malfunction FINAL of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Section 3.2, PZR Pressure Drop Due SUBMITTAL to Failed PORV/Safety or Spray Valve. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation. Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

• 3.3.1, RTS Instrumentation Not applicable
• 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation Not applicable

• 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System Not applicable
• 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits May be applicable, depending upon severity of pressure drop when the PORV opened.
• 3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits Not SRO applicable
• 3.4.9, Pressurizer Not applicable
• 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves Not applicable
• 3.4.1 1, Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valves Condition B. One PORV inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled.

Close associated block valve within 1 hour. AND Remove power from associated block valve within 1 hour AND Restore PORV to OPERABLE status within 72 hours.

10. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

When SRO contacts Work control to have power removed from SRO 1-FCV-68-332A BLOCK VLVFOR PZR PORV 334, and for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1-PCV-68-334, repeat back request. SRO 11. RETURN TO Instruction in effect. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2J Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 19 of 47 Event

Description:

1-PCV-68-334, PZR PORV to open. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to attempt to close I -HS-68-334A and/or to close 1 -HS 332A, BLOCK VALVE FOR PORV 334. Requires entry into AOI-18, Malfunction FINAL of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Section 3.2, PZR Pressure Drop Due SUBMITTAL to Failed PORV/Safety or Spray Valve. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 5, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner. Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event. Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief. Operations Management Typically Shift Manager. SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager). If not already cued, Console Operator will check with Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 5. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 20 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-0, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.1, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time N Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications: 237-C RCP 1 OIL CLRS RET FLOW LO 238-C RCP 2 OIL CLRS RET FLOW LO 239-C RCP 3 OIL CLRS RET FLOW LO 240-C RCP 4 OIL CLRS RET FLOW LO BOP Diagnoses and announces the leak on the RCP oil cooler line. May enter and take actions of ARI 237(238, 239, 240)-C RCP 1 BOP (2, 3, 4) OIL CLRS RET FLOW LO. Enters and directs actions of Aol-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling SRO Water (CCS). The following actions are taken from ARI 237-C RCP I OIL CLRS ARI 237-C RET FLOW LO. BOP [1] IF Phase B initiated, THEN GO TO Emergency Instructions. [2] CHECK the following [0-M-27B], AND COMPARE with other RCPs: BOP

• i-FI-70-1 16, RCP 1 UPR OIL CLR FLOW
• i-FI-70-l 19, RCP 1 LWR OIL CLR FLOW

[3] ENSURE CCS isolation valves OPEN:

• 1-FCV-70-100 and -140, RCP OIL CLRS SUP CIV0B
• l-FCV-70-89 and -92, RCP OIL CLRS RET CIVØB 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 21 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power GenerationlATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-Q, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.1, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL GenerationfATWS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior [4] CHECK 1-PI-70-24A, CCS HX A SUP PRESS [0-M-27B], AND BOP START CCS Pumps as necessary to maintain press between 40 and 108 psig. [5] IF flow NOT restored, THEN: [5.1] MONITOR RCP temps on computer. [5.2] IF bearing temp greater than or equal to195°F, THEN GO TO AOI-24, RCP MALFUNCTIONS DURING PUMP BOP OPERATION. [5.3] REFER TO AOl-i 5, LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCS). [5.4] ADJUST 1 -THV-70-695A or 1 -THV-70-696A per TI-31 .08, FLOW BALANCING VALVES SETPOINTS. The following actions are taken from AOl-I 5, Loss of AOI-15 Component Cooling Water (CCS), Section 3.2, Loss of CCS Flow.

1. CHECK CCS pumps status:

a. CHECK any CCS pump TRIPPED or running pump NOT pumping forward:

• ERCW/CCS Motor tripout alarm, BOP
• Low header pressure (Train A or B),
• Multiple low flow alarms.

BOP observes and reports that the proper CCS pumps are in service and pumping forward. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 22 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (A]WS). Requires entry into FR-Si, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop I inside containment. Requires performance of E-O, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-Si, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED: SRO

a. GO TO CAUTION prior to Step 2.

CAUTION A closed Surge Tank vent valve may cause a positive or negative tank pressure, giving an erroneous level indication.

2. CHECK 1-FCV-70-66, UI Surge Tank Vent, OPEN.

BOP BOP observes handswitch I-HS-70-66A, UI SURGE TANK VENT, RED indicating light is LIT and the GREEN indicating light is DARK.

3. IF Surge Tank level less than 57%, THEN ENSURE 1-LCV-70-63, Ui Surge Tank Makeup LCV, OPEN (Refer to 50 1-70.01 as required if makeup NOT available).

BOP BOP observes handswitch I-HS-70-63A, UI SURGE TANK MAKEUP, RED indicating light is LIT and the GREEN indicating light is DARK. BOP 4. MONITOR A and B side Surge Tank levels greater than 10%.

5. IF RHR Shutdown Cooling is inservice, THEN **

GO TO AOl-i 4, BOP Loss of RHR Shutdown Cooling. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

[ Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 23 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into Aol-I 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATNS). Requires entry into FR-S.i, Nuclear Power Generation/AT\NS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop I inside containment. Requires performance of E-O, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.i, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. [Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. MONITOR the following for Unit 1 CCS Train A:

• U-i CCS Train A level
• ERCW flowto CCS HXA BOP IF loss of either is imminent, THEN PERFORM the following:

SRO determines that although surge tank level is dropping, level loss is NOT IMMINENT and continues to the RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED column.

6. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP GO TO Step 7.

7. MONITOR the following for Unit 1 CCS Train B:

U-i CCS Train B level

• ERCWfIowtoCCS HXC IF loss of either is imminent, THEN STOP and LOCKOUT the following Train B equipment:
• CCS pumps C-S & 2B-B, BOP
• CS pump lB-B,
• RHR pump lB-B,

                                   *Sl pump lB-B,

• CCP lB-B.

SRO determines that Train B surge tank level loss is NOT IMMINENT and continues without stopping pumps. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 24 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCP5 from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-0, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.1, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. CHECK all RCP upper and lower oil cooler flows NORMAL:

Upper cooler flow: 150 220 gpm. BOP

• Lower cooler flow: 5 - 10 gpm.

BOP observes upper and lower oil cooler flows and determines that all flows are low.

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF oil cooler flow abnormally high or low indicating possible line break, THEN:

a. CLOSE RCP oil cooler isol valves:

• 1-FCV-70-l00 or 1-FCV-70-140, RCP Oil Coolers Supply CIV.

BOP BOP places at least 1-HS-70-IOOA, RCP OIL CLRS SUP CIV B OR 1-HS-70-140A, RCP OIL CLRS SUP CIV qB in the CLOSED position.

• 1-FCV-70-89 or 1-FCV-70-92, RCP Oil Coolers Return CIV.

BOP places at least 1-HS-70-89A, RCP OIL CLRS RET CIV çB OR 1-HS-70-92A, RCP OIL CLRS RET CIV in the CLOSED position. EXAMINER: Enter time flow to oil coolers terminated: CAUTION RCPs can be operated for up to 10 minutes after loss of CCS flow. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 25 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into Aol-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATNS). Requires entry into FR-SI, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop i inside containment. Requires performance of E-O, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.i, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED: (Continued.)

b. TRIP Reactor.

When the reactor trip is attempted, the trip is unsuccessful from both 1-RT-1 REACTOR TRIP (1-M-4) and 1-RT-2 REACTOR TRIP (1-M-6). 2011-12 Wafts Bar NRC Examination

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 26 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-O, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-Si, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the applicants initiate a reactor trip, the trip fails. This FR-S.1 requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power GerierationlATWS. NOTE

  . Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS.
  . Status Trees I SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

Performs IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. Attempts to manually RD trip the reactor from 1 -M-4 and 1 -M-6. When actions are unsuccessful, the RD begins to insert the control rods. Performs IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS. Manually trips the BOP turbine from 1 -M-2. CAUTION RCPs should not be tripped UNTIL reactor power is less than 5%. EXAMINER: Enter time RCPs removed from service: NOTE Steps 1 and 2 are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 27 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-O, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.i, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: When the Console Operator receives the communication from the RO dispatching personnel to open the reactor trip breakers locally OR to open the MG set supply breakers, the Console Operator will wait 3 minutes, then will remove malfunction rpOlc to clear the ATWS, and enter malfunctions rp5la and rp5lb to open the reactor trip breakers. Critical Task I Insert negative reactivity into the core by inserting control rods. Critical 1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED: Task I Manually TRIP reactor. IF reactor will NOT trip, THEN INSERT control rods. RO observes rods inserting at 72 steps per minute in RO AUTOMATIC. When the rod speed slows to 48 steps per minute, the RO transfers from AUTO to MAN on 1-RBSS, ROD BANK SELECT. After selecting MAN, the RO inserts rods at 48 steps per minute by holding I-FLRM, ROD MOTION CONTROL to the IN position.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

BOP

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

3. CHECK AFW pumps operation:

a. Both MD AFW pumps RUNNING.

BOP

b. TD AFW pump RUNNING.

c. LCVs in AUTO or controlled in MANUAL.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 28 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into Aol-I 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop I inside containment. Requires performance of E-O, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.l, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP Manually START pumps and open valves as necessary.

4. INITIATE RCS Boration:

a. ENSURE at least one centrifugal charging pump RUNNING.

b. OPEN RWST outlet valves 1-LCV-62-135 and l-LCV-62-136.

c. CLOSE VCT outlet valves 1 -LCV-62-l 32 and I -LCV-62-1 33.

BOP d. OPEN BIT outlet valves l-FCV-63-25 and 1-FCV-63-26.

e. CHECK BIT flow.

f. PLACE BA pumps in FAST speed.

g. Throttle OPEN emergency borate valve 1-FCV-62-138 to maintain boric acid flow greater than 35 gpm.

BOP 5. CHECK pzr pressure less than 2335 psig.

6. VERIFY Cntmt Vent Isolation:

SRO *TrainAGREEN.

• Train B GREEN.

6. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PERFORM the following:

a. ENSURE containment purge supply and exhaust fans STOPPED. [M-9]

BOP Since purge was not in service, the containment purge supply and exhaust fans all be found in the STOP, PULL-TO-LOCK position.

b. CLOSE dampers. [M-9j 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 29 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-0, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.1, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. IF AFW flow established, THEN BOP a. PLACE 1-HS-3-45 to LONG CYCLE RECIRC.

b. PLACE MEW Bypass Reg Valves in AUTO.

8. IF SI actuated OR required, THEN PERFORM Steps 1 through 6 of SRO E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, as time allows.

9. ENSURE the following trips:

RO

a. Reactor Trip.

9.a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a. DISPATCH operator to locally trip reactor:

RO

• OPEN reactor trip breakers and MG set output breakers [MG set room].
• OPEN breakers to MG sets [480V unit boards A and B].

BOP b. Turbine Trip. RO 10. MAINTAIN rod insertion UNTIL rods fully inserted. EXAMINER: Console Operator will enter the Steam Line break at this time when contacted as Shift Manager to REFER to EPIP-1 in the next step. ii. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart for ATWS event. SRO When contacted as Shift Manager to refer to EPIP-1, Console operator will acknowledge the request and also insert the Steam Line break at this time. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 30 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into Aol-IS, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-0, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.1, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/AIWS, allows performance. Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. MONITOR reactor subcriticality:

a. CHECK Power range channels less than 5%.

RD

b. CHECK Intermediate range startup rate NEGATIVE.

c. GOTO Step 21.

EXAMINER: When the crew diagnoses the Steam Line break, they may perform the following actions while continuing FR-S.1:

        . Initiate Safety Injection
        . Close the MSIVs

21. TERMINATE emergency boration:

a. PLACE BA transfer pumps in SLOW speed.

RD b. CLOSE emergency borate valve 1-FCV-62-138.

c. IF alternate boration opened, THEN Locally CLOSE I -ISV-62-929.

NOTE If the reactor is verified to be subcritical, Status Trees may be implemented for other Red or Orange paths SRO 22. IMPLEMENT other Red or Orange paths identified on Status Trees SRO 23. IF SI actuated, THEN RETURN TO Instruction in effect. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 31 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into Aol-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.i, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCP5 are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-O, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-Si, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time j Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I The following actions are taken from E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. NOTE Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS. Status Trees I SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR A GREEN indicating light LIT on panel 1-M-4. RO checks l-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR B GREEN indicating light LIT on panel 1-M-4. RO checks 1-52BYA, BYPASS BKR A lights DARK. RO checks 1-52BYB, BYPASS BKR B lights DARK. RO

• RPIs at bottom of scale.

RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor I and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 for indication that all SHUTDOWN and CONTROL bank rods are inserted.

• Neutron flux DROPPING.

RO observes neutron flux trending down on 1-NR-92-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER. May also observe levels decreasing on 1-Nl-92-135A, CH I NEUTRON MON % PWR and 1-Nl-92-136A, CH II NEUTRON MON % PWR. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 32 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactorfailsto trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.i, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop I inside containment. Requires performance of E-O, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.l, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

RO RO observes that indicating lights on 1-XX-47-1000 EHC CONTROL for individual throttle and governor valves are GREEN.

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

                                    . CSST (offsite),

OR RO

• DIG (blackout).

When observed by the RO during IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS, both shutdown boards are energized, based on 1-El-57-39, 6.9 SDB IA-A VOLTS indicating approximately 7000 volts and 1-EI-57-66, 6.9 SDB lB-B VOLTS indicating approximately 7000 volts.

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RO will announce that the window 70-A, SIACTUA TED is LIT. RO May also announce that FIRST OUT 76-G SI MANUAL is LIT.

b. Both trains SI ACTUATED.

• 1 -XX-55-6C
• I-XX-55-6D 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 33 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into Aol-I 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCP5 are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop I inside containment. Requires performance of E-0, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.1, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/AENS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendixes A and B are included as .

5. PERFORM Appendixes A and B, E-0, pages 16-30 BOP SRO assigns BOP to perform Appendixes A and B. Handout for E-O contains copy for EXAMINER assigned to BOP.

SRO 6. ANNOUNCE reactor trip and safety injection over PA system.

7. ENSURE secondary heat sink available with either:

• Total AFW flow greater than 410 gpm, RD OR
• At least one SIG NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

EXAMINER: Crew may isolate AFW to faulted SIG #1 at this point.

8. MONITOR RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F using:

• RCS Loop T-avg with any RCP running, RD OR
• RCS Loop T-cold with RCPs out-of-service.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 34 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-0, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.1, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IF temp less than 557°F, THEN ENSURE steam dumps and SIG PORVs CLOSED.

IF cooldown continues, THEN CONTROL total AFW flow to maintain greater than 410 gpm UNTIL NR level in at least one SIG greater than 29% [39% ADV]. RO takes manual control of AFW LCVs and reduces AFW flow. RO IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN

• PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

RO rotates 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSVA, and 1-HS-103B STEAM DUMP FSV B to the left to the OFF RESET position.

• CLOSE MSIVs.
• ENSURE MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

IF RCS temp greater than 564°F, THEN ENSURE either steam dumps or SIG PORVs OPEN.

9. ENSURE excess letdown valves CLOSED:

RO

• 1 -FCV-62-54
• 1 -FCV-62-55 EXAMINER: PORV 334 will indicate open and its Block valve will indicate closed in the next step due to previous failure.

2011-12 Wafts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 35 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop I inside containment. Requires performance of E-0, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.1, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. CHECK pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

RO observes 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV34OA, GREEN indicating light is LIT, RED indicating light is DARK. RO RO observes 1-HS-68-334A, PZR PORV 334, RED indicating light is LIT, GREEN indicating light is DARK. RO observes 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV34OA, GREEN indicating light is DARK, RED indicating light is LIT. RO observes 1-HS-68-332A, BLOCK VLVFOR PORV 334, GREEN indicating light is LIT, RED indicating light is DARK.

11. CHECK pzr safety valves CLOSED:

• EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitors.

RO RO observes response of 1-TI-68-330, SAFETY 68-563 TAILPIPE TEMP, 1-TI-68-329, SAFETY 68-564 TAILPIPE TEMP and 1-TI 328, SAFETY 68-565, stable at elevated temperatures due to the previous failure of 1-PCV-68-334.

12. CHECK pzr sprays CLOSED.

RO RO observes the GREEN indicating lights are LIT for 1-XI 334B, PZR SPRAY LOOP 2 and 1-XI-68-334D, PZR SPRAY LOOP I NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 36 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (A1WS). Requires entry into FR-S.i, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop I inside containment. Requires performance of E-0, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-Si, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

13. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

a. Phase B signals DARK [MISSP].

RO SRO may have directed that the RCPs be shutdown when

• power was less than 5%, due to the loss of oil cooler flow.

a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RO STOP all RCPs. GO TO Step 14.

14. CHECK SIG pressures:

• All SIG pressures controlled or rising.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG I through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressure on SG I is NOT controlled. May also observe trends on I-PR-I-2, SG I & 2 RO PRESS P51G. and I-PR-I-23, SG 3 & 4 PRESS PSIG to assess this step.

• All SIG pressures greater than 120 psig.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG I through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressure is low on SG I.

14. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO IF SIG pressure low OR dropping uncontrolled, THEN GO TO E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 37 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-O, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.1, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. CAUTION If a faulted SIG is NOT needed for RCS cooldown, it should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions.

1. ENSURE all MSIVs and MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

RD RO determines that the MSIVs are CLOSED based on GREEN and BLUE indicating lights LIT on handswitches. NOTE If it is known that a steam leak exists in the Turbine building, the following step should not be performed until the affected steam header is depressurized.

2. PLACE steam dump controls OFF:

• 1-HS-i-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A.

BOP

• 1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSVB.

SRO observes that the steam dump controls were placed in the OFF position during E-O performance.

3. CHECK for at least one Intact SIG:

• Any SIG pressure controlled or rising, OR
• Any SIG pressure greater than P-sat for RCS incore BOP temperature.

BOP determines that SG I is FAULTED and that the remaining SGs are INTACT based on SG pressure response. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 38 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of component Cooling Water (cCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCP5 from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-O, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-Si, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. IDENTIFY Faulted SIG based on ANY of the following:

• Any SIG pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner, OR
• Any SIG pressure less than 120 psig, OR
• SIG enclosure temps high:

1)TlO02Afor2and3, BOP

2) Ti 003A for I and 4.OR

• Local indication of break in any of the following:

1) Main steam lines,

2) Main feedwater lines,

3) Other secondary piping.

CAUTION

• If the turbine-driven AFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, steam supply to the turbine-driven AFW pump must be maintained from one SG.
• RCS cooldown requires the availability of at least one SIG.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 39 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATvVS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop I inside containment. Requires performance of E-O, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.1, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 2 Isolate the faulted steam generator (SG 1) prior to exiting E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Critical 5. ISOLATE Faulted SIG: Task 2 a. ISOLATE AFW flow to Faulted SIG. BOP rotates 1-HS-3-164A, SG I SUPPLY LCV-3-164 CNTL from the AUTO position to the ACC. RESET MODULATE position. The BOP then rotates I-HS-3-164A, SG I SUPPLY LCV-3-164 CNTL to the CLOSE position and PULLS the switch OUT. BOP rotates I-HS-3-174A, SG I SUPPLY LCV-3-174 CNTL from the AUTO position to the ACC. RESET MODULATE position. The BOP then rotates I-HS-3-174A, SG I SUPPLY LCV-3-174 CNTL to the CLOSE position and PULLS the switch OUT. BOP b. ENSURE MFW ISOLATED to Faulted SIG:

• MFW isolation and bypass isolation valves CLOSED.

BOP observes I-HS-3-33A, SG I MFWISOL VLV, I-HS-3-47A, 5G2 MFWISOL VLV, I-HS-3-87A, SG 3 MFWISOL VLVand I HS-3-IOOA, SG 4 MFWISOL VLV, RED indicating lights are DARK, GREEN indicating lights are LIT BOP observes I-XI-3-236, SG I MFW BYP ISOL VLV, I-XI-3-239, 5G2 MFWBYP ISOL VLV, I-Xl-3-242, SG 3 MFWBYP ISOL VLV and I-XI-3-245, SG 4 MFW BYP ISOL VLV, RED indicating lights are DARK, GREEN indicating lights are LIT (Continued Next Page) 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 40 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-0, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-Si, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical

• MEW reg and bypass reg valves CLOSED.

Task 2 BOP observes 1-XX-3-35 MFW REG, RED indicating lights are (Contd) DARK, GREEN indicating lights are LIT. BOP observes 1-XX-3-35A BYP REG, RED indicating lights are

                 .                DARK, GREEN indicating lights are LIT.

• MFPs TRIPPED.

BOP observes 1-HS-46-9A, MFPTA TRIP-RESET and 1-HS 36A, MFPT B TRIP-RESET RED indicating lights are DARK, GREEN indicating lights are LIT. BOP BOP observes 1-HS-3-200A, Standby MFWP Switch, RED indicating light is DARK, GREEN indicating light is LIT.

c. ENSURE Faulted SIG PORV CLOSED.

BOP may rotate 1-HS-1-6, SG I PORV PCV-I-5 from the P AUTO position to the CLOSE position. BOP observes the RED indicating light is DARK, GREEN indicating light is LIT.

d. ENSURE Faulted S/G blowdown ISOLATED.

