ML12030A022

Special Report - Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Inoperability

ML12030A022
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	01/27/2012
From:	Maguire W Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TS 3.3.7.5
Download: ML12030A022 (2)

Text

TS 3.3.7.5 January 27, 2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn.: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-39 and NPF-85 NRC Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353

Subject:

Special Report - Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Inoperability This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Limerick Generating Station (LGS), Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.9.2, and Technical Specification 3.3.7.5, Table 3.3.7.5-1, Action 81. Action 81 states the following:

ACTION 81 - With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameters within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and

a. Either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or

b. Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 14 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

On Wednesday January 11, 2012, at 1335 hours0.0155 days <br />0.371 hours <br />0.00221 weeks <br />5.079675e-4 months <br />, the Wide Range Accident Monitor (WRAM) was declared inoperable to perform ST-2-026-438-0 Accident Monitoring North Stack Wide Range Accident Monitor Calibration/Functional Test (RY-26-076) and ST-2-026-626-0 Accident Monitoring North Stack Wide Range Accident Monitor Functional Test (RY-26-076). On Friday January 13, 2012, it was identified that the sample flow transducer card (FT-026-076-1) was not adjustable which prevented restoring the instrument to operable status.

Action taken:

Operations verified that the affected system isolation valves were closed as required by TS 3.3.2 Isolation Actuation Instrumentation, Table 3.3.2-1, Action 23. Operations also initiated the preplanned alternate method of monitoring required by TS 3.3.7.5 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, Table 3.3.7.5-1 Action 81.

Cause of the inoperability:

The WRAM sample flow transducer card could not be calibrated.

Plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable:

Repair of the instrument is in progress. The WRAM is currently scheduled to be returned to operable status by February 3, 2012.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.

If you have any questions, please contact John Hunter III at (610) 718-3400.

Respectfully, Original signed by William F. Maguire Vice President - Limerick Exelon Generation Company, LLC cc: Administrator, Region I, NRC NRC Resident Inspector, Limerick