BOP may rotate 1-HS-I-7/181 SG I BLOWDOWN VLVS from the P-AUTO position to the CLOSE position. BOP observes RED indicating light is DARK, GREEN indicating light is LIT. NOTE TD AEW pump steam supply should NOT be aligned from a SIG with a known primary to secondary leak if other AFW sources are available. BOP 6. ENSURE TD AEW pump being supplied from Intact S/G. BOP 7. MONITOR CST volume greater than 200,000 gal. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 41 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.i, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop I inside containment. Requires performance of E-O, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.1, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/A1WS, allows performance. Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. WHEN RCS temperature is stable or rising following Faulted SIG blowdown, THEN ADJUST Intact SIG PORV controllers in AUTO to:

                                    . P-sat for the highest RCS temp (one or more RCPs running)

Not applicable, since the RCPs were previously stopped due to loss of CCS flow to the oil coolers. OR BOP

• P-sat for the highest T-cold temp (no RCPs running)

BOP or RO will check 1-Tl-68-18, LOOP I CL TEMP, I-Tl-68-41, LOOP 2 CL TEMP 1-Tl-68-60, LOOP 3 CL TEMP and I-Tl-68-83, LOOP 4 CL TEMP to determine the highest T-cold temperature. The BOP or RO will then refer to steam tables or the ICS computer to determine the saturation pressure. The BOP will then lower the setting of 1-PIC-I-I3A, SG 2 PORV FCV-I-12, I-PIC-I-24A, SG 3 PORVFCV-1-23, and I-PIC-I-31A, SG I PORV FCV-I-30 to the saturation pressure identified.

9. CHECK secondary side radiation:

S/G discharge monitors NORMAL.

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitors NORMAL.

BOP

• SIG blowdown rad monitor recorders NORMAL trend prior to isolation.
• S/G sample results by Chemistry.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 j Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 42 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into Aol-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-Si, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-0, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-Si, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. CHECK SI termination criteria:

a. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65°F [85°F ADV].

b. CHECK secondary heat sink available with either:

• Total feed flow to Intact S/Gs greater than 410 gpm, OR
• At least one Intact S/G NR level greater than 29% [39%

ADVJ. RO c. CHECK RCS pressure stable or rising.

d. CHECK pzr level greater than 15% [33% ADV].

It is possible that PZR level may not be greater than 33% when the crew reaches this step. If PZR level is less than 33%, the crew will transition to E-I, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, instead of ES-I. I, SI Termination. Both paths are acceptable, and are provided in the scenario. EXAMINER: Scenario may be terminated at this point at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

d. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RESTORE pzr level: SRO 1) ATTEMPT to stabilize RCS pressure with normal pzr sprays.

2) ** GO TO Step ii.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 43 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into Aol-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCP5 from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.i, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-O, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.i, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

e. GO TO ES-i .1, SI Termination.

SRO When the transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination, is directed by the SRO, inform the applicants that another crew will continue from this point. SRO 1 1. GO TO E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-.D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 44 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCP5 from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-0, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.1, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATvVS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I The following actions are taken from E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

1. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

a. Phase B DARK [MISSP].

SRO

b. RCS pressure greater than 1 500 psig.

RCPs should have been stopped prior to reaching this step. SRO 2. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart. NOTE Time since initiation of event is defined by performance of Step 3.

3. RECORD current time to mark initiation of LOCA and SRO determination of time for hot leg recirc.

4. CHECK SIG pressures:

BOP

• All SIG pressures controlled or rising.
• All SIGs pressures greater than 120 psig.

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF Faulted S/G has NOT been isolated, THEN ** GO TO E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. SRO The faulted SG isolation has already been addressed during performance of E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, so a transition is NOT required. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 45 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into AOl-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1 Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-O, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-Si, Nuclear Power

• SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance.

Time j Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. MAINTAIN Intact SIG NR levels:

a. MONITOR levels greater than 29% [39% ADV].

BOP

b. CONTROL intact SIG levels between 29% and 50% [39% and 50% ADV].

6. CHECK secondary radiation:

• SIG discharge monitors NORMAL.

BOP

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitors NORMAL.
• SIG blowdown rad monitor recorders NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

7. ENSURE cntmt hydrogen analyzers in service:

• PLACE 1-HS-43-200A in ANALYZE [M-10].
• PLACE 1-HS-43-210A in ANALYZE [M-10].

BOP

• CHECK low flow lights NOT lit [M-1 0].
• LOCALLY CHECK low analyzer temp lights NOT lit AND RESET local alarm panel. [North wall of Train A 480V SD Bd rm].

EXAMINER: PORV 334 will indicate open and its Block valve will indicate closed in the next step due to previous failure. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 46 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into Aol-I 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATNS). Requires entry into FR-S.I, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-O, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.l, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. MONITOR pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

RO observes 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV34OA, GREEN indicating light is LIT, RED indicating light is DARK. RO RO observes 1-HS-68-334A, PZR PORV 334, RED indicating light is LIT, GREEN indicating light is DARK. RO observes 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VLVFOR PORV34OA, GREEN indicating light is DARK, RED indicating light is LIT RO observes 1-HS-68-332A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 334, GREEN indicating light is LIT, RED indicating light is DARK.

9. DETERMINE if cntmt spray should be stopped:

a. MONITOR cntmt pressure less than 2.0 psig.

b. CHECK at least one cntmt spray pump RUNNING.

RO c. RESET cntmt spray signal.

d. STOP cntmt spray pumps, AND PLACE in A-AUTO.

e. CLOSE cntmt spray discharge valves 1-FCV-72-2 and 1-FCV-72-39.

10. ENSURE both pocket sump pumps STOPPED [M-15]:

BOP

• 1-HS-77-410.
• 1 -HS-77-41 I.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 47 of 47 Event

Description:

A leak develops on the RCP oil cooler supply header line inside containment. Requires entry into Aol-i 5, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS). After the RCP oil cooler flow path is isolated, requires a manual reactor trip to remove the RCPs from service. Reactor fails to trip (ATWS). Requires entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. RCPs are left in service until reactor power is reduced below 5%. ALL AFW pumps fail to automatically start. Requires the BOP to manually start each AFW pump. Main steam line break on Loop 1 inside containment. Requires performance of E-O, Reactor trip or Safety Injection FINAL and E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, after FR-S.i, Nuclear Power SUBMITTAL Generation/ATWS, allows performance. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1 1. CHECK SI termination criteria:

a. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65°F [85°F ADV].

b. CHECK secondary heat sink available with either:

• Total feed flow to Intact S/Gs greater than 410 gpm, SRO OR
• At least one Intact SIG NR level greater than 29% [39% ADVJ.

c. CHECK RCS pressure stable or rising.

d. CHECK pzr level greater than 15% [33% ADV].

e. ** GO TO ES-I .1, SI Termination.

EXAMINER: When the transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination, is directed by the SRO, inform the applicants that another crew will continue from this point. END OF SCENARIO 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Scenano 2 FIfJAL SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of I Q SM US/MCR Unit 1 Q UO Unit Off-going Name Q AUO Station 0 STA (STA Function) On-coming Name Part 1 Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift:

      -                                                                                                      RCS Cb  1031 ppm

• Abnormal equipment lineup I conditions:

lB-B RHR pump fs out of service for motor winding inspection. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 1 hour ago. lB-B RHR pump is expected to be returned to service in 12 hours. Protected equipment signs have been posted for lA-A RHR pump. 1 B Condensate Booster pump has an oil leak, and is being monitored every 30 minutes.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)
• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Train B/Channel II Work Week. 100% power, RCS boron concentration 1031 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. A power reduction to 95% at 2%/mm using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, is required to be performed to remove the 1 B Condensate Booster pump from service.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only) [] Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items) D Current qualification status Q Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUO5) 0 Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUO5) Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs) [] SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA) Relief Time: Relief Date: Part 3 Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties: U Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station) O Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week) O Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked) O Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs) O Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week) (N/A for AUO5) O Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs) TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-l-l [01-14-2011]

Scenano 2 FIiNAL SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 Q SM D US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going Name [] AUO Station [] STA (STA Function) On-coming Name Part 1 Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb 1031 ppm Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions: I B-B RHR pump is out of service for motor winding inspection. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 1 hour ago. I B-B RHR pump is expected to be returned to service in 12 hours. Protected equipment signs have been posted for 1 A-A RHR pump. lB Condensate Booster pump has an oil leak, and is being monitored every 30 minutes.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)
• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Train B/Channel II Work Week. 100% power, RCS boron concentration 1031 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. A power reduction to 95% at 2%/mm using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, is required to be performed to remove the 1 B Condensate Booster pump from service.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Q Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only) [] Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items) Q Current qualification status 0 Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs) U Review current TS/TRMIODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs) Q Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs) U SRIPER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA) Relief Time: Relief Date: Part 3 Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties: O Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station) 0 Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week) U Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked) U Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUO5) E] Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week) (N/A for AUOs) O Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs) TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-l-l [01-14-20111

Scenario 2 Attachment I AOI-2, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM. Attachment I

AOI-2 WBN MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM Revision 37 Page 51 of5l ATTACHMENT I Page 1 of I REACTOR POWER VS TAVG/TREF TEMPERATURE AND PZR LEVEL (Tavg-Tref values rounded to one tenth of a degree) RX TAVG- PZR RX TAVE- PZR POWER TREF LEVEL POWER TREE LEVEL 2% 557.6 °F 25.7 % 52% 572.2 °F 43.2 % 4% 558.2 °F 26.4 % 54% 572.8 °F 43.9 % 6% 558.8 °F 27.1 % 56% 573.4 °F 44.6 % 8% 559.3 °F 27.8 % 58% 573.9 °F 45.3 % 10% 559.9 °F 28.5 % 60% 574.5 °F 46.0 % 12% 560.5°F 29.2% 62% 575.1 °F 46.7 % 14% 561.1°F 29.9% 64% 575.7 °F 47.4 % 16% 561.7°F 30.6% 66% 576.3 °F 48.1 % 18% 562.3°F .31.3% 68% 576.9 °F 48.8 % 20% 562.8°F 32.0% 70% 577.4 °F 49.5 % 22% 563.4 °F 32.7 % 72% 578.0 °F 50.2 % 24% 564.0°F 33.4% 74% 578.6 °F 50.9 % 26% 564.6 °F 34.1 % 76% 579.2 °F 51.6% 28% 565.2 °F 34.8 % 78% 579.8 °F 52.3 % 30% 565.8 °F 35.5 % 80% 580.4 °F 53.0 % 32% 566.3 °F 36.2 % 82% 580 9 °F 53.7 % 34% 566.9 °F 36.9 % 84% 581 5 °F 54.4 %

• 36% 567.5°F 37.6% 86% 582 1 °F 55.1 %

38% 568.1 °F 38.3 % 88% 582.7 °F 55.8 % 40% 568.7 °F 39.0 % 90% 583 3 °F 56.5 % 42% 569.3 °F 39.7 % 92% 583.9 °F 57.2 % 44% 569.8 °F 40.4 % 94% 584.4 °F 57.9 % 46% 570.4°F 41.1% 96% 585.0 °F 58.6 % 48% 571.0°F 41.8% 98% 585 6 °F 59.3 % 50% 571.6°F 42.5% 100% 586.2 °F 60.0 %

Scenario 2 Attachment 2 E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Appendix A and B Attachments I through 5

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix A (Page 1 of 9) Equipment Verification Step _Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained ENSURE PCB5 OPEN: OPEN manually.

• PCB 5084.
• PCB 5088.

2. ENSURE AFW pump operation: ESTABLISH at least one train AEW operation.

• Both MDAFW pumps RUNNING.
• TDAFWpump RUNNING.
• LCVs1nAUTO,OR controlled in MANUAL.

3. ENSURE MEW isolation: Manually CLOSE valves AND

• MEW isolation and bypass STOP pumps, as necessary.

isolation valves CLOSED.

• MEW reg and bypass reg valves CLOSED. IF any valves can NOT be closed, THEN
• MEP A and B TRIPPED.
• Standby MEP STOPPED. CLOSE #1 heater outlet valves.
• Cond demin pumps TRIPPED.
• Cond booster pumps TRIPPED.

       *   #3 HDT Pumps TRIPPED.
       *   #7 HDT Pumps TRIPPED.

Page 16of31

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix A (Page 2 of 9) Equipment Verification Step _Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

4. MONITOR ECCS operation:

a. Charging pumps RUNNING. a. Manually START charging pumps.

b. Charging pump aHgnment: b. ENSURE at least one valve in each set aligned.

• RWST outlets 1 -LCV-62-1 35 and 1-LCV-62-136 OPEN.
• VCT outlets 1-LCV-62-132 and 1 -LCV-62-1 33 CLOSED.
• Charging 1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV-62-91 CLOSED.

c. RHR pumps RUNNING. c. Manually START RHR pumps.

d. SI pumps RUNNING. d. Manually START SI pumps.

e. BIT alignment: e. ENSURE at least one valve

• Outlets 1 -FCV-63-25 aligned, and flow thru BIT.

and 1-FCV-63-26 OPEN.

• Flow thru BIT.

f. RCS pressure greater f. ENSURE SI pump flow.

than 1650 psig. IF RCS press drops to less than 150 psig, THEN ENSURE RHR pump flow. Page 17of31

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix A (Page 3 of 9) Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

5. CHECK cntmt isolation: ACTUATE Phase A and

a. Phase A isolation: Cntmt Vent Isolation signal,

• Train A GREEN. OR
• Train B GREEN.

Manually CLOSE valves and

b. Cntmt vent isolation: dampers as necessary.

• TrainAGREEN.
• Train B GREEN.

Page 18 of 31

• WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix A (Page 4 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step _Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

6. CHECK cntmt pressure: PERFORM the following:

• Phase B DARK [MISSP]. 1) ENSURE Phase B actuated.
• Cntmt Spray DARK [MISSP]. 2) ENSURE Cntmt Spray actuated.
• Cntmt press less than 2.8 psig. 3) ENSURE cntmt spray pumps running.

4) ENSURE cntmt spray flow.

5) ENSURE Phase B isolation:

• Train A GREEN.
• Tra1nBGREEN o Manually CLOSE valves and dampers as necessary.

6) STOP all RCPs.

7) ENSURE MSIVs and bypasses CLOSED.

8) PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

9) WHEN 10 minutes has elapsed since Phase B actuated, THEN ENSURE air return fans start.

10) USE adverse cntmt [ADV] setpoints where provided.

7. DISPATCH AUO to perform Attachment 1 (E-0), Ice Condenser AHU Breaker Operation.

Page 19 of 31

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix A (Page 5of9) Equipment Verification Step _Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

8. CHECK plant radiation NORMAL: NOTIFY Unit Supervisor IMMEDIATELY.

• S/G blowdown rad recorder 1-RR-90-120 NORMAL prior to isolation [M-12].
• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad recorder 1-RR-90-119 NORMAL prior to trip [M-1 2].
• 1-RR-90-106 and 1-RR-90-1 12 radiation recorders NORMAL prior to isolation [M-12].
• S/G main steamline discharge monitors NORMAL [M-30].
• Upper and Lower containment high range monitors NORMAL

[M-30].

• NOTIFY Unit Supervisor conditions NORMAL.

9. ENSURE all D/Gs RUNNING. EMERGENCY START D/Gs

10. ENSURE ABGTS operation:

a. ABGTS fans RUNNING. a. Manually START fans.

b. ABGTS dampers OPEN: b. Locally OPEN dampers.

• FCO-30-146A.
• FCO-30-146B.
• FCO-30-1 57A.
• FCO-30-157B.

Page 20 of 31

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-O Uniti Rev.0030 Appendix A (Page 6 of 9) Equipment Verification Step _Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

11. ENSURE at least four ERCW pumps Manually START pumps as necessary.

RUNNING, one on each shutdown board preferred.

12. ENSURE ERCW supply valves IF ERCW can NOT be OPEN to running D/Gs. aligned to running D/G, THEN EMERGENCY STOP affected D/G.

13. ENSURE O-FCV-67-152, CCS HX C Manually OPEN O-FCV-67-152 ALT DISCH TO HDR B, is open to to position A.

position A.

14. CLOSE O-FCV-67-144, CCS HX C DISCH TO HDR A.

15. MONITOR EGTS operation: Manually START fans

• EGTS fans RUNNING.

AND

• ENSURE dampers OPEN
• VERIFY filter bank dp between 5 OPEN dampers.

and 9 inches of water.

16. ENSURE CCS pumps RUNNING: Manually START pumps as necessary.

o 1A-ACCS pump.

• lB-B CCS pump.
• C-S or 2B-B CCS pump.

17. DISPATCH AUO to shutdown Upper and Lower CNTMT rad monitors USING SOI-90.02.Gaseous Process Radiation Monitors Page 21 of3l

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix A (Page 7 of 9) Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

18. WHEN Attachment 1 is complete (Ice Condenser AHU Breakers OPEN),

THEN ENERGIZE hydrogen igniters [1-M-10]:

• 1-HS-268-73 ON.
• 1-HS-268-74 ON.

NOTE The following equipment is located on 1-M-9.

19. CHECK CNTMT PURGE fans STOP fans AND STOPPED.

PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

20. CHECK FUEL HANDLING EXH fans STOP fans AND STOPPED, Fuel and Cask loading dampers CLOSED: PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK, THEN Manually CLOSE dampers.

21. ENSURE AB GEN SUPPLY and STOP fans AND EXH fans STOPPED.

PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK. NOTE Dampers 1-HS-30-158 and 2-HS-30-270 remain open during ABI.

22. ENSURE AB GEN SUP & EXH Manually CLOSE dampers.

dampers CLOSED. Page22of3l

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix A (Page 8 of 9) Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

23. ENSURE MCR & SPREAD RM Manually CLOSE dampers.

FRESH AIR dampers CLOSED:

• FCV-31-3.
• FCV-31-4.

24. ENSURE at least one CB EMER CLEANUP fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• CB EMERG CLEANUP FAN A-A, Manually START fan.

OR FanB-BRUNNING..

• FCO-31-8,OPEN. NOTIFY TSC if at least one damper NOT OPEN.

OR

• FCO-31-7, OPEN

25. ENSURE at least one CB EMER PRESS fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• CB EMERG PRESS FAN A-A, Manually START fan.

OR FAN B-B RUNNING.

• FCO-31-6,OPEN. NOTIFY TSC if at least one damper NOT OPEN.

OR

• FCO-31-5, OPEN.

Page23of3l

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix A (Page 9 of 9) Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

26. ENSURE Control Building fans STOPPED and dampers CLOSED:

• SPREADING ROOM SUPPLY Manually STOP fans AND and EXH FANS AND dampers.

NOTIFY TSC if any damper NOT o TOILET & LKR RM EXHAUST CLOSED. FAN AND dampers.

27. INITIATE Appendix B (E-O), Phase B Pipe Break Contingencies.

Page24of3l

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Appendix B (Page 1 of 1) Phase B Pipe Break Contingencies Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

1. CHECK PHASE B actuated. WHEN PHASE B actuation occurs,

[MISSP 1-XX-55-6C, -6D]

                  -                              THEN GO TO step 2.

2. ENSURE 1-FCV-32-1 10 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP 1-XX-55-6E]

                -                                Attachment 2 (E-0).

(A-train, window 13)

3. ENSURE 1-FCV-67-107 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP 1-XX-55-6E]

                -                                Attachment 3 (E-0).

(A -train, window 43)

4. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-92 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP 1-XX-55-6E}

                -                                Attachment 4 (E-0).

(A -train, window 73)

5. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-140 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP 1-XX-55-6F]

                -                                Attachment 5 (E-0).

(B -train, window 74) Page25of3l

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Attachment I (Page 1 ofl) Ice Condenser AHU Breaker Operation OPEN the following to remove power from ice condenser air handling units AND REPORT completion to UO: BOARD COMPT NOMENCLATURE 480 V Reactor Vent 13D 1-BKR-232-A000/13D ICE COND Board 1 A-A I -AHU-61 -1/4/8/12/16/20/24/28 480 V Reactor Vent 14D 1-BKR-232-A000/14D ICE COND Board I A-A 1 -AHU-61 -3/7/1 I /15/19/23/27 480 V Reactor Vent 1 3D 1 -BKR-232-B000/1 3D ICE COND Board I B-B 1 -AH U-61 -2/6/10/14/18/22/26/30 480 V Reactor Vent 14D 1-BKR-232-B000/14D ICE COND Board 1 B-B 1 -AHU-61 -5/9/13/17/21/25/29 Page26of3l

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Attachment 2 (Page 1 ofl) Control Air Isolation A. CLOSE O-ISV-32-1013 CONTROL AIR EL 713 AB HDR ISOL [A6/S EL. 713] (chain operated behind Fuel and Waste Handling Bd. A). B. IF O-ISV-32-1013 CANNOT BE CLOSED, THEN OPEN and DISCONNECT C&SS air compressor breakers:

1. O-BKR-32-25 [480V SD BD 1A2-A, C/3D]

2. O-BKR-32-26 [480V SD BD IB1-B, C/3D]

3. O-BKR-32-27 [480V AUX BLDG COM BD, C/6C]

4. O-BKR-32-4900A [480V TURB BLDG COM BD, C/6C]

Page 27 of 31

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Attachment 3 (Page 1 of 1) ERCW Isolation UNLOCK AND CLOSE 1 -ISV-67-523B, LOWER CNTMT VENT CLR lB &i D ERCW SUP ISOL [A2U/692] (U-i penetration room North of AB Pipe Chase Cooler lB-B in overhead) Page28of3l

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit I Rev. 0030 Attachment 4 (Page 1 ofl) CCS Return Isolation CLOSE i-ISV-70-700, RCP OIL COOLER CCS RETURN ISOLATION [A4N EL. 710 U-i Penetration Room] (approximately 10 ft. North of Penetration Room Cooler lB-B on mezzanine above RHR Sump Valve Room) Page 29 of 31

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-0 Unit j Rev. 0030 Attachment 5 (Page 1 ofl) CCS Supply Isolation CLOSE 1-ISV-70-516, REACTOR BUILDING CCS SUPPLY ISOLATION [A6IT EL. 737] (Behind Elevator approximately 2 ft. west on mezzanine above A CCS Heat Exchanger) Page3Oof3l

I hiI Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit I Abnormal Operating Instruction AOI-39 Rapid Load Reduction Revision 0014 Quality Related Level of Use: Continuous Use Effective Date: 03-02-2011 Responsible Organization: OPS, Operations Prepared By: R. A. ORear Approved By: Brian Mcllnay

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39 Uniti Rev.0014 Revision Log Revision Affected or Change Effective Page Number Date Numbers Description of RevisionlChange 9 06/20/06 2, 4, 5 Revised condenser backpressure requirements per PlC 52076-A 10 06/22/07 2, 4 Revised condenser backpressure requirements per DON 52215 stage 1. 11 08/30/07 2, 6, 20, 21 Non-intent. Added Step I RNO transit to Appendix A on a failure of turbine load reduction in AUTO. Complies with changes made to GO-4 for PER125113. 12 03/07/08 4, 5-6, 12 Replaced Table 1 and cautions at beginning of step 3.1, Section 3.2 & 3.3 for DON 52228. 13 02/24/10 All Converted from W95 to W2003 using Rev 12. Deleted table for recommended boration rates and referenced Reactivity Briefing Sheet. Added concern for AFD to Caution for over borating. Included Reactivity Control Plan discussion into section 4.0. [PCR 3827] Added steps to shutdown a MFP [PCR 3449] Added step to place EHC in IMP-IN. [PCR 4219] Enhanced steps for borating to provide flexibility to control AFD and Rod position. [PCR 3328, 3318] Changed target band for AFD to +/-3% as outlined in NOB. Added Tl-7.012 as a Developmental Ref. 14 03/02/1 1 2, 4, 6- Reversed order of steps to ensure boration is 9,13, 14, started first as recommended by Reactivity 17, 19, 22- Management Review Board. 24 Minor editorial changes included: added page numbers to Diagnostic box, updated source identification, added Greek symbol (p) to steps directly affecting reactivity. Page 2 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39

• Uniti Rev.0014 1.0 PURPOSE This Instruction provides the guidance to initiate a controlled load reduction whenever plant conditions require a rapid power reduction without a reactor trip.

2.0 SYMPTOMS A. Tech Spec Safety Limit being exceeded. B. Tech Spec Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) and/or ACTION not being satisfied due to circumstances in excess of those addressed in LCO 3.0.3. C. Expiration of a Tech Spec ACTION time. D. Serious condition requiring rapid load reduction to prevent or minimize a more serious condition, but not requiring a unit trip. E. The SM has determined that plant conditions require a rapid load reduction at less than or equal to 5% per minute. 2.2 Indications A. NONE 2.3 Automatic Actions A. If a signal has occurred requiring an Auto turbine runback and the runback failed to occur, then action should be taken in accordance with AOI-16, Loss Of Normal Feedwater or AOI-37, Turbine Runback Response. Page 3 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39 Uniti Rev.0014 3.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 3.1 Diagnostics CAUTION Condenser backpressure should be maintained less than the limits of Table 1 during load reduction-see next page. NOTE Load reduction rate shall be limited to a maximum of 5%/mm. If greater than 5% is required or becomes necessary, then reactor should be tripped. IF GO TO Subsection Page Reactor power is greater than 50% 3.2 6 Reactor power is less than 50% 3.3 13 Page4of24

A & B and C CONDENSER VACUUM LO-LO AND LO ALARMS C

                                                                                                 =

6.50 -z 0 C) ZONE C, 6.00 Cl) C, 0

   < 5.50 BZONES CD 0.

I 0 w 5.00 0. -a 0) Co Ce) CD CD U) 0 0i C C, o -h 0 I) = w 4.00 w 0 z 3.50 CD 0 3.00 2.50 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 LOAD (MWe)

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOl-39 Unit I Rev. 0014 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.2 Power Reduction From Greater Than 50% Power CAUTION Over boration may result in excessive rod withdrawal, T-avg lower than desired, and AFD oscillations. NOTE

• Rod Control should remain in automatic for T-avg Control
• Reactivity Briefing Sheet, Thumb Rules (page 3), lists boration flows and volumes for different reduction rates.
• Effect of boration will lag behind turbine load reduction and can be compensated for by temporarily increasing boric acid flow rate above recommended rate.

1. INITIATE a manual boration:

a. DETERMINE recommended a. INITIATE emergency boration.

boration flow rate and volume

1) PLACE boric acid transfer from Reactivity Briefing Sheet:

pump aligned to blender in

b. INITIATE normal boration: FAST speed

1) ADJUST BA flow controller, 2) (p) ADJUST 1FCV-62-138 to 1-FC-62-139, to desired flow establish desired flow rate.

rate.

3) WHEN boration is complete,

2) ADJUST BA batch counter THEN 1-FQ-62-139 to required CLOSE 1 -FCV-62-1 38, quantity. AND

3) PLACE mode selector PLACE boric acid transfer 1-HS-62..140B to BOR. pump used in SLOW speed

4) (p) PLACE VCT makeup control 1-HS-62-140A, to START.

5) VERIFY desired boric acid flow indicated on 1 -Fl-621 39.

Page 6 of 24

• WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39
• Unit I Rev. 0014 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.2 Power Reduction From Greater Than 50% Power (continued)

CAUTION

• Condenser Backpressure limits are on page 5.
• TURBINE MANUAL Operation requires continuous operator monitoring and control.
• LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM may be made worse if steam dumps are actuated. AOl-Il requires T-ave and T-ref be maintained within 3°F.

NOTE If the initiating condition is corrected, the power reduction may be terminated

2. ESTABLISH a turbine load reduction SELECT TURBINE MANUAL, and rate less than or equal to 5%/mm: PERFORM Appendix A.

a. PLACE turbine in IMP IN OR

b. SET a desired load in the CHECK that turbine control has tripped SETTER with the REFERENCE to MANUAL as indicated by the CONTROL. TURBINE MANUAL pushbutton

c. SET the LOAD RATE at less than backlighted, or equal to 5%/mm. (p) Momentarily DEPRESS

d. (p) DEPRESS GO pushbutton. the G.V. LOWER at intervals that control load reduction less than or equal to 5% /min.

Page 7 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39 Unit I Rev. 0014 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.2 Power Reduction From Greater Than 50% Power (continued) NOTE AFD green target band can be monitored using ICS Turn On code DOGHOUSE.

3. MONITOR rod position: (p) ADJUST boric acid flow rate as needed to return rods to required

• Rods above Lo-Lo insertion limit position
• AFD within Target Band IF higher boric acid flow rate is needed to compensate for load reduction rate, THEN INITIATE emergency boration

1. PLACE boric acid transfer pump aligned to blender in FAST speed

2. (p) ADJUST 1-FCV-62-138 to establish desired flow rate.

WHEN boration is complete, THEN CLOSE 1-FCV-62-138, AND PLACE boric acid transfer pump used in SLOW speed

4. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart

5. NOTIFY the Load Coordinator of the required load reduction and expected ramp rate Page8of24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39 Unit I Rev. 0014 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.2 Power Reduction From Greater Than 50% Power (continued) NOTE If reactor power is stabilized at a lower level a drop in T-avg will occur due to Xenon build up. Dilution may be required to maintain power level.

6. MONITOR T-avg and T-ref: (p) CONTROL T-avg with Control Rods

• T-ave trending to T-ref. in manual.

IF T-ave and T-ref mismatch can NOT

• Mismatch less than 5°F.

be maintained less than 5°F, THEN TRIP reactor, and GO TO E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

7. CHECK rate of power reduction is (p) TRIP reactor, and rapid enough for existing plant **

GO TO E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety conditions. Injection.

8. NOTIFY Cnds Demin AUO of impending pmp shutdowns.

Page 9 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39 Unit I Rev. 0014 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.2 Power Reduction From Greater Than 50% Power (continued)

9. WHEN rated thermal power change exceeds 15% in one hour, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate 1-S 1-68-28.

10. WHEN between 70 and 75% power, THEN REMOVE one Cnds Bstr Pmp and one Cnds Demin Pmp from service:

• PLACE selected Cnds Bstr Pmp handswitch to STOP.
• PLACE selected Cnds Demin Pmp handswitch to STOP, and CLOSE the suction valve.

Page 10 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39 Unit I Rev. 0014 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.2 Power Reduction From Greater Than 50% Power (continued) NOTE A MFPT may be removed from service at power levels between 65% and 45%, if approved by the SM. NOTE If holding power level at less than 60%, the Cnds Demin pumps may be left running based on header pressure and the ability of the pumps to pump forward.

11. WHEN between 55 and 70% power, THEN REMOVE both operating Cnds Demin Pumps and one of three #3 Heater Drain Pumps from service:

a. Simultaneously PLACE Cnds Demin Pump handswitches to STOP.

b. CLOSE Cnds Demin Pump suction valves.

c. STOP and PULL-TO-LOCK one of three #3 Heater Drain Pumps.

12. WHEN 65% power is reached, THEN STOP and PULL-TO-LOCK one of two #7 Heater Drain Pumps.

13. WHEN 49% power is reached, THEN CHECK Annunciator Window 69-E, P-9 RX TRIP FROM TURB TRIP BLOCKED, is LIT.

Page 11 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39 Uniti Rev. 0014 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.2 Power Reduction From Greater Than 50% Power (continued)

14. IF Power reduction below 50% is required, THEN GO TO Subsection 3.3, Step 4.

15. STOP The load reduction by depressing HOLD on the Turbine Reference Setter.

16. STABILIZE Turbine/Reactor power with Tavg/Tref within 3°F.

17. WHEN Boration is COMPLETE, THEN PERFORM the following to REALIGN makeup to AUTO:

a. ENSURE 1-FC-62-142, PWTO BLENDER, on 35% (7ogpm) and Manual-Auto toggle in AUTO.

b. ADJUST 1-FC-62-139, BATO BLENDER, to new RCS CB.

c. PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE, in AUTO.

d. TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL, to START.

e. CHECK Red light is LIT.

18. **

GO TO GO-4, Normal Power Operation. End of Subsection Page 12 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOl-39 Uniti Rev.0014 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.3 Power Reduction From 50% Power CAUTION

• Condenser Backpressure limits are on page 5.
• Avoid excessive rod insertion after turbine is tripped. If resulting reactor power is subcritical or less than desired, rods SHALL NOT be withdrawn in an attempt to recover reactor power.

NOTE If the initiating condition is corrected, power reduction may be terminated.

1. CHECK reactor power less than or **

GO TO Subsection 3.2 equal to 49%, annunciator window 69-E, P-9 RX TRIP FROM TURBINE TRIP BLOCKED, is LIT.

2. ENSURE rod control in AUTO. Manually INSERT the control bank as turbine load is reduced, maintaining Tavg on program.

CAUTION TURBINE MANUAL operation requires continuous operator monitoring and control.

3. ESTABLISH a turbine load reduction SELECT TURBINE MANUAL, rate of less than or equal to 5%/mm:

OR

a. PLACE turbine in IMP IN CHECK that Turbine Control has

b. SET a desired load in the tripped to MANUAL as indicated by the SETTER with the REFERENCE TURBINE MANUAL pushbutton CONTROL backlighted,

c. SET the LOAD RATE less than (p) Momentarily DEPRESS or equal to 5%/mm. the G.V. LOWER at intervals that

d. (p) DEPRESS GO pushbutton. control load reduction less than or equal to 5%/mm.

Page 13 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39 Unit I Rev. 0014 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3-3 Power Reduction From 50% Power (continued)

4. WHEN 48% reactor power is reached, THEN CHECK annunciator window 70-C, P-8 LO PWR-FLOW TRIP BLOCKED, is LIT.

5. CHECK power reduction rate rapid PERFORM one of the following based enough for existing plant conditions. on plant conditions:

(p) TRIP reactor and ** GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. OR (p) TRIP turbine and ** GO TO AOI-17, Turbine Trip.

6. WHEN 45% power is reached, THEN CONTINUE with the procedure.

Page 14 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39 Unit I Rev. 0014 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.3 Power Reduction From 50% Power (continued)

7. IF two MFWPs in service THEN SHUTDOWN one MFWP:

a. IF 1A MFWP is to be removed from service, THEN

1) PLACE 1-SIC-46-20A, MFPT A speed control in MANUAL and DECREASE speed.

2) ENSURE recirc valve OPENS

3) WHEN 1A MFP speed is approx 3,300 rpm, THEN PLACE 1-HS-46-9A, to TRIP

4) REFER TO SOI-2 & 3.01, Condensate and Feedwater System to complete shutdown.

Page 15 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39 Uniti Rev. 0014 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.3 Power Reduction From 50% Power (continued)

b. IF IS MFWP is to be removed from service, THEN

1) PLACE 1-SIC-46-20B, MFPT B speed control in MANUAL and DECREASE speed.

2) ENSURE recirc valve OPENS

3) WHEN lB MFPspeed is approx 3,300 rpm, THEN PLACE 1 -HS-46-36A, to TRIP

4) REFER TO SOI-2 & 3.01, Condensate and Feedwater System to complete shutdown.

8. STOP the second #7 Heater Drain Tank pump, and PLACE both #7 Heater Drain Tank pumps handswitches in PULL TO LOCK.

9. CLOSE #7 Heater Drain Tank pumps discharge valves:

• 1-HS-6-143A
• 1-HS-6-163A
• 1.-HS-6-184A Page 16 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39 Unit I Rev. 0014 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.3 Power Reduction From 50% Power (continued)

10. WHEN less than 40% power, Manually PUSH AMSAC THEN Test/BIk/Operate, 1-HS-3-264A CHECK 1-HS-3-264A, AMSAC AMSAC TEST/BLOCK pushbutton.

BLOCK <40% light is LIT.

11. WHEN 30% power is reached, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. ENSURE turbine is operating in the IMP OUT position.

b. STOP and PULL-TO-LOCK one of two #3 Heater Drain Pumps.

c. STOP one of two operating CBPs by PLACING the pump handswitches to STOP.

d. STOP one of three operating Hotwell Pumps.

12. STABILIZE the unit between 20 PERFORM either of the following:

and 30% reactor power with reliable (p) TRIP reactor and steam/feed flow indications. ** GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. OR (p) TRIP turbine and GO TO AOl-i 7, Turbine Trip.

13. EVALUATE conditions to determine if turbine AND reactor shutdown required.

Page 17 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39 Unitl Rev. 0014 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.3 Power Reduction From 50% Power (continued)

14. WHEN Boration is COMPLETE, THEN PERFORM the following to REALIGN makeup to AUTO:

a. ENSURE 1-FC-62-142, PWTO BLENDER, on 35% (7Ogpm) and Manual-Auto toggle in AUTO.

b. ADJUST 1-FC-62-139, BATO BLENDER, to new RCS CB.

c. PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE, in AUTO.

d. TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL, to START.

e. CHECK Red light is LIT.

15. WHEN rated thermal power change exceeds 15% in one hour, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate 1-S 1-68-28.

Page 18 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39

• Uniti Rev.0014 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.3 Power Reduction From 50% Power (continued)

16. PERFORM the following:

• REFER TO GO-5, Unit Shutdown From 30% Reactor Power To Hot Standby for guidance in removing equipment from service.

o (p) ADJUST reduction rate as necessary to facilitate removal of equipment and maintain controlled conditions.

• CONTINUE rapid load reduction.

End of Subsection Page 19 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39 Unitl Rev. 0014 4.0 DISCUSSION A. When removing the unit from service with conditions that require a rapid shutdown from 100% RTP, it is advisable to begin a boration in accordance with the applicable Reactivity Control Plan. The boration should assist in keeping the rods above the RIL during the power reduction while allowing the rods to insert to maintain TavglTref. The inserted rods should provide the capacity to withdraw rods and stabilize Tavg in the event that a momentary hold is required during the power reduction. B. Very fast ramp rates (up to 5%/mm) may result in rods inserting below the RIL briefly until the effects of the boration are realized. The Reactivity Control Plan boration volumes are calculated to maintain nominal rod position for AFD control. Boration should be started at the beginning of the power reduction. Time outside of the plus or minus 3% target band during the load reduction is allowed, but should be minimized in order to limit the resultant Xenon oscillation. Rods should remain in automatic for Tavg control during the load reduction until the applicable Reactivity Control Plan specifies Manual control. C. For events requiring a partial load reduction at a rapid rate such as an automatic turbine runback or the need for manual run back the turbine in order to remove equipment from service, the load reduction should be made using rods for Tavg control. Boration should be initiated as soon as the unit is stabilized at the new lower power level in order to clear any RIL alarms and to return AFD to within limits. Placard values can be used to commence the initial boration, and then the rod position can be optimized by a more detailed review of the Reactivity Control Plan. The guidance for a partial load drop assumes a rapidly evolving transient occurring over a short duration. In situations requiring a partial load reduction of greater than 50% load, and it is determined during the evolution that the RIL is being exceeded, then a boration should be commenced during the load reduction as soon as time and operator span-of-control allows. D. For power levels less than 50% power the TS limits for AFD do not apply. While it is desirable to maintain Delta Flux within the target band for all power levels greater than 15%, it should be emphasized that plant stability and maneuverability is a higher priority than Delta Flux control at low power levels. Page 20 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39 Unit I Rev. 0014

5.0 REFERENCES

5.1 Performance A. AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater. B. AOl-i 7, Turbine Trip. C. AOl-37, Turbine Runback Response. D. E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection. E. GO-4, Normal Power Operation. F. GO-5, Unit Shutdown From 30% Reactor Power To Hot Standby. G. EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart. H. 1-51-68-28, Primary Radiochemistry Requirements. I. SOl-2 & 3.01, Condensate and Feedwater System. J. SOI-62.02, Boron Concentration Control. 5.2 Developmental A. SPP-10.4, Reactivity Management Program. B. TI-7.012, Administration Of The Reactivity Briefing Sheets And Reactivity Control Plan 5.3 Technical Specifications A. 3.1.1, Shutdown Margin (SDM)- T-avg > 200°F. B. 3.1.7, Control Bank Insertion Limits C. 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference (AFD) D. LCO 3.0.3 Page 21 of24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39 Unit I Rev. 0014 Appendix A (Page 1 of 2) Operating with Turbine Controls in Manual Mode 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTES

1) This section should only be used when the OPERATOR AUTO mode is malfunctioning and the turbine is online.

2) When the turbine controls are in MANUAL mode the active Turbine Manual buttons will be illuminated.

3) Turbine load changes immediately when a raise or lower button is pressed.

4) Brief momentary button presses are best for making small load changes.

5) Raising and Lowering load contained in steps 1 .OB and 1 .OC below may be used alternatively to achieve desired load.

A. IF turbine controls are NOT in TURBINE MANUAL mode AND TURBINE MANUAL mode is desired, THEN PRESS TURBINE MANUAL button in TURBINE MODES group. B. INITIATE load reduction by PERFORMING the following on the Turbine EHC panel:

1. (p) MOMENTARILY PRESS the lower button (GV) in the TURBINE MANUAL group.

2. MONITOR REFERENCE DROP.

3. REPEAT Substeps 1.OB.1 and 1.OB.2 as required to achieve desired load.

Page 22 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOl-39 UnitI Rev.0014 Appendix A (Page 2 of 2) Operating with Turbine Controls in Manual Mode 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) CAUTION Raise and Lower buttons operate Governor Valves at a rate of 33%! minute. If Fast push button is also depressed at the same time the valve movement rate is 133.3%! minute. C. INITIATE load increase by PERFORMING the following on the Turbine EHC panel:

1. (p) MOMENTARILY PRESS the raise button (GV) in the TURBINE MANUAL group.

2. MONITOR REFERENCE INCREASE.

3. REPEAT Substeps 1.OC.1 and 1.OC.2 as required to achieve desired load.

D. IF OPERATOR AUTO turbine control mode is desired, THEN PRESS OPER AUTO button in TURBINE MODES group. Page 23 of 24

WBN Rapid Load Reduction AOI-39 , Unit I Rev. 0014 Source Notes (Page 1 ofl) Implementing Affected Requirements Statement Source Document Statement Steps Rewrite GOI-6 to become a rapid SOER 94-01 Rec. 2 0.1 All load reduction procedure. Page 24 of 24

I I/ Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit I System Operating Instruction SOl-2&3.OI Condensate And Feedwater System Revision 0112 Quality Related Level of Use: Multiple Effective Date: 02-17-2011 Responsible Organization: OPS, Operations Prepared By: R. A. ORear Approved By: Brian Mcllnay

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOl-2&3.O1 Uniti Rev.0112 Page2of 242 Revision Log Revision Affected or Change Effective Page Number Date Numbers Description of RevisionlChange 110 10/27/10 2,9, 11-13, 29, 34, Created Section 8.28 to facilitate fast 44, 45, 48, 49, 51, draindown of hotwell (PCR 4288). Corrected Source Note notation 82-84: 8890,99, (PCR 4432). 102-104, 108, 110, Enhanced hose step in Section 8.25. 113, 115, 121-123, Added MFP trip oil press verification to Eng 131-134,136,138, recommended value due to 140, 142, 146, 149, SQN-NOER-10032. 151, 155, 156, 158, Minor/editorial changes: 170-172,174,177, Revised TE NOTE in Section 5.4 and 5.5 180, 184-187, 189, and deleted incorrect TE NOTE in Section 214-217

208, 5.4 to clarify which TEs need to be above 250°F (PER 232129).

Added Critical Step markers and Critical Evolution consideration step to Sections 8.22.1 and 8.22.2 (PER 246210). Revised NOTE 1 in Section 5.10 and 5.11 (PCR 4629). Updated Maintenance Shop names, WO to SR, and RADCON to RP. Revised section closure steps. Corrected minor formatting errors. 111 12/20/2010 2,35, 124,217, Added infrequent section 8.29 to align 218 condensate to suction of MFWP to use recirc valve flowpath to condenser for cooling. Added HS information for operating FCV-3-205 in section 7.3.3 step 4 [PER 268677] 112 02/17/11 2, 18, 70-76, 78- Revised and clarrified sections 5.10 and 84, 86, 95-100, 5.11 to control MFW pump trip bus breakers 102103, 105, 106, and to work in conjunction with and allow

                           ,               preparations to be performed in parallel with GO-2. [PCR 5003] Made minor format changes to Sections 5.10 and 5.1 1 to enhance configuration control and comply with Writers Guide.

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3.01 Uniti Rev.0112 Page 3 of 242 Table of Contents

1.0 INTRODUCTION

7 1.1 Purpose 7 1.2 Scope 7

2.0 REFERENCES

8 2.1 Performance References 8 2.2 Developmental References 9 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 11 4.0 PREREQUISITE ACTIONS 21 4.1 Preliminary Actions 21 4.2 Field Preparations 22 4.3 Approvals and Notifications 22 5.0 STARTUP 23 5.1 Short Cycle Operation 23 5.2 Establishing Condenser Vacuum 30 5.3 Long Cycle Deaeration 35 5.4 Power Escalation 45 5.5 Long Cycle Operation 45 5.6 Bypass Reg to Main Reg Transfer (Method 1) 52 5.7 Bypass Reg to Main Reg Transfer (Method 2) 54 5.8 Condensate Booster Pump Operation 56 5.9 Standby Main Feed Pump Operation Or Standby Alignment 61 5.10 MFP lAOperation 70 5.11 MFP lB Operation 95 5.12 Condensate Demin Pump Operation 118 6.0 NORMAL OPERATION 120 6.1 Condensate Processing And Handling 120 6.2 Operation of the Feedwater System 120 6.3 Condensate System 121

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3.01 Unit I Rev. 0112 Page 4of 242 Table of Contents (continued) 7.0 SHUTDOWN 122 7.1 Shutdown Cond Demin Pumps 122 7.2 Shutdown Condensate Booster Pumps 123 7.3 MFP SHUTDOWN 125 7.3.1 TDMFP Shutdown 125 7.3.2 Standby Main Feed Pump Shutdown 131 7.3.3 Standby MFP Shutdown And Standby Alignment 132 7.4 Main Reg to Bypass Reg Transfer 135 7.5 Shut Down Condensate System from Long Cycle Deaeration 138 7.6 HWPShutdown 141 7.7 Removing CBP and MFP from Service During Shutdown 142 8.0 INFREQUENT OPERATIONS 143 8.1 CST A Cleanup via Condensate System 143 8.2 Swapping MFPT Duplex Filter 1A and lB 144 8.2.1 Swapping MFPT Duplex Filter 1A: 144 8.2.2 Swapping MFPT Duplex Filter lB 146 8.3 Align CST B for UI Hotwell Makeup 148 8.4 Transfer Water between CSTs 150 8.5 Placing MFPs on Turning Gear During Shutdown 152 8.6 lsoIateMFPTAorB 156 8.7 Alternating HWPs 159 8.8 Guidelines for Starting SMFP with Short Term Use of I-FCV-3-195 161 8.9 Replacing Turbine Driven MFP with SMFP, or Periodic Operation of SMFP 165 8.10 Transferring Hotwell Level Transmitters 168 8.11 Placing Condensate In Service to SGBD First Stage HXs 171 8.12 Starting CVPs With Vacuum Established 174 8.13 Swapping MFP Turbine Oil Coolers 176 14 GST A Heatup via Condensate System 180

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3.O1 Uniti Rev.0112 Page 5 of 242 Table of Contents (continued) 8.15 Removing Condensate From Service to SGBD First Stage HXs 181 8.16 Hot Well Pump Operation at Power 182 8.16.1 HWP Shutdown at Power 182 8.16.2 HWP Startup at Power 184 8.17 Condensate Booster Pump Operation at Power 187 8.17.1 CBPShutdownatPower 187 8.17.2 CBPStartupatPower 190 8.18 Check For Water Accumulation On Discharge Of Vacuum Pumps 194 8.19 Isolate Hotwell From CST 195 8.20 Transfer Water from CSTs to Station Sump 196 8.21 Checking Condenser Vacuum Inleakage 199 8.22 Adjust Main Feed Pump Hand Speed Changers 201 8.22.1 Adjust A Main Feed Pump Turbine Hand Speed Changer 201 8.22.2 Adjust B Main Feed Pump Turbine Hand Speed Changer 204 8.23 Adjust CBP Oil Temperature During Plant Operation 207 8.24 Swapping MFPT Main Oil Pumps With MFPT In Service 208 8.24.1 Swapping 1A MFPT Main Oil Pumps 208 8.24.2 Swapping lB MFPT Main Oil Pumps 210 8.25 Condenser Water Level Control 212 8.26 Throttling H/P Steam Supply lsol During MFPT Startup 214 8.26.1 Throttling 1A MFPT H/P Steam Supply Isol During Startup 214 8.26.2 Throttling lB MFPT H/P Steam Supply Isol During Startup 216 8.27 Post Trip Cooldown of Feedwater Lines 218 8.28 Fast Draindown of Hotwell 224 8.29 Modified Longcycle for Condensate Cooling While Shutdown 226 9.0 RECORDS 228 9.1 QARecords 228 9.2 Non-QA Records 228 Appendix A: MFPT buplex Filters IA And lB 229

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3.O1 Uniti Rev.0112 . Page6of 242 Table of Contents (continued) Appendix B: SG Program Level-vs-Nuclear Power 231 Appendix C: Main Feed Pump Hot Start 234 Appendix D: Main Feed Pump Cold Start 235 Appendix E: CBP Oil And Bearing Temperature Trending 239 Source Notes 241 ATTACHMENTS Attachment 1 H: Condensate And Feedwater System Handswitch Checklist 2&3.O1-1 H Attachment 1P: Condensate And Feedwater System Power Checklist 2&3.O1-1P Attachment 2P: Condensate And Feedwater System Power Checklist 2&3.O1-2P Attachment 1V: Condensate And Feedwater System Valve Checklist 2&3.O1-IV Attachment 2V: Condensate And Feedwater System Valve Checklist 2&3.O1-2V

• WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3M1 Uniti Rev.0112

.                                                              Page7of 242

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose To provide instructions for operation of the Condensate and Feedwater Systems. 1.2 Scope This Instruction includes startup, normal operation, and shutdown [cli] operation of the following equipment: A. Hotwell Pumps B. Condensate Booster Pumps C. Main Feed Pumps (MFP) [cli] D. Standby Main Feed Pump (SMFP) E. Condenser Vacuum Pumps (CVP) F. Condensate Demin Pumps

• WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3.01 Unitl Rev.0112

. Page8of 242

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Performance References A. SOI-2.02, Condensate Startup Filter B. 501-3.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System C. SOI-5&6.01, Extraction Steam, Heater Drains, and Vent System D. SOI-14.01, Condensate Demineralizer Polisher Operation E. SOI-25/26.01, Raw Service and High Pressure Fire Protection Systems F. SOI-37.0l, Gland Seal Water System G. SOI-47.Ol, Main Turbine Turning Gear Operation H. SO1-47.03, Main Turbine Steam Seal System I. SOI-54.0l, Injection Water System J. SOI-90.02, Gaseous Process Radiation Monitors K. SOl-90.05, Post-Accident Rad Monitors L. TI-i 01 .03A.01, System 3A, MFP Periodic Checkout Operation Using Aux Boiler Steam M. 0-Pl-OPS-i7.O, 18 Month Locked Valve Verification N. MI-57.036, Electric Motor/Generator Replacement and Bearing

0. 0-Pl-OPS-i.1, Jumper Control Process

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOl-2&3.01 Unitl Rev. 0112 Page 9 of 242 2.2 Developmental References A. SOl-2.03, Main Condenser Fast Fill and Drain B. N3-2-4002, System Description, Condensate System C. N3-3A-4002, System Description, Main Feedwater, Feedwater Control, and Injection Water D. Vendor Manuals:

1. WBN-VTM B580-0010, Byron Jackson, Contract 083018, #0038

2. WBN-VTM-B580-0030; Vendor Technical Manual For Byron Jackson Condensate Booster, Condensate Hotwell, #3 & #7 Heater Drain And Standby Main Feed Pumps; Byron Jackson, Ingersoll-Rand, Contract 083174

3. WBN-VTD-B580-0150; Installation, Operation And Maintenance Instructions For The Byron Jackson Standby Main Feed Pumps [PUB. #

G404550]

4. WBN-VTM-W1 20-2094

5. WBN-VTD-P076-0020, Parson-Peebles Operating and Maintenance Instructions For Standby Main Feed, Hotwell, Booster, NO. 3 and NO. 7 Heater Drain Pump Motors [PUB. # AGC/254498-502]

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOl-2&3.01 Unitl Rev.0112 Page 10 of 242 2.2 Developmental References (continued) E. fl/A Drawings:

1. 45B1754-5C

2. l-45B6236-010, -011, -017, -020, -033, -034, -035, -041, -042, -043, -044

3. 1-45B6275-011, -028

4. 45N700-1

5. 45N721-1

6. 1-45W600-2, -3, -5, -6, -7, -8, -9, -11

7. 1-45W600-46-1, -3, -4, -5, -7

8. 1-45W600-57-1, -2, -31

9. 1-45W703-1

10. 1-45W753-7

11. 1-45W760-2-1 through -5

12. 1-45W760-3-1 through -11

13. 1 -45W1 646-2

14. 1-47W803-1

15. 1-47W804-1,-2

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3.01 Uniti Rev.0112 Page 11 of 242 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS A. Hotwell/Hotwell Pumps

1. Failure to isolate 1-LCV-37-1, GSW STOR TNK MU LEVEL CNTL, before starting the first Hotwell Pump, will result in GSW Tank overflow.

2. Flow from the Hotwell to the CSTs should be limited when condenser vacuum does NOT exist. Notify Chemistry for contingent actions. [c.12]

3. Filling Hotwell 18 or more above normal when water temp is below 60°F could cause Condenser wall weld failure.

4. 1-LCV-2-9, MAIN CONDENSER AUTO MAKEUP LEVEL CNTL, has a hole drilled in valve to allow 8 to 10 gpm leak-by with valve closed, thus raising Hotwell level.

5. Pumping Hotwell water to the CST when vacuum is broken raises CST 02.

6. Hotwell Pump motor bearing temp alarm should be set at 225°F or lower.

Max temperature limit on bearings is 300°F per reference 2.2.A.

7. Hotwell pumps require >12 inches Hotwell Level to ensure adequate suction is available. [c.6]

8. If hotwell pump motor has been NOT running for 7 days or more, or motor upper bearing maintenance has just been performed, Mechanical Maintenance must be contacted to prelube the upper bearing by removing about a cup of oil from the drain valve at the bearing sight glass and adding it back through the oil filler/breather connection at the top of the bearing.

(Ref: Ml-57.036, Attachment 1, Step 1.B) B. Common/Misc Systems

1. Since the Condenser Vacuum Exhaust effluent must be monitored for a SG tube leak, and the CVE monitors must remain isolated until vacuum is achieved to avoid water damage, the following comp measures must be taken per guidance in System Description N3-2-4002, Section 4.10:

a. SG blowdown rad monitors should be placed in service.

b. Sampling provisions of the ODCM will be used to assess radioactive effluents out of the CVE.

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3.01 Uniti Rev. 0112 . Pagel2of242 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (continued)

2. RCW supplies to various oil Hxs throughout system are isolated to prevent excessive oil cooling and condensation in piping. Care should be taken to ensure these valves are open before starting associated equipment.

3. Injection Water Pump damage may occur if operated over 4 minutes without at least one MFP receiving seal flow. Pumps have no recirc capability.

4. Steam Dumps to the Main Condenser should NOT be used with a water box out of service. Prolonged exposure to super heated steam in a water box without circ water may cause damage to condenser tubes and adversely impact Condenser Vacuum Pump performance.

5. 1FS-2-35 permits 1-FCV-15-43 to open at greater than 3500 gpm condensate flowrate.

6. To protect the condensate demins, 1-TS-15-43 alarms at greater than or equal to 145°F blowdown fluid temperature and closes 1-FCV-15-43 at greater than or equal to 150°F.

7. 1-FCV-2-260, (actuated by 1-PDI-2-260), maintains a constant AP across the second stage HXs and the GSC.

8. 1-FCV-2-329B is modulated by 1-PDIC-2-329 to maintain 2.1 psid across the first stage HXs (1-FCV-2-329A full open).

9. During unit startup, 1-FCV-2-329A is fully open, initially. As load rises, 1-FCV-2-329Bs capacity to maintain 2.1 psid is exceeded. At 2.8 psid (13% load) across low pressure heaters, 1-FCV-2-329B closes and 1-FCV-2-329A is modulated by 1-TIC-2-329A to maintain 230°F condensate temperature out of the first stage heat exchangers.

10. If SGBD flow is being initiated or isolated with unit at greater than 13%

load, 1-FCV-2-329A could be fully closed. This valve should be partially opened to ensure condensate flow through first stage heat exchanger prior to initiating SGBD flow to prevent water hammer. Controller gain/setpoint may be adjusted as required to maintain stable system operation as directed by System Engineering/Instrument Maintenance (IM).

11. Chemistry should be notified before initiating Short Cycle, Long Cycle, or Power Operation to coordinate chemical addition and sampling activities.

12. Instrument Maintenance should be notified to ensure required instruments are in service as necessary to support Systelil operation: -

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3M1 Uniti Rev.0112 Page 13 of 242 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (continued)

13. Work in Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) requires the use of existing RWPs, and may require additional ALARA Preplans. Failure to follow posted Rad control requirements can cause unnecessary radiation exposure. Radiation Protection should be notified of work having the potential to change radiological conditions.

14. Steps that directly affect reactivity will be preceded with the Greek symbol (p).

C. Condensate

1. Before pressurizing the Condensate System or drawing a vacuum, consideration should be given to Injection Water, Gland Seal Water, Auxiliary Feedwater, Exhaust Hood Sprays, and Chemical Feeds.

2. Cond Demin AUO should be notified before starting pumps that could affect Cond Demin AP, to allow actions to prevent high AP auto-bypass.

3. Normal Condensate operating temp limit is 140°F. Operating above 140°F can damage Cond Demin Resin.

D. Shortcycle

1. Short Cycle is not for long-term operation. Due to piping vibration and movement, Short Cycle operation should be minimized by proceeding to Long Cycle recirc as soon as reasonable, when the required conditions are satisfied.

E. Long Cycle Deaeration

1. Used when:

a. SG temp is 400°F or less (not required when in Hot Standby with NO possibility of injecting into SGs, i.e., NO feedwater pumps in service) and MFW ISOL MOV5 closed.

b. Condensate press below 350 psig (below 550 psig if operating CBP).

c. SG press atmospheric or greater.

d. Condensate temp 100°F or greater (If Unit Heatup/Startup in progress).

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3.01 Uniti Rev.0112 Page 14 of 242 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (continued)

2. The deaeration line valves (1-ISV-3-602 and 1-FCV-3-195) should be open during long-cycle deaeration with only HWPs operating and closed during all other modes. 1-FCV-3-195 will NOT withstand the higher pressure drop caused by the MFPs. [c.17]

F. Condensate Booster Pumps

1. The minimum oil temperature recommendation is 70°F to 80°F. This is based on ensuring adequate oil is available during startup, when the oil temperature is lowest. (with oil temperature this low, the auxiliary oil pump may trip on overload, or the oil relief valve may lift due to high pressure and cause the bearing to be starved). The maximum oil temperature is 135°F.

This is based on allowing a maximum oil temperature out of the bearing of 185°F, with a 40°F rise across the bearing.

2. If injection water is aligned to a non-running Condensate Booster Pump, the pump should either be promptly started or injection water isolated to avoid water intrusion to the CBPs oil system.

G. Standby Main Feedwater Pump

1. 1-PCV-3-40 must be set at 1200 psia and closed, and 1-FCV-3-195 closed before starting any of the three MFPs.

2. The Standby Main Feed Pump minimum oil temperature recommendation is 70°F to 80°F. This is based on ensuring adequate oil is available during startup, when the oil temperature is lowest. (with oil temperature this low, the auxiliary oil pump may trip on overload, or the oil relief valve may lift due to high pressure, and cause the bearing to be starved). The maximum oil temperature is 135°F. This is based on allowing a maximum oil temperature out of the bearing of 185°F, with an 40°F rise across the bearing.

3. Standby Main Feed Pump (SMFP) should be operated at low flow conditions without a Condensate Booster Pump, to prevent lifting #1 Heater relief valves at 1650 psig.

4. SMFP Motor, Gear, and Pump Lube systems should be heated to 140 to 160°F oil leaving the bearings before placing RCW in service to the oil coolers. Oil temp alarm is 170°. This helps limit startup vibration.

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOl-2&3.01 Unitl Rev. 0112 Page 15 of 242 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (continued)

5. A feedwater isolation (FWI) signal will cause the SMFP miniflow valves to fully open. The valves will return to their modulated position on FWI signal reset, or they can be controlled manually. This design change was made to give the miniflow valves a head start open signal on FWI to limit the delta pressure transient across the valves for improvement of operation and service life.

6. The following are monitored during Standby MFP operation. Pump is manually tripped if manufacturers limit is reached and no auto-trip occurs.

PARAMETER MANUFACTURERS LIMIT Low Suction Press 100 psig (below 50% load) 250 psig (50% load or above) High Discharge Press 1363 psig Low Bearing Oil Press 8 psig or less (Auto Trip) 10 psig or less (Auto Trip) High Bearing Metal Temp 225°For more (Journal & Thrust)

7. If SBMFP vibration is greater than or equal to 5 mils, evaluate Unit load reduction to allow removal of pump from service. If vibration reaches 10 mils, immediately trip the pump.

8. The following guidance may be used to start or stop the SBMFP during hot weather:

NOTE The MFPT CONDENSER VACUUM LO alarm [Window 55-D] comes in at 12.5 Hg vacuum (17.5 HgA). This corresponds to a MFPT condenser drain temperature of185°F. If the SBMFP is in service due to elevated hotwell and circulating water temperatures, the following guidance may be used to remove the SBMFP from service as water temperatures drop: The SBMFP may be secured if any of the following conditions exist:

a. Both MFPT condensers are 12.5 in. HgA, OR

b. HotWell pump discharge temperature drops to 129°F, OR

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3.01 Uniti Rev.0112 . Page16of242 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (continued)

c. C zone main condenser back pressure drops to 5.0 in. HgA, OR

d. CCW inlet temperature drops to 87°F (should be secured prior to 67°F) with all 4 CCW pumps in service, OR

e. MFPT Condenser drain temperature 171°F.

If the SBMFP is NOT in service, the following guidance may be used to place the SBMFP in service as water temperatures rise: The SBMFP should be placed in service if any of the following conditions exist:

f. Either MFPT condensers are >15.4 in. HgA, OR

g. Hotwell pump discharge temperature achieves the maximum allowable condensate polisher inlet temperature of 140°F, OR

h. C zone main condenser back pressure achieves the alarm setpoint when operating above 90% power, OR

i. Plant power is power limited due to C Zone main condenser back pressure exceeding the associated alarm setpoint, OR

j. MFPT Condenser drain temperature >180°F.

9. All jumper installation and removal shall be in accordance with 0-PI-OPS-1 .1, Jumper Control Process.

H. MFWPs/MFPTs

1. MFPTs and MFPs Motor, Gear, and Pump Lube systems should be heated to 140 to 160°F oil leaving the bearings before placing RCW in service to the oil coolers. Oil temp alarm is 170°F. This helps limit startup vibration.

2. The MFPT turning gear is NOT designed to be rolled off like the main turbine. Any action or evolution that could spin the MFP turbine while the turning gear is in operation could result in damage if the turning gear is NOT removed from service. Example: Unisolating the manual valves to the HP or LP steam supply.

3. MFP suction press should be kept as low as possible to help prevent exceeding the discharge piping design pressure of 1230 psig. However, short duration disch press up to 1363 psig is acceptable.

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3.01 Uniti Rev. 0112 Page 17 of 242 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (continued)

4. The TDMFP should NOT be operated until sufficient forward flow (approx 4500 gpm) can be provided continuously to the SGs using the SMFP.

5. Trip of a MFPT, loss of MFPT reset, or reset of a MFP NOT available due to maintenance activities, may cause ESFAS AFW start or require entering LCO 3.3.2, Condition J.

6. A feedwater isolation (FWI) signal will cause the TDMFP miniflow valves to fully open. The vales will return to their modulated position on FWI signal reset, or they can be controlled manually. This design change was made to give the miniflow valves a Thead start open signal on FWI to limit the delta pressure transient across the valves for improvement to operation and service life.

7. If MFPT steam seals are applied with rotor at rest, rotor, seal, and/or bearing damage can occur. Prolonged admission of seal steam before establishing condenser vacuum may damage condenser. Removing steam seals before condenser vacuum is zero, may damage seals due to high air in-leakage through seals.

8. When extended shutdown of MFP Turbines is required, voltage should be removed from affected MFPT Control Panel to extend relay coil life. [c.4]

9. MFP Turbine vibration is high when operated at rated speed (5012 RPM) and low forward flow or recirc flows. Operator action should be taken to minimize time in this condition to less than 20 minutes, at which time speed should be reduced to achieve acceptable vibration conditions.

10. The following are monitored during MFP operation. MFPs are manually tripped if manufacturers limit is reached and no auto-trip occurs:

PARAMETER MANUFACTURERS LIMIT PUMP Low Suction Press 100 psig (below 50% load) MFPs 250 psig (50% load or above) High Discharge Press 1363 psig MFPs Low Bearing Oil Press 8 psig or less (Auto Trip) MFPs & MFPT 10 psig or less (Auto Trip) Low Vacuum 10 in. Hg or less (Auto Trip) MFPT High Thrust Bearing Wear 0.010 in. or more wear displacement MFPT from 0 (Auto Trip) High Bearing Metal Temp 225°F or more (Journal & Thrust) MFPs & MFPT Overspeed 6006 to 6126 rpm (Auto Trip) MFPT

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3.01 Unit I Rev. 0112 Page 18 of 242 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (continued)

11. If MFP and/or MFPT vibration is greater than or equal to 5 mils, evaluate Unit load reduction to allow removal of pump from service. If vibration reaches 10 mils, immediately trip the pump.

12. In Mode 1, entry into Tech Spec 3.3.2 condition J may be suspended for up to 4 hours when placing the second Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pump (TDMFWP) in service or removing one of two Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pumps (TDMFWP) from service. Refer to Tech Spec 3.3.2 table 3.3.2-1.

13. In Mode 2, trip function of all Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pumps (TDMFWP) is required when one or more (TDMFWP) is supplying feedwater to the Steam Generators. During the process of placing the first TDMFW pump in service, the anticipatory AFW auto-start channel for the non-operating TDMFW pump is deenergized to prevent inadvertent AFW auto-start during rollup trip testing and overspeed trip testing. Once the operating TDMFW pump has established sufficient feed flow to maintain SG level, the anticipatory AFW auto-start channel for the non-operating TDMFW pump is placed in the trip condition, and the AFW pumps secured. Refer to Tech Spec 3.3.2.6,e and B 3.3.2.6.e.

14. MFPT condenser initial vacuum is drawn using the Condenser Vacuum Pumps and then swapped to the Main Condenser to prevent creating a large pressure change in the Main Condenser.

MFP5 Common/Feedwater

1. 1-PCV-3-40 must be set at 1200 psia and closed, and 1-FCV-3-195 closed before starting any of the three MFPs.

2. MFW discharge piping Overpressure may occur if CBPs or Cond Demin Pumps are operated in conjunction with the MFP5 below 50% Power.

3. Loss of MFP Injection Water may result in steaming or hot water leakage into the bearing oil or bearing overheat. Injection Water should be restored immediately or a controlled shutdown of the MFP should be initiated.

4. When MEW flow is stopped, the MEW piping may lose its charge to the main condenser. The line charge and pressure must be reestablished very slowly past the valves or pump used to stop flow, prior to reopening the valves or starting pump, to prevent a severe water-hammer.

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3.01 Uniti Rev. 0112 Page 19 of 242 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (continued)

5. MEW Bypass flows in excess of 84,510 pph will exceed the calibration range of the bypass flow transmitters computer points E0407A, E0427A, F0447A, and F0467A which will make Ui 118 series ICS venturi -based calorimetric power inaccurate.

6. During startup, the main FRVs and bypass ERVs should be momentarily throttled almost closed, prior to starting the first higher pressure pump (CDP5, CBPs, MFPs) and the flow and pressure downstream of FRVs established very slowly, to avoid severe water hammer.

7. Eor short duration test purposes, using a single MEP, 1-ECV-3-195 may be opened to allow higher long cycle recirculation flow than achievable via 1-PCV-3-40, with the following limitations:

a. MEW and long cycle piping must be charged and at the higher pressure before opening 1-ECV-3-195.

b. 1-ECV-3-195 to be gradually opened fully and NOT throttled.

c. Limited to two MEW loops with the other two loops main and bypass ERVs and long cycle paths closed (single loop flow performed for SMEP).

d. Throttle flow on the one or two open main ERVs.

e. No two higher pressure pumps (CDPs, CBP, or MEPs) are to be in operation simultaneously.

f. Should only be done during cold shutdown long cycle recirculation.

• WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3.01 Uniti Rev.0112 Page 20 of 242 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (continued)

J. Low Power (Below 22% load)/Swapover Operations:

1. SG Feedwater additions must be via the upper (bypass) nozzle and should be continuous rather than intermittent, to reduce SG upper nozzle thermal cycling, but intermittent flow is permitted.

2. SG lower nozzle must be isolated (MFW ISOL MOVs closed) to prevent cold water, at the hot lower nozzle, in order to limit the number of feedwater system induced transients and the minimum temperature of continuous FWflow into the S/G preheater region.

3. 1-HS-3-45, LONG CYCLE RECIRC-NORMAL, accomplishes partial auto realignment for the 2 modes; however, manual positioning of some valves is required as directed by this instruction.

4. The interlock functions of 1-HS-3-45, LONG CYCLE RECIRC-NORMAL, are functional, but the operator is expected to take appropriate action if conditions warrant. Feedwater flow to the lower nozzle must be terminated and bypass flow established if any of the following minimums are reached:

(1) MFW line temp below 250°F. (2) MFW line flow below 14%.

5. A low flow alarm at 20% (ARI-57-63 Window 59-C) gives the operator time to take corrective action before manual actions must be taken when flow drops to <14%. This low flow condition (<14%) is indicated by the extinguishing of the blue Main Flow> SP lights on 1-M-3.

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOl-2&3.O1 Uniti Rev.0112 Page 187 of 242 Date________ INITIALS 8.17 Condensate Booster Pump Operation at Power 8.17.1 CBP Shutdown at Power CAUTION Consider load reduction of approximately 2% based on current plant conditions. NOTES

1) When a CBP is stopped near full power the following parameters are expected to change as follows: Feedwater flow will fluctuate and stabilize at original value, MFWP suction pressure will lower approx. 70 psig (See P&L 3.0H.10), and #3 HDT level will fluctuate approximately 1/2 inch.

2) FW Heater levels may fluctuate, consider local monitoring.

3) The ICS may be used to monitor discharge valve closure progress by observing lowering CBP motor power and raising discharge pressure.

4) Precaution 3.OF.2 should be reviewed prior to removing a CBP from service.

[1] ENSURE selected CBP AUX OIL PUMP in P-AUTO: (NIA other CBP5) A. 1-HS-2-105A, AUX OIL PMP CNDS BSTR PMP A. B. 1-HS-2-107A, AUX OIL PMP CNDS BSTR PMP B. C. 1-HS-2-109A, AUX OIL PMP CNDS BSTR PMP C. [2] THROTTLE CLOSE selected Condensate Booster Pump discharge valve: (N/A other CBPs) A. 1-ISV-2-607, CONDENSATE BSTR PUMP 1A DISCHARGE ISOL [T7G/685]. B. 1-ISV-2-608, CONDENSATE BSTR PUMP lB DISCHARGE ISOL [T7F1685]. C. 1-ISV-2-609, CONDENSATE BSTR PUMP 1C DISCHARGE ISOL [T7F1685].

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3.O1 Unitl Rev.0112 Page 188 of 242 Date________ INITIALS 8.17.1 CBP Shutdown at Power (continued) [3] PLACE selected CBP(s) handswitch to STOP, AND HOLD UNTIL associated suction valve starts to CLOSE [1-M-3]: (NIA other CBP5) A. 1-HS-.2-97A, CNDS BSTR PMP A. B. 1-HS-2-91A, CNDS BSTR PMP B. C. 1-HS-2-84A, CNDS BSTR PMP C. [4] ENSURE suction valve CLOSED for applicable CBP [1-M-31: (NIA other CBP5) A. 1-FCV-2-94 [1-HS-2-94A], CNDS BSTR PMP A SUCTION VLV. B. 1-FCV-2-87 [1-HS-2-87A], CNDS BSTR PMP B SUCTION VLV. C. 1-FCV-2-81 [1-HS-2-81A], CNDS BSTR PMP C SUCTION VLV. [5] LOCALLY OBSERVE pump rotation stops. [6] CLOSE respective CBP Oil Hx RCW Supply: (NIA valves not used) NOMENCLATURE LOCATION POSITION CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP IA UNID I PERF INITIALS J CBP OIL COOLER 1A ROW IN LET ISOL T7G1685 CLOSED CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP lB 1-ISV-24-71 1 I ] CBP OIL COOLER lB RCW INLET ISOL T7F/685 CLOSED CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP IC I -ISV-24-71 0 I I CBP OIL COOLER 1C ROW INLET ISOL T7F1685 CLOSED 1 -ISV-24-709 T 1

WBN Condensate And Feedwater System SOI-2&3.O1 Uniti Rev.0112 Page 189 of 242 Date________ INITIALS 8.17.1 CBP Shutdown at Power (continued) NOTE Approximately 30 minutes should be allowed from time of pump shutdown to allow pump casing to cool to prevent seal leakoff from flashing to steam. [7] CLOSE the applicable Seal Water Injection valves for the CBP being shutdown: (N!A other CBP5) NOMENCLATURE LOCATION UNID PERF INITIALS CNDS BSTR PUMP IA SEAL T8G/685.5 I-ISV-54-540 WTR INJ ISOL CNDS BSTR PUMP lB SEAL T8F/685.5 1-ISV-54-541 WTR NJ ISOL CNDS BSTR PUMP 1C SEAL T8F/685.5 l-ISV-54-542 WTR NJ ISOL CNDS BSTR PUMP 1A SEAL T8G1685.5 1-LOV-54-543 WTR LEAKOFF CNDS BSTR PUMP lB SEAL T8F/685.5 1-LOV-54-544 WTR LEAKOFF CNDS BSTR PUMP 1C SEAL T8F/685.5 l-LOV-54-545 WTR LEAKOFF [8] IF stopping the Aux Oil Pump, THEN PLACE selected CBP AUX OIL PUMP in STOP/PULL-TO-LOCK: (NIA other CBP5) A. 1-HS-2-105A, AUX OIL PMP CNDS BSTR PMP A. B. 1-HS-2-107A, AUX OIL PMP CNDS BSTR PMP B. C. 1-HS-2-109A, AUX OIL PMP CNDS BSTR PMP C. End of Section

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Watts Bar December 2011 Scenario No. 4 Op Test No.: 2 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Run Time: 78 minutes Initial Conditions: 100% power, RCS boron concentration 747 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. FINAL SUBMITTAL Turnover: Train AlChannel 1 Work Week. lA-A CCP is tagged for motor bearing replacement. LCO 3.5.2 and TR 3.1 .4 were entered 8 hours ago. Protected equipment signs have been posted for 1 B-B CCP. An oil leak developed on the 1A MFP during the last shift. Leak rate is being monitored, and Operations Management is meeting to determine whether the pump will be removed from service. The Standby Main Feedwater pump is in service. Event MaIf. No. Event Type* Event Description No. 1 rx05a 1-RO 1 -LT-68-339, PZR LEVEL fails low. TS-SRO 2 rxl8 C-RO T-avg control signal fails high. 3 n/a R-RO Operations Superintendent contacts the control room and states that the 1A MFP is to be taken out of service. Power is to be reduced at 3%/mm to 75% using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction. N-BOP/SRO BOP manipulates Turbine controls in support of the rapid plant shutdown. 4 fwo5a C-BOP At 95% power, 1A Main Feedwater pump trips due to low oil TS-SRO pressure. 5 fw94 C-BOP 1-FCV-2-205, MFPT A CONDENSER CNDS OUTLET and 1-fw95 FCV-2-210, MFPT A CONDENSER CNDS INLET fail to close automatically. 6 fw29c M-ALL 1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MFW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing fw22c SG 3 level to drop. The automatic reactor trip function has failed, fw49a requiring a manual trip of the reactor from panel 1 -M-6 due to a rpOl b failure of the manual trip switch on 1-M-4. E-0, Reactor Trip or rprtl Safety Injection, will be entered and a transition to ES-0.1, ed06b Reactor Trip Response, will be made. At the trip, the TDAFW rpr68 pump becomes steam bound, the 1A MDAFW pump shaft shears. rpr69 1 B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-0.1 Step 4. Bleed-and-feed must start immediately, since neither CCP is available. The 1-M-4 reactor trip switch failure will require the Reactor Trip Breakers to be cycled locally in FR-H.1. (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Watts Bar Examination December2011 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 4 Summary Initial Condition 100% power, RCS boron concentration 747 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. Turnover Train A/Channel 1 Work Week. lA-A CCP is tagged for motor bearing replacement. LCO 3.5.2 and TR 3.1.4 were entered 8 hours ago. Protected equipment signs have been posted for 1 B-B CCP. An oil leak developed on the 1A MFP during the last shift. Leak rate is being monitored, and Operations Management is meeting to determine whether the pump will be removed from service. The Standby Main Feedwater pump is in service. Event 1 1-LT-68-339, PZR LEVEL fails low. Requires entry into AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires return of letdown flowpath to normal. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation Event 2 T-avg control signal fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place rod control to MANUAL to stop rod motion. Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled rod movement. Requires manual control of 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL. Event 3 Operations Superintendent contacts the control room and states that the 1A MFP is to be taken out of service due to the slow oil leak. Power is to be reduced at 3%/rn in to 75% using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction. Event 4 At 95% power, 1A Main Feedwater pump trips due to low oil pressure. Requires entry into AOl-i 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, TDMFWP Trip OR Loss of Flow GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load). Requires a Tech Spec evaluation of Axial Flux Difference. Requires a boration to return AFD to target band. Event 5 1-FCV-2-205, MFPT A CONDENSER CNDS OUTLET and 1-FCV-2-210, MFPT A CONDENSER CNDS INLET fail to close automatically. Requires the BOP to manually close valves. Event 6 1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MFW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from panel 1 -M-6 due to a failure of the manual trip switch on 1 -M-4. E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, will be entered, and a transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, will be made. At the trip, the TDAFW pump becomes steam bound and the 1A MDAFW pump shaft shears. lB-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-Hi, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-0.1 Step 4. Bleed-and-feed must start immediately, since neither CCP is available. The 1-M-4 manual reactor trip switch failure will require the Reactor Trip Breakers to be cycled locally in FR-Hi. Appendix D Watts Bar Examination December 2011 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ppendix D Scenario Outline Form ESD-1 Scenario 4 Critical Task Summary Critical Task I Manually trip the reactor from the control room using handswitch I -RT-2, REACTOR TRIP, on panel 1 -M-6, upon recognition of the failure of the automatic trip circuit and failure of 1 -RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, on panel 1 -M-4. Critical Task 2 Initiate RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for safety injection pumps to inject into the RCS. Critical Task 3 Initiate RCS bleed and feed prior to reaching hot conditions in the Steam Generators. Appendix D Watts Bar Examination December 2011 NUREG 1021 Revision 9

Watts Ba iclear Plant 2011-12 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION ENSURE Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 304 by performing the following actions:

a. Select lCManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate IC# 304.

c. Right click on IC# 304.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC# 304.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value J fw94 fail auto close 2-205 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active fw95 fail auto close 2-2 10 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active rprtl rprtl manual reactor trip close-trip sw 0 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 neutral neutral rpOl b automatic reactor trip signal failure (atws) M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active cv0la charging pump a trip M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active fw22c airbound tdafw pump *M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active rx05a pzr level transmitter fails to position chnl 1 68-339 M 1 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 59.4271 rxl8 t-avg control signal failure M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 56.4271 fw05a turbine driven feed pump a trip M 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive pi-46-12 02120 mfp a brg oil press 0 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 18.9983 fw29c main fw reg vlv fcv-3-90 fail position M 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 25 0 Page 1 of 5

Watts Ba iclear Plant 2011-12 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value fW49a afW pump a sheared shaft M 19 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive ed06b loss of 6.9kv shutdown board bus lb-b M 19 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive rprl8 blocktrainaautosi R 21 00:00:00 00:00:00 Block Normal rprl9 block train b auto si R 21 00:00:00 00:00:00 Block Normal rpr68 HS Manual trip/close reactor trip breaker a R 25 00:00:00 00:00:00 Close Open rpr69 HS Manual trip/close reactor trip breaker b R 26 00:00:00 00:00:00 Close Open

5. rpr68 and rpr69 overrides are entered to locally cycle the reactor trip breakers when requested. To cycle reactor trip breaker A, enter Event 25 to close the breaker then immediately modify the remote to the trip position. To cycle reactor trip breaker B, enter Event 26 to close the breaker then immediately modify the remote to the trip position.

6. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

ENSURE 1-HS-62-108A, CCP A-A (ECCS (ECCS) is in Stop, Pull-to-Lock position and a Hold Notice (Red) Tag is placed on the handswitch. Place pink PROTECTED EQUIPMENT tag on 1-HS-62-104A, CCP B-B (ECCS).

8. -

ENSURE the Train A Week Channel I sign is placed on 1-M-30.

9. Place simulator in FREEZE.

10. ENSURE Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit I Reactivity Briefing Book MOL (Middle of Life) is provided to the crew as part of the Turnover Package, and that the MOL placards are on I-M-6, below the Boric Acid and Primary Water Integrators.

111. WHEN prompted by the Chief Examiner, place the Simulator in RUN. Page 2 of 5

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2011-12 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event Description/Role Play No. No. n/a nla ROLE PLAY: When the applicants assume shift, the BOP may contact the TB AUO for the latest status of the oil leak on IA MFW pump. If/when contacted, state that the oil leak rate is stable, approximately 0.25 gpm. The oil is contained and Fire Operations personnel are at the IA MFW pump. I I 1-LT-68-339, PZR LEVEL fails low. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Contro4 repeat back request to remove the failed channel from service. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, repeat back request for a troubleshooting and repair package for I-LT-68-339, PZR LEVEL. 2 2 T-avg control signal fails high. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work ControI, repeat back request to prepare a troubleshooting and repair package for the Tavg auctioneering circuit. 3 n/a Operations Superintendent contacts the control room and states that the IA MFP is to be taken out of service. Power is to be reduced at 3%/mm to 75% using AOl-39, Rapid Load Reduction. ROLE PLAY: When the SRO contacts Shift Manager, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to evaluate conditions using EPIP-I, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart. ROLE PLAY: When the SRO contacts Load Coordinator, the Console Operator will repeat back the information provided. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Chemistry, repeat back request perform power change samples to be performed. Page 3 of 5

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2011-12 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event Description/Role Play No. No. 4 4 At 95% power, 1A Main Feedwater pump trips due to low oil pressure. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Turbine Building AUO, repeat back request to investigate the cause of the IA MFP trip. Report that the oil leak caused the trip and that Fire Ops is on the scene containing the oil. Report that there is no fire. ROLE PLAY: When the BOP cOntacts the AUO to perform this step(LOCALLY MAINTAIN oil temp between 110 to 130°F on running Standby MFP using 1-THV-24-948.), the Console Operator will repeat back the request. Report back that SMFP oil temperature is 115°F. ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Chemistry, repeat back request perform power change samples to be performed. ROLE PLAY: When the SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back request to prepare a troubleshooting and repair package for the IA Main Feedwater Pump. 5 n/a 1-FCV-2-205, MFPT A CONDENSER CNDS OUTLET and 1-FCV-2-210, MFPT A CONDENSER CNDS IN LET fail to close automatically. ROLE PLAY: None 6 n/a IA-A MD AFW pump shaft failure. ROLE PLAY: When dispatched as an AUO, report that the IA-A MD AFW pump shaft appears to be broken. TDAFW pump becomes steam bound. ROLE PLAY: When dispatched as an AUO to the TD AFW pump, state that the discharge piping and pump casing are very hot. If requested to vent the pump, report back that the vent valve is stuck and that assistance from Maintenance has been requested. 1 B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board Trip. ROLE PLAY: When dispatched as an AUO to the lB-B 6.9 KVShutdown Board, state that the board tripped on differential relay operation. State that the board is damaged severely, and that there is NO fire. Page4of5

Watts BarNuclear Plant 2011-12 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event Description/Role Play No. No. . Block of AUTO SI. (From FR-H.1 Step 11 .b, contained in attachment 3 of the scenario guide) ROLE PLAY: If/when notified as Work Control OR Instrument Maintenance to block auto SI using IMI-99.040, AUTO SI Block repeat back the request. Wait 10 minutes then insert remote functions rprl8, block train a auto si and rprl9, block train b auto si. Report back that IMl-99.040 is complete. Cycle Reactor Trip Breakers Locally (From FR-H.1 Step 12 RNO or Appendix A, contained in attachment 3 of the scenario guide) ROLE Play: When contacted to cycle the reactor trip breakers locally, acknowledge the request then wait 3 mm prior to entering simulator event 25 and event 26. To cycle the trip breakers enter Event 25 to close the A reactor trip breaker, verify the red indicating light is lit, then immediately modify the override to open the A reactor trip breaker and verify the green light is lit. To cycle the trip breakers enter Event 26 to close the B reactor trip breaker, verify the red indicating light is lit, then immediately modify the override to open the B reactor trip breaker and verify the green light is lit. Page 5of5

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2J OpTestNo.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 1 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LT-68-339, PZR LEVEL fails low. Requires entry into AOl-20, Malfunction of FINAL Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires return of letdown flowpath to normal. SUBMITTAL Requires a Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The Chief Examiner cues the Console Operator to enter Event 1. Indications: 92-A PZR LEVEL LO 92-C PZR LEVEL LO HTRS OFF & LTDN CLOSED Diagnoses and announces the failure of the 1 -LT-68-339. PZR RD LEVEL. Takes the IMMEDIATE ACTION of AOI-20, Malfunction of RD Pressurizer Level Control System. Enters and directs actions of ADl-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer SRO Level Control System. The following actions are taken from AOl-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. NOTE Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step. RD 1. CHECK charging in service.

2. CHECK pzr level program signal NORMAL (green pen):

• 1 -LR-68-339 RD RO determines that the GREEN indicating pen is indicating normal full power PZR level (60%).

3. ENSURE 1-XS-68-339E selected to OPERABLE channels for control and backup:

• LT-68-339 & 335 RD OR
• LT-68-335 & 320 OR
• LT-68-339 & 320 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 2 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LT-68-339, PZR LEVEL fails low. Requires entry into AOl-20, Malfunction of FINAL Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires return of letdown flowpath to normal. SUBMITTAL Requires a Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO directs the RO to position 1-XS-68-339E to select L T-68-335&320.

4. CHECK letdown in SERVICE

• 1-FCV-62-69 OPEN
• 1-FCV-62-70 OPEN
• 1-FCV-62-77 OPEN RD
• Letdown orifice OPEN
• Letdown flow NORMAL RO determines letdown was isolated by the failure of 1-LT 339 low.

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE pzr heater banks D and C ON. RO ESTABLISH charging and letdown:

• REFER TO Attachment 1 EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System, Attachment 1, ALIGNMENT OF CHARGING AND LETDOWN.

NOTE This section can be used in conjunction with SOI-62.O1 for local control of 1-FCV-62-89, 1-PCV-62-81 or 1-FCV-62-93. Substitute local actions as appropriate for Steps 1.1A.1, 1.1A.2, 1.1A.6, liD, 1.1G and liE. 1.1 Establish Charging and Letdown. A. IF charging NOT established, THEN PERFORM the following: RO Since charging is in service, the SRO continues to the next step. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event# 1 Page 3 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LT-68-339, PZR LEVEL fails low. Requires entry into AOl-20, Malfunction of FINAL Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires return of letdown flowpath to normal. SUBMITTAL Requires a Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior B. ENSURE letdown isol valves OPEN:

1. 1-FCV-62-69, CVCS LETDOWN ISOLATION.

2. 1-FCV-62-70, CVCS LETDOWN ISOLATION RO RO rotates 1-FCV-62-70 CVCS LETDOWN ISOLATION to the right to the OPEN position, and holds the handswitch OPEN until the RED indicating light is LIT and the GREEN indicating light is DARK.

3. 1-FCV-62-77, CVCS LP LETDOWN ISOLATION.

C. PLACE 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP 1-TCV 192 CNTL, in MANUAL at 25% OPEN. RO 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL is placed in MANUAL by lifting the toggle switch from the AUTO position, the toggle is pushed to the right to open the valve to 75% (as read on the controller.) D. PLACE 1- HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, in MANUAL at 40-50% OPEN if using 75 gpm orifice (20-30% OPEN if using 45 gpm orifice) RO 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL is placed in MANUAL by lifting the toggle switch from the AUTO position, the toggle is pushed to the right to open the valve to 50-60% (as read on the controller). E. ESTABLISH 75 gpm or greater charging flow while maintaining seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm for each RCP using 1-FCV-62-93 and 1-FCV-62-89. RO RO establishes 75 gpm charging flow on 1-FI-62-93A, and 8 to 13 gpm on 1-Fl-62-IA, RCP I SEAL SUP FLOW, 1-Fl-62-14A,, RCP 2 SEAL SUP FLOW, 1-Fl-62-27A, RCP 3 SEAL SUP FLOW, and I-Fl-62-40A, RCP 4 SEAL SUP FLOW. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DJ Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event# 1 Page 4 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LT-68-339, PZR LEVEL fails low. Requires entry into AOl-20, Malfunction of FINAL Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires return of letdown flowpath to normal. SUBMITTAL Requires a Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior F. OPEN letdown orifices as needed:

• 1-FCV-62-72 (45 gpm)
• 1-FCV-62-73 (75 gpm).
• 1-FCV-62-74 (75 gpm).

RO

• 1-FCV-62-76 (5 gpm).

RO selects either 1-HS-62-73A. LETDOWN ORIFICE B 75 GPM - ClV-qA, or 1-FCV-62-74, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM ClV-bA - and rotates the selected handswitch to the right to the OPEN position, and holds the handswitch OPEN until the RED indicating light is LIT and the GREEN indicating light is DARK. G. ADJUST 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, for desired press, (320 psig at normal letdown temp), and PLACE in AUTO. RO 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL toggle switch is moved to the right to close the valve and raise pressure to 320 psig. 1-HIC-62-81A is placed in AUTO by pushing the toggle switch down to the AUTO position. H. PLACE 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL, in AUTO. RO 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL, is placed in AUTO by pushing the toggle switch down to the AUTO position. I. RETURN pzr level to program. RO makes periodic adjustments to 1-HIC-62-93A, RO CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL and 1-HIC 89A, CHG HDR RCP SEALS FLOW CONTROL to return PZR level to program level. J. WHEN ready to return 1-FCV-62-93 to AUTO control, THEN RO PERFORM Section 1.2 1.2 Establish AUTO Control of 1-FCV-62-93 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: _L..._ Scenario # 4 Event # I Page 5 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LT-68-339, PZR LEVEL fails low. Requires entry into AOl-20, Malfunction of FINAL Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires return of letdown fiowpath to normal. SUBMITTAL Requires a Tech Spec evaluation. Time N Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior A. RETURN l-FCV-62-93 to AUTO. RO 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL, is placed in AUTO once PZR level is on program if required. EXAMINER: After completing Attachment 1, ALIGNMENT OF CHARGING AND LETDOWN, the applicants will return to AOI-20, Subsection 3.2, at Step 5.

5. ENSURE pzr level returning to program:

RO CONTROL I-HIC-62-93A in MAN as necessary

• MAINTAIN regen hx letdown temp < 380 F.

6. CHECK pzr heaters ENERGIZED:

a. Control Heaters D red light LIT.

RO observes handswitch 1-HS-68-341F CONTROL HEATERS D RED indicating light LIT. RO b. Backup Heaters C red light LIT. RO places handswitch 1-HS-68-341H, BACKUP HEATERS C in the OFF position, then may place the handswitch to the ON position for boron concentration control. Handswitch 1-HS 341H is then returned to P-AUTO position.

7. ENSURE operable channel selected for recording with 1-XS RO 339B [1-M-5]:

RO observes that 1-XS-68-339E is selected LT-68-335&320.

8. CHECK 1-HIC-62-93A in AUTO.

• RO RO checks that 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL, was placed in AUTO as a result of performing Attachment 1, ALIGNMENT OF CHARGING AND LETDOWN.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

rApendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event# 1 Page 6 of 43 Event

Description:

1 -LT-68-339, PZR LEVEL fails low. Requires entry into AOI-20, Malfunction of FINAL Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires return of letdown flowpath to normal. SUBMITTAL Requires a Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

• 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.

Function 9 Pressurizer Water Level High, Condition)( With one channel inoperable, place the failed channel in trip within 72 hours OR reduce THERMAL POWER to <P-7 within 78 hours.

• 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.

RO Function 13, RCS Pressurizer Level, Condition A, With one or more Functions with one required channel inoperable, restore required channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

• 3.4.9 Pressurizer not applicable
• 3.5.2, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) not applicable
• TR 3.1.4 Charging Pump, Operating not applicable

10. NOTIFY Work Control to remove any failed channel from service.

SRO When the SRO contacts Work Control the Console Operator will repeat back request to remove the failed channel from service. 1 1. INITIATE repairs to failed instrument/circuitry. SRO When the SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back request for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1-LT-68-339, PZR LEVEL. SRO 12. RETURN TO instruction in effect. EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner. Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time SRO allows prior to the next event. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2_J OpTestNo.: 2 Scenario# 4 Event# 1 Page 7 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LT-68-339, PZR LEVEL fails low. Requires entry into AOl-20, Malfunction of FINAL Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires return of letdown flowpath to normal. SUBMITTAL Requires a Tech Spec evaluation. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief. Operations Management Typically Shift Manager. SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager). If not already cued, Console Operator will check with Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 2. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 8 of 43 Event

Description:

T-avg control signal fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place rod control to MANUAL to stop rod motion. Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod FINAL Rod Bank Movement. Requires manual control of 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING SUBMITTAL FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications: 94-A AUCT TAVG-TREF DEVIATION 94-B LOOP TAVG & AUCT TAVG DEVN Diagnoses and announces the failure of the Auctioneered Tavg RO signal. Takes the IMMEDIATE ACTION of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod Bank Movement, RO by placing 1-RBSS ROD BANK SELECT in MAN and determining that rod motion has stopped. Enters and directs actions of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control SRO System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod Bank Movement. The following actions are taken from AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod Bank Movement. NOTE Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step.

1. STOP uncontrolled rod motion:

a. PLACE control rods in MAN.

RO placed 1-RBSS ROD BANK SELECT in MAN during RO performance of IMMEDIATE ACTION.

b. CHECK control rod movement STOPPED.

RO observed rod motion stopped when 1-RBSS ROD BANK SELECT was placed in MAN. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 9 of 43 Event

Description:

T-avg control signal fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place rod control to MANUAL to stop rod motion. Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod FINAL Rod Bank Movement. Requires manual control of 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING SUBMITTAL FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL. Time ,, Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. MAINTAIN T-ave on PROGRAM. (Reference Attachment 1)

                                 * (p) USE control rods.

RO RO evaluates Tavg and may adjust control rod position in MAN. OR

                                 * (p) ADJUST turbine load.

EXAMINER: AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Attachment 1, Reactor Power VS T-avglT-ref Temperature and PZR Level, is included as Attachment I to this scenario.

3. CHECK loop T-ave channels NORMAL.

RO RO observes Tavg normal on 1-Tl-68-2E, LOOP I TAVG, I-TI 25E, LOOP 2 TAVG, I-TI-68-44E, LOOP 3 TAVG, and 1-Tl-68-67E, LOOP 4 TAVG.

4. CHECK Auct T-avg NORMAL on 1-TR-68-2B.

RO RO observes that the GREEN pen (Tavg) is off-scale high on I TR-68-2B, TREF & AUCT TAVG P. -

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

CONTROL PZR level in MAN with 1-FCV-62-93 and 1-FCV 89. (Reference Attachment 1) RO RO places 1-HIC-62-93A CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL in MAN. Since the PZR level program is capped at 60%, no adjustment is expected.

5. CHECK NIS power range channels NORMAL.

RO RO observes I-Nl-41B, PR FLUX % POWER, I-NI-42B, PR FLUX

                              % POWER, I-NI-43B, PR FLUX % POWER, I-NI-44B, PR FLUX %

POWER are indicating normal (approximately 100% power.) 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

rAppendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: 2 Scenario# 4 Event# 2 Page 10 of 43 Event

Description:

T-avg control signal fails high. Requires the RD to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place rod control to MANUAL to stop rod motion. Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod FINAL Rod Bank Movement. Requires manual control of 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING SUBMITTAL FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL. Time U Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. CHECK the following:

• Turbine impulse pressure channel 1-PI-1-73, NORMAL.

RO observes 1-Pl-1-73, % HP TURBINE POWER TR A, and after comparing the output to 1-PI-1-72, % HP TURBINE POWER TR B RO determines that it is NORMAL.

• T-ref and Auct T-avg NORMAL on 1-TR-68-2B (Reference Attachment 1).

RO observes that the GREEN pen (Tavg) is off-scale high on 1-TR-68-2B, TREF & AUCT TAVG F. - 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 11 of 43 Event

Description:

T-avg control signal fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place rod control to MANUAL to stop rod motion. Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod FINAL Rod Bank Movement. Requires manual control of 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING SUBMITTAL FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PLACE steam dumps in pressure mode as follows:

a. PLACE steam dumps to OFF.

BOP rotates 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A to the left to the OFF RESET position. BOP rotates 1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B to the left to the OFF RESET position.

b. PLACE mode selector HS to STEAM PRESS.

BOP rotates 1-HS-1-103D, STEAM DUMP MODE to the right to the STEAM PRESS position.

c. ADJUST steam dump demand to zero.

BOP BOP observes 1-XI-1-33, STEAM DUMP DEMAND dropping to zero.

d. PLACE steam dumps to ON.

BOP rotates 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A to the right to the ON position. BOP rotates 1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B to the right to the ON position.

e. ENSURE controller set at 84% (1092 psig).

BOP observes that 1-PIC-1-33, STM DUMP PRESS CONTROL dial is set to 84%.

f. WHEN conditions allow, THEN REFER TO SQl-i .02 and PLACE steam dumps in TAVG Mode.

maintains this step open until repairs are made. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario# 4 Event# 2 Page 12 of 43 Event

Description:

T-avg control signal fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place rod control to MANUAL to stop rod motion. Requires entry into AOl-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod FINAL Rod Bank Movement. Requires manual control of 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING SUBMITTAL FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. MONITOR core power distribution parameters:

• Power range channels
• tx Flux Indicators SRO ST-ave

                               *LooptiT              -

• Incore TCs
• Feed flow/Steam flow

8. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

SRO When the SRO contacts Work ControI the Console Operator will repeat back request to prepare a troubleshootIng and repair package for the Tavg auctioneering circuit. EXAMINER: Since the auctioneering circuit effects control functions only, Tech Specs are not applicable. SRO 9. REFER TO Tech Specs: Not applicable

10. NOTIFY Chemistry of any reactor power changes greater than SRO 15% in one hour.

11. WHEN ready to restore repaired LT and ioop T-avg channels, THEN:

SRO SRO determines that the conditions of the step cannot be made and continues to the next step. CAUTION Allowing at least 5 minutes between any rod control input change (i.e., T-ave, T-ref, or NIS) and placing rods in AUTO, will help prevent undesired control rod movement. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 13 of 43 Event

Description:

T-avg control signal fails high. Requires the RO to take IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION to place rod control to MANUAL to stop rod motion. Requires entry into AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod FINAL Rod Bank Movement. Requires manual control of 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING SUBMITTAL FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL. Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. WHEN auto rod control desired, THEN:

SRO SRO determines that the conditions of the step cannot be made and continues to the next step.

13. WHEN conditions allow auto PZR level control, THEN SRO SRO determines that the conditions of the step cannot be made and continues to the next step.

SRO 14. RETURN TO Instruction in effect. EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner. Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event. Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief. Operations Management Typically Shift Manager. SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager). If not already cued, Console Operator will check with Chief Examiner prior to contacting the crew as the Operations Superintendent and directing a plant shutdown using AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction to 75% at 3%Imin. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo: 2 Scenario# 4 Event# 3 Page 14 of 43 Event

Description:

Operations Superintendent contacts the control room and states that the 1A MFP is to FINAL be taken out of service. Power is to be reduced at 3%/mm to 75% using AOl-39, SUBMITTAL Rapid Load Reduction, Section 3.3, Reactor power is greater than 50%. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from AOl-39, Rapid Load AOI-39 Reduction, Section 3.3, Reactor power is greater than 50%. CAUTION Over boration may result in excessive rod withdrawal, T-avg lower than desired, and AFD oscillations. NOTE

• Rod Control should remain in automatic for T-avg Control o Reactivity Briefing Sheet, Thumb Rules (page 3), lists boration flows and volumes for different reduction rates.
• Effect of boration will lag behind turbine load reduction and can be compensated for by temporarily increasing boric acid flow rate above recommended rate.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 15 of 43 Event

Description:

Operations Superintendent contacts the control room and states that the 1A MFP is to FINAL be taken out of service. Power is to be reduced at 3%/mm to 75% using AOI-39, SUBMITTAL Rapid Load Reduction, Section 3.3, Reactor power is greater than 50%. Time Position j Applicants Actions or Behavior j

1. INITIATE a manual boration:

a. DETERMINE recommended boration flow rate and volume from Reactivity Briefing Sheet:

RO determines the recommended boration flow rate to be 40 gpm (for 3%/Mm or greater) and the volume to add to be 341 gallons of boron.

b. INITIATE normal boration:

1) ADJUST BA flow controller, 1 -FC-62-1 39, to desired flow rate.

RO adjusts l-FC-62-139 to 100% which corresponds to 40 gpm.

2) ADJUST BA batch counter 1-FQ-62-139 to required quantity.

RO adjusts 1-FQ-62-139 BA BATCH COUNTER as follows:

1. Depresses and holds the black pushbutton.

RO 2. While holding the pushbutton, the applicant raises the red translucent cover.

3. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant enters 000341 in the display.

4. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant lowers the red translucent cover, and then releases the pushbutton.

3) PLACE mode selector 1-HS-62-140B to BOR.

RO rotates 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE from AUTO to the right to BOR position.

4) (p) PLACE VCT makeup control 1-HS-62-140A, to START.

RO rotates 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL to the right to the START position.

5) VERIFY desired boric acid flow indicated on 1 -FI-62-1 39.

RO observes approximately 40 gpm flow on 1-Fl-62-139, BA TO BLENDER FLOW 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 16 of 43 Event

Description:

Operations Superintendent contacts the control room and states that the 1A MFP is to FINAL be taken out of service. Power is to be reduced at 3%/mm to 75% using AOI-39, SUBMITTAL Rapid Load Reduction, Section 3.3, Reactor power is greater than 50%. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION

• Condenser Backpressure limits are on page 5.
• TURBINE MANUAL Operation requires continuous operator monitoring and control.
• LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM may be made worse if steam dumps are actuated. AOl 11 requires T-ave and T-ref be maintained within 3°F.

NOTE If the initiating condition is corrected, the power reduction may be terminated

2. ESTABLISH a turbine load reduction, to less than or equal to 76%

power, at a rate greater than or equal to 2%/rn in, and less than 5%/mm:

a. PLACE turbine in IMP IN.

BOP depresses the IMP IN pushbutton and observes the transfer from IMP OUT to IMP IN control complete.

b. SET a desired load in the SETTER with the REFERENCE CONTROL.

BOP depresses the reference control V (down) button to BOP reduce the setter display to less than 75% load as directed by the SRO.

c. SET the LOAD RATE at greater than or equal to 2%/rn in, and less than 5%/rn in.

BOP selects the load reduction rate directed by the SRO using the LOAD RATE % PER MIN thumbwheei selector. It is expected that the load reduction rate of 3%/minute, specified by the Operations Superintendent will be used.

d. (p) DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

BOP depresses the REFERENCE CONTROL GO button. NOTE AFD green target band can be monitored using ICS Turn On code DOGHOUSE. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 17 of 43 Event

Description:

Operations Superintendent contacts the control room and states that the 1A MFP is to FINAL be taken out of service. Power is to be reduced at 3%/mm to 75% using AOl-39, Rapid Load Reduction, Section 3.3, Reactor power is greater than 50%. SUBMITTAL Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. MONITOR rod position:

RO

• Rods above Lo-Lo insertion limit
• AFD within Target Band

4. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart SRO When the SRO contacts Shift Manager, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to evaluate conditions using EPIP 1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart.

5. NOTIFY the Load Coordinator of the required load reduction and expected ramp rate.

SRO When the SRO contacts Load Coordinator, the Console Operator will repeat back the information provided.

6. MONITOR T-avg and T-ref:

RO

• T-ave trending to T-ref.
• Mismatch less than 5°F.

7. CHECK rate of power reduction is rapid enough for existing plant SRO conditions.

BOP 8. NOTIFY Cnds Demin AUO of impending pmp shutdowns.

9. WHEN rated thermal power change exceeds 15% in one hour, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate 1-SI-68-28.

SRO When the SRO contacts Chemistry, the Console Operator will repeat back the request. EXAMINER: At the Chief Examiners discretion after power has been dropped to 95%, cue the Console Operator to initiate Event 4. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 and 5 Page 18 of 43 Event

Description:

4. At 95% power, 1A Main Feedwater pump trips due to low oil pressure. Requires entry into Aol-i 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Sub Section 3.4, TDMFWP Trip OR Loss of Flow GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

Requires a Tech Spec evaluation of Axial Flux Difference. Requires a boration to return AFD to target band.

5. i-FCV-2-205, MFPT A CONDENSER CNDS OUTLET and i-FCV-2-210, MFPT FINAL ACONDENSER CNDS INLET fail to close automatically. Requires the BOP to SUBMITTAL manually close valves.

Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications: 50-A MFPT 1A ABNORMAL 51-A MFPT 1ATRIPPED BOP Diagnoses and announces the trip of the 1A Main Feedwater pump. May determines MFWP turbine condenser valves did not BOP automatically close and closes them manually Enters and directs actions of AOl-i 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, SRO Section 3.4, TDMFWP Trip OR Loss of Flow GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load). The following actions are taken from AOl-I 6, Loss of Normal AOI-16 Feedwater, Section 3.4, TDMFWP Trip OR Loss of Flow GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

1. (p) IF loss of SIG level is imminent, THEN TRIP reactor, and **

GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. BOP BOP determines from SG level trends that loss of SG level is NOT imminent. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 and 5 Page 19 of 43 Event

Description:

4. At 95% power, 1A Main Feedwater pump trips due to low oil pressure. Requires entry into AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Sub Section 3.4. TDMFWP Trip OR Loss of Flow GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

Requires a Tech Spec evaluation of Axial Flux Difference. Requires a boration to return AFD to target band.

5. 1-FCV-2-205, MFPT A CONDENSER CNDS OUTLET and 1-FCV-2-210, MFPT FINAL ACONDENSER CNDS INLET fail to close automatically. Requires the BOP to SUBMITTAL manually close valves.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. ENSURE failed MFP TRIPPED.

BOP determines that 1-HS-46-9A, MFPTA TRIP RESET, RED - indicating light is DARK and GREEN indicating light is LIT. BOP If contacted as the Turbine Building AUO, console operator will repeat back request to investigate the cause of the IA MFP trip. Report that the oil leak caused the trip and that Fire Ops is on the scene containing the oil. Report that there is no fire.

3. CHECK turbine load less than or equalto 1000 MWe (85%).

BOP BOP observes 1-El-57-16A, MEGAWATTS or the MEGAWATT meter on 1-XX-47-2000 EHC DISPLAY less than 1000 MWe.

4. PLACE tripped MFP recirc valve controller in MANUAL, and CLOSE recirc valve.

BOP BOP places 1-FIC-3-70, MFWP A RECIRC CONTROL, in MANUAL and presses and holds the close pushbutton until the red arrow indicates 100% (as read on the controller).

5. CHECK turbine load less than 800 MWe (67%).

BOP BOP observes 1-El-57-16A, MEGAWATTS or the MEGAWATT meter on 1-XX-47-2000 EHC DISPLAY greater than 800 MWe.

5. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE Standby MFWP running. (p) IF Standby MFWP NOT BOP available, THEN REDUCE turbine load to less than 800 MWe with valve position limiter. BOP verifies the Standby MFWP is running. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 and 5 Page 20 of 43 Event

Description:

4. At 95% power, 1A Main Feedwater pump trips due to low oil pressure. Requires entry into AOl-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Sub Section 3.4, TDMFWP Trip OR Loss of Flow GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

Requires a Tech Spec evaluation of Axial Flux Difference. Requires a boration to return AFD to target band.

5. 1-FCV-2-205, MFPT A CONDENSER CNDS OUTLET and 1-FCV-2-210, MFPT FINAL ACONDENSER CNDS INLET fail to close automatically. Requires the BOP to SUBMITTAL manually close valves.

Time 1 Position [ Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. ENSURE MFWP speed rising to control SIG li-P and levels on program..

BOP BOP verifies MFPT B SPEED 1-SI-46-20B is rising or stable, and

                               #1 HTR INLET PRESS I -P1-3-I is indicating greater than MAIN STEAM PRESS 1-Pl-1-33.

CAUTION Continued load reductions below 800 MWe should be done using normal turbine controls at less than or equal to 5% mm. NOTE Load will not change until VALVE POS LIMIT light is cleared.

7. ENSURE adequate feed flow for existing conditions:

• Feed flow greater than or equal to steam flow.

BOP

• SIG levels returning to program.

BOP verifies feed flow greater than steam flow for all steam generators, and all steam generator levels are rising or stable. RO 8. MONITOR T-avg trending to within 3°F of T-ref.

9. MAINTAIN AFD within limits (p) INITIATE boration as required REFER TO ATTACHMENT 1, Manual Boration.

SRO Based on the power reduction, LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference (AFD) Condition A, must be entered. With AFD not within limits, reduce THERMAL POWER to < 50% RTP within 30 minutes. EXAMINER: AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Attachment 1, Manual Boration, is included as Attachment 2 to this scenario. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 and 5 Page 21 of 43 Event

Description:

4. At 95% power, IA Main Feedwater pump trips due to low oil pressure. Requires entry into AOl-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Sub Section 3.4, TDMFWP Trip OR Loss of Flow GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

Requires a Tech Spec evaluation of Axial Flux Difference. Requires a boration to return AFD to target band.

5. 1-FCV-2-205, MFPT A CONDENSER CNDS OUTLET and 1-FCV-2-210, MFPT FINAL ACONDENSER CNDS INLET fail to close automatically. Requires the BOP to SUBMITTAL manually close valves.

Time j Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: Event 5 will cause the IA MFWP turbine condenser valves fail to automatically close when the IA MFW pump trips. The BOP must close valves I-FCV 205 and 1-FCV-2-210 manually.

10. ENSURE tripped MFWP turbine condenser valves CLOSED:

• Pump A, 1-FCV-2-205 and 210 OR
• Pump B, 1-FCV-2-211 and 216 BOP BOP determines MFWP turbine condenser valves did not automatically close and closes them manually by rotating MFPT A CONDENSER CNDS INLET 1-HS-2-210A and MFPT A CONDENSER CNDS OUTLET 1-HS-2-205A switches to the left to CLOSE and verifying the GREEN indicating lights are LIT and the RED indicating lights are DARK.

BOP 11. MONITOR reg valves controlling S/G levels on program.

12. LOCALLY MAINTAIN oil temp between 110 to 130°F on running Standby MFP using 1-THV-24-948.

BOP When the BOP contacts the AUO to perform this step, the Console Operator will repeat back the request. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 and 5 Page 22 of 43 Event

Description:

4. At 95% power, 1A Main Feedwater pump trips due to low oil pressure. Requires entry into Aol-i 6. Loss of Normal Feedwater, Sub Section 3.4, TDMFWP Trip OR Loss of Flow GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

Requires a Tech Spec evaluation of Axial Flux Difference. Requires a boration to return AFD to target band.

5. i-FCV-2-205, MFPT A CONDENSER CNDS OUTLET and i-FCV-2-210, MFPT FINAL ACONDENSER CNDS INLET fail to close automatically. Requires the BOP to SUBMITTAL manually close valves.

Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: Since the steam dump controls are in STEAM PRESSURE mode at this time, the SRO may elect to: 1.) Not reset C-7 interlock OR 2.) Direct the BOP to place the steam dump controls in OFF prior to resetting C-7.

13. ENSURE reset of C-7:

a. CHECK C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK annunciator LIT. [66-El BOP will verify C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK (66-E) is LIT.

BOP b. ENSURE steam dump valves have zero demand. BOP will verify STEAM DUMP DEMAND 1-Xl-1-33 indicates zero.

c. RESET loss-of-load interlock with steam dump mode switch.

BOP will rotate STEAM DUMP MODE switch 1-HS-1-103D to the left and verify C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK (66-E) is DARK.

14. ENSURE Condensate System Pumps in service as necessary:

• REFER TO GO-4, Normal Power Operation.

BOP BOP verifies all condensate pumps are running and MFW PMPS SUCT PRESS adequate. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 and 5 Page 23 of 43 Event

Description:

4. At 95% power, 1A Main Feedwater pump trips due to low oil pressure. Requires entry into AOl-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Sub Section 3.4, TDMFWP Trip OR Loss of Flow GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

Requires a Tech Spec evaluation of Axial Flux Difference. Requires a boration to return AFD to target band.

5. 1-FCV-2-205, MFPT A CONDENSER CNDS OUTLET and 1-FCV-2-210, MFPT FINAL ACONDENSER CNDS INLET fail to close automatically. Requires the BOP to SUBMITTAL manually close valves.

Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

15. IF reactor power dropped by greater than or equal to 15% in one hour, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate power change SRO sampling requirements.

When SRO contacts Chemistry to initiate sampling, console operator will acknowledge the request. BOP 16. CHECK VALVE POS LIMIT LIT.

17. RETURN valve position limiter to normal:

a. ENSURE TURBINE in IMP OUT.

SRO b. (p) REDUCE turbine load setpoint using REFERENCE CONTROL V (lower) AND GO button until VALVE POS LIMIT LIGHT not LIT.

c. SET valve position limiter to 95%.

18. INITIATE repairs on failed pump.

SRO When the SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back request to prepare a troubleshooting and repair package for the IA Main Feedwater Pump. SRO 19. RETURN TO Instruction in effect. EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner. Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows SRO prior to the next event. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 and 5 Page 24 of 43 Event

Description:

4. At 95% power, 1A Main Feedwater pump trips due to low oil pressure. Requires entry into Aol-i 6, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Sub Section 3.4, TDMFWP Trip OR Loss of Flow GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

Requires a Tech Spec evaluation of Axial Flux Difference. Requires a boration to return AFD to target band.

5. 1-FCV-2-205, MFPT A CONDENSER CNDS OUTLET and 1-FCV-2-210, MFPT FINAL ACONDENSER CNDS INLET fail to close automatically. Requires the BOP to SUBMITTAL manually close valves.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief. Operations Management Typically Shift Manager. SRO Maintenance Personnel Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note: Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager). If not already cued, Console Operator will check with Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 6. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 25 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MFW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from 1 -M-6. E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAFW pump becomes steam bound and the 1A MDAFW pump shaft shears. I B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-Hi, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-O.1 Step 4. Time N Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications: 62-C SG 3 STM-FW FLOW MISMATCH 63-F SG 3 LEVEL LO Diagnoses and announces the failure of 1-LCV-3-90 SG 3 MEW BOP REG VLV closed. May recommend to the SRO that a reactor trip be initiated based on BOP imminent loss of SG level. May attempt to open 1-LCV-3-90 manually, in an attempt to recover BOP feedwater flow. May direct the RO to manually trip the reactor based on loss of SG SRO level. Enters and directs the actions of E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The following actions are taken from E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. NOTE

. Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS.
 . Status Trees I SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

EXAMINER: The next step (E-O Step 1) assumes the reactor is manually tripped prior to entering E-O completing Critical Task I. If Reactor has not been manually tripped, Critical Task I will be accomplished in E-O step I Response Not Obtained column. as indicated below. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 26 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MFW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from 1 -M-6. E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAFW pump becomes steam bound and the 1A MDAFW pump shaft shears. 1 B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-O.1 Step 4. Time osition N Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. ENSURE reator trip:

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO checks l-52RTB, R)( TRIP BKR A GREEN indicating light LIT on pane! 1-M-4. RO checks 1-52RTB, RC TRIP BKR B GREEN indicating light LIT on pane! 1-M-4. RO checks 1-52BYA, BYPASS BKRA lights DARK. RO checks 1-52BYB, BYPASS BKR B lights DARK. RO

• RPIs at bottom of scale.

RO normally observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor I and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 for indication that all SHUTDOWN and CONTROL bank rods are inserted. Note: CERPI Monitors are not working due to power loss.

• Neutron flux DROPPING.

RO observes neutron flux trending down on 1-NR-92-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER. May also observe levels decreasing on 1-NI-92-135A, CH I NEUTRON MON % PWR, and 1-NI-92-136A, CH I! NEUTRON MON % PWR. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 27 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MFW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from 1-M-6. E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAFW pump becomes steam bound and the IA MDAFW pump shaft shears. 1 B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-Hi, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-O.1 Step 4. Time N Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task I Manually trip the reactor from the control room upon recognition of the failure of the automatic trip circuit. Critical 1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED: Task I Manually TRIP reactor. If RO rotates 1-RT-1 on 1-M-4, REACTOR TRIP to the right to the TRIP position the reactor will NOT Trip. The RO will be required to rotate 1-RT-2 on 1-M-6, REACTOR TRIP to the right to the TRIP RO position to trip the reactor. IF reactor will NOT trip, THEN GO TO FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation I ATWS.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

All turbine stop valves CLOSED. RO RO observes that indicating lights on 1-XX-47-1000 EHC CONTROL for individual throttle and governor valves are GREEN. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

rApendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 28 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MEW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from 1 -M-6. E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAEW pump becomes steam bound and the 1A MDAFW pump shaft shears. 1 B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-O.1 Step 4. Time N Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

CSST (offsite), OR DIG (blackout). RO At the trip, the lB-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board suffers a differential relay operation causing the board to be lost. When dispatched as an AUO to the lB-B 6.9 KVShutdown Board, console operator will state that the board tripped on differential relay operation. State that the board is damaged severely, and that there is NO fire.

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RO RO checks window 70-A, SI ACTUATED; 76-G SI MANUAL; 77-G IS PZR PRESS LO; SI CNTMT PRESS HI; and SI STM PRESS LO DARK. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required. Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 29 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LcV-3-90, SG 3-MEW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from 1-M-6. E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAEW pump becomes steam bound and the 1A MDAFW pump shaft shears. I B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. ER-Hi, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-0.i Step 4. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

DETERMINE if SI required:

a. IF ANY of the following exists:

• SIG press less than 675 psig, OR RO observes SG pressures greater than 675 psig (stable, at approximately 1092 psig.)
• RCS press less than 1870 psig, OR RO observes RCS pressure greater than 1870 psig (approximately RO 2235 psig.)
• Cntmt press greater than 1.5 psig RO observes containment pressure less than 1.5 psig (approximately 0 psig.)

THEN ACTUATE SI manually. IF SI NOT required, THEN ** GO TO ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. SRO determines that SI is NOT required and transitions to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-?J Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 30 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MFW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from 1 -M-6. E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAFW pump becomes steam bound and the IA MDAFW pump shaft shears. I B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-0.1 Step 4. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from ES-O.1, Reactor Trip ES-O.1 Response. CAUTION Plant conditions, AFW pump start signals and flow requirements should be evaluated as time allows.

1. MONITOR SI actuation criteria:

RO

• IF SI actuation occurs during the performance of this Instruction, THEN ** GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

2. CHECK Generator PCBs OPEN.

BOP observes that 1-HS-57-26, PCB 5044 MAIN GENERATOR 500 KVBUS red INDICATING LIGHT IS DARK and GREEN INDICA TING LIGHT IS lit. BOP observes 1-HS-57-24, PCB 5088 MAIN GENERATOR 500 KVBUS red INDICATING LIGHT IS DARK and GREEN INDICA TING LIGHT IS lit.

3. MONITOR RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F using:

• RCS Loop T-avg with any RCP running.

OR

• RCS Loop T-cold with RCPs out-of-service.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

[ Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario# 4 Event# 6 Page 31 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MFW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from 1 -M-6. E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAFW pump becomes steam bound and the 1A MDAFW pump shaft shears. 1 B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-O.1 Step 4. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. ENSURE AFW operation:

a. AFW established:

• Both MD AFW pumps RUNNING.

BOP determines that IA-A MD AFW pump is running but not pumping forward. BOP dispatches an AUO to locally inspect the IA-A MDAFWpump. When dispatched as an AUO, console operator will report that the IA-A MD AFW pump shaft appears to be broken. lB-B MD AFW pump has no power due to the loss of lB-B 6.9 KV Shutdown board.

• TD AFW pump RUNNING.

BOP determines that the TD AFW pump is running but has no discharge flow. BOP dispatches an AUO to inspect the TD AFW pump locally. When dispatched as an AUO to the TD AFW pump, console operator will state that the discharge piping and pump casing are very hot. If requested to vent the pump, console operator will report back that the vent valve is stuck and that assistance from Maintenance has been requested.

• LCVs in AUTO or controlled in MANUAL.

4. a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RO ESTABLISH feed flow from AFW or MEW as necessary. SRO may direct the BOP to attempt to restore MFW.

b. Heat sink available:

RO

• Total feed flow greater than 410 gpm, OR
• At least one SIG NR level greater than 29%.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 32 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MEW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from 1-M-6. E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAFW pump becomes steam bound and the 1A MDAFW pump shaft shears. 1 B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-O.1 Steo 4. Time N Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. b. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RD IF heat sink can NOT be established, THEN GO TO FR-Hi, Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 33 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MEW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from i-M-6. E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-0.i, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAEW pump becomes steam bound and the 1A MDAEW pump shaft shears. I B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-Hi, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-0.i Step 4. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following steps are taken from E-2, Faulted Steam FR-H.1 Generator Isolation. CAUTION

• If total feed flow CAPABILITY of 410 gpm is available, this Instruction should NOT be performed.
• If an Intact SIG is available, feed flow should NOT be reestablished to any faulted SIG.

1. CHECK if secondary heat sink is required:

a. RCS pressure greater than any Intact S/G pressure.

BOP b. RCS temperature greater than 375F [360°F ADV}. RO determines that both of the conditions requiring a heat sink exist.

2. ENSURE at least one charging pump RUNNING.

BOP RO reports that NO charging pumps are running or available to be placed in service.

2. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP IF at least one charging pump NOT RUNNING, THEN STOP all RCPs AND GO TO Cautions prior to Step 18 to initiate RCS bleed and feed. CAUTION

• Step 18 Through 20 must be performed quickly in order to establish RCS heat removal by RCS bleed and feed.
• Termination of bleed and feed is required prior to transitioning out of FR-H.1 when heat sink is restored.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 34 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MFW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from 1 -M-6. E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAFW pump becomes steam bound and the IA MDAFW pump shaft shears. 1 B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-O.1 Step 4. Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 2 Initiate RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for safety injection pumps to inject into the RCS. Critical 18. ACTUATE SI. Task 2 RO rotates 1-HS-63-133B SI ACTUATE TR A & B to the right to Begin RO the ACTUATE position. RO observes window 70-A SI ACTUATED light is LIT. RO observes that window 76-G, SI MANUAL is LIT. Critical 19. ENSURE at least one of the following RCS feed paths: Task 2

• At least one charging pump injecting thru BIT, OR RO
• At least one SI Pump running with its injection valves open.

RO determines that the IA-A SI pump is running and its discharge valve is open. CAUTION

• When the reactor vessel head vent block valve is opened, the throttle valve will cycle open and closed.
• Slowly opening (5 seconds stroke time) the head vent valve will prevent water hammer and pipe damage.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 35 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MFW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from 1-M-6. E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAFW pump becomes steam bound and the 1A MDAFW pump shaft shears. 1 B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-0.1 Step 4. Time N Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical 20. ENSURE adequate RCS bleed path: Task 2 a. ENSURE all pzr PORVs and pzr PORV block valves OPEN. END RO rotates 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV34OA to the right to the OPEN position. RO observes the Red indicating light LlT, GREEN indicating light DARK. RO rotates 1-HS-68-334A, PZR PORV 334 to the right to the RD OPEN position. RO observes the Red indicating light LIT, GREEN indicating light DARK. RO observes 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV34OA RED indicating light LIT, GREEN indicating light DARK. RO observes 1-HS-68-332A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 334 RED and GREEN indicating lights are DARK due to power loss. RO reports that the last position of 1-HS-68-332A was OPEN. CAUTION WHEN feedwater source is AVAILABLE, THEN feed rate will be controlled by Steps 30 and 31. NOTE The details of Steps 4 through 15 may be referred to as necessary to establish feed flow in the following step but procedure performance must continue to terminate RCS bleed and feed. EXAMINER: The applicants are expected to refer to FR-H.1 Steps 4 through 15, to establish Main feedwater using the Standby Main Feedwater Pump. Steps 4 through 15 along with Appendix A, Establishing MFW Following Reactor Trip, are contained in to this scenario. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 36 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MEW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from 1-M-6. E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAEW pump becomes steam bound and the 1A MDAEW pump shaft shears. 1 B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-O.1 Step 4. Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

21. RESET SI, AND CHECK the following:

RO depresses 1-HS-63-134A, SI RESET TR A, and depresses 1-HS-63-134B SI RESET TR B. SI ACTUATED permissive DARK. RO RO observes window 70-A SI ACTUATED is DARK on Panel 1-XX-55-4A. AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT. RO observes window 70-B AUTO SI BLOCKED is LIT on Panel 1-XX-55-4A.

22. RESET Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B.

RO depresses 1-HS-30-63D, .6A CNTMT ISOL RESET TR-A and 1-HS-30-63E, çA CNTMT ISOL RESET TR-B and observes RED bA lights on 1-XX-55-6C MASTER ISOL STATUS PNL and 1-XX-55-6D are DARK. RO RO depresses 1-HS-30-64D, qf.B CNTMT ISOL RESET TR-A and 1-HS-30-64E, B CNTMT ISOL RESET TR-B. If the i8 signal was present then the RO will observe RED q!B lights on 1-XX-55-6C MASTER ISOL STATUS PNL and 1-XX 6D DARK. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 37 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MFW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from 1 -M-6. E0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAFW pump becomes steam bound and the 1A MDAFW pump shaft shears. lB-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-Hi, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-O.i Step 4. Time 0 Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior

23. ENSURE cntmt air in service:

a. Aux air press greater than 75 psig [M-15].

RO observes 1-PI-32-104A AUX AIR A PRESS indicating approximately 95-100 psig. RO observes l-Pl-32-105A AUX AIR B PRESS indicating approximately 95-100 psig.

b. Cntmt air supply valves OPEN {M-1 5]:

• 1 -FCV-32-80.

RO

• 1-FCV-32-102.
• 1-FCV-32-1 10.

BOP observes the RED indicating lights are LIT and the GREEN indicating lights are DARK on 1-HS-32-80A, AUXAIR TO RX BLDG TR A CIV-çB/70 PSI DIS CLOSES, 1-HS-32-102A, AUX AIR TO RX BLDG TR B CIV-çtB!70 PSI D/S CLOSES, and 1-HS IIOA, NON ESSAUXAIR TO RXBLDG CIV-/70 PS1D/S CLOSES.

24. PERFORM Steps 1 through 6 of E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, while continuing with this Instruction.

RO SRO assigns BOP to perform Steps 1-6 of E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

25. MAINTAIN RCS bleed and feed paths:

• MAINTAIN charging pump injection thru BIT.

RO Charging flow is NOT available.

                                      *MAINTAIN SI pump flow.

MAINTAIN both pzr PORVs and block valves OPEN. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 38 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MEW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from 1 -M-6. E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAFW pump becomes steam bound and the 1A MDAFW pump shaft shears. lB-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-0.1 Step 4. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION If containment pressure rises to greater than 2.8 psig, containment spray should be verified.

26. DETERMINE if cntmt spray should be stopped:

a. Spray pumps running.

b. MONITOR cntmt pressure less than 2.0 psig.

RO c. RESET containment spray signal.

d. STOP cntmt spray pumps AND PLACE in A-AUTO.

e. CLOSE cntmt spray discharge valves 1-FCV-72-2 and 1-FCV-72-39.

27. WHEN RWST level is less than 34%, THEN ** GO TO ES-i .3, RO TRANSFER TO RHR CONTAINMENT SUMP.

28. ENSURE CCS alignment for RHR operation:

a. RHR heat exchanger B outlet 1-FCV-70-153 OPEN.

RO

b. RHR heat exchanger A outlet 1-FCV-70-156 OPEN.

c. SEP heat exchanger A supply 0-FCV-70-197 CLOSED.

NOTE Thedetails of Steps 4 through 15 may be referred to as necessary to establish feed flow in the following step but procedure performance must continue to terminate RCS bleed and feed. EXAMINER: The applicants are expected to refer to FR-H.1 Steps 4 through 15, to establish Main feedwater using the Standby Main Feedwater Pump. Steps 4 through 15 along with Appendix A, Establishing MFW Following Reactor Trip, are contained in Attachment 3 to this scenario. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 39 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MFW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from 1 -M-6. E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAFW pump becomes steam bound and the IA MDAFW pump shaft shears. 1 B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-O.1 Step 4. Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

29. EVALUATE the following to restore level in at least one SIG:

a. AFW pumps.

b.MFW pumps. RD

c. Condensate pumps.

d. ERCW valves to AFW suction.

e. HPFP spool piece (AD 1-7.06).

CAUTION Feedwater flow rates should be controlled to prevent excessive RCS cooldown. NOTE If possible, a SIG should be selected to feed which has WR level greater than 15% [25% ADVI and RCS Loop WR hot leg temperature less than 550F. EXAMINER: See Attachment 3 Step 11, 12, and Appendix A as required for SlITrip interlocks reset to support restart of the Standby Main Feedwater pump. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 40 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MEW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from 1-M-6. E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAEW pump becomes steam bound and the 1A MDAFW pump shaft shears. I B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. ER-H.1, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-0.l Step 4. Time N Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: Reactor Trip Breakers will have to be cycled locally to clear Feedwater isolation signal and establish Standby Feed flow. When contacted to cycle the reactor trip breakers locally acknowledge the request then wait 3 mm prior to entering simulator event 25 and event 26. To cycle the trip breakers enter Event 25 to close the A reactor trip breaker, verify the red indicating light is lit, then immediately modify the override to open the A reactor trip breaker and verify the green light is lit. To cycle the trip breakers enter Event 26 to close the B reactor trip breaker, verify the red indicating light is lit, then immediately modify the override to open the B reactor trip breaker and verify the green light is lit. EXAMINER: If/when notified as Work Control OR Instrument Maintenance to block auto SI using lMI-99.040, AUTO SI Block the Console Operator will repeat back the request. The Console Operator will wait 10 minutes or until prompted by the Chief Examiner and then insert remote functions rprl8, block train a auto si and rprl9, block train b auto si. Console Operator will then report back that lMI-99.040 is complete. 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 41 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LcV-3-90, SG 3-MFW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from I -M-6. E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAFW pump becomes steam bound and the 1A MDAFW pump shaft shears. 1 B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-0.1 Step 4. Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 3 Initiate RCS bleed and feed prior to reaching hot conditions in the Steam Generators. FR-H.1 Steps 30.b and 30.c: e Selected S/G WR level less than 15% (25% ADVJ.

• Selected SIG RCS Loop hot leg temperature greater than 550°F CritiCal RO

[ (See Critical Task 2 for specific Bleed and Feed Actions)

30. ESTABLISH feedflow to one Selected SIG:

a. Feed source AVAILABLE RNO leading to Step 33 will be required until Standby Main Feedwater Pump is in service

b. Selected SIG WR level less than 15% [25% ADV]

RO When Standby Main Feedwater Pump is in service, RNO for this step is expected leading to Step 31.

c. Selected SIG RCS Loop WR hot leg temperature greater -

than 550°F

d. Core exit TCs - RISING

e. ESTABLISH feedflow to selected SIG at maximum rate.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 42 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MFW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from 1 -M-6. E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAFW pump becomes steam bound and the 1A MDAFW pump shaft shears. lB-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-Hi, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-0.1 Step 4. Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

30. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a. GO TO Step 33.

b. ESTABLISH feedflow to selected SIG at a rate which causes SIG WR level to rise and RCS Loop WR hot leg temperature to drop.

                                          **GO TO Step 31.

c. ESTABLISH feedflow to selected S/G at a rate which causes RO S/G WR level to rise and RCS Loop WR hot leg temperature to drop.

                                          **GO TO Step 31.

d. ESTABLISH feedflow to selected S/G at less than 100 GPM (40,000 PPH) UNTIL selected SIG WR level is greater than 15% [25% ADV], THEN ADJUST feedflow as necessary to obtain S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADVJ.

                                          **GO TO Step 31.

• 31. CHECK Selected S!G:

a. Selected S/G RCS Loop WR hot leg temperature less than -

RO 550°F RNO for this step is expected when Standby Main Feedwater Pump is in service. 31 .a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED: MAINTAIN feedflow to selected SIG at rate established in Step 30. RO WHEN selected SIG RCS Loop Hot Leg temperature less than 550° F, THEN PERFORM Steps 31 b, c and d.

                                         **GO TO Step 33.

2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

• Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario# 4 Event# 6 Page 43 of 43 Event

Description:

1-LCV-3-90, SG 3-MFW REG VLV fails to 25% position causing SG 3 level to drop. Requires a manual trip of the reactor from I -M-6. E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection will be entered, and a transition to ES-O.1, Reactor Trip Response will be made. At the trip, the TDAFW pump becomes steam bound and the 1A MDAFW pump shaft shears. 1 B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay FINAL operation. This results in a loss of secondary heat sink. FR-Hi, Loss of Secondary SUBMITTAL Sink will be entered either from the Status Tree evaluation OR at ES-O.1 Step 4. Time N Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

33. CHECK all RCS bleed and feed termination criteria met:

• At least one SIG NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

RO

                                        . Incore TIC dropping.

• T-hot dropping.

33. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

CONTINUE RCS bleed and feed UNTIL all criteria met. RO CONTINUE actions to restore secondary heat sink. GO TO Note prior to Step 29. EXAMINER: When the SRO enters Step 33 RNO with the Standby Main Feedwater Pump in service and states that a return to Step 29 is required, direct the Console Operator to place the simulator in STOP and inform the applicants that the scenario is terminated. END OF SCENARIO 2011-12 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Scenario 4 FINAL SHifT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of I Q SM US/MCR Unit E UO Unit Off-going Name D AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-comine Name Part I Completed by off-going shift I Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb = 747 ppm Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions: lA-A CCP is tagged for motor bearing replacement. LCO 3.5.2 and TR 3.1.4 were entered 8 hours ago. Protected equipment signs have been posted for lB-B CCP. Standby Main Feedwater pump is in service. SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Train A/Channel I Work Week. An oil leak on the 1 A-MFP was identified last shift, and Operations Management is meeting to determine whether the pump will be removed from service. The TB AUO is monitoring the IA MFP every 30 minutes. Current direction is to maintain current plant conditions. e

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties [] Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only) Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items) [1 Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUO5) Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs) Q Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs. as applicable for SM/STAs) SRJPER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA) Relief Time: Relief Date: Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties: Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station) [] Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week) Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked) Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs) Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week) (N/A for AUOs) Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs) TVA 40741 Page 1 of I OPDP-l-l [01-14-2011)

Scenano 4 FINAL SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of I SM fl US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-oin Name 1 AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-comma Name Part I Completed by off-going shift! Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb = 747 ppm

• Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions; lA-A CCP is tagged for motor bearing replacement. LCO 3.5.2 and TR 3.1.4 were entered 8 hours ago.

Protected equipment signs have been posted for I B-B CCP. Standby Main Feedwater pump is in service.

• SI/Test in progress/planned; (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)
• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned; Train A/Channel 1 Work Week. An oil leak on the 1 A-MFP was identified last shift, and Operations Management is meeting to determine a plan for repairs. The TB AUO is monitoring the 1A MFP every 30 minutes.

Current direction is to maintain current plant conditions.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift; Part 2 Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Aboonnal reading (AUOs only)

D Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items) [] Current qualification status LJ Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs) c:i Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs) U Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs) Q SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA) Relief Time: Relief Date: Part 3 Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties: U Review Operator Workarouods, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station) U Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week) U Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked) U Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUO5) U Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week) (N/A for AUOs) U Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs) TVA 40741 Page 1 of I OPDP-l-l [01-14-2011]

Scenario 4 Attachment I AOI2, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM Attachment I

WBN Malfunction of Reactor Control System AOl.2 Unit I Rev. 0038 Attachment I (Page 1 ofl) Reactor Power VS T-avglT-ref Temperature and PZR Level (TavgTref values rounded to one tenth of a degree) RX TAVG- PZR RX TAVE- PZR POWER TREF LEVEL POWER TREF LEVEL 2% 557.6 °F 25.7 % 52% 572.2 °F 43.0 % 4% 558.2 °F 26.4 % 54% 572.8 °F 43.7 % 6% 558.8 °F 27.1 % 56% 573.4°F 44.4% 8% 559.3 °F. 27.8 % 58% 573.9 °F 45.1 % 10% 559.9 °F 28.5 % 60% 574.5 °F 45.8% 12% 560.5°F 29.2% 62% 575.1 °F 46.5 % 14% 561.1 °F 29.8% 64% 575.7°F 47.1 % 16% 561.7°F 30.5% 66% 576.3 °F 47.8 % 18% 562.3°F 31.2% 68% 576.9 °F 48.5 % 20% 562.8°F 31.9% 70% 577.4 °F 49.2 % 22% 563.4 °F 32.6 % 72% 578.0 °F 49.9 % 24% 564.0 °F 33.3 % 74% 578.6 °F 50.6 % 26% 564.6 °F 34.0 % 76% 579.2°F 51.3% 28% 565.2 °F 34.7 % 78% 579.8 °F 52.0 % 30% 565.8 °F 35.4 % 80% 580.4 °F 52.7 % 32% 566.3 °F 36.1 % 82% 580.9 °F 53.4 % 34% 566.9 °F 36.8 % 84% 581.5°F 54.1 % 36% 567.5 °F 37.5 % 86% 582.1 °F 54.8 % 38% 568.1 °F 38.1 % 88% 582.7 °F 55.4 % 40% 568.7 °F 38.8 % 90% 583.3°F 56.1 % 42% 569.3 °F 39.5 % 92% 583.9 °F 56.8 % 44% 569.8 °F 40.2 % 94% 584.4 °F 57.5 % 46% 570.4 °F 40.9 % 96% 585.0°F 58.2% 48% 571.0 °F 41.6 % 98% 585.6 °F 58.9 % 50% 571.6°F 42.3% 100% 586.2 °F 59.6 % Page 48 of 48

Scenario 4 Attachment 2 AOl16, Loss of Normal Feedwate r Attachment I

WBN Loss of Normal Feedwater AOl=16 Uniti Rev.0033 Attachment I (Page I of 2) Manual Boration tO MANUAL BORATION METHODS NOTE The required Boric Acid needed to compensate for a runback may be obtained from Reactivity Briefing Sheet A. INITIATE boration of RCS to restore AFD to normal using Section 1.2 OR 1.3. 1.2 Normal Manual Boration A. INITIATE normal boration to change CS as necessary:

1. PLACE BA flow controller 1-FC-62-139, to desired flow rate.

2. ADJUST BA batch counter 1-FQ-62-139 to ensure boration continues.

3. PLACE mode selector 1-HS-62-140B to BOR.

4. PLACE VCT makeup control 1-HS-62-l4OAto START.

5. VERIFY boric acid flow indicated on 1-FI-62-139.

6. WHEN adequate amount of boric acid injected, THEN CONTINUE with this instruction.

7. PLACE 1-H-62-140A, VCT Makeup Control to STOP.

8. VERIFY 1-FI-62-139 Boric Acid to Blender, indicating ZERO.

9. ENSURE 1-FC-62-142, PW to Blender on 35% (7ogpm), and Manual-Auto toggle in AUTO.

10. ADJUST 1-FC-62-139, BAto Blender, to new RCS CB

11. PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE, in AUTO.

12. TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL, to START, and VERIFY red light lit.

Page 35 of 36

WBN Loss of Normal Feedwater AOll6 Unit I Rev. 0033 Attachment I (Page 2 of 2) 1.3 Emergency Boration A. IF manual boration unavailable, THEN ESTABLISH required emergency boration flow:

1. PLACE both BA pumps in FAST speed.

2. ADJUST emergency borate valve 1-FCV-62-138 to obtain required flow.

3. CHECK emergency borate flow on 1-FI-62-137A.

4. WHEN adequate amount of boric acid injected, THEN CONTINUE with this instruction.

5. PLACE both BA pumps in SLOW speed.

6. CLOSE emergency borate valve 1-FCV-62-138.

7. VERIFY emergency borate flow 1-FI-62-137A, indicating zero flow.

Page 36 of 36

Scenario 4 Attachment 3 FRHA LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SNKm Steps 415 and Appendix A

WBN Loss of Secondary Heat Sink FR-H.1 Uniti Rev. 0018 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

4. ENSURE S/G blowdown ISOLATED. Manually CLOSE valves.

5. MONITOR CST volume INITIATE CST refill USING SOl-59.01, greater than 200,000 gal. Demineralized Water System.

IF CST volume drops to less than 5000 gal, THEN MONITOR AFW pumps to ensure suction transfer. NOTE If the use of condensate flow is anticipated, then a higher pzr level will better accommodate the level shrink from S/G cooldown and depressurization.

6. CONTROL pzr level between 29% and 63%

[47% and 58% ADV}. Page 5of37

• WBN Loss of Secondary Heat Sink FR-H.1 Uniti Rev.0018 V Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained ESTABLISH MD AFW pump flow:

a. CHECKMDAFW a. **

GOTOStep8. pump AVAILABLE.

b. ENSURE both MD AFW b. START pumps from pumps RUNNING. the shutdown boards.

c. ENSURE MD AFW LCVs OPEN. c. OPEN MD LCVs from the auxiliary control room, OR Locally OPEN MD LCVs and manual isolation valves USING SOI-3.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System.

d. CHECK MD AFW pump flow d. ENSURE AFW valve alignment greater than 410 gpm. USING SOI-3.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System.

e. CHECK NR level in at least e. MAINTAIN total feed flow to S!Gs one S/G greater than 29% greater than 410 gpm UNTIL NR

[39% ADV]. level in at least one S/G greater than 29% [39% ADV}. WHEN NR level in at least one S/G greater than 29% [39% ADV], THEN RETURN TO instruction in effect. GOTOStep8.

f. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

Page6of37

WBN Loss of Secondary Heat Sink FR-H.1 Uniti Rev.0018 [ Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

8. ESTABLISH TD AFW pump flow:

a. CHECK TD AFW pump a. **

GO TO Step 9. AVAILABLE.

b. ENSURE turbine steam b. OPEN steam supply valves supply valves OPEN: from reactor MOV boards.

• Either 1-FCV-1-15 or tFCV-1-16. IF trip and throttle valve 1-FCV-1-17 and 1-FCV-1-51 closed, THEN 1-FCV-1-18 CHECK the following:
• Tnp and throttle valve.

o Valve latched to motor operator. o Mechanical overspeed reset. o Thermal overloads reset.

c. ENSURE TD AFW LCVs OPEN. c. OPEN TD LCVs at auxiliary control panel [TD pump room, 692],

OR Locally OPEN TD LCV5 and manual isolation valves: S/G 1 and 4 [south vlv room]. o S/G 2 and 3 [Aux Bldg 737].

d. CHECK TD AFW d. Locally CONTROL TD AFW pump.

pump speed NORMAL.

e. CHECK TD AFW pump flow e. ENSURE AFW valves aligned greater than 410 gpm. USING 501-3.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System.

Step continued on next page Page 7 of 37

WBN Loss of Secondary Heat Sink FR-H.1 Unit I Rev. 0018 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

8. (continued)

f. CHECK NR level in at least f. MAINTAIN total feed flow to S/Gs one S/G greater than 29% greater than 410 gpm UNTIL NR

[39% ADV]. level in at least one S/G greater than 29% [39% ADV]. WHEN NR level in at least one SIG greater than 29% [39% ADV}, THEN RETURN TO Instruction in effect. GOTO Step 9.

g. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

9. STOP all four RCPs.

10. IF Secondary pumps will be used to feed S/Gs, THEN REFER TO Appendix A (FR-I-Li),

Establishing MEW following Reactor Trip, while continuing this Instruction. Page8of37

WBN Loss of Secondary Heat Sink FR-H.1 Unit I Rev. 0018 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained CAUTION e If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action will be required to restart the SI pumps and RHR pumps due to loss of SI start signal. If plant conditions degrade after automatic SI is blocked, manual actuation may be required. NOTE After the low steamline pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

11. BLOCK SI signals:

a. INITIATE RCS depressurization to less than 1912 psig:

1) IF letdown in service, THEN 1) IF letdown is NOT in service, THEN ALIGN aux spray USING Appendix B (FR-H.i), ALIGN USE one pzr PORV.

AUX SPRAY.

b. BLOCK auto SI actuation signals

[68-B], and 169-B]:

1) NOTIFY lMs to block auto SI USING IMI-99.040, AUTO SI Block.

2) WHEN RCS pressure is less than 1962 psig (P-li),

THEN BLOCK low pzr pressure SI.

• BLOCK low steam pressure SI.

Step continued on next page Page9of37

WBN Loss of Secondary Heat Sink FR-H.1 Unitl Rev. 0018 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained ii. (continued)

c. ENSURE high cntmt pressure SI signal CLEARED [78-G].

d. CHECK SI actuated. d. **

GO TO Substep 1 if.

e. RESETSI,AND CHECK the following:

• SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.
• AUTOSIBLOCKED permissive LIT.

f. MAINTAIN RCS pressure less than 1912 psig.

Page 10 of 37

WBN Loss of Secondary Heat Sink FR-H.1 Unit I Rev. 0018 Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained NOTE o Cycling reactor trip breakers to allow MEW Isolation reset is required if SI, HI-HI SIG level, or Valve Vault Room Flooding has occurred.

• If any valid SI signal has occurred since SI reset, cycling reactor trip breakers will initiate SI.

12. PREPARE for MEW startup:

a. PLACE MEW pump controllers in MANUAL, AND SET to zero.

b. PLACE MEW reg valve controllers in MANUAL, AND SET to zero.

c. PLACE MEW reg bypass valve controllers in MANUAL, AND SET to zero.

Step continued on next page. Page 11 of 37

WBN Loss of Secondary Heat Sink FR-H.1 Unit I Rev. 0018 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

12. (continued)

d. CHECK FW bypass isolation d. PERFORM the following:

valves OPEN.

1) WHEN SI signals are blocked or cleared, THEN CYCLE reactor trip breakers to allow MEW Isolation reset.

2) RESET MEW isolation:

• PLACE both MEW isol reset switches to RESET

[M-3].

• ENSURE MEW isol signal clears

[M-6 Master Panel]. o PUSH MEW isol reset pushbuttons [M-3]. o ENSURE MEW bypass isol valves OPEN.

3) PLACE 1-HS-3-45 in LONG CYCLE RECIRC.

F no FW bypass isolation valve can be opened, THEN GOTOStepl7. Page 12 of 37

WBN Loss of Secondary Heat Sink FR-H.1 Uniti Rev.0018 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained NOTE If the standby feed pump will be used, only the hotwell pumps should be started to prevent an overpressure condition.

13. ESTABLISH feedwater flow:

a. START secondary plant pumps a. IF secondary plant pumps are as necessary: NOT available, THEN

1) Hotwell pumps. **

GOTO Step 17.

2) Condensate booster pumps.

3) Cond DI booster pumps.

b. CHECK MSIVs OPEN. b. IF MSIVs can be OPENED, THEN:

1) OPEN MSIV bypass valves.

2) OPEN MSIVs as necessary.

c. ESTABLISH MEW pump flow: c. IF MEW pump flow is NOT

1) START MEW pump turbine established, THEN:

or standby feed pump.

2) CONTROL MFW pump and e START additional secondary bypass reg valve(s) to plant pumps as necessary.

restore SIG level(s). ** GO TO Step 15. Page 13 of 37

• WBN Loss of Secondary Heat Sink FR-H.1 Uniti Rev.0018 Step Action/Expected Response esponse Not Obtained

14. CHECK secondary heat sink restored:

a. NR level in at least one SIG a. IF feed flow established to at least greater than 29% [39% ADV]. one SIG:

• S/G Wide Range level rising, OR
• Incore TIC dropping.

THEN MAINTAIN flow to restore NR level to greater than 29% [39% ADVI. IF feed flow NOT established to at least one SIG, THEN GOTOStep15.

b. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

Page 14 of 37

WBN Loss of Secondary Heat Sink FR-H.1 Unt1 Rev. 0018 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

15. ESTABLISH condensate flow:

a. ENSURE condensate aligned to S/Gs:

1) OPEN MEW pump bypass valve 1-FCV-3-86.

2) THROTTLE OPEN bypass reg valves.

b. DEPRESSURIZE at least b. IF condenser NOT available, one S/G at maximum rate THEN (25% demand) USING steam dump to condenser UNTIL USE S/G PORV(s) for at least one condensate flow established. intact S/G at maximum rate.

c. WHEN condensate flow is established, THEN STOP S/G depressurization AND MAINTAIN S/G press (using steam dump or PORV) low enough to ensure condensate flow is maintained.

Page 15of37

WBN Loss of Secondary Heat Sink FR-H.1 Uniti Rev.0018 Appendix A (Page 1 ofl) Establishing MFW Following Reactor Trip 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS CAUTIONS

1) Rx trip breakers must be cycled to allow reset of MFW when isolated by SI or HI-HI SIC level or Valve Vault Room level switches.

2) If any valid SI signal has occurred since SI reset, cycling Rx trip breakers may initiate SI actuation, if signal has NOT yet been blocked by lMs.

A. ENSURE MFW reg valves controllers in MANUAL, AND SET to ZERO demand. B. ENSURE bypass reg valves controllers in MANUAL, AND SET to ZERO demand. C. WHEN SI signals blocked OR cleared, THEN CYCLE reactor trip breakers to allow MEW Isolation reset. D. RESET MEW isolation:

1. PLACE both MEW isolation reset switches to RESET [M-3].

2. ENSURE MEW isolation signal clears [M-6 Master Panel].

3. PUSH MEW isolation reset push-buttons [M-3].

E. ENSURE MEW mode switch 1-HS-3-45 in LONG CYCLE RECIRC. E. ENSURE MEW bypass isolation valves OPEN. G. ENSURE standby MEW pump RUNNING, if available, AND CONTROL S/C levels with MEW bypass reg controllers. Page 36 of 37}